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THE  MIND  AND   SOCIETY 


The  Mind  and  Society 

VOLUME  I 

non-logical  conduct 

volume  ii 

analysis  of  sentiment 
(theory  of  residues) 

volume  iii 

sentiment  in   THINKING 

(theory  OF  derivations) 

VOLUME   IV 

THE  GENERAL   FORM 
OF   SOCIETY 


The  Mind  and  Society 


[  Trattato  di  Sociologia  general e  ] 


BY  VILFREDO  PARETO 


EDITED    BY    ARTHUR    LIVINGSTON 


TRANSLATED    BY   ANDREW   BONGIORNO   AND   ARTHUR   LIVINGSTON 

WITH    THE   ADVICE   AND   ACTIVE   COOPERATION    OF 

JAMES    HARVEY   ROGERS 


VOLUME     ONE 

Non-Logical  Conduct 


HARCOURT,    BRACE    AND    COMPANY 
NEV^    YORK 


COPYRIGHT,    1935,   BY 
HARCOURT,   BRACE  AND   COMPANY,   INC. 


All  rights  reserved,  including 
the  right  to  reproduce  this  book 
or  portions  thereof  in  any  form. 


first  edition 


PRINTED    IN    THE    UNITED    STATES    OF    AMERICA 
BY    QUINN    &    BODEN    COMPANY,    INC.,    RAHWAY,    N.    J. 

Typography  by  Robert  Josephy 


Editor's  Note 


Vilfredo  Pareto's  Trattato  di  Sociologia  generde  appears  in  this 
English  edition  as  the  realization  of  dreams  and  efforts  that  extend 
over  fifteen  years.  My  first  moves  towards  the  introduction  of  this 
work  to  the  English-speaking  world  go  back  to  1920  and  they  were 
successful  in  the  sense  that  from  that  date  an  eventual  publication 
of  the  Trattato  in  English  in  some  form  or  other  was  assured.  I 
had  published  what  I  believe  to  be  the  first  American  note  on 
Pareto  December  3,  1915  {Nation)^  and  the  second  in  1916  {hiter- 
national  Year  Boo^).  These  two  articles  were  anterior  to  Professor 
Robinson's  now  famous  footnote  on  Pareto  in  his  Mind  in  the 
Making,  1921.  I  reviewed  Pareto's  Trasformazione  delta  demo- 
crazia,  with  allusions  to  the  Trattato  in  the  New  York  Herald, 
April  19,  1922,  and  gave  what  I  believe  to  have  been  the  first  Ameri- 
can course  on  the  Trattato  in  Will  Durant's  Labor  College  in  New 
York  in  the  autumn  of  that  same  year.  I  introduced  Pareto  for  the 
first  time  to  large  audiences  at  meetings  of  the  Foreign  Policy 
Association  in  New  York  in  December,  1923,  and  in  Philadelphia, 
January,  1924,  and  lectured  on  him  again  at  Columbia  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1924  and  during  the  spring  of  1925.  An  article  called  "The 
Myth  of  Good  English"  which  I  published  in  Century,  August, 
1925,  and  which  Edward  Valentine  Mitchell,  of  Hartford,  included 
in  his  Essays  of  7925,  made  explicit  reference  to  Pareto's  theory  of 
group-persistences.  Disregarding  the  much  writing  and  lecturing 
that  I  did  on  Pareto  between  1925  and  1930,  I  will  note  that  an 
article  I  published  in  Nation,  May,  1926,  in  view  of  a  certain  reso- 
nance that  it  chanced  to  obtain  in  the  West,  I  at  the  time  regarded 
and  still  regard  as  the  beginning  of  the  Pareto  vogue  in  America. 
To  summarize,  and  saving  correction,  the  enterprise  that  finds  its 
completion  in  these  volumes  was  at  least  five  years  old  at  the  time 
of  the  opening  of  Professor  Henderson's  epoch-making  seminar  in 
Harvard;  eight  years  old  when  Mr.  Aldous  Huxley  first  called 
public  attention  to  Pareto  in  England;  thirteen  years  old  at  the 


2rj.}Hi-r2 


vi  EDITOR  S  NOTE 

time  when  the  Pareto  vogue  burst  upon  us  in  full  force  as  the  result 
of  Mr.  Canby's  notes  in  the  Saturday  Revietd/  of  Literature,  and  of 
Mr.  DeVoto's  brilliant,  spirited  and  effective  campaign  in  that 
same  review  and  in  Harper's,  1933. 

I  must  beg  the  reader's  forgiveness  for  mentioning  these  facts 
just  here  in  this  form.  I  do  so  only  because  a  voluminous  Pareto 
literature  already  exists  in  which  they  are  differently,  and  some- 
times fantastically,  recounted. 

This  enterprise  in  publishing  has  been  promoted  since  1920  on 
the  assumption  that  there  is  no  priesthood  of  learning  from  which 
the  profane  are  to  be  forever  excluded  by  reticence  on  the  part  of 
those  who  know.  It  is  my  faith,  which  I  assert  as  a  faith,  and  per- 
haps quia  absurdum,  that  the  general  public  is  interested,  and  has 
an  interest,  in  objective  thinking  apart  from  sentiment,  and  in  the 
methods  by  which  the  rational  state  of  mind  can  be  cultivated  in 
the  face  of  the  countless  pitfalls  that  environment,  temperament, 
the  struggle  for  life,  strew  in  our  way.  I  believe — again  an  act  of 
faith — that  the  work  that  is  here  offered  to  the  public  is  the  greatest 
and  noblest  effort  in  that  direction  to  which  literary  history  can 
point. 

That  faith  betrays  itself,  to  the  extent  of  the  capacities  of  four 
words,  in  the  title  which  I  have  ventured  to  give  this  work  in  pref- 
erence to  the  original  title.  I  am  aware  that  there  are  other  points 
of  view  from  which  Pareto's  masterpiece  may  be  envisaged  (I  even 
share  some  of  them)  and  for  which  the  original  title  would  better 
serve.  But  from  the  outset  the  chief  purpose  in  this  enterprise  has 
been  to  make  the  Trattato  accessible  to  the  general  public  to  which 
it  belongs.  I  have  called  it  "The  Mind  and  Society"  because  it 
illumines  the  whole  relation  of  thought  to  conduct,  and  of  thought 
to  sentiment,  and  the  relation  of  the  individual  in  all  his  mental 
processes  to  the  society  in  which  he  lives.  That  particular  stress  may 
not  reflect  Pareto's  original  stress  and  intent.  It  certainly  represents 
his  objective  achievement. 

This  edition  is  a  reproduction  without  any  abbreviations  or  omis- 
sions of  the  last,  the  1923,  edition  of  the  Trattato  in  its  Italian 


EDITOR  S  NOTE  VU 

original.   One   or   two  explanations   will   be   in   point,   however. 

The  division  into  volumes  is  quite  arbitrary  and  is  based  on 
typographical  considerations  only.  The  Italian  original  is  in  three 
volumes.  M.  Boven's  French  translation  is  in  two.  The  larger  units 
in  the  treatise  are  the  chapters.  The  smaller  unit  is  the  paragraph, 
for  which  I  retain  a  peculiar  system  of  numbering  that  Pareto  used, 
with  one  variation  or  another,  in  many  of  his  writings.  Strange  as 
it  may  appear  to  the  general  reader  this  device  justifies  itself  once 
one  reflects  that  the  inductive  and  deductive  portions  of  the  exposi- 
tion are  closely  related,  that  the  theory  is  built  up  systematically 
like  an  architectural  structure  in  which  the  parts  are  all  mutually 
explanatory  and  where  a  cross-reference  is  now  and  again  most 
useful. 

Pareto  first  expounded  the  subject  matter  of  these  volumes  in 
the  form  of  lectures  that  were  delivered  orally  and  taken  down 
stenographically.  Many  traces  of  that  origin  survive  in  the  body 
of  the  printed  Italian  text.  In  this  translation  I  eliminate  them. 
Pareto  also  makes  frequent  remarks  as  to  the  mechanism  of  his 
book  or  as  to  his  manner  of  developing  his  thought.  Such  comments 
I  regularly  throw  into  footnotes,  and  in  so  doing  I  merely  general- 
ize a  device  that  Pareto  used  to  an  extent  himself.  Pareto's  original 
contains  a  number  of  repetitions.  These  too  I  eliminate,  barring 
exception,  inserting  cross-references  if  anything  is  to  be  gained  by 
them.  In  cases  where  substantial  departures  from  Pareto's  text  are 
made,  I  warn  and  explain  in  footnotes. 

There  has  been  some  public  speculation  of  late  as  to  the  whys  and 
wherefores  of  the  many  delays  that  have  occurred  in  the  appearance 
of  "The  Mind  and  Society."  As  a  venture  in  publishing  this  enter- 
prise has  been  replete  with  surprises,  difficulties,  paradoxes,  from 
its  very  inception  fifteen  years  ago.  As  a  bookmaking  enterprise 
it  has  consumed  some  9,000  hours  of  my  personal  toil  spread  over 
the  last  five  years.  Nearly  half  of  that  has  gone  into  editing  the 
bibliographical  material  in  the  notes.  Unimportant,  from  any 
ordinary  point  of  view,  as  such  problems  were,  it  really  seemed 
that  if ,  in  a  spirit  of  textual  fidelity,  one  were  compelled  to  reprint 


Vlll  EDITOR  S  NOTE 

references  such  as  "F.  H.  G.,  XIV,  378,"  or  "Antonio  in  Melissa," 
one  might  as  well  know  what  they  meant,  even  if  Pareto  himself 
never  knew  or  had  known  and  forgotten.  I  have  therefore  in  many 
respects  amplified  Pareto's  bibliographical  apparatus,  and  indeed 
quite  generally  used  a  reference  system  that  is  all  my  own,  and 
which,  within  the  limits  of  human  frailty,  should  be  exact. 

I  believe  that  up  to  this  time  I  must  be  the  only  person,  not 
excluding  Pareto  himself,  who  has  ever  made  a  careful  reading  of 
his  notes  throughout  in  the  shape  in  which  he  left  them.  One 
reason  for  that  belief  is  that  actually  as  a  result  of  gross  misprinting 
they  are  often  unreadable  in  the  garbled  forms  in  which  they  appear 
in  the  Barbera  or  the  Boven  editions  (try,  for  instance,  in  those 
volumes,  the  quotations  from  St.  Peter  Damian,  or,  even,  one  or  two 
of  those  from  Tacitus).  I  believe  it  has  been  worth  the  trouble  to 
open  this  treasure  store  of  enjoyment  and  learning  by  making  these 
texts  available  in  English ;  and  I  will  further  add  that  ninety  percent 
of  them  at  least  are  from  books  of  the  first  order,  books  that  made 
their  marks  in  their  day  and  that  still  tower  above  the  surface  of 
the  vast  intellectual  production  of  the  ages.  The  trait  was  charac- 
teristic of  Pareto's  method  of  work.  In  solving  the  problem  of  the 
library,  which  confronts  every  scholar,  he  made  for  the  great  beacons 
of  culture,  disregarding  monographic  minutiae. 

In  the  notes  in  this  edition  the  translations  of  quoted  texts  are, 
as  a  rule,  mine  whatever  the  English  translations  I  may  mention  in 
the  references.  This  procedure  was  adopted  for  purely  practical 
reasons,  and  not  in  any  spirit  of  disrespect  for  such  magnificent 
versions  as  Friedlander's,  for  instance,  of  "The  Guide  of  the  Per- 
plexed," or  many  others  that  I  might  mention.  I  simply  found  in 
practice  that  it  was  better  to  translate  the  notes  with  Pareto's  specific 
comment  and  stress  in  mind,  if  I  were  to  spare  the  reader  many 
editorial  notes  that  would  have  been  otherwise  required  to  make 
things  fit  together  accurately.  An  example  would  be  the  use  I  have 
actually  made  of  the  Bostock-Riley  version  of  Pliny  in  one  or  two 
paragraphs.  The  utility  of  the  double  references  that  I  often  make 
will,  I  think,  be  self-evident.  In  addition  to  serving  as  a  double  check 


EDITOR  S  NOTE  IX 

on  possible  misprints,  they  should  prove  useful  to  readers  who  may 
care  to  see  ampler  contexts  of  interesting  quotations  either  in  the 
originals  from  which  they  were  taken  or  in  standard  translations. 
Where  Pareto  quotes  from  English  writers  the  originals  are,  of 
course,  restored. 

In  solving  these  thousands  of  bibliographical  problems,  finding 
these  hundreds  of  books,  identifying  exact  references,  correcting 
texts  on  the  originals  and  checking  the  translations,  I  would  still 
be  nowhere  save  for  the  devoted  assistance  of  Mr.  Charles  H.  Tutt 
and  Miss  Elisabeth  Abbott,  to  whom  I  must  extend  my  sincerest 
appreciation  for  their  rapid,  accurate  and  ingenious  researches  on 
hundreds  of  points.  I  must  also  thank  Miss  Abbott  for  her  pains- 
taking work  in  twice  copying  and  proofreading  my  manuscript; 
Mr.  Gaudence  Megaro  for  valuable  researches  on  a  number  of 
points,  and  the  indispensable  Miss  Isabel  Lord  for  the  relentless  war 
she  has  waged  (and  doubtless  could  still  wage)  on  my  typographical 
and  other  inconsistencies.  Presuming  to  speak  now  in  behalf  of 
Paretan  studies  in  America,  I  would  still  have  to  add  many  words 
of  appreciation  for  two  gentlemen  whose  names  a  code  of  ethics, 
which  they  perhaps  too  rigorously  enforce,  keeps  from  appearing 
in  this  note.  Their  diplomacy  and  courage  have  helped  this  enter- 
prise over  many  barriers  that  without  them  would  truly  have 
seemed  insuperable.  It  is  with  deep  regret  that  I  find  myself  re- 
stricted to  this  indirect  allusion. 

Another  regret  is  that  this  edition  must  go  to  press  without  a 
critical  introduction  to  Pareto  from  some  outstanding  American 
scholar.  Pareto,  however,  was  most  averse  to  any  introduction  that 
should  attempt  to  summarize,  epitomize  or  otherwise  interpret  his 
thought.  He  left  directions  covering  the  point  with  his  heirs  and 
the  prohibition  was  included  formally  in  our  agreement  with  them. 

ARTHUR  LIVINGSTON 


Contents 

VOLUME  I 

Chapter  L  THE  SCIENTIFIC  APPROACH  3 

Statement  of  points  of  view.  Logico-experimental  and  non- 
logical  experimental  sciences.  Differences  between  them.  The 
experimental  field  is  absolutely  and  in  all  respects  distinct  from 
the  non-experimental  field.  In  these  volumes  we  are  to  confine 
ourselves  strictly  to  the  experimental  field.  Our  research  is  essen- 
tially relative,  essentially  contingent,  and  all  the  propositions  we 
enunciate  are  to  be  taken  as  valid  only  "within  the  limits  of 
time,  space  and  experience  known  to  us."  Such  a  research  is 
in  process  of  continuous  development;  it  proceeds  by  successive 
approximations  and  in  no  wise  aims  at  attaining  the  certain, 
the  necessary,  the  absolute.  The  language  of  the  logico-experi- 
mental and  non-logico-experimental  sciences  and  ordinary  lan- 
guage. Explanation  of  various  terms  that  are  used  in  these 
volumes.  Definitions  are  mere  labels  that  are  used  to  help  us 
keep  track  of  things.  Names  defined  in  that  way  may  be  re- 
placed at  will  with  letters  of  the  alphabet. 

Chapter  II.  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  75 

Definition  and  classification  of  logical  and  non-logical  actions. 
The  latter  are  sometimes  admirably  adapted  to  the  realization 
of  logical  purposes.  Non-logical  action  in  animals.  In  human 
beings.  Human  language.  In  human  beings  non-logical  impulses 
are  sometimes  expressed  in  language.  Theology  and  rites  of  wor- 
ship. Theories  and  the  facts  in  which  they  originate.  Different 
intensities  in  different  peoples  of  the  forces  that  hold  certain 
non-logical  inclinations  together  and  of  the  forces  that  prompt 
innovation.  The  Romans  and  the  Athenians,  the  English  and 
the  French.  Mysterious  powers  that  words  seem  to  have  over 
things.  The  extreme  limits  of  theological  and  metaphysical 
theories.  In  the  manifestations  of  non-logical  impulses  there  is 
a  constant  element  and  an  element  that  is  exceedingly  variable. 
Example:  Weather-magic.  Interpretations  adapt  themselves  to 


Xii  CONTENTS 

the  non-logical  inclination  of  people.  They  show  a  multiple 
evolution.  A  first  encounter  with  the  necessity  of  making  a  sharp 
distinction  between  the  logico-experimental  truth  of  a  doctrine 
and  its  social  utility  or  any  other  utility  that  it  may  have.  The 
logical  form  human  beings  give  to  non-logical  actions. 

Chapter  III.  RATIONALIZATION  OF  NON-LOGICAL  CON- 
DUCT 171 
If  non-logical  actions  are  of  such  great  importance  how  have  the 
many  men  of  talent  who  have  concerned  themselves  with 
human  societies  failed  to  perceive  them?  They  have  perceived 
them,  now  taking  them  into  account  implicitly,  now  considering 
them  under  other  names  without  arriving  at  any  general  theory, 
now  noting  the  particular  case  without  grasping  its  general 
bearing.  Examples  from  various  authors.  The  imperfection,  from 
the  scientific  standpoint,  of  ordinary  language  tends  to  promote 
logical  interpretations  of  non-logical  conduct.  Examples.  Human 
beings  are  somehow  prone  to  shun  considering  non-logical 
actions  and  therefore  to  disguise  them  with  logical  vestments  of 
one  sort  or  another.  Classification  of  the  devices  that  are  used 
for  that  purpose.  Comment  on  the  various  categories.  The  atti- 
tude of  practical  men  towards  non-logical  conduct. 

Chapter  IV.  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  231 

The  ordinary  terms  "religion,"  "morality,"  "law."  Do  they  cor- 
respond to  anything  definite?  Study  of  the  term  "religion."  The 
terms  "natural  law"  and  "law  of  nations."  Type-doctrines  and. 
deviations  from  them.  The  materials  that  go  into  theories  and 
the  nexuses  by  which  they  are  brought  together.  Examples.  The 
use  sociology  makes  of  facts.  The  unknown  has  to  be  explained 
by  the  known.  The  present  helps  to  an  understanding  of  the  past 
and  to  some  lesser  extent  the  past  to  understand  the  present. 
Probability  of  the  conclusions  that  science  reaches.  Classification 
of  propositions  that  add  something  to  the  uniformity  that  ex- 
perience reveals,  or  which  ignore  it.  Studv  of  abstract  entities 
known  independently  of  experience. 


CONTENTS  XIU 

Chapter  V.  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  385 

How  get  from  a  theory  to  the  facts  in  which  it  may  possibly 
originate?  Theories  in  which  abstract  entities  are  exphcitly 
referred  to  origins  that  lie  beyond  experience.  Summary  of  the 
results  that  our  induction  so  far  has  achieved.  The  chief  one  is 
that  in  non-logico-experimental  theories,  c,  there  is  a  quasi- 
constant  element,  a,  and  a  very  variable  element,  b.  The  ele- 
ment a  is  the  principle  that  is  functioning  in  the  mind  of  the 
human  being,  b  is  the  explanation  he  gives  of  it  or  of  the  con- 
duct which  it  inspires.  Some  examples.  In  theories  that  add 
something  to  experience,  premises  oftentimes  are  left  at  least  par- 
tially implicit,  yet  those  premises  play  a  very  important  role  in  the 
reasoning  that  is  used  to  constitute  the  theory.  Efforts  that  have 
been  made  to  derive  doctrines,  c,  from  arbitrary  principles,  a. 


Biographical  Note 


Vilfredo  Federico  Damaso  Pareto  was  born  in  Paris,  July  15,  1848. 
He  died  at  Celigny,  near  Geneva,  Switzerland,  August  19,  1923.  His 
birth  in  Paris  was  incidental,  though  his  mother  was  a  French- 
woman, Marie  Mettenier,  and  his  father,  the  Marquis  Raflaele 
Pareto,  had  become  a  naturalized  French  citizen.  The  Paretos  were 
Genoese,  and  since  the  days  when  Napoleon  Bonaparte  conferred 
a  coronet  on  Vilfredo  Pareto's  grandfather,  Agostino,  the  family 
had  been  distinguished  as  conspirators  in  the  cause  of  Italian 
independence,  and  as  statesmen.  Furious  Liberals  and  Mazzinians, 
they  fought  for  Italy  against  Austria  and  for  an  Italian  republic 
against  Cavour  and  the  monarchists.  The  Marquis  Agostino  rep- 
resented the  Republic  of  Genoa  at  Vienna  in  18 15.  The  Marquis 
Lorenzo,  an  uncle  of  Vilfredo,  was  involved  in  the  conspiracy  of 
Santarosa,  went  on  to  ministerial  honors  under  Charles  Albert  of 
Savoy,  and  was  President  of  the  Italian  Senate  under  Victor 
Emmanuel  II.  In  1856  an  aunt  by  marriage  of  Pareto's,  an  Irish- 
woman, hid  Mazzini  in  her  house  and  sewed  him  into  a  mattress 
when  the  police  came  to  arrest  him.  The  Marquis  Raifaele  himself 
was  in  exile  in  Paris  at  the  time  of  Vilfredo's  birth. 

Before  the  Corsican  adventurer  made  nobles  of  the  Paretos,  the 
family  had  for  generations  been  prominent  in  the  mercantile  bour- 
geoisie of  Genoa.  Actually  Paretos  are  numerous  all  along  the  two 
Rivieras  into  Catalonia.  A  Bartolommeo  Pareto  was  famous  as  an 
astronomer  in  Catalonia  in  the  days  of  Columbus. 

Vilfredo  Pareto  left  Paris  for  Turin  when  he  was  eleven  years 
old,  his  father,  who  was  an  engineer  of  note,  having  accepted  a  post 
in  the  railways  under  the  first  great  administrator  of  the  new  Italy, 
Quintino  Sella.  The  young  man  seemed  to  have  inherited  his 
father's  talents  as  a  mathematician,  but  he  was  just  as  brilliant  in 
the  classics  and  in  history.  He  completed  his  elementary  education 
at  Turin  and  graduated  from  the  celebrated  Polytechnic  Institute 
in  that  city  at  the  age  of  twenty-two.  His  dissertation  dealt  with 


XVI  BIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

"the  index  functions  of  equilibrium  in  solid  bodies."  Adepts  in 
mysteries  of  that  sort  recognized  already  in  that  treatise  the  germ 
that  was  to  produce  such  wonders  as  Note  2022^  in  the  treatise 
hereafter  following. 

Faced  with  the  problem  of  a  career,  Pareto  followed  his  father 
through  the  famous  Breach  in  Porta  Pia  into  a  post  in  the  railways 
at  Rome.  He  was  to  work  four  years  as  a  consulting  engineer  in  the 
new  capital  of  the  kingdom.  In  1874  lie  passed  into  the  employ  of 
the  Banca  Nazionale  of  Florence,  which  selected  him  as  general 
superintendent  of  three  iron  mines  that  it  owned  in  the  Valley  of 
the  Arno.  He  held  this  post  for  six  years.  They  were  the  critical 
years  of  his  career.  As  a  manager  of  an  important  business  enter- 
prise he  was  drawn  into  the  question  of  free-trade  and  protection 
and  first  began  to  interest  himself  in  economic  questions.  On  the 
theoretical  side  he  became  impressed  with  the  fact  that  there  was  a 
great  deal  of  "literature"  and  very  little  "science"  in  the  political 
economy  that  was  practised  and  especially  preached  in  those  days. 
On  the  practical  side  he  became  disgusted  with  the  restraints  that 
a  government  puts  upon  free  initiative  when  bureaucracy  begins  to 
regulate  and  manage  business.  He  stood  for  parliament  for  the  dis- 
trict of  Pistoia  on  the  free-trade  platform  and  was  defeated. 

In  Florence  during  these  years  he  made  decisive  friendships — 
Domenico  Comparetti,  the  revered  and  greatly  beloved  author  of 
Virgil  in  the  Middle  Ages,  Arturo  Linnacher,  a  learned  classicist, 
Sydney  Sonnino,  the  statesman,  Giustino  Fortunato,  the  biographer 
of  Giordano  Bruno.  They  were  all  members  of  a  company  of  bril- 
hant  minds  that  foregathered  in  the  salon  of  Emilia  Toscanelli- 
Peruzzi,  one  of  the  most  charming  hostesses  of  that  era  in  the  life 
of  Florence.  At  this  time,  too,  Pareto  fell  under  the  spell  of  Auguste 
Comte's  writings,  and  began  seriously  to  ponder  the  problems  of 
scientific  sociology.  On  his  father's  death  in  '82,  his  mother  came 
to  live  with  him  and  he  retired  with  her  and  his  wife — for  he  was 
now  married — on  the  small  competence  that  was  left  him,  to  Villa 
Rosa  in  Fiesole,  with  the  idea  of  preparing  himself  for  a  professor- 
ship in  economics.  For  twelve  years  he  knocked  in  vain  at  the  doors 
of  academic  Italy,  though  the  papers  he  read  before  the  Academy 


BIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  XVll 

of  the  Georgiofili  attracted  wide  attention.  His  great  friend  during 
this  period  was  the  economist,  MafTeo  Pantaleoni,  who  figured  in 
the  next  decisive  change  in  Pareto's  life.  Pareto  had  had  a  poor 
opinion  of  Leon  Walras,  the  great  Swiss  economist.  Pantaleoni  not 
only  opened  Pareto's  eyes  to  the  merits  of  Walras  but  opened  the 
eyes  of  Walras  to  the  merits  of  Pareto.  Invited  to  nominate  his  own 
successor  to  the  chair  of  political  economy  at  Lausanne  in  1894, 
Walras  designated  Pareto. 

Pareto  bade  farewell  to  his  country  with  a  certain  bitterness, 
which  manifested  itself  in  a  consistent  scorn  for  such  honors  as, 
in  the  days  of  his  greatness,  it  would  willingly  have  accorded  him. 
Already  he  had  conceived  that  utter  contempt  for  plutocratic 
democracy  which  finds  its  completest  expression  in  "The  Mind  and 
Society."  He  was  convinced  that  ten  men  of  courage  could  at  any 
time  march  on  Rome  and  put  the  band  of  "speculators"  that  were 
filling  their  pockets  and  ruining  Italy  to  flight.  During  the  great 
years  in  Switzerland  he  scanned  the  heavens  continually  for  any 
signs  of  the  certain  cataclysm,  and  thought  he  saw  them,  now  in 
1904  when  the  Czar's  visit  to  Italy  was  cancelled  in  deference  to  a 
Socialist  protest,  now  in  1914  when  all  northern  Italy  rushed  into 
the  wild  orgies  of  the  "Red  Week."  When,  in  1922,  the  unspeakable 
Facta  was  frightened  by  the  March  on  Rome  into  one  of  the  most 
abject  surrenders  known  to  history,  Pareto  was  able  to  rise  from  a 
sick-bed  and  utter  a  triumphant  "I  told  you  so!" — the  bitter  exult- 
ance  of  the  justified  prophet,  not  the  assertion,  and  by  far,  of  a  wish. 

As  the  "Socialist  Systems"  followed  on  the  Cours  and  the  Manuale 
on  the  "Socialist  Systems,"  Pareto  moved  to  the  forefront  in  social 
science  in  Europe  as  one  of  the  founders,  if  not  the  founder,  of 
mathematical  economics  and  of  mathematical  sociology,  and  the 
measure  of  that  eminence  was  furnished  by  the  jubilee  which  was 
celebrated  in  his  honor  by  his  colleagues  in  science  in  1917.  Mean- 
time he  had  acquired  a  quite  different  sort  of  fame  in  both  Italy 
and  France  by  a  long  list  of  trenchant  comments  on  European  and 
world  affairs  which  he  contributed  to  newspapers  in  Paris,  Rome, 
Turin  and  Genoa.  Noteworthy  in  this  regard  was  his  association 
with  the  group  of  the  Independence  in  Paris,  headed  by  Georges 


XVlll  BIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

Sorel.  In  1907  he  had  inherited  a  considerable  fortune  from  a 
parallel  branch  of  his  family.  He  had  already  settled  in  the  villa 
at  Celigny  with  which  his  later  years  were  associated.  Born  gentle- 
man that  he  was,  he  was  famous  among  his  friends  for  his  indif- 
ference to  the  exteriors  that  go  with  wealth  and  fame.  There  is  a 
legend  that  the  whole  Traitato  was  written  in  one  pair  of  shoes  and 
one  suit  of  clothes,  and  anecdotes  abound  in  that  sense.  Giving  a 
lecture  before  a  convention  of  scientists  at  Geneva,  Pareto  was 
interrupted  from  the  floor  by  a  patronizing  cry  from  Gustav 
Schmoller,  an  economist  of  the  then  German  Strassburg:  "But  are 
there  laws  in  economics?"  Schmoller  had  no  personal  acquaintance 
with  Pareto  at  the  time.  After  the  lecture  Pareto  recognized  his 
heckler  on  the  street  and  sidled  up  to  him  in  his  shabby  clothes 
and  in  guise  of  a  beggar:  "Please,  sir,  can  you  direct  me  to  a  res- 
taurant where  one  can  eat  for  nothing.?"  "Not  where  you  can  eat 
for  nothing,  my  good  man,"  the  German  replied,  "but  here  is  one 
where  you  can  eat  for  very  little!"  "So  there  are  laws  in  economics!" 
laughed  Pareto  as  he  turned  away. 

At  the  time  of  his  death  Pareto  had  accepted  a  royal  appoint- 
ment to  the  Italian  Senate,  and  was  nominally  economic  delegate 
of  Italy  to  the  League  of  Nations.  Pareto  married  twice,  the  first 
time  unhappily.  His  second  wife  was  a  Frenchwoman,  Jane  Regis, 
to  whom  "The  Mind  and  Society"  was  dedicated. 

A.  L. 

WORKS 

Cours  d'economte  politique  projessS  a  I'universite  de  Lausanne  (2  vols.,  Lau- 
sanne, 1896-97) 
Les  Systemes  socialistes  (Paris,  1902-03) 
Manuale  di  economia  politica  (Milano,  1906) 
Manuel  d'economie  politique,  translation  and   revision  of  Manuale   (Paris, 

1909) 
Le  mythe  vertuiste  et  la  litterature  immorale  (Paris,  191 1,  new  ed.,  1920) 
Trattato  di  Sociologia  generale   (ist  ed.,  2  vols.,  Florence,   1916;  2nd  ed., 

Florence,  1923) 
Traite  de  Sociologie  generale  (2  vols.,  Paris,  1917) 
Fatti  e  teorie  (Firenze,  1920) 
Trasjormazione  delta  democrazia  (Milano,  1921) 

FOR  ARTICLES  SEE  INDEX  IN  VOL.  IV 


THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY 
Volume  I:  Non-Logical  Conduct 


CHAPTER     I 


The  Scientific  Approach 


1.  Human  society  is  the  subject  of  many  researches.  Some  of  them 
constitute  speciaHzed  disciplines:  law,  political  economy,  political 
history,  the  history  of  religions,  and  the  like.  Others  have  not  yet 
been  distinguished  by  special  names.  To  the  synthesis  of  them  all, 
which  aims  at  studying  human  society  in  general,  we  may  give  the 
name  of  sociology. 

2.  That  definition  is  very  inadequate.  It  may  perhaps  be  improved 
upon — but  not  much ;  for,  after  all,  of  none  of  the  sciences,  not  even 
of  the  several  mathematical  sciences,  have  we  strict  definitions.  Nor 
can  we  have.  Only  for  purposes  of  convenience  do  we  divide  the 
subject-matter  of  our  knowledge  into  various  parts,  and  such  divi- 
sions are  artificial  and  change  in  course  of  time.  Who  can  mark  the 
boundaries  between  chemistry  and  physics,  or  between  physics  and 
mechanics?  And  what  are  we  to  do  with  thermodynamics?  If  we 
locate  that  science  in  physics,  it  will  fit  not  badly  there ;  if  we  put  it 
with  mechanics,  it  will  not  seem  out  of  place;  if  we  prefer  to  make 
a  separate  science  of  it,  no  one  surely  can  find  fault  with  us.  Instead 
of  wasting  time  trying  to  discover  the  best  classification  for  it,  it  will 
be  the  wiser  part  to  examine  the  facts  with  which  it  deals.  Let  us  put 
names  aside  and  consider  things. 

In  the  same  way,  we  have  something  better  to  do  than  to  waste 
our  time  deciding  whether  sociology  is  or  is  not  an  independent 
science — whether  it  is  anything  but  the  "philosophy  of  history" 
under  a  different  name;  or  to  debate  at  any  great  length  the  methods 
to  be  followed  in  the  study  of  sociology.  Let  us  keep  to  our  quest  for 
the  relationships  between  social  facts,  and  people  may  then  give  to 
that  inquiry  any  name  they  please.  And  let  knowledge  of  such  rela- 
tionships be  obtained  by  any  method  that  will  serve.  We  are  inter- 
ested in  the  end,  and  much  less  or  not  at  all  interested  in  the  means 

by  which  we  attain  it. 

3 


4  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §3 

3.  In  considering  the  definition  of  sociology  just  above  we  found  it 
necessary  to  hint  at  one  or  two  norms  that  we  intend  to  follow  in 
these  volumes.  We  might  do  the  same  in  other  connexions  as  occa- 
sion arises.  On  the  other  hand,  we  might  very  well  set  forth  our 
norms  once  and  for  all.  Each  of  those  procedures  has  its  merits  and 
its  defects.  Here  we  prefer  to  follow  the  second.* 

4.  The  principles  that  a  writer  chooses  to  follow  may  be  put  for- 
ward in  two  different  ways.  He  may,  in  the  first  place,  ask  that  his 
principles  be  accepted  as  demonstrated  truths.  If  they  are  so  accepted, 
all  their  logical  implications  must  also  be  regarded  as  proved.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  may  state  his  principles  as  mere  indications  of  one 
course  that  may  be  followed  among  the  many  possible.  In  that  case 
any  logical  implication  which  they  may  contain  is  in  no  sense  dem- 
onstrated in  the  concrete,  but  is  merely  hypothetical — ^hypothetical 
in  the  same  manner  and  to  the  same  degree  as  the  premises  from 
which  it  has  been  derived.  It  will  therefore  often  be  necessary  to 
abstain  from  drawing  such  inferences:  the  deductive  aspects  of  the 
subject  will  be  ignored,  and  relationships  be  inferred  from  the  facts 
directly. 

Let  us  consider  an  example.  Suppose  Euclid's  postulate  that  a 
straight  line  is  the  shortest  distance  between  two  points  is  set  before 
us  as  a  theorem.  We  must  give  battle  on  the  theorem;  for  if  we  con- 
cede it,  the  whole  system  of  Euclidean  geometry  stands  demon- 
strated, and  we  have  nothing  left  to  set  against  it.  But  suppose,  on 
the  contrary,  the  postulate  be  put  forward  as  a  hypothesis.  We  are 
no  longer  called  upon  to  contest  it.  Let  the  mathematician  develop 
the  logical  consequences  that  follow  from  it.  If  they  are  in  accord 
with  the  concrete,  we  will  accept  them;  if  they  seem  not  to  be  in 
such  accord,  we  will  reject  them.  Our  freedom  of  choice  has  not 
been  fettered  by  any  anticipatory  concession.  Considering  things 
from  that  point  of  view,  other  geometries — non-Euclidean  geome- 
tries— are  possible,  and  we  may  study  them  without  in  the  least  sur- 
rendering our  freedom  of  choice  in  the  concrete. 

3  ^  In  the  first  chapter  of  my  Manuale  I  examined  with  special  regard  to  political 
economy  several  subjects  that  are  touched  upon  here  with  regard  to  sociology. 


§6  THE  SCIENTIFIC  APPROACH  5 

If  before  proceeding  with  their  researches  mathematicians  had  in- 
sisted upon  deciding  whether  or  not  the  postulate  of  EucHd  corre- 
sponded to  concrete  reality,  geometry  would  not  exist  even  today. 
And  that  observation  is  of  general  bearing.  All  sciences  have  ad- 
vanced when,  instead  of  quarrelling  over  first  principles,  people 
have  considered  results.  The  science  of  celestial  mechanics  developed 
as  a  result  of  the  hypothesis  of  the  law  of  universal  gravitation. 
Today  we  suspect  that  that  attraction  may  be  something  different 
from  what  it  was  once  thought  to  be;  but  even  if,  in  the  light  of 
new  and  better  observations  of  fact,  our  doubts  should  prove  well 
founded,  the  results  attained  by  celestial  mechanics  on  the  whole 
would  still  stand.  They  would  simply  have  to  be  retouched  and  sup- 
plemented. 

5.  Profiting  by  such  experience,  we  are  here  setting  out  to  apply 
to  the  study  of  sociology  the  methods  that  have  proved  so  useful  in 
the  other  sciences.  We  do  not  posit  any  dogma  as  a  premise  to  our  | 
research;  and  our  statement  of  principles  serves  merely  as  an  indi- 
cation of  that  course,  among  the  many  courses  that  might  be  chosen, 
which  we  elect  to  follow.  Therefore  anyone  who  joins  us  along  such 
a  course  by  no  means  renounces  his  right  to  follow  some  other. 
From  the  first  pages  of  a  treatise  on  geometry  it  is  the  part  of  the 
mathematician  to  make  clear  whether  he  is  expounding  the  geome- 
try of  Euclid,  or,  let  us  say,  the  geometry  of  Lobachevski.  But  that 
is  just  a  hint;  and  if  he  goes  on  and  expounds  the  geometry  of 
Lobachevski,  it  does  not  follow  that  he  rejects  all  other  geometries. 
In  that  sense  and  in  no  other  should  the  statement  of  principles 
which  we  are  here  making  be  taken. 

6.  Hitherto  sociology  has  nearly  always  been  expounded  dogmati- 
cally. Let  us  not  be  deceived  by  the  word  "positive"  that  Comte 
foisted  upon  his  philosophy.  His  sociology  is  as  dogmatic  as  Bos- 
suet's  Discourse  on  Universal  History.  It  is  a  case  of  two  different 
religions,  but  of  religions  nevertheless ;  and  religions  of  the  same  sort 
are  to  be  seen  in  the  writings  of  Spencer,  De  Greef,  Letourneau,  and 
numberless  other  authors. 

Faith  by  its  very  nature  is  exclusive.  If  one  believes  oneself  pos- 


6  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §6 

sessed  of  the  absolute  truth,  one  cannot  admit  that  there  are  any 
other  truths  in  the  world.  So  the  enthusiastic  Christian  and  the  pug- 
nacious free-thinker  are,  and  have  to  be,  equally  intolerant.  For  the 
believer  there  is  but  one  good  course;  all  others  are  bad.  The  Mo- 
hammedan will  not  take  oath  upon  the  Gospels,  nor  the  Christian 
upon  the  Koran.  But  those  who  have  no  faith  whatever  will  take 
their  oath  upon  either  Koran  or  Gospels — or,  as  a  favour  to  our  hu- 
manitarians, on  the  Social  Contract  of  Rousseau;  nor  even  would 
they  scruple  to  swear  on  the  Decameron  of  Boccaccio,  were  it  only 
to  see  the  grimace  Senator  Berenger  would  make  and  the  brethren 
of  that  gentleman's  persuasion.^  We  are  by  no  means  asserting  that 
sociologies  derived  from  certain  dogmatic  principles  are  useless ;  just 
as  we  in  no  sense  deny  utility  to  the  geometries  of  Lobachevski  or 
Riemann.  We  simply  ask  of  such  sociologies  that  they  use  premises 
and  reasonings  which  are  as  clear  and  exact  as  possible.  "Humani- 
tarian" sociologies  we  have  to  satiety — they  are  about  the  only  ones 
that  are  being  published  nowadays.  Of  metaphysical  sociologies 
(with  which  are  to  be  classed  all  positive  and  humanitarian  sociol- 
ogies) we  suffer  no  dearth.  Christian,  Catholic,  and  similar  sociolo- 
gies we  have  to  some  small  extent.  Without  disparagement  of  any 
of  those  estimable  sociologies,  we  here  venture  to  expound  a  sociol- 
ogy that  is  purely  experimental,  after  the  fashion  of  chemistry, 
physics,  and  other  such  sciences.^  In  all  that  follows,  therefore,  we 
intend  to  take  only  experience  ^  and  observation  as  our  guides.  So  far 
as  experience  is  not  contrasted  with  observation,  we  shall,  for  love  of 
brevity,  refer  to  experience  alone.  When  we  say  that  a  thing  is  at- 
tested "by  experience,"  the  reader  must  add  "and  by  observation." 

6  ^  [Senator  Rene  Berenger  (1830-1915),  a  bete  noire  of  Pareto  and  one  of  the 
villains  in  this  long  story,  was  president  of  the  French  Federation  des  societes  contre 
la  pornographie,  and  was  the  author,  among  other  things,  of  a  Manuel  pratique 
pour  la  lutte  contre  la  pornographie  (Paris,  1907)  and  of  a  Rapport  (to  the  French 
Senate,  1895)  .  .  .  sur  la  prostitution  et  les  outrages  aux  bonnes  mceurs. — A.  L.] 

6  ^  For  greater  detail  on  this  point,  see  Sensini,  La  teoria  della  rendita,  and 
Boven,  Les  applications  mathematiques  a  I'economie  politique. 

6  ^  [In  Italian  the  word  esperienza  contains  the  meaning  of  "experiment"  as  well 
as  "experience"  and  the  word  "experience"  is  so  used  in  this  translation,  barring 
specification  to  the  contrary. — A.  L.] 


§9  PROPOSITIONS  AND  THEORIES  7 

When  we  speak  of  "experimental  sciences,"  the  reader  must  supply 
the  adjective  "observational,"  and  so  on. 

7.  Current  in  any  given  group  of  people  are  a  number  of  proposi- 
tions, descriptive,  preceptive,  or  otherwise.  For  example:  "Youth 
lacks  discretion."  "Covet  not  thy  neighbour's  goods,  nor  thy  neigh- 
bour's wife."  "Love  thy  neighbour  as  thyself."  "Learn  to  save  if  you 
would  not  one  day  be  in  need."  Such  propositions,  combined  by 
logical  or  pseudo-logical  nexuses  and  amplified  with  factual  narra- 
tions ^  of  various  sorts,  constitute  theories,  theologies,  cosmogonies, 
systems  of  metaphysics,  and  so  on.  Viewed  from  the  outside  without 
regard  to  any  intrinsic  merit  with  which  they  may  be  credited  by 
faith,  all  such  propositions  and  theories  are  experimental  facts,  and 
as  experimental  facts  we  are  here  obliged  to  consider  and  examine 
them. 

8.  That  examination  is  very  useful  to  sociology;  for  the  image  of 
social  activity  is  stamped  on  the  majority  of  such  propositions  and 
theories,  and  often  it  is  through  them  alone  that  we  manage  to  gain 
some  knowledge  of  the  forces  which  are  at  work  in  society — that  is, 
of  the  tendencies  and  inclinations  of  human  beings.  For  that  reason 
we  shall  study  them  at  great  length  in  the  course  of  these  volumes. 

, Propositions  and  theories  have  to  be  classified  at  the  very  outset,  for' 
classification  Js  a  first  step  that  is  almost  indispensable  if  one  would 
have  an  adequate  grasp  of  any  great  number  of  differing  objects.^ 
To  avoid  endless  repetition  of  the  words  "proposition"  and  "theory," 
we  shall  for  the  moment  use  only  the  latter  term;  but  whatever  we 
say  of  "theories"  should  be  taken  as  applying  also  to  "propositions," 
barring  specification  to  the  contrary. 

9.  For  the  man  who  lets  himself  be  guided  chiefly  by  sentiment — 
for  the  believer,  that  is — there  are  usually  but  two  classes  of  theories : 
there  are  theories  that  are  true  and  theories  that  are  false.  The  terms 

7  ^  ["Narration,"  narrazione ,  is  a  technical  term  with  Pareto,  used  for  a  recital 
of  facts  seriatim  quite  apart  from  any  interpretation,  organization  or  "thought." — 
A.  L.] 

8  ^  The  classification  that  is  bar-ly  suggested  here  will  be  amply  dealt  with  in 
later  chapters. 


8 


THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY 


§10 


n 


^^ 


ec"^ 


"true"  and  "false"  are  left  vaguely  defined.  They  are  felt  rather  than 
explained. 

10.  Oftentimes  three  further  axioms  are  present: 

1.  The  axiom  that  every  "honest"  man,  every  "intelligent"  human 
being,  must  accept  "true"  propositions  and  reject  "false"  ones.  The 
person  w^ho  fails  to  do  so  is  either  not  honest  or  not  rational.  The- 
ories, it  follows,  have  an  absolute  character,  independent  of  the 
minds  that  produce  or  accept  them. 

2.  The  axiom  that  every  proposition  w^hich  is  "true"  is  also  "bene- 
ficial," and  vice  versa.  When,  accordingly,  a  theory  has  been  shov^^n 
to  be  true,  the  study  of  it  is  complete,  and  it  is  useless  to  inquire 
whether  it  be  beneficial  or  detrimental. 

3.  At  any  rate,  it  is  inadmissible  that  a  theory  may  be  beneficial 
to  certain  classes  of  society  and  detrimental  to  others — yet  that  is  an 
axiom  of  modern  currency,  and  many  people  deny  it  without,  how- 
ever, daring  to  voice  that  opinion. 

11.  Were  we  to  meet  those  assertions  with  contrary  ones,  we  too 
would  be  reasoning  a  priori;  and,  experimentally,  both  sets  of  asser- 
tions would  have  the  same  value — zero.'  If  we  would  remain  within 
the  realm  of  experience,  we  need  simply  determine  first  of  all 
whether  the  terms  used  in  the  assertions  correspond  to  some  experi- 
mental reality,  and  then  whether  the  assertions  are  or  are  not  cor- 
roborated by  experimental  facts.  But  in  order  to  do  that,  we  are 

.^'^bliged  to  admit  the  possibility  of  both  a  positive  and  a  negative 
answer;  for  it  is  evident  that  if  we  bar  one  of  those  two  possibilities 
a  priori,  we  shall  be  giving  a  solution  likewise  a  priori  to  the  prob- 
lem we  have  set  ourselves,  instead  of  leaving  the  solution  of  it  to 
experience  as  we  proposed  doing. 

12.  Let  us  try  therefore  to  classify  theories,  using  the  method  we 
would  use  were  we  classifying  insects,  plants,  or  rocks.  We  perceive 
at  once  thal(a  theory  is  not  a  homogeneous  entity,]  such  as  the  "ele- 
ment" known  to  chemistry.  A  theory^  rather,  is  like  a  rock,  which  is 
made  up  of  a  number  of  elements.  In  a  theory  one  may  detect  de- 
scriptive elements,  axiomatic  assertions,  and  functionings  of  certain 
entities,  now  concrete,  now  abstract,  now  real,  now  imaginary;  and 


^.^«-" 


§13  theories:  classification  9 

all  such  things  may  be  said  to  constitute  the  matter  of  the  theory. 
But  there  are  other  things  in  a  theory:  there  are  logical  or  pseudo- 
logical  arguments,  appeals  to  sentiment,  "feelings,"  traces  of  religious 
and  ethical  beliefs,  and  so  on;  and  such  things  may  be  thought  of  as 
constituting  the  instrumentalities  whereby  the  "matter"  mentioned 
above  is  utilized  in  order  to  rear  the  structure  that  we  call  a  theory. 
Here,  already,  is  one  aspect  under  which  theories  may  be  considered. 
It  is  sufficient  for  the  moment  to  have  called  attention  to  it.^ 

13.  In  the  manner  just  described,  the  structure  has  been  reared — 
the  theory  exists.  It  is  now  one  of  the  objects  that  we  are  trying  to 
classify.  We  may  consider  it  under  various  aspects : 

I.  Objective  aspect.  The  theory  may  be  considered  without  refer- 
ence to  the  person  who  has  produced  it  or  to  the  person  who  assents 
to  it — "objectively,"  we  say,  butfwithout  attaching  any  metaphysical 
sense  to  the  term)  In  order  to  take  account  of  all  possible  combina- 
tions that  may  arise  from  the  character  of  the  matter  and  the  char- 
acter of  the  nexus,  we  must  distinguish  the  following  classes  and 
subclasses: 

Class  I.  Experimental  matter 
\a.  Logical  nexus 
lb.  Non-logical  nexus 
Class  II.  Non-experimental  matter 
11^.  Logical  nexus 
11^.  Non-logical  nexus 

The  subclasses  \b  and  lib  comprise  logical  sophistries,  or  specious 
reasonings  calculated  to  deceive.  For  the  study  in  which  we  are  en- 
gaged they  are  often  far  less  important  than  the  subclasses  la  or  lla. 
The  subclass  la  comprises  all  the  experimental  sciences;  we  shall 
call  it  logico-experimental.  Two  other  varieties  may  be  distinguished 
in  it: 

lai,  comprising  the  type  that  is  strictly  pure,  with  the  matter 
strictly  experimental  and  the  nexus  logical.  The  abstractions  and 

12  ^We  shall  discuss  it  at  length  in  Chapter  IV  (§467). 


10  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §13 

general  principles  that  arc  used  within  it  are  derived  exclusively 
from  experience  and  are  subordinated  to  experience  (§  63). 

lai,  comprising  a  deviation  from  the  type,  which  brings  us  closer 
to  Class  II.  Explicitly  the  matter  is  still  experimental,  and  the  nexus 
logical;  but  the  abstractions,  the  general  principles,  acquire  (im- 
plicitly or  explicitly)  a/ significance  transcending  experience^  This 
variety  might  be  called  transitional.  Others  of  like  nature  might  be 
considered,  but  they  are  far  less  important  than  this  one. 

The  classification  just  made,  like  any  other  that  might  be  made, 
is  dependent  upon  the  knowledge  at  our  command.  A  person  who 
regards  as  experimental  certain  elements  that  another  person  regards 
as  non-experimental  will  locate  in  Class  I  a  proposition  that  the 
other  person  will  place  in  Class  II.  The  person  who  thinks  he  is 
using  logic  and  is  mistaken  will  class  among  logical  theories  a  prop- 
osition that  a  person  aware  of  the  error  will  locate  among  the  non- 
logical.  The  classification  above  is  a  classification  of  types  of  the- 
oriesiln  reality,  a  given  theory  may  be  a  blend  of  such  types — it  may, 
that  is,  contain  experimental  elements  and  non-experimental  ele- 
ments, logical  elements  and  non-logical  elements.^  j 

2.  Subjective  aspect.  Theories  may  be  considered  with  reference  to 
the  persons  who  produce  them  and  to  the  persons  who  assent  to 
them.  We  shall  therefore  have  to  consider  them  under  the  follow- 
ing subjective  aspects: 

a.  Causes  in  view  of  which  a  given  theory  is  devised  by  a  given 
person.  Why  does  a  given  person  assert  that  A  =  B?  Conversely,  if 
he  makes  that  assertion,  why  does  he  do  so  ? 

b.  Causes  in  view  of  which  a  given  person  assents  to  a  given  theory. 
Why  does  a  given  person  assent  to  the  proposition  A  =  B?  Con- 
versely, if  he  gives  such  assent,  why  does  he  do  so  ? 

These  inquiries  are  extensible  from  individuals  to  society  at  large. 

3.  Aspect  of  utility.  In  this  connexion,(it  is  important  to  keep  the 

13  ^  There  are  theories  that  are  logico-experimental  in  appearance  but  which  sub- 
stantially are  not  of  that  character.  For  an  interesting  and  very  important  example 
of  such  pseudo-logico-experimental  theories,  see  §  §  407  f .  Strictly  speaking,  such  theo- 
ries should  be  placed  in  the  non-logico-experimental  group. 


§14  THEORIES :   CLASSIFICATION  II 

theory  distinct  from  the  state  of  mind,  the  sentiments,  that  it  reflects.^ 
Certain  individuals  evolve  a  theory  because  they  have  certain  senti- 
ments; but  then  the  theory  reacts  in  turn  upon  them,  as  well  as  upon 
other  individuals,  to  produce,  intensify,  or  modify  certain  senti^ 
ments. 

I.  Utility  or  detriment  resulting  from  the  sentiments  reflected 

by  a  theory: 
la.  As  regards  the  person  asserting  the  theory 
lb.  As  regards  the  person  assenting  to  the  theory 
II.  Utility  or  detriment  resulting  from  a  given  theory: 
W.a,  As  regards  the  person  asserting  the  theory 
11^.  As  regards  the  person  assenting  to  it. 

These  considerations,  toa  are  extensible  to  society  at  large. 

We  may  say,  then,  that^e  are  to  consider  propositions  and  the- 
ories under  their  objective  and  their  subjective  aspects,  and  also  from 
the  standpoint  of  their  individual  or  social  utility.  However,  the 
meanings  of  such  terms  must  not  be  derived  from  their  etymology, 
or  from  their  usage  in  common  parlance,  but  exclusively  in  the  man- 
ner designated  later  in  §  119.  ' 

14.  To  recapitulate:  Given  the  proposition  A  =  B,we  must  answer 
the  following  questions : 

i(  Objective  aspect.  Is  the  proposition  in  accord  with  experience, 
or  is  it  not?  \ 

2.  Subjective  aspect.  Why  do  certain  individuals  assert  that  A  =  B? 
And  why  do  other  individuals  believe  that  A==  B? 

3.  Aspect  of  utility.  What  advantage  (or  disadvantage)  do  the 
sentiments  reflected  by  the  proposition  A=^  B  have  for  the  person 
who  states  it,  and  for  the  person  who  accepts  it?  What  advantage 
(or  disadvantage)  does  the  theory  itself  have  for  the  person  who 
puts  it  forward,  and  for  the  person  who  accepts  it  ? 

In  an  extreme  case  the  answer  to  the  first  question  is  yes;  and 
then,  as  regards  the  other  question,  one  adds:  "People  say  (people 
believe)  that  A  =  B,  because  it  is  true."  "The  sentiments  reflected 


12  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §15 

in  the  proposition  are  beneficial  ^  because  true."  ''The  theory  itself 
is  beneficial  because  true."  In  this  extreme  case,  we  may  find  that 
data  of  logico-experimental  science  are  present,  and  then  "true" 
means  in  accord  with  experience.  But  (also  present  may  be  data  that 
by  no  means  belong  to  logico-experimental  science,  and  in  such 
event  "true"  signifies  not  accord  with  experience  but  something  else 
— frequently  mere  accord  with  the  sentiments  of  the  person  defend- 
ing the  thesis^  We  shall  see,  as  we  proceed  with  our  experimental 
research  in  chapters  hereafter,  that  the  following  cases  are  of  fre- 
quent occurrence  in  social  matters: 

a.  Propositions  in  accord  with  experience  that  are  asserted  and 
accepted  because  of  their  accord  with  sentiments,  the  latter  being 
now  beneficial,  now  detrimental,  to  individuals  or  society 

b.  Propositions  in  accord  with  experience  that  are  rejected  because 
they  are  not  in  accord  with  sentiments,  and  which,  if  accepted, 
would  be  detrimental  to  society 

c.  Propositions  not  in  accord  with  experience  that  are  asserted  and 
accepted  because  of  their  accord  with  sentiments,  the  latter  being 
beneficial,  oftentimes  exceedingly  so,  to  individuals  or  society 

d.  Propositions  not  in  accord  with  experience  that  are  asserted  and 
accepted  because  of  their  accord  with  sentiments,  and  which  are 
beneficial  to  certain  individuals,  detrimental  to  others,  and  now 
beneficial,  now  detrimental,  to  society. 

(  On  all  that  we  can  know  nothing  a  priori.  Experience  alone  can 
enlighten  us.| 

15.  After  objects  have  been  classified,  they  have  to  be  examined, 
and  to  that  research  we  shall  devote  the  next  chapters.  In  Chapter*' 
IV  and  V  we  shall  consider  theories  with  special  reference  to  their 
accord  with  experience  and  observation.  In  Chapters  VI,  VII,  and 

14  ^  [Pareto's  doctrine  of  utility  takes  Bentham's  utilitarian  theory  as  its  point  of 
departure.  Bentham  used  the  adjective  "useful"  as  corresponding  to  "utility,"  the 
opposites  being  "harm"  and  "harmful."  Pareto  uses  "useful"  {utile)  quite  regularly. 
In  this  translation  I  have  found  most  convenient  the  terms  "utility,"  "beneficial," 
"detriment"  and  "detrimental,"  alternating,  on  occasion,  with  "advantage,"  "ad- 
vantageous," "disadvantageous." — A.  L.] 


§l6  THE  SCIENTIFIC  APPROACH  I3 

VIII  we  shall  study  the  sentiments  in  which  theories  originate.  In 
Chapters  IX  and  X  we  shall  consider{the  ways  in  which  sentiments 
are  reflected  in  theories.JIn  Chapter  XI  we  shall  examine  the  char- 
acteristics of  the  elements  so  detected.  And  finally  in  Chapters  XII 
and  XIII  we  shall  see  the  social  effects  of  the  various  elements,  and 
arrive  at  an  approximate  concept  of  variations  in  the  forms  of  so- 
ciety— the  goal  at  which  we  shall  have  been  aiming  all  along  and 
towards  which  all  our  successive  chapters  will  have  been  leading.^ 
16.  From  the  objective  standpoint  (§  i3),(we  divided  propositions 
or  theories  into  two  great  classes,  the  first  in  no  way  departing  from 
the  realm  of  experience,  the  second  overstepping  it  in  some  respect 
or  other .^  If  one  would  reason  at  all  exactly,  it  is  essential  to  keep 
those  two  classes  distinct,  for  at  bottom  they  are  heterogeneous 
things  that  must  never  be  in  any  way  confused,  and  which  cannot. 
either,  be  compared.^  Each  of  them  has  its  own  manner  of  reason- 
ing and,  in  general,  its  own  peculiar  standard  whereby  it  falls  into 
two  divisions,  the  one  comprising  propositions  that  are  in  logical 
accord  with  the  chosen  standard  and  are  called  true;  the  other  com- 
prising propositions  which  are  not  in  accord  with  that  standard  and 
are  called  false./The  terms  "true"  and  "false,"  therefore,  stand  in 
strict  dependence  on  the  standard  chosenMf  one  should  try  to  give 
them  an  absolute  meaning,  one  would  be  deserting  the  logico-ex- 
perimental  field  for  the  field  of  metaphysics. 

I  (^The  standard  of  truth  for  propositions  of  the  first  class  lies  in  ex- 
perience and  observation  only.  The  standard  of  truth  for  the  second 

.  class  lies  outside  objective  experience — in  some  divine  revelation /in 
concepts  that  the  human  mind  finds  in  itself,jas  some  say,  without 

~the  aid  of  objective  experience;  in  the  universal  consensus  of  man- 
kind, and  so  on. 

15  ^  In  some  other  book  we  might  carry  the  investigation  begun  in  this  one  fur- 
ther and  investigate  the  particular  forms  of  the  various  social  phenomena  of  which 
we  shall  here  have  found  the  general  forms. 

16  ^  Pareto,  Manuale,  Chap.  I,  §  37. 

16  ^  Ibid.,  Chap.  I,  §41:  "Fatuous  and  silly  is  the  claim  of  certain  individuals 
that  the  faith  they  hold  is  'more  scientific'  than  the  faiths  of  other  people.  Faith  and 
science  have  nothing  in  common,  and  a  faith  can  contain  neither  more  nor  less  of 
science." 


14  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §17 

There  must  never  be  any  quarrelling  over  names.  If  someone  is 
minded  to  ascribe  a  different  meaning  to  the  terms  "truth"  and 
"science,"  for  our  part  we  shall  not  raise  the  slightest  objection. /We 
are  satisfied^  if  he  specifies  the  sense  that  he  means  to  give  to  the 
terms  he  uses  and  especially  the  standard  by  which  he  recognizes  a 
proposition  as  "true"  or  "false.") 

17.  If  that  standard  is  not  specified,  it  is  idle  to  proceed  with  a  dis- 
cussion that  could  only  resolve  itself  into  mere  talk;  just  as  it  would 
be  idle  for  lawyers  to  plead  their  cases  in  the  absence  of  a  judge.  If 
someone  asserts  that  "A  has  the  property  B,"  before  going  on  with 
the  discussion  we  must  know  who  is  to  judge  the  controversy  be- 
tween him  and  another  person  who  maintains  that  "A  does  not  have 
the  property  B."  If  it  is  agreed  that  the  judge  shall  be  objective  ex^ 
perience,  objective  experience  will  then  decide  whether  A  has,  or 
does  not  have,  the  property  .S/Throughout  the  course  of  these  vol- 
umes, we  are  in  the  logico-experimental  field.  I  intend  to  remain 
absolutely  in  that  field  and  refuse  to  depart  from  it  under  any  in- 
ducement whatsoever.llf,  therefore,  the  reader  desires  a  judge  other^ 
than  objective  experience,  he  should  stop  reading  this  book,  just  as 
he  would  refrain  from  proceeding  with  a  case  before  a  court  to 
which  he  objected. 

18.nf  people  disposed  to  argue  the  propositions  mentioned  desire  a 
judge  other  than  objective  experience,  they  will  do  well  to  declare 
exactly  what  their  judge  is  to  be,  and  if  possible  (it  seldom  is)  to 
make  themselves  very  clear  on  the  point^  In  these  volumes  we  shall 
refrain  from  participating  in  arguments  as  to  the  substance  of  prop- 
ositions and  theories.  We  are  to  discuss  them  strictly  from  the  out- 
side, as  social  facts  with  which  we  have  to  deal. 

19.  Metaphysicists  generally  give  the  name  of  "science"  to  knowl- 
edge of  the  "essences"  of  things.,  to  knowledge  of  "principles.?  If  we 
accept  that  definition  for  the  moment,  it  would  follow  that  this" 
work  would  be  in  no  way  scientific^  Not  only  do  we  refrain  from 
dealing  with  essences  and  principles:  we  do  not  even  know  the 
meaning  of  those  terms  (§  530)  .A 


•o^^j  ♦j-ncj^  o-^d  cv\o  J>c<l»-ctt 

§20  VERA  AND  THE  ABSOLUTE  1 5 

Vera,  Hegel's  French  translator,  says,^  "The  notions  of  science  and 
absolute  science  are  inseparable.  .  .  .  Now  if  there  be  an  absolute 
science,  it  is  not  and  cannotjjejjther  than  philosophy.  So  philosophy 
is  the  common  foundation  of  all  the  sciences,  and  as  it  were  the 
common  intelligence  of  all  intelligences.'^  In  this  book  we  refuse  to 
have  anything  whatever  to  do  with  such  a  science,  and  with  those 
other  pretty  things  that  go  with  itN  "The  absolute  (in  other  words. 
essence')  and  unity  Tin  other  words,  the  necessary  relations  of  be- 
ings') are  the  two  prime  conditions  of  science."  Both  of  them  will 
be  found  missing  in  these  volumes,  and  we  do  not  even  know  what 
they  may  be.  We  seek  the  relationships  obtaining  between  jhings 
within  the  limits  of  the  space  and  time  known  to  us,  and  we  ask  ■ 
experience  and  observation  to  reveal  them  to  us.  "Philosophy  is  at 
once  an  explanation  and  a  creation." (^ We  have  neither  the  desire  1 
nor  the  ability  to  explain,  in  Vera's  sense  of  the  term,  much  less  to 
create.  JThe  science  that  knows  the  absolute  and  grasps  the  inner- 
most reason  of  things  knows  how  and  why  events  come  to  pass  and 
beings  are  engendered  [That  is  something  we  do  not  know.],  and 
not  only  knows  but  in  a  certain  way  itself  engenders  and  brings  to 
pass  in  the  very  fact  of  grasping  the  absolute.  And  indeed  we  must 
either  deny  science,  or  else  admit  that  there  is  a  point  where  knowl- 
edge and  being,  thought  and  its  object,  coincide  and  are  identified; 
and  a  science  of  the  absolute  that  arose  apart  from  the  absolute,  and 
so  failed  of  achieving  its  real  and  innermost  nature,  would  not  be  a 
science  of  the  absolute,  or  more  exactly,  would  not  be  science  at  all." 

20.  Well  said!  In  that  we  agree  with  Vera.^If  science  is  what 
Vera's  terms  describe  it  as  being — terms  as  inspiring  as  they  are  (to 
us)  incomprehensible — we  are  not  here  dealing  with  science.jWe 
are,  however,  dealing  with  another  thing  that  Vera  very  well  de- 
scribes in  a  particular  case  when  he  says,  p.  214,  note:  "Generally 
speaking,  mechanics  is  just  a  miscellany  of  experiential  data  and 
mathematical  formulae."  In  terms  still  more  general,  one  might 
say:  "a_  miscellany  of  experiential  data  and  logical  inferences  from 

19  ^  Introduction  a  la  philosophic  de  Hegel,  pp.  78-89. 


1 6  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §21 

such  data."  Suppose,  for  a  moment,  we  call  that  non-science.  Both 
Vera  and  Hegel  are  then  right  in  saying  that  the  theories  of  Newton 
are  not  science  but  non-science;  and  in  these  volumes  I  also  intend  to 
deal  with  non-science,  since  my  wish  is  to  construct  a  system  of 
sociology  on  the  model  of  celestial  mechanics,  physics,  chemistry,  and 
other  similar  non-sciences,  and  eschew  entirely  the  science  or  sciences 
of  the  metaphysicists  (§§  503,^  514 '). 

21.  A  reader  might  observe:  "That  granted,  why  do  you  contin- 
ually harp  on  science  in  the  course  of  your  book,  since  you  use  the 
term  in  the  sense  of  non-science?  Are  you  trying  in  that  way  to 
usurp  for  your  non-science  a  prestige  that  belongs  to  science  alone?" 

(l  answer  that  if  the  word  "science"  ordinarily  meant  what  the  meta- 
physicists say  it  means,  rejecting  the  thing,  I  would  conscientiously 
reject  the  word.]  But  that  is  not  the  case.  Many  people,  nay,  most 
people,  think  of  celestial  mechanics,  physics,  chemistry,  and  so  on 
as  sciences;  and(to  call  them  non-sciences  or  something  else  of  the 
sort  would,  I  fear,  be  ridiculous)  All  the  same,(if  someone  is  still  not 
satisfied,  let  him  prefix  a  "non-"  to  the  words  "science"  and  "scien- 
tific" whenever  he  meets  them  in  these  volumes,  and  he  will  see  that 
the  exposition  develops  just  as  smoothly,  since  we  are  dealing  with 
things  and  not  with  words  (§  119). 

22.  While  metaphysics  proceeds  from  absolute  principles  to  con- 
crete cases, [experimental  science  proceeds  from  concrete  cases,  not 
to  absolute  principles,  which,  so  far  as  it  is  concerned,  do  not  exist, 
but  to  generalprinciples,  which  arcvbrought  under  principles  still 
more  general,  and  so  on  indefinitely./rhat  procedure  is  not  readily 
grasped  by  minds  accustomed  to  metaphysical  thinking,  and  it  gives 
rise  to  not  a  few  erroneous  interpretations. 

23.  Let  us  note,  just  in  passing,  the  preconception  that  in  order  to 
know  a  thing  its  "essence"  must  be  known.  To  the  precise  contrary, 
experimental  science  starts  with  knowledge  of  things,  to  go  on,  if 
not  to  essences,  which  are  entities  unknown  to  science,  at  least  to 
general  principles  (§§  19-20).  Another  somewhat  similar  concep- 
tion is  widely  prevalent  nowadays  in  the  fields  of  political  economy 


§26  "true"  and  "false"  17 

and  sociology.  It  holds  that  knowledge  of  things  can  be  acquired 
only  by  tracing  their  "origins"  ^  (§§93,  346). 

24JIn  an  attenuated  form  the  preconception  requiring  knowledge 
of  "essences"  aims  at  demonstrating  particular  facts  by  means  of  gen- 
eral principles,  instead  of  deriving  the  general  principle  from  the 
factAJust  so  proof  of  the  fact  is  confused  with  proof  of  its  causes. 
For  example,  observation  shows  the  existence  of  a  fact  A;  and  we 
go  on  and  designate  B,  C,  D  .  .  .  as  its  probable  causes.  It  is  later 
shown  that  those  causes  are  not  operative,  and  from  that  the  con- 
clusion is  drawn  that  A  does  not  exist.  The  demonstration  would  be 
valid  if  the  existence  oi  B,  C,D  .  .  .  had  been  shown  by  experience 
and  the  existence  of  A  inferred  from  them.  It  is  devoid  of  the  slight- 
est value  if  observation  has  yielded  A  directly. 

25.  Close  kin  to  the  preconception  just  mentioned  is(the  difficulty 
some  people  experience  in  analyzing  a  situation  and  studying  its 
various  aspects  separately.JWe  shall  have  frequent  occasion  to  return 
to  this  matter.  Suffice  it  here  to  note  that  the  distinctions  drawn 
above  in  §  13  will  not  be  recognized  by  many  people ;  and(if  others 
do  indeed  accept  them  theoretically,  they  straightway  forget  them 
in  actual  thinking  (§§  31-32,  817).) 

26.  For  people  of  "living  faith"  the  various  characteristics  of  the- 
ories designated  in  §  13  often  come  down  to  one  only.  What  the  be- 
liever wants  to  know,  and  nothing  else,  is  whether  the  proposition 
is  true  or  not  true/ Just  what  "true"  means  nobody  knows,  and 
the  believer  less  than  anybody.  Jin  a  general  way  it  seems  to  indicate 
accord  with  the  believer's  sentiments;  but  that  fact  is  evident  only 
to  the  person  viewing  the  belief  from  the  outside,  as  a  stranger  to 
it — never  to  the  believer  himself.  He,  as  a  rule,  denies  the  subjective 
character  of  his  belief.  To  tell  him  that  it  is  subjective  is  almost  to 
insult  him,  for  he  considers  it  true  in  an  absolute  sense.  For  the  same 
reason  he  refuses  ta  think  of  the  term  "true"  apart  from  the  mean- 
ing he  attaches  to  it,")  and  readily  speaks  of  a  truth  different  from 
experimental  truth  and  superior  to  it.^ 

23  1  Pareto,  Manuale,  Chap.  I,  §  33. 

26  ^  With  that  state  of  mind  also  we  shall  deal  at  length  in  chapters  following. 


1 8  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §27 

27.  It  is  idle  to  continue  discussions  of  that  type — they  can  only 
prove  fruitless  and  inconclusive — unless  we  know  exactly  what  the 
terms  that  are  used  mean,  and  unless  we  have  a  criterion  to  refer 
to,  a  judge  to  render  judgment  in  the  dispute  (§§  i7f.).ys  the  cri- 
terion, the  judge,  to  be  experience  and  observation,  or  is  it  to  be 
something  elsePjThat  point  has  to  be  clearly  determined  before  we 
can  go  on.  If  you  are  free  to  choose  between  two  judges,  you  may 
pick  the  one  you  like  best  to  decide  your  case.  But  you  cannot  choose 
them  both  at  the  same  time,  unless  you  are  sure  in  advance  that 
they  are  both  of  one  mind  and  one  will. 

28.  Of  that  agreement  metaphysicists  enjoy  an  a  priori  certitude, 
for  their  superexperimental  criterion  is  of  such  majesty  and  power ' 
that  it  dominates  the  experimental  criterion,  which  mustj)f  neces.- 
sity  accord  with  it.  For  a  similar  reason  theologians  too  are  certain 
a  priori  that  the  two  criteria  can  never  fail  of  accord.  We,  much  . 
more  humble,  enjoy  no  such  a  -priori  enlightenment.  We  have  no 
knowledge  whatever  of  what  must  or  ought  to  be.  We  are  looking 
strictly  for  what  is.  That  is  why  we  have  to  be  satisfied  with  one 
judge  at  a  time. 

29.  From  our  point  of  view  not  even  logic  supplies  necessary  in- 
ferences, except  when  such  inferences  are  mere  tautologies.Vj^ogic  de- 
rives its  efficacy  from  experience  and  from  nothing  elseY§97)-^ 

30.  The  human  mind  is  synthetic,  and  only  training  in  the  habit 
of  scientific  thinking  enables  a  few  individuals  to  distinguish  the 
iparts  in  a  whole  by  an  analytical  process  (§25).  Women  especially, 
and  the  less  well-educated  among  men,  often  experience  an  insur- 
mountable difficulty  in  considering  the  different  aspects  of  a  thing; 
separately,  one  by  one.  To  be  convinced  of  that^one  has  only  to  read  ^ 
a  newspaper  article  before  a  mixed  social  gathering  and  then  try  to 
discuss  one  at  a  time  the  various  aspects  under  which  it  may  be 
considered.  One  will  notice  that  one's  listeners  do  not  follow,  that 
they  persist  in  considering  all  the  aspects  of  the  subject  all  together 
at  one  time. 

29  ^  This  is  not  the  place  to  deal  with  the  question.  Wc  note  the  point  in  passing 
just  to  avoid  misunderstandings. 


§33  THE  SYNTHETIC  JUDGMENT  I9 

31.  The  presence  of  that  trait  in  the  human  rnind  makes  it  very 
difficult  for  both  the  person  who  is  stating  a  proposition  and  the 
person  who  is  hstening  to  keep  (the  two  criteria,  th^  experimental 
and  the  non-experimental,  distinct.  An  irresistible  force  seems  always 
to  be  driving  the  majority  of  human  beings  to  confuse  them/Many 
facts  of  great  significance  to  sociology  find  their  explanation  in  just 
that^  as  will  be  more  clearly  apparent  from  what  follows. 

32.  In  the  natural  sciences  people  have  finally  realized  the  neces- 
sity of  analysis  in  studying  the  various  aspects  of  a  concrete  phe- 
nomenon— the  analysis  being  followed  by  a  synthesis  in  getting  back 
from  theory  to  the  concrete.  In  the  social  sciences  that  necessity  is 
still  not  grasped  by  many  people. 

33.  Hence  the  very  common  error  of  denying  the  truth  of  a  theory 
because  it  fails  to  explain  every  aspect  of  a  concrete  fact;  and  the 
same  error,  under  another  form,  of  insisting  on  embracing  under 
one  theory  all  other  similar  or  even  irrelevant  theories. 

Let  0  in  Figure  i  stand  for  a  concrete  situation.  By  analysis  we 
distinguish  within  it  a  number  of  facts:  c,  e,  g.  .  .  . 


The  fact  c  and  others  like  it,  a,  b  .  .  .  are  brought  together  under 
a  certain  theory,  under  a  general  principle,  P.  In  the  same  way,  e 
and  facts  like  e  (d,  f  .  .  .)  yield  another  theory,  0;  and  the  facts 
g,  l,m,n  .  .  .  still  another  theory,  R,  and  so  on.  These  theories  are 
worked  out  separately;  then,  to  determine  the  concrete  situation  O, 


20  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §34 

the  results  {c,  e,  g  .  .  .)  oi  the  various  theories  are  taken  together. 
After  analysis  comes  synthesis. 

People  who  fail  to  understand  that  will  say:  "The  situation  0  pre- 
sents not  only  the  fact  e  but  also  the  fact  c;  therefore  the  theory  Q 
has  to  account  for  c."  That  conclusion  is  erroneous.  One  should  say — 
and  it  is  the  only  sound  conclusion:  ".  .  .  therefore  the  theory  Q  ac- 
counts for  only  a  part  of  the  situation  0." 

34.  Example:  Let  Q  stand  for  the  theory  of  political  economy.  A 
concrete  situation  0  presents  not  only  an  economic  aspect,  e,  but  the 
further  aspects  c,  g  .  .  .  oid.  sociological  character.  It  is  a  mistake  to 

I  include,  as  many  have  included,  the  sociological  elements  c,  g  .  .  . 

under  political  economy.  The  only  sound  conclusion  to  be  drawn 
from  the  facts  is  that  the  economic  theory  which  accounts  for  e  must 
be  supplemented  (^supplemented,  not  replaced)  by  other  theories 
which  account  for  c,  g.  .  .  . 

35.  In  political  economy  itself,  the  theories  of  pure  or  mathe- 
matical economics  have  to  be  supplemented — not  replaced — by  the 
theories  of  applied  economics.  Mathematical  economics  aims  chiefly 
at  emphasizing  the  interdependence  of  economic  phenomena.  So  far 
no  other  method  has  been  found  for  attaining  that  end.^N 

36.  Straightway  one  of  those  numberless  unfortunates  who  are 
cursed  with  the  mania  for  talking  about  things  they  do  not  under- 
stand comes  forward  with  the  discovery — lo  the  wonders  of  genius! 
— that  pure  economics  is  not  applied  economics,  and  concludes, 
not  that  something  must  be  added  to  pure  economics  if  we  are  to 

*^     understand  concrete  phenomena,  but  that  pure  economics  must  be 
replaced  by  his  gabble,  Alas,  good  soul,  mathematical  economics 
\>  helps,  at  least,  to  a  rough  understanding  of  the  effects  of  the  inter- 

dependence of  economic  phenomena,  while  your  gabble  shows  abso- 
lutely nothing! 

37.  And  lo,  another  prodigious  genius,  who  holds  that  because 
many  economic  phenomena  depend  on  the  human  will,  economics 
must  be  replaced  by  psychology.  But  why  stop  at  psychology  ?  Why 
not  geography,  or  even  astronomy  ?  For  after  all  the  economic  factor 

35  ^  Pareto,  Manuale,  Chap.  Ill,  §  228. 


§38  THE  SCIENTIFIC  APPROACH  21 

is  influenced  by  seas,  continents,  rivers,  and  above  all  by  the  Sun, 
fecundator  general  of  "this  fair  family  of  flowers  and  trees  and  all 
earthly  creatures."  ^  Such  prattle  has  been  called  positive  economics, 
and  for  that  our  best  gratitude,  for  it  provokes  a  laugh,  and  laughter, 
good  digestion! 

38.  Many  economists  have  been  inclined  to  bring  each  and  every 
sort  of  economic  theory  under  the  theory  of  valued  True,  nearly  all 
economic  phenomena  express  themselves  in  terms  of  value;  but 
from  that  we  have  a  right  to  conclude  that  in  isolating  the  various 
elements  in  such  phenomena  we  come  upon  a  theory  for  value — but 
not  that  all  other  elements  have  to  be  squeezed  into  that  theory. 
Nowadays  people  are  going  farther  still,  and  value  is  coming  to  be 
the  door  through  which  sociology  is  made  to  elbow  its  way  into 
political  economy.  Perhaps  we  ought  to  be  thankful  that  they  are 
stopping  at  that,  for  no  end  of  other  things  might  be  pushed  through 
the  same  door :  psychology,  to  explain  why  and  how  a  thing,  real  or 
imaginary,  comes  to  have  value;  then  physiology  as  handmaiden  to 
psychology;  and  then — why  not? — a  little  biology  to  explain  the 
foundations  of  physiology;  and  surely  a  little  mathematics,  for  after 
all  the  first  member  of  an  equation  has  the  same  value  as  the  second 
and  the  theory  of  value  would  not  be  complete  without  the  theory 
of  equations;  and  so  on  forever.  In  all  of  which  there  is  this  much 
truth:  that  the  concrete  situation  is  very  complex  and  may  be  re- 
garded as  a  compound  of  many  elements  A,  B,  C.  .  .  .  Experience 
teaches  that  to  understand  such  a  situation  it  is  best  to  isolate  the 
elements  A,  B,  C  .  .  .  and  examine  them  one  by  one,  that  we  may 
then  bring  them  together  again  and  so  get  the  theory  of  the  com- 
plex as  a  whole.  That  is  just  what  logico-experimental  science  does. 
But  those  who  are  unfamiliar  with  its  methods  grope  blindly  for- 
ward, shifting  from  A  to  B,  from  B  to  C,  then  every  so  often  turn- 
ing back,  mixing  things  up,  taking  refuge  in  words,  thinking  of  B 
while  studying  A,  and  of  something  else  while  studying  B.  Worse 
yet,  if  you  are  looking  into  A  they  interrupt  to  remind  you  of  B; 

37  '^  [The  allusion  is  to  Foscolo,  7  sepolcri,  vv.  4-5. — A.  L.] 

38  ^  Pareto,  Manuale,  Chap.  Ill,  §  226;  Systemes  socialistes.  Vol.  I,  pp.  338  f. 


22  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §39 

and  if  you  answer  on  B,  they  are  off  to  C,  jumping  about  now  here, 
now  there,  prattHng  ever  beside  the  point  and  demonstrating  one 
thing  only: (their  helpless  innocence  of  any  scientific  method.^ 

39.  Those  who  deny  scientific  status  to  political  economy  argue, 
in  fact,  to  show  that  it  is  not  adequate  to  explain  concrete  phenom- 
ena; and  from  that  they  conclude  that  it  should  be  ignored  in  such 
explanation.  The  sound  conclusion  would  be  that  other  theories 
should  be  added  to  it.  Thinking  as  such  people  think  we  should 
have  to  say  that  chemistry  ought  to  be  ignored  in  agriculture,  since 
chemistry  is  inadequate  to  explain  everything  about  a  farm.  More- 
over, engineering  schools  would  have  to  bar  pure  mathematics,  for 
it  stands  to  applied  mechanics  almost  as  pure  economics  stands  to 
applied  economics. 

40.  Further,  it  fs  difficult,  in  fact  almost  impossible,  to  induce  peo- 
ple to  keep  mere  knowledge  of  the  laws  (uniformities)  of  society 
distinct  from  action  designed  to  modify  them.  If  someone  is  keep- 
ing strictly  to  such  knowledge,  people  will  insist  at  all  costs  that  he 
have  some  practical  purpose  in  view.  They  try  to  find  out  what  it  is, 
and,  there  being  none,  one  is  finally  invented  for  him. 

41.  In  the  same  way,  it  is  difficult  to  induce  people  not  to  go  be- 
yond what  an  author  says  and  add  to  the  propositions  he  states 
others  that  may  seem  to  be  implicit  in  them  but  which  he  never  had 
in  mind  (§§  73  f.,  311).  If  you  note  a  defect  in  a  given  thing  A,  it  is 
taken  for  granted  that  you  are  condemning  ^  as  a  whole;  if  you 
note  a  good  point,  that  you  approve  of  ^4  as  a  whole.  It  seems  in- 
credibly strange  to  people  that  you  should  be  stressing  its  defects  if 
you  are  not  intending  to  condemn  it  as  a  whole,  or  its  excellences  if 
you  are  not  approving  of  it  as  a  whole.  The  inference  would  be 
somewhat  justified  in  a  case  of  special  pleading,  for  after  all  it  is 
not  the  business  of  the  advocate  to  accuse  his  client.  But  it  is  not  a 
sound  inference  from  a  plain  description  of  fact,  or  when  a  scientist 
is  seeking  scientific  uniformities.  The  inference  would  be  admissible, 
further,  in  the  case  of  an  argument  not  of  a  logico-experimental 
character  but  based  on  accord  of  sentiments  (§514).  In  fact,  when 
one  is  trying  to  win  the  sympathies  of  others  by  such  an  argument, 


§43  SCIENTIFIC  PROOF  23 

one  may  be  expected  to  declare  one's  own  sympathies ;  and  if  that  is 
not  done  expUcitly,  people  may  properly  assume  that  it  is  done  im- 
plicidy.  But  ^hen  we  are  reasoning  objectively,  according  to  the 
logico-experimental  method,  we  are  not  called  upon  to  declare  our 
sentiments  either  explicitly  or  by  implication^ 

42.  As  regards  proofs,  a  person  stating  a  logico-experimental  prop- 
osition or  theory  (§  13,  la)  asks  them  of  observation,  experience, 
and  logical  inferences  from  observation  and  experience.  But  the 
person  asserting  a  proposition  or  theory  that  is  not  logico-experi- 
mental can  rely  only  on  the  spontaneous  assent  of  other  minds  and 
on  the  more  or  less  logical  inferences  he  can  draw  from  what  is  as- 
sented to.  At  bottom  he  is  exhorting^  rather  than  proving.  However, 
that  is  not  commonly  admitted  by  people  using  non-logico-experi- 
mental  theories.  They  pretend  to  be  offering  proofs  of  the  same  na- 
ture as  the  proofs  offered  for  logico-experimental  theories;  and  in 
such  pseudo-experimental  arguments  they  take  full  advantage  of  the 
indefiniteness  of  common  everyday  language. 

As  regards  persuasion,(^proofs  are  convincing  only  to  minds 
trained  to  logico-experimental  thinking.]  Authority  plays  a  great 
part  even  in  logico-experimental  propositions,  though  it  has  no  status 
as  proof.  Passions,  accords  of  sentiment,  vagueness  of  terms,  are  of 
great  efficacy  in  everythinp-  that  is  not  logico-experimental  (§514). 

43.  In  the  sphere  of  proof,  experience  is  powerless  as  against  faith, 
and  faith  as  against  experience,  with  the  result  that  each  is  confined 
to  its  own  domain.  If  John,  an  unbeliever,  denies  that  God  created 
Heaven  and  Earth,  and  you  meet  him  with  the  authority  of  the 
Bible,  you  have  made  a  nice  round  hole  in  the  water,  for  he  will 
deny  the  authority  of  the  Bible  and  your  argument  will  crumble. 
To  replace  the  authority  of  the  Bible  with  the  authority  of  your 
"Christian  experience"  is  a  childish  makeshift,  for  John  will  reply 
that  his  own  experience  inclines  him  not  in  the  least  to  agree  with 
you;  and  if  you  retort  that  his  experience  is  not  Christian,  you  will 
have  reasoned  in  a  neat  circle,  for  it  is  certain  that  if  only  that  ex- 
perience is  Christian  which  leads  to  your  results,  one  may  conclude 


24  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §44 

without  fear  of  contradiction  that  Christian  experience  leads  to  your 
results — and  by  that  we  have  learned  exactly  nothing, 

44.  When  one  asserts  a  logico-experimental  proposition  (§  13,  I^), 
one  can  place  those  who  contradict  in  the  dilemma  of  either  accept- 
ing the  proposition  as  true  or  refusing  credence  to  experience  and 

n  logic.  Anyone  adopting  the  latter  course  would  be  in  the  position 
of  John,  the  unbeliever  just  mentioned:  you  would  have  no  way  of 
persuading  him. 

45.  It  is  therefore  evident  that,  aside  as  usual  from  sophistical  rea- 
sonings made  in  bad  faith*,  the  difference  as  regards  proofs^  between 
theories  that  are  logico-experimental  (la)  and  theories  that  are- 
not  Jies  chiefly  in  the  fact  that  in  our  day  in  Western  countries  it  is 
easier  to  find  disbelievers  in  the  Koran  or  the  Gospels;  in  types  of 
experience,  whether  Christian,  personal,  humanitarian,  rational,  or 
of  whatever  other  kind;  in  the  categorical  imperative;  or  in  the 
dogmas  of  positivism,  nationalism,  pacifism,  and  numberless  other 
things  of  that  brand,  than  it  is  to  find  disbelievers  in  logic  and  ex- 
perience. In  dealing  with  other  ages  and  countries  the  situation  may 
be  difFerent. 

46(  We  are  in  no  sense  intending,  in  company  with  a  certain  ma- 
terialistic metaphysics,  to  exalt  logic  and  experience  to  a  greater 
power  and  majesty  than  dogmas  accepted  by  sentimenty  Our  aim  is. 
to_distinguish,  not  to  compare,  and  much  less  to  pass  judgment  on 
the  relative  merits  and  virtues  of  those  two  sorts  of  thinking  (§  69). 

47.  Again,  we  have  not  the  remotest  intention  of  bringing  back 
through  the  window  a  conviction  we  have  just  driven  out  by  the 
door.  We  in  no  wise  assert  that  the  logico-experimental  proof  is 
superior  to  the  other  and  is  to  be  preferred.  We  are  saying  simply — 
and  it  is  something  quite  different — that  such  proof  alone  is  to  be 
used  by  a  person  concerned  not  to  abandon  the  logico-experimental 
field.^ 

48.  The  extreme  case  of  a  person  flatly  repudiating  all  logical  dis- 

47  ^  The  remark  is  really  tautological  and  would  hardly  be  worth  making  if  it 
were  not  so  frequently  forgotten  by  people  who  mix  experience  and  faith,  reasoning 
and  sentiment. 


§49  PROOF  AND  FAITH  25 

cursion,  all  experience,  is  rarely  met  with./Logicoexperimental  con- 
siderations are  commonly  enough  ignored,  left  unexpressed,  crowded 
aside,  by  one  device  or  another;  but  it  is  difficult  to  find  anyone 
really  combating  them  as  enemies]  That  is  why  people  almost  a  I  way?; 
try  to  demonstrate  theories  that  are  not  objective,  not^exp^ejrimental^ 
by  pseudo-logical  and  pseudo-experimental  proofs. 

49yAll  religions  have  proofs  of  that  type,  supplemented  as  a  rule 
by  proofs  of  utility  to  individual  and  society .jAnd  when  one  religion 
replaces  another,  it  is  anxious  to  create  the  impression  that  its  experi- 
mental proofs  are  of  a  better  quality  than  any  the  declining  faith  can 
.marshal. (christian  miracles  were  held  to  be  more  convincing  than 
pagan  miracles,  jand  nowadays  the  "scientific"  proofs  of  "solidarity" 
and  humanitarianism  are  considered  superior  to  the  Christian  mir- 
acles.) All  the  samej  the  man  who  pvaminps  such  farts  withnnt  the 
assistance  of  faith  fails  to  nnt-irp  any  great  differenrp  ig  them: ^or 
him  they  have  exactly  the  same  scientifir  vahiPj  to  wit-^  vrm.  We  are 
obliged  to  believe  that  "when  Punic  fury  thundered  from  the  Thrasi- 
mene"  the  defeat  of  the  Romans  was  caused  by  the  impious  indif- 
ference of  the  consul  Flaminius  to  the  portents  sent  of  the  gods. 
The  consul  had  fallen  from  his  horse  in  front  of  the  statue  of  Jupiter 
Stator.  The  sacred  chickens  had  refused  to  eat.  Finally,  the  legionary 
ensign  had  stuck  in  the  ground  and  could  not  be  extricated.^  We 
shall  also  be  certain  (whether  more  or  less  certain,  I  could  not  say) 
that  the  victory  of  the  Crusaders  at  Antioch  was  due  to  the  divine 
protection  concretely  symbolized  in  the  Holy  Lance."  Then  again  it 

49  ^  Cicero,  De  divinatione ,  I,  35,  77:  "On  that  occasion  the  standard-bearer  of 
the  First  Spears  found  he  could  not  move  his  ensign  from  where  it  was;  and  notli- 
ing  could  be  done  about  it,  though  many  came  to  his  assistance.  But  when  the  thing 
was  reported  to  Flaminius  he,  as  was  his  usual  habit,  paid  no  attention;  and  so, 
within  three  hours,  his  army  was  cut  to  pieces  and  he  himself  was  slain."  [The  lit- 
erary allusion  in  "Punic  fury"  is  to  Carducci,  "Alle  jonti  del  Clitumno"  (Poesie,  p. 
803).— A.  L.] 

49  ^  Michaud,  Histoire  des  croisades,  1877  ed..  Vol.  I,  p.  94:  "Many  of  the  Cru- 
saders attributed  the  victory  they  had  won  over  the  Saracens  to  the  discovery  of  the 
Holy  Lance.  Raymond  d'Agiles  avers  that  the  enemy  dared  not  approach  battalions 
in  the  midst  of  which  the  miraculous  weapon  could  be  seen  glistening."  Idem,  Bibli- 
otheqiie  des  croisades,  Vol.  I,  pp.  33-34:  "Raymond  d'Agiles  adds  that  none  of  the 
men  fighting  about  the  Holy  Lance  suffered  any  harm.  'If  someone  objects,'  he  con- 


26  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §50 

is  certain,  in  fact  the  height  of  certitude,  because  attested  by  a  better 
and  more  modern  religion,  that  Louis  XVI  of  France  lost  his  throne 
and  his  life  simply  because  he  did  not  love  to  the  degree  required 
his  good,  his  darling,  people.  The  humanitarian  god  of  democracy 
never  suffers  such  offences  to  go  unpunished ! 

50.  Experimental  science  has  no  dogmas,  not  even  the  dogma  that 
experimental  facts  can  be  explained  only  by  experience.  If  the  con- 
trary w^ere  seen  to  be  the  case,  experimental  science  would  accept 
the  fact,  as  it  accepts  every  other  fact  of  observation.  And  it  in  truth 
accepts  the  proposition  that  inventions  may  at  times  be  promoted 
by  non-experimental  principles,  and  does  so  because  that  proposition 
is  in  accord  with  the  results  of  experience.^  But^o  far  as  demonstra- 
tion goes,  the  history  of  human  knowledge  clearly  shows  that  all 
attempts  to  explain  natural  phenomena  by  means  of  propositions 
derived  from  religious  or  metaphysical  principles  have  failedjfSuch 
attempts  have  finally  been  abandoned  in  astronomy,  geology,  physi- 
ology, and  all  other  similar  sciences^  If  traces  of  them  are  still  to  be 
found  in  sociology  and  its  subbranches,  law,  political  economy, 
ethics,  and  so  on,  that  is  simply  because  in  those  fields  a  strictly 
scientific  status  has  not  yet  been  attained.^ 

51.  One  of  the  last  efforts  to  subordinate  experience  to  metaphysics 
was  made  by  Hegel  in  his  Philosophy  of  Nature,  a  work  which,  in 
all  frankness,  attains  and  oversteps  the  limits  oF  comic  absurdity^^ 

52.  On  the  other  hand,  in  our  day  people  are  beginning  to  repudi- 
ate dogmas  that  usurp  status  as  experimental  science.  Sectarians  of 
the  humanitarian  cult  are  wont  to  meet  the  "fictions"  of  the  religion 
they  are  combating  with  the  "certainty"  of  science.  But  that  "cer- 
tainty" is  just  one  of  their  preconceptions.|Scientific  theories  are 

tinues,  'that  the  Vicomte  Heracle,  standard-bearer  to  the  Bishop,  was  wounded,  that 
was  because  he  had  handed  the  banner  to  another  person  and  had  moved  some 
distance  away.'  " 
50  ^  Pareto,  Manuale,  Chap.  I,  §§45,  51. 

50  2  Experiment  is  helpful  even  in  mathematics.  As  is  well  known,  modern 
analysis  has  discredited  by  experimental  data  a  number  of  theories  that  were  con- 
sidered certain  on  the  basis  of  sense-perceptions  of  space. 

51  ^Pareto,  Systemes  socialistes,  Vol.  II,  pp.  71  f.;  Manuel,  pp.  35,  note  i;  14, 
note  I. 


§57  THE  SCIENTIFIC  APPROACH  27 

mere  hypotheses,  which  endure  so  long  as  they  accord  with  the  facts 
and  which  die  and  vanish  from  the  scene  as  new  investigations  d^^ 
I     -stroyjkar  accord. ..They  are  then  superseded  by  new  ones  for  which 
a  similar  fate  is  held  in  store  (§  22). _J 

53.  Let  us  assume  that  a  certain  number  of  facts  are  given.  The 
1.  problem  of  discovering  their  theory  may  be  solved  in  more  than  one 
1      way.  A  number  of  theories  may  satisfy  the  data  equally  well,  and 

the  choice  between  them  may  sometimes  be  determined  by  subjec- 
tive considerations,  such  as  preference  for  greater  simplicity  (§64). 

54.  In  both  logico-experimental  (la)  and  non-logico-experimental 
theories,  one  gets  certain  general  propositions  called  "principles," 
logically  deducible  from  which  are  inferences  constituting  theories. 
Such  principles  differ  entirely  in  character  in  the  two  kinds  of  the- 
ories mentioned. 

■    Y^55.^In  logico-experimental  theories  (la)  principles  are  nothing  but 
i   abstract  propositions  summarizing  the  traits  common  to  many  dif- 
I  £ci(^nr  far.rsjThe  principles  depend  on  the  factSj  not  the  facts  on  the 
principles.  They  are  governed  by  the  facts,  not  the  facts  by  them. 
(They  are  accepted  hypothetically  only  so  long  and  so  far  as  they  are 
in  agreement  with  the  facts;  and  they  are  rejected  as  soon  as  there  is 
disagreement  (§63).  s\ 
^  "T  56. /But  scattered  through  non-logico-experimental  theories  one 
finds  principles  that  are  accepted  a  priori,  independently  of  ex- 
perience, dictating  to  experience.)  They  do  not  depend  upon  the 
facts;  the  facts  depend  upon  them.  They  govern  the  facts;  they  are 
not  governed  by  them.  vThey  are  accepted  without  regard  to  the 
facts,  which  must  of  necessity  accord  with  the  inferences  deducible 
from  the  principles  ;jand  if  they  seem  to  disagree,  one  argument 
after  another  is  tried  until  one  is  found  that  successfully  re-estab- 
lishes the  accord,  which  can  never  under  any  circumstances  fail."! 

57.  In  order  of  time,  the  grouping  of  theories  as  given  in  §  13  has 
in  many  cases  to  be  reversed.  In  history,  that  is,[non-logico-experi- 
mental  theories  often  come  first,  the  logico-experimental  (I^)  after- 
wardsJ 


28     c-fy^^'f  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §58 

58.  The  subordination  of  facts  to  principles  in  non-logico-experi- 
V Rental  theories  is  manifested  in  a  number  of  ways: 
^  'f     i^ People  are  so  sure  of  the  principles  with  which  they  start  that 
^  J^  C     th^y  ^^  ^°^  ^^^^  ^^^^  ^^^  trouble  to  inquire  whether  their  implica- 
^  ^'       tions  are  in  accord  with  experience^  Accord  there  must  be,  and  ex- 
perience as  the  subordinate  cannot,  must  not,  be  allowed  to  talk  back 
to  its  superior/ (That  is  the  case  especially  when  logico-experimental 
theories  {la)  begin  to  invade  a  domain  that  has  been  pre-empted  by 
non-logico-experimental  theoriesA 

2.  As  that  invasion  gains  headway,  progress  in  the  experimental 
sciences  finally  rescues  them  from  the  servitude  to  which  they  were 
regarded  as  sternly  subject.  They  are  conceded  a  measure  of  auton- 
omy; they  are  permitted  to  verify  the  inferences  drawn  from  tradi- 
tional principles,  though  people  continue  to  assert  that  verification 
always  corroborates  the  principle.(lf  things  seem  not  to  turn  out 
that  way,  igsuistry^  comes  to  the  rescue  to  re-establish  the  desired 
accord. ) 

3.  When  finally  that  method  of  maintaining  the  sovereignty  of 
the  general  principles  also  fails,  the  experimental  sciences  are  resign- 
edly allowed  to  enjoy  their  hard-won  independence;  bu^ their  do- 
main is  now  represented  as  of  an  inferior  order  envisaging  the  rela- 
tive and  the  particular,  whereas  philosophical  principles  contemplate 
the  absolute,  the  universal.) 

59.  No  departure  from  the  experimental  field  and  therefore  from 
the  domain  of  logico-experimental  theories  (la)  is  involved  in  the 
resort  to  hypotheses,  provided  they  are  used  strictly  as  instruments 
infthe  quest  for  consequences  that  are  uniformly  subject  to  verifica- 
tion by  experience,  ^he  departure  arises  when  hypotheses  are  used  as 
instruments  of  proof  without  reference  to  experimental  verification. 
The  hypothesis  of  gravitation,  for  instance,  does  not  carry  us  outside 
the  experimental  field  so  long  as  we  understand  that  its  implications 

58  ^  For  example,  Zeller  well  notes  of  HeracHtus,  Philosophic  dcr  Griechen,  Vol. 
I,  p.  658  (Alleyne,  Vol.  II,  p.  95),  that  when  that  philosopher  is  carried  to  hypotheses 
which  conflict  with  the  known  testimony  of  the  senses,  he  concludes  \Fragmenta, 
rV  ?]  not  that  his  hypotheses  are  false,  as  an  empiricist  would  do,  but  that  the 
senses  are  deceptive,  that  reason  alone  gives  trustworthy  knowledge. 


§6l  SCIENTIFIC  HYPOTHESES  29 

are  at  all  times  subject  to  experience,  as  modern  physics  always 
assumes|^It  would  carry  us  outside  the  experimental  field  were  we 
to  declare  gravitation  an  "essential  property"  of  "matter"  and  assert 
that  the  orbits  of  the  stars  must  of  necessity  comply  with  the  New- 
tonian law.jThat  distinction  was  not  grasped  by  writers  such  as 
Comte,  who  tried  to  bar  the  hypothesis  of  a  luminous  ether  from 
science.  That  hypothesis  and  others  of  the  kind  are  to  be  judged  not 
intrinsically  but  extrinsically,  that  is.  by  ascertaining  wbpthgr  and 
to  what  extent  inferences  drawn  from  them  accord  with  the  facts. 

60.  When  any  considerable  number  of  inferences  from  a  given 
hypothesis  have  been  verified  by  experience,  it  becomes  exceedingly 
probable  that  a  new  implication  will  likewise  be  verified;  so  in  that 
case  the  two  types  of  hypotheses  mentioned  in  §§55  and  56  are  in- 
clined to  blend,  and  in  practice  there  is  the  temptation  to  accept  the 
new  inference  without  verifying  it.  That  explains  the  haziness  present 
in  many  minds  as  to  the  distinction  between  hypotheses  subordinate 
to  experience  and  hypotheses  dominating  experience.  Still,  as  a 
matter  of  practice  there  are  cases  where  the  implications  of  this  or 
that  hypothesis  may  be  accepted  without  proof.  For  instance,  certain 
principles  of  pure  mechanics  are  being  questioned  nowadays,  at  least 
as  regards  velocities  to  any  considerable  degree  greater  than  velocities 
practically  observable.  But  it  is  evident  that  the  mechanical  engineer 
may  continue  to  accept  them  without  the  slightest  fear  of  going 
wrong,  since  the  parts  of  his  machines  move  at  speeds  which  fall  far 
short  of  any  that  would  require  modifications  in  the  principles  of 
dynamics. 

61.  In  pure  economics  my  hypothesis  of  "ophelimity"  (§  21 10)  re- 
mains experimental  so  long  as  inferences  from  it  are  held  sub- 
ject to  verification  on  the  facts.  Were  that  subordination  to  cease,  the 
hypothesis  could  no  longer  be  called  experimental.  Walras  did  not 
think  of  his  "exchange  value"  in  any  such  manner.^  If  one  drops  the 

61  ^  Boven,  Les  applications  mathematiques  a  I' economic  politique,  pp.  106  f.: 
"First  a  few  definitions  of  Walras.  Interesting  his  definition  of  'value'':  [Elements 
d'economie  politique  pure,  p.  44.]  'Exchange  value  is  the  property  possessed  by 
certain  things  whereby  they  are  not  obtained  or  disposed  of  gratuitously,  but  are 
bought  or  sold,  received  or  given,  in  certain  quantitative  proportions  in  exchange 


30  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §62 

hypothesis  of  opheHmity,  as  is  possible  by  observing  curves  of  in- 
difference (§  2408  ^)  or  by  some  other  device  of  the  kind,  one  is 
excused  from  verifying  experimentally  the  implications  of  a  hypothe- 
sis that  is  no  longer  there. 

62,  Likewise,  (the  hypothesis  of  value  remains  experimental  so 

long  as  value  is  thought  of  as  something  leading  to  inferences  that 

/  are  experimentally  verifiable.^  It  ceases  to  be  experimental  v^hen 

value  is  taken  as  a  metaphysical  entity  presumably  superior  to  experi- 

mental  verification  (§  104).^ 

[63.  [In  the  logicoexperimental  sciences,  if  they  are  to  be  kept 
strictly  such,  so-called  general  principles  are,  as  wt  said  above  (§  55), 
nothing  but  hypotheses  designed  to  formulate  syntheses  of  facts^ 
linking  facts  under  theories  and  epitomizing  them!^rrheories,  their 
principles,  their  implications,  are  altogether  subordinate  to  facts  and_ 
possess  no  other  criterion  of  truth  than  their  capacity  for  picturing 
them.JThat  is  an  exact  reversal  of  the  relations  between  general  prin- 
ciples and  experimental  facts  that  obtain  in  non-logico-experimental 
theoriesV§  13,  Class  II).  But  the  human  mind  has  such  a  predilection 
for  theories  of  that  sort  that^general  principles  have  often  been  seert 
to  recover  sovereignty  even  over  theories  aspiring  to  status  as  logico- 
experimental (la)j  It  was  agreed,  that  is,  that  principles  had  a  quasi-  ^ 

for  other  things.'  This  'property  possessed  by  certain  things'  smacks  of  the  domain 
of  physics  or  metaphysics.  It  is  not  the  same  thing  as  price.  .  .  .  One  gets  the  im- 
pression that  Walras  finds  it  hard  to  explain  just  what  his  'property'  is.  He  goes 
round  and  round  it,  quahfies  it,  classifies  it,  suggests  the  conditions  under  which  it 
is  to  be  met  with,  how  it  behaves;  but  he  never  shows  it  except  under  a  blurred 
glass." 

62  ^  Pareto,  "L'economie  et  la  sociologie,"  in  Scientia,  Bologna,  1907,  No.  2:  "The 
term  [value]  has  finished  by  designating  some  mystical,  metaphysical  entity  or  other 
that  may  mean  anything,  since  it  has  come  to  mean  nothing  at  all.  William 
Stanley  Jevons  in  his  day  [1882]  saw  that  the  term  was  giving  rise  to  endless  mis- 
understandings and  proposed  banishing  it  from  science  [see  Theory  of  Political 
Economy,  p.  Si].  Meantime  matters  have  grown  worse,  if  possible;  and  use  of  the 
term  'value'  may  in  future  serve  to  distinguish  economic  treatises  that  are  not  scien- 
tific from  treatises  that  are.  [In  a  note:]  In  a  volume  on  economics  recently  pub- 
lished we  find  that  'price  is  a  concrete  manifestation  of  value.'  We  are  already  famil- 
iar with  the  incarnations  of  Buddha.  To  them  we  are  now  asked  to  add  the  incarna- 
tions of  Value.  Using  that  sort  of  language  we  might  say  that  a  cat  is  a  concrete 
manifestation  of  'felinity,'  water  a  concrete  manifestation  of  the  'liquid  principle.' 
But  what  is  the  liquid  principle?  Alas,  nobody  knows!" 


§65  NOMINALISM  AND  REALISM  3 1 

independent  subsistence,  that  only  one  theory  was  true,  while  num- 
berless others  were  false,  that  experience  could  indeed  determine 
which  theory  was  true,  but  that,  having  done  that  much,  it  was 
called  upon  to  submit  to  the  theory.  In  a  word(  general  principles, 
which  were  lords  by  divine  right  in  non-logico-experimental  theo- 
ries ](§  16),  became  lords  by  election,  but  lords  nevertheless,  in  logico- 
experimental  theories  (la).  So  we  get  the  two  subclasses  distin- 
guished in  §  13;  but  it  is  well  to  note  that  oftentimes  their  traits 
are  implicit  rather  than  explicit,  that  isigeneral  principles  are  used 
without  explicit  declaration  as  to  just  how  they  are  regarded.r> 

64.  Steady  progress  in  the  experimental  sciences  eventually 
brought  about  the  downfall  of  this  elective  sovereignty  as  well,  and 
so  led  to  strictly  lofflco-experimental  theories  (lai),  in  which  gen- 
eral principles  are  mere  abstractions  devised  to  picture  factj,  it  being 
meantime  recognized  that  different  theories  may  be  equally  true 
(§  53),  in  the  sense  that  they  picture  the  facts  equally  well  and  that 
choice  among  them  is,  within  certain  limits,  arbitrary.  In  a  word,  one 
might  say  thac(we  have  reached  the  extreme  of  Nominalism^ pro- 

vided  that  term  be  stripped  of  its  metaphysical  connotations.  Jj^^Xm* 

65.  For  the  very  reason  that  we  intend  to  remain  stric^  wittnn 
logico-experimental  bounds,  we  are  not  calle^-'trpon  to  solve  the  I 

metaphysical    prnhlpp    nf    TsJnmmaHQm  -^w4^eQ];^Tr>  ^    We    do    HOt  \ 

presume  to  decide  whether  only  the  ifidividuum,  or  only  the  species, 
_exists,  for  the  good  reason,  among  others,  thatfwe  are  not  sufficiently 
clear  as  to  the  precise  meaning  of  the  term  "exist.V  "V^  intend  to 
study  things  and  hence  individua,  and  to  consider  species  as  aggre- 
gates of  more  or  less  similar  things  on  which  we  determine  ourselves 
for  specified  purposes.  Farther  than  that  we  choose  not  to  go  just 

65  ^  Familiar  the  language  in  which  Boethius,  translating  Porphyry,  states  the 
problem,  Isagogen  Porphyrii  commenta  I,  10  (Vienna,  p.  159;  Berlin,  p.  25):  "Mox 
de  genenbus  et  speciebiis,  tllitd  qiiidem  sive  subsistaut  sive  in  solis  nitdis  intellecti- 
biis  posita  sint,  sive  subsisteutia  corporalia  sitit  an  incorporalia,  et  utriim  separata  a 
sensibilibiis  an  insensibilibus  posita  et  circa  haec  consistentia,  dicere  rectisabo." 
("Next,  as  regards  genera  and  species,  I  must  be  excused  from  deciding  whether 
they  are  real  or  are  mere  conceptions  of  the  mind,  whether  they  are  corporeal  or 
incorporeal  realities,  and  whether  they  are  real  apart  from  objects  or  are  attributes 
of  objects  inseparable  from  them.") 


32  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  ^66 

here,  though  without  prejudice  to  anybody's  privilege  of  going  be- 
yond the  point  at  which  we  stop. 

66.(The  fact  that  we  deal  with  individua  by  no  means  implies 
that  a  number  of  individua  taken  together  are  to  be  considered  a 
simple  sum.)  They  form  compounds  which,  like  chemical  com- 
pounds, may  have  properties  that  are  not  the  sum  of  the  properties 
of  their  components. 

67.(  Whether  the  principle  that  replaces  experience  or  observation 
be  theological,  metaphysical,  or  pseudo-experimental  may  be  of 
great  importance  from  certain  points  of  view;  but  it  is  of  no  im- 
portance whatever  from  the  standpoint  of  the  logico-experimental 
sciences)  St.  Augustine  denies  the  existerjce  of  antipodes  because 
Scripture  makes  no  mention  of  them.^  (in  general,  the  Church 
Fathers  find  all  their  criteria  of  truths,  even  of  experimental  truths,  ^ 
in  Holy  Writ.)Metaphysicists  make  fun  of  them  and  replace  their 
theological  principles  with  nrher  principles  just  as  remote  from 
experience.  (Scientists  who  came  after  Newton,  forgetting  that  he  ' 
had  wisely  halted  at  the  dictum  that  celestial  bodies  moved  as  if  by 
mutual  attraction  according  to  a  certain  law,ysaw  in  that  law  an  abso- 
lute principle,  divined  by  human  intelligence,  verified  by  experience, 
and  presumably  governing  all  creation  eternally.  But  the  principles 
of  mechanics  have  of  late  been  subjected  to  searching  criticism,  and 
the  conclusion  has  been  reached  that  only  facts  and  the  equations  , 
that  picture  them  can  stand.  Poincare  judiciously  observes  that  from 
'  the  very  fact  that  certain  phenomena  admit  of  a  mechanical  exr 
planation,  they  admit  also  nf  an  indefinite  number  of  other  explana- 
tions. 

68.  (AH  the  natural  sciences  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  are  ap- 
proximating the  logico-experimental  type  (I^i).  We  intend  to  study 
'sociology  in  just  that  fashion,  trying,  that  is,  to  reduce  it  to  the  same 

^pe)(§§6,486,5i4^). 

69.  The  course  we  elect  to  pursue  in  these  volumes  is  therefore  the 


followmg: 

o 


"^     i.[We  intend  in  no  way  to  deal  with  the  intrinsic  "truth"  of  any 

67  ^  For  his  arguments  see  §  485. 


i 


§69  THE  SCIENTIFIC  APPROACH  33 

religion  or  faith,  or  of  any  belief,  whether  ethical,  metaphysical,  or 
otherwise,  and  we  adopt  that  resolve  not  in  any  scorn  for  such  be- 
liefs, but  just  because  they  lie  beyond  the  limits  within  which  we 
have  chosen  to  confine  ourselves.  Relifflons,  beliefs,  and  the  like  we 
consider  strictly  from  the  outside  as  social  facts,  and  altogether  apart 
from  their  intrinsic  merits.  The  proposition  that  "A  must^  be  equal 
to  5^  in  virtue  of  some  higher  superexperimental  principle  escapes 
our  examination  entirely  (§  46) ;  but(we  do  want  to  know  how  that 
belief  arose  and  developed  and  in  what  relationships  it  stands  to 
other  social  facts.  N 

2/ The  field  in  which  we  move  is  therefore  the  field  of  experience 
and  observation  strictlyjWe  use  those  terms  in  the  meanings  they 
have  in  the  natural  sciences  such  as  astronomy,  chemistry,  physi- 
ology, and  so  on,  and  not  to  mean  those  other  things  which  it  is  the 
fashion  to  designate  by  the  terms  "inner"  or  "Christian"  experience, 
and  which  revive,  under  barely  altered  names,  the  "introspection" 
of  the  older  metaphysicists.  Such  introspection  we  consider  as  a 
strictly  objective  fact,  as  a  social  fact,  and  not  as  otherwise  concern- 
ing us. 

3.(Not  intruding  on  the  province  of  others,  we  cannot  grant  that 
others  are  to  intrude  on  ours.^  )We  deem  it  inept  and  idiotic  to  set 
up  experience  against  principles  transcending  experience:  l^ut  we 
likewise  deny  any  sovereignty  of  such  principles  over  experience.^ 

69  ^  Pareto,  Manuale,  Chap.  I,  §  §  39-40. 

69  -Ibid.,  Chap.  I,  §§  42-48. 

69  ^  These  volumes  were  already  in  type  when  an  article  by  Adrien  Naville  ap- 
peared in  the  Reuue  de  theologie  et  de  philosophie,  Sept.-Oct.,  1915,  excellently 
urging  against  the  theories  of  Bergson  ideas  similar  to  those  above.  The  conclusions 
of  a  thinker  of  Naville's  distinction  are  well  worth  noting.  Says  he,  p.  18:  "As  re- 
gards the  theory  of  the  two  truths  and  the  case  made  against  science,  I  have  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  science  is  limited,  relative,  in  part  conventional,  that  it  is 
immersed  in  mystery,  and  leaves  open  a  whole  world  of  questions  partaking  of  the 
nature  of  transcendental  speculation;  but  that  meantimeCin  its  own  domain  and  in 
the  fields  where  it  pronounces  judgment,  there  is  no  authority  higher  than  its  own.") 
Just  previously  Naville  had  said,  p.  3:  "A  strange  development  has  taken  place  in 
our  day/ The  sovereignty  of  science  has  been  brought  under  fire,) and  not  by  back- 
ward mmds  stifled  in  roudne,  not  by  partisans  of  ignorance  and  of  a  dogma  con- 
cerned to  endure  for  ever  unchanged,  but  by  most  wide-awake,  most  open-minded, 
most  active  intelligences^Science  is  being  called  to  the  bar  by  very  enlightened  and 


34  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §69 

4.  We  start  with  facts  to  work  out  theorjes,  and  we  try  at  all  times 
to  stray  from  the  facts  as  little  as  possible. (We  do  not  know  what  the 
"essences"  of  things  are  (§§  19,  91,  530)  and  we  ignore  them,  since 
that  investigation  oversteps  our  field  (§91).  We  are  looking  for  the 

very  daring  innovators.  1  .  .  Not  that  the  cult  of  science  has  entirely  disappeared. 
One  might  even  say  that  it  has  become  wide-spread  and  that  worshippers  of  science 
are  more  numerous  today  than  fifty  years  ago.  The  masses  at  large  are  professing 
for  science  a  reverence  that  seems  to  be  on  the  increase  [§  2392]  and  their  leaders 
are  encouraging  that  attitude  in  them.  .  .  .  But  if  science  has  maintained  all  its 
prestige  for  those  who  move  on  the  lower  or  middle  planes  of  the  intellectual 
world,  the  case  is  different  with  those  who  dwell  on  the  summits.  These  latter  have 
grown  mistrustful  of  science — they  are  talking  back,  criticizing,  drawing  up  an 
indictment  and  demanding  an  answer."  After  reviewing  a  number  of  such  criti- 
cisms, Naville  continues,  p.  16:  "M.  Bergson  ...  is  one  of  the  severest  critics  that 
science  has  ever  had.  Not  that  he  despises  the  thing,  by  any  means;  he  vaunts  its 
merits  as  loudly  as  anyone,  but  only  on  condition  that  science  attend  to  its  own  busi- 
ness, which  is,  one  might  say,  to  (formulate  the  truth  that  is  useful  and  not  the 
truth  that  is  true.j  The  truth  that  is  true  can  be  obtained  only  by  procedures  that 
are  altogether  different  from  the  procedures  of  science." 

So  by  plain  observation  of  facts  and  without  any  preconceived  theories,  Naville 
is  led  to  note  a  particular  case  of  a  phenomenon  of  which  we  shall  state  the  general 
theory  in  Chapter  XII  (§§  2339  f.);  and  in  the  same  way  he  goes  on  to  note  other 
particular  cases  of  the  same  thing,  p.  6:  "That  there  are  two  truths  [Two?  There 
are  an  infinite  number  of  truths:  qiiot  homines  tot  sententiae!^-{—t\\t  one  profound, 
philosophy,  the  other  less  profound  and,  in  a  word,  less  true — is  a  thesis  that  has 
frequendy  turned  up  in  the  course  of  history.'!  From  the  standpoint  of  logic  and 
experience,  this  notion  of  a  number  of  different  truths  is  a  vagary  without  head_or 
tail,  a  hotchpotch  of  meaningless  words;  but  from  the  standpoint  of  sentiments  and 
the  social  or  individual  utility  of  sentiments  (§§  1678  f.)  it  expresses,  be  it  only  by 
combating  one  error  with  another,  jhe  discrepancy  between  experierf^f  ^r,A  the 
do^ma  that  non-|ofjfp1  af*^'"""  ^'•■fT'"irr  fi^clusivelv  in  niitwnr"i  ^^""•'^i  ''"^  p^''- 
nicious  prejudices  (§  1679).  Says  Naville,  pp.  7-8:  "In  Western  Europe  it  [the  the- 
ory  or  tne  two  truths]  came  to  the  fore  with  particular  aggressiveness  in  the  latter 
centuries  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Its  appearance  marked  the  decline  and  heralded  the 
demise  of  Scholasticism.  Scholasticism  had  been  an  alliance  between  Church  doctrine 
and  philosophy.  There  were  two  Scholasticisms  in  Europe,  the  one  Christian,  the 
other  Judaic.  .  .  ^When  Greek  came  to  be  known  and  acquaintance  with  Aristotle 
to  be  intimate,  the  Church  had  to  decide  whether  to  turn  her  back  on  Greek  science 
and  thought  or  accept  them  as  auxiliaries  and  alliesJS^e  adopted  the  latter  course, 
^d  ^^^  allinprp  was  Schnlasrirism.  The  Jewish  synagogue  did  likewise.  .  .  .  All 
the  same, (the  alliance  between  Church  doctrine  and  philosophical  speculation  had 
not  been  struck  on  a  footing  of  equalitv.)The  Church  claimed  the  MPP^'"  hand — sh^ 
was  mistress:  and  philosophical  research,  free  within  certain  limits,  was  not  expected 
to  overstep  them.  Towards  the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages  the  number  of  emancipated 
minds  progressively  increased,  and  then  the  theory  of  the  two  truths  came  quite 
generally  to  the  fore  in  university  circles,  notably  at  Paris  and  at  Padua." 

At  that  time  the  theory  served  as  a  bridge  between  the  theology  of  sentiment  and 


§69  LAWS  AS  UNIFORMITIES  35 

uniformities  presented  by  facts,*  and  those  uniformities  we  may  even 
call  laws  (§  99);  but  the  facts  are  not  subject  to  the  laws:  the  laws 
are  subject  to  the  facts.  Laws  imply  no  necessity  (§§29,  97).  They 
are  hypotheses  serving  to  epitomize  a  more  or  less  extensive  number 
of  facts  and  so  serving  only  until  superseded  by  better  ones. 

5.  Every  inquiry  of  ours,  therefore,  is  contingent,  relative,  yielding 
results  that  are  just  more  or  less  probable,  and  at  best  very  highly 
probable.  The  space  we  live  in  seems  actually  to  be  three-dimen- 
sional; but  if  someone  says  that  the  Sun  and  its  planets  are  one  day 
to  sweep  us  into  a  space  of  four  dimensions,  we  shall  neither  agree 
nor  disagree.  When  experimental  proofs  of  that  assertion  are  brought 
to  us,  we  shall  examine  them,  but  until  they  are,  the  problem  does 
not  interest  us.  Every  proposition  that  we  state,  not  excluding  propo-  f 
sitions  in  pure  logic,  must  be  understood  as  qualified  by  the  restric- 
tion within  the  limits  of  the  time  and  experience  \nown  to  us  (§  97). 

6.  We  argue  strictly  on  thiags  and  not  on  the  sentiments  that  the 
names  "of  things  awaken  in  us.  Those  sentiments  we  study  as  objec« 
tive  facts  strictly.  So,  for  example,  we  refuse  to  consider  whetherX 
an  action  be  "just"  or  "unjust,"  "moral"  or  "immoral,"  unless  the  j 
things  to  which  such  terms  refer  have  been  clearly  specified.  We^/ 
shall,  however,  examine  as  an  objective  fact  what  people  of  a  given 
social  class,  in  a  given  country,  at  a  given  time,  meant  when  they 
said  that  A  was  a  "just"  or  a  "moral"  act.  We  shall  see  what  their 
motives  were,  and  how  oftentimes  the  more  important  motives  have 
done  their  work  unbeknown  to  the  very  people  who  were  inspired 
by  them;  and  we  shall  try  to  dej^ermine  the  relationships  between 
such  facts  and  other  social  facts.(  We  shall  avoid  arguments  involv- 
ing terms  lacking  in  exactness  (§  486),  because  from  inexact  premises    - 
only  inexact  conclusions  can  be  drawn.^  But  such  arguments  we 


the  theology  of  reason,  and  its  indirect  consequences  were  favourable  to  experimental 
science.  Today  the  theory  is  serving  as  a  bridge  between  the  theology  of  reason  and 
the  theology  of  sentiment;  and  it  may  again  turn  out  to  be  to  the  benefit  of  experi-' 
mental  science  by  demonstrating  experimentally  the  individual  and  social  utility  of 
non-logical  conduct.  And  see  §§  1567-79. 

69  *  Pareto,  Maniiale,  Chap.  I,  §§  4  f . 

69  ^  As  always  we  use  the  terms  "exact,"  "exactness,"  in  the  sense  designated  in 
§§  108  and  119^.  They  are  applied  to  terms  that  designate  things  with  the  closest 


\ 


36  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §69 

shall  examine  as  social  facts;  indeed^ we  have  in  mind  to  solve  a 
very  curious  problem  as  to  how  premises  altogether  foreign  to  reality 
sometimes  yield  inferences  that  come  fairly  close  to  reality]  (Chapter 

XI). 

7.  Proofs  of  our  propositions  we  seek  strictly  in  experience  and 
observation,  along  with  the  logical  inferences  they  admit  of,  bar- 
ring all  proof  by  accord  of  sentiments,  "inner  persuasion,"  "dictate  of 
conscience." 

8.  For  that  reason  in  particular  we  shall  keep  strictly  to  terms 

approximation  possible.  The  chemist  does  not  reject  the  term  "water"  for  pure 
water — as  pure,  that  is,  as  can  be  obtained  with  the  means  at  present  at  our  com- 
mand; but  he  would  reject  it  as  a  designation  for  sea-water.  The  mathematician 
knows  very  well  that  there  is  no  number  that,  when  multiplied  by  itself,  gives  2 — 
which  is,  in  other  words,  the  square  root  of  2;  but  he  does  not  scruple  to  use  a 
number  as  approximate  as  is  required  for  the  calculation  he  has  in  hand,  say  the 
number  1.414214;  yet  he  would  refuse  to  use  the  number  5  for  the  same  computa- 
tion. Mathematicians  have  proceeded  as  though  a  square  root  of  2  (in  general,  an 
irrational  number)  existed.  They  have  now  come  to  recognize  the  necessity  of  using 
instead  two  classes  of  real  numbers,  the  first  containing  all  rational  numbers  with 
squares  less  than  2,  the  second,  all  rational  numbers  with  squares  larger  than  2.  The 
example  is  noteworthy  on  two  accounts: 

1.  It  illustrates  the  continuous  development  of  science,  by  showing  how  in  a  sci- 
ence as  perfect,  as  exact,  as  mathematics  improvements  in  the  direction  of  greater 
perfection  and  exactness  have  still  been  possible.  Similar  improvements  might  be 
mentioned  in  mathematical  series,  and  in  many  mathematical  demonstrations. 

2.  It  is  an  example  of  successive  approximation  in  the  sense  of  gradual  progress 
towards  greater  and  greater  exactness.  The  mathematicians  of  antiquity  wisely 
avoided  the  risk  of  losing  their  way  among  such  niceties,  and  modern  mathemati- 
cians have  just  as  wisely  gone  into  them.  The  ancients  were  paving  the  way  for  the 
moderns;  the  moderns  are  paving  the  way  for  their  successors.  Hipparchus,  Kepler, 
Newton,  Laplace,  Gauss,  Poincare,  represent  successive  approximations  in  celestial 
mechanics.  Hegel  reached  the  absolute  in  one  bound;  but  there  is  this  differ- 
ence between  his  speculations  and  the  theories  of  those  scientists:  With  Hegel's  the- 
ories one  could  not  locate  a  star,  however  indefinitely — he  leaves  one  in  the  fix  of 
a  mathematician  taking  100  as  the  square  root  of  2;  whereas  with  scientific  theo- 
ries one  may  determine  those  locations  roughly  and  with  closer  and  closer  approxi- 
mation, being  in  the  position  of  the  mathematician  utilizing  some  value  such  as 
1.414214  as  the  square  root  of  2.  We  are  trying  to  follow  in  sociology  the  path  trod- 
den before  us  by  astronomers,  physicists,  chemists,  geologists,  botanists,  zoologists, 
physiologists,  in  short,  by  all  natural  scientists  of  modern  times;  and  to  avoid,  so 
far  as  within  us  lies,  the  road  that  led  the  Church  Fathers  to  denying  the  existence 
of  antipodes,  and  Hegel  to  prattling  about  mechanics,  chemistry,  and  other  similar 
sciences — and  which  is  generally  followed  by  metaphysicists,  theologians,  and  men 
of  letters  in  studies  that  they  pretend  deal  with  facts  of  nature  but  which  in  reality 
are  a  mere  hotchpotch  of  sentiments. 


§71  THE  SCIENTIFIC  APPROACH  37 

corresponding  to  things,  using  the  utmost  care  and  endeavour  to 
have  them  as  definite  as  possible  in  meaning  (§  108). 

9.  We  shall  proceed  by  successive  afproximations.  That  is  to  say, 
we  shall  first  consider  things  as  wholes,  deliberately  ignoring  de- 
tails. Of  the  latter  we  shall  then  take  account  in  successive  approxi- 
mations (§54o).^„.> 

70.  We  in  no  sense  mean  to  imply  that  the  course  we  follow  is 
better  than  others,  for  the  reason,  if  for  no  other,  that^he  term  "bet- 
ter" in  this  case  has  no  meaning.  jNo  comparison  is  possjble  between 
theories  altogether  contingent  and  theories  recognizing  an  absolute. 
They  are  heterogeneous  things  and  can  never  be  brought  together 
(§  16).  If  someone  chooses  to  construct  a  system  of  sociology  start- 
ing with  this  or  that  theological  or  metaphysical  principle  or,  fol- 
lowing a  contemporary  fashion,  with  the  principles  of  "progressive 
democracy,"  we  shall  pick  no  quarrel  with  him,  and  his  work  we 
shall  certainly  not  disparage.(The  quarrel  will  not  become  inevitable 
until  we  are  asked  in  the  name  of  those  principles  to  accept  some 
conclusion  that  falls  within  the  domain  of  experience  and  observa- 
tion.JTo  go  back  to  the  case  of  St.  Augustine :  When  he  assorts  that 
the_Scriptures  are  inspired  of  God,  we  have  no  objection  to  the 
proposition,  which  we  do  not  comprehend  very  clearly  to  begin  with. 
But  when  he  sets  out  to  prove  by  the  Scriptures  that  there  are  no 
antipodes  (§  485),  we  have  no  interest  in  his  arguments,(since  juiis- 
diction  in  the  premises  belongs  to  experience  and  observation.] 

71.  We  move  in  a  narrow  field,  the  field,  namely,  of  experience 

69  ^  Pareto,  Mantiale,  Chap.  I,  §  14.  I  have  given  many  illustrations  of  the  method 
of  successive  approximations  in  my  Cotirs  and  Manuale.  For  sociology  a  good  ex- 
ample is  available  in  Marie  Kolabinska's  La  circulation  des  elites  en  France.  The 
writer  vi'isely  centred  on  the  main  elements  in  her  problem,  disregarding  the  sec- 
ondary. That  method  is  the  only  one  that  can  be  followed  if  one  is  to  construct  a 
scientific  theory  and  steer  clear  of  the  divagations  of  that  ethical  literature  which  is 
sdll  passed  off  as  sociology.  Many  further  examples  of  successive  approximadons  will 
be  found  in  these  volumes. 

70  ^  Hence  also  we  refrain  from  passing  any  judgment  on  the  conflict  now  raging 
on  the  matter  of  divine  inspiration  between  Catholic  orthodoxy  and  the  Modernists. 
The  subject  lies  outside  the  field  in  which  we  choose  to  remain.  We  must,  how- 
ever, remark  that  the  interpretation  of  the  Modernists  has  really  nothing  to  do  with 
the  posidve  sciences. 


30S92 


38  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §72 

and  observation.  We  do  not  deny  that  there  are  other  fields,  but  in 
these  volumes  we  elect  not  to  enter  themAOur  purpose  is  to  discover 
theories  that  picture  facts  of  experience  and  observation  ](§  486),  and 
in  these  volumes  we  refuse  to  go  beyond  that.  If  anyone  is  minded 
to  do  so,  if  anyone  craves  an  excursion  outside  the  logico-experir. 

j  mental  field,  he  should  seek  other  company  and  drop  ours,  for  he 

I  mil  find  us  disappointing. 

C  72.  We  differ  radically  from  many  people  following  courses  simi- 
lar to  ours  in  thatAve  do  not  deny  the  social  utility  of  theories  unlike 
our  own)  On  the  contrary  we  believe  that  in  certain  cases  they  may 
be  very  beneficial.  Correlation  of  the  social  utility  of  a  theory  with 
its  experimental  truth  is,  in  fact,  one  of  those  a  priori  principles 
which  we  reject  (§14).  Do  the  two  things  always  go  hand  in  hand, 
or  do  they  not?  Observation  of  facts  alone  can  answer  the  question; 
and  the  pages  which  follow  will  furnish  proofs  that  the  two  things 
can,  in  certain  cases,  be  altogether  unrelated. 

73.  I  ask  the  reader  to  bear  in  mind,  accordingly,  that  when  I  call 
a  doctrine  absurd,  in  no  sense  whatever  do  I  mean  to  imply  that  it 
is  detrimental  to  society:  on  the  contrary,  it  may  be  very  beneficial. 
Conversely,  when  I  assert  that  a  theory  is  beneficial  to  society,  in  no 
wise  do  I  mean  to  imply  that  it  is  experimentally  true.  In  short,  a 
idoctrine  may  be  ridiculed  on  its  experimental  side  and  at  the  same 
ftime  respected  from  the  standpoint  of  its  social  utility.  And  vice 
versa. 

7C  in  general,  when  I  call  attention  to  some  untoward  conse- 
quence of  a  thing  A,  indeed  one  very  seriously  so,  in  no  way  do  I 
mean  to  imply  that  A  on  the  whole  is  detrimental  to  society;  for 
there  may  be  good  effects  to  overbalance  the  bad.  Conversely,  when 
I  call  attention  to  a  good  effect  of  A,  great  though  it  be,  I  do  not  at 
all  imply  that  on  the  whole  A  is  beneficial  to  society. 

75.  The  warning  I  have  just  given  I  had  to  give,  for  in  general 
people  writing  on  sociology  for  purposes  of  propaganda  and  with 
ideals  to  defend  speak  in  unfavourable  terms  alone  of  things  they 
consider  bad  on  the  whole,  and  favourably  of  things  they  consider 
good  on  the  whole.  Furthermore,  since  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent 


§76  THE   SYNTHETIC   JUDGMENT  39 

they  use  arguments  based  on  accords  of  sentiment  (§§  41,  514),  they 
are  induced  to  manifest  their  own  sympathies  in  order  to  win  the 
sympathies  of  others. (They  look  at  facts  with  not  altogether  in- 
different eves?)They  love  and  they  hate,  and  they  disclose  their  loves 
and  their  hares,  their  likes  and  dislikes.  Accustomed  to  that  manner 
of  doing  and  saying,  a  reader  very  properly  concludes  that  if  a  writer 
speaks  unfavourably  of  a  thing  and  stresses  one  or  another  of  its  de- 
fects, that  means  that  on  the  whole  he  judges  it  bad  and  is  un- 
favourably disposed  towards  it;  whereas  if  he  speaks  favourably  of  a^  Tj<n^ 
thing  and  stresses  one  or  another  of  its  good  points,  on  the  whole  he       C^ 
deems  it  good  and  is  favourably  disposed  towards  it.(That  rule  does 
not  apply  to  this  work^and  I  shall  feel  obliged  to  remind  the  reader 
of  that  fact  over  and  over  again  (§311).  In  these  volumes  I  am  rea- 
soning objectively,  analytically,  according  to  the  logico-experimental  \ 
method.  In  no  way  am  I  called  upon  to  make  known  such  senti-  \ 
ments  as  I  may  happen  to  cherish,  and  the  objective  judgment  I    I 
pass  upon  one  aspect  of  a  thing  in  no  sense  implies  a  similar  judg-  "'"V 
ment  on  the  thing  considered  synthetically  as  a  whole,^ 
76.  If  one  person  would  persuade  another  on  matters  pertaining 

75  -^  I  am  going  to  register  just  one  exception  at  this  point,  and  after  all  it  is 
more  apparent  than  real,  sinjfe  it  aims  at  clearer  explanation,  by  an  example,  of  the 
objective  fact  here  in  point^J  shall  have  occasion  hereafter  to  speak  unfavourably, 
very  much  so,  of  certain  acts  by  Athenian  demagogues. /Now  I  do  not  imagine  the 
reader  is  especially  concerned  to  know  my,g]flbal  personal  attitude  towards  the  ^f 
ancient  Athenian  republic.  However,  if  I  may  be  allowed  to  state  it,(l  will  say  that 
I  do  not  think  anyone  admires  or  loves  the  Greek  mind  more  than  I  do)  I  shall 
poke  fun  at  the  "goddess  Scignce."  ^^t  the  fact  stands  that  I  have  devoted  mv 
life  to  experimental  science.  [One  may  ridicule  the  democratic  humanitarianism  of 
this  or  that  French  politician  and  still  hold  the  scientists  of  that  country  in  highest 
esteem^and  even  regard  the  republican  form  of  government  as  perhaps  the  best  for 
France. (,One  may  note  the  licentiousness  of  certain  emancipated  women  in  the 
United  States  and  still  cherish  the  deepest  reverence  for  the  many  admirable  wives 
and  mothers  who  are  to  be  found  in  that  country.!  Finally,(^ to  point  the  finger  of 
scorn  at  the  hypocrisies  of  German  sex-reformers  is  not  inconsistent  with  admira- 
tion for  their  mighty  nation  and  reverence  for  German  scholarship.^!  deem  it  su- 
perfluous to  note  similar  contrasts  in  the  case  of  my  own  country,  Italy.  That  is  my 
whole  confession.  I  urgently  beg  the  reader  to  be  convinced  that  this  exception  will 
have  no  counterparts.  These  volumes  should  be  read  not  for  something  that  is  not  | 
therg; — a  statement,  namely,  nf  my  personal  sentiments — but  exclusively  for  reports  / 
on  objective  relationships  between  things,  between  facts,  and  between  experimental  I 
uniformities. 


40  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §77 

to  experimental  science,  he  chiefly  and,  better  yet,  exclusively,  states 
facts  and  logical  implications  of  facts  (§42).  Butj^if  he  would  per- 
suade another  on  matters  pertaining  to  what  is  still  called  social 
science,  his  chief  appeal  is  to  sentiments,  with  a  supplement  of  facts 
and  logical  inferences  from  facts)  And  he  must  proceed  in  that 
fashion  if  his  idea  is  to  talk  not  in  vain;  for  if  he  were  to  disregard 
sentiments,  he  would  persuade  very  few  and  in  all  probability  fail 
to  get  a  hearing  at  all,  whereas  if  he  knows  how  to  play  deftly  on 
sentiments,  his  reputation  for  eloquence  will  soar  (§  514).^ 

77.  Political  economy  has  hitherto  been  a  practical  discipline  de- 
signed to  influence  human  conduct  in  one  direction  or  another.  It 
could  hardly  be  expected,  therefore,  to  avoid  addressing  sentiment, 
and  in  fact  it  has  not  done  so.  All  along  economists  have  given  us 
systems  of  ethics  supplemented  in  varying  degree  with  narrations  of 
facts  and  elaborations  of  the  logical  implications  of  facts.  That  is 
Istrikingly  apparent  in  the  writings  of  Bastiat;  but  it  is  apparent 
enough  in.  virtually  all  writings  on  economics,  not  excluding  works 
Jbf  the  historical  school,  which  are  oftentimes  more  metaphysical  and 
/sentimental  than  the  rest.  As  mere,  examples  of  forecasts  based  on 
/  the  scientific  laws  of  political  economy  and  sociology  (to  the  ex- 
j  elusion  of  sentiment),  I  offer  the  following.  The  first  volume  of  my 
/  Cours  appeared  in  the  year  1896,  but  had  been  written  in  1895,  with 
/    statistical  tables  coming  down  not  later  than  the  year  1894. 
J        I.  Contrarily  to  the  views  of  ethical  sociologists,  whether  of  the 
',    historical  school  or  otherwise,  and  of  sentimental  anti-Malthusians, 
at  that  time  I  wrote  with  reference  to  population  increase :  "We  are 
therefore  witnessing  rates  of  increase  in  our  day  that  cannot  have 
obtained  in  times  past  and  cannot  continue  to  hold  in  the  future."  ^ 
And  I  mentioned  in  that  connexion  the  examples  of  England  and 
Germany.  As  for  England,  there  were  already  signs  of  a  slackening. 
Not  so  for  Germany,  where  there  were  as  yet  no  grounds,  em- 

76  ^  This  topic  is  touched  upon  just  incidentally  here.  It  belongs  to  our  study  of 
the  objective  aspect  of  theories  (§  13)  and  will  be  amply  developed  in  due  course. 

77  ^  Cours,  §  198. 





§77  SCIENTIFIC  PREDICTIONS  4I 

pirically,  for  arriving  at  any  conclusions  whatever.  But  now  both 
countries  show  a  decHning  curve.^ 

2.  With  specific  reference  to  England,  after  determining  the  law 
of  population  increase  for  the  years  1801-91,  I  concluded  that  popu- 

77  -Ibid.,  §  196:  "It  is  therefore  quite  evident  that  the  population  of  the  three 
countries  considered  cannot  continue  to  increase  indefinitely  at  the  present 
rate."  The  three  countries  were  Norway,  England-Wales,  and  Germany.  As  regards 
Norway,  the  annual  rate  of  geometric  increase,  which  was  13.9  per  cent  for  the 
period  1861-80,  fell  to  5.7  per  cent  for  the  period  1905-10.  For  England-Wales  and 
Germany  the  figures  are  as  follows: 

PERCENTAGE   OF    INXREASE 

YEARS                                                                England-Wales  Germany 

1880-85   II. I  7.1 

1885-90    13.4  10.7 

1890-95   11.5  11.3 

1895-1900   II. 5  15-2 

1900-05   10.6  14.7 

1905-10  10.4  13.7 

"It  is  evident  that  after  reaching  a  maximum  in  the  years  1 895-1900,  the  rate  of 
population  increase  in  Germany  is  now  [1910]  on  a  descending  curve.  The  falling- 
ofT  in  rate  is  more  clearly  apparent  still  from  the  annual  statistics  of  births  per  thou- 
sand: 

PERCENTAGE    OF   INCREASE 

YEARS  Norway         England-Wales  Germany 

1875     31-2  354  40.6 

1885     31.3  32-9  37-0 

1895     30-5  30.3  36-1 

1900     29.9  28.7  35.6 

1905     27.4  27.3  33.0 

1910  26.1  25.1  3 1. 1  (for  1909) 

"The  falling-off  in  the  rate  of  population  increase  in  Germany  is  especially  notable 
in  the  large  cities,  where  wealth  has  appreciably  increased: 

NUMBER  OF  BIRTHS  PER   1000  INHABITANTS 
GERMANY  I9O2,  I912 

Munich    35-i  21.9 

Leipzig    31-5  22.1 

Dresden     31.5  20.3 

Cologne   37-8  26.7 

Magdeburg   29.2  22.8 

Stettin    35-3  22.7 

Danzig    34-7  -7-6" 

That  substantiates  what  I  wrote  in  my  Cows,  §  198:  "It  is  therefore  evident  that 
forces  limiting  increment  in  population  must  have  interfered  widi  the  genetic  tend- 
ency in  times  past,  or  will  do  so  in  the  future." 


42  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §77 

lation  could  not  continue  to  increase  at  the  same  rate.  And  the  rate 
has  in  fact  fallen.^ 

3.  ("The  gains  made  by  certain  Socialistic  ideas  in  England  are 
probably  the  result  of  an  increment  in  the  economic  obstacles  to 

^ population  increase.'T  The  soundness  of  that  conclusion  is  even 
more  apparent  now.  Socialism  has  progressed  in  England,  while  a 
falling-off  has  been  observable  in  the  other  countries  in  Europe. 

4.  In  Chapter  XII  we  shall  see  a  verification  of  a  sociological  law 
that  I  used  in  my  Systemes  socialistes. 

5.  The  second  volume  of  my  Cours  was  published  In  1897.  At  that 

77  ^Ibid.,  §  211  ^.  If  P  is  the  population  in  the  year  /,  reckoning  from  the  year 

1801,  we  get:  ,       ,,        ^    ^         ■  ^ 

log  P  =z  6.96324  -)-  0.005637/. 

That  yields  the  theoretical  law  of  population  for  the  years  1801-91.  The  following 
figures  are  given  in  my  Coins: 

POPULATION    (in   millions) 

YEARS  Real  Estimated  Difference 

1801 8.892  9.188  +0.296 

1811 10.164  10.294  -j- 0.130 

1821 12.000  11.912  — 0.088 

1831 13-897  13-563  —  0.334 

1841 15-914  15-443  —0.471 

1851  17.928  17.583  —0.345 

1861 20.066  20.020  —  0.046 

1871 22.712  22.795  +  0.083 

1881 25.975  25.953  — 0.022 

1891 29.001  29.551  -{-0.550 

The  greatest  difference,  in  other  words  the  maximum  error,  arising  in  the  appli- 
cation of  the  formula  is  0.550.  Using  the  formula  to  estimate  population  for  the 
year  1910,  we  get  37.816,  while  the  actual  population  was  35.796.  The  difference  is 
-|-  2.020,  a  figure  much  greater  than  the  maximum  error.  That  proves  that  popula- 
tion is  no  longer  following  the  law  observable  for  the  years  1801-91,  and  that  it  is 
increasing  at  a  slower  rate. 

77  ^  Ibid.,  §  211  ^.  The  remark  has  to  be  taken  in  connexion  with  matter  preced- 
ing, §§  179-80:  "Movements  in  the  transformation  of  personal  capital  are  in  part  de- 
pendent on  the  economic  movement.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  we  have  not 
shown  their  explicit  dependence  on  the  economic  situation,  but  merely  their  de- 
pendence on  variations  in  it  [In  a  note:]  If  the  economic  situation  is  characterized 
by  a  function  F  of  any  number  of  variables  that  are  functions  of  the  time  /,  then 
we  have  shown  that  the  numbers  of  marriages,  births,  and  to  a  certain  extent  also 

dF 
deaths,  are  a  function  of——;  but  we  have  not  shown  that  such  numbers  are  explicit 
dt 

functions  of  F." 


II 


§  8o  FACTS  43 

time  it  was  an  article  of  faith  with  many  people  that  social  evolution 
was  in  the  direction  of  the  rich  growing  richer  and  the  poor,  poorer. 
Contrarily  to  that  sentimental  view,  the  law  of  distribution  of  in- 
come led  to  the  proposition  ^  that  "if  total  income  increases  with 
respect  to  population,  there  must  be  either  an  increase  in  the  mini- 
mum income,  or  a  decrease  in  inequality  in  incomes,  or  the  two 
things  must  result  simultaneously."  Between  1897  ^^^  ^9^^  there 
was  an  increase  in  total  income  as  compared  with  population,  and 
what  in  fact  resulted  was  an  increase  in  minimum  income  and  a 
decrease  in  inequality  in  incomes.^  A  counter-proof,  furthermore,  is 
available  in  the  fact  that  my  Cours  is  defective  in  those  sections  into 
which  sentiment  was  allowed  to  intrude.^ 

78.f  A  person  often  accepts  a  proposition  for  no  other  reason  than 
that  It  accords  with  his  sentiments.N  Such  accord,  indeed,  usually 
makes  a  proposition  more  "obvious.  And  from  the  standpoint  of 
social  utility  in  many  cases  it  is  perhaps  well  that  that  be  so(  But 
from  the  standpoint  of  experimental  science,  such  accord  has  little 
value  and  often  none  whatever )Of  that  I  shall  give  many  examples. 

79.(  Since  I  intend  in  these  volumes  to  take  my  stand  strictly  with- 
in the  field  of  experimental  science,  I  shall  try  to  avoid  any  appeal 
to  the  reader's  sentiments  whatsoever  and  keep  to  facts  and  impli- 
cations of  facts.'^ 

80.(When  a  writer  is  "doing  literature"  or  addressing  sentiments 
in  any  way  at  all,  he  finds  it  necessary,  in  deference  to  them,  to 
choose  between  the  facts  he  nses^  Not  all  of  them  rise  to  the  dignity 
of  rhetorical  or  historical  propriety.  There  is  an  aristocracy  of  facts 
reference  to  which  is  always  commendable.  There  is  a  commonalty 
of  facts  reference  to  which  incurs  neither  praise  nor  blame.  There 
is  a  proletariat  of  facts  reference  to  which  is  at  all  times  improper 

77  5  Ibid.,  §  965. 

77  ^  A  definition  of  "decrease  in  inequality  in  incomes"  is  given  in  Ibid.,  §  965  ^. 
See  also  my  Manuel,  pp.  389  f.,  and  Sensini,  La  teoria  della  rendita,  pp.  342-53,  and 
especially  p.  350,  §  185.* 

77  '^  A  criticism  of  the  passages  may  be  found  in  the  introduction  to  my  Manttale, 
where  the  various  errors  are  duly  noted. 

79  ^  That  is  why  there  will  be  so  many  notes  with  quotations.  Their  design  is 
to  keep  the  body  of  facts  vividly  present  before  the  reader's  mind. 


44  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §8l 

and  reprehensible/ So  amateur  entomologists  may  find  it  pleasant  to 
catch  bright-coloured  butterflies,  just  routine  to  catch  flies  and 
wasps,  loathsome  to  lay  hand  to  dung-  and  carrion-beetles.  But  the 
naturalist  knows  no  such  distinctions,  nor  do  they  arise  for  us  in  the 
field  of  social  science  )(§§  85,  896). 

Csi.  We  keep  open  house  to  all  facts,  whatever  their  character. 
provided  that  directly  or  indirectly  they  point  the  way  to  discovering 
a  uniformity.  Even  an  absurd,  an  idiotic  argument  is  a  fact,  and  if 
accepted  by  any  large  number  of  people,  a  fact  of  great  importance 
to  sociology. (Beliefs,  whatever  their  character,  are  also  facts,  and 
their  importance  depends  not  on  their  intrinsic  merits,  but  on  the 

/  greater  or  fewer  numbers  of  individuals  who  profess  them.  JThey 
serve  furthermore  to  reveal  the  sentiments  of  such  individuals,  and 
sentiments  are  among  the  most  important  elements  with  which 
sociology  is  called  upon  to  deal  (§  69-6).^^^^ 

82.  The  reader  must  bear  that  in  mind,  as  he  encounters  in  these 
volumes  facts  which  at  first  blush  might  seem  insignificant  or 
childish{  Tales,  legends,  the  fancies  of  magic  or  theology,  may  often 
be  accounted  idle  and  ridiculous  things — and  such  they  are,  in- 
trinsically; but  then  again  they  may  be  very  helpful  as  tools  for 
discovering  the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  men.  po  the  psychiatrist 
studies  the  ravings  of  the  lunatic  not  for  their  intrinsic  worth  but  for 
their  value  as  symptoms  of  disease. 

83.  The  road  that  is  to  lead  us  to  the  uniformities  we  seek  may 
at  times  seem  a  long  one.  If  that  is  the  case,  it  is  simply  because  I 
have  not  succeeded  in  finding  a  shorter.  If  someone  manages  to  do 
so,  all  the  better;  I  will  straightway  leave  my  road  for  his.  Mean- 
time I  deem  it  the  wiser  part  to  push  on  along  the  only  trail  as  yet 
blazed. 

84.(lf  one's  aim  is  to  inspire  or  re-enforce  certain  sentiments  in 
men,  one  must  present  facts  favourable  to  that  design  and  keep  un- 
favourable data  quiet.Jput  if  one  is  interested  strictly  in  uniformities, 
one  must  not  ignore  any  fact  that  may  in  any  way  serve  to  dis- 
close them.)  And  since  my  aim  in  these  volumes  is  no  other,  J  refuse 


I 


§86  FACTS  OF  THE   PAST  45 

out  of  hand  to  consider  in  a  fact  anything  but  its  logic(k£xperi- 
mental  significance. 

85.  The  one  concession  that  I  can  make — and  really  it  is  not  so 
much  a  concession  as  a  grasp  at  some  method  for  securing  a  far 
greater  clearness  by  removing  from  the  reader's  eyes  any  veil  that 
sentiment  may  have  drawn  across  them — is  to  choose  from  the 
multitude  of  facts  such  as,  in  my  judgment,  vyill  exert  least  in- 
fluence upofn  sentiments.  So  u^hen  T  have  facts  of  equal  experimental 
value  before  me  from  the  past  and  from  the  present^  I  choose  facts 
of  the  past.  That  accounts  for  my  many  quotations  from  Greek  and 
Latin  winters,  (in  the  same  way,  when  I  have  facts  of  equal  experi- 
mental value  from  religions  now  extinct  and  religions  still  extant, 
I  give  my  preference  to  the  former.)But  to  prefer  a  thing  is  not  to  use 
it  exclusively.  ^In  many  many  cases  I  am  constrained  to  use  facts 
from  the  present  or  from  religions  still  existing,  sometimes  because 
I  have  no  other  facts  of  an  equivalent  experimental  value,  sometimes 
in  order  to  show  the  continuity  of  certain  phenomena  from  past  to 
present.  In  such  connexions  I  intend  to  write  with  absolute  freedom ; 
and  (the  same  frankness  I  maintain  against  the  malevolence  of  our 
modern  Paladins  of  Purity,  for  whom  I  care  not  the  proverbial  fig.^) 

86.  In  propounding  this  or  that  theory  an  author  as  a  rule  wants 
other  people  to  assent  to  it  and  adopt  it — in  him  the  seeker  after 
experimental  truth  and  the  apostle  stand  combined.  In  these  volumes 
I  keep  those  attitudes  strictly  separate,  retaining  the  first  and  barring 
the  second.  I^have  said,  and  I  repeat^  that  my  sole  interest  is  the. 
quest  for  social  uniformities,  social  laws.  I  am  here  reporting  on  the 
results  of  my  quest,  since  I  hold  that  in  view  of  the  restricted  num- 
ber of  readers  such  a  study  can  have  and  in  view  of  the  scientific 
training  that  may  be  taken  for  granted  in  them,  such  a  report  can 
do  no  harm.  I  should  refrain  from  doing  so  if  I  could  reasonably 
imagine  that  these  volumes  were  to  be  at  all  generally  read  (§§  14, 
1403)-' 

85  ^  See  in  this  connexion,  Pareto,  Le  mythe  vertuiste. 

86  ^  Running,  as  it  does,  counter  to  the  general  trend  in  the  social  sciences,  thus 
work  will  be  severely  criticized  by  all  individuals  whose  minds  are  closed  to  inno- 
vations from  a  habit  of  drifting  with  that  ciu-rent.  They  state  the  problem  of  judg- 


46  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §87 

87.  Long  ago  in  my  Maniude,  Chap.  I,  §  i,  I  wrote:  "It  is  pos- 
sible for  an  author  to  aim  exclusively  at  hunting  ou^J^nd  running 
down  uniformitjes_among  facts — th^eirjaws,  in  other  words— With- 
out having  any  purpose  of  direct  practical  utility  in  mind,  any  in- 
tention of  offering  remedies  and  precepts,  any  ambition,  even,  to 
\   promote  the  happiness  and  welfare  of  mankind  in  general  or  of  any 
\  part  of  mankind. \His  purpose  in  such  a  case  is  strictly  scientific:  he 
I  wants  to  learn,  to  \now,  and  nothing  more.  I  warn  the  reader  that 
*  in  this  Manual  I  am  trying  exclusively  to  realize  this  last  purpose 
only.  Not  that  I  und'errate  the  others  fl  am  just  drawing  distinctions 
between  methods,  separating  them  and  indicating  the  one  that  is 
to  be  followed  in  this  book.\[Anyone  differently  minded  can  find 
plenty  of  books  to  his  liking)  He  should  feast  on  them  and  leave  this 
one  alone,  for,  as  Boccaccio  said  of  his  tales  {Decameron,  X,  Co7i- 
clusione],  it  does  not  go  begging  a  hearing  of  anybody." 

Such  a  declaration  seems  to  me  clear  enough,  and  I  confess  that 
I  could  not  express  myself  in  plainer  terms^Yet  I  have  been  credited 
with  intentions  of  reforming  the  world,  and  even  been  compared 
to  Fourier!  M 

ing  a  theory  in  the  terms:  "Is  it  in  accord  with  the  theories  I  consider  good?"  If 
the  answer  is  yes,  they  classify  it  with  the  good  theories,  if  no,  with  the  bad.  It  is 
obvious  enough  that  being  at  variance  with  all  such  theories,  this  one  of  mine  will 
certainly  be  bad.  It  may  find  a  warmer  welcome  among  young  people  whose  minds 
are  not  yet  clogged  with  the  preconceptions  of  orthodox  science  and  among  people 
who  state  the  problem  of  judging  a  theory  in  the  terms:  "Is  it  in  accord  with  the 
facts?"  I  must  have  made  it  sufficiently  clear  by  this  time  that  that  is  the  only 
accord  I  seek,  and  that  I  have  no  interest  whatsoever  in  anything  else. 

87  ^  In  the  year  1909  and  with  the  Manmile,  which  had  appeared  in  1906,  before 
his  eyes.  Professor  Gide,  Histoire  des  doctrines  economiques,  p.  623,  was  able  to 
write:  "The  Hedonists  [Among  whom  Gide  counts  V.  Pareto — on  what  grounds, 
he  only  knows]  are  very  reticent  as  regards  the  possibilides  of  realizing  their  eco- 
nomic world.  On  the  other  hand  they  are  very  positive,  in  fact  a  litde  too  much  so, 
as  regards  the  virtues  of  their  method,  not  being  exempt  on  that  score  from  a  dog- 
matic conceit  that  reminds  one  of  the  Utopian  Socialists.  One  seems  to  be  listening 
to  Fourier  when  one  reads  that  'what  has  already  been  discovered  in  political 
economy  is  nothing  as  compared  with  what  may  be  discovered  hereafter' — by  the 
mathematical  method,  of  course."  Gide  ascribes  his  quotation  to  one  "V.  Pareto, 
["Le  niiove  teorie  economiche"],  Giornale  degli  economisti,  September,  1901."  Even 
if  the  quotation  were  exact,  M.  Gide  might  at  least  have  noted  that  V.  Pareto  had 
changed  his  views,  as  is  apparent  enough  from  his  Manuale.  But  it  is  not  exact,  for 
M.  Gide  is  thinking  of  practice,  whereas  I  was  thinking  stricdy  of  pure  theory!  A 


II 


§88  THE   SCIENTIFIC  APPROACH  47 

88.  In  general^  this  method  of  studying  the  social  sciences  is  not 
grasped  by  literary  economists,  the  cast  of  their  minds  being  against 
any  such  thing.  )Then  again  they  often  discuss  books  and  other 
writings  that  they  know  only  at  second  hand,  and  which  they  have 
never  read,  or  never  read  with  the  care  required  for  understanding 
them.  Finally,  the  person  who  has  always  had  some  practical  pur- 
pose in  view  can  hardly  be  convinced  that  anyone  can  have  a  purely 
scientific  aim;  or  if  he  does  understand  it  for  a  moment,  he  imme- 
diately forgets.(l  have  therefore  little  hope  that  the  cautions  I  have 
voiced  in  this  chapter  will  effectually  prevent  theories  which  I  do 
not  hold  from  being  ascribed  to  me,Jsimilar  warnings  having  failed 
on  past  occasions,  though  endlessly  repeated.  Yet  it  seems  best  to 
me  to  follow  the  maxim  "Do  what  you  ought,  follow  what  may." 
Only  I  must  beg  my  reader's  pardon  for  certain  repetitions  that 
have  no  other  justification,  and  which  may  appear  superfluous — as 
they  in  fact  are  for  anyone  consenting  to  read  what  I  say  with 
moderate  attention. 

good  guess  would  be  that  M.  Gide  had  not  read  the  article  from  which  he  quoted. 
My  article  says,  p.  239:  ".  .  .  Now  the  outstanding  trait  in  the  new  economic 
theories  is  that  they  are  the  only  ones  so  far  to  have  given  us  a  general  picture  of 
the  economic  phenomenon  as  a  whole.  The  picture  is  just  approximative,  much  like 
a  sphere  offered  as  a  model  of  the  Earth.  All  the  same  we  know  of  nothing  better." 
On  p.  241,  as  to  "the  equations  of  pure  economics,"  I  clearly  state  that  they  are  of 
service  only  as  instruments  for  study,  much  as  it  is  of  service  to  know,  for  instance, 
the  dimensions  of  the  terrestrial  ellipsoid.  On  p.  242:  "Pure  economics,  one  may 
say,  has  indeed  found  the  tool  for  its  researches,  but  it  has  hardly  begun  to  use  it. 
Practically  everything  along  that  line  is  still  to  be  done;  and  economists  really 
devoted  to  the  progress  of  their  science  ought  to  set  about  doing  it."  I  was  speaking 
of  science,  pure  science,  and  not  of  practical  applications,  as  Gide's  allusion  to 
Fourier  would  insinuate.  I  conclude,  p.  252,  with  the  quotation  that  Gide  detached 
from  its  context — with  a  remodelling  to  boot:  "We  are  in  the  first  stages  of  the 
new  science,  and  what  it  has  already  achieved  is  nothing  as  compared  with  the 
results  it  may  achieve  hereafter.  The  present  state  of  pure  economics  is  not  even 
comparable  to  the  state  of  astronomy  after  the  appearance  of  Newton's  Principia." 
The  parallel  I  drew  was  with  an  abstract  science,  astronomy,  not  with  a  concrete 
science.  In  the  rest  of  his  article  Professor  Gide  continues  to  ascribe  to  me  opinions 
and  theories  that  I  have  never  held  and  which  I  have  even  disputed  as  directly 
opposite  to  theories  actually  mine.  For  further  details  see  my  article,  Economic 
mathematique,  in  the  Encyclopedic  des  sciences  mathematiques  [Meyer,  Vol.  I, 
pp.  1094-1120,  /.  V.  Anwendungen  der  Mathematik^  attf  Nationalokpnomie;  Molk, 
Vol.  I,  pp.  591-640]  and  in  Giornale  degli  economisti,  Nov.,  1906,  p.  424. 


48  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §89 

89,  This  is  not  the  place  to  add  further  details  touching  my  man- 
ner of  regarding  economic  theories/  The  reader  will  find  excellent 
and  ample  expatiations  on  that  point  in  the  works  of  Sensini  and 
Boven  already  referred  to. 

"^J^.VNt  saw  (§§13,  63)  that  our  subclass  of  logico-experimental 
theories  (I^)  was  divisible  into  two  varieties,  in  one  of  which  general 
principles  were  mere  abstractions  from  experimental  facts,  while  in 
the  other  they  aspired  more  or  less  explicitly  to  an  existence  of  their 
own  not  strictly  dependent  on  mere  abstraction  from  facts.jThe  two 
varieties  are  often  distinguished  as  based  on  the  inductive  or  the 
deductive  methods.  But  that  is  not  exact.  jThey  differ  not  in  the 
method  they  use,  but  in  their  respective  criteria  of  truth  for  proposi- 
tions and  theoriespln  the  strict  type,  Igi,  whether  propositions  are 
obtained  by  induction  or  by  deduction  or  by  a  mixture  of  the  two, 
theyare^ways  subordinate  to  experience;  whereas  in  the  deviation 
from  the  type,  \a2,  they  tend  explicitly  to  dominate  experience ^When 
a  general  principle  is  corroborated  by  facts  in  large  numbers  as,  for 
instance,  the  principles  of  Euclidean  geometry  or  of  universal  gravi- 
tation are,  the  two  varieties  are  not  very  sharply  distinguished,  for 
after  all  the  experimental  verification  may  often  be  taken  for  granted J^ 
r91.  But  if  the  gap  between  the  two  varieties  is  very  marked,  a 
difference  appears  that  is  the  better  seen  in  a  comparison  between 

( theories  which  are  logico-experimental  {\d)  and  theories  which  are 
notj  Tn  the  former  procedure  is  gradual.  One__starts  with  facts  and 
reaches  this  nr  that  abstraction,  thence  going  on  to  a  more  generaL 
abstraction,  becoming  more  and  more  circumspect,  more  and  more 
cautious,  the  farther  one  gets  from  direct  experience^ In  non-logico- 
experimental  theories,  a  deliberate  leap  is  taken  away  from  direct 
experience,  as  broad  a  leap  as  possible,  and  the  farther  one  gets  from 
direct  experience,  the  greater  the  assurance,  the  greater  the  reckless- 

89  ^  An  altogether  estimable  person  once  asked  whether  my  science  were  "demo- 
cratic"! It  has  been  said,  in  black  and  white,  that  it  was  "socialistic";  and  then  again 
that  it  was  "reactionary."  The  science  interested  strictly  in  uniformities  (laws) 
among  facts  is  nothing  of  any  of  those  sorts  and  can  in  no  way  be  so  labelled. 
It  is  just  a  quest  for  uniformities,  and  that  is  the  end  of  it.  Personally,  I  was  a 
free-trader  in  my  Cours;  but  in  my  Maniiale  I  dropped  that  cloak,  and  I  remain 
divested  of  it  when  dealing  with  science. 


II 


§95  PROBLEM  OF  REALITY  49 

ness.jOne  is  bent  on  knowing  the  "essences"  of  things.  tb£_aiilyJdnd 
of  knowledge  worthy  of  the  name  of  "science^"  direct  experience 
and  its  impHcations  being  mere  "empiricism,"  and  as  such  held  in 
poor  esteem  (§530).  \. 

92.  Working  out  a  chemistry,  for  example,  on  that  system,  the 
first  problem  would  be  to  know  what  "matter"  is.  Knowing  that,  we 
should  know  its  chemical  propertiesJ[The  modern  chemist,  instead, 
following  the  methods  and  procedures  of  logico-experimental 
science,  studies  chemical  properties  directly,  and  gets  more  and 
more  general  properties  or  abstractions  from  them.'j 

The  ancients  thought  that  in  imagining  cosmogonies  they  were 
studying  astronomv| Modern  scientists  study  the  movements  of  the 
stars  directly,  and  go  no  farther  than  required  for  establishing  uni- 
formities in  such  movements. )  Newton  found  that  ascertain 
hypothesis,  the  so-called  hypothesis  of  universal  gravitation,  was  all 
that  was  required  for  discovering  the  equations  governing  the  move- 
ments of  the  stars/But  what  is  gravitation?  Neither  he  nor  his  suc- 
cessors in  celestial  mechanics  took  the  trouble  to  go  too  deeply  into 
that  question.j  Not  that  the  problem  was  not  worth  considering; 
buc(celestial  mechanics  can  dispense  with  a  solution  of  it.^So  long 
as  its  equations  hold,  it  matters  little  how  they  are  obtained. 

Y  93.  (Errors  that  are  ancient  history  for  the  more  advanced  sciences 
recur  or  have  their  modern  counterparts  in  the  more  backward 
sciences^  So  the  theory  r>f  pvohirinn  has  in  some  cases  played  a  role 
in  sociology  similar  to  the  role  once  played  by  cosmogony  in  astron- 
omy.(  It  was  generally  held  that  the  only  way  to  determine  uni- 
formities in  social  phenomena  was  to  know  the  history  of  the  latter 
and  trace  them  back  to  their  origins  )(§§  23,  346)."^ 

94.  for  the  theories  that  are  to  be  elaborated  in  these  volumes  we 
cannot  avoid  going  back  to  a  distinction  betyyeen  the  objective  and 
the  subjective  phenomenon.  However,  we  do  not  need  to  go  beyond 
that  and  solve  the  problem  as  to  the  "reality  of  the  external  world." 
assuming  (but  not  granting)  that  that  problem  has  some  exact 
meaning  (§  149).      ^ 

V  95,  Solve  it  as  you  will,  the  two  great  categories  mentioned  still 


50  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §95 

Stand,  even  if  under  different  names.  It  may  well  be  that  a  sheet  of 
paper  with  engravings  on  it  and  a  genuine  bank-note  of  the  Bank 
of  England  are  both  mere  thoughts  of  the  mind ;  but  if  you  dine  at  a 
London  restaurant  and  try  to  pay  your  bill  with  the  first  of  those 
thoughts,  you  will  soon  notice  that  just  as  "one  thought  is  oJLan- 
other  born."  that  thought  will  present  you  with  a  whole  litter  of 
offspring:  first  the  thought  of  a  policeman,  which,  whether  ob- 
jectively real  or  not^  will  hale  you  before  the  rhniight  of  ^aLJudge, 
which  will  introduce  you  to  the  thought  of  a  well-barred  jail,  wjh^re 
you  will  meet  a  thought  that  the  English  call  "hard  labour."  and 
which,  according  <•"  ^11  reports,  is  not  the  pleasantest  thought  in  the 
Viiorld.  All  that  will  convince  you  that  |he  two  sheets  of  paper  cer- 
tainly belong  to  two  sharply  distinguished  categories,  since  they 
give  rise  to  differing  facts — or  differing  thoughts,  if  you  preferJQ 

Similarly,  when  we  assert  that  to  know  the  properties  of  sulphuric 
anhydride  one  must  appeal  to  experience  and  not,  as  Hegelian  meta- 
physics would  have  it,  to  the  "concept"  of  sulphur  or  even  of  oxygen, 
we  are  not  in  the  least  intending  to  set  an  external  world  over  against 
an  internal  world,  an  objective  reality  over  against  a  subjective 
reality.  We  can  state  the  same  proposition  in  a  jargon  that  recog- 
nizes the  "existence"  of  nothing  but  thought.  We  can  say,  that  is, 
that  to  get  the  concept  of  sulphuric  anhydride,  it  is  not  enough  to 
have  the  mere  concepts  of  sulphur  and  oxygen  and  meditate  upon 
them.  We  could  do  that  for  century  on  century  without  getting  con- 
cepts of  sulphuric  anhydride  that  would  gibe  with  the  con- 
cepts supplied  by  chemical  experiment.  The  ancient  philosophers 
thought  that  they  could  replace  observation  and  experience  in  just 
that  way,  but  they  were  entirely  wrong.  I  Chemistry  is  learned  in 
laboratories  and  not  by  philosophical  meditations,  even  of  the 
Hegelian  brand  !(§  14). (To  get  the  concept,  or  concepts,  of  sulphuric 
anhydride  we  must  first  have  the  many  concepts  acquired  through 
the  concept  otherwise  known  as  experience-Vburning  sulphur  in 
oxygen  or  in  air,  and  collecting  the  concept  of  sulphuric  anhydride 
in  the  concept  of  a  glass  container — finally  bringing  all  such  con- 
cepts together  to  get  the  concept  of  the  properties  of  sulphuric  an- 


§97  NECESSITY  AND  FREE  WILL  5I 

hydride.  But  such  a  jargon  would  be  proUx,  tedious,  ridiculous;  and 
just  to  avoid  it  we  use  the  terms  "subjective"  and  "objective."  For 
the  logico-experimental  purposes  we  have  in  view  no  other  terms  are 
required. 

96^  In  the  same  way  and  for  the  same  reason  it  is  enough  for  us  to 
know  that  social  facts  reveal  certain  uniformities  which  are  con- 
nected by  ties  of  interdependence.^  M[£_aj:g  not  called  upon  to  go  to 
the  trouble  of  finding  out  whether  and  just  how  that  result  yielded 
by  observation  can  be  reconciled  with  what  is  railed  free  will  (if 
indeed  the  latter  phrase  has  any  meaning). i^uch  problems  transcend 
the  limits  of  our  investigations^ 

97.  ^nd  we  shall  also  neglect  to  inquire  whether  scientific  laws 
have  the  trait  of  "necessity"y(§  528).  On  that  point  observation  and 
experience  can  tell  us  nothing.  They  can  only  reveal  certain  uni- 
formities, and  those  only  within  the  limits  of  the  time  and  space  to 
which  our  observation  and  experience  extend.  Every  scientific  law, 
therefore,  is  subject  to  that  qualification ;  and  if,  for  considerations  of 
brevity,  it  is  omitted,  tjie  statement  of  every  scienrifir  law  must 
nevertheless  be  taken  as  prefaced  by  the  restriction :  within  the  limits 
of  time  and  space  known  to  us  (§  69-5). 

(In  like  manner  we  hold  aloof  from  debates  as  to  the  necessity  of 
the  conclusion  in  a  syllogism^VThe  syllogism  of  the  text-books  on 
logic,  for  example,  "All  men  are  mortal;  Socrates  is  a  man;  there- 
fore Socrates  is  mortal,"  from  the  experimental  standpoint  must  be 
stated  thus:  "All  men  of  whom  we  have  had  any  knowledge  have 
died;  what  we  know  of  Socrates  induces  us  to  classify  him  with  such 
men;  therefore  it  is  very  probable  that  Socrates  is  mortal." 

That  probability  is  greatly  enhanced  by  other  circumstances  which 
we  shall  specify  farther  along  (§§531,  556);  and  it  is  therefore 
greater,  enormously  greater,  than  the  plausibility  of  a  syllogism  that 
might  have  been  drawn  before  the  discovery  of  Australia:  "All  the 
swans  we  have  ever  known  have  been  white;  a  bird  of  unknown 

96  ^  ["Interdependence"  is  a  technical  term  with  Pareto — see  our  Index.  The 
same  concept  is  expressed  in  English  by  the  words  "correlation,"  "interrelation." 
—A.  L.] 


52  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §98 

colour  that  has  all  the  characteristics  of  the  swan  must  be  classed 
with  the  swans;  therefore  that  bird  will  probably  be  white"  (§  526). 
People  reasoning  on  essences  may  sometimes  substitute  certitude  for 
probability,  even  very  great  probability.  But  we  know  nothing  about 
essences  and  accordingly  lose  our  certitude. 

98.  To  assert,  as  some  assert,  that  a  miracle  is  impossible  as  vio- 
lating the  recognized  constancy  of  natural  laws  is  to  reason  in  a 
circle  and  offer  an  assertion  as  proof  of  itself.^If  ^  miracle  could  be 

,  proved,  the  constancy  of  natural  laws  would  at  once  go  by  the 

f'iboard.jThe  kernel  of  the  question  therefore  lies  strictly  injhe  prooL 
of  fact.  WejnigliLadd  that  such  a  proof  has  to  withstand  a  scrutiny 
all  the  more  severe,  the  farther  it  carries  us  outside  the  circle  of 
known  facts.(lf  someone  were  to  assert  that  the  Sun  is  one  day  to 
carry  its  planetary  system  to  a  locality  where  the  laws  of  chemistry, 
physics,  and  mechanics  are  different  from  the  laws  at  present  known, 
we  could  make  no  objectionNWe  could  only  remind  the  prophet  that 
the  burden  of  proof  rests  upon  the  person  making  the  assertion..  As 
we  have  already  stated  (§  29),  we  admit  of  no  exceptions  to  this  rule, 

_even  for  the  laws  of  logic. 

1  99.  (Scientific  laws  are  for  us,  therefore,  nothing  more  than  experi- 
rnental  uniformities  (§69-4).  From  that  point  of  view  there  is  not 
the  slightest  difference  between  the  laws  of  political  economy  or 
sociology  and  the  laws  of  other  sciences.\The  differences  that  do 
exist  are  of  an  entirely  different  character,  lying  chiefly  in  the  greater 
or  lesser  complexity  with  which  effects  of  the  various  laws  are  inter- 
twined (§  1792).  Celestial  mechanics  has  the  good  fortune  to  be  able 
to  deal  with  the  effects  of  a  single  law  (uniformity).  And  that  is  not 
all,  for  the  effects  might  be  such  as  seriously  to  interfere  with  the 
discovery  of  the  uniformity  they  manifest.  But  by  a  most  happy 
circumstance,  the  mass  of  the  Sun  is  much  greater  than  the  masses 
of  the  various  planets,  so  that  the  uniformity  is  disclosed  under  a 
simple  though  not  strictly  exact  form  by  assuming  that  the  planets 
move  around  a  fixed  Sun;  whence  we  can  go  on  to  rectify  the  error 
involved  in  the  first  approximation.^  Chemistry,  physics,  mechanics, 

99  ^  We  shall  see  something  remotely  similar  in  the  case  of  sociology  (Chapter 
XII). 


§102  EXCEPTIONS  TO  LAWS  53 

are  likewise  able  to  deal  with  separate  laws,  or  at  least,  by  one 
device  or  another,  to_  isolate  effects ;  7  but  then  again,  there  are 
cases  where  fbe  complex  is  hard  to  unravel.  Such  cases  grow 
more  numerous  in  biology  and  geology,  and  most  of  all  in 
meteorology.  It  is  with  these  latter  that  the  social  sciences  are  to  be 
classed  in  this  respect.  > 
L_^  100/Another  difference  in  scientific  laws  lies  in  the  possibility  or 
impossibility  of  isolating  their  effects  by  experiment,  which  is  here 
to  be  distinguished  from  observation.jCertain  sciences,  such  as  chem- 
istry, physics,  mechanics,  and  biology,  can  and  do  make  extensive 
use  of  experiment.  Certain  others  can  use  it  but  sparingly;  others, 
such  as  the  social  sciences,  little  if  any;  still  others  not  at  all,  as  for 
instance,  celestial  mechanics — at  least  as  regards  the  movements  of 
the  heavenly  bodies.^^ 

PlOl.  Economic  and  social  laws  as  well  as  the  laws  of  the  other 
sciences  never  suffer  any  genuine  exception.^(To  speak  of  a  uni- 
formity that  is  not  uniform  is  to  say  a  thing  which  has  no  meaning^ 
What  is  commonly  called  an  exception  to  a  law  is  really  the  super- 
position of  the  effect  of  another  law  upon  its  own  normal  effects. 
From  that  standpoint  all  scientific  laws,  even  the  laws  of  mathe- 
matics, suffer  exceptions.  All  bodies  on  the  surface  of  the  earth 
tend  to  move  toward  the  centre;  but  a  feather  caught  by  the  wind 
moves  away  from  the  centre,  and  a  balloon  filled  with  hydrogen 
rises  in  the  air.  The  chief  difficulty  in  a  great  many  sciences  lies  in 
finding  ways  to  unravel  tangles  of  many  different  upifnrfrijf-ifs.N 

102.  To  that  end,(it  often  helps  to  consider  not  the  individual  phe- 
nomena actually  observed  but  average  situations  where  the  effects  of 
certain  laws  are  attenuated  and  those  of  others  are  emphasized.  We 
cannot  predict,  for  example,  what  the  temperature  on  the  tentn  of 
June  in  some  future  year  is  going  to  be ;  but  we  can  come  pretty  close 
to  the  mean  temperature  for  the  month  of  June,  and  closer  still  to 

99  ^  Pareto,  Manuale,  Chap.  I,  §  20. 

loi  ^  Pareto,  Manuale,  Chap,  i,  §  7.  There  are  still  professors  of  political  economy 
who  keep  repeating  parrot-like  that  economic  laws  have  exceptions,  while  physical 
laws  do  not.  Such  "the  ignorance  that  tormenteth  them"!  Not  even  with  a  spyglass 
could  one  find  a  physicist  to  class  among  unexceptionable  physical  laws  the  law  that 
bodies  diminish  in  volume  as  they  cool. 


54  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §103 

the  mean  temperature  over  a  three  months'  period  for  a  number  of 
years.  No  one  can  tell  whether  John  Doe  will  live  or  die  next  year; 
but  we  can  tell,  approximately,  how  many  people  out  of  a  hundred 
thousand  of  John  Doe's  age  will  die.  Who  can  tell  whether  a  given 
grain  of  wheat  sown  by  a  farmer  will  sprout  and  yield  a  return  ?  But 
we  can  predict  with  reasonable  probability  the  crop  an  acre  of  wheat 
will  yield,  and  even  better  the  average  yield  over  a  specified  period 
of  years. 

103. CWe  must  not  forget  that  such  averages  are  largely  arbitrary, 
that  they  are  formulated  by  ourselves  for  purposes  of  our  own,  and 
that  therefore  we  must  avoid  the  error  of  thinking  of  them  as  ob- 
jective things  having  an  existence  independent  of  the  facts.j|'One 
often  finds  them  going  about  under  different  names  as  metaphysical 
entities,  used  by  scholars  to  fix  on  something  at  least  that  is  constant 
in  the  flux  of  fact. 

Lj.04.  In  political  economy,  for  instance,  we  find  that  the  whole- 
sale prices  of  commodities  differ  in  almost  every  transaction.CTo  get 
a  theory  we  have  to  have  something  less  variable,  something  more 
constant,  than  that!)  Scientifically  we  consider  averages,  we  strikc, 
medium  curves  (interpolations).^  Metaphysically,  people  have  used 
an  entity  called  value  taken  as  a  constant  cause  of  variations  in  price. 
This  second  manner  of  reasoning  easily  leads  astray,  since  it  deprives 
averages  of  the  status  they  have  scientifically  and  gives  them  another 
that  is  altogether  imaginary  (§62).  This  statement,  however,  implies 
no  criticism  of  early  economists  for  using  the  term  "value."  But  it 
was  a  notable  step  in  advance  when  "exchange  value"  came  to  be 
distinguished  from  "utility  value."  Further  progress  derived  the  far 
more  exact  concept  of  "final  utility"  from  the  concept  of  "utility 
value";  and  going  on  in  that  fashion,  general  theories  of  the  eco- 
nomic equilibrium  were  finally  attained.  There  is  nothing  unusual 
about  such  a  course.  It  is  the  course  the  natural  sciences  have  all  fol- 
lowed (§§69^  106).  But  just  as  it  is  no  longer  possible  in  our  day 
tr>  <;i-nrly  celestial  mechanics  with  the  tools  of  Ptolemy  or  _g.venjTf_ 

104  ^  One  of  the  many  forms  of  the  method  of  successive  approximations  (§§  6g- 
9,  540). 


I 


§I06  THE  SCIENTIFIC  APPROACH  55 

Kpplfr,   «;n  pn|JtiVn1    emnnrpy  can  no  longer  he   fianr]]^.^   yyjt^   ^"^^ 
indeterminate  concept  of  value.^ .  ' ' 

105.  In  a  first  approximation  we  may  be  satisfied  with  knowing 
that,  roughly,  we  have  discarded  certain  effects  of  minor  importance 
as  compared  with  others  of  major  importance.  But(,it  is  wiser  to  get 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment  a  fairly  exact  picture  of  what  the 
terms  "minor"  and  "major"  imply,*)  and  to  know  approximately 
what  has  been  discarded  and  what  has  been  kept.  It  will  be  all  the 
better  to  determine,  if  we  can,  the  limits  of  the  variations  between 
the  situation  as  it  really  is — the  facts — and  the  picture  which  our 
averages  or  theories  give  us  of  ir.  In  mathematics,  it  is  already  some- 
thing to  know  that  the  fraction  22/7  expresses  the  approximate  rela- 
tionship of  the  circumference  of  a  circle  to  the  diameter.  It  is  better 
yet  to  know  that  the  actual  ratio  is  greater  than  22/7;  still  better  to 
know  that  the  error  is  less  than  0.015,  or  that  the  true  ratio  lies  be- 
tween the  fractions  22/7  and  333/io6.Ut  is  a  good  thing  to  know  that 
prices  are  not  numbers  varying  haphazard.  It  is  better  yet  to  know 
that  there  is  some  relation  between  them  and  the  tastes  of  human  be- 
ings and  the  difficulties  lying  in  the  way  of  obtaining  commodities.} 
It  is  even  better  to  have  some  notion  of  what  that  relation  is,  and 
better  still  to  have  the  concept  more  exact  and  know  the  relative 
importance  of  the  situation  pictured  by  the  theory,  as  compared 
with  the  real  situation,  and  to  know  just  what  aspects  it  ignores. 
LIO6.  A  concrete  situation  cannot  be  known  in  all  its  detaik:  there 
is  always  a  remainder,  which  is  even  physically  apparent  at  times.^ 
"^e  can  have  only  approximate  concepts  of  concrete  phenomena.  ^ 
theory  therefore  can  never  account  for  all  particulars.(Divergences 
are  inevitable,  and  the  best  we  can  do  is  reduce  them  to  a  minimum. ) 
And  in  this  connexion  too  we  are  once  more  carried  back  to  our 
/successive  approximations!  Science  is  a  continuous  development;  that 
is  to  say,  every  theory  is  supplanted  by  another  which  corresponds 

104  -  Pareto,  Maniiale,  Chap.  Ill,  §§  29-30,  35. 

106  ^  Pareto,  Manuel,  p.  10.  To  humour  the  Hegelians  we  might  say:  "It  has  been 
observable  that  the  concept  of  a  thing  which  people  have  at  a  given  moment  is 
supplemented,  as  time  goes  by,  with  new  concepts,  and  the  series  of  additions,  so 
far  as  we  can  tell,  must  be  infinite." 


56  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §107 

more  closely  to  the  real  facts.  The  theory  of  yesterday  has  been  per- 
fected today;  the  theory  of  today  will  be  improved  on  tomorrow; 
that  of  tomorrow,  on  the  following  day;  and  so  on.  Such  the  story 
that  is  to  be  read  on  every  page  of  the  history  of  the  sciences,  and 
no  one  can  suppose  that  it  will  not  continue  to  be  the  story  for  a 
long  long  time  to  come.  Since  no  theory  absolutely  commands  ac- 
ceptance, of  the  theories  among  which  we  aje  free  to  select  we  shall 
prefer  the  one  that  diverges  least  from  facts  of  the  past,  which  best 
enables  us  to  foresee  the  facts  of  the  future,  and  which,  in  addition, 
embraces  the  greatest  number  of  facts.  7 

107.(ln  astronomy  the  theory  of  epicycles,]  which  some  people  are 
at  present  trying  to  rehabilitate  on  sentimental  grounds,  satisfies  the 
requirement  of  adequately  picturing  facts  of  the  past  as  such  facts 
are  known  to  us.\By  multiplying  the  number  of  epicycles  as  often  as 
is  required,  every  movement  of  the  stars  that  observation  reveals 
can  be  represented ;  but  we  cannot,  or  cannot  so  well,  foresee  future 
movements,  as  is  possible  with  the  theory  of  gravitation)  The  latter 
theory,  furthermore,  utilizing  the  general  law  of  mechanics,  em- 
braces a  greater  number  of  facts.  Hence  it  is  certainly  to  be  preferred, 
as  in  fact  is  customary,  to  the  theory  of  epicycles.  But  the  choice  is 
made  for  those  reasons,  or  for  others  of  the  kind,  not  for  meta- 
physical considerations  as  to  the  "essence"  of  things. 
TT08.  The  facts  among  which  we  live  have  their  influence  upoiLiis^ 
and  as  a  result  our  minds  acquire  certain  attitudes  which  must  not  be 
too  violently  in  conflict  with  those  factj.  Such  attitudes  go  on  to 
give  form  and  manner  to  language(  Some  small  amount  of  informa- 
tion as  to  external  facts  we  can  derive,  therefore,  from  knowledge 
of  the  processes  of  the  human  mind  and  from  language)  But  that 
small  amount  is  small  indeed,  and  once  a  science  is  at  all  advanced, 
more  errors  than  truths  are  obtained  in  that  fashion  (§§  113  f.).^ 

108  ^  That  influence — nothing  very  definite,  to  tell  the  truth — of  the  facts  upon 
our  minds  makes  up  such  truth,  experimentally  speaking,  as  there  is  in  theories 
ascribing  a  scientific  status  to  intuition.  Intuition  serves  about  as  much  tovyards 
knowledge  of  reality  as  a  poor,  sometimes  a  very  poor,  photograph  of  a  place  serves 
towards  knowledge  of  that  place.  Sometimes  intuition  supplies  just  a  fanciful 
illusion,  and  not  even  a  poor  photograph,  of  reality. 


§I08  WORDS  AND  THINGS  57 

(The  terms  of  common  speech  are  lacking  in  definiteness,  and  it 
cannot  be  otherwise,  for  precision  goes  only  with  scientific  exacti- 
tude^ Every  argument  based  on  sentiment,  as  all  metaphysical  argu- 
ments are,  must  of  necessity  use  terms  lacking  in  exactness,  since 
sentiments  are  indefinite  and  the  name  cannot  be  more  definite  than 
the  thing.(Siirh  arguments,  besides,  actually  rely  on  the  lack  of 
exactness  in  everyday  language  to  mask  their  defects  in  logic  and 
carry  conviction  i  (§  109).  (Logico-experimental  arguments,  being 
based  instead  on  objective  observation,  tend  to  use  words  strictly  to 
designate  things  and  therefore  to  choose  them  in  such  a  way  as  to 
avoid  ambiguities  and  have  terms  as  exact  as  possible.)  Moreover, 
they  eventually  equip  themselves  with  a  special  technical  language 
and  so  escape  the  indefiniteness  of  common  parlance. 

As  already  noted  (§  69-8),  our  purpose  being  to  use  logico-experi- 
mental reasoning  exclusively, hve  shall  exert  every  endeavour  to  use 
only  words  that  are  as  far  as  possible  precise  and  strictly  defined,  )and 
which  correspond  to  things  unequivocally  and  without  ambiguities 
(§  119),  or  better,  with  a  minimum  of  error. 

A  word  designates  a  concept,  and  the  concept  may  or  may  not 
correspond  to  a  thing.  But  the  correspondence,  when  it  is  there, 
cannot  be  perfect.^  Even  if  the  word  corresponds  to  a  thing,  it  can 
never  correspond  to  it  exactly,  in  an  absolute  manner.)lt  is  always  a 
question  of  a  more  or  a  less.  Not  only  are  there  no  such  things,  in  the 
concrete,  as  geometric  entities  such  as  the  straight  line,  the  circle,  and 
so  on,  but  not  even  chemical  substances  that  are  absolutely  pure, 
not  even  the  species  with  which  zoologists  and  botanists  deal,  not 
even  an  individual  body  designated  by  a  name — for  it  would  be 
further  necessary  to  specify  at  just  what  moment  it  is  considered :  a 
,  piece  of  iron  does  not  remain  identical  with  itself  if  it  is  subject  to 
changes  in  temperature,  in  electrical  tension,  and  so  on.  In  a  word, 
the  "absolute"  has  no  place  in  logico-experimental  science,  and  we 
must  always  take  in  a  relative  sense  propositions  that  in  die  dress  of 
ordinary  parlance  seem  absolute ;  and  in  the  same  way  too,  wt  must 
make  quantitative  distinctions  where  common  speech  stops  at  the 
qualitative  (§144^).  That  much  being  clearly  grasped,  any  mis- 


58  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §109 

understanding  is  impossible;  whereas  to  express  ourselves  always 
with  absolute  exactness  would  be  to  wallow  in  lengthy  verbosities  as 
useless  as  they  would  be  pedantic. 

We  may  say,  then,  that  (we  are  carried  outside  the  logico-experi- 
mental  field  entirely  whenever  we  reason  in  terms  which  do  not  lie 
in  that  field) and  that  we  are  carried  partially  nntside  ir  whenever  we 
reason  in  indefinite  terms  which  correspond  to  experimental  en- 
tities only  in  part  (Chapter  X).  This  last  proposition  must  be  taken 
in  the  sense  that  if  our  terms  have  that  minimum  of  indefiniteness 
which  corresponds  to  the  present  state  of  knowledge,  they  take  us 
so  little  putside  the  experimental  field  that  we  may  overlook  the  ex- 
trusion|Though  there  are  no  chemical  substances  that  are  absolutely 
pure,  the  laws  of  chemistry  are  valid,  in  very  close  approximation, 
for  the  substances  that  our  methods  of  analysis  designate  as  pureT]^ 

109.  People  in  the  vast  majority  use  common  everyday  langua^rg, 
f^A  few  scientists  use  scientific  language  in  their  specialties,  outside 
_  of  which  they  reason  as  badly  as  the  plain  man — and  often  worse.^ 
Human  beings  are  prompted  to  acquire  such  knowledge  as  they 
have  from  common  speech  by  two  sorts  of  motives:  first,  because 
they  assume  that  a  word  necessarily  corresponds  to  a  thing,  yvhereby 
the  name  becomes  everyrhing  and  sometimes  even  acquires  myst£.r 
rious  properties;  and,  second,  because  of  the  great  ease  with  whidi- 
a  "science"  can  be  so  constituted,  each  person  carrying  within  him- 
self all  that  is  required  for  that  purpose,  without  going  to  the  pains 
of  long,  difficult,  and  tedious  researches.  It  is  much  easier  to  talk 
about  antipodes  than  to  go  out  and  see  if  they  are  really  there.  To 
discuss  the  implication  of  a  "principle  of  fire"  or  "damp"  is  much 
more  expeditious  than  to  prosecute  all  the  field  studies  that  have 
made  up  the  science  of  geology.[To  ruminate  on  "natural  law"  is  a 
much  more  comfortable  profession  than  to  dig  out  the  legal  codes  of 
the  various  countries  in  various  periods  of  historyTjxLpiattl^jhQut 
"value"  and  ask  when  and  nnder  what  rifc^um'^tanrp'^  it  is  said  that 
"a  thing  has  value"  is  much  less  difficult  than  to  discover  and  com- 
prpVipnrl  thr  l^w^  '^f  th^  ecouomic  equilibrium.^ 

In  view  of  all  that,  (one  readily  understands  how  the  history  of 


1 


§113  "^^^  SCIENTIFIC  APPROACH  59 

the  sciences  down  to  our  time  is  substantially  a  history  of  the  battles 
that  the  experimental  methgd  has  had  to  fight  and  still  has  to  fight 
against  the  methods  of  introspection,  etymology,  analysis  of  yprhc^\ 
pypressinn.  Defeated  and  put  to  rout  in  one  place,  the  latter  method 
bobs  up  in  another.  If  it  cannot  fight  in  the  open  it  dissembles,  flat- 
tening out  like  a  snake  in  the  grass,  and  so  succeeds  in  making  its 
way  into  the  very  camp  of  the  adversary  under  guise  of  something 
else. 

110.  In  our  day  the  method  has  been  largely  banished  from  the 
physical  sciences,  and  the  advances  they  have  made  are  the  fruit 
of  that  proscription.  But(it  is  still  strutting  about  in  political  econ- 
omy and  more  blatantly  still  in  sociology;) whereas  if  those  sciences 

wnnld  prngrf-ss^  it  ic  imppraHvp  fhaf  fhpy  shnnld  follow  the  example 
-     set  by  the  pV»ysiVa1   <:ri>nrp«;   (§  ii8). 

111.  Belief  that  the  facts  of  the  universe  and  their  relationships 
could  be  discovered  by  introspection  was  general  in  a  day  gone  by, 

^and  it  still  remains  the  foundation  of  metaphysics,  which  seeks 
a  criterion  of  truth  outside  experieacf  Tn  nur.uiav4t  found  its  cornp" 
plete  expression  in  the  lunacies  of  Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Nature^ 
One  need  hardly  observe  that /mankind  has  never  discovered  the 
puniest  uniformity  in  the  facts  of  nature  in  that  fashion)(§§  50,  484). 

112.  The  positivism  of  Herbert  Spencer  is  nothing  but  a  meta- 
physics. Though  Spencer  asserts  the  relative  nature  of  all  knowledge, 

_he  still  speaks  of  the  relations  of  knowledge  to  ''absolute  reality."  ^ 
He  asserts  the  existence  of  an  Unknowable,  but  claims,  by  an  amus- 
ing contradiction,  to  know  at  least  something  about  it." 

113.  In  all  the  rustle  and  bustle  of  our  daily  lives  we  cannot  of 
course  speak  in  the  manner  or  with  the  severity  of  the  logico-experi- 

112  "^  First  Principles,  §46.  "Thought  being  possible  only  under  relation,  the 
relative  reality  can  be  conceived  as  such  only  in  connexion  with  an  absolute  reality; 
and  the  connexion  between  the  two  being  absolutely  persistent  in  our  conscious- 
ness,  is  real  in  the  same  sense  as  the  terms  it  unites  are  real."  All  of  Spencer's 
writing  is  packed  with  such  concepts. 

112  2  Here  is  an  example  selected  at  random:  Ibid.,  §  48:  "Such  being  our  cogni- 
tion of  the  relative  reality,  what  are  we  to  say  of  the  absolute  reality?  We  can  only 
say  that  it  is  some  mode  of  the  Unknowable,  related  to  the  Matter  we  know  as  cause 
to  effect."  There  are  people  who  will  tc]]  yon  they  nndersrand  rhnt. 


6o  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §113 

mental  sciences  (§§  108-09),  ^nd  we  are  therefore  led  to  ascribe  great 
importance  to  words.  (Whenever  we  are  able  to  give  a  name  to  a 
thing,  it  succeeds  by  that  sole  fact  in  finding  a  place  in  a  class  of 
objects  of  which  the  properties  are  known,  and  its  properties  there- 
fore also  become  known.)  Furthermore — and  it  is  the  point  that 
really  matters — the  thing  is  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  sentiments  the 
name  arouses,  and  it  is  to  its  advantage,  therefore,  to  have  a  name 
that  awakens  favourable  sentiments  and  to  its  disadvantage  to  have  a 
name  inspiring  unfavourable  sentiments.^ 

In  practical  life  it  would  be  difficult,  nay  impossible,  to  do  other- 
wise. We  cannot  go  to  the  bottom  of  all  the  multifarious  questions 
that  are  at  every  moment  arising— ^e  cannot  test  everything  in  the 
crucible  of  doubt.)  Once  we  admit  that  a  man's  hat  is  his,  that  is 
the  end  of  it;  he  puts  it  on  his  head  and  goes  his  way;  and  we 
could  not,  before  permitting  him  to  take  it,  debate  the  real  nature 
of  property,  nor  settle  the  problem  of  individual  or  collective 
property  or  other  problems  of  the  kind. 

In  civilized  countries  civil  and  penal  laws  have  an  exact  termi-, 
nology;  and  so  in  order  to  pass  judgment  upon  an  act  one  must  first 
know  the  name  by  which  it  can  be  designated.  Ordinary  speech  too 
has  maxims  in  large  numbers,  which,  save  for  exactness,  in  which 
they  are  usually  wanting,  are  like  the  articles  in  a  code  of  law;  so 
for  maxims  too  the  name  to  be  given  to  an  act  or  a  thing  is  of  great 
importance.  The  legislator  uses  terms  in  the  meanings  they  com- 
monly have  among  the  people  for  whom  he  is  legislating.  He  need 
not  wait  for  scientists  to  agree  upon  a  definition  of  the  term  "reli- 
gion" before  he  makes  laws  governing  sacrilege,  religious  freedom, 
and  the  like.  We  talk  of  numberless  things  offhand,  never  exactly 
defining  their  nature  and  traits,  l^ractical  life  evolves  in  the  approxi- 
mate. Sriencp  alone  aims  at  the  precise. 

Within  the  sphere  of  that  approximate  we  get  theorems  that  cor- 
respond to  facts  so  long  as  they  are  not  extended  beyond  the  scope, 
at  times  very  limited,  within  which  they  are  valid.  Ordinary  lan- 
guage crystallizes  and  preserves  them,  and  it  is  there  that  we  can 

113  ^  Of  that  we  shall  give  many  examples  in  the  pages  that  follow. 


II 


§117  WORDS  AND  THINGS  6 1 

recover  and  use  them,  but  always  with  the  reservation  that,  roughly 
approximative  and  true  only  within  certain  limits  (which  as  a  rule 
are  unknown  to  us),  they  become  false  outside  those  limits  (Chapter 
XI).  Such  theorems  are  theorems  of  words  rather  than  of  things; 
and  we  can  therefore  conclude  that  in  practical  life,  for  purposes  of 
influencing  others,  and  oftentimes  in  the  early  beginnings  of  the  sci- 
ences, words  are  of  great  importance,  and  that  it  is  by  no  means  a 
waste  of  time  to  quarrel  over  them. 

114.  Bu/as  regards  investigations  in  experimental  science  our  con- 
clusion must  be  precisely  opposite.  Such  researches  envisage  things 
exclusively,  and  can  therefore  derive  no  advantage  from  words. '^ 
They  can,  however,  incur  great  harm,  whether  because  of  the  senti- 
ments that  words  arouse,  or  because  the  existence  of  a  word  may 
lead  one  astray  as  to  the  reality  of  the  thing  that  it  is  supposed 
to  represent  (§§  366-67),  and  so  introduce  into  the  experimental  field 
imaginary  entities  such  as  the  fictions  of  metaphysics  or  theology; 
or,  finally,  because  reasonings  based  on  words  are  as  a  rule  woefully 
lacking  in  exactness. 

115^So  the  more  advanced  sciences  develop  languages  of  their 
own  as  a  result  both  of  coining  new  terms  and  of  giving  special 
meanings  to  terms  of  ordinary  parlance.)  The  "water"  of  chemistry, 
the  "light"  of  physics,  the  "velocity"  of  mechanics,  have  senses  very 
different  from  the  meanings  of  those  identical  words  in  everyday 
usage. 

Y116.  A  simple  device  often  serves  to  determine  whether  an  argu- 
ment is  of  the  variety  that  relies  on  sentiment  or  on  the  assistance 
of  the  more  or  less  vague  notions  stored  up  in  the  vernacular,  or  of 
the  variety  peculiar  to  experimental  science.  It  is  sufficient  to  (sub- 
stitute plain  letters  of  the  alphabet,  a,  b,c  .  .  .  for  the  key-words  in 
it.) If  the  argument  loses  cogency,  it  belongs  to  the  first  class;  if  it 
retains  its  full  vigor,  it  belongs  to  the  second  (§  642).  ~p' 
III7.  Like  other  sciences,  political  economy  began  by  using  terms 
from  the  vernacular,  trying  merely  to  give  them  meanings  some- 
what more  exact;  and  so  it  became  enriched  with  the  wealth  of  ex- 
perience accumulated  in  everyday  language — a  capital  by  no  means 


62  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §  Il8 

inconspicuous,  for  economic  operations  make  up  a  large  fraction  of 
human  activity.  But  then  gradually,  as  political  economy  progressed, 
that  advantage  waned,  andCthe  drawbacks  involved  in  the  use  of  such 
terms  became  more  and  more  irksome^  Jevons  in  his  day  very  wisely 
dispensed  with  the  word  "value."  which  from  being  stretched  in 
this,  that,  and  every  direction,  and  from  having  countless  meanings, 
ended  by  having  no  meaning  at  all  (§  62  ^) ;  and  he  proposed  a  new 
term,  "rate  of  exchange,"  of  which  he  gave  an  exact  definition 

(§38^- 
llq^iterary  economists  did  not  follow  him  along  that  road;  and 

they  are  llo  chls  day  stiTl  dilly-dallying  with  speculations  such  as 
"What  is  value?"  "What  is  capital?"  They  cannot  get  it  into  thein 
heads  that  things  are  everything  and  words  nothing,  and  that  they, 
may  apply  the  terms  "value"  and  "capital"  to  any  blessed_things_ 
they  please,  so  only  they  be  kind  enough — they  never  are — to  tell 
one  precisely  what  those  things  are.  If  their  arguments  partook  of 
experimental  science,  they  would  continue  to  hold  even  if  blanks 
were  used  for  the  terms  "value"  and  "capital";  for  the  name  being 
taken  away,  the  things  still  stand,  and  it  is  in  things  alone  that  ex-_ 
perimental  science  is  interested.^  But  since  such  arguments  are  pri- 
marily rhetorical,  they  are  strictly  dependent  on  words  capable  of 
arousing  the  sentiments  that  are  useful  in  convincing  people;  and 
that  is  why(literary  economists  very  properly  are  so  much  concerned 

118  ^  In  my  Manuale  I  showed  that  economic  theories  can  just  as  well  be  elab- 
orated without  mention  of  the  terms  "value,"  "price,"  "capital,"  and  the  like. 
Literary  economists  cannot  see  it  that  way;  and  to  an  extent  they  are  right,  since 
for  them  the  term  "capital,"  let  us  say,  designates  not  a  thing  but  a  sum  of  senti- 
ments, and  naturally  enough  they  want  to  keep  a  term  to  designate  that  sum.  To 
humour  them,  the  thinj  might  be  called  "objective  capital,"  and  the  complex  of 
sentiments  "subjective  capital."  Then  one  could  say:  "Economic  theories  concerned 
exclusively  with  investigating  relationships  between  economic  facts  have  nothing 
to  do  with  the  concept  'subjective  capital.'  They  may  or  may  not,  as  they  choose, 
utilize  the  concept  'objective  capital.'  "  And  going  on:  "Economic  theories  that 
aim  at  making  converts  and  thereby  at  achieving  some  practical  result  can  turn  the 
concept  of  'subjective  capital'  to  good  account,  converts  being  made  by  appeals  to 
sentiment.  For  that  reason  it  is  the  wiser  part  for  them  to  create  a  confusion  be- 
tween the  notions  of  'objective  capital'  and  'subjective  capital,'  so  that  the  scientific 
argument  will  not  avail  against  the  sentimental  argument."  At  some  few  points 
such  theories   approximate  the   concrete  more  closely   than   the   theories   of  pure 


II 


§Il8  WORDS  AND  THINGS  6;^ 

about  words  and  much  less  about  things^Anyone  asking  what  value 
is,  what  capital  is,  what  income  is,  and  the  like,  shows  by  that  mere 
fact  that  he  is  concerned  primarily  with  words  and  secondarily  with 
things^The  word  "capital"  certainly  exists  for  him.  What  he  is  in 
doubt  about  is  what  it  means,  and  he  sets  out  to  discover  that.  This 
procedure  might  be  justifiable  on  a  reasoning  developed  as  follows: 
"There  is  something  unknown  that  acts  upon  language  and  gives 
rise  to  the  word  'capital.'  Sinc^  ordinary  words  are  exact  copies  of  ■^, 
the  things  they  represent,  we  can  understand  the  thing  by  studying 
the  word.  So  by  finding  out  what  capital  is,  we  shall  come  to  know 
the  thing  unknown."  The  fallacy  in  the  justification  lies  in  the  prop- 
osition italicized.  It  is  false.vFor  more  convincing  proof  one  need 
simply  substitute  for  the  term  "capital"  some  scientific  term  such  as 
"water,"  and  see  whether  the  most  painstaking  inquiry  as  to  what 
it  is  that  is  called  water  will  ever  reveal  the  properties  of  the  chemi- 
cally pure  substance  known  by  that  name.  \ 
/In  science  the  course  followed  is  the  exact  opposite:  first  one  ex- 
amines the  thing  and  then  hunts  up  a  name  to  give  iL^jUFirst  one 
considers  the  substance  formed  by  combining  oxygen  and  hydrogen, 
and  then  a  term  is  sought  to  designate  it  JSince  the  substance  in  ques- 
tion is  present  in  great  quantities  in  the  vaguely  defined  thing  that 
the  ordinary  vernacular  designates  as  water,  we  call  it  water.  But 
it  might  have  been  called  otherwise — "lavoisier,"  for  instance — and 
all  of  chemistry  would  stand  exactly  as  it  is.  We  would  simply  say 

economics,  for  they  inject  into  the  concept  of  "subjective  capital"  sociological  notions 
that  have  no  place  in  scientific  economics.  But  they  still  have  the  fatal  defect  of 
being  entirely  devoid  of  exactness.  If  one  would  get  closer  to  the  concrete,  instead 
of  introducing  sociological  concepts  implicitly  and  as  it  were  by  stealth,  it  would 
be  better  to  advance  them  openly:  that  would  make  at  least  a  certain  amount  of 
definiteness  unavoidable.  All  such  things  can  be  better  seen  from  Sensini's 
La  teoria  della  rendita. 

The  concept  "subjective  capital"  becomes  of  prime  importance  to  sociology,  which 
is  in  fact  directly  concerned  with  the  sentiments  expressed  in  such  terms;  and  since 
the  concrete  phenomenon  is  both  economic  and  sociological,  anyone  studying  it  in 
applied  economics  inevitably  encounters  notions  analogous  to  "subjective  capital." 
That  is  why,  in  my  Mantiale,  I  examined  concrete  phenomena  not  only  from  the 
strictly  economic  standpoint,  but  also  as  regards  the  manners  in  which  they  are 
conceived  by  the  individuals  involved  in  them  (see  the  caption  Veditta  soggettiva  in 
the  index  to  the  Man  tide). 


64  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §1x9 

that  the  Hquid  present  in  rivers  and  in  the  sea  contains  great  quan- 
tities of  lavoisier.(Literary  economists  and  sociologists  do  not  under- 
stand such  things,  for  they  are  wanting  in  the  mental  attitude  and 
the  training  required  for  understanding  them^p* 
yil9.(ln  these  volumes  we  intend  to  keep  strictly  to  the  logico- 
experimental  method  (§108)  and  deal  exclusively  with  things.  ^ 
Words  therefore  are  of  no  importance  whatever  to  us ;  they  are  mere 
labels  for  keeping  track  of  things.  So  we  say,  "Such  and  such  a  thing 
we  are  going  to  call  A";  or,  "We  suggest  calling  it  A."  We  do  not 
say — an  entirely  different  matter — "Such  and  such  a  thing  is  A." 
The  first  proposition  is  a  definition,  and  we  are  free  to  word  it  as  we 
choose.  The  second  is  a  theorem,  and  requires  demonstration;  but 
before  we  can  prove  it  we  have  to  know  exactly  what  ^  is  (§  963). 

To  avoid  in  these  volumes  the  danger,  ever  threatening  in  the 
social  sciences,  that  meanings  of  words  will  be  persistently  sought 
not  in  the  objective  definitions  supplied  but  in  common  usage  and 
etymology,  we  would  gladly  have  replaced  word-labels  with  letters 
of  the  alphabet,  such  2iS  a,  b,  c  .  .  .  or:  with  ordinal  numbers;  and 
that  we  have  done  for  some  parts  of  our  exposition  (§  798).  We  have 
refrained  from  doing  so  more  often  in  fear  lest  our  argument  be- 
come altogether  too  tedious  and  obscure.  So  here  we  follow  the  ex- 
ample of  the  chemist  who  continues  using  the  term  "water"  but 
gives  it  an  exact  meaning.^ 

We  too  shall  use  terms  of  ordinary  parlance,  explaining  exacdy 
what  they  are  to  represent.  We  accordingly  urge  the  reader  to  keep 
strictly  to  such  definitions  and  never  to  try  to  guess  from  etymology 
or  common  usage  the  meanings  of  the  technical  terms  that  he  finds 
in  these  volumes.  The  reader  will  shortly  be  meeting  the  terms  "resi- 
dues" and  "derivations"  (§  868).  If  he  desires  to  know  what  they 
mean,  let  him  refer  exclusively  to  the  definitions  we  furnish.  If  he 

119  1  One  should  here  recall  the  points  alluded  to  in  §  108.  There  is  nothing  abso- 
lute in  logico-experimental  science.  Here  the  term  "exact"  means  "with  the  least  pos- 
sible margin  of  error."  Science  tries  to  bring  theory  as  close  to  the  facts  as  possible, 
knowing  very  well  that  absolute  coincidence  cannot  be  attained.  If,  in  view  of  that 
impossibility,  anyone  refuses  to  be  satisfied  with  approximate  exactness,  he  had  better 
emigrate  from  this  concrete  world,  for  it  has  nothing  better  to  offer. 


■^ 


§121  WORDS  AND  THINGS  65 

were  to  seek  their  meaning  in  etymology  or  common  acceptation,  he 
would  be  certain  to  find  things  very  different  from  the  things  we 
label  with  them.  If  anyone  does  not  like  them,  he  may  feel  quite 
free  to  replace  them  with  others — we  shall  never  quarrel  on  that 
score.  And  he  will  see  that  with  his  own  terms,  or  better  yet,  using 
letters  of  the  alphabet  or  numerals,  all  our  arguments  will  stand 
just  the  same. 

Anyone  finding  these  explanations  superfluous  must  be  patient. 
My  excuse  is  that  similar  explanations  ever  and  anon  repeated  for 
my  term  "ophelimity"  did  not  prevent  literary  economists  from  seek- 
ing its  meaning  in  etymology;  while  others,  who  must  truly  have 
had  a  deal  of  time  to  waste,  began  wondering  whether  "desirability" 
would  not  have  been  a  better  name."  Nor  could  I  silence  such  idle 
prattle  by  showing  that  we  could  very  well  do  without  "ophelimity" 
and  all  other  similar  terms  in  developing  economic  theories.^  ^~/^ 

120.  In  these  volumes  I  shall  use,  for  the  reasons  just  stated,  a 
number  of  terms  that  are  also  used  in  mechanics.  I  must  accordingly 
make  clear  the  exact  senses  in  which  I  use  them. 

121.  Let  A,  B,C  .  .  .  stand  for  certain  things  that  have  a  capacity 
for  influencing  an  economic  or  social  situation.  We  may  consider 
the  situation  either  at  a  moment  when  the  action  of  such  things  is 
not  yet  exhausted,  or  at  a  moment  when  it  is  entirely  spent.  Let  A, 
for  instance,  stand  for  an  individual's  desire  to  drink  wine,  and  B 
for  a  fear  he  has  that  it  may  injure  his  health.  The  man  drinks  one 
glass  of  wine,  then  a  second,  and  then  he  stops,  because  after  the 
second  glass  the  fear  effectively  curbs  the  thirst.  After  the  first  glass 
the  movement  is  not  complete:  the  thirst  is  still  effective  in  spite 
of  the  fear.  Not  even  the  fear  has  completed  its  work,  because  it  has 
not  yet  quenched  the  individual's  desire  for  drinking  wine.  It  is 
evident  that  when  we  are  considering  a  situation  we  have  to  specify 

119  ^  Pareto,  Maitiiel,  p.  556,  note  i. 

119  ^  For  other  misconceptions  arising  from  lack  of  exactness  in  language  and 
from  the  prattle  of  literary  economics,  see  my  Manuel,  pp.  219,  note  i;  246,  329, 
note  i;  333,  note  i;  391,  note  i;  414,  439,  note  i;  544,  note  i;  6},6,  note  i;  638, 
note  i;  but  especially,  Sensini,  La  teoria  delta  rendita,  and  Boven,  Les  applications 
mathematiques  a  I'economie  politique. 


66  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §122 

whether  we  are  considering  it  at  a  time  when  the  things  A,  B  have 
not  completed,  or  at  a  time  when  they  have  completed,  their  action. 
In  mechanics  there  is  an  analogous  situation — analogous,  notice, 
not  identical — where  two  forces  are  acting  upon  a  physical  point. 
So  instead  of  speaking  of  two  things,  A,  B,  that  have  a  capacity  for 
influencing  an  economic  or  a  social  situation,  we  may  for  the  sake 
of  brevity  speak  of  two  forces,  A  and  B. 

122.  The  intermediate  stage  in  which  the  individual  has  drunk 
the  first  glass  of  wine  and  is  about  to  drink  another,  in  which,  that 
is,  the  work  of  A  and  B  is  not  yet  completed,  is  described  in  me- 
chanics by  saying  that  an  equilibrium  has  not  yet  been  attained. 
The  stage  in  which  both  the  thirst  and  the  fear  have  completed 
their  work,  so  that  the  individual  ceases  drinking,  is  described  in 
mechanics  by  saying  that  an  equilibrium  has  been  attained.  By 

inalogy,  not  from  identity,  we  may  likewise  use  the  term  equi- 
librium  tor  an  economic  or  a  social  situation. 

123.  But  an  analogy  is  not  a  definition;  and  we  should  be  delib- 
erately exposing  ourselves  to  ready  and  frequent  error  were  we  satis- 
fied with  such  an  analogy  to  represent  the  social  or  economic  equi- 
librium. We  are  therefore  called  upon  to  give  an  exact  definition  of 
the  economic  or  social  equilibrium  in  question;  and  the  reader  will 
find  it  in  Chapter  XII. 

124.  Keeping  to  the  definition  of  the  thing,  we  can  change  the 
term  at  will  and  the  arguments  will  stand  just  the  same.  For  ex- 
ample, instead  of  calling  A  and  B  "forces,"  we  might  call  them  "in- 
fluences" ("operative  things")  or  even  "things  /.''  The  state  defined 
above  we  might  call  rsXoc,,  or  even  "state  X,"  instead  of  "equilib- 
rium." In  which  cases  all  the  arguments  in  which  we  have  used  the 
terms  "forces"  and  "equilibrium"  would  still  hold. 

125.  It  is  therefore  a  monumental  stupidity  to  say,  as  one  critic 
said,  that  when  I  speak  of  a  state  of  equilibrium,  I  am  thinking  of  a 
state  which  I  consider  better  than  another  state,  equilibrium  being 
better  than  lack  of  equilibrium! 

126.  By  similar  analogy  we  can  use  other  terms  from  mechanics 
in  economics  and  sociology.  Suppose  we  are  considering  a  society  in 


§129  terminology:  "ties"  (i"] 

which  private  property  exists.  We  may  propose  to  study  the  possible 
forms  of  such  a  society,  premising  always  the  condition  that  private 
property  exist.  In  the  same  way  other  relationships  supply  other 
conditions  that  we  may  assume  or  not  assume  as  premises.  Similar 
situations  are  met  with  in  mechanics,  and  there  the  conditions  in 
question  are  known  as  ties  {vinculo).  By  analogy,  we  can  use  that 
term  in  economics  and  sociology  as  well.^  However,  if  there  were 
no  other  analogies  with  mechanics  it  would  be  useless  to  do  that, 
and  better  in  particular  not  to  use  the  term  "tie." 

127.  Suppose  we  are  considering  a  system  of  material  points  main- 
tained by  certain  tieSj  and  upon  which  certain  forces  A,  B,  C  .  .  . 
are  acting.  The  successive  positions  of  the  points  will  be  determined 
by  the  resultant  of  the  forces  as  modified  by  the  ties.  Now  take  a 
given  group  of  individuals.  Certain  conditions  prevail,  such  as  pri- 
vate property,  freedom  (or  slavery),  technical  training,  wealth,  sci- 
entific knowledge,  religion,  and  so  on.  Active  also  in  the  group  are 
certain  individual  desires,  interests,  prejudices,  and  the  like.  The  suc- 
cessive states  of  the  group  may  be  assumed  as  determined  by  these 
latter  elements  working  in  conjunction  with  the  conditions  (the 
ties)  premised. 

128.  So  by  analogy — never  from  identity — we  can  call  the  group 
a  social  or  an  economic  system  and  say  that  certain  forces  are  acting 
upon  it,  which  determine  the  position  of  the  points  in  the  system  in 
conjunction  with  the  ties.  Considerations  of  brevity  solely  and 
strictly  counsel  the  use  of  such  terms,  and  as  always  they  may  be 
replaced  by  others  at  pleasure. 

129.  A  transition  from  one  state  to  another  is  called  a  movement 
in  mechanics,  and  it  may  be  so  called  in  sociology  also.  In  mechanics, 
if  we  assume  that  ties  and  forces  are  determined,  movements  in  the 
system  are  likewise  determined.  So  in  sociology,  if  we  assume  con- 
ditions and  active  influences  as  given,  the  various  successive  states  of 

126  ^  [Pareto's  word  was  vincolo,  "bond."  The  vincolo  is  a  force  that  conditions 
the  operation  of  another  force.  The  term  vinculum  itself  has  a  certain  currency  in 
technical  sociologies.  In  most  connexions  it  can  well  be  translated  as  "condidon,"  or 
"check,"  and  more  generally  as  "correlation,"  or  even  as  "premise."  In  deference 
to  the  baroque  quality  of  Pareto's  own  term,  I  render  it  regularly  as  "tie." — A.  L.] 


68  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §130 

the  group  are  determined.  Such  movements  are  called  real  in  me- 
chanics, and  may  be  so  called  in  sociology. 

130.  If,  for  theoretical  purposes,  we  assume  as  suppressed  some 
tie  in  a  mechanical  system,  some  condition  in  a  sociological  group, 
the  mechanical  system  will  show  movements  different  from  the 
real,  and  the  sociological  group  will  attain  states  other  than  those 
it  really  attains.  Such  movements  are  called  virtual  in  mechanics, 

|and  virtual  they  may  be  called  in  sociology.  For  example,  a  person 
investigating  what  society  would  be  like  if  private  property  were 
to  be  abolished  is  making  a  study  in  virtual  movements. 

131.  We  can  think  of  the  "ties"  and  "forces"  in  the  social  system 
as  summed  together;  and  if  we  designate  the  aggregate  by  the  term 
"conditions,"  the  so-called  theory  of  determinism  could  be  stated 
by  saying  that  the  state  of  a  system  is  wholly  determined  by  "condi- 
tions" and  can  therefore  change  only  with  a  change  in  "condi- 
tions. 

132.  Science  has  no  dogmas,  and  so  cannot  and  must  not  accept 
determinism  a  priori;  and  so  far  as  it  does  accept  it,  it  must,  as 
always,  do  so  strictly  within  the  limits  of  the  time  and  space  that 
have  been  investigated.  With  that  premise  solidly  established,  ex- 
perience indicates  that  in  many  cases  social  situations  seem  really  to 
be  determined  by  "conditions"  and  change  only  with  changes  in 
"conditions."  In  such  cases  we  therefore  recognize  determinism,  but 
without  in  the  least  precluding  that  there  may  be  other  cases  where 
it  cannot  be  granted.^ 

133.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  deterministic  hypothesis,  we  are 
now  called  upon  to  solve  a  problem  that  is  continually  arising  in  one 

131  ^  Here,  accordingly,  the  term  "conditions"  has  a  different  and  more  compre- 
hensive meaning  than  it  had  in  §  126. 

132  ^  Naville,  review  of  Bergson,  Op.  cit.,  p.  11:  "I  am  well  aware  that  deter- 
minism has  its  fascination  for  the  scholar  and  affords  great  satisfaction  to  the  scien- 
tific mind.  [More  exactly,  "to  the  theology  of  Reason."]  Determinism  is  the  belief 
[That  word  alone  should  serve  to  give  warning  that  we  are  overstepping  the  bound- 
aries of  experimental  science.]  that  everything  can  be  explained,  and  what  the  sci- 
entist wants  is  explanations.  Determinism  is  the  conviction  that  all  phenomena  can 
be  understood,  associated,  that  is,  with  other  phenomena  that  envelop  and  produce 
them.  .  ,  .  But  however  natural  the  inclination  [to  determinism]  may  be,  it  proves 
nothing,  and  not  all  scientists  succumb  to  it." 


§134  POSSIBLE,   IMPOSSIBLE  69 

form  or  another  in  history  and  sociology.^ Accordinp^  to  determin- 
ism, whatever  happens  cannot  happen  otherwise;  and  so  the  terms 
"possible"  and  "impossible"  as  used  in  ordinary  language  have  no 
meaning,  since  only  that  is  possible  which  happens,  and  what  does 
not  happen  is  impossible.  We  do  not  choose  to  quarrel  over  words ; 
so  if  anyone  is  inclined  to  throw  such  terms  overboard,  let  us  do  so 
by  all  means.  All  the  same,  after  they  have  been  dispensed  with  we 
are  still  confronted  with  the  different  things  that  were  designated  by 
them,  and  for  which  it  will  be  expedient  to  find  other  designations. 

John  Doe  did  not  have  his  dinner  yesterday,  but  speaking  in  ordi- 
nary terms,  it  was  "possible"  for  him  to  dine.  He  did  not  cut  off  his 
head;  but  it  was  "impossible"  for  him  to  cut  off  his  head,  then  glue 
it  on  again  and  be  alive  and  well  today.  It  may  well  be  that  from 
the  standpoint  of  determinism  the  two  things  are  equally  impossi- 
ble; but  it  is  also  evident  that  they  are  different  kinds  of  things,  and 
it  would  be  a  grave  misfortune  if  we  were  unable  to  designate  the 
different  classes  to  which  they  belong.  Suppose,  for  the  moment, 
we  label  the  first  class  (I)  and  the  second  (II).  It  is  at  once  apparent 
that  the  difference  between  (I)  and  (II)  lies  in  the  fact  that  cases 
like  (I)  have  been  often  enough  observable,  whereas  no  case  like 
(II)  has  ever  been  seen. 

134.  To  be  more  exact  ifin  both  cases  we  are  dealing  with  "vir- 
tual" movements ;  and  in  declaring  them  both  impossible,  determin- 
ism is  merely  calling  them  virtual  as  opposed  to  real  movements.] 
But  there  is  more  than  one  class  of  virtual  movements/ There  is  a 
class  of  virtual  movements  that  take  place  when  we  assume  as  absent 
a  certain  tie  which  was  not  absent  at  the  time  the  real  movement  in 
question  was  observed,]but  which  has  been  found  absent  on  other 
occasions,  when  real  movements  equivalent  to  the  virtual  movement 
have  been  observable.  That  movement  therefore  belongs  in  the  class 
we  have  called  (I)  and  which,  in  ordinary  langauge,  is  a  class  of 
possible  things.(  There  is  another  class  of  virtual  movements  that 
would  take  place  only  if  we  assumed  as  absent  a  tie  which  has  never 
been  found  absent,  so  that  real  movements  equivalent  to  such  vir- 
tual movements  have  never  been  observed.jThese  belong  to  the  class 


70  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §135 

we  have  called  (II),  which  in  ordinary  terms  is  a  class  of  impossible 
things.  Having  so  supplied  exact  definitions  of  the  things  that  the 
terms  "possible"  and  "impossible"  designate,  there  can  be  no  objec- 
tion to  using  them  even  with  the  hypothesis  of  determinism. 

135/Of  what  conceivable  use  can  the  study  of  virtual  movements 
be  if  they  are  things  foreign  to  the  domain  of  reality  and  only  real 
movements  actually  occur  ?jThe  advantages  are,  in  chief,  two: 

I.  If  we  are  considering  virtual  movements  that  have  not  been 
real  because  of  the  presence  of  ties  which  have  been  found  absent 
on  other  occasions — if,  in  other  words,  we  are  considering  move- 
ments that  are  virtual  in  some  cases  but  are  observable  as  real  in 
others — knowledge  of  the  virtual  movements  may  help  to  foresee 
vyhat  the  real  movements  are  going  to  be  like.  Such,  for  instance, 
are  forecasts  as  to  the  effects  of  a  certain  piece  of  legislation  or  of 
some  other  practical  measure. 

2I  Consideration  of  virtual  movements  may  help  towards  isolating 
and  determining  the  character  and  peculiarities  of  a  given  social 
state.] 

136.  The  propositions  "A  determines  B"  and  "If  there  were  no  A 
there  would  be  no  B"  state  the  same  fact,  in  the  one  case  as  a  func- 
tion of  A,  in  the  other  in  terms  of  a  virtual  movement.  The  proposi- 
tions "In  such  and  such  a  state  society  has  a  maximum  of  A"  and 
"If  society  departs  from  that  state,  there  will  be  a  diminution  in  A" 
express  the  same  fact,  in  the  first  case  as  a  description  of  the  state, 
in  the  second  in  terms  of  a  virtual  movement. 

137^  In  the  social  sciences,  virtual  movements  are  to  be  resorted  to 
with  great  caution,  for  very  very  often  we  have  no  means  of  know- 
ing what  the  consequences  of  suppressing  some  condition,  some  tie, 
would  be.jlf  a  person  says,  "If  the  Emperor  Julian  had  continued 
very  long  on  the  throne,  the  Christian  religion  would  not  have  sur> 
vived,"  he  is  assuming  that  the  death  of  Julian  was  alone  responsible 
for  the  triumph  of  Christianity.  And  if  one  answers,  "If  the  Em- 
peror Julian  had  continued  longer  on  the  throne,  he  might  have  re- 
tarded, but  could  not  have  prevented,  the  triumph  of  Christianity," 
one  is  assuming  that  there  were  other  conditions  present  which 


§141  REMAKING  HISTORY  7I 

made  that  triumph  certain.  In  general,  propositions  of  this  second 
variety  are  more  often  verifiable  than  are  propositions  of  the  first 
kind.  In  many  cases,  that  is,  social  developments  are  determined  by 
the  concurrent  action  of  large  numbers  of  conditions;  so  that  the 
removal  of  any  one  of  them  disturbs  the  course  of  events  but  slightly. 

138.  Conditions,  furthermore,  are  not  independent.  Many  of  them 
influence  each  other.  Nor  is  that  all.  The  effects  of  conditions  react 
in  turn  upon  the  conditions  themselves.  In  a  word,  social  facts — that 
is  to  say,  conditions  and  effects — are  interdependent,  and  modifica- 
tions in  one  of  them  react  upon  larger  or  smaller  numbers  of  the 
others,  and  with  greater  or  lesser  intensities. 

139.  That  is  why  attempts  to  remake  history  by  conjecturing  what 
would  have  happened  had  a  certain  event  never  occurred  are  alto- 
gether fatuous.^We  have  no  way  of  determining  all  the  changes  that 
would  have  taken  place  on  a  given  hypothesis  if  the  hypothesis  had 
come  true.\  What  would  have  happened  had  Napoleon  won  at 
Waterloo?  Only  one  answer  is  possible — "We  do  not  know." 

140j(We  can  get  something  a  little  better  by  keeping  to  effects 
that  are  very  immediate  in  a  very  limited  field,  and  progress  in  the 
social  sciences  will  tend  gradually  to  enlarge  those  very  restricted 
confines.j^Every  time  we  succeed  in  discovering  some  hitherto  un- 
known relation  between  social  facts,  we  are  a  little  better  prepared 
to  know  what  the  effects  of  certain  changes  in  the  social  situation 
will  be;^nd  pushing  on  along  that  road  we  make  new  advances, 
however  slight,  towards  realizing  the  purpose  of  determining  the 
probable  course  of  social  developments  in  the  future.  Therefore  no 
study  that  aims  at  discovering  some  uniformity  in  the  relations  of 
social  facts  can  be  called  useless.  It  may  be  useless  at  the  present 
time  and  continue  to  be  so  in  any  near  future;  but  we  cannot  be 
sure  that  the  day  will  not  come  when,  taken  in  conjunction  with, 
other  discoveries,  it  will  contribute  towards  forecasting  probabilities 
in  social  evolution., 

141.  The  difficulties  in  discovering  social  uniformities  are  great 
because  of  the  great  complexity  of  social  phenomena.  They  are  im- 
measurably increased,  and  in  fact  become  insuperable,  when  uni- 


72  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §142 

formities  are  sought  not  with  the  one  and  undivided  intent  of  dis- 
covering them,  but  with  the  purpose,  expHcitly  chosen  or  tacitly  set 
by  sentiment,  of  justifying  a  preconception,  a  doctrine,  a  faith.  Just 

'/such  impediments  account  for  the  present  backward  state  of  the 

ijrsocial  sciences.) 

142.  The  man  entirely  unaffected  by  sentiments  and  free  from  all 
bias,  all  faith,  does  not  exist;  and  to  re^rd  that  freedom  as  an  essen- 
tial prerequisite  to  profitable  study  of  the  social  sciences  would 
amount  to  saying  that  such  study  is  impossible(lBut  experience  shows 
that  a  person  can  as  it  were  divide  himself  in  two  and,  to  an  extent 
at  least,  lay  aside  his  sentiments,  preconceptions,  and  beliefs  when 
engaged  in  a  scientific  pursuit,  resuming  them  afterwards.jThat  was 
the  case  with  Pasteur,  who  outside  his  laboratory  was  a  devout  Cath- 
olic, but  inside  kept  strictly  to  the  experimental  method.  And  before 
Pasteur  one  might  mention  Newton,  who  certainly  used  one  method 
in  discoursing  on  the  Apocalypse  and  quite  another  in  his  Principia. 
143.(Such  self-detachment  is  more  readily  achieved  in  the  natural 
sciences  than  in  the  social  sciences.)f  t  is  an  easy  matter  to  look  at  an 
ant  with  the  sceptical  disinterestedness  of  experimental  science.  It  is 
much  more  difficult  to  look  at  human  beings  that  way^  But  even  if 
complete  success  in  such  an  effort  is  impossible,  we  can  at  least  try 
to  succeed  in  part,  and  reduce  the  power  and  influence  of  senriments, 
preconceptions,  beliefs,  to  a  minimum.  Only  at  that  prir.p  can  prog- 
ress in  the  social  sciences  be  achieved. 

144/^  Social  facts  are  the  elements  of  our  study.  Our  first  effort  will 
be  to  classify  them  for  the  purpose  of  attaining  the  one  and  only 
objective  we  have  in  view:  the  discovery,  namely,  of  uniformities    ' 
(laws)  in  the  relations  between  them)  When  we  have  so  classified 
kindred  facts,  a  certain  number  of  uniformities  will  come  to  the.  7 


^surface  by  induction;  andafter  going  a  g[ood  qfttance  alon^^  that 
primarily  inductive  path,  we  shall  turn  to  another  where  more 
ample  room  will  be  found  for  deduction/  So  we  shall  verify  the  uni- 
formities to  which  induction  has  carried  us,  give  them  a  less  em- 
pirical, more  theoretical  form,  and  see  just  what  their  implications 
are,  just  what  picture  they  give  of  society.  J 


§144  QUANTITATIVE  VARIATIONS  73 

In  general  we  have  to  deal  with  things  that  vary  by  imperceptible 
degrees,  and  our  picture  of  them  approximates  reality  the  more 
closely  in  proportion  as  it  is  drawn  in  c^uantitative  terms.  That  factj 
if  often  recognized  by  saying  that  as  sciences  progress,  they  tend  to 
become  more  and  more  quantitative.  But  that  is  much  more  difficult' 
than  to  studymerely  qualitative  diff  erences.(ln  fact,  the  first  forward 
step  lies  always  in  a  rough  quantitative  approximation.^  ) 

It  is  no  difficult  matter  to  distinguish  day  from  night  with  toler- 
able accuracy.  Though  there  is  no  precise  instant  at  which  day  ends 
and  night  begins,  we  can  after  all  roughly  say  that  there  is  a  qualita- 
tive difference  between  them.  It  is  more  difficult  to  divide  such 
periods  of  time  into  parts.  We  manage  to  do  so  approximately  by 
saying  "shortly  after  sunrise,"  "towards  noon,"  and  the  like;  and 
with  more  or  less  success — less  rather  than  more — the  night  used 
to  be  divided  into  "watches."(When  clocks  came  to  be  available,  it 
was  possible  to  get  quantitative  measurements  of  time,  the  exactness 
increasing  with  improvements  in  clocks  and  becoming  very  consid- 
erable with  the  modern  chronometer?) 

For  a  long  time  people  were  satisfied  with  knowing  that  the 
death-rate  was  higher  among  the  aged  than  among  the  young,  no 
one  as  usual  knowing  very  definitely  where  youth  ended  and  old 
age  began.  Then  something  more  was  learned;  statistics  were  made 
available,  very  imperfect  statistics  at  first,  then  better  ones,  now 
fairly  good  ones — and  they  are  steadily  improving^  For  a  long  time 
there  was  very  little  of  the  quantitative  about  political  economy.) 

144  ^  The  terms  "quality,"  "quantity,"  "qualitative,"  "quantitative,"  will  at  all 
times  be  used  in  these  volumes  not  in  any  metaphysical  sense  but  in  the  sense  com- 
monly used  in  chemistry  in  contrasting  qualitative  with  quantitative  analysis.  The 
one  shows,  for  instance,  that  a  given  substance  is  an  alloy  of  gold  and  copper;  the 
other  shows  the  weight  of  gold  and  the  weight  of  copper  present  in  a  given  weight 
of  the  alloy.(Whenever  we  note  the  presence  of  a  certain  element  in  a  sociological 
complex,  we  are  stating  a  qualitative  proposition!^  When  we  are  in  a  position  to  des- 
ignate, however  roughly,  the  intensity  of  that  element,  our  proposidon  becomes 
quantitative .  Unfortunatel)(  no  scales  are  available  for  weighing  the  things  that  are  | 
dealt  with  in  sociology,  and  we  shall  generally  have  to  be  satisfied  with  designating  1 
quandties  by  certain  indices  that  increase  or  diminisb   with   the   thing-  itself.)  An   ' 
interesting  example  of  that  method  applied  to  political  economy  is  provided  in  my 
use  of  indices  of  opheliflaity  (see  my  Manuale,  Appendix). 


74  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §144 

Then  it  became  quantitative  in  pure  economics — in  theory  at  least. 
For  sociology  we  shall  try  as  far  as  we  can  to  replace  qualitative 
considerations  with  considerations  of  quantity.^Imperfect,  very  im- 
perfect, as  they  may  be,  they  will  at  any  rate  be  a  little  better  than 
the  qualitative)  We  shall  do  what  we  can,  our  successors  will  do 
better — and  so  science  advances! 

In  these  volumes  we  shall  confine  ourselves  to  a  very  general  pic- 
ture— something  like  a  sphere  offered  as  a  model  of  the  Earth.  That 
is  why  I  call  this  a  seneral  sociology-  Details  will  still  be  left  for 
future  study — much  as  oceans,  continents,  and  mountains  have  to 
be  drawn  in  on  the  sphere  of  the  Earth.  Such  studies  would  make 
up  a  special  sociology.  Incidentally,  however,  we  shall  examine  not 
a  few  special  themes  in  the  course  of  these  volumes ;  f or(we  shall  be 
meeting  them-  all  along  the  path  we  shall  have  to  traverse  in  get- 
ting our  picture  of  society  in  general.^ 


CHAPTER     II 

Non-logical  Conduct^ 

145.  So  far  we  have  stated  our  attitude  in  writing  these  volumes 
and  the  field  in  which  we  intend  to  remain.  Now  we  are  to  study 
human  conduct,  the  states  of  mind  to  which  it  corresponds  and  the 
ways  in  which  they  express  themselves,  in  order  to  arrive  eventually 
at  our  goal,  which  is  to  discover  the  forms  of  society.  We  are  follow- 
ing the  inductive  method.  We  have  no  preconceptions,  no  a  priori 
notions.  We  find  certain  facts  before  us.  We  describe  them,  classify 
them,  determine  their  character,  ever  on  the  watch  for  some  uni- 
formity (law)  in  the  relationships  between  them.  In  this  chapter  we 
begin  to  interest  ourselves  in  human  actions.^ 

146.  This  is  the  first  step  we  take  along  the  path  of  induction.  If 
we  were  to  find,  for  instance,  that  all  human  actions  corresponded  to 
logico-experimental  theories,  or  that  such  actions  were  the  most  im- 
portant, others  having  to  be  regarded  as  phenomena  of  social  pathol- 
ogy deviating  from  a  normal  type,  our  course  evidently  would  be 
entirely  different  from  what  it  would  be  if  many  of  the  more  im- 
portant human  actions  proved  to  correspond  to  theories  that  are  not 
logico-experimental. 

147.  Let  us  accordingly  examine  actions  from  the  standpoint  of 

'^  [Pareto,  following  Bentham,  invariably  uses  the  word  "actions"  {azion'i)  where 
ordinary  English  parlance  uses  "conduct"  or  "behaviour."  Such  phrases  as  "logical 
actions"  and  "non-logical  actions"  often  lead  to  syntactical  and  other  paradoxes  in 
Pareto's  text  that  have  contributed  not  a  litde  to  his  occasional  obscurity.  For  mere 
convenience  azioni  is  rendered  here  by  "conduct,"  "behaviour,"  "acts,"  "actions," 
more  or  less  interchangeably.  The  literally-minded  reader  can  always  recover  the 
feel  of  the  original  Italian  by  understanding  those  words  as  "actions"  with  construc- 
tions in  the  plural.  More  troublesome  still  to  the  translator  is  Pareto's  use  of  the 
phrase  "non-logical  actions"  for  "the  sentiments  (or  "impulses"  or  "residues") 
underlying  non-logical  actions,"  or  for  "the  principles  of  non-logical  acdons."  There 
is  no  extricating  him  from  that  situation,  and  in  it  as  a  rule  I  leave  hini. — A.  L.] 

145  ^  Originally  written  in  French,  this  chapter  was  in  part  translated  into 
Italian  by  the  Rivista  italiana  di  sociologia,  and  published  in  that  review,  May- 
August,  1910. 

75 


76  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §148 

their  logicoexperimental  character.  But  in  order  to  do  that  we  must 
first  try  to  classify  them,  and  in  that  effort  we  propose  to  follow  the 
principles  of  the  classificgtinn  called  natural  in  botany  and  zoology, 
whereby  objects  on  the  whole"presenfing~similar  characteristics  are 
grouped  together.  In  the  case  of  botany  Tournefort's  classification 
was  very  wisely  abandoned.  It  divided  plants  into  "herbs"  and 
"trees,"  and  so  came  to  separate  entities  that  as  a  matter  of  fact  pre- 
sent close  resemblances.  The  so-called  natural  method  nowadays 
preferred  does  away  with  all  divisions  of  that  kind  and  takes  as  its 
norm  the  characteristics  of  plants  in  the  mass,  putting  like  with  like 
and  keeping  the  unlike  distinct.  Can  we  find  similar  groupings  to 
classify  the  actions  of  human  beings? 

148.  It  is  not  actions  as  we  find  them  in  the  concrete  that  we  are 
called  upon  to  classify,  but  the  elements  constituting  them.  So  the 
chemist  classifies  elements  and  compounds  of  elements,  whereas  in 
nature  what  he  finds  is  mixtures  of  compounds.  Concrete  actions  \ 
are  synthetic — they  originate  in  mixtures,  in  varying  degrees,  of  the  I 
elements  we  are  to  classify. 

149.  Every  social  phenomenon  may  be  considered  under  two  as- 
pects: as  it  is  in  reality,  and  as  it  presents  itself  to  the  mind  of  this 
or  that  human  being.  The  first  aspect  we  shall  call  objective,  the 
second  subjective  (§§94f.).  Such  a  division  is  necessary,  for  we 
cannot  put  in  one  same  class  the  operations  performed  by  a  chemist 
in  his  laboratory  and  the  operations  performed  by  a  person  prac- 
tising magic;  the  conduct  of  Greek  sailors  in  plying  their  oars  to 
drive  their  ship  over  the  water  and  the  sacrifices  they  offered  to 
Poseidon  to  make  sure  of  a  safe  and  rapid  voyage.  In  Rome  the  Laws 
of  the  XII  Tables  punished  anyone  casting  a  spell  on  a  harvest.  We 
choose  to  distinguish  such  an  act  from  the  act  of  burning  a  field 
of  grain. 

We  must  not  be  misled  by  the  names  we  give  to  the  two  classes.  \ 
In  reality  both  are  subjective,  for  all  human  knowledge  is  subjective.  J 
They  are  to  be  distinguished  not  so  much  by  any  difference  in  na- 
ture as  in  view  of  the  greater  or  lesser  fund  of  factual  knowledge 


I 


§  150  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  77 

that  we  ourselves  have.  We  know,  or  think  we  know,  that  sacrifices 
to  Poseidon  have  no  effect  whatsoever  upon  a  voyage.  We  therefore 
distinguish  them  from  other  acts  which  (to  our  best  knowledge,  at 
least)  are  capable  of  having  such  effect.  If  at  some  future  time  we 
were  to  discover  that  we  have  been  mistaken,  that  sacrifices  to  Posei- 
don are  very  influential  in  securing  a  favourable  voyage,  we  should 
have  to  reclassify  them  with  actions  capable  of  such  influence.  All 
that  of  course  is  pleonastic.  It  amounts  to  saying  that  when  a  person 
makes  a  classification,  he  does  so  according  to  the  knowledge  he  has. 

I,  One  cannot  imagine  how  things  could  be  otherwise. 
■!  150.  There  are  actions  that  use  means  appropriate  to  ends  and 
which  logically  link  means  with  ends.  There  are  other  actions  in 
which  those  traits  are  missing.  The  two  sorts  of  conduct  are  very 
different  according  as  they  are  considered  under  their  objective  or 
their  subjective  aspect.  From  the  subjective  point  of  view  nearly  all 
human  actions  belong  to  the  logical  class.  In  the  eyes  of  the  Greek 
mariners  sacrifices  to  Poseidon  and  rowing  with  oars  were  equally 
^  logical  means  of  navigation.  To  avoid  verbosities  which  could  only 
prove  annoying,  we  had  better  give  names  to  these  types  of  conduct.^ 
Suppose  we  apply  the  term  logical  actions  to  actions  that  logically 

■  x   conjoin  means  to  ends  not  only  from  the  standpoint  of  the  subject 

performing  them,  but  from  the  standpoint  of  other  persons  who 
have  a  more  extensive  knowledge — in  other  words,  to  actions  that 

■  •  are  logical  both  subjectively  and  objectively  in  the  sense  just  ex- 

plained. Other  actions  we  shall  call  non-logical  (b_y  no  means  the 
same  as  "illogical").  This  latter  class  we  shall  subdivide  into  a  num- 
ber of  varieties. 

150  ^  As  we  have  already  said  (§§  116  f.),  it  would  perhaps  be  better  to  use  desig- 
nations that  have  no  meanings  in  themselves,  such  as  letters  of  the  alphabet.  On  the 
other  hand,  such  a  system  would  impair  the  clarity  of  our  argument.  We  must 
therefore  resign  ourselves  to  using  terms  of  ordinary  speech;  but  the  reader  must 
bear  in  mind  that  such  words,  or  their  etymologies,  in  no  way  serve  to  describe  the 
things  they  stand  for.  Things  have  to  be  examined  directly.  Names  are  just  labels  to 
help  us  keep  track  of  them  (§  119). 


yS  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §151 

151.  A  synoptic  picture  of  the  classification  will  prove  useful: 

GENERA  AND  SPECIES  HAVE  THE  ACTIONS  LOGICAL  ENDS  AND  PURPOSES : 

Objectively?  Subjectively? 

CLASS  i:  LOGICAL  ACTIONS 

(The  objective  end  and  the  subjective  purpose  are  identical.) 

Yes  Yes 

CLASS  II.  NON-LOGICAL  ACTIONS 

(The  objective  end  differs  from  the  subjective  purpose.) 
Genus  i  No  No 

Genus  2  No  Yes 

Genus  3  Yes  No 

Genus  4  Yes  Yes 

SPECIES  OF  THE  GENERA  3  AND  4 

3a,  4a  The  objective  end  w^ould  be  accepted  by  the  sub- 

ject if  he  knew  it. 

3/3,  ^(5  The  objective  end  would  be  rejected  by  the  sub- 

ject if  he  knew  it. 

The  ends  and  purposes  here  in  question  are  immediate  ends  and 
purposes.  We  choose  to  disregard  the  indirect.  The  objective  end  is 
a  real  one,  located  within  the  field  of  observation  and  experience, 
and  not  an  imaginary  end,  located  outside  that  field.  An  imaginary 
end  may,  on  the  other  hand,  constitute  a  subjective  purpose. 

152.  Logical  actions  are  very  numerous  among  civilized  peoples. 
Actions  connected  with  the  arts  and  sciences  belong  to  that  class,  at 
least  for  artists  and  scientists.  For  those  who  physically  perform 
them  in  mere  execution  of  orders  from  superiors,  there  may  be 
among  them  non-logical  actions  of  our  II-4  type.  The  actions  dealt 
with  in  political  economy  also  belong  in  very  great  part  in  the 
class  of  logical  actions.  In  the  same  class  must  be  located,  further,  a 
certain  number  of  actions  connected  with  military,  political,  legal, 
and  similar  activities. 

153.  So  at  the  very  first  glance  induction  leads  to  the  discovery 
that  non-logical  actions  play  an  important  part  in  society.  Let  us 
therefore  proceed  with  our  examination  of  them. 


1 


§155  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  79 

154.  First  of  all,  in  order  to  get  better  acquainted  with  these  non- 
logical  actions,  suppose  we  look  at  a  few  examples.  Many  others  will 
find  their  proper  places  in  chapters  to  follow.  Here  are  some  illus- 
trations of  actions  of  Class  II: 

Genera  i  and  3,  which  have  no  subjective  purpose,  are  of  scant 
importance  to  the  human  race.  Human  beings  have  a  very  conspicu- 
ous tendency  to  paint  a  varnish  of  logic  over  their  conduct.  Nearly 
all  humaff  "actions  therefore  work  their  way  into  genera  2  and  4. 
Many  actions  performed  in  deference  to  courtesy  and  custom  might 
be  put  in  genus  i.  But  very  very  often  people  give  some  reason  or 
other  to  justify  such  conduct,  and  that  transfers  it  to  genus  2.  Ignor- 
ing the  indirect  motive  involved  in  the  fact  that  a  person  violating 
common  usages  incurs  criticism  and  dislike,  we  might  find  a  certain 
number  of  actions  to  place  in  genera  i  and  3. 

Says  Hesiod :  ^  "Do  not  make  water  at  the  mouth  of  a  river  empty- 
ing into  the  sea,  nor  into  a  spring.  You  must  avoid  that.  Do  not 
lighten  your  bowels  there,  for  it  is  not  good  to  do  so."  The  precept 
not  to  befoul  rivers  at  their  mouths  belongs  to  genus  i.  No  objec- 
tive or  subjective  end  or  purpose  is  apparent  in  the  avoidance  of  such 
pollution.  The  precept  not  to  befoul  drinking-water  belongs  to  genus 
3.  It  has  an  objective  purpose  that  Hesiod  may  not  have  known,  but 
which  is  familiar  to  moderns:  to  prevent  contagion  from  certain 
diseases. 

It  is  probable  that  not  a  few  actions  of  genera  i  and  3  are  com- 
mon among  savages  and  primitive  peoples.  But  travellers  are  bent 
on  learning  at  all  costs  the  reasons  for  the  conduct  they  observe.  So 
in  one  way  or  another  they  finally  obtain  answers  that  transfer  the 
conduct  to  genera  2  and  4. 

155.  Granting  that  animals  do  not  reason,  we  can  place  nearly  all 
their  so-called  instinctive  acts  in  genus  3.  Some  may  even  go  in  i. 
Genus  3  is  the  pure  type  of  the  non-logical  action,  and  a  study  of  it 
as  it  appears  in  animals  will  help  to  an  understanding  of  non-logical 
conduct  in  human  beings. 

154  ^  opera  et  dies,  vv.  757-58. 


8o  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §155 

Of  the  insects  called  Eumenes  (pseudo-wasps)  Blanchard  writes 
that,  like  other  Hymenoptera,  they  "suck  the  nectar  of  flowers  when 
they  are  full  grown  [but  that]  their  larvae  feed  only  upon  living 
prey;  and  since,  like  the  larvae  of  wasps  and  bees,  they  are  apodal 
and  incapable  of  procuring  food,  they  would  perish  at  once  if  left  to 
themselves.  What  happens,  then,  may  be  foreseen.  The  mother  her- 
self has  to  procure  food  for  her  young.  That  industrious  little  ani- 
mal, who  herself  lives  only  on  the  honey  of  flowers,  wages  war  upon 
the  tribe  of  insects  to  assure  a  livelihood  for  her  offspring.  In  order 
to  stock  its  nest  with  victuals,  this  Hymenopteron  nearly  always  at- 
tacks particular  species  of  insects,  and  it  knows  how  to  find  such 
species  without  any  trouble,  though  to  the  scientist  who  hunts  for 
them  they  seem  very  rare  indeed.  The  female  stings  her  victims 
with  her  dart  and  carries  them  to  her  nest.  The  insect  so  smitten 
does  not  die  at  once.  It  is  left  in  a  deep  coma,  which  renders  it  in- 
capable of  moving  or  defending  itself.  The  larvae  are  hatched  in 
close  proximity  to  the  provisions  that  have  been  laboriously  accu- 
mulated by  the  mother,  and  find  within  their  reach  a  food  adapted 
to  their  needs  and  in  quantities  sufficient  for  their  whole  life  as 
larvae.  Nothing  is  more  amazing  than  this  marvellous  foresight; 
and  it  is  altogether  instinctive,  it  would  seem.  In  laying  her  eggs 
every  female  prepares  food  for  young  whom  she  will  never  see ;  for 
by  the  time  they  are  hatched  she  will  long  since  have  ceased  to 
live."^ 

155  ^  Histoire  des  insectes,  Vol.  I,  p.  71.  But  there  is  something  else.  Fabre  made 
interesting  observations  of  these  insects  and  others  of  the  kind.  He  succeeded  in  de- 
termining that  the  number  of  caterpillars  prepared  to  feed  the  larva  varies  from  five 
to  ten,  according  as  the  insect  is  to  be  female  or  male.  Since  the  egg  is  laid  after  the 
provisions  have  been  stored,  Fabre  believes  that  the  mother  know^s  beforehand  the 
sex  to  which  the  egg  is  to  belong  {Souvenirs  entomologiques,  Ser.  2,  pp.  72-73).  He 
reverts  to  the  matter  of  the  sex  of  the  egg  in  his  third  series  (pp.  384  f.).  Fabre 
managed  to  discover  how  the  larva  of  the  Eumenis  is  fed:  Ibid.,  Ser.  2,  pp.  78-79: 
"The  egg  is  not  laid  on  the  food:  it  is  hung  from  the  ceiling  of  the  dome  by  a  fila- 
ment rivalling  the  thread  of  a  spider's  web  in  fineness.  .  .  .  The  larva  has  hatched 
and  is  already  of  some  size.  Like  the  egg,  it  hangs  by  the  back  from  the  ceiling  of  its 
home.  .  .  .  The  worm  is  now  at  table!  Head  down,  he  feels  about  over  the  soft  belly 
of  one  of  the  caterpillars.  With  a  wisp  of  straw  I  touch  the  game  gently,  before  it 
has  been  bitten.  The  caterpillars  begin  wriggling,  and  the  larva  beats  a  hasty  re- 


§155  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  8 1 

Other  Hymenoptera,  the  Cerceres,  attack  Coleoptera.  Here  the 
action,  subjectively  non-logical,  shows  a  marvellous  objective  logic. 
Suppose  we  let  Fabre  speak  for  himself.  He  observes  that,  in  order 
to  paralyze  its  prey,  the  Hymenopteron  has  first  to  find  Coleoptera 
either  with  three  thoracic  ganglia  very  close  together,  contiguous  in 
fact,  or  with  the  two  rear  ganglia  joined.  "That,  really,  is  the  prey 
they  need.  These  Coleoptera,  with  motor  centres  situated  so  close 
together  as  to  touch,  forming  a  single  mass  and  standing  in  intimate 
mutual  connexions,  can  thus  be  paralyzed  at  a  single  thrust;  or  if 
several  stings  are  needed,  the  ganglia  that  require  treatment  will  at 
least  lie  together  under  the  point  of  the  stinger."  Further  along: 
"Out  of  the  vast  numbers  of  Coleoptera  upon  which  the  Cerceres 
might  inflict  their  depredations,  only  two  groups,  the  weevils  and 
the  Buprestes,  fulfil  the  indispensable  conditions.  They  live  far  from 
infested  and  noisome  places,  for  which,  it  may  be,  the  fastidious 
huntress  has  an  unconquerable  repugnance.  Their  numerous  repre- 
sentatives vary  in  size,  proportionate  to  the  sizes  of  the  various 
pirates,  who  are  thus  free  to  select  their  victims  at  pleasure.  They, 
more  than  all  others,  are  vulnerable  at  the  one  point  where  the 
stinger  of  the  Hymenopteron  can  penetrate  with  success :  for  at  that 
point  the  motor  centres  of  the  feet  and  wings  are  concentrated  in 
such  a  way  as  to  be  readily  accessible  to  the  stinger.  These  three 
thoracic  ganglia  of  the  weevil  lie  very  close  together,  the  last  two 
touching.  In  the  Buprestes  the  second  and  third  ganglia  blend  in  a 
single  bulky  mass  a  short  distance  from  the  first.  Now  it  is  the 
weevils  and  the  Buprestes  precisely,  to  the  absolute  exclusion  of  all 
other  prey,  that  we  find  hunted  by  the  eight  species  of  Cerceres  that 
lay  in  stores  of  Coleoptera."  ^ 

treat."  It  crawls  back  into  a  sort  of  sheath:  "The  covering  of  the  egg  is  its  tunnel 
of  refuge.  It  still  keeps  its  cylindrical  form,  prolonged  a  little  perhaps  by  the  special 
labours  of  the  new-born  larva.  At  the  first  signs  of  peril  from  the  pile  of  caterpillars, 
the  larva  draws  into  its  sheath  and  climbs  back  to  the  ceiling  where  the  wriggling 
mob  cannot  reach  it."  Later  on,  when  the  worm  has  grown  stronger  and  the 
caterpillars  weaker,  the  worm  drops  to  the  floor. 

155  ^  Ibtd.,  Ser.  i,  pp.  67-79.  Another  truly  extraordinary  example  is  supplied  in 
Fabre's  Ser.  4,  pp.  253-54.  The  Callicurgus  hunts  a  certain  spider,  the  Epeiron. 
The  Epeiron    "has  under  his   throat   two   exceedingly   sharp   needles   with   drops 


82  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §156 

156.  For  that  matter,  a  certain  number  of  actions  in  animals 
evince  reasoning  of  a  kind,  or  better,  a  sort  of  adaptation  of  means 
to  ends  as  circumstances  change.  Says  Fabre,  whom  we  quote  at 
such  length  because  he  has  studied  the  subject  better  than  anybody 
else:^  "For  instinct  nothing  is  difficult,  so  long  as  the  act  does  not 
extrude  from  the  fixed  cycle  that  is  the  animal's  birthright.  For  in- 
stinct also  nothing  is  easy  if  the  act  has  to  deviate  from  the  rut 
habitually  followed.  The  insect  that  amazes  for  its  high  perspicacity 
will  an  instant  later,  when  confronted  with  the  simplest  situation 
foreign  to  its  ordinary  practice,  astound  for  its  stupidity.  ,  .  .  Dis- 
tinguishable in  the  psychic  life  of  the  insect  are  two  wholly  different 
domains.  The  one  is  instinct  proper,  the  unconscious  impulse  that 
guides  the  animal  in  the  marvellous  achievements  of  its  industry. 
...  It  is  instinct,  and  nothing  but  instinct,  that  makes  a  mother 
build  a  nest  for  a  family  she  will  never  know,  which  counsels  a 
supply  of  food  for  an  unknowable  posterity,  which  steers  the  dart 
toward  the  nerve-centre  of  the  prey  .  .  .  with  a  view  to  keeping 
provisions  fresh.  .  .  .  But  for  all  of  its  unbending,  unconscious  clev- 
erness, pure  instinct,  all  by  itself,  would  leave  the  insect  disarmed 
in  its  perpetual  battle  with  circumstance.  ...  A  guide  is  necessary 
to  devise,  accept,  refuse,  select,  prefer  this,  ignore  that — in  a  word, 
take  advantage  of  the  usables  occasion  offers.  Such  a  guide  the  in- 

of  poison  on  the  points.  The  Callicurgus  is  lost  if  the  spider  pricks  him,  and 
meantime  his  operation  in  anaesthesia  requires  the  unfailing  precision  of  the  sur- 
geon's knife.  What  is  he  to  do  in  a  perilous  situation  that  would  ruin  the  composure 
of  the  coolest  human  operator?  The  patient  has  first  to  be  disarmed  and  then  dealt 
with!  And,  in  fact,  there  is  the  stinger  of  the  Callicurgus  darting  forward  from  the 
back  and  driving  into  the  mouth  of  the  Epeiron  with  minutest  precautions  and 
untiring  persistence!  Almost  at  once  the  poisonous  hooks  fold  up  lifeless  and  the 
dread  prey  is  powerless  to  harm.  The  belly  of  the  Hymenopteron  then  stretches 
its  bow  and  drives  the  stinger  home  just  behind  the  fourth  pair  of  legs,  on  the 
median  line,  almost  at  the  juncture  of  belly  and  cephalo-thorax.  .  .  .  The  nerve 
ganglia  controlling  the  movements  of  the  legs  are  located  a  little  higher  than  the 
point  pricked,  but  the  backward-forward  thrust  enables  the  weapon  to  reach  them. 
This  second  stroke  paralyzes  the  eight  legs  all  at  once.  .  .  .  First,  to  safeguard  the 
operator,  a  prick  in  the  mouth,  a  point  terrifyingly  armed  and  to  be  dreaded  more 
than  all  else!  Then,  to  safeguard  the  offspring,  a  second  thrust  into  the  nervous 
centres  of  the  thorax,  to  end  all  movement!" 
156  ^  Ibid.,  Ser.  i,  pp.  165-66;  Ser.  4,  pp.  65-67. 


§157  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  83 

sect  certainly  has  and  even  to  a  very  conspicuous  degree.  It  is  the 
second  domain  of  his  psychic  hfe.  In  it  he  is  conscious  and  teachable 
by  experience.  Not  daring  to  call  that  rudimentary  aptitude  intelli- 
gence, a  title  too  exalted  for  it,  I  w^ill  call  it  discernment." 

157.  Qualitatively  (§  144^),  phenomena  are  virtually  the  same  in 
human  beings;  but  quantitatively,  the  field  of  logical  behaviour,  ex- 
ceedingly limited  in  the  case  of  animals,  becomes  very  far-reaching 
in  mankind.  All  the  same,  many  many  human  actions,  even  today 
.  among  the  most  civilized  peoples,  are  performed  instinctively,  me- 
\  chanically,  in  pursuance  of  habit ;  and  that  is  more  generally  observ- 
able still  in  the  past  and  among  less  civilized  peoples.  There  are  cases 
in  which  it  is  apparent  that  the  effectiveness  of  certain  rites  is  be- 
lieved in  instinctively,  and  not  as  a  logical  consequence  of  the  reli- 
gion that  practises  them  (§  952).  Says  Fabre:  ^ 

"The  various  instinctive  acts  of  insects  are  therefore  inevitably 
linked  together.  Because  a  certain  thing  has  just  been  done,  another 
must  unavoidably  be  done  to  complete  it  or  prepare  the  vi^ay  for  its 
completion  [That  is  the  case  with  many  human  actions  also.],  and 
the  two  acts  are  so  strictly  correlated  that  the  performance  of  the 
first  entails  the  performance  of  the  second,  even  when  by  some 
fortuitous  circumstance  the  second  may  have  become  not  only  un- 
seasonable, but  at  times  even  contrary  to  the  animal's  interests." 

But  even  in  the  animal  one  detects  a  seed  of  the  logic  that  is  to 
come  to  such  luxuriant  flower  in  the  human  being.  After  describing 
how  he  tricked  certain  insects  that  obstinately  persisted  in  useless 
acts,  Fabre  adds:  "But  the  yellow-winged  Sphex  does  not  always  let 
himself  be  fooled  by  the  game  of  pulling  his  cricket  away.  There 
are  chosen  clans  in  his  tribe,  families  of  brainy  wit,  that,  after  a  few 
disappointments,  perceive  the  wiles  of  the  trickster  and  find  ways  to 
checkmate  them.  But  such  revolutionaries,  candidates  for  progress, 
are  the  small  minority.  The  rest,  stubborn  conservators  of  the  good 
old-fashioned  ways,  are  the  hoi  polloi,  the  majority." 

This  remark  should  be  remembered,  for  the  conflict  between  a 
tendency  to  combinations,  which  is  responsible  for  innovations,  and 

157  '^  Ibid.,  Ser.  i,  pp.  174-77. 


84  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §158 

a  tendency  to  permanence  in  groups  of  sensations,  which  promotes 
stability,  may  put  us  in  the  way  of  explaining  many  things  about 
human  societies  (Chapter  XII). 

158.  The  formation  of  human  language  is  no  whit  less  marvel- 
lous than  the  instinctive  conduct  of  insects.  It  would  be  absurd  to 
claim  that  the  theory  of  grammar  preceded  the  practice  of  speech. 
It  certainly  followed,  and  human  beings  have  created  most  subtle 
grammatical  structures  without  any  knowledge  of  it. 

Take  the  Greek  language  as  an  example.  If  one  chose  to  go  farther 
back  to  some  Indo-European  language  from  which  Greek  would  be 
derived,  our  contentions  would  hold  a  fortiori,  because  the  chance 
of  any  grammatical  abstraction  would  be  less  and  less  probable.  We 
cannot  imagine  that  the  Greeks  one  day  got  together  and  decided 
what  their  system  of  conjugation  was  to  be.  Usage  alone  made  such 
a  masterpiece  of  the  Greek  verb.  In  Attic  Greek  there  is  the  aug- 
ment, which  is  the  sign  of  the  past  in  historical  tenses;  and,  for  a 
very  subtle  nuance,  besides  the  syllabic  augment  there  is  the  tem- 
poral (quantitative)  augment,  which  consists  in  a  lengthening  of 
the  initial  vowel.  The  conception  of  the  aorist,  and  its  functions  in 
syntax,  are  inventions  that  would  do  credit  to  the  most  expert  logi- 
cian. The  large  number  of  verbal  forms  and  the  exactness  of  their 
functions  in  syntax  constitute  a  marvellous  whole.^ 

158  ^  Albert  Dauzat  well  says,  Lm  langtte  francaise  d'atijourd'hui,  pp.  238-39: 
"The  whole  field  is  today  under  the  dominion  of  a  principle  that  holds  the  alle- 
giance of  the  vast  majority  of  philologists,  namely,  that  linguistic  phenomena  are 
unconscious.  [Another  way  of  expressing  what  we  mean  by  "non-logical  actions."] 
Almost  universally  accepted  in  the  domain  of  phonology — transformations  in  sounds 
have  long  since  ceased  to  be  ascribed  to  individual  caprice — the  principle  is  never- 
theless meeting  the  same  opposition  in  the  field  of  semantics  that  [phonetic]  laws 
were  generally  arousing  not  so  long  ago.  M.  Breal  [Essai  de  semantiqtte,  p.  311; 
Cust,  pp.  279-81]  assigns  a  very  definite  role  to  individual  volition  in  the  evolu- 
tion of  word-meanings.  .  .  .  This  [Breal's]  theory,  which  would  have  found  prac- 
tically no  adversaries  fifty  years  ago,  is  today  rejected  with  virtual  unanimity  by 
philologists,  who  readily  subscribe  to  the  axiom  stated  by  V.  Henry  {Antinomies  lin- 
giiistiqiics,  p.  78]  that  'any  explanation  of  a  linguistic  phenomenon  which  to  any 
extent  whatever  assumes  exercise  of  conscious  activity  on  the  part  of  a  speaking 
subject  must  be  a  priori  discarded  and  held  null  and  void.'  "  But  that  is  an  exag- 
geration. Scientific  terminology  is  nearly  always  a  product  of  conscious  activity,  and 
some  few  terms  in  ordinary  language  may  have  similar  origiiis.  On  the  other  hand. 


§159  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  85 

159.  In  Rome,  the  general  invested  with  the  imperium  had  to  take 
the  auspices  on  the  Capitol  before  he  could  leave  the  city.  He  could 
do  that  only  in  Rome.  One  cannot  imagine  that  that  provision  had 
originally  the  political  purpose  that  it  eventually  acquired.^  "As  long 
as  the  extension  of  existing  imperia  depended  exclusively  upon  the 
will  of  the  comitia,  no  new  ones  carrying  full  military  authority 
could  be  established  except  by  taking  the  auspices  on  the  Capitol — 
consequently  by  performing  an  act  that  lay  within  urban  jurisdic- 
tion. ...  To  organize  another  [taking  of  auspices]  in  defiance  of 
the  constitution  would  have  implied  transgressing  bounds  held  in 
awe  even  by  the  comitia  of  the  sovereign  People.  No  constitutional 
barrier  to  extraordinary  military  usurpations  held  its  ground  any- 
where near  as  long  as  this  guarantee  that  had  been  found  in  the 
regulation  as  to  a  general's  auspices.  In  the  end  that  regulation  also 
lapsed,  or  rather  was  circumvented.  In  later  times  some  piece  of  land 
or  other  situated  outside  of  Rome  was  'annexed'  by  a  legal  fiction  to 
the  city  and  taken  as  though  located  within  the  pomerium,  and  the 
required  auspicium  was  celebrated  there." 

Later  on  Sulla  not  only  abolished  the  guarantee  of  the  auspices, 
but  even  rendered  it  inapplicable  by  an  ordinance  whereby  the  mag- 
istrate was  obligated  not  to  assume  command  till  after  the  expiration 
of  his  year  of  service  [as  a  magistrate] — at  a  time,  that  is,  when 

Breal's  objection  does  not  disturb  the  fact  that  a  large  number  of  phenomena  are 
conscious  only  in  appearances,  the  activity  of  the  subject  resolving  itself  into  non- 
logical  behaviour  of  our  varieties  2  and  especially  4.  Darmesteter,  La  vie  des  mots, 
pp.  86,  133:  "In  all  such  changes  [in  the  meanings  of  words]  one  finds,  at  bottom, 
two  concurrent  intellectual  elements,  the  one  principal,  the  other  secondary.  In  the 
long  run,  as  the  result  of  an  unconscious  detour,  the  mind  loses  sight  of  the  first  and 
thinks  only  of  the  second.  ...  So  the  mind  passes  from  one  idea  to  quite  another 
under  cover  of  one  same  physiological  fact — the  word.  Now  this  unconscious  devel- 
opment, which  shifts  the  stress  from  the  principal  detail  to  the  secondary,  is  the  law, 
no  less,  of  transformadons  in  the  mental  world.  ...  So  in  spite  of  the  family  rela- 
tionships that  developments  in  a  language  may  establish  between  words,  words  most 
often  lead  lives  of  their  own  and  follow  their  respecdve  destinies  all  by  themselves. 
When  human  beings  speak,  they  are  by  no  means  'doing  etymology.'  "  Nothing 
could  be  truer;  and  that  is  why  people  often  go  astray  in  trying  to  infer  the  mean- 
ing of  a  word  from  its  etymology  or,  what  is  worse,  trying  to  reconstruct  the  un- 
known history  of  a  remote  past  on  an  etymological  basis. 
159  -^  Mommsen,  Riimisches  Staatsrecht,  Vol.  I,  p.  100. 


86  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §l6o 

[being  in  his  proconsular  province]  he  could  no  longer  take  the 
urban  auspices.  Now  Sulla,  a  conservative,  obviously  had  no  intention 
of  providing  for  the  overthrow  of  his  constitution  in  that  way,  any 
more  than  the  older  Romans,  in  establishing  the  requirement  of 
auspices  taken  in  the  Urbs,  were  anticipating  attacks  upon  the  con- 
stitution of  the  Republic.  In  reality,  in  their  case,  we  have  a  non- 
logical  action  of  our  4a  type;  and  in  the  case  of  Sulla  a  non-logical 
action  of  our  ^8  type. 

In  the  sphere  of  political  economy,  certain  measures  (for  example, 
wage-cutting)  of  business  men  (entrepreneurs)  working  under  con- 
ditions of  free  competition  are  to  some  extent  non-logical  actions  of 
our  4/^  type,  that  is,  the  objective  end  does  not  coincide  with  the 
subjective  purpose.  On  the  other  hand,  if  they  enjoy  a  monopoly,  the 
same  measures  (wage-cutting)  become  logical  actions.^ 

160.  Another  very  important  difference  between  human  conduct 
and  the  conduct  of  animals  lies  in  the  fact  that  we  do  not  observe 
human  conduct  wholly  from  the  outside  as  we  do  in  the  case  of 
animals.  Frequently  we  know  the  actions  of  human  beings  through 
the  judgments  that  people  pass  upon  them,  through  the  impressions 
they  make,  and  in  the  light  of  the  motives  that  people  are  pleased 
to  imagine  for  them  and  assign  as  their  causes.  For  that  reason, 
actions  that  would  otherwise  belong  to  genera  i  and  3  make  their 
way  into  2  and  4. 

Operations  in  magic  when  unattended  by  other  actions  belong  to 
genus  2.  The  sacrifices  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans  have  to  be  classed 
in  the  same  genus — at  least  after  those  peoples  lost  faith  in  the  real- 
ity of  their  gods.  Hesiod,  Opera  et  dies,  vv.  735-39,  warns  against 
crossing  a  river  without  first  washing  one's  hands  in  it  and  uttering 
a  prayer.  That  would  be  an  action  of  genus  i.  But  he  adds  that  the 

159  ^  Pareto,  Cotirs,  §  719:  ".  .  .  while  the  business  man  aims  at  reducing  costs 
of  production,  involuntarily  he  achieves  the  further  effect  of  reducing  selling  prices 
[That  is  not  the  case  with  monopolies.],  competition  always  restoring  parity  be- 
tween the  two  prices."  And  cf.  Ibid.,  §§  151,  718.  Pareto,  Mantiale,  Chap.  V,  §  11. 
Ibid.,  Chap.  V,  §  74:  "So  competing  enterprises  get  to  a  point  where  they  had  no  in- 
tention of  going.  Each  of  them  has  been  looking  strictly  to  profits  and  thinking  of 
the  consumer  only  in  so  far  as  he  can  be  exploited;  but  owing  to  the  successive  ad- 
jusmients  and  readjustments  required  by  competition  their  combined  exertions  turn 
out  to  the  advantage  of  the  consumer." 


§l6l  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  87 

gods  punish  anyone  who  crosses  a  river  without  so  washing  his 
hands.  That  makes  it  an  action  of  genus  2. 

This  rationalizing  procedure  is  habitual  and  very  wide-spread. 
Hesiod  says  also,  vv.  780-82,  that  grain  should  not  be  sown  on  the 
thirteenth  of  a  month,  but  that  that  day  is  otherwise  very  auspicious 
for  planting,  and  he  gives  many  other  precepts  of  the  kind.  They  all 
belong  to  genus  2.  In  Rome  a  soothsayer  who  had  observed  signs  in 
the  heavens  was  authorized  to  adjourn  the  comitia  to  some  other 
day.^  Towards  the  end  of  the  Republic,  when  all  faith  in  augural 
science  had  been  lost,  that  was  a  logical  action,  a  means  of  attain- 
ing a  desired  end.  But  when  people  still  believed  in  augury,  it  was  an 
action  of  genus  4.  For  the  soothsayers  who,  with  the  help  of  the 
gods,  were  so  enabled  to  forestall  some  decision  that  they  considered 
harmful  to  the  Roman  People,  it  belonged  to  our  species  4a,  as  is 
apparent  if  one  consider  that  in  general  such  actions  correspond, 
very  roughly  to  be  sure,  to  the  provisions  used  in  our  time  for  avoid- 
ing ill-considered  decisions  by  legislative  bodies:  requirements  of 
two  or  three  consecutive  readings,  of  approvals  by  two  houses,  and 
so  on. 

Most  acts  of  public  policy  based  on  tradition  or  on  presumed  mis- 
sions of  peoples  or  individuals  belong  to  genus  4.  William  I,  King 
of  Prussia,  and  Napoleon  III,  Emperor  of  the  French,  both  consid- 
ered themselves  "men  of  destiny."  But  William  I  thought  his  mis- 
sion lay  in  promoting  the  welfare  and  greatness  of  his  country, 
Louis  Napoleon  believed  himself  destined  to  achieve  the  happiness 
of  mankind.  William's  policies  were  of  the  4a  type;  Napoleon's,  of 
the  4/3. 

Human  beings  as  a  rule  determine  their  conduct  with  reference 
to  certain  general  rules  (morality,  custom,  law),  which  give  rise  in 
greater  or  lesser  numbers  to  actions  of  our  4a  and  even  4/?  vari- 
eties. 

161.  Logical  actions  are  at  least  in  large  part  results  of  processes 

160  ^  Cicero,  De  legibtis,  II,  12,  31:  "If  we  are  thinking  of  prerogative,  what  pre- 
rogative more  extreme  than  to  be  able  to  adjourn  assembhes  and  councils  called  by 
the  supreme  authorities,  the  highest  magistrates,  or  to  annul  their  enactments  if 
they  have  already  been  held?  And  what  more  important  than  diat  business  in 
course  should  be  postponed  if  a  single  augur  cries,  Alto  die!}" 


88  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §  162 

of  reasoning.  Non-logical  actions  originate  chiefly  in  definite  psychic 
states,  sentiments,  subconscious  feelings,  and  the  like.  It  is  the  prov- 
ince of  psychology  to  investigate  such  psychic  states.  Here  v^e  start 
with  them  as  data  of  fact,  vv^ithout  going  beyond  that. 

162.  Thinking  of  animals,  let  us  assume  that  the  conduct  B  (I)  in 
Figure  2,  w^hich  is  all  we  are  in  a  position  to  observe,  is  connected 
with  a  hypothetical  psychic  state  A  (I).  In  human  beings  that  psy- 
chic state  is  revealed  not  through  the  conduct  5  (II)  alone,  but  also 
through  expressions  of  sentiments,  C,  which  often  develop  moral, 

religious,  and  other  similar  theo- 

A I — IS    ries.  The  very  marked  tendency  in 

^h  (n;  human  beings  to  transform  non- 

'n^  logical  into  logical  conduct  leads 

^\  them  to  imagine  that  B  is  an  effect 

\  of  the  cause  C.  So  a  direct  rela- 

\  tionship,  CB,  is  assumed,  instead 

of  the  indirect  relationship  arising 
through  the  two  relations  AB,  AC. 
Sometimes  the  relation  CB  in  fact 


^^^^  ^  obtains,  but  not  as  often  as  people 

think.  The  same  sentiment  that  restrains  people  from  performing 
an  act  B  (relation  AB)  prompts  them  to  devise  a  theory  C  (rela- 
tion AC).  A  man,  for  example,  has  a  horror  of  murder,  B,  and  he 
will  not  commit  murder;  but  he  will  say  that  the  gods  punish  mur- 
derers, and  that  constitutes  a  theory,  C. 

163.  We  are  thinking  not  only  of  qualitative  relations  (§  144  ^), 
but  of  quantitative  also.  Let  us  assume,  for  a  moment,  that  a  given 
force  impelling  a  man  to  perform  an  act  B  has  an  index  equivalent 
to  10  and  that  the  man  either  performs  or  refrains  from  performing 
the  act  B  according  as  the  forces  tending  to  restrain  him  have  an 
index  greater  or  smaller  than  10.  We  shall  then  get  the  following 
alternatives : 

Case  I.  The  restraining  force  of  the  association  AB  has  an  index 
greater  than  10.  In  that  situation  it  is  strong  enough  to  keep  the 


§165  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  89 

man  from  performing  the  act.  The  association  CB,  if  it  exists,  is 
superfluous. 

Case  2.  The  restraining  force  of  the  association  CB,  if  it  exists,  has 
an  index  larger  than  10.  In  such  a  case,  it  is  strong  enough  to  pre- 
vent the  act  B,  even  if  the  force  AB  is  equivalent  to  zero. 

Case  3.  The  force  resulting  from  the  association  AB  has,  let  us 
say,  an  index  equal  to  4;  and  the  force  resulting  from  the  association 
CB  an  index  equal  to  7.  The  sum  of  the  indices  is  11.  The  act,  there- 
fore, w^ill  not  be  performed.  The  force  resulting  from  the  association 
AB  has  an  index  equal  to  2,  the  other  retaining  its  index  7.  The 
sum  is  9;  the  act  v^^ill  be  performed. 

Suppose  the  association  AB  represents  a  person's  aversion  to  per- 
forming the  act  B.  AC  represents  the  theory  that  the  gods  punish 
persons  who  commit  the  act  B.  Some  people  w^ill  abstain  from  doing 
B  out  of  mere  aversion  to  it  (Case  i).  Others  refrain  from  it  only 
because  they  fear  the  punishment  of  the  gods  (Case  2).  Others  still 
will  forbear  for  both  reasons  (Case  3). 

164.  The  following  propositions  are  therefore  false,  because  too 
absolute:  "A  natural  disposition  to  do  good  is  sufficient  to  restrain 
human  beings  from  doing  wrong."  "Threat  of  eternal  punishment 
is  suflBcient  to  restrain  men  from  doing  wrong."  "Morality  is  inde- 
pendent of  religion."  "Morality  is  necessarily  dependent  on  reli- 
gion." \ 

Suppose  we  say  that  C  is  a  penalty  threatened  by  law.  The  same 
sentiment  that  prompts  people  to  establish  the  sanction  restrains 
them  from  committing  B.  Some  refrain  from  B  because  of  their 
aversion  to  it;  others  in  fear  of  the  penalty  C;  still  others  for  both 
reasons. 

165.  The  relationships  between  A,  B,  C  that  we  have  just  consid- 
ered are  fundamental,  but  they  are  far  from  being  the  only  ones. 
First  of  all,  the  existence  of  the  theory  C  reacts  upon  the  psychic 
state  A  and  in  many  many  cases  tends  to  re-enforce  it.  The  theory 
consequently  influences  B,  following  the  line  CAB.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  check  B,  which  keeps  people  from  doing  certain  things, 


/ 


90  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §  l66 

reacts  upon  the  psychic  state  A  and  consequently  upon  the  theory 
C,  following  the  line  BAC.  Then  again  the  influence  of  C  upon  B 
influences  A  and  so  is  carried  back  upon  C.  Suppose,  for  instance,  a 
penalty  C  is  considered  too  severe  for  a  crime  B.  The  infliction  of 
such  a  penalty  (C5)  modifies  the  psychic  state  A,  and  as  a  conse- 
quence of  the  change,  the  penalty  C  is  superseded  by  another  more 
mild. 

Change  in  a  psychic  state  is  first  disclosed  by  an  increase  in  cer- 
tain crimes  B.  The  increase  in  crime  modifies  the  psychic  state  A, 
and  the  modification  is  translated  into  terms  of  a  change  in  C. 

Up  to  a  certain  point,  the  rites  of  worship  in  a  religion  may  be 
comparable  to  the  conduct  B,  its  theology  to  the  theory  C.  The  two 
things  both  emanate  from  a  certain  psychic  state  A. 

166.  Let  us  consider  certain  conduct  D  (Figure  3),  depending 
upon  that  psychic  state,  A.  The  rites  of  worship,  B,  do  not  influence 

D  directly,  but  influence  A  and  consequently 
D.  In  the  same  way  they  influence  C  and, 
vice  versa,  C  influences  B.  There  can  in  addi- 
tion be  a  direct  influence  CD.  The  influence 
of  the  theology  C  upon  A  is  usually  rather 
weak,  and  consequently  its  influence  upon 
D  is  also  feeble,  since  the  influence  CD  is  it- 
self usually  slight.  In  general,  then,  we  go 
^  Figure  ^        ^    ^^^Y  ^^^  astray  in  assuming  that  a  theology, 

C,  is  the  motive  of  the  conduct,  D.  The  prop- 
osition so  often  met  with,  "This  or  that  people  acts  as  it  does  be- 
cause of  a  certain  belief,"  is  rarely  true;  in  fact,  it  is  almost  always 
erroneous.  The  inverse  proposition,  "People  believe  as  they  do  be- 
cause of  this  or  that  conduct,"  as  a  rule  contains  a  larger  amount  of 
truth;  but  it  is  too  absolute,  and  has  its  modicum  of  error.  Beliefs 
and  conduct  are  not,  to  be  sure,  independent;  but  their  correlation 
Hes  in  their  being,  as  it  were,  two  branches  of  one  same  tree  (§  267).^ 

167.  Before  the  invasion  of  Italy  by  the  gods  of  Greece,  the  ancient 
Roman  religion  did  not  have  a  theology,  C:  it  was  no  more  than  a 

166  ^  This  theme  will  be  amply  developed  in  Chapter  XL 


§l68  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  9I 

cult,  B.  But  the  cult  B,  reacting  upon  A,  exerted  a  powerful  influence 
on  the  conduct,  D,  of  the  Roman  people.  Nor  is  that  the  whole  story. 
The  direct  relation,  BD,  when  it  existed,  looks  to  us  moderns  mani- 
festly absurd.  But  the  relation  BAD  may  often  have  been  very  rea- 
sonable and  very  beneficial  to  the  Roman  people.  Any  direct  influ- 
ence of  a  theology,  C,  upon  D  is  in  general  weaker  even  than  its  in- 
fluence upon  A.  It  is  therefore  a  serious  mistake  to  measure  the  social 
value  of  a  religion  strictly  by  the  logical  or  rational  value  of  its 
theology  (§  14).  Certainly,  if  the  theology  becomes  absurd  to  the 
point  of  seriously  affecting  A,  it  will  for  the  same  reason  seriously 
affect  D.  But  that  rarely  occurs.  Only  when  the  psychic  state  A  has 
changed  do  people  notice  certain  absurdities  that  previously  had 
escaped  them  altogether. 

These  considerations  apply  to  theories  of  all  kinds.^  For  example, 
C  is  the  theory  of  free  trade ;  D,  the  concrete  adoption  of  free  trade 
by  a  country;  A,  a  psychic  state  that  is  in  great  part  the  product  of 
individual  interests,  economic,  political,  and  social,  and  of  the  cir- 
cumstances under  which  people  live.  Direct  relations  between  C  and 
D  are  generally  very  tenuous.  To  work  upon  C  in  order  to  modify 
D  leads  to  insignificant  results.  But  any  modification  in  A  may  react 
upon  C  and  upon  D.  D  and  C  will  be  seen  to  change  simultaneously, 
and  a  superficial  observer  may  think  that  D  has  changed  because  C 
has  changed,  whereas  closer  examination  will  reveal  that  D  and  C 
are  not  directly  correlated,  but  depend  both  upon  a  common 
cause,  A. 

168.  Theoretical  discussions,  C,  are  not,  therefore,  very  serviceable 
directly  for  modifying  D;  indirectly  they  may  be  effective  for  modi- 
fying A.  But  to  attain  that  objective,  appeal  must  be  made  to  senti- 
ments rather  than  to  logic  and  the  results  of  experience.  The  situa- 
tion may  be  stated,  inexactly  to  be  sure,  because  too  absolutely,  but 
I  nevertheless  strikingly,  by  saying  that  in  order  to  influence  people 
thought  has  to  be  transformed  into  sentiment. 

In  the  case  of  England,  the  continuous  practice  of  free  trade  B 
(Figure  3)  over  a  long  period  of  years  has  in  our  day  reacted  upon 

167  ^Pareto,  Manuel,  pp.  134-35,  520  (§62). 


92  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §169 

the  psychic  state  A  (interests,  etc.)  and  intensified  it,  so  increasing 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  introducing  protection.  The  theory  of  free 
trade,  C,  is  in  no  way  responsible  for  that.  However,  other  facts,  such 
as  growing  needs  on  the  part  of  the  Exchequer,  are  nowadays  tend- 
ing to  modify  A  in  their  turn ;  and  such  modifications  may  serve  to 
change  B  and  so  bring  protection  about.  Meantime  modifications  in 
C  will  be  observable  and  new  theories  favourable  to  protection  will 
come  into  vogue. 

A  theory,  C,  has  logical  consequences.  A  certain  number  of  them 
are  to  be  found  present  in  B.  Others  are  absent.  That  would  not  be 
the  case  if  B  were  the  direct  consequence  of  C,  for  if  it  were,  all  the 
logical  implications  of  C  would  appear  in  B  without  exception.  But 
C  and  B  are  simply  consequences  of  a  certain  psychic  state,  A.  There 
is  nothing  therefore  to  require  perfect  logical  correspondence  be- 
tween them.  We  shall  always  be  on  the  wrong  road,  accordingly, 
when  we  imagine  that  we  can  infer  B  from  C  by  establishing  that 
correspondence  logically.  We  are  obliged,  rather,  to  start  with  C  and 
determine  A,  and  then  find  a  way  to  infer  B  from  A.  In  doing  that 
very  serious  difficulties  are  encountered;  and  unfortunately  they 
have  to  be  overcome  before  we  can  hope  to  attain  scientific  knowl- 
edge of  social  phenomena. 

169.  We  have  no  direct  knowledge  of  A.  What  we  know  is  certain 
manifestations  of  A,  such  as  C  and  B;  and  we  have  to  get  back  from 
them  to  A.  The  difficulties  are  increased  by  the  fact  that  though  B 
is  susceptible  of  exact  observation,  C  is  almost  always  stated  in  ob- 
scure terms  altogether  devoid  of  exactness. 

170.  The  theory  we  have  been  thinking  of  is  a  popular  theory,  or 
at  least,  a  theory  held  by  large  numbers  of  people.  The  case  where 
C  is  a  theory  framed  by  scientists  is  in  some  respects  similar,  yet 
in  other  respects  different. 

Unless  the  theory  C  is  coldly  scientific,  C  is  affected  by  the  psychic 
state  of  the  scientists  who  frame  it.  If  they  belong  to  the  group  that 
has  been  performing  the  acts,  B,  their  psychic  state  has — save  in  the 
very  rare  case  of  an  individual  not  given  to  following  the  beaten 
path — something  in  common  with  the  psychic  state  of  the  members 


Figure  "4 


§172  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  93 

of  the  group;  and  consequently  A  still  influences  C.  That  is  all  the 
case  can  have  in  common  with  the  preceding  case.  If  scientists  are 
dealing  with  the  conduct  of  people  belonging  to  groups  entirely 
different  from  their  own — say  with  some  foreign  country,  or  some 
very  different  civilization,  or  with  historical  matters  going  back  to  a 
remote  past — their  psychic  state,  A'  (Figure  4),  is  not  identical  with 
A.  It  may  differ  now  more,  now  Ic^s,  or  even  in  some  particular  case 
be  altogether  different.  Now  it  is  the 
psychic  state  that  influences  C.  So  A 
may  affect  C  very  little,  if  at  all.  If  we 
ignore  all  influences  from  A  or  A' ,  we 
get  interpretations  of  the  facts,  B,  that 
are  purely  theoretical.  If  C  is  a  strict 
and  exact  principle  and  is  applied  to  B 
with  faultless  logic  and  without  am- 
biguities of  any  kind,  we  get  scientific 
interpretations. 

171.  But  the  class  of  theories  that  we  are  here  examining  includes 
others.  C  may  be  an  uncertain  principle,  lacking  in  exactness,  and 
sometimes  even  a  principle  of  the  experimental  type.  Furthermore, 
it  may  be  applied  to  B  with  illogical  reasonings,  arguments  by  anal- 
ogy, appeals  to  sentiment,  nebulous  irrelevancies.  In  such  cases  we 
get  theories  of  little  or  no  logico-experimental  value,  though  they 
may  have  a  great  social  value  (§14).  Such  theories  are  very  nu- 
merous, and  we  shall  find  them  occupying  much  of  our  attention.^ 

172.  Let  us  go  back  to  the  situation  in  Figure  3,  and  to  get  better 
acquainted  with  that  subject,  which  is  far  from  being  an  easy  one 
to  master,  let  us  put  abstractions  aside  and  examine  a  concrete  case. 
In  that  way  we  shall  be  led  to  follow  certain  inductions  which  arise 
spontaneously  from  the  exposition  of  facts.  Then  we  can  go  back  to 
the  general  case  and  continue  the  study  of  which  we  have  just 
sketched  the  initial  outlines. 

171  ^  Here  we  come  by  induction  to  many  points  beyond  which  we  choose  not 
to  go  for  the  present.  We  shall  resume  our  advance  from  them  in  chapters  to  fol- 
low, and  there  devote  ourselves  specially  to  many  things  that  are  merely  sign- 
boarded  here. 


94  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  ^^73 

There  is  a  very  important  psychic  state  that  establishes  and  main- 
tains certain  relationships  between  sensations,  or  facts,  by  means  of 
other  sensations,  P,  Q,  R.  .  .  .  Such  sensations  may  be  successive, 
and  that,  probably,  is  one  of  the  v^^ays  in  which  instinct  manifests 
itself  in  animals.  On  the  other  hand  they  may  be  simultaneous,  or 
at  least  be  considered  such;  and  their  union  constitutes  one  of  the 
<  chief  forces  in  the  social  equilibrium. 

^l-  Let  us  not  give  a  name  to  that  psychic  state,  in  order,  if  possible, 

to  avoid  any  temptation  to  derive  the  significance  of  the  thing  from 
the  name  we  give  it  (§  119).  Let  us  continue  to  designate  it  simply 
by  the  letter  A,  as  we  have  done  for  a  psychic  state  in  general.  We 
^  shall  have  to  think  of  the  state  not  only  as  static,  but  also  as  dynamic. 
It  is  very  important  to  know  how  the  fundamental  element  in  the 
institutions  of  a  people  changes.  Case  i.  It  may  change  but  reluc- 
tantly, slowly,  showing  a  marked  tendency  to  keep  itself  the  same. 
Case  2.  It  may  change  readily,  and  to  very  considerable  extents,  but 
in  different  ways,  as  for  instance:  Case  2a.  The  form  may  change  as 
readily  as  the  substance — for  a  new  substance,  new  forms.  The  sensa- 
tions P,Q,R  .  .  .  may  be  easily  disjoined,  whether  because  the  force 
X  that  unites  them  is  weak,  or  because,  though  strong,  it  succumbs 
to  a  still  stronger  counter-force.  Case  2/5.  Substance  changes  more 
readily  than  forms — for  a  new  substance,  the  old  forms!  The  sen- 
sations P,  Q,  R  .  .  .  are  disjoined  with  difficulty,  whether  because 
the  force  X  that  unites  them  is  the  stronger,  or  because,  though  weak, 
it  does  not  meet  any  considerable  counter-force. 

The  sensations  P,  Q,  R  .  .  .  may  originate  in  certain  things  and 
later  on  appear  to  the  individual  as  abstractions  of  those  things,  such 
as  principles,  maxims,  precepts,  and  the  like.  They  constitute  an 
aggregate,  a  group.  The  permanence  of  that  aggregate,  that  group, 
will  be  the  subject  of  long  and  important  investigations  on  our  part.^ 
173.  A  superficial  observer  might  confuse  the  Case  2/?  with  Case 

172  ^  It  will  develop  in  Chapter  VI,  when  induction  has  carried  us  some  distance 
ahead,  and  we  are  in  a  position  to  replace  it  with  deduction.  For  tlie  present  it 
would  be  premature  to  deal  with  the  problem  as  it  deserves. 


§174  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  95 

I  (§  172).  But  in  reality  they  differ  radically.  Peoples  called  con- 
servative may  be  such  now  only  with  respect  to  forms  (Case  2i3), 
now  only  with  respect  to  substance  (Case  i).  Peoples  called  formal- 
ist may  now  preserve  both  forms  and  substance  (Case  i),  now  only 
forms  (Case  2^3).  Peoples  commonly  said  to  have  "fossilized  in  a 
certain  state"  correspond  to  Case  i.  v 

174.  When  the  unifying  force,  X,  is  quite  considerable,  and  the 
force  Y — the  trend  toward  innovation — is  very  weak  or  non-existent, 
we  get  the  phenomena  of  instinct  in  animals,  and  something  like  the 
situation  in  Sparta,  a  state  crystalUzed  in  its  institutions.  When  X  is 
strong,  but  Y  equally  strong,  and  innovations  are  wrought  upon 
substance  with  due  regard  to  forms,  we  get  a  situation  like  that  in 
ancient  Rome — the  effort  is  to  change  institutions,  but  disturbing 
the  associations  P,  Q,  R  .  .  .  as  little  as  possible.  That  can  be  done 
by  allowing  the  relations  P,  Q,  R  .  .  .  to  subsist  in  form.  From  that 
point  of  view,  the  Roman  people  may  be  called  formalist  at  a  cer- 
tain period  in  its  history,  and  the  same  may  hold  for  the  English. 
The  aversion  of  those  two  peoples  to  disturbing  the  formal  rela- 
tions P,  Q,  R  .  .  .  may  even  tempt  one  to  call  them  conservative. 
But  if  we  fix  our  attention  on  substance,  we  see  that  they  do  not 
preserve  but  transform  it.  Among  the  ancient  Athenians  and  the 
modern  French,  X  is  relatively  feeble.  It  is  difficult  to  assert  that  Y 
was  more  vigorous  among  the  Athenians  than  among  the  Romans, 
more  vigorous  among  the  French  than  among  the  English  from  the 
seventeenth  to  the  nineteenth  century.  If  the  effects  in  question 
manifest  themselves  in  different  ways,  the  difference  lies  in  the 
strength  of  X  rather  than  in  the  strength  of  Y. 

Let  us  assume  that  in  the  case  of  two  peoples  Y  is  identical  in  both 
and  X  different  in  both.  To  bring  about  innovations,  the  people 
among  whom  X  is  feeble  wipes  out  the  relations  P,  Q,  R  .  .  .  and 
replaces  them  with  other  relations.  The  people  among  whom  X  is 
strong  allows  those  relations  to  subsist  as  far  as  possible  and  modi- 
fies the  significance  of  P,  Q,  R.  .  .  .  Furthermore,  there  will  be 
fewer  "relics  from  the  past"  in  the  first  people  than  in  the  second. 


g6  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §175 

Since  X  is  feeble,  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  abolition  of  the  rela- 
tions P,  0,  R  .  .  .  now  considered  useless;  but  when  X  is  strong, 
those  relations  will  be  preserved  even  if  they  are  considered  useless. 

These  inductions  are  obtainable  by  observing  manifestations  of 
the  psychic  state  A.  As  regards  Rome  we  have  facts  in  abundance — 
to  begin  with,  religion.  There  is  now  no  doubt:  (i)  that  the  earliest 
Romans  had  no  mythology,  or  at  best  an  exceedingly  meagre  one; 
(2)  that  the  classical  mythology  of  the  Romans  was  nothing  but  a 
Greek  form  given  to  the  Roman  gods,  if  not  an  actual  naturalization 
of  foreign  deities.  Ancient  Roman  religion  consisted  essentially  of 
an  association  of  certain  religious  practices  with  the  conduct  of  life — 
it  was  the  perfect  type  of  the  P,  Q,  R  .  .  .  associations.  Cicero  could 
well  say  ^  that  "the  whole  religion  of  the  Roman  people  comes  down 
to  cult  and  auspices  (§  361),  with  a  supplement  of  prophecies  orig- 
inating in  portents  and  prodigies  as  interpreted  by  the  Sibyl  and  the 
haruspices." 

175.  Even  in  our  day  numerous  and  most  variegated  types  of  the 
associations  P,  Q,R  .  .  .  are  observable.  In  his  Au  pays  des  Veddas, 
pp.  159-62,  Deschamps  says  that  in  Ceylon  "the  astrologer  plays  a 
part  in  every  act  of  the  native's  life.  Nothing  could  be  undertaken 
without  his  counsel;  and  ...  I  have  often  seen  myself  refused  the 
simplest  favours  because  the  astrologer  had  not  been  consulted  as  to 
the  day  and  hour  auspicious  for  granting  them."  When  a  piece  of 
ground  is  to  be  cleared  or  brought  under  cultivation,  the  astrologer 
is  first  consulted,  receiving  offerings  of  betel  leaves  and  betel  nuts.^ 
"If  the  forecast  is  favourable,  gifts  of  the  leaves  and  nuts  are  repeated 
on  a  specified  day,  and  an  'auspicious  hour'  {na\atd)  is  chosen  for 
cutting  the  first  trees  and  bushes.  On  the  appointed  day,  the  culti- 
vators of  the  plot  selected  partake  of  a  repast  of  cakes,  and  rice  and 
milk,  prepared  for  the  occasion.  Then  they  go  forth,  their  faces 

174  '^  De  nattira  deortim,  III,  2,  5. 

175  ^  Bell,  Superstitious  Ceremonies  Connected  with  the  Ctdtivation  of  Alvi  or 
Hill  Paddy,  quoted  by  Deschamps,  loc.  cit.  [Paddy  is  rice.  I  fail  to  find  any  record 
of  just  this  article  by  H.  C.  P.  Bell,  who  was  secretary  of  the  Royal  Society  of  Ceylon, 
and  wrote  extensively  on  the  rites  of  the  rice  cultivators  in  that  colony  during  the 
'8o's.— A.  L.] 


§176  THE   "little  gods"   OF  ROME  97 

turned  in  the  direction  designated  as  propitious  by  the  astrologer. 
If  a  hzard  chirps  at  the  moment  of  their  departure  or  if  they  en- 
counter along  the  way  something  of  evil  omen — a  person  carrying 
dead  wood  or  dangerous  weapons,  a  'rat-snake'  crossing  the  path, 
a  woodpecker — they  give  up  the  idea  of  clearing  that  particular 
piece  of  land,  or,  more  likely,  the  idea  of  visiting  it  that  day,  picking 
another  nakata  and  starting  over  again.  On  the  other  hand,  if  good 
omens — a  milch  cow,  a  woman  nursing  a  child — are  encountered, 
they  proceed  cheerily  and  in  all  confidence.  Once  on  the  ground, 
an  auspicious  moment  is  awaited,  then  the  trees  and  brush  are  set 
on  fire.  Two  or  three  weeks  are  allowed  for  the  ground  to  cool,  then 
another  nakata  is  set  for  the  final  clearing  of  the  land.  .  .  .  On  a 
na\ata  designated  by  the  same  astrologer,  a  man  sows  a  first  handful 
of  rice  as  a  prelude."  Birds  and  also  rain  may  play  havoc  with  the 
seeding.  "To  avert  such  mishaps  a  \ema  or  magic  brew  called  nava- 
nilla  (nine-herbs?)  is  made  ready.  ...  If  the  ks^^  proves  ineffec- 
tual, a  special  kind  of  oil  is  distilled  for  another  charm.  ...  At 
weeding-time  a  na\ata  is  sought  of  the  same  fortune-teller.  When 
the  rice-blossoms  have  faded  the  ceremony  of  sprinkling  with  five 
kinds  of  milk  takes  place."  They  go  on  in  the  same  way  for  each  of 
the  successive  operations  till  the  rice  is  finally  harvested  and  barned." 
176.  Similar  practices  are  observable  to  greater  or  lesser  extents  in 
the  primitive  periods  of  all  peoples.^  Differences  are  quantitative  not 

175  2  In  Greece  and  Rome  also  conduct  was  largely  governed  by  oracles,  presages, 
and  the  like.  In  course  of  time  many  such  practices  became  purely  formal.  Cicero, 
De  divinatione,  I,  16,  28:  "In  olden  times  hardly  any  business  of  importance,  even 
of  a  private  nature,  was  transacted  without  consulting  omens,  as  witness  the  'nuptial 
auspices'  even  of  our  day,  which  have  lost  their  old  substance  and  preserve  just  the 
name  {re  omissa  nomen  tantum  tenent).  Nowadays  auspices  on  important  occasions 
are  obtained,  though  somewhat  less  generally  than  was  once  the  case,  by  inspections 
of  entrails.  In  the  old  days  they  were  commonly  sought  of  birds." 

176  ^  They  still  endure  among  half-civilized  peoples,  such  as  the  Chinese,  and 
they  have  not  disappeared  even  in  our  western  countries.  Matignon,  Superstition , 
crime  et  misere  en  Chine,  pp.  4-8,  18-19:  "Superstition,  as  I  am  about  to  describe  it, 
has  nothing  to  do  with  religion."  Going  on,  Matignon  explains  the  mysterious  entity 
that  the  Chinese  call  fong-choue,  literally,  "wind-and-water":  "One  might  in  a  gen- 
eral way  regard  it  as  a  sort  of  topographical  superstition.  For  the  Chinese,  any  given 
point  in  the  Middle  Empire  is  a  centre  of  forces,  of  spiritual  influences,  as  to  the 
nature  of  which  they  have  very  vague  and  ill-defined  ideas,  and  which  no  one 


98  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §176 

qualitative.  Preller"  observes  that  in  Rome  parallel  with  the  world 
of  the  gods  was  a  family  of  spirits  and  genii:  "Everything  that  hap- 
pened in  nature,  everything  that  was  done  by  human  beings  from 
birth  to  death,  all  the  vicissitudes  of  human  life  and  activity,  all 
mutual  relationships  between  citizens,  all  enterprises  .  .  .  were 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  these  little  gods.  Indeed  they  owe  their 
existence  to  nothing  but  those  thousands  of  social  relationships  with 
which  they  are  to  be  identified."  ^  Originally  they  were  mere  asso- 
ciations of  ideas,  such  as  we  find  in  fetishism.  They  constituted 
groups,  and  the  groups  were  called  divinities  or  something  else  of 

understands,  but  which  are  all  the  more  respected  and  feared  on  that  account. 
[Matignon  then  tries  to  explain  the  facts  by  the  beliefs.  He  does  not  succeed,  be- 
cause the  facts  are  not  consequences  of  the  beliefs  (logical  actions),  but  the  beliefs 
consequences  of  the  facts  (non-logical  actions)].  The  fong-chotte,  accordingly, 
seems  to  be  something  vague,  mysterious,  obscure,  difficult,  not  to  say  impossible,  of 
interpretation  [As  was  the  case  with  divination  in  Greece  and  Rome].  And  never- 
theless, in  Chinese  eyes,  that  body  of  fiction  becomes  science.  [Is,  in  other  words,  a 
logical  veneer  sprinkled  lavishly  over  their  non-logical  conduct.  As  regards  funer- 
als:] the  astrologer  must  have  fixed  on  a  propitious  day  and  especially  by  long 
and  sagacious  investigation,  have  gone  into  all  aspects  of  the  engrossing  problem 
of  the  jong-choue.  ...  In  building  a  house,  the  Chinaman  must  not  only  consider 
the  fong-chotte  of  his  neighbours,  but  also  of  his  own  house.  A  millstone,  a  well, 
the  junction  of  two  walls  or  two  streets,  must  not  be  on  a  line  with  the  main  en- 
trance. .  .  .  That  is  not  all.  The  jong-chottS  may  be  satisfied  with  the  site  and 
alignment  of  a  building;  but  how  about  the  use  to  which  it  is  to  be  put?  X  builds 
a  house  for  a  rice-shop.  But  it  develops  that  the  fong-choue  was  inclined  to  favour  a 
tea-shop.  There  is  no  further  doubt.  X  and  his  rice  business  will  soon  be  in  the 
hands  of  the  receiver.  .  .  .  The  jong-choue  superstition  is  exceedingly  tenacious 
[Merely  because  it  is  an  expression  of  the  psychic  state  A  of  the  Chinese,  and 
nothing  else].  It  is  the  one  that  holds  out  longest  against  Christianity.  And  then 
again,  what  Chinaman,  even  though  considered  a  good  Christian,  has  altogether 
abandoned  his  jong-choue?"  The  situation  is  a  general  one.  See  §§  1002  f. 
176  -  Romische  Mythologie,  p.  66. 

176  ^  Marquardt,  Romische  Staatsverwaltung:  Sacralwesen,  pp.  12-19,  gives  a 
list  of  these  gods.  It  must  be  very  incomplete,  for  we  may  reasonably  assume  that 
large  numbers  of  names  have  failed  to  come  down  to  us.  For  some  of  the  gods  in 
question  see  our  §  1339.  Just  a  sample  here,  pp.  12-13:  "Potina  and  Educa,  who  teach 
the  child  to  eat  and  drink;  Cuba,  who  protects  the  child  while  it  is  being  carried 
from  cradle  to  bed;  Ossipago,  'who  hardens  and  strengthens  the  bones  of  little 
children';  Carna,  who  strengthens  the  muscles;  Levana,  'who  lifts  the  child  from  the 
floor';  Statanus,  Statilinus,  and  the  goddess  Statina,  who  teach  the  child  to  stand 
upright;  Abeona  and  Adeona,  who  hold  him  up  when  he  first  tries  to  walk; 
Farimus  and  Fabulinus,  who  help  him  to  talk."  Marquardt  goes  on  to  list  the 
divinities  protecting  adolescence,  matrimony,  and  other  various  circumstances  of 
life,  and  he  adds,  p.  15:  "The  business  of  the  gods  just  listed  was  to  protect  persons; 


§176  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  99 

the  sort.  Pliny  soundly  remarks  that  the  god  population  was  larger 
than  the  population  of  men.*  When  the  tendency  to  give  a  coating 
of  logic  to  non-logical  conduct  developed,  people  tried  to  explain 
why  certain  acts  were  associated  with  certain  other  acts.  It  was  then 
that  the  rites  of  the  cult  were  referred  to  great  numbers  of  gods,  or 
taken  as  manifestations  of  a  worship  of  natural  forces  or  abstrac- 
tions. In  reality  we  have  the  same  situation  here  as  in  §  175.  The 
psychic  state  of  the  Romans  A  (Figure  2)  gave  rise,  through  certain 
associations  of  ideas  and  acts,  to  the  rites  B.  Later  on,  or  even  simul- 
taneously in  some  instances,  the  same  psychic  state  expressed  itself 
through  the  worship  C  of  abstractions,  natural  forces,  attributes  of 
certain  divinities,  and  so  on.  Then,  from  the  simultaneous  existence 
of  B  and  C  came  the  inference,  in  most  cases  mistaken,  that  B  was  a 
consequence  of  C. 

but  there  was  a  whole  series  of  other  gods  who  watched  over  the  manifold  activities 
of  men  and  the  scenes  of  such  activities."  Marquardt  is  mistaken  in  asserting,  p.  18, 
that  "originally  at  least,  as  Ambrosch  has  shown  [Ueber  die  Religionsbiicher  der 
Romer,  rem.  121],  the  thousands  of  names  registered  in  the  itidigitameiita  [ritual 
catalogues  and  calendars]  were  mere  designations  for  the  various  functions  (potes- 
tates)  of  relatively  few  divinities."  That  is  the  old  abstraction  idea.  The  proofs 
adduced  for  it  are  inadequate.  They  are  stated  by  Marquardt  as  follows,  pp.  18-19: 
"i.  Indigitare  meant  to  offer  a  prayer  to  one  or  more  divinities,  not  in  general 
terms  but  with  specific  reference  to  the  divine  capacities  of  which  help  was  asked. 
The  god  was  addressed  several  times,  each  time  one  attribute  or  another  being  added 
to  his  name."  The  various  attributes  mentioned  corresponded  at  times  to  a  number 
of  gods  who  had  been  fused  into  a  single  personality.  At  other  times  they  may 
have  been  different  aspects  of  the  same  god.  But  that  does  not  prove  that  Potina, 
Educa,  Cuba,  and  so  on,  were  abstract  capacities  of  one  same  divine  person.  "2.  In 
the  second  place,  pontifical  law  forbade  offering  one  victim  to  two  gods  at  the  same 
time."  M.  Brissaud,  Marquardt's  French  translator,  himself  shows  that  that  argu- 
ment is  baseless,  Le  ctdte  chez  les  Romains,  Vol.  I,  p.  24:  "There  has  been  no  doubt 
either  that  some  of  the  names  listed  were  surnames  of  well-known  gods."  The  fact 
that  some  gods  had  surnames  does  not  prove  that  all  the  names  catalogued  in  the 
indigitamenta  were  surnames,  and  much  less,  as  Marquardt  suggests  in  a  note,  p. 
18,  that  they  "represented  the  various  attributes  of  divine  Providence."  Otherwise 
one  would  have  to  conclude  that  the  various  surnames  of  the  Roman  Emperors 
represented  various  attributes  of  a  single  personality. 

176  ^Historia  naturalis,  II,  5,  3  (7)  (Bostock-Riley,  Vol.  I,  p.  21):  "Wherefore 
the  population  of  celestials  can  be  seen  to  be  greater  than  the  population  of  mor- 
tals, since  individuals  make  gods  for  themselves,  each  one  his  own  {totidem),  adopt- 
ing Junos  and  genii;  and  peoples  [abroad]  take  certain  animals  as  gods,  and  even 
obscene  things  and  things  that  it  is  not  the  part  of  decency  to  mention,  swearing  by 
smelly  onions,  garlics,  and  the  like." 


100  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §177 

177.  The  view  that  acts  of  cult  are  consequences  of  a  worship  of 
abstractions,  whether  considered  as  "natural  forces"  or  otherwise,  is 
the  least  acceptable  of  all  and  must  be  absolutely  rejected  (§§  158, 
996)  /  Proofs  without  end  go  to  show  that  human  beings  in  general 
proceed  from  the  concrete  to  the  abstract,  and  not  from  the  abstract 
to  the  concrete.  The  capacity  for  abstraction  develops  with  civiliza- 
tion; it  is  very  rudimentary  among  primitive  peoples.  Theories  that 
assume  it  as  fully  developed  in  the  early  stages  of  human  society  fall 
under  grave  suspicion  of  error.  The  ancient  Romans,  a  people  still 
uncivilized,  could  not  have  had  a  very  highly  developed  capacity 
for  abstraction,  as  would  have  been  necessary  if  they  were  to  per- 
ceive in  every  concrete  fact,  sometimes  an  altogether  insignificant 
fact,  a  manifestation  of  some  natural  power. 

Had  such  a  capacity  for  abstraction  existed,  it  would  have  left 
some  trace  in  language.  In  the  beginning,  probably,  the  Greeks  did 
not  possess  it  in  any  higher  degree  than  the  Romans.  But  they  soon 
acquired  it  and  brought  it  to  remarkable  development;  and  abstrac- 
tion has  left  a  very  definite  imprint  on  their  language.  Using  the 
article,  they  are  able  to  turn  an  adjective,  a  participle,  a  whole  sen- 
tence, into  a  substantive.  The  Latins  had  no  article.  They  could  not 
have  availed  themselves  of  that  device.  But  they  would  certainly 
have  found  some  other  had  they  felt  the  need  of  doing  so.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  well  known  that  the  capacity  for  using  adjectives  sub- 
stantively is  more  limited  in  Latin  than  in  Greek  or  even  in  French.^ 

177  ^  We  cannot  accept  what  Marquardt  says.  Op.  cit.,  pp.  6-7:  "The  gods  of  the 
Romans  were  mere  abstractions.  In  them  they  worshipped  those  forces  of  nature  to 
which  the  human  being  feels  himself  at  all  times  subject,  but  which  he  can  manage 
to  control  by  scrupulous  observance  of  the  altogether  external  prescriptions  laid 
down  by  the  state  for  honouring  the  gods."  The  terms  have  to  be  inverted.  To  as- 
sure success  in  their  undertakings  the  Romans  meticulously  observed  certain  rules 
which,  spontaneous  at  first,  eventually  came  to  be  used  by  the  state.  When,  in  course 
of  time,  people  wondered  how  the  rules  arose,  they  imagined  they  saw  forces  of 
nature  worshipped  in  them.  Marquardt  himself,  for  that  matter,  stresses  the  pre- 
ponderant importance  of  the  material  acts  and  the  scant  importance  of  the  abstrac- 
tions, p.  7:  "Religious  practice  required  material  paraphernalia  of  the  simplest  sort; 
but  the  rites  themselves  bristled  with  difficulties  and  complicadons.  The  slightest 
irregularity  in  a  ceremony  deprived  it  of  all  effectiveness." 

177  ^  Antoine,  Syntaxe  de  la  langiie  latine,  p.  125:  "The  capacity  for  using  ad- 
jectives substantively  is  much  more  resti'icted  in  Latin  than  in  Greek  and  even  than 


I 


§177  ^^^  "little  gods"  of  rome  ioi 

Probably  there  is  some  exaggeration  in  what  St.  Augustine  says 
as  to  the  multitude  of  Roman  "gods";  but  making  all  due  allow- 
ances for  overstatement,  there  are  still  plenty  left  who  seem  to  have 
been  created  for  the  sole  purpose  of  accounting  logically  for  the 
association  of  certain  acts  with  certain  other  acts.^ 

in  French.  Latin  avoids  the  substantive  even  when  it  is  available  and  tends  to  re- 
place it  with  a  paraphrase;  for  example,  'hearers':  animi  eorum  qui  audiunt;  instead 
of  auditorutn.  For  the  adjective  to  be  turned  into  a  substantive,  it  must  result  dis- 
tinctly from  the  arrangement  of  the  words  in  a  sentence  and  from  the  sentence  as  a 
whole  that  the  adjective  designates  not  the  quality,  but  a  definite  person  or  thing 
possessing  the  quality."  That  is  the  exact  opposite  of  the  process  which  is  alleged  to 
have  taken  place  in  the  little  gods  considered  as  qualifying  abstractions.  Riemann- 
Goelzer,  Grammaire  comparee  du  grec  et  du  latin,  p.  741,  note:  "In  the  beginning 
the  adjective  was  not  distinct  from  the  substantive  .  .  .  the  substantive  derived 
from  the  adjective:  before  coming  to  substance,  people  first  saw  an  object  only  in 
its  modes,  in  its  apparent  and  striking  attributes:  a  C,uov  was  a  'living  thing,'  an 
a^iiftial  was  a  'thing  endowed  with  life.'  Only  at  a  comparatively  late  date,  in  an 
advanced  state  of  civilization  when  the  mind  had  become  capable  of  conceiving  of 
the  object  independently  of  its  attributes,  were  substantives  distinguished  from 
adjectives."  We  cannot,  therefore,  assume  the  contrary:  namely,  that  abstract  beings, 
such  as  Providence,  were  first  conceived,  and  that  the  modes  whereby  they  mani- 
fested themselves  were  imagined  later.  Observation  shows  that  people  went  from 
modes  to  beings — beings  most  often  imaginary. 

177  ^  De  civitate  Dei,  VI,  9:  "If  a  man  assigned  two  nurses  to  a  child,  the  one 
just  for  giving  him  his  food,  the  other  his  drink,  the  way  two  goddesses  Educa  and 
Potina  were  appointed  to  those  offices,  would  we  not  say  that  he  was  mad  and 
that  in  his  own  house  he  was  acting  like  a  clown?  Some  maintain  that  Liber  is 
derived  from  liberare:  quod  mares  in  coeundo  per  eius  beneficium  emissis  seminibus 
liberentur;  and  that  Libera,  whom  they  also  say  is  Venus,  performs  the  same  ser- 
vice for  women:  quod  et  ipsas  perhibeant  setnina  emittere,  and  therefore  the  same 
male  organ  is  set  up  in  the  temples  to  Liber,  and  the  female  likewise  to  Libera. 
.  .  .  When  the  male  unites  with  the  female,  the  god  Jugatinus  presides.  Be  it  so. 
But  the  bride  has  to  be  taken  to  the  groom's  house,  and  that  is  the  business  of  the 
god  Domiducus.  There  is  the  god  Domitius  to  see  that  she  stays  there;  and  the 
goddess  Maturna  that  she  abide  with  her  husband.  What  more  is  needed?  Mercy,  I 
pray,  on  decency!  Let  concupiscence  of  flesh  and  blood  do  the  rest  under  the  secret 
tutelage  of  modesty!  Why  crowd  the  bedchamber  with  a  throng  of  gods,  when  even 
the  'best  men'  [paranymphs]  have  seen  fit  to  withdraw?  And  yet  it  is  so  filled  not 
that  the  thought  of  their  presence  may  inspire  higher  regard  for  chastity,  but  to  the 
end  that  through  their  concert  the  maiden,  afraid  as  befits  the  weakness  of  her 
sex  of  what  is  in  store,  may  be  deprived  of  her  maidenhood  without  mishap.  And 
that  is  why  the  goddess  Verginensis  is  there,  and  the  father-god  Subigo,  and  the 
mother-goddess  Prema,  and  the  goddess  Pertunda,  and  Venus,  and  Priapus.  And  why 
all  that?  If  the  groom  needed  the  help  of  the  gods  in  everything  he  did,  would  not 
one  of  the  gods  or  one  of  the  goddesses  be  enough?  Was  not  Venus  enough  all  by 
herself?  She  was  already  there,  summoned,  they  say,  because  without  her  influence  a 


102  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §178 

St.  Augustine,  loc.  cit.,  says  that  Varro,  speaking  of  the  concep- 
tion of  man,  gives  a  Hst  of  the  gods.  He  begins  with  Janus;  and, 
reviewing  in  succession  all  the  divinities  that  take  care  of  a  man, 
step  by  step,  down  to  his  extreme  old  age,  he  closes  with  the  goddess 
Nenia,  who  is  naught  but  the  mournful  litany  chanted  at  funerals 
of  the  aged.  He  enumerates  furthermore  divinities  who  were  not 
concerned  with  a  man's  person  directly,  but  rather  with  the  things 
he  uses,  such  as  food,  clothing,  and  the  like. 

178.  Gaston  Boissier  says  in  this  connexion :  ^  "What  first  strikes 
one  is  the  little  life  there  is  in  these  gods.  No  one  has  gone  to  the 
trouble  of  making  legends  about  them.  They  have  no  history.  All 
that  is  known  of  them  is  that  they  have  to  be  worshipped  at  a  given 
moment  and  that,  at  that  time,  they  can  be  of  use.  The  moment 
gone,  they  are  forgotten.  They  do  not  have  real  names.  The  names 
they  are  given  do  not  designate  them  in  themselves,  but  merely  the 
functions  which  they  fulfil." 

The  facts  are  exact,  the  statement  of  them  slightly  erroneous,  be- 
cause Boissier  is  considering  them  from  the  standpoint  of  logical 
conduct.  Not  only  did  the  gods  in  question  have  very  little  life — they 
had  none  at  all.  Once  upon  a  time  they  were  mere  associations  of  acts 
and  ideas.  Only  at  a  date  relatively  recent  did  they  get  to  be  gods 
(§  995).  "All  that  is  known  of  them"  is  the  little  that  need  be  known 
for  such  associations  of  acts  and  ideas.  When  it  is  said  that  they  have 

maid  cannot  cease  to  be  a  maid.  .  .  .  And,  forsooth,  if  the  goddess  Verginensis  is 
there  that  the  maid's  girdle  be  loosed;  if  the  god  Subigo  is  there  ut  viro  sttbigatur;  if 
the  goddess  Prema  is  there,  ttt  subacta  ne  se  commoveat  comprimatur — what,  pray,  is 
the  goddess  Pertunda  doing  there?  Shame  on  her!  Out  with  her!  Let  the  groom  do 
something  himself,  I  say!  Valde  inhonestum  est  ut  quod  vacatur  ilia  (the  thing  that 
takes  the  name  from  her)  impleat  quisquam  nisi  ille!  But  that  is  perhaps  tolerated 
because  she  is  said  to  be  a  goddess  not  a  god.  For  if  the  deity  were  believed  a  male  and 
called  Pertundus,  out  of  respect  for  his  bride  the  groom  would  cry  for  help  against 
him  in  louder  voice  than  woman  in  childbirth  against  Sylvanus.  Sed  quid  hoc  dicam, 
cum  ibi  sit  et  Priapus  nimius  masculus,  super  cuius  immanissimum  et  turpisstmum 
jascinum  sedere  nova  nupta  iubebatur  more  honestissimo  et  religiosissimo  matro- 
narum?"  St.  Augustine  is  right,  with  plenty  to  spare,  if  such  acts  are  to  be  judged 
from  the  logical  standpoint;  but  he  does  not  observe  that  they  were  originally  non- 
logical  acts,  mechanical  formalities,  which  eventually  found  their  place  among  cere- 
monies of  divine  worship. 

178  '^  La  religion  romaine.  Vol.  I,  p.  5. 


§179  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  IO3 

to  be  "worshipped"  at  certain  moments,  a  new  name  is  being  given 
to  an  old  concept.  One  might  better  say  that  they  were  "invoked";  or 
better  yet,  that  certain  words  were  brought  into  play.  When  a  person 
pronounces  the  number  2  (§  182)  to  keep  a  scorpion  from  stinging, 
will  anybody  claim  that  he  is  worshipping  the  number  2  or  invoking 
it?  Are  we  to  be  surprised  that  the  number  2  has  no  legend,  no 
history  ? 

179.  In  the  Odyssey,  X,  vv.  304-05,  Hermes  gives  Ulysses  a  plant  to 
protect  him  from  the  enchantments  of  Circe — "black  at  the  root, 
like  milk  in  the  flower.  The  gods  call  it  moly.  Difficult  it  is  for 
mortals  to  tear  from  the  ground,  but  the  gods  can  do  all  things." 

Here  we  have  a  non-logical  action  of  the  pure  type.  There  can  be 
no  question  of  an  operation  in  magic  whereby  a  god  is  constrained  to 
act.  To  the  contrary,  a  god  gives  the  plant  to  a  mortal.  No  reason  is 
adduced  to  explain  the  working  of  the  plant.  Now  let  us  imagine 
that  we  were  dealing  not  with  a  poetic  fiction  but  with  a  real  plant 
used  for  a  real  purpose.  An  association  of  ideas  would  arise  between 
the  plant  and  Hermes,  and  no  end  of  logical  explanations  would  be 
devised  for  it.  The  plant  would  be  regarded  as  a  means  for  con- 
straining Hermes  to  action — and  that  really  would  be  magic — or  as 
a  means  of  invoking  Hermes,  or  as  a  form  of  Hermes  or  one  of  his 
names,  or  as  a  means  of  paying  homage  to  "forces  of  nature."  Homer 
designates  the  plant  by  the  words  <pdp(iaxov  kadT^ov,  which  might  be 
translated  "healing  remedy."  Is  it  not  evident,  one  might  argue,  that 
there  is  a  resort  to  natural  forces  to  counteract  the  pernicious  effects 
of  a  poison?  And  so  on  to  all  the  rank  tanglewood  of  notions  that 
might  be  read  into  Homer's  story !  ^ 

179  ^  The  idea  is  not  altogether  hypothetical.  That  blessed  weed  has  a  whole 
literature  all  its  own!  Eustathius,  Commentarii  ad  Homeri  Odysseam,  Vol.  I,  p. 
381,  offers  us  our  choice  between  two  interpretations.  The  one  is  mythological. 
The  giant  Pikolous,  in  flight  after  his  battle  with  Zeus,  landed  on  Circe's  island 
and  attacked  her.  The  Sun  rushed  to  the  rescue  of  his  daughter  and  slew  the  giant. 
From  the  blood  that  was  spilled  on  the  ground  there  sprouted  a  plant  which  was 
named  /iwAv  after  the  terrible  fight  (fiu/iog)  the  giant  had  offered.  The  blossom 
is  milk-white  because  of  the  bright  sun;  and  the  root  black  because  the  giant's 
blood  was  black,  or  because  of  Circe's  terror.  Hephestion  tells  more  or  less  the  same 
story. 

If  that  interpretation  is  not  to  your  liking,  Eustathius  has  another  ready — alle- 


104  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §l8o 

180.  The  human  being  has  such  a  weakness  for  adding  logical  de- 
t>  j  velopments  to  non-logical  behaviour  that  anything  can  serve  as  an 
excuse  for  him  to  turn  to  that  favourite  occupation.  Associations  of 
ideas  and  acts  vi^ere  probably  as  abundant  at  one  time  in  Greece  as 
they  were  in  Rome;  but  in  Greece  most  of  them  disappeared,  and 
sooner  than  was  the  case  in  Rome.  Greek  anthropomorphism  trans- 
formed simple  associations  of  ideas  and  acts  into  attributes  of  gods. 

gorical,  this  time  [Op.  cit.,  loc.  cit.] :  fiu?.v  is  education;  the  root  is  black,  to  sym- 
bolize ignorance;  the  flowers  milk-white,  to  symbolize  the  splendours  of  knowl- 
edge. The  plant  is  difficult  to  pull  up  because  learning  is  an  arduous  achievement. 
Now  all  we  need  is  that  some  pupil  of  Max  Miiller  shall  bob  up  and  tell  us  that 
that  plant  with  the  black  root  and  the  white  blossoms,  which  mortals  are  unable 
to  pull  up,  and  which  has  beneficent  effects,  is  the  Sun,  which  rises  from  the  dark- 
ness of  the  night,  is  brilliantly  luminous,  cannot  be  disturbed  by  any  human  act, 
and  gives  life  to  the  earth. 

Pliny,  Historia  naturalis,  XXV,  8  (4)  (Bostock-Riley,  Vol.  V,  pp.  87-88):  "Most 
celebrated  of  plants,  according  to  Homer,  is  the  one  that  he  believes  was  named 
moly  [Allium  magicum,  "witch-garlic,"  according  to  Littre,  in  the  notes  to  his 
translation  of  Pliny]  by  the  gods  themselves,  the  discovery  of  which  he  credits 
to  Mercury  and  which  he  represents  as  efficacious  against  deadly  poisons  [Bos- 
tock-Riley: "Against  the  most  potent  spells  of  sorcery"].  It  is  said  that  a  plant 
of  that  name  still  grows  today  about  Lake  Pheneus  and  at  Cyllene  in 
Arcady.  It  is  like  the  plant  mentioned  by  Homer.  It  has  a  round  black  root, 
about  the  size  of  an  onion,  with  leaves  like  the  squill.  It  is  hard  to  pull  up.  [Bos- 
tock-Riley: "There  is  no  difficulty  experienced  in  taking  it  up"].  Greek  writers 
say  its  blossom  is  yellow,  but  Homer  describes  it  as  pure  white.  I  once  met  a 
physician  whose  hobby  was  botany,  and  he  told  me  that  the  'moly'  also  grew  in  Italy; 
and  some  few  days  later  he  brought  me  a  specimen  from  Campania  that  he  had 
pulled  up  with  great  difficulty  from  a  rocky  soil.  The  root  was  thirty  feet  long;  and 
that  was  not  the  whole  of  it,  for  it  had  broken  off."  Theophrastus,  Historia 
plantarum,  IX,  15,  7  (Hort,  Vol.  II,  pp.  294-95):  "The  moly  is  found  at  Pheneus 
and  in  the  Cyllene  region.  They  also  say  that  it  is  like  the  plant  Homer  mentions. 
It  has  a  round  root,  like  an  onion.  The  leaves  are  like  the  squill.  It  is  used  as  an 
antidote  and  in  magic  rites.  It  is  not  as  hard  to  pull  up  as  Homer  says."  All  of 
these  writers  take  Homer's  fiuXv  for  a  real  plant.  [Littre's  note  identifying  the  moly 
as  "witch-garlic"  is  not  his  own  but  derives  from  Antoine  Laurent  Fee,  biographer 
of  Linnaeus,  who  edited  Pliny's  botany  for  the  French  translation  of  Pliny  that  was 
published  in  1826  by  Francois  Etienne  Ajasson  de  Grandsagne. — A.  L.] 

In  the  Middle  Ages  the  mandrake  enjoyed  a  very  considerable  prestige.  Mercury 
has  vanished,  but  Satan  is  on  hand  to  replace  him.  O'Reilly,  Les  deux  proces  de  con- 
damnation  de  Jeanne  d'Arc,  Vol.  II,  pp.  164-65:  "Jeanne  was  in  the  habit  of  carry- 
ing a  mandrake  on  her  person,  hoping  thereby  to  procure  fortune  and  riches  in 
this  world.  She  believed,  in  fact,  that  the  mandrake  had  the  virtue  of  bringing 
good  fortune.  Q.  What  have  you  to  say  [about  the  charge]  as  to  the  mandrake? 
A.  That  is  false,  absolutely.  (Abstract  of  examinations  relative  to  Charge  7):  Thurs- 


I 


§l82  MAGIC  105 

Says  Boissier:^  "Other  countries  no  doubt  felt  the  need  of  putting 
the  principal  acts  of  life  under  divine  protection,  but  ordinarily  for 
such  purposes  gods  well  known,  powerful,  tried  and  tested  of  long 
experience,  were  chosen,  that  there  might  be  no  doubt  as  to  their 
efficacy.  In  Greece  the  great  Athena  or  the  wise  Hermes  was  called 
upon  that  a  child  might  grow  up  competent  and  wise.  In  Rome 
there  was  a  preference  for  special  gods,  created  for  particular  pur- 
poses and  used  for  no  others."  The  facts  are  exact,  but  the  explana- 
tion is  altogether  wrong,  and  again  because  Boissier  is  working  from 
the  standpoint  of  logical  conduct.  His  explanation  is  like  an  explana- 
tion one  might  make  of  the  declensions  in  Latin  grammar:  "Other 
countries  no  doubt  felt  the  need  of  distinguishing  the  functions  of 
substantive  and  adjective  in  a  sentence,  but  ordinarily  they  chose 
prepositions  for  that  purpose."  No,  peoples  did  not  choose  their  gods, 
any  more  than  they  chose  the  grammatical  forms  of  their  languages,  j 
The  Athenians  never  came  to  any  decision  in  the  matter  of  placing 
their  children  under  the  protection  of  Hermes  and  Athena,  any 
more  than  the  Romans  after  mature  reflection  chose  Vaticanus, 
Fabulinus,  Educa,  and  Potina  for  that  purpose. 

181.  It  may  be  that  what  we  see  in  Greece  is  merely  a  stage,  some- 
what more  advanced  than  the  one  we  find  in  Rome,  in  the  evolution  \ 
from  the  concrete  to  the  abstract,  from  the  non-logical  to  the  logical. 
It  may  also  be  that  the  evolution  was  different  in  the  two  countries. 
That  point  we  cannot  determine  with  certainty  for  lack  of  docu- 
ments. In  any  event — and  that  is  the  important  thing  for  the  study 
in  which  we  are  engaged — the  stages  of  evolution  in  Greece  and  in 
Rome  in  historical  times  were  different. 

182.  In  virtue  of  a  most  interesting  persistence  of  associations  of 
ideas  and  acts,  words  seem  to  possess  some  mysterious  power  over 

day,  March  i.  Questioned  as  to  what  she  did  with  her  mandrake,  she  answered 
that  she  had  never  had  one,  that  she  had  heard  that  there  was  one  near  her  house, 
without  having  seen  it.  It  was,  she  had  been  told,  a  dangerous  and  wicked  thing 
to  keep.  She  did  not  know  what  it  might  be  used  for.  Questioned  as  to  the  place 
where  the  mandrake  of  which  she  had  heard  was,  she  answered  that  she  had 
heard  it  was  on  die  ground  near  a  tree,  but  she  did  not  know  where.  She  had 
heard  that  it  was  under  a  walnut-tree." 
180  ^  Zv«  religion  romaine.  Vol.  I,  p.  4. 


I06  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §  182 

things/  Even  as  late  as  the  day  of  PHny  the  NaturaUst,  one  could 
still  write :  ^  "With  regard  to  remedies  derived  from  human  beings 
there  is  a  very  important  question  that  remains  unsettled:  Do  magic 
words,  charms,  and  incantations  have  any  power  ?  If  so,  it  has  to  be 
ascribed  to  the  human  being.  Individually,  one  by  one,  our  wisest 
minds  have  no  faith  in  such  things ;  but  in  the  mass,  in  their  everyday 
lives,  people  believe  in  them  unconsciously.^  [Pliny  is  an  excellent 
observer  here,  describing  a  non-logical  action  beautifully.]  In  truth  it 
seems  to  do  no  good  to  sacrifice  victims  and  impossible  properly  to 
consult  the  gods  without  chants  of  prayer.*  The  words  that  are  used, 
moreover,  are  of  different  kinds,  some  serving  for  entreaty,  others  for 
averting  evil,  others  for  commendation.^  We  see  that  our  supreme 

182  ^  Here  we  come  by  induction  upon  a  matter  that  will  be  studied  deductively 
and  at  length  in  Chapter  VI — and  we  shall  meet  it  in  other  places  also.  Other  similar 
cases,  which  we  need  not  specify,  will  occur  in  this  present  chapter.  Just  here  we  are 
exploring  the  material  before  us,  now  in  one  direction,  now  in  another.  In  chapters 
to  follow  we  shall  complete  investigations  that  are  merely  labelled  here  for  future 
reference. 

182  -Historia  naturalis,  XXVIII,  2  (3)  (Bostock-Riley,  Vol.  V,  pp.  278-80).  This 
quotation  will  be  of  use  to  us  elsewhere.  We  transcribe  it  therefore  somewhat  fully. 
[Translations  of  this  passage  present  wide  differences.  I  note  in  brackets  important 
variations  between  Pareto's  version  and  that  of  Bostock-Riley. — A.  L.] 

182  ^  The  Latin  reads:  "//;  tiniversum  vero  omnibus  horis  credit  vita,  nee  sentit. 
Dalechamps  paraphrases  (Leyden,  1669,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  161):  Credit  vulgi  opinio 
valere  verba  nee  certa  cognitione  et  rerum  sensu  id  persiiasimi  habet."  Cicero  too 
bars  any  rational  process.  De  divinatione,  I,  3,  3:  "And  the  ancients,  in  my  judg- 
ment, established  such  practices  rather  under  admonition  of  experience  than  at  the 
dictates  of  reason."  Cf.  §  296^. 

182  *  The  Latin  reads:  "Quippe  victimas  caedi  sine  precatione  non  videtur  referre 
nee  deos  rite  consuli."  The  difficulty  lies  in  the  verb  referre.  Gronov  well  para- 
phrases (Leyden,  1669,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  798) :  "  'Sine  precatione  non  videtur  referre  [Id 
est,  nihil  iuvare  putatur,  nihil  prodesse  vulgo  creditur}  caedi  victimas,  nee  videtur 
deos  rite  consuli.'  Quo  significat  necessario  preces  adhibendas."  [Bostock-Riley  follow 
Gronov:  "It  is  the  general  belief  that  without  a  general  form  of  prayer  it  would 
be  useless  to  immolate  a  victim." — A.  L.] 

182  ^Text:  "Praeterea  alia  sunt  verba  impetritis,  alia  depulsoriis,  alia  commenta- 
tionis  [^commentationis  for  cot7imendationis^."  Impetritum  is  a  technical  term  of 
augury  and  designates  a  request  made  of  the  gods  according  to  ritual.  Cicero,  De 
divinatione,  II,  15,  35:  "How  comes  it  that  a  person  desiring  to  ask  an  omen  of 
the  gods  (impetrire)  sacrifices  a  victim  appropriate  to  his  need  (rebus  suis)?"  Vale- 
rius Maximus,  De  dictis  factisque  memorabilibus,  I,  i,  i :  "Our  forefathers  provided 
that  fixed  and  solemn  ceremonies  should  be  entrusted  (explicari  voluerunt)  to  the 
learning  of  pontiffs,  assurances  of  success   {bene  gerendarum   rerum  auctoritates) 


§l82  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  IO7 

magistrates  pray  with  specified  words.  And  in  order  that  no  word  be 
omitted  or  uttered  out  of  its  proper  place,  a  prompter  accompanies 
from  the  ritual,  another  person  repeats  the  words,  another  preserves 
'silence,'  and  a  flutist  plays  so  that  nothing  else  may  be  heard.  The 
two  following  facts  are  deservedly  memorable.  Whenever  a  prayer 
has  been  interrupted  by  an  invocation  or  been  badly  recited,  forth- 
with, without  hands  being  laid  to  the  victim,  the  top  of  the  liver,  or 
else  the  heart,  has  been  found  either  missing  or  double.  Still  extant, 
as  a  revered  example,  is  the  formula  with  which  the  Decii,  father  and 
son,  uttered  their  vows,^  and  we  have  the  prayer  uttered  by  the 
Vestal  Tuccia  when,  accused  of  incest,  she  carried  water  in  a  sieve, 
in  the  Roman  year  609.  A  man  and  a  woman  from  Greece,  or  from 
some  other  country  with  which  we  were  at  war,  were  once  buried 
alive  in  the  Forum  Boarium,  and  such  a  thing  has  been  seen  even  in 
our  time.  If  one  but  read  the  sacred  prayer  that  the  head  of  the 
College  of  the  Quindecemviri  is  wont  to  recite  ["on  such  occasions" 
— Bostock-Riley],  one  will  bear  witness  to  the  power  of  the  prayer 
as  demonstrated  by  the  eight  hundred  and  thirty  years  of  our  con- 
tinued prosperity  [Bostock-Riley:  "by  the  experience  of  eight  hun- 
dred"]. We  believe  in  our  day  that  with  a  certain  prayer  our  Vestals 
can  arrest  the  flight  of  fugitive  slaves  who  have  not  yet  crossed  the 
boundaries  of  Rome.  Once  that  is  granted,  once  we  concede  that  the 
gods  answer  certain  prayers  or  allow  themselves  to  be  moved  by  such 
words,  we  have  to  grant  all  the  rest."  ^ 
Going  on,  loc.  cit.,  5(3),  Pliny  appeals  to  conscience,  not  to  rea- 

to  the  observation  of  augurs,  prophecy  to  the  books  of  the  soothsayers  of  Apollo, 
and  exorcisms  of  unfavourable  omens  {portentonim  deptilsiones)  to  the  lore  of  the 
Etruscans.  By  ancient  custom,  divine  influences  are  invoked,  in  case  of  a  commenda- 
tion through  a  prayer;  when  something  is  requested,  through  a  vow;  when  a 
favour  is  to  be  paid  for,  by  a  thanksgiving  {gratitlatione);  when  information  is 
sought  either  of  entrails  or  of  lots,  through  a  petition  {impetrito,  that  is,  by  an 
observation  of  omens);  when  a  solemn  rite  is  called  for  {cum  solemni  ritu  pera- 
gendum)  by  a  sacrifice,  wherewith  also  the  significance  of  portents  and  lightning 
bolts  is  carefully  observed." 

182  ^  Livy,  Ab  urbe  condita,  VIII,  9,  6-8;  X,  28,  14-18. 

182  ^  The  Latin  reads:  "Confitendtim  sit  de  tota  coniectione."  Gronov  paraphrases 
(Leyden,  1669,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  798):  "Perinde  est  ac  si  dixisset:  de  tota  lite,  de  tota 
quaestione  (we  have  to  surrender  "on  the  whole  issue")." 


I08  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §183 

son,  that  is,  he  emphasizes,  and  very  soundly,  the  non-logical  char- 
acter of  the  acts  in  question:  "I  would  appeal,  too,  for  confirmation 
on  this  subject,  to  the  intimate  experience  of  the  individual  [Bostock- 
Riley  translation].  .  .  .  Why  do  we  wish  each  other  a  happy  new 
year  on  the  first  day  of  each  year  ?  Why  do  we  select  men  with  pro- 
pitious names  to  lead  the  victims  in  public  sacrifices  ?  .  .  .  Why  do 
we  believe  that  odd  numbers  are  more  effective  than  others  ^ — a 
thing  [Bostock-Riley]  that  is  particularly  observed  with  reference 
to  the  critical  days  in  fever.  .  .  .  Attains  [Philometor]  avers  that  if 
one  pronounces  the  number  duo  ^  at  sight  of  a  scorpion,  the  scorpion 
stops  and  does  not  sting."  ^° 

183.  These  actions,  Jn  which  words  act  upon  things,  belong  to 

182  ^  See  §§  960  f.  for  just  a  titbit  from  the  endless  amount  of  nonsense  connected 
with  numbers.  Note  Pliny's  effort  to  justify  a  non-logical  fancy — the  influence  of  a 
day  on  a  fever — by  logic. 

182  ^  Such  data  are  abundant.  For  example,  Thiers,  Traite  des  superstitions,  I,  6, 
2  (Avignon,  Vol.  I,  p.  415;  Amsterdam,  Vol.  I,  p.  loi) :  "To  stop  a  snake  by  the  fol- 
lowing conjuration  (Mizauld,  Centuriae,  II,  no.  93):  'I  abjure  thee  by  Him  who 
created  thee  to  stop,  and  if  thou  dost  not,  I  curse  thee  with  the  curse  whereby  the 
Lord  God  did  exterminate  thee.'  "  It  is  evident  that  the  basic  fact  in  the  situation 
is  the  feeling  that  it  is  possible  to  act  on  certain  animals  by  means  of  certain  definite 
words  (element  rt  in  §  798) ;  the  secondary  fact  is  in  the  words  themselves  (element 
^  in  §  798).  The  basic  fact  belongs  to  a  very  populous  class  of  facts  comprising  the 
sentiments  which  induce  himian  beings  to  believe  that  things  can  be  influenced  by 
means  of  words  (genus  I-y  of  §  888).  It  is  interesting  that  though  Thiers  considers 
certain  superstitions  absurd,  he  does  not  think  of  them  all  that  way  (Avignon,  Vol. 
I,  Preface,  pp.  viii-ix  [Amsterdam,  Vol.  I,  p.  ii,  publisher's  note  Au  lecteur,  quot- 
ing Thiers  to  the  same  general  effect] ) :  "I  have  quoted  superstitions  entire  when  I 
felt  that  there  could  be  no  harm  in  doing  so  and  when  it  seemed  in  a  way  neces- 
sary not  to  abbreviate  them  if  they  were  to  be  correctly  understood.  But  I  have 
often  used  dots  and  etc.'s  for  certain  words,  letters,  signs,  and  other  things,  with 
which  they  have  to  be  equipped  in  order  to  produce  the  effects  desired  of  them, 
because  I  was  afraid  of  inspiring  evil  in  my  effort  to  combat  it." 

182  ^°  Cicero,  De  divinatione ,  I,  45,  102:  "The  Pythagoreans  noted  the  words 
not  only  of  gods  but  also  of  men,  calling  such  things  'omens.'  And  our  forefathers 
thought  words  very  important,  and  began  everything  they  did  by  uttering  the 
formula  'May  it  be  good,  fortunate,  propitious,  successful.'  At  ceremonies  conducted 
in  public  there  was  always  the  request  for  silence  {faverent  hngtiis),  and  proclama- 
tions of  religious  festivals  contained  an  injunction  of  abstinence  from  quarrels  and 
brawls.  When  a  colony  was  receiving  the  lustration  from  its  head,  an  army  from 
its  general,  the  People  from  the  Censor,  the  individuals  who  led  the  victims  to 
sacrifice  had  to  have  auspicious  names;  and  so  in  enlisting  men  for  the  army  the 
consuls  made  sure  that  the  first  soldier  taken  had  a  good  name." 


\ 


§184  MAGIC  109 

that  class  of  operations  which  ordinary  language  more  or  less  vaguely 
designates  as  magic.  In  the  extreme  type,  certain  words  or  acts,  by 
some  unknown  virtue,  have  the  power  to  produce  certain  effects. 
Next  a  first  coating  of  logic  explains  that  power  as  due  to  the  inter- 

.  \  position  of  higher  beings,  of  deities.  Going  on  in  that  direction  we 
finally  get  to  another  extreme  where  the  action  is  logical  through- 

'  out — the  mediaeval  belief,  for  instance,  that  by  selling  his  soul  to 
the  Devil  a  human  being  could  acquire  the  power  to  harm  people. 
When  a  person  interested  strictly  in  logical  actions  happens  on 

'     phenomena  of  the  kind  just  mentioned,  he  looks  at  them  contemptu- 

I  ously  as  pathological  states  of  mind,  and  goes  his  way  without 
further  thought  of  them.  But  anyone  aware  of  the  important  part 
non-logical  behaviour  plays  in  human  society  must  examine  them 
with  great  care.^ 

184.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  only  cases  known  to  us  showed  that 
success  in  operations  in  magic  depended  on  the  activity  of  the  Devil. 
Then  we  might  accept  the  logical  interpretation  and  say,  "Men  be- 
lieve in  the  efficacy  of  magic  because  they  believe  in  the  Devil."  That 
inference  would  not  be  substantially  modified  by  our  discovery  of 
other  cases  where  some  other  divinity  functioned  in  place  of  the 
Devil.  But  it  collapses  the  moment  we  meet  cases  that  are  absolutely 
independent  of  any  sort  of  divine  collaboration  whatsoever.  It  is  then 
apparent  that  the  essential  element  in  such  phenomena  is  the  non- 
logical  action  that  associates  certain  words,  invocations,  practices, 
with  certain  desired  effects;  and  that  the  presence  of  gods,  demons, 
spirits,  and  so  on  is  nothing  but  a  logical  form  that  is  given  to  those 
associations.^ 

The  substance  remaining  intact,  several  forms  may  coexist  in  one 
individual  without  his  knowing  just  what  share  belongs  to  each.  The 
witch  in  Theocritus,  Idyllia,  II,  vv.  14-17,  relies  both  upon  the  con- 

183  ^  In  this,  as  in  other  cases,  induction  has  led  us  to  the  threshold  of  an  investi- 
gation that  we  shall  have  to  prosecute  at  length  hereafter.  Here  we  shall  still  go  ' 
groping  along  trying  to  find  some  road  that  will  take  us  to  our  destination — 
knowledge  of  the  nature  and  forms  of  human  societies. 

184  1  Here  again  we  get  one  of  the  many  situations  considered  in  §  162.  The 
logical  form  serves  to  connect  C  with  B. 


no  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §184 

tributions  of  gods  and  upon  the  efficacy  of  magic,  without  distin- 
guishing very  clearly  just  how  the  two  powers  are  to  function.  She 
beseeches  Hecate  to  make  the  philtres  she  is  preparing  deadlier  than 
the  potions  of  Circe,  or  Medea,  or  the  golden-haired  Perimede.  Had 
she  relied  on  Hecate  alone,  it  would  have  been  simpler  for  her  to  ask 
the  goddess  directly  for  results  that  she  hoped  to  get  from  the  phil- 
tres. When  she  repeats  the  refrain  "Wry-neck,  wry-neck  (Ivyri,  a 
magic  bird),  drag  this  man  to  my  dwelling!"  she  is  evidently  en- 
visaging some  occult  relationship  between  the  bird  and  the  effect 
she  desires.^ 

For  countless  ages  people  have  believed  in  such  nonsense  in  one 
form  or  another;  and  there  are  some  who  take  such  things  seriously 
even  in  our  day.  Only,  for  the  past  two  or  three  hundred  years  there 
has  been  an  increase  in  the  number  of  people  who  laugh  at  them  as 
Lucian  did.  But  the  vogue  of  spiritualism,  telepathy,  Christian  Sci- 
ence (§  1695^),  and  what  not,  is  enough  to  show  what  enormous 
power  these  sentiments  and  others  like  them  still  have  today.' 

184  ^  Samples  of  the  kind  are  available  for  all  peoples  and  in  any  quantity  de- 
sired— one  has  only  the  embarrassment  of  choice.  The  charms  imparted  by  Cato 
seem  to  have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  gods:  they  funcdon  all  by  themselves. 
De  re  riistica,  160:  "In  cases  of  sprain,  a  cure  may  be  obtained  by  the  following 
charm.  Take  a  green  stick  four  or  five  feet  long.  Split  it  in  two  down  the  middle, 
and  have  two  men  hold  [the  two  pieces]  at  [your]  hips.  Then  begin  to  chant: 
In  alio  s.j.  motas  vaeta  daries  dardaries  astataries  dissunapiter,  and  keep  on  till  ["the 
free  ends"  (Harrison)]  come  together  [in  front  of  you].  Brandish  a  knife  (ferrum) 
in  the  air  over  them.  Take  them  in  your  hand  at  the  point  where  they  touch  on 
coming  together  and  cut  them  off,  right  and  left.  Bind  [the  pieces]  to  the  sprain  or 
fracture  and  it  will  heal."  Pliny  mentions  this  magic  formula  given  by  Cato  and 
adds  others;  Historia  naturalis,  XXVIII,  4  (2)  (Bostock-Riley,  Vol.  V,  p.  283): 
"Cato  has  handed  down  to  us  a  magic  cure  for  sprained  limbs,  and  M.  Varro 
one  for  gout.  They  say  that  Caesar,  the  dictator,  after  a  serious  accident  in  a  car- 
riage, was  accustomed,  before  taking  his  seat  in  one,  to  repeat  a  rigmarole  three 
times  to  make  sure  of  a  safe  ride,  and  we  know  that  many  people  nowadays  do 
the  same." 

184  ^Lucian,  Philopseudes  (Lover  of  Lies),  14-15  (Harmon,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  343). 
A  hyperborean  magician  summons  a  certain  Chrysis  to  do  the  pleasure  of  her 
admirer,  Glaucias.  "  'At  length  die  hyperborean  moulded  a  clay  Eros,  and  ordered 
it  to  go  and  fetch  Chrysis.  Off  went  the  image,  and  before  long  there  was  a  knock 
at  the  door,  and  there  stood  Chrysis!  She  came  in  and  threw  her  arms  about 
Glaucias's  neck.  You  would  have  said  she  was  dying  for  love  of  him;  and  she  stayed 


§l86  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  III 

185.  "Your  ox  would  not  die  unless  you  had  an  evil  neighbour," 
says  Hesiod  {Opera  et  dies,  v.  348);  but  he  does  not  explain  how 
that  all  happens.  The  Laws  of  the  XII  Tables  deal  with  the  "man 
who  shall  bewitch  the  crops"  ^  and  with  the  "man  who  shall  chant  a 
curse"  without  explaining  exactly  what  was  involved  in  those  oper- 
ations. That  type  of  non-logical  action  has  also  come  down  across 
the  ages  and  is  met  with  in  our  day  in  the  use  of  amulets.  In  the 
country  about  Naples  hosts  of  people  wear  coral  horns  on  their 
watch-chains  to  ward  off  the  evil  eye.  Many  gamblers  carry  amulets 
and  go  through  certain  motions  considered  helpful  to  winning." 

186.  Suppose  we  confine  ourselves  to  just  one  of  these  countless 
non-logical  actions — to  rites  relating  to  the  causation  or  prevention 
of  storms,  and  to  the  destruction  or  protection  of  crops.  And  to  avoid 
any  bewilderment  resulting  from  examples  chosen  at  random  here 
and  there  and  brought  together  artificially,  suppose  we  ignore  any- 
thing pertaining  to  countries  foreign  to  the  Graeco-Roman  world. 
That  will  enable  us  to  keep  to  one  phenomenon  in  its  ramifications 
in  our  Western  countries,  with  some  very  few  allusions  to  data  more 

on  till  at  last  we  heard  the  cocks  crowing.  Away  flew  the  Moon  to  Heaven,  Hecate 
disappeared  underground,  all  the  apparitions  vanished,  and  we  saw  Chrysis  out 
of  the  house  just  about  dawn. — Now,  Tychiades,  if  you  had  seen  that,  it  would 
have  been  enough  to  convince  you  that  there  was  something  in  incantations.'  'Ex- 
actly,' I  replied.  'If  I  had  seen  it,  I  should  have  been  convinced:  as  it  is,  you  must 
bear  with  me  if  I  have  not  your  eyes  for  the  miraculous.  But  as  to  Chrysis,  I 
know  her  for  a  most  inflammable  [and  not  very  fastidious]  lady.  I  do  not  see 
what  occasion  there  was  for  the  clay  ambassador,  and  the  Moon,  no  less,  or  for 
a  wizard  all  the  way  from  the  land  of  the  hyperboreans!  Why,  Chrysis  would  go 
that  distance  herself  for  the  sum  of  twenty  shillings.  It  is  a  form  of  incantation  that 
she  cannot  resist.  She  is  the  exact  opposite  of  an  apparition.  Apparitions,  you  tell 
me,  take  flight  at  the  clash  of  brass  or  iron,  whereas  if  Chrysis  hears  the  chink  of 
silver,  she  flies  to  the  spot.'  "  (Fowler  translation.) 

185  ^  The  text  is  given  in  Pliny,  Historia  nattiralis,  XXVIII,  4  (2) :  "Qui  frtiges 
excantassit  .  .  .  Qui  malum  carmen  incantassit  .  .  ."  See  also  Seneca,  Natttrales 
quaestiones,  IV,  6-7,  and  our  §  194. 

185  ^  Even  nowadays  love-philtres  are  still  concocted  by  processes  not  materially 
different  from  the  methods  used  of  old.  A  court  decision  handed  down  at  Lucera 
and  examined  by  Attorney  Vittorio  Pasotti  in  the  Monitore  dei  Tribiinali,  Milan, 
Aug.  9,  1913,  recites  that  three  women  took  human  bones  from  a  cemetery  for 
the  purpose  of  compounding  a  philtre  that  would  induce  a  man  to  marry  a  certain 
woman.  [From  1916  ed.] 


112  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §187 

remotely  sought.^  The  method  we  adopt  for  the  group  of  facts  we 
are  about  to  study  is  the  method  that  will  serve  for  other  similar 
groups  of  facts.  The  various  phenomena  in  the  group  constitute  a 
natural  family,  in  the  same  sense  that  the  Papilionaceae  in  botany 
constitute  a  natural  family:  they  can  readily  be  identified  and 
grouped  together.  There  are  huge  numbers  of  them.  We  cannot 
possibly  mention  them  all,  but  we  can  consider  at  least  their  prin- 
cipal types. 

187.  We  get  many  cases  where  there  is  a  belief  that  by  means  of 
certain  rites  and  practices  it  is  possible  to  raise  or  quell  a  storm.  At 
times  it  is  not  stated  just  how  the  effect  ensues — it  is  taken  as  a 
datum  of  fact.  At  other  times,  the  supposed  reasons  are  given;  the 
effect  is  taken  as  the  theoretically  explainable  consequence  of  the 
working  of  certain  forces.  In  general  terms,  meteorological  phe- 
nomena are  considered  dependent  upon  certain  rites  and  practices, 
either  directly,  or  else  indirectly,  through  the  interposition  of  higher 
powers. 

188.  Palladius  gives  precepts  without  comment.  Columella  adds 
a  touch  of  logical  interpretation,  saying  that  custom  and  experience 
have  shown  their  efficacy.^  Long  before  their  time,  Empedocles, 

186  ^  Quite  deliberately  we  choose,  for  our  first  example,  a  group  of  facts  that, 
in  our  day  at  least,  have  little  social  importance.  For  that  reason  they  do  not  arouse 
any  sentiments  likely  to  disturb  the  scientifically  objective  work  to  which  we  are 
trying  to  apply  ourselves.  Sentiments  are  the  worst  enemies  the  scientific  study  of 
sociology  has  to  fear.  Unfortunately  we  shall  not  always  be  able  to  side-step  them 
in  just  this  way.  Later  on  the  reader  will  have  to  do  his  part  in  holding  his. senti- 
ments in  hand. 

188  ^  Palladius,  De  re  nistica,  I,  35:  "Many  things  are  said  [to  be  good]  for  hail. 
A  millstone  is  covered  with  a  red  cloth.  Also,  an  ax  stained  with  blood  may  be 
shaken  in  threat  at  the  sky.  Also,  whitevine  [briony,  alba  vitis'\  may  be  strung 
about  the  whole  garden,  or  an  owl  may  be  nailed  up  with  outspread  wings,  or  the 
working-tools  may  be  greased  with  bear-fat.  Some  people  keep  a  supply  of  bear-suet 
beaten  {tusiun)  in  olive-oil  on  hand,  and  grease  the  sickles  with  it  at  pruning-time; 
but  this  remedy  must  be  applied  in  secret,  so  that  no  pruner  will  know  of  it.  It 
is  reported  to  be  of  such  efficiency  that  no  harm  can  be  done  by  any  storm  or  pest 
{iieqiie  nebula  neque  aliquo  animali  possit  noceri,  taking  possit  noceri  as  an  im- 
personal construction).  It  is  also  important  that  nothing  that  has  been  profaned  be 
used."  Pliny,  Historia  nattiralis,  XXVIII,  23,  i:  "In  the  first  place  hail-stones,  they 
say,  whirlwinds,  and  lightning  even,  will  be  scared  away  by  a  woman  uncovering 
her  body  while  her  monthly  courses  are  upon  her  [Bostock-Riley,  Vol.  V,  p.  314]; 


§l88  WEATHER-MAGIC  AND  WITCHCRAFT  II 3 

according  to  Diogenes  Laertius,  Empedocles,  VIII,  2,  59  (Hicks, 
Vol.  II,  pp.  373-75),  boasted  that  he  had  power  over  the  rain  and 
the  winds.  On  one  occasion  when  the  winds  were  blowing  hard  and 
threatening  to  destroy  the  harvests,  he  had  bags  of  ass's  skin  made 
and  placed  on  the  mountains  and  in  that  way,  trapped  in  the  bags, 
the  winds  abated  {loc.  cit.,  60,  quoting  Timaeus).  Suidas  makes  this 
interpretation  a  little  less  absurd  by  saying  that  Empedocles  stretched 
asses'  skins  about  the  city.  Plutarch,  Adversus  Colotem,  32  (Goodwin, 
Vol.  V,  p.  381),  gives  an  explanation  still  less  implausible  (though 
implausible  enough)  by  having  Empedocles  save  a  town  from  plague 
and  crop-failure  by  stopping  up  the  mountain  gorges  through  which 
a  wind  swept  down  over  the  plain.  In  another  place,  De  curiositate, 
I  (Goodwin,  Vol.  II,  p.  424),  he  repeats  virtually  the  same  story, 
but  this  time  mentioning  only  the  plague.  Clement  of  Alexandria 
credits  Empedocles  with  calming  a  wind  that  was  bringing  disease 
to  the  inhabitants  and  causing  barrenness  in  the  women — and  in 
that  a  new  element  creeps  in,  for  the  feat  would  be  a  Greek  counter- 
feit of  a  Judaic  miracle;  and  so  we  get  a  theological  interpretation." 

and  that  so  the  violence  of  the  heavens  is  averted;  and  out  at  sea  tempests  may  be 
lulled  in  the  same  way,  even  though  the  woman  is  not  menstruating  at  the  time." 
Columella,  De  re  rustica,  I,  i  (Zweibriicken,  Vol.  I,  p.  23). 

188  ^  Stromata,  VI,  3  {Opera,  Vol.  II,  pp.  243-52;  Wilson,  Vol.  II,  pp.  321  f.). 
Clement  mentions  other  cases  also.  The  land  of  Greece  suffering  from  a  great 
drought,  the  Pythoness  prescribed  that  the  people  should  resort  to  prayers  by 
Aeacus.  Aeacus  went  up  on  a  mountain  and  prayed,  and  soon  it  rained  copiously. 
For  the  same  incident,  see  Pindar's  scholiast,  Nemea,  V,  17  (Abel,  Vol.  II,  p.  155); 
Diodorus  Siculus,  Bibliotheca  historica,  IV,  61,  1-2  (Booth,  Vol.  I,  pp.  272-73); 
Pausanias,  Periegesis,  I,  Attica,  44,  9.  In  the  same  connexion  Clement  recalls  that 
Samuel  also  made  it  rain  (I  Kings,  12:  18).  Going  back  to  the  Greeks,  Clement 
relates  how  at  Chios  Aristeus  obtained  winds  from  Jove  to  temper  the  heat  of  the 
dog-days;  and  that  fact  is  also  vouched  for  by  Hyginus,  Poeticon  astronomicon,  II, 
4,  5  (Chatelain,  p.  17).  Clement  does  not  forget  that  at  the  time  of  the  Persian  in- 
vasion the  Pythoness  advised  the  Greeks  to  placate  the  winds  (Herodotus,  Historiae, 
VII,  178).  Then  comes  the  story  of  Empedocles;  and  Clement  is  back  with  his 
Bible  again,  quoting  Ps.,  83;  Deut.  10:16,  17;  Isa.  40:26.  Then  he  remarks:  "Some 
say  that  pestilences,  hail-storms,  wind-squalls,  and  other  similar  calamities  arc 
caused  not  only  by  nattiral  perturbations,  but  also  by  certain  demons,  or  by  the 
wrath  of  wicked  angels."  He  continues  with  the  story  of  the  oflicials  appointed  at 
Cleonae  to  prevent  hail-storms,  and  discusses  the  sacrifices  used  for  that  purpose 
(§  194).  Then  he  tells  about  the  purification  of  Athens  by  Epimenides  and  mentions 
other  similar  stories. 


114  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §189 

189.  It  is  evident  that  here  we  have,  as  it  were,  a  tree-trunk  with 
many  branches  shooting  off  from  it:  a  constant  element,  then  a 
multitude  of  interpretations.  The  trunk,  the  constant  element,  is  the 
belief  that  Empedocles  saved  a  town  from  damage  by  winds;  the 
ramifications,  the  interpretations,  are  the  various  conceptions  of  the 
way  in  which  that  result  was  achieved,  and  naturally  they  depend 
upon  the  temperaments  of  the  writers  advancing  them:  the  prac- 
tical man  looks  for  a  pseudo-experimental  explanation;  the  theo- 
logian, for  a  theological  explanation. 

In  Pausanias  we  get  a  conglomerate  of  pseudo-experimental,  mag- 
ical, and  theological  explanations.  Speaking  of  a  statue  of  Athena 
Anemotis  erected  at  Motona,  Pausanias  writes,  Periegesis,  IV,  Mes- 
senia,  35,  8 :  "It  is  said  that  Diomedes  erected  the  statue  and  gave  the 
goddess  her  name.  Winds  very  violent  and  blowing  out  of  season 
began  devastating  the  country.  Diomedes  offered  prayers  to  Athena; 
whereafter  the  country  suffered  no  further  ravages  from  the  winds." 
Ibid.,  II,  Corinth,  12,  i:  "At  the  foot  of  the  hill  (for  the  temple  is 
built  on  a  hill)  stands  the  Altar  of  the  Winds,  whereon,  one  night 
each  year,  the  priest  sacrifices  to  the  winds.  In  four  pits  that  are 
there  he  performs  other  secret  ceremonies  to  calm  the  fury  of  the 
winds,  and  likewise  chants  magic  words  that  are  said  to  come  down 
from  Medea."  Ibid.,  34:  "I  record  this  fact  also,  whereat  I  marvelled 
greatly  while  among  the  Methanians.  If  the  south-east  wind  ["the 
Lipz"]  blows  in  from  the  Saronic  Gulf  when  the  vines  are  bud- 
ding, it  dries  up  the  buds.  So,  as  soon  as  the  wind  begins  to  blow, 
two  men  take  a  white-feathered  cock,  tear  it  in  two,  and  run  around 
the  vineyards  in  opposite  directions,  each  carrying  half  of  the  cock. 
Coming  back  to  the  point  at  which  they  started,  they  bury  it.  Such 
the  remedy  they  have  devised  against  that  wind." 

Pomponius  Mela  mentions  nine  virgins  who  dwelt  on  the  "Isle 
of  Sena"  and  who  were  able  to  stir  up  the  winds  and  the  sea  with 
their  chants.^  In  the  Geoponicon,  compiled  by  Cassianus  Bassus, 

189  '^De  situ  orbis,  III,  6,  3:  "On  [the  Isle  of]  Sena  [Sizun,  Leon]  in  the  British 
sea  off  the  shores  of  Brittany  {Osismicis  ad  versa  litoribus)  there  is  a  celebrated 
oracle  of  a  Gallic  divinity,  where  the  priestesses  are  said  to  be  nine  in  number  and 


§191  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  II5 

I,  14,  several  methods  of  saving  the  fields  from  hail  are  mentioned; 
but  the  compiler  of  that  collection  explains  that  he  has  transcribed 
them  only  to  avoid  seeming  disrespectful  to  things  that  have  come 
down  from  the  forefathers.  His  own  beliefs,  in  a  word,  are  different. 

190.  One  branch  shooting  off  from  this  nucleus  of  interpretation 
overlying  non-logical  behaviour  ends  in  a  deification  of  tempests. 
Cicero,  De  natura  deorum,  III,  20,  51,  has  Cotta  meet  Balbus  with 
the  objection  that  if  the  sky,  the  stars,  and  the  phenomena  of  weather 
were  to  be  deified  the  number  of  the  gods  would  be  absurdly  great. 
In  this  case  the  deification  stands  by  itself;  in  other  examples,  it 
bifurcates  and  gives  rise  to  numerous  interpretations,  personifica- 
tions, explanations.^ 

191.  Capacity  for  controlling  winds  and  storms  becomes  a  sign 
of  intellectual  or  spiritual  power,  as  in  Empedocles;  or  even  of 

sanctified  by  perpetual  chastity.  They  are  called  'Barrigenae'  (variant,  Gallicenae) 
and  are  supposed  to  be  endowed  with  remarkable  abilides  to  raise  winds  and  high  seas 
with  their  incantadons,  to  turn  into  any  animal  they  choose,  cure  diseases  usually 
considered  incurable,  and  see  and  predict  the  future;  though  they  will  perform 
such  favours  only  for  mariners  who  have  made  special  voyages  for  the  purpose  of 
consulting  them."  Reinach  deals  with  this  text  in  Citltes,  mythes  et  religions.  Vol.  I, 
p.  199,  Les  vierges  de  Sena.  He  thinks  that  Mela  was  repeadng  information  derived 
from  Greek  traditions:  "Whatever  Mela's  immediate  source  in  what  he  says  of  the 
Isle  of  Sena,  there  is  reason  to  suppose  that  the  substance  of  his  story  is  very  ancient. 
I  believe  I  detect  traces  of  it  in  the  Odyssey  itself,  that  prototype,  as  Lucian  was  to 
say  in  his  time,  of  all  the  geographical  romances  of  antiquity."  That  may  well  be; 
or  it  may  also  be  that  both  the  stories  in  the  Odyssey  and  the  others  had  a  common 
origin  in  the  nodon  that  it  is  possible  to  influence  winds,  a  notion  that  was 
variously  elaborated  and  explained  as  time  went  on. 

190  1  There  are  Latin  inscriptions  with  invocations  to  the  "divine"  winds.  Corpus 
inscriptionitm  Latinarmn,  Vol.  III-I,  nos.  2609-10,  p.  308  (Orelli,  Inscriptionum 
collectio,  no.  1271):  "loui  O.M.  tempestatum  divinartim  potenti  leg.  Ill  Aug. 
dedicante."  Maury,  Histoire  des  religions  de  la  Grece  antique,  Vol.  I,  pp.  166-69: 
"The  winds  were  also  worshipped  by  the  primitive  peoples  of  Greece,  but  that  cult, 
which  plays  such  an  important  part  in  the  Rig-Veda,  had  noticeably  weakened 
among  the  Hellenes.  The  winds  continue,  of  course,  to  be  personified,  but  they  are 
worshipped  only  on  special  occasions  and  in  certain  localities.  .  .  .  Among  the  Chi- 
nese, worship  of  winds  and  mountains  was  associated  with  worship  of  streams  (Biot, 
Le  Tcheou-li,  Vol.  II,  p.  86).  When  the  Emperor  drove  over  a  mountain  in  his 
chariot,  the  driver  offered  a  sacrifice  to  the  mountain's  genius  {Ibid.,  Vol.  II,  p.  249). 
.  .  .  The  ancient  Finns  also  addressed  the  winds  as  gods,  especially  north  and  south 
winds,  the  cold  ones  in  formulas  of  disparagement." 


Il6  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §192 

v.divinity,  as  In  Christ  quelling  the  tempest/  Magicians  and  witches 
demonstrate  their  powers  in  that  fashion;  and  Greek  anthropo- 
morphism knows  lords  of  winds,  storms,  and  the  sea. 
.  192.  Sacrifices  were  made  to  the  winds.  The  sacrifice  is  just  a 
I  logical  development  of  a  magical  operation  like  the  use  of  the  white 
cock  just  described.  In  fact  for  that  ceremony  to  become  a  sacrifice,  it 
need  simply  be  stated  that  the  cock  is  torn  in  twain  as  a  sacrifice 
to  this  or  that  divinity. 

Virgil  has  a  black  sheep  sacrificed  to  the  Tempest,  a  white  sheep 
to  the  fair  Zephyr.  Note  the  elements  in  his  action:  i.  Principal  ele- 
ment: the  notion  that  it  is  possible  to  influence  the  winds  by  means 
of  certain  acts.  2.  Secondary  element:  logical  explanation  of  such 
acts,  by  introducing  an  imaginary  being  (personified  winds,  divini- 
ties, and  the  like).  3.  An  element  still  more  secondary:  specification 
of  the  acts,  through  certain  similarities  between  black  sheep  and 
storms,  white  sheep  and  fair  winds.^ 

193.  The  winds  protected  the  Greeks  against  the  Persian  invasion 

191  ^  Matt.  8:23-27.  The  disciples,  in  wonder  at  the  cessation  of  the  storm, 
exclaim:  "What  manner  of  man  is  this  that  even  the  winds  and  the  sea  obey  him!" 

192  "^  Aeneid,  III,  115:  "Let  us  appease  the  winds,  and  strike  out  for  the  realms 
of  Gnosus."  And  III,  118:  "So  saying,  he  made  the  due  sacrifices  on  the  altars:  a 
bull  to  Neptune,  and  a  bull  to  thee,  fair  Apollo;  a  black  sheep  to  Hiems  [god  of 
storms]  and  a  white  sheep  to  the  favouring  Zephyrs."  S<  rvius  annotates  (Thilo- 
Hagen,  Vol.  I,  pp.  364-65) :  "due  \rneritos\ :  appropriate  to  each  god.  .  .  ,  The 
kind  of  victim  should  correspond  to  the  character  of  the  divinity,  for  the  victim 
is  sacrificed  either  for  its  oppositeness  to  the  gifts  of  the  god,  as,  for  instance,  a  pig 
to  Ceres,  the  pig  being  destructive  to  crops;  or  a  he-goat  to  Liber,  the  goat  being 
harmful  to  grape-vines;  or  indeed  by  way  of  similitude,  as  black  sheep  to  the  nether 
gods,  and  white  sheep  to  the  gods  of  Heaven,  black  sheep  to  the  Tempests  and 
white  to  Fair  Weather.  ...  'A  black  sheep  to  Hiems,'  etc.  Aeneas  performed  the 
sacrifices  in  the  proper  order,  first  averting  evil  influences,  the  more  readily  to  allure 
the  good  ones." 

Aristophanes,  Ranae,  vv.  847-48,  plays  upon  this  custom  and  calls  for  a  black 
lamb  to  sacrifice  as  a  shelter  from  the  hurricane  v/hich  Aeschylus  is  about  to  stir 
up  through  his  chaffing  at  Euripides:  "Dionysus:  Quick,  boys,  a  black-fleeced  ewe! 
A  hurricane  is  upon  us!"  The  scholiast  notes  (Diibner,  pp.  299,  530,  701):  "Blacf^^ 
ewe:  because  that  is  the  sacrifice  offered  to  the  storm,  Typhon,  that  the  hurricane 
may  cease;  a  black  ewe:  since  that  is  the  sacrifice  offered  to  Typhon  when  the 
storm  is  in  the  form  of  a  tornado.  .  .  .  BlacX_  and  not  white  because  Typhon 
is  black." 


I 


§193  WEATHER-MAGIC  AND  WITCHCRAFT  II 7 

and  in  gratitude  the  Delphians  reared  an  altar  to  them  at  Pthios.^  It 
is  a  famihar  fact  that  Boreas,  son-in-law  to  the  Athenians  by  virtue 
of  his  marriage  to  Orithyia,  daughter  of  Erechtheus,  dispersed  the 
Persian  fleet,  and  therefore  well  deserved  the  altar  that  the  Athenians 
reared  in  his  honour  on  the  shores  of  the  Ilissus." 

Boreas,  good  fellow,  looked  after  other  people  besides  the  Atheni- 
ans. He  destroyed  the  fleet  of  Dionysius,  as  the  latter  was  voyaging  to 
attack  the  Thurii  (Tarentines).  "The  Thurii  therefore  sacrificed  to 
Boreas  and  elected  that  wind  to  citizenship  [in  their  city] ;  assigned 
him  a  house  and  a  piece  of  land,  and  each  year  celebrated  a  festival 
in  his  honour."  ^  He  also  saved  the  Megalopolitanians  when  they 
were  besieged  by  the  Spartans;  and  for  that  reason  they  ojfifered 
sacrifices  to  him  every  year  and  honoured  him  as  punctiliously  as 
any  other  god.* 

The  art  of  lulling  the  winds  was  known  to  the  Persian  Magi  also. 
Herodotus  relates,  Historiae,  VII,  191,  in  connexion  with  the  tempest 
that  Boreas  raised  to  help  the  Athenians  and  which  inflicted  heavy 
losses  on  the  Persian  fleet:  "For  three  days  the  storm  raged.  The 
Magi  sacrificed  victims  and  addressed  magical  incantations  to  the 
wind,  and  sacrificed  further  to  Thetis  and  the  Nereids.  Whereupon 
the  winds  ceased  on  the  fourth  day — unless  it  be  that  they  fell  of 
their  own  accord."  Interesting  this  scepticism  on  the  part  of 
Herodotus!^ 

193  ^  Herodotus,  Historiae,  VII,  178. 

193  ^Herodotus,  loc.  cit.,  189.  At  a  later  date  one  gets  an  interpretation  that 
clears  the  episode  of  the  supernatural  element  and  explains  it  logically — a  particular 
instance  of  a  procedure  that  is  general.  Scholiast  on  Apollonius,  Argonaittica,  I,  v.  211 
(Wellauer,  Vol.  II,  p.  13):  "Heragoras  [read  Hereas]  says  in  his  Megarica  that 
Boreas,  ravisher  of  Orithyia,  was  not  the  wind  [of  that  name]  but  [a  human  being] 
son  of  Strymon."  And  cf.  Carl  Miiller's  note  on  this  scholium  in  his  Fragmenta 
historicorian  Graecontm,  Vol.  IV,  p.  427.  Still  to  be  found  are  similar  interpretations 
for  other  similar  cases  in  which,  according  to  the  Athenians,  Boreas  was  of  help  to 
them.  But  that  is  very  easy:  there  must  have  been  no  end  of  individuals  named 
Boreas! 

193  ^  Aelian,  De  varia  historia,  XII,  61. 

193  ^  Pausanias,  Periegesis,  VIII,  Arcadia,  36,  6  (Dindorf,  p.  411). 

193  ^  Herodotus  has  some  doubts  also  as  to  the  aid  lent  by  Boreas  to  the 
Athenians.  He  cautions  that  he  does  not  know  that  Boreas  really  scattered  the 
Barbarian  fleet  in  answer  to  the  prayers  of  the  Athenians.  He  does  know  that  the 


Il8  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §194 

194.  The  notion  that  winds,  rains,  tempests,  can  be  produced  by 
art  of  magic  is  a  common  one  in  ancient  writers/  Seneca  discusses 
the  causes  of  weather  at  length  and  derides  magic.  He  does  not 
admit  the  possibihty  of  forecasting  the  weather  by  observation,  re- 
garding observation  as  just  a  preparation  for  the  rites  commonly 

Athenians  assert  that  Boreas  helped  them  at  that  time  and  that  he  had  done  so  on 
previous  occasions:  Historiae,  VII,  189:  ol  S'uv  AdrjvaloL  atjtiai  Xiyovai  (io7jd?'/cavTa  tuv 
Boplr/v  TTpdTcpov  Kal  rure  EKslva  Ka~epyacaa6ai. 

194  ^  Tibullus,  for  example,  Delia,  1,  vv.  51-52,  mentions  a  witch  at  whose  pleas- 
ure   clouds    vanish    from    the    sky    and    snow    falls    in    summer: 

"Cum  libet  haec  tristi  depellit  nubila  caelo, 
cum  libet  aestivo  convocat  orbe  nives." 

And  Ovid,  Amoves,  I,  8,  vv.  5,  9-10:  "She  knows  the  arts  of  witchcraft  and  the 
chants  of  Circe  (Aeaeaque  carmina).  ...  At  her  pleasure  clouds  gather  over  the 
whole  sky,  at  her  pleasure  bright  day  shines  forth  from  the  whole  orb  of  Heaven." 
In  Ovid's  Metamorphoses,  VII,  v.  201,  Medea  boasts:  "The  clouds  I  bring  and  drive 
away,  the  winds  I  raise  and  hush."  And  Seneca  makes  her  say  in  Medea,  vv.  754, 
765:  "Rain  I  called  forth  from  dry  clouds.  .  .  .  The  waves  began  to  moan,  and 
wildly  did  the  sea  rage,  though  there  was  no  wind."  And  see  his  Hercules  Oetaetts, 
vv.  452  f.  Lucan,  Pharsalia,  VI,  vv.  440-61,  describes  the  arts  of  a  witch  of  Thessaly 
at  length.  It  is  noteworthy  that  her  powers  availed  not  through  grace  of  the  gods 
but  against  their  will,  compelling  them.  In  Thessaly,  says  Lucan: 

".  .  .  phirima  surgunt 
Vim  jactura  deis  .  .  ." 

(".  .  .  many  a  plant  grows  that  can  force  the  hand  of  the  gods.")  At  the  com- 
mand of  the  Thessalian  witch,  Ibid.,  vv.  467-77: 

"Cessavere  vices  reriim,  dilataque  longa 
haesit  node  dies;  legi  non  paruit  aether, 
torpuit  et  praeceps  audita  carmine  mundus, 
axibus  et  rapidis  impulsos  luppiter  urguens 
miratur  non  ire  polos.  Nunc  omnia  conplent 
imbribtts  et  calido  praediicitnt  nubila  Phoebo, 
et  tonat  ignaro  caelum  love;  vocibus  isdem 
umentes  late  nebulas  nimbosque  solutis 
excussere  comis.  Ventis  cessantibus  aequor 
intumuit;  rursus  vetitum  sen  tire  procellas 
conticuit  turbante  Noto  .  .  ." 

("The  natural  changes  cease  to  function.  Daylight  lingers  as  night  is  lengthened; 
the  atmosphere  follows  not  its  laws.  Under  the  incantadons  of  the  witches  the  swift- 
whirling  firmament  comes  to  a  stop  and  Jupiter  notes  with  surprise  that  the  heavens 
cease  to  turn  on  their  axes.  Now  they  [the  witches]  drench  the  earth  in  rain  and 
make  clouds  appear  under  a  hot  sun:  there  are  peals  of  thunder  that  Jove  knows 
nothing  of.  So  with  their  magic  words  (vocibus)  they  dispel  the  canopy  of  watery 
vapour  and  cause  the  tresses  of  the  storm-clouds  to  vanish.  Now  the  sea  lashes  wild 


I 


§1^5  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  II9 

performed  for  averting  storms."  He  says  that  at  Cleonae  there  were 
pubhc  officials  known  as  "hail-observers."  As  soon  as  they  gave 
warning  of  the  approach  of  a  storm,  the  inhabitants  rushed  to  the 
temple  and  sacrificed  some  a  ewe,  others  a  fowl.  Those  who  had 
nothing  to  sacrifice  pricked  a  finger  and  shed  a  little  blood,  and 
the  clouds  moved  on  in  another  direction.  "People  have  wondered 
how  that  happens.  Some,  as  befits  educated  people,  deny  that  it  is 
possible  to  bargain  with  hail-stones  and  ransom  oneself  from  storms 
by  trifling  gifts,  granted  that  gifts  sway  even  the  gods.  Others  sus- 
pect that  the  blood  may  contain  some  property  that  is  able  to  banish 
clouds.  But  how  can  so  little  blood  contain  a  force  of  such  magni- 
tude as  to  work  far  up  in  the  skies  and  be  felt  by  clouds  ?  How  much 
simpler  to  say  that  it  is  stuff  and  nonsense.  All  the  same  the  officials 
entrusted  with  forecasting  storms  at  Cleonae  were  punished  when 
through  oversight  on  their  part  the  vines  and  the  crops  were  dam- 
aged. Our  own  XII  Tables  forbid  anyone's  laying  an  enchantment 
on  another's  crops.  An  ignorant  antiquity  believed  that  clouds  could 
be  compelled  or  dispelled  by  magic.  But  such  things  are  so  manifestly 
impossible  that  no  great  schooling  is  required  to  know  as  much." 

Few  writers,  however,  evince  the  scepticism  of  Seneca,  and  we' 
have  a  long  series  of  legends  about  storms  and  winds  that  come 
down  to  a  day  very  close  to  our  own. 

195.  The  Roman  legions  led  by  Marcus  Aurelius  against  the 
Quadi  chanced  to  be  caught  by  a  shortage  of  water,  but  a  storm  came 

though  there  is  no  wind  or  Hes  smooth  and  calm  under  the  blasts  of  Notus  which 
it  has  been  forbidden  to  heed.") 

Philostratus,  Vita  Apollonii,  III,  14;  Coming  to  the  place  where  the  Brahmans 
dwelt,  Apollonius  and  his  companions  "beheld  two  jars  of  black  stone,  one  the 
jar  of  rain  and  the  other  the  jar  of  the  winds.  If  India  is  suffering  from  a  drought, 
the  one  containing  the  rain  is  opened,  and  it  sends  clouds  and  rains  over  all  the 
land.  If  there  is  too  much  rain,  the  jar  is  closed,  and  the  storm  ceases.  The  jar  of 
the  winds  works,  I  should  say,  something  like  the  bag  of  Aeolus.  If  it  is  opened, 
one  of  the  winds  gets  out,  and  it  blows  where  it  is  needed  and  dries  the  land." 

194  ^  Naturales  quaestiones,  IV,  6-7:  "I  cannot  refrain  from  alluding  to  die  plen- 
teous idiocies  of  our  own  Stoics.  They  say  that  there  are  individuals  who  are  expert 
at  observing  the  clouds  and  predicting  when  it  is  going  to  hail,  the  which  they 
are  able  to  do  by  long  experience  in  noting  such  colours  in  the  clouds  as  hail  quite 
frequently  (toiiens)  follows." 


120  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §195 

along  just  in  time  to  save  them.  The  fact  seems  to  be  well  authenti-  ■ 
ij  cated.^  So  then,  the  why  and  wherefore  of  the  storm  has  to  be  ex-  I 
'  plained;  and  everybody  does  so  according  to  his  individual  senti-  " 
J     ments  and  inclinations. 

It  may  be  a  case  of  witchcraft.  Even  the  name  of  the  magician  is 
known — in  such  cases  one  can  be  very  specific  at  small  cost !  Suidas 
says  he  was  one  Arnuphis,  "an  Egyptian  philosopher  who,  being  in 
attendance  on  Marcus  Aurelius,  the  philosopher.  Emperor  of  the 
Romans,  at  the  time  when  the  Romans  fell  short  of  water,  straight- 
way caused  black  clouds  to  gather  in  the  skies  and  a  heavy  rain 
to  fall,  wherewith  thunder  and  frequent  lightning;  and  those  things 
he  did  of  his  science.  Others  say  that  the  prodigy  was  the  work  of 
Julian  the  Chaldean."  ^ 

Then  again  pagan  gods  may  have  a  hand  in  it — otherwise  what 
are  gods  good  for?  Dio  Cassius,  Historia  Romana,  LXXII,  8  (Gary, 
Vol.  IX,  pp.  27-29),  says  that  while  the  Romans  were  hard  pressed  by 
the  Quadi  and  were  suffering  terribly  from  heat  and  thirst,  "of  a  sud- 
den many  clouds  gathered  and  much  rain  fell,  not  without  divine 
purpose,  and  violently.  And  it  is  said  of  this  that  an  Egyptian 
magician,  Arnuphis  by  name,  who  was  with  Marcus,  invoked  a 
number  of  divinities  ^  by  magic  art,  and  chiefly  Hermes  Aerius,  and 
so  brought  on  the  rain." 

Claudian  believes  that  the  enemy  was  put  to  flight  by  a  rain  of 
fire.  And  the  cause?  Magic,  or  else  benevolence  of  Jove  the  Thun- 
derer.* Capitolinus  knows  that  Marcus  Antoninus  "with  his  prayers 

195  ^  We  need  not  inquire  here  whether  the  legion  called  the  Fulminata  got  its 
name  from  that  episode.  The  question  is  irrelevant  to  our  present  purposes.  Even 
if  the  story  of  the  storm  were  itself  not  true,  the  example  would  serve  quite  as  well, 
since  we  are  interested  not  in  the  historical  fact  but  in  the  sentiments  disclosed  by 
the  stories,  true  or  false,  that  grew  up  around  it. 

195  2  Lexicon,  s.v.  ' Apvov(pi^. 

195  ^  Stricdy  "demons";  but  the  pagan  SalfiuvEg  rcmsx.  not  be  confused  widi 
the  Christian  "demons"  (§  1613). 

195  ■*  Pattegyricus  de  sexto  consulatu  Hot7orii  Augusti,  vv.  342-49  (Carmina,  Vol. 

II,  p.  98): 

".  .  .  natn  flcuiimeiis  imber  in  hostem  decidit  .  .  . 
tunc  contenta  polo  mortalis  nescia  teli 
pugna  jiiit,  Chaldaea  mago  seu  carmina  ritu 


§195  WEATHER-MAGIC  AND  WITCHCRAFT  121 

turned  the  thunderbolts  of  heaven  against  the  war  machines  of  the 
enemy  and  obtained  rain  for  his  soldiers  who  were  suffering  from 
thirst.^  With  Lampridius  the  episode  is  further  elaborated  and  as- 
sumes new  garb.  Marcus  Antoninus  has  succeeded  in  making  the 
Marcomanni  friendly  to  the  Romans  by  certain  magical  practices. 
The  formulas  are  withheld  from  Elagabalus  in  fear  lest  he  be  de- 
siring to  start  a  new  war.^ 

armavere  deos,  seu,  quod  reor,  omne  Tonantis 
obseqiiium  Marci  mores  potnere  mereri." 

("For  a  storm  of  fire  descended  upon  the  enemy.  .  .  .  Then  a  battle  knowing  no 
mortal  weapon  was  fought  by  Heaven  alone:  for  either  Chaldean  chants  by  magic 
rite  had  armed  the  gods;  or  else,  as  I  believe,  the  character  {mores)  of  Marcus 
merited  all  deference  from  the  Thunderer.")  Note  the  ethical  elaboration.  Boreas  in- 
terposes on  the  basis  of  a  mere  family  relationship  with  the  Athenians.  The  Thun- 
derer intervenes  here  not  as  a  favour  to  Marcus,  but  in  view  of  his  good  character. 
Such  transformations  are  general. 

195  ^  Marcus  Antoninus  Philosophus,  24,  4.  The  case  of  a  storm  favouring  one  of 
two  belligerents  as  a  result  of  magic  or  by  divine  goodwill  is  to  be  noted  in  coun- 
tries widely  separated  and  under  such  conditions  as  to  preclude  any  suspicion  of 
imitation.  In  The  Chinese,  Vol.  II,  1806,  p.  112;  1836,  pp.  1 17-18,  Davis  transcribes 
a  passage  from  the  History  of  the  Three  Kingdoms:  "Lew-pei  took  occasion  to  steal 
upon  Chang-paou  with  his  whole  force,  to  baiBe  which  the  latter  mounted  his  horse, 
and,  with  dishevelled  hair  and  waving  sword,  betook  himself  to  magic  arts.  The 
wind  arose  with  loud  peals  of  thunder,  and  there  descended  from  on  high  a  black 
cloud,  in  which  appeared  innumerable  men  and  horses  as  if  engaged.  Lew-pei  im- 
mediately drew  off  his  troops  in  confusion,  and  giving  up  the  contest,  retreated  to 
consult  with  Choo-tsien.  The  latter  observed,  'Let  him  have  recourse  again  to 
magic;  I  will  prepare  the  blood  of  swine,  sheep,  and  dogs.'  .  .  .  On  the  following 
day,  Chang-paou,  with  flags  displayed  and  drums  beadng,  came  forth  to  offer  bat- 
tle, and  Lew-pei  proceeded  to  meet  him;  but  scarcely  had  they  joined  before  Chang- 
paou  put  his  magic  in  exercise;  the  wind  and  thunder  arose,  and  a  storm  of  sand 
and  stone  commenced.  A  dark  cloud  obscured  the  sky,  and  troops  of  horsemen 
seemed  to  descend.  Lew-pei  upon  this  made  a  show  of  retreating,  and  Chang-paou 
followed  him;  but  scarcely  had  they  turned  the  hill  when  the  ambushed  troops 
started  up  and  launched  upon  the  enemy  their  impure  stores.  The  air  seemed  im- 
mediately filled  with  men  and  horses  of  paper  or  straw,  which  fell  to  the  earth  in 
confusion;  while  the  winds  and  thunder  at  once  ceased,  and  the  sand  and  stones 
no  longer  flew  about." 

195  ^Antoninus  Heliogabalus,  9,  1-2  (Magie,  Vol.  II,  p.  125):  "Desiring  to  make 
war  upon  the  Marcomanni  (Marchmen)  whom  Marcus  (Aurelius)  Antoninus  had 
very  handily  (pulcherrime)  subdued,  he  [Elagabalus]  was  told  by  certain  individ- 
uals that  Marcus  had  arranged  through  Chaldean  magicians  that  the  Marcomanni 
should  for  ever  be  friendly  and  devoted  to  the  Roman  People,  and  that  that  had 
been  done  by  recidng  certain  chants,  with  a  rite.  When  he  asked  what  the  chants 


122  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §195 

Finally  the  Christians  claim  the  miracle  for  their  God.  On  the 
passage  from  Dio  Cassius  (LXXII,  8)  quoted  above,  XiphiUnus 
(Gary,  Dio,  Vol.  IX,  pp.  29-33)  notes  that  Dio  wittingly  or  unwit- 
tingly, but  he  suspects  wittingly,  misleads  the  reader.  He  surely 
knew — since  he  mentions  it  himself — all  about  the  "Thundering 
Legion,"  the  Fulminata,  to  which,  and  not  to  the  magician  Arnu- 
phis,  the  rescue  of  the  army  was  due !  The  truth  is  as  follows :  Marcus 
had  a  legion  made  up  entirely  of  Christians.  During  the  battle,  the 
praetor's  adjutant  came  and  told  Marcus  that  there  was  nothing 
which  Christians  were  unable  to  obtain  by  prayer  and  that  there 
was  a  legion  of  Christians  in  the  army.  "Hearing  which,  Marcus 
urged  them  to  bestir  themselves  and  pray  to  their  God.  They  prayed, 
and  God  heard  their  prayer  immediately  and  smote  the  enemy  with 
lightning,  whereas  the  Romans  He  comforted  with  rain."  Xiphilinus 
adds  that  a  letter  of  Marcus  Aurelius  on  the  incident  was  said  to  be 
in  existence  in  his  time.  The  letter,  forged  by  people  more  dis- 
tinguished for  piety  than  veracity,  is  also  alluded  to  by  other  writers; 
and  Justin  Martyr  goes  so  far  as  to  give  its  authentic  text.^ 

were  or  where  tliey  could  be  found,  he  was  not  told;  for  it  was  certain  that  he 
was  inquiring  about  the  spell  in  order  to  undo  it  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  on  a 
war." 

195  ''Apologia,  I,  71  (Migne,  p.  439A,  Davie,  p.  55).  The  Emperor  Marcus  is 
writing  to  the  Senate,  and  the  forger  makes  him  say  of  the  Christians:  "They  prayed 
to  a  god  unknown  to  me,  and  straightway  water  fell  from  the  sky  and  to  us  it  was 
ice-cold,  but  to  the  enemies  of  the  Romans  it  was  a  hail  of  fire."  The  miracle  grows 
and  grows  and  gets  prettier  and  prettier!  The  incident  and  the  letter  are  mentioned 
by  Tertullian,  Apologeticus,  V,  6;  and  Eusebius,  Historia  ecclesiastica,  V,  1-6.  Euse- 
bius  does  not  state  that  the  Emperor  requested  the  Christians  to  pray — they  knelt 
and  prayed  of  their  own  accord  before  the  battle.  The  enemy  was  surprised  at  the 
spectacle.  But  a  more  astounding  thing  then  occurred:  a  hurricane  arose  and  put 
the  enemy  to  flight,  while  a  gentle  rain  refreshed  the  Romans.  Zonaras,  Epitome 
historiarum,  XII,  2  (Migne,  Vol.  134,  pp.  1003-06),  on  the  other  hand,  repeats  by  and 
large  the  story  of  the  Pseudo-Justin.  Orosius,  Histoiiae  adversus  paganos,  VII,  15 
(Browne,  p.  126),  says:  "The  tribes  had  risen  in  insurrection,  barbarous  in  their 
cruelties  and  countless  in  their  multitudes,  to  wit:  the  Marcomanni,  the  Quadi, 
the  Vandals,  the  Sarmatae,  the  Suebi — in  fact  almost  all  Germany.  The  army  hav- 
ing advanced  to  the  frontiers  of  the  Quadi,  it  was  there  surrounded  by  the  enemy, 
and  found  itself  in  imminent  danger  from  thirst,  but  more  in  view  of  a  shortage  of 
water  than  because  of  the  foe.  Whereupon  certain  of  the  soldiers  began  to  pray  in 
great  earnestness  of  faith  and  publicly  to  call  upon  the  name  of  Christ;  and  straight- 
way a  rain  fell  in  such  abundance  as  to  refresh  the  Romans  bounteously  and  with- 


§196  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 23 

196.  So  the  legend  expands,  widening  in  scope  and  gradually 
approximating  a  veritable  novel.  But  not  only  the  external  embellish- 
ments increase  in  number.  Concepts  multiply  in  the  substance  itself. 
The  nucleus  is  a  mechanical  concept.^  Certain  words  are  uttered, 
certain  rites  are  performed,  and  the  rain  falls.  Then  comes  a  feeling 
that  that  has  to  be  explained.  A  first  theory  assumes  the  inter- 
position of  supernatural  beings.  But  then  the  interference  of  such 
gods  has  also  to  be  explained,  and  we  get  a  second  explanation.  But 
that  explanation  too  bifurcates  according  to  the  supposed  reasons  for 
the  intervention,  foremost  among  which  stands  the  ethical  reason, 
so  introducing  a  new  concept  that  was  altogether  absent  in  the 
magical  operation  proper.  This  new  concept  enlarges  the  scope  of 
the  whole  procedure.  Rain  was  once  the  sole  objective  of  the  rite. 
Now  it  becomes  a  means  whereby  the  divine  power  rewards  its 
favourites  and  punishes  their  enemies,  and  then,  further,  a  means 
for  rewarding  faith  and  virtue.  A  final  step  is  to  move  on  from  the 
particular  case  to  the  general.  It  is  no  longer  a  question  of  a  single 
fact,  but  of  a  multiplicity  of  facts,  all  following  a  certain  rule.  This 

out  damage,  whereas  the  Barbarians  were  terrified  by  a  rapid  succession  of  thunder- 
bolts and  large  numbers  of  them  were  killed,  so  that  he  [Marcus  Aurelius]  put 
them  to  rout."  See  also  Nicephorus  Callistus,  Ecclesiastica  historia,  FV,  12;  Cedrenus, 
Historiarum  compendium,  I,  250,  15-22  (Bekker,  Vol.  I,  p.  439);  Gregory  of  Nyssa, 
Oratio  77*  in  laudem  XL  martirum  {Opera,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  758-72). 

196  ^  It  appears  in  virtually  naked  form  in  the  case  of  the  "pluvial  stone"  in 
Rome,  which  needed  only  to  be  moved  about  the  streets  to  produce  rain.  Festus, 
De  verhortim  significatione,  I,  s.v.  Aquaelicittm  (London,  Vol.  I,  p.  84) :  "  [This 
term]  is  used  when  rain-water  is  attracted  by  certain  rites,  such  as  dragging  the 
'pluvial  stone'  about  the  streets  of  the  city  as  used  to  be  done,  according  to  legend, 
in  days  gone  by."  And  Ibid.,  XI,  s.v.  Manalis  lapis  "flowing  stone"  (London,  Vol. 

I,  p.  383) :  "The  'flowing  stone,'  so  called,  was  a  certain  stone  that  lay  outside  the 
Porta  Capena  near  the  temple  of  Mars.  In  times  of  excessive  drought  this  stone  was 
carried  about  the  streets  inside  the  city,  whereupon  rain  at  once  ensued.  They  called 
it  the  flowing  stone  because  the  water  began  flowing."  So  then,  all  that  was  required 
was  to  drag  the  stone  about  the  city,  and  the  rain  came  down  at  once.  Cf.  Nonius 
Marcellus,  De  compendiosa  doctrina,  15,  s.v.  Trtdletim  (Mercier,  p.  547);  Fulgen- 
tius,  Expositio  sermonum  antiqiionim  ad  Chalcidium  grammaticum  (Miincker,  Vol. 

II,  pp.  169-70) :  "Labeo,  who  compiled  and  annotated  the  Etruscan  rituals  of  the 
gods  Tages  and  Bacitis,  writes  as  follows:  'If  the  flesh  of  the  liver  is  of  a  sandarac 
red,  it  is  time  for  the  flowing  stones  to  be  scraped  and  cleaned  {verrere)^  He  means 
those  cylinder-shaped  stones  which  our  forefathers  used  to  drag  about  their  prop- 
erties to  break  a  period  of  dry  weather." 


124  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §^97 

leap  is  taken  by  Tertullian.  After  telling  the  story  of  the  rain  secured 
by  the  soldiers  of  Marcus  Aurelius,  he  adds:  "How  often  have 
droughts  not  been  stopped  by  our  prayers  and  our  fasts!"" 

Other  cases  of  the  same  kind  could  be  adduced;  which  goes  to 
show  that  the  sentiments  in  which  they  originate  are  fairly  common 
throughout  the  human  race.^ 

197.  In  Christian  writers  it  is  natural  that  logical  explanations  of 
the  general  law  of  storms  should  centre  about  the  Devil.  Clement 
of  Alexandria  records  the  belief  that  wicked  angels  have  a  hand  in 
tempests  and  other  such  calamities  (§  i88  ").^  But,  let  us  not  forget, 

196  -  Ad  Scapulatn,  4  {Opera,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  46-52;  English,  Vol.  I,  p.  51):  "Marcus 
quoque  Aurelius  in  Germanica  expeditione  Christianorum  militum  orationibus  ad 
deum  jactis  imbres  in  siti  impetravit.  Quando  non  geniculationibus  et  ieiunationibus 
nostxis  etiam  siccitates  sunt  depulsae?" 

196  ^  Pausanias,  Periegesis,  VIII,  Arcadia,  38,  4  (Dindorf,  pp.  414-15).  The  au- 
thor is  speaking  of  the  spring  called  Hagnus  on  Mount  Lycaeus:  "When  a  drought 
has  lasted  for  a  long  time  and  the  sown  seed  and  the  trees  have  begun  to  suffer,  the 
priest  of  the  Lycaean  Zeus  offers  prayers  and  sacrifices  to  the  water  according  to  the 
established  forms  and  then  stirs  the  water  in  the  spring  with  an  oak-branch — on 
the  surface,  not  deep  down.  As  the  water  is  stirred  a  mistlike  vapour  rises.  Soon 
the  vapour  becomes  a  cloud,  and  attracting  other  clouds  causes  rain  to  fall  on  the 
land  of  the  Arcadians."  We  shall  see  (§  203)  that  witches  caused  rain  and  hail  by 
somewhat  similar  means,  the  differences  being  as  follows:  i.  The  Devil  of  the 
Christians  takes  the  place  of  the  pagan  divinities  (each  people  of  course  introducing 
the  beings  deified  in  its  own  religion).  2.  In  Pausanias  the  operation  is  primarily 
beneficent.  It  may  be  so  among  Christians;  but  in  general  it  is  a  wicked  thing. 
(Deified  beings  usually  exert  influences  appropriate  to  their  individual  characters 
and  the  Devil  is  by  nature  wicked.)  In  the  present  case  we  see  an  imaginary  fact 
explained  in  various  ways.  The  sentiments  corresponding  to  the  fact  are  evidently 
the  constant  element,  the  explanations  the  variable  element. 

197  ^  Stromata,  VI,  3  (Opera,  Vol.  II,  p.  247B;  Wilson,  Vol.  II,  pp.  319-23).  The 
Dominican  Inquisitors,  Sprenger  and  Kramer,  who  wrote  the  Malleus  maleficarum, 
debate  learnedly  and  at  length  as  to  whether  the  Devil  must  always  work  with  the 
magician,  or  whether  they  can  function  separately.  Pars  I,  quaestio  1  (Summers,  p. 
12):  "Whether  it  is  sound  doctrine  to  hold  that  the  Devil  must  always  co-operate 
with  the  sorcerer  in  an  act  of  witchcraft,  or  whether  the  one  can  produce  that  effect 
without  the  other,  as  the  Devil  without  the  sorcerer,  or  vice  versa."  As  proof  that 
the  human  being  could  do  without  the  Devil  or,  in  general  terms,  the  "lower" 
without  the  "higher"  power,  some  cited  the  fact  vouched  for  by  Albertus  Magnus 
that  sage-leaves  when  rotted  in  a  certain  manner  and  thrown  into  a  well  [Summers, 
"running  water"]  could  bring  on  a  storm.  The  Malleus  has  no  doubts  on  the  point, 
but  explains  it.  It  begins  by  distinguishing  different  effects,  such  as  ministeriales , 
noxiales,  maleficiales,  et  naturales  [Summers,  p.  14:  "beneficial,  hurtful,  wrought 
by  witchcraft,  natural"].  The  first  are  produced  by  good  angels,  the  second  by 


§198  WEATHER-MAGIC  AND  WITCHCRAFT  1 25 

that  is  just  an  adjunct,  by  way  of  explanation,  to  the  basic  element— 
the  belief  that  it  is  possible  to  influence  storms  and  other  calamities 
of  the  kind  by  certain  rites.  Victorious  Christianity  had  to  fight  for 
its  interpretations  first  with  ancient  pagan  practices  and  later  on 
with  magical  arts  that  in  part  continued  the  pagan  and  in  part  were 
new.  But  great  the  need  of  escaping  storms!  And  powerful  the 
thought  that  there  were  ways  of  doing  so!  So  in  one  manner  or 
another  the  need  was  covered  and  the  thought  carried  out." 

198.  In  mediaeval  times  individuals  endowed  with  such  powers 
were  known  as  tempestarii,  and  even  the  law  took  cognizance  of 
them.  Nevertheless  the  Church  did  not  recognize  this  power  of 
producing  storms  without  a  struggle.  The  Council  of  Braga  in  the 
year  563  (Labbe,  Vol.  VI,  p.  518)  anathematizes  anyone  teaching 
that  the  Devil  can  produce  thunder,  lightning,  tempests,  or  drought. 
A  celebrated  ecclesiastical  decree  denies  all  basis  in  fact  to  fanciful 
tales  about  witches.^ 

wicked  angels,  the  third  by  the  Devil  with  the  help  of  sorcerers  or  witches,  the  last 
by  influences  from  celestial  bodies.  That  much  clear,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  the  sage 
has  the  effects  it  has  without  the  help  of  the  Devil  [Summers,  p.  16] :  "And  diirdly, 
as  to  the  sage  that  has  been  rotted  and  thrown  into  a  well,  it  is  to  be  said  that  a 
'noxial'  effect  can  ensue  without  the  pardcipadon  of  the  Devil  but  not  apart  from 
the  influence  of  a  celesdal  body." 

197  ^  St.  Gregory  of  Tours,  De  sancto  Nicetio  Treveroriim  episcopo,  5  {Vitae 
Patrum,  XVII,  Opera,  p.  1083B),  tells  of  an  incident  that  happened  to  St.  Nizier. 
One  day  a  man  called  on  the  Saint  to  thank  him  for  having  saved  his  life  at  sea 
under  very  perilous  circumstances,  in  the  following  terms:  "A  short  time  since, 
while  in  a  ship  on  my  way  to  Italy,  I  found  myself  amid  a  muldtude  of  heathen, 
and  in  that  great  throng  of  uncouth  individuals  I  was  the  only  Chrisdan.  One  day 
a  tempest  arose  and  I  began  to  call  on  the  name  of  God  that  by  His  intercession 
He  should  cause  the  tempest  to  abate.  The  heathen  for  their  part  were  praying  to 
their  own  gods,  some  beseeching  Jove,  some  calling  on  Mercury,  in  loud  voice,  oth- 
ers begging  help  now  of  Minerva,  now  of  Venus.  Since  wc  were  in  grave  peril  of 
death,  I  said  to  them:  'Gentlemen,  pray  not  to  those  gods,  for  they  are  not  gods 
but  devils.  If  ye  would  save  yourselves  from  this  present  perdition,  call  upon  St. 
Nizier,  that  he  secure  you  salvation  of  the  mercy  of  God.'  Whereupon  with  one 
loud  voice  they  cried,  'God  of  Nizier,  save  us!'  and  straightway  the  sea  subsided, 
the  winds  abated,  the  sun  came  out,  and  the  ship  sailed  on  whither  we  were 
bound." 

198  ^  Decretum  Gratiani,  pars  II,  causa  26,  quaestio  5,  canon  12  (Friedberg, 
Vol.  I,  pp.  1030-31):  The  witches'  sabbath  is  declared  a  fraud:  "Wherefore  the 
priests  through  the  Churches  entrusted  to  them  shall  preach  to  God's  people  in  all 
urgency  that  they  should  know  that  all  such  things  are  altogether  false  and  that 


126  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §198 

St.  Agobard  wrote  an  entire  book  "against  idiotic  notions  current 
as  to  hail  and  thunder."  Says  he:  "In  these  parts  nearly  all  people, 
noble  or  villein,  burgher  or  rustic,  old  or  young,  believe  that  hail 
and  thunder  can  be  produced  at  the  will  of  men.  They  therefore 
exclaim  at  the  first  signs  of  thunder  and  lightning:  'Raised  air!' 
Asked  to  explain  what  'raised  air'  is,  they  will  tell  you,  some  shame- 
facedly as  though  conscious  of  sin,  others  with  the  wonted  frankness 
of  the  ignorant,  that  the  air  has  been  stirred  by  the  incantations  of 
individuals  known  as  'tempestuaries'  and  that  that  is  why  they  say 
'raised  air.'  We  have  seen  and  heard  many  people  possessed  of  such 
stupidity  and  out  of  their  heads  with  such  lunacy  as  to  believe  and 
say  that  there  is  a  certain  country  called  'Magonie'  whence  ships  sail 
out  on  the  clouds  and  return  laden  with  the  grain  which  the  hail 
mows  and  the  storms  blow  down,  and  that  the  'tempestuaries'  are 
paid  by  such  aerial  mariners  for  the  grain  and  other  produce  de- 
livered to  them.  We  have  seen  a  great  crowd  of  people — blinded  by 
such  great  stupidity  as  to  believe  such  things  possible — drag  four 
persons  in  chains  before  our  court,  three  men  and  a  woman,  alleging 
that  they  had  fallen  from  one  of  those  ships.  They  had  been  held  in 
chains  for  several  days  till  the  court  convened;  then  they  were  pro- 
duced, in  our  presence,  as  I  said,  as  culprits  worthy  to  be  stoned  to 
death.  Nevertheless,  after  much  parley  the  truth  prevailing,  the 
accusers  were,  in  the  prophet's  words,  confounded  like  thieves  caught 
in  the  act."  ^ 

such  phantoms  are  inflicted  upon  the  minds  of  the  faithful  not  by  a  divine  but  by 
an  evil  spirit.  .  .  .  For  who  of  us  is  not  carried  outside  himself  in  dreams  and 
nocturnal  visions  and  does  not  see  in  his  sleep  things  never  seen  while  waking? 
And  who  could  be  so  stupid  and  so  weak  of  mind  as  to  think  that  all  such  things 
which  take  place  only  in  the  spirit  take  place  in  the  body  also?"  The  decree  was 
taken  from  Reginon,  De  disciplinis  ecdesiasticis  et  religione  Christiana,  II,  364 
(Opera,  p.  352).  It  is  possibly  a  fragment  of  a  capitulary  of  Charles  the  Bald. 
Baronio,  Annates  ecclesiastici,  anno  382,  XX,  quotes  a  decree  of  Pope  Damasus: 
"Likewise  to  be  excommunicated  are  all  such  as  attend  to  spells,  auguries,  fortune- 
telling  and  all  other  superstidons;  and  under  the  same  condemnation  are  especially 
to  be  punished  women  who  by  the  Devil's  deception  imagine  they  are  carried  about 
at  night  on  the  backs  of  animals  and  go  travelling  in  company  with  Herodias." 

198  ^  Contra  insulsam  vulgi  opiuionem  de  grandine  et  tonitrtiis  {Opera,  pp. 
147-48).  In  comment  on  the  passage,  Baluze  writes:  "Girard,  Archbishop  of  Tours, 
mentions  'tempestuaries'  by  name  in  the  third  section  of  his  statutes:  'Relative  to 


§200  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 27 

St.  Agobard  demonstrates  from  Holy  Writ  the  error  of  believing 
that  hail  and  thunder  are  at  the  beck  and  call  of  human  beings. 
Others,  on  the  contrary,  will  likewise  show  by  Scripture  that  the 
belief  is  sound.  Yes  and  no  have  at  all  times  been  produced  from 
Scripture  with  equal  readiness. 

199.  Doctrines  recognizing  the  powers  of  witches  were  mistrusted 
by  the  Church  for  two  reasons,  at  first  because  they  looked  like 
survivals  of  paganism,  the  gods  of  which  were  identified  with  devils; 
then  because  they  were  tainted  with  Manicheism,  setting  up  a  prin- 
ciple of  evil  against  a  principle  of  good.  But  owing  to  the  pressure 
of  the  popular  beliefs  in  which  the  non-logical  impulses  involved  in 
magic  expressed  themselves,  the  Church  finally  yielded  to  something 
it  could  not  prevent,  and  with  little  trouble  found  an  interpretation 
humouring  popular  superstition  and  at  the  same  time  not  incom- 
patible with  Catholic  theology.  After  all,  what  did  it  want?  It 
wanted  the  principle  of  evil  to  be  subordinate  to  the  principle  of 
good.  No  sooner  said  than  done!  We  can  grant,  to  be  sure,  that 
magic  is  the  work  of  the  Devil — but  we  will  add,  "God  permitting." 
That  will  remain  the  final  doctrine  of  the  Catholic  Church. 

200.  Popular  superstitions  exerted  pressure  not  only  upon  the 
Church  but  also  upon  secular  governments ;  and  they,  without  both- 
ering very  much  to  find  logical  interpretations,  set  out  with  a  will  to 
punish  all  sorts  of  sorcerers  and  witches,  "tempestuaries"  included.^ 

spellbinders,  enchanters,  soothsayers,  fortune-tellers,  dream-readers,  tempestuaries 
and  rigmaroles  against  frosts  (?  brevibus  pro  jrigoribtis),  and  relative  to  witches 
and  such  females  as  deal  in  signs  and  portents  of  various  kinds,  that  they  may  be 
prohibited  and  public  punishment  inflicted  {publicae  poenitentiae  miiltentur).''  " 

200  ^  Eunapius  relates,  Vitae  philosophortitn  ac  sophistartim,  Aedisitis,  Sopater, 
Wright,  pp.  383-85,  that  one  year  it  came  to  pass  that,  favourable  winds  failing, 
ships  could  not  get  to  Byzantium  with  their  grain.  The  famished  inhabitants  were 
being  entertained  in  a  theatre  with  scant  success  and  loudly  protested  to  the  Em- 
peror Constantine  that  the  philosopher  Sopater  was  the  cause  of  the  famine,  since 
"he  had  shackled  the  winds  with  his  transcendent  science."  Constantine  was  con- 
vinced, and  ordered  the  man  executed.  Suidas,  Lexicon,  s.v.  lu-arpoc  'ATa/iEi-g 
says  that  the  philosopher  in  question  was  killed  by  Constantine  "so  as  to  make  evi- 
dent to  all  that  he,  Constantine,  was  no  longer  a  devotee  of  the  Hellenic  religion." 
This  version  accords  with  the  other,  Suidas  explaining  the  "convinced"  of  Eunapius! 
Codex  Theodosianus,  IX,  16,  5  (Haenel,  p.  869) :  "Many  individuals  do  not  hesitate 
to  disturb  the  elements  by  art  of  magic  nor  to  upset  the  tranquillity  {vitas)  of  inno- 


128  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §201 

201.  Whenever  a  certain  state  of  fact,  a  certain  state  of  belief, 
exists,  there  is  always  someone  on  hand  to  try  to  take  advantage  of 
it;  and  it  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  Church,  State,  and  indi- 
viduals should  all  have  tried  to  profit  by  the  belief  in  witchcraft. 
St.  Agobard  reports  that  blackmail  was  paid  to  "tempestuaries,"  ^ 
and  Charlemagne,  no  less,  admonishes  his  subjects  to  pay  their 
tithes  to  the  Church  regularly  if  they  would  be  surer  of  their  crops.^ 

cent  citizens  and  annoy  them  by  fatuous  talk  {ventilare)  about  evoking  ghosts  of 
the  dead  {manibus  accitis),  on  pretence  that  they  can  overcome  their  enemies  by 
witchcraft.  Since  such  individuals  are  unnatural  monsters  {naturae  peregrini),  may 
a  deadly  pest  destroy  them."  The  same  law  appears  in  the  Codex  Justiniani,  IX, 
i8,  6  {Corpus  iuris  civilis.  Vol.  II,  p.  596;  Scott,  Vol.  XV,  p.  33).  And  cf.  Codex 
legis  Wisigothorum,  VI,  2,  3  (Canciani,  Vol.  IV,  p.  133) :  "Sorcerers  and  storm- 
compellers  who  are  said  to  bring  hail  upon  vineyards  and  grain-fields  by  certain 
incantations,  and  those  who  disturb  the  minds  of  people  by  conjuring  up  devils, 
wheresoever  discovered  and  arrested  by  a  magistrate  or  by  a  local  representadve  or 
attorney  [of  the  Crown]  shall  be  publicly  lashed  with  two  hundred  lashes,  and 
with  their  hair  clipped  in  derision  they  shall  be  forced,  if  unconsendng,  to  march 
around  the  ten  estates  next  adjoining,  that  others  may  profit  by  their  example." 
Capitulare  seculare  anni  80$:  De  incantoribus  et  tempestariis,  25:  "As  to  enchant- 
ments, fortune-telling  and  divinations,  and  individuals  who  cause  storms  or  prac- 
tise other  witchcraft,  it  is  the  pleasure  of  the  Council  that  wherever  such  are  ar- 
rested, the  archbishop  of  that  diocese  shall  provide  for  their  subjection  to  a  most 
searching  examination  to  see  whether,  perchance,  they  confess  to  the  crimes  they 
have  committed." 

201  ^  Op.  cit.,  15:  "Such  idiocy  is  no  small  part  of  disloyalty  to  the  Church,  and 
meantime  the  evil  has  so  spread  abroad  that  in  many  places  there  are  wretches  who 
say  they  not  only  know  how  to  cause  storms  but  also  how  to  protect  the  inhabitants 
of  a  locality  from  storms.  They  have  a  tariff  {statutum)  as  to  how  much  farmers 
shall  give  of  their  crops,  and  they  call  it  their  'canon.'  There  are  many  people  who 
never  pay  their  tithes  to  the  Church  of  their  own  accord,  and  never  give  alms  to 
widows  and  orphans  or  the  other  poor;  and  no  matter  how  often  such  things  are 
preached  and  published  to  them,  no  matter  how  urgendy  they  are  exhorted,  they 
still  refuse.  But  what  they  call  the  'canon'  they  pay  to  those  who  they  think  protect 
them  from  storms,  without  any  preaching,  admonition,  or  exhortation — strictly  of 
their  own  accord,  the  Devil  prompting,  of  course." 

201  ^  Karoli  Magni  capitularia,  28,  Synodus  Francofurtensis,  June  25,  anno 
Christi  DCCXCIV  {Monumenta  Germaniae  historica,  Legum,  Vol.  I,  p.  76) : 
".  .  .  and  every  man  shall  pay  the  legal  tithe  to  the  Church  out  of  his  property; 
for  we  learned  of  experience  in  the  year  of  the  great  famine  that  abundant  harvests 
came  to  naught  because  devoured  by  devils,  and  voices  were  heard  in  upbraiding." 
One  of  these  wicked  demons,  who  was  possessing  a  maiden,  was  exorcized  on  relics 
of  St.  Marcellinus  and  St.  Peter,  and  gave  a  clear  explanation  of  the  trouble:  "I 
am,"  he  said,  "a  satellite  and  disciple  of  Satan  and  was  for  a  long  time  door-man 
in  Hell.  But  for  some  years  past,  along  with  eleven  companions,  I  have  been  ravag- 


§203  WEATHER-MAGIC  AND  WITCHCRAFT  12^ 

202.  In  the  Middle  Ages  and  the  centuries  following  there  was  a 
veritable  deluge  of  accusations  against  sorcerers  for  stirring  up 
storms  and  destroying  harvests.  Humanity  lived  in  terror  of  the 
Devil  for  generation  after  generation.  Whenever  people  spoke  of 
him,  they  seemed  to  go  out  of  their  heads,  and,  as  might  be  ex- 
pected of  raving  lunatics,  spread  death  and  ruin  recklessly  about. 

203.  The  Malleus  maleficarum  {Hammer  for  Witches)  of  Spren- 
ger  and  Kramer  gives  a  good  summary  of  the  doctrine  prevailing 
in  the  fifteenth  century,  though  it  was  also  the  doctrine  of  periods 
earlier  and  later: 

"That  demons  and  their  disciples  can  work  such  enchantments  on 
lightning  and  hail,  having  received  power  therefor  of  God,  and 
namely  through  His  authorization  of  devils  or  their  disciples,  is 
attested  by  Holy  Writ,  Job  i  and  2  .  .  .  whereof  St.  Thomas  in  a 
note  on  Job  writes  as  follows:^  'We  must  confess  that,  God  per- 
mitting, demons  may  effect  disturbances  in  the  air,  raise  storms, 
and  cause  fire  to  fall  from  the  sky.  Though  corporeal  nature  in 
assuming  its  forms  does  not  obey  the  commands  of  angels,  whether 
good  or  bad,  but  only  God  the  Creator,  nevertheless,  as  regards  local 
motion,  [corporeal]  nature  is  susceptible  of  obedience  to  spiritual 
nature,  as  may  be  seen  in  human  beings,  who,  by  sole  power  of  the 
will,  which  is  subjective  in  the  soul,  are  able  to  move  their  members 
to  the  end  of  performing  desired  actions.  Therefore  motion — which, 
by  its  nature,  not  only  good  but  also  wicked  angels  can  effect — is 
alone  possible,  save  it  be  forbidden  of  God.' "  ^  The  disquisition  on 

ing  this  kingdom  of  France.  Grain  and  wine,  and  all  the  other  fruits  which  come 
of  the  Earth  for  the  use  of  mankind,  we  have  destroyed  as  we  were  bidden."  This 
intelligent  demon  expatiates  at  length  on  what  was  back  of  it  all.  The  devastation 
was,  he  said,  "due  to  the  wickedness  of  this  people  and  the  many  iniquities  of  its 
rulers."  And,  the  tongue  falling  where  the  tooth  scratched,  he  did  not  forget  the 
tithes:  "Rari  sunt  qui  fideliter  ac  devote  decimas  dent."  Cf.  Eginhard,  Historia 
translationis  sanctorum  Christi  martyrum  Marcellini  et  Petri,  V,  50  {Opera,  Vol.  II, 
pp.  284-86;  Wendell,  pp.  66-67). 

203  *  [In  librum  beati  Job  expositio,  I,  lectio  4  {Opera,  1570  ed..  Vol.  Ill,  p.  3, 

2C).] 

203  ^  [So  Pareto.  Summers:  "Therefore,  whatever  can  be  accomplished  by  mere 
local  motion,  this  not  only  good  but  also  bad  spirits  can  by  their  natural  power 
accomplish,  unless  God  should  forbid  it." — A.  L.] 


130  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §203 

the  power  of  demons  runs  on  and  finally  the  authors  of  the  Malleus 
give  an  example:  "In  [Nider's]  Formicarius,  [V,  4,  f.  R2],  we  are 
told  of  a  man  who  was  seized  by  a  judge  and  questioned  touching 
his  manner  of  procedure  in  raising  storms  and  whether  it  were  an 
easy  matter  to  do  that.  He  answered:  'It  is  easy  enough  to  make  it 
hail,  but  we  cannot  inflict  damage  at  will  because  of  the  surveillance 
of  good  angels.'  And  he  added:  'We  can  harm  only  those  who  are 
without  succour  of  God.  Those  who  take  care  to  carry  the  sign  of 
the  Cross  we  cannot  harm.  Our  procedure  is  as  follows :  First  in  the 
field  [in  question]  we  pray,  by  a  magic  formula,  to  the  Prince  of  all 
the  demons  to  send  us  one  of  his  servants  to  smite  whither  we  point. 
The  demon  comes.  Thereupon  at  a  cross-roads  we  sacrifice  a  black 
fowl  to  him,  tossing  it  high  in  the  air.  The  demon  takes  it  and  obeys. 
He  brings  on  a  storm  and  hurls  hail-stones  and  lightning-bolts,  but 
not  always  on  the  spots  we  have  designated,  but  whither  God  per- 
mits.' "  ^  The  writer  continues  with  other  stories  as  plausible  as  they 
are  marvellous.  We  will  touch  briefly  here  on  just  one  of  them  which 
is  told  by  another  writer. 

The  daughters  of  witches  often  have  the  powers  their  mothers 
have.^  "Hence  it  may  happen  and  has  been  known  to  happen  .  .  . 
that  a  girl  under  the  age  of  puberty,  eight  or  ten  years  old,  has 
produced  hail  and  tempests."  And  the  author  gives  an  example 
(Summers,  p.  144) :  "In  Swabia  a  peasant  with  his  daughter,  hardly 
eight  years  old,  was  once  looking  at  the  grain  in  the  fields.  And 
considering  the  drought,  and  sorrowful,  he  wished  for  rain,  saying: 
'Alas,  when  is  it  going  to  rain?'  The  child,  hearing  her  father's 
words,  said  in  the  simpleness  of  her  soul :  'Father,  if  you  would  have 
rain,  I  will  make  it  rain  right  soon!'  And  the  father:  'How  in  the 
world  can  you  make  it  rain?'  'Certainly  I  can,  and  not  only  can  I 
make  it  rain:  I  can  also  make  it  hail  and  storm.'  'And  who  taught 

203  "^  Pars  II,  qtiaestio  I,  cap.  XV  (Summers,  pp.  147-48):  "As  to  the  manner  in 
which  sorcerers  customarily  raise  tempests  and  hail-storms  and  hurl  thunderbolts  at 
human  beings  and  cattle." 

203  ^  Ibid.,  Pars  II,  qtiaestio  I,  cap.  XIII  (Summers,  pp.  140-44) :  "As  to  the  man- 
ner in  which  midwives  who  are  witches  do  still  greater  harm,  either  killing  children 
or  pledging  them  to  the  Devil  by  enchantments." 


§204  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  I3I 

you  that?'  'Mama,  but  she  told  me  not  to  tell  anyone!'"  The  con- 
versation continues;  and  finally  "the  father  led  his  daughter  to  a 
brook.  'Make  it  rain,'  he  said,  'but  only  on  our  field.'  The  girl  then 
put  her  hand  into  the  water,  and  in  the  name  of  her  master,  accord- 
ing to  her  mother's  teaching,  stirred  it  about.  And  lo!  the  rain  fell, 
and  only  upon  her  father's  field!  Seeing  which  her  father  said: 
'Make  it  hail,  but  only  upon  one  of  our  fields.'  When  the  girl  did 
that  too,  the  father  was  convinced  from  what  he  had  seen,  and  re- 
ported his  wife  to  the  judge.  She  was  seized,  convicted,  and  burned; 
and  her  daughter,  baptized  anew  and  consecrated  to  God,  no  longer 
had  powers  to  work  her  art." 

Though  Del  Rio  quotes  the  Malleus,  and  another  authority  still, 
he  tells  the  story  somewhat  differently,  especially  as  to  the  way  in 
which  the  rain  was  caused.  Here  we  catch  these  legends  in  process 
of  formation.  Probably  not  all  of  this  story  was  invented.  Some  such 
incident  occurs.  It  is  then  amplified,  commented  upon,  explained, 
and  from  it,  as  from  a  little  seed,  there  comes  an  abundant  harvest 
of  fantastic  and  grotesque  fiction.^ 

204.  De  Rio  gives  a  long  list  of  highly  reputable  writers  who  main- 
tain that  sorcerers  can  produce  hail  and  storms;  and  whose  names, 

203  ^  Del  Rio,  Disquisitiones  magicae,  II,  11  (Louvain,  Vol.  I,  p.  155;  Cologne, 
p.  139) :  "Recentiora  exempla  nitpcri  scriptores  protulerunt:  Addam  duo,  tinum 
lepidtim  [He  calls  "amusing"  a  story  that  ends  in  the  death  of  two  women  at  the 
stake!]  horrendmn  alteritm.  In  ditione  Trevirensi  rttstictts  fttit  qui  cum  filiola  sua 
octenni  caules  plantabat  in  horto.  Filiolam  forte  coUaudavit,  quod  apte  hoc  munus 
obiret.  Ilia  sexu  et  aetate  garrula  se  nosse  alia  face  re  magis  stupe  12  da  iactat.  Pater 
quid  id  foret  sciscitatur:  'Secede  paullum,'  iiiquit,  'et  in  quam  voles  horti  partem 
subitum  imhrem  dabo.'  Miratus  ille:  'Age,  secedam,'  ait.  Quo  recedente,  scrobem 
puella  fodit,  in  earn  de  pedibus  (ut  cum  Hebraeis  loquar  pudentius)  aquam  fundit, 
eamque  bacillo  turbidat,  nescio  quid  submurmurans.  Et  ecce  tibi  subito  pluviam  de 
nubibus  in  conditum  locum.  'Outs'  inquit  obstupejactus  pater  'te  hoc  docuit?' 
'Mater,'  respondet,  'huius  et  aliorum  siinilitim  peritissima.'  Zelo  incitatus  agricola 
post  paiicos  dies,  invitatum  se  ad  nuptias  simulans,  uxorem  cum  gnata  festive  nup- 
tiali  modo  exornatas  in  carrum  imponit,  in  vicinum  oppidum  devehit,  et  iudici 
tradit  maleficii  crimen  supplicio  expiaturas.  Hoc  mihi  fide  dignissimorum  virorum 
narratio  suggessit.  Ubi  notandus  modus  scrobiculam  jaciendi  et  quod  in  eam  iecerts 
bacillo  confutandi."  Just  for  a  comparison,  I  quote  the  passage  in  the  Malleus  which 
tells  how  the  rain  was  obtained  (Summers,  p.  144):  "Tunc  pater  puellam  per 
manum  ad  torrentem  deduxit.  'Fac,'  inquit,  'sed  tantutnmodo  super  agrum  nos- 
trum.' Tunc  puella  manum  in  aquam  misit  et  in  nomine  sui  magistri  iuxta  doc- 


132  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §205 

supplemented  by  the  authority  of  Scripture  and  by  practical  instances 
attested  by  people  worthy  of  all  credence,  are  surely  calculated  to 
vanquish  the  most  obstinate  incredulity!  ^ 
205.  Godelmann  imparts  various  ways  in  which  witches,  schooled 

triua7n  matiis  movit.  Et  ecce  tantummodo  pluvia  agriim  ilium  perfudit.  Quod 
cernens  pater,  'Fac,'  inquit,  'et  grandinem,  sed  tantummodo  super  unurn  ex  agris 
nostris/  "  and  so  on. 

The  other  example  reported  by  Del  Rio  is  a  story  taken  from  Pontano,  of  a  city 
besieged  by  the  King  of  Naples,  which  ran  short  of  water  and  obtained  it  by  rains 
provoked  by  magic  and  sacrilege.  Del  Rio  may  have  had  before  him  other  passages 
from  the  Formicarius  or  the  Malleus:  for  example,  as  regards  the  latter,  the  inci- 
dent recounted  in  Pars  II,  quaestio  I,  cap.  Ill  (Summers,  pp.  104,  107) :  "As  to 
the  manner  in  which  they  [witches]  are  transferred  physically  from  one  place  to 
another."  A  witch  had  not  been  invited  to  a  wedding  banquet.  "Enraged  and  think- 
ing to  avenge  herself,  she  conjured  up  the  Devil,  stated  her  grievance  and  asked 
him  to  be  good  enough  to  make  a  hail-storm  and  scatter  the  company  at  the  dance. 
Consenting,  he  lifted  her  up  and  in  full  view  of  certain  shepherds  bore  her  through 
the  air  to  [the  top  of]  a  hill  near  the  town.  As  she  afterwards  confessed,  there  was 
no  water  there  for  pouring  into  her  pit — a  way  they  have,  as  will  be  seen,  when 
they  are  getting  hail.  So  she  made  a  little  hole  and  filled  it  with  her  urine  in  place 
of  water,  and  stirred  it  with  her  finger,  as  her  custom  was,  the  Devil  looking  on. 
And  straightway  the  Devil,  raising  the  liquid  high  in  the  air,  sent  a  violent  storm 
with  hail-stones,  just  upon  the  party  at  the  dance  and  the  people  in  the  town.  The 
guests  were  scattered.  They  were  sdll  talking  together  as  to  the  cause  of  what  had 
happened  when  the  witch  came  home.  That  aroused  their  suspicions.  But  when  the 
shepherds  told  what  they  had  seen,  the  suspicion  which  had  been  strong  became 
violent.  [We  laugh  nowadays  at  such  idiocy;  but  the  sendments  it  expresses  have 
been  the  cause  of  untold  sufferings  to  mankind,  and  countless  deaths.]  The  woman 
was  arrested  and  confessed  that  she  had  done  those  things  for  cause — probably  be- 
cause she  had  not  been  invited  to  the  party.  Then  she  was  burned,  in  view  also  of 
many  other  acts  of  witchcraft  [Probably  as  well  authenticated  as  the  above!]  of 
which  she  had  been  guilty."  Del  Rio  got  this  story  from  the  Daemonolatreia  of 
Remy,  I,  25  (Lyons,  pp.  158-62;  Ashwin,  pp.  74-75). 

204  ^  Op.  cit.,  V,  16  (Vol.  Ill,  p.  99).  In  II,  II  (Louvain,  Vol.  I,  pp.  152-54; 
Cologne,  p.  136)  he  writes:  "Thirdly  .  .  .  sorcerers  can  abate  tempests,  cause  light- 
ning and  thunder,  provoke  hail-storms  and  rain-storms  and  like  weather,  and  they 
can  send  them  upon  such  lands  as  they  choose."  He  rebukes  people  who  do  not 
believe  such  things  and  claim  that  only  God  can  do  them:  "To  be  sure,  God  does 
do  them  as  the  prime,  independent,  universal  efEcient-cause;  but  his  creatures  do 
them  as  particular,  dependent,  and  secondary  efficient-causes.  Wherefore  the  com- 
mon opinion  of  theologians  and  jurists,  which  I  stated  as  my  thesis,  is  to  be  fol- 
lowed. It  is  proved,  firstly,  by  Most  Holy  Scripture:  for  there  Satan  causes  fire  to 
fall  from  Heaven  and  destroy  the  servants  and  the  flocks  of  Job;  and  he  also  causes 
violent  winds.  .  .  .  Most  Holy  Scripture  expressly  states  that  the  hail  whereby  the 
Egyptians  were  punished  was  sent  by  wicked  angels.  .  .  .  Why,  finally,  are  the 
demons  so  many  times  called  by  the  Apostle  'princes  of  the  air'?  Far  rather  because 
of  their  great  power  over  the  air!  The  same  is  confirmed  [secondly]  not  only  by 


§206  WEATHER-MAGIC  AND  WITCHCRAFT  1 33 

of  the  Devil,  can  produce  hail:^  "They  toss  pieces  of  flint  behind 
them,  towards  the  west.  Sometimes  they  throw  sand  from  river- 
bottoms  into  the  air.  Often  they  dip  a  broom  in  water  and  make  a 
sprinkUng  motion  at  the  sky.  Or  they  dig  a  httle  ditch,  fill  it  with 
water  or  urine,  and  stir  the  liquid  with  a  finger.  Then  again  they 
boil  hog-bristles  in  kettles,  or  set  boards  or  timbers  criss-cross  on  a 
river-bank.  .  .  .  Thus  they  make  believe  that  the  hail  comes  through 
their  doings,  whereas  really  it  comes  of  the  Devil,  God  permitting." 
206.  Weier  denies  that  witches  have  any  powers,  but  he  con- 
cedes that  the  Devil  has,  God  permitting.  Such  the  interpretation 
he  devised  in  striving  to  save  the  unhappy  women  who  were  being 
sent  to  the  stake.  He  may  have  taken  it  seriously  himself,  and  such 
deviousness  may  have  been  required  in  an  age  when  law  and  custom 
cramped  free  expression  of  thought.^  Few  people  went  as  far  as 

the  ancient  Law  of  the  XII  Tables  .  .  .  but  by  the  decrees  of  Emperors  and  Popes. 
It  is  confirmed  [thirdly]  by  all  those  Fathers  whom  I  have  quoted.  .  .  .  And 
fourthly,  it  is  proved  by  history  and  by  examples.  Herodotus  bears  witness  to  the 
abating  of  winds  and  a  storm  by  magicians  at  the  time  of  Xerxes.  [Not  a  word 
about  the  qualifying  remarks  of  Herodotus  (§  193).]  ...  Of  the  Finns  and  Lapps 
Olaus  [Magnus]  writes  as  follows  [Histoyia  de  gentibiis  septentrionalibus,  III,  16, 
p.  119  (Streater,  III,  15,  p.  47)]:  "In  olden  times  they  put  the  winds  up  for  sale  to 
merchants,  offering  three  knots  on  which  a  spell  had  been  cast:  untying  the  first 
they  [the  merchants]  would  get  gentle  breezes;  untying  the  second,  stronger  winds, 
and  the  third,  a  whole  gale.'  "  Just  earlier,  II,  9  (Louvain,  Vol.  I,  p.  137;  Cologne, 
p.  124),  Del  Rio  tells  the  story  of  "Eric,  King  of  the  Goths,  who  could  get  a  fair 
wind  from  any  direction  in  which  he  turned  his  fur  cap:  and  for  that  reason  he 
was  nicknamed  'Windy-Cap'  {Pileits  VentosusY'  [Magnus,  Ibid.,  Ill,  15,  p.  116; 
Streater,  III,  13,  p.  45.  In  reading  these  passages  in  Magnus,  Streater  arbitrarily 
changes  "ventitm  venalem"  to  "viniim  venalem,"  which  gives  a  different  cast  to  the 
anecdote,  the  game  with  the  knots  remaining  a  mere  trick  or  curiosity. — A.  L.] 

205  ^  De  magis,  veneficis,  et  lamiis,  II,  6,  21. 

206  ^  Histoires,  disputes  et  discours.  III,  16  (Vol.  I,  pp.  357-58) :  "Furthermore, 
those  poor  old  women  are  slyly  tricked  by  the  Devil.  For  as  soon  as  he  has  seen 
and  foreseen  some  tempest  or  change  in  the  weather  by  watching  the  movements 
of  the  elements  and  the  course  of  nature — a  thing  he  does  sooner  and  more  readily 
than  any  human  being  could;  or  as  soon  as  he  has  understood  that  someone  is  to 
receive  some  plague  by  the  hidden  will  of  God,  whereof  in  such  respects  he  is  the 
executor,  he  besets  the  minds  of  those  silly  women,  and  fills  them  with  all  sorts 
of  insane  ideas,  and  shows  them  this  or  that  opportunity  for  getting  even  with 
their  enemies,  as  by  clouding  the  sky,  stirring  up  tempests,  and  making  it  hail." 
That  rascal  of  a  Bodin,  however,  has  serious  objections  to  Weier's  theory:  De  la 
demo72omat7ie,  p.  235b:  "As  to  what  Wier  says  to  the  effect  that  witches  cannot 
cause  hail  or  thunder  of  themselves,  I  agree,  and  the  same  for  killing  people  or 


134  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §207 

Tartarotti,  who  ascribes  the  phenomena  of  witchcraft  to  natural 
forces  and  leaves  His  High-and-Mightiness,  the  Devil,  the  mere 
credit  of  foreseeing  them,  so  following  a  doctrine  that  had  been 
current  for  centuries  in  the  Christian  Church  (§213).^  But  he  too 
appeals  to  the  authority  of  Scripture,  and  judiciously  balms  the 
Holy  Inquisition  when  he  writes:  "And  here  I  could  not,  without 
blemish  of  grave  injustice,  dispense  with  paying  a  deserved  tribute  to 
the  most  revered  and  level-headed  Tribunal  of  the  Holy  Inquisition 
of  Rome,  which  on  these  matters  is  guided  by  such  moderation  and 
caution  as  unmistakably  to  manifest  the  spirit  and  motive  by  which 
it  is  inspired,  regardless  of  the  unjust  insults  and  the  groundless  com- 
plaints that  heretics  keep  hurling  at  it."  ^ 

207.  In  our  time  we  may  say  what  we  please  about  witches,  but 
not  about  sex;  and  just  as  in  days  gone  by,  whether  out  of  convic- 
tion or  from  a  desire  to  please  people  who  in  this  connection  can 
only  be  called  ignorant  fanatics,  governments  persecuted  individuals 
who  discussed  the  Bible  freely,  so  in  our  day,  and  for  similar  rea- 
sons, governments  prosecute  individuals  who  discuss  sex  without 
due  caution.  Lucretius  was  free  to  speak  his  mind  both  on  the  re- 
ligion of  the  gods  and  on  the  religion  of  sex. 

208.  In  those  days  the  heretic  was  called  a  criminal.  So  is  the  sex 
heretic  today.  To  read  what  Bodin  wrote  of  Weier  is  to  read  what 

causing  them  to  die  by  means  of  wax  images  and  incantadons.  But  what  cannot 
be  denied,  and  Wier  himself  agrees  on  that  score,  is  that  Sathan  causes  people,  ani- 
mals, and  crops  to  die,  if  God  does  not  keep  him  from  it,  and  that  that  he  does  by 
way  of  the  sacrifices,  'wishes,'  and  prayers  of  sorcerers,  with  the  just  permission  of 
God,  who  uses  His  enemies  to  get  even  with  His  enemies."  Bodin  certainly  knew 
a  great  deal  about  other  people's  business! 

206  ^  Del  congresso  nottiirno  delle  lammte,  11,  16,  7  (pp.  189-90):  "There 
seems  to  be  somewhat  more  persuasive  force  in  the  fact  that  these  individuals  boast, 
for  example,  of  raising  tempests  or  of  causing  the  death  of  this  person  or  that,  and 
that  there  are  trustworthy  witnesses  to  the  fact  that  things  afterwards  take  place 
exactly  as  they  predict.  But  that  too  can  easily  be  explained  on  the  assumption  of 
illusion,  by  saying  that  the  Devil,  in  order  to  give  his  followers  a  high  opinion  of 
his  powers,  loves  to  ascribe  natural  happenings  to  himself,  foresees  them,  and  in- 
cites witches  to  produce  them;  and  thereupon  they  occur,  not  of  his  power,  much 
less  by  the  power  of  the  witches,  but  because  they  were  destined  to  occur  according 
to  natural  course  of  nature." 

206  ^Ibid.,  I,  10,  I  (p.  63). 


§209  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 35 

Senator  Berenger  and  his  brethren  say  today  of  people  whose  minds 
are  not  as  narrow  as  their  own.^ 

209.  There  is  another  analogy  that  sheds  light  on  the  nature  of 
non-logical  behaviour.  As  we  noted  in  §  199,  interpretations  had  to 
adapt  themselves  to  popular  prejudices,  and  so  did  law  and  penal 
procedure.  The  records  of  many  many  trials  for  witchcraft  show  that 
what  happens  is  this:  public  rumour  first  designates  the  witch; 
public  frenzy  then  assails  and  persecutes  her;  finally  public  authority 
is  compelled  to  interfere.  Here  is  one  example  among  the  countless 
that  might  be  mentioned:  In  the  year  1546,  in  the  barony  of  Viry, 
a  certain  Marguerite  Moral,  wife  of  Jean  Girard,  complains  to  the 
chatelain  of  the  barony  that  certain  women  have  attacked  and  beaten 
her,  at  the  same  time  calling  her  a  witch  (hyrige).  The  chatelain 
proceeds  against  the  defendants  and  learns  from  them  that  Mar- 
guerite is  accused  of  having  caused  the  deaths  of  certain  children. 
Exactly  as  would  be  done  today,  he  investigates  in  order  to  ascertain 
whether  the  charges  made  against  Marguerite  are  true.  At  first  the 
plaintiff,  she  is  now  the  defendant!  The  charge  next  extends  to 
Marguerite's  husband.  Many  witnesses  testify  that  the  children  died, 
presumably  through  practices  by  Marguerite.  She  and  her  husband 
are  put  to  torture  and  of  course  say  whatever  they  are  asked  to  say. 
They  confess  to  intercourse  with  the  Devil,  just  as  they  would  have 
confessed  to  administering  poison,  or  anything  else.  Both  accord- 
ingly are  condemned  to  the  stake  and  burned.^ 

208  1  Op.  cit.,  p.  240b:  "So  then  we  are  asked  to  condemn  all  antiquity  as  igno- 
rant and  mistaken,  cancel  all  history,  and  draw  a  line  through  all  laws  human  and 
divine  as  false,  illusory,  and  based  on  false  principles;  and  in  place  of  all  that  set 
up  the  judgment  of  this  man  Wier  and  a  few  other  sorcerers  who  are  working 
hand  in  hand  to  establish  and  consolidate  the  empire  of  Sathan,  as  Wier  cannot 
deny,  if  he  has  not  lost  all  shame." 

209  ^  Duval,  Proces  des  sorciers  a  Viry,  pp.  88-108:  "Marguerite  [Moral]  .  .  . 
files  complaint  and  criminal  action  before  us,  Claude  Dupuis,  chatelain  of  this 
barony,  in  due  and  proper  form,  against  .  .  .  [names  of  three  women]  alleging 
that  on  the  twenty-ninth  day  of  April  at  noontime,  the  said  Marguerite  coming 
from  the  fields  from  weeding  her  beans  and  being  in  her  yard  gathering  greens, 
the  said  defendants  came  up  each  carrying  a  stick  of  wood  in  hand,  and  saying 
such  words  as  'Deceitful  witch,  you  have  got  to  go  to  Viry';  whereupon  they  began 
to  beat  the  said  plaintiff  on  her  body  with  all  their  might  and  also  ded  her  arms 
Vv'ith  a  rope  so  that  she  could  not  move."  The  defendants  are  questioned   and 


136  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §210 

210.  In  this  instance  interpretations  play  a  very  minor  role.  In 
the  forefront  stands  the  notion  that  death  can  be  inflicted  in  some 
mysterious  manner;  and  that  concept  works  primarily  on  the  minds 
of  the  plain  people.  The  judges  accept  it  too;  but  had  it  not  been 
for  the  other  notion  that  the  truth  can  be  ascertained  by  torture, 
one  could  not  be  sure  what  the  outcome  of  the  trial  would  have  been. 
In  a  word,  it  is  clearly  apparent  that  public  opinion  is  influencing 
the  judges  and  that  except  for  it  they  would  have  taken  no  action. 
So  in  our  day  governments  have  never  taken  action  against  sex 
heresy  until  after  persistent  agitation  by  that  pestilential  breed  of  , 
individuals  that  forgathers  in  societies  for  the  promotion  of  morality 
and  conventions  for  the  suppression  of  pornography;  and  our 
modern  legislators,  like  our  modern  judges,  for  the  most  part  accede 

".  .  .  declare  that  they  know  nothing,  that  they  did  in  no  way  beat  the  said  Mar- 
guerite, and  would  not  have  thought  of  doing  so.  They  confess  nevertheless  that 
they  said  and  called  her  a  witch  to  her  face,  because  many  others  so  called  her  and 
almost  everybody  who  knew  her,  especially  since,  after  the  death  of  the  child  of 
Pierre  Testu,  otherwise  known  as  Grangier,  the  said  Marguerite  had  fled,  because 
people  said  that  she  had  killed  it."  The  trial  continues,  the  chatelain  hearing  sev- 
eral witnesses.  Some  of  them  know  nothing.  Others  testify  corroborating  Mar- 
guerite's charge  that  she  had  been  beaten.  But  the  chatelain  and  his  jury  are  not 
convinced.  And  since  the  defendants  accused  of  the  assault  and  battery  "have  con- 
fessed that  they  said  and  rebuked  the  said  Marguerite  that  she  was  a  witch,  which 
is  a  very  serious  charge,"  they  order  an  investigation  by  criminal  procedure  (tor- 
ture) to  ascertain  what  truth  there  may  be  in  it.  So  Marguerite  the  plaintiff  becomes 
Marguerite  the  defendant.  Several  witnesses  are  heard.  They  mention  a  number  of 
children  who  have  died,  they  allege,  because  of  Marguerite.  One  of  them  testifies 
that  she  had  a  quarrel  with  a  certain  woman  named  Andree  "and  a  little  after  one 
of  her  children  died  and  also  a  child  of  her  brother,  Claude,  under  mysterious  cir- 
cumstances." In  our  day,  there  would  have  been  an  inquest  to  determine  whether 
any  poison  had  been  administered.  In  those  days  it  was  not  considered  necessary 
that  a  material  cause  of  death  be  shown.  "Before  the  said  children  fell  ill,  the  said 
Marguerite  walked  into  the  house  of  the  witness,  took  a  seat  in  the  middle  between 
the  cradles  of  the  said  children,  asking  the  said  Andree  if  she  had  a  place  where 
she  could  leave  certain  linen.  .  .  .  The  said  Andree  refusing,  the  said  Marguerite 
was  angry  and  wroth,  and  immediately  afterwards  the  said  children  fell  ill  and 
died" — and  the  witness  believed  for  that  reason  that  they  had  been  killed  by  Mar- 
guerite. Other  evidence  of  the  same  kind  is  brought  against  Marguerite.  One  witness 
avers  "that  that  was  her  fame  and  reputation  in  the  village  of  Vers  and  every- 
where where  she  was  known,  and  that  many  people  had  said  and  charged  to  her 
face  that  she  was  a  witch  without  her  making  any  objection  or  taking  any  [legal] 
action." 


§211  WEATHER-MAGIC  AND  WITCHCRAFT  I37 

reluctantly,  and  do  their  best  to  mitigate  at  least  the  hysterical 
frenzies  of  the  sex-reformers. 

211.  Witches  were  being  burned  as  late  as  the  eighteenth  century, 
and  in  doing  such  things  governments  and  the  Church  were  abet- 
ting popular  superstition  and  so  contributed  to  strengthening  it; 
but  they  certainly  were  not  the  authors  of  it.  Far  from  enforcing 
belief  in  such  non-logical  actions  in  the  beginning,  the  Church 
found  that  belief  forced  upon  it  and  sought  to  find  logical  interpreta- 
tions for  it.  Only  later  did  the  Church  altogether  accept  it,  with  the 
correctives  supplied  by  its  interpretations. 

A  writer  who  cannot  be  suspected  of  partiality  to  the  CathoHc 
Church  says :  "The  slight  attention  paid  in  the  thirteenth  century  by 
the  Church  to  a  crime  so  abhorrent  as  sorcery  is  proved  by  the  fact 
that  when  the  Inquisition  was  organized  it  was  for  a  considerable 
time  restrained  from  jurisdiction  over  this  class  of  offences.  In  1248 
the  Council  of  Valence,  while  prescribing  to  inquisitors  the  course 
to  be  pursued  with  heretics,  directs  sorcerers  to  be  delivered  to  the 
bishops,  to  be  imprisoned  or  otherwise  punished  [Labbe,  Vol.  XIV, 
p.  115,  cap.  12].  In  various  councils,  moreover,  during  the  next 
sixty  years  the  matter  is  alluded  to,  showing  that  it  was  constantly  be- 
coming an  object  of  increased  solicitude,  but  the  penalty  threatened 
is  only  excommunication.  In  that  of  Treves,  for  instance,  in  1310, 
which  is  very  full  in  its  description  of  the  forbidden  arts  [Labbe, 
Vol.  XIV,  pp.  1450-51,  cap.  79-84],  all  parish  priests  are  ordered  to 
prohibit  them;  but  the  penalty  proposed  for  disobedience  is  only 
withdrawal  of  the  sacraments,  to  be  followed,  in  case  of  continued 
obduracy,  by  excommunication  and  other  remedies  of  the  law  ad- 
ministered by  the  Ordinaries;  thus  manifesting  a  leniency  almost 
inexplicable.  That  the  Church,  indeed,  was  disposed  to  be  more 
rational  than  the  people  is  visible  in  a  case  occuring  in  1279  at  Ruf- 
fach,  in  Alsace,  when  a  Dominican  nun  was  accused  of  having  bap- 
tized a  waxen  image  after  the  fashion  of  those  who  desired  either 
to  destroy  an  enemy  or  to  win  a  lover.  The  peasants  carried  her  to 


138  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §212 

a  field  and  would  have  burned  her,  had  she  not  been  rescued  by 
the  friars."  ^ 

212.  People  who  see  logical  actions  everywhere  are  therefore  in 
error  when  they  blame  Catholic  theology  for  the  persecutions  of 
witches.  Such  persecutions,  incidentally,  were  as  common  among 
Protestants  as  among  Catholics.  Belief  in  magic  belongs  to  all  ages 

211  ^  Lea,  History  of  the  Inquisition,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  433-34.  Fertile  is  also  of  the 
same  opinion.  Storia  del  diritto  italiano,  Vol.  V,  pp.  447-48:  "And  the  Church  pro- 
ceeded mildly,  excommunicating  practitioners  of  magic,  subjecting  them  to  canonical 
penances.  .  .  .  Nor  did  it  abandon  that  system  even  later,  when,  in  the  thirteenth 
century,  faith  had  been  weakened  by  the  reversion  to  paganism,  and  the  spread  of 
a  neo-Manicheism  in  the  sects  of  the  Catharists  ["Perfects"]  and  the  Patarins,  and 
older  superstitions  were  coming  to  life  again  stronger  than  ever."  But  at  this  point 
the  author,  a  man  writing  in  our  day,  feels  called  upon  to  pass  judgment  on  beliefs 
that  he  terms  superstitious:  "They  were  in  truth  very  wicked  notions  not  only  in- 
volving belief  in  commerce  with  the  Devil,  in  compacts  with  him  in  exchange  for 
one's  soul,  and  in  powers  obtained  from  him  by  calling  on  his  name,  consecrating 
oneself  to  him,  worshipping  him;  but  also  involving  something  much  worse — abuse 
of  most  sacred  things."  What  this  good  soul  calls  "very  wicked,"  others  regard  as 
objectively  ridiculous  and  subjectively  pathological!  But  such  the  power  of  certain 
sentiments!  Here  we  have  a  man  who  is  not  a  churchman  writing  towards  the  end 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  but  who  seemingly  takes  pacts  with  the  Devil  seriously, 
and  calls  them  "wicked";  whereas  many  modern  theologians  are  at  least  very  scepti- 
cal, as  witness  the  Dictionnaire  encyclopedique  de  la  theologie  catholiqtie,  s.v.  Magie 
(Wetzer,  s.v.  Zattherei):  "The  main  question  ...  is  to  determine  whether  demons 
can  enter  the  special  service  of  a  human  being.  That  question  cannot  be  answered  in 
the  negative  a  priori.  .  .  .  Then  a  secondary  question  arises  as  to  the  manner  in  which 
the  relationship  of  service  between  demon  and  human  being  is  established.  Popular 
belief  answers  [both  questions]  by  assuming  that  the  Devil  can  be  'conjured  up' 
and  thereby  constrained  to  serve  the  human  being.  But  that  commonplace  fancy 
cannot  have  our  assent.  .  .  .  The  stories  that  were  so  readily  abused  in  a  day  gone 
by  in  that  connexion  .  .  .  undoubtedly  originated  in  the  boastings  or  in  the  un- 
healthy imaginations  of  self-styled  possessors  of  powers,  and  not  one  of  them  de- 
serves the  slightest  credence. 

"Another  view,  which  was  held  by  many  theologians  and  played  a  part  of  some 
importance  in  the  days  of  the  prosecutions  for  witchcraft,  held  that  the  human  being 
can  strike  a  compact  with  the  Devil  and  so  bind  him  to  certain  services.  The  nego- 
tiation of  the  contract  was  regarded  now  as  a  literal  objective  procedure,  now  as 
subjective  but  no  less  literal,  now  as  implicit,  now  as  explicit.  As  for  the  objective 
reality,  the  contract  may  be  thought  of  as  made  either  by  a  person  in  possession 
of  his  right  mind  or  by  one  in  the  sickly  condition  of  the  ecstatic.  ...  As  for  direct 
commerce  with  the  Devil  .  .  .  the  notion  is  so  vulgar  that  we  may  be  excused  from 
dwelling  on  it  longer."  The  writer  of  this  article  recognizes  that  there  may  be  such 
a  compact  in  the  ecstadc  condition:  "But  it  is  readily  apparent  that  such  a  pact  could 


§213  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 39 

and  all  peoples.  Interpretations  are  the  servants,  not  the  masters,  of 
the  thing.^ 

Other  writers,  such  as  Michelet  in  his  Sorciere,  find  the  cause  of 
the  witchcraft  superstition  in  feudalism.  But  where  was  feudalism 
when  the  Roman  Laws  of  the  XII  Tables  were  penalizing  people 
who  laid  curses  on  harvests?  When  people  were  believing  in  the 
witches  of  Thessaly?  When  Apuleius  was  being  accused  of  using 
love-philtres  to  win  the  favour  of  the  lady  he  married — not  to  men- 
tion countless  other  cases?  The  truth  is,  Michelet's  interpretation  is 
an  exact  counterpart  of  the  Christian,  except  that  the  "great  enemy" 
has  changed  his  name:  he  used  to  be  Satan;  now  he  is  Feudalism! 

213.  But  to  go  back  to  the  Christian  interpretations.  Even  grant- 
ing that  the  Devil  had  no  power  to  produce  storms,  there  was  no 
adequate  reason  for  eliminating  him  altogether  from  such  phenom- 
ena on  that  account.  He  could  be  brought  in  in  another  way  by  say- 
ing that  he  could  foresee  storms  and  therefore  predict  them.  That 
explanation  has  been  current  from  the  earliest  days  of  Christianity 
down  to  our  own.  The  idea,  in  brief,  is  that  devils  have  aerial  bodies, 
that  they  can  travel  with  great  speed,  that  being  immortal  they  have 
had  long  experience  and  can  therefore  know  and  predict  many 

not  be  a  contract  in  any  ordinary  sense.  .  .  .  Furtliermore  the  alleged  pact  may  be 
something  altogether  subjective,  as  is  the  case  with  the  lunatics  known  as  demono- 
maniacs.  In  such  cases  the  patient  imagines  he  has  concluded  a  contract  with  the 
Devil,  but  there  is  absolutely  nothing  in  reality  corresponding  to  his  illusion.  .  .  . 
As  for  ways  and  means  of  binding  a  demon  to  the  assistance  of  a  human  being  in 
the  exercise  of  magical  powers,  we  assert  that  none  such  exist,  and  that  if  the  demon 
enters  the  service  of  a  person,  he  does  so  of  his  own  accord  under  the  lure  of  the 
elective  affinity  between  his  wickedness  and  the  wickedness  of  the  person.  .  .  .  The 
Devil,  moreover,  is  not  above  the  laws  of  nature.  ...  He  can  do  nothing  that  is  not 
naturally  possible  in  itself." 

212  ^  Cauzons,  La  tnagie  et  la  sorcellerie  en  France,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  63-65:  "Of  all 
Catholic  publications,  Del  Rio's  book  was  responsible  for  more  victims  than  any 
other.  ...  I  say  Catholic,  for  the  Protestants  had  a  generous  share  in  prosecutions 
for  witchcraft.  If  it  might  be  hard  to  prove  that  they  burned  more  witches  than 
the  Catholics,  it  would  be  just  as  hard  to  prove  that  they  burned  fewer.  The  certain 
thing  is  that  persecution  of  unfortunates  called  witches  raged  violently  in  Germany 
and  England,  and  more  so  than  in  Spain  and  Italy  and  even  than  in  France,  where 
witch-burnings  were  frequent,  especially  at  certain  times  and  in  certain  localities." 


140  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §2X4 

things  in  addition  to  predicting  the  things  they  are  going  to  do 
themselves/ 

We  still  do  not  know  why  it  is  that  certain  rites  happen  to  attract 
devils.  Never  fear!  There  will  always  be  as  many  explanations  as 
are  asked  for!  St.  Augustine  imparts  that  devils  are  attracted  to 
physical  bodies  "not  as  animals  are  by  food,  but  as  spirits  are  by 
signs  compatible  with  their  pleasure  or  by  various  sorts  of  stones, 
plants,  woods,  animals,  chants,  rites."  And,  with  all  his  weighty 
authority,  St.  Thomas  agrees  that  this  is  so.^ 

214.  From  the  very  earliest  days  of  demoniacal  interpretation  one 
very  grave  question  kept  coming  up:  Could  magic  practised  with 
evil  intent  be  met  with  magic  practised  with  good  intent?  Constan- 
tine  would  permit  such  things,  but  Godefroi,  in  his  commentary, 
disapproves  of  them,  on  the  ground  that  evil  things  are  not  to  be 
done  in  order  to  achieve  legitimate  purposes.  Such  also  has  been 
the  doctrine  of  the  Church.^ 

213  ^  St.  Augustine,  De  divinatione  daemontim  {Opera,  Vol.  VI,  p.  581),  III,  7: 
"Demons  are  of  such  nature  that  with  the  senses  of  their  aerial  bodies  they  easily 
outstrip  the  senses  of  terrestrial  bodies,  and  in  view  of  the  superior  mobility  of  the 
same  aerial  bodies  they  incomparably  excel  in  speed,  let  alone  the  legs  of  any  human 
being  or  animal  whatsoever,  the  very  flight  of  birds.  Endowed  with  those  two 
things  pertaining  to  the  aerial  body,  to  wit,  sharpness  of  sense  and  swiftness  of 
motion,  they  tell  and  foretell  many  things  that  are  known  to  them  before  they  are 
perceived  by  humans  in  view  of  the  sluggishness  of  human  senses.  In  vievi^  also  of 
the  long  space  of  time  over  which  their  lives  extend,  demons  acquire  far  greater 
experience  than  can  be  acquired  in  the  short  life  of  a  human  being."  Ibid.,  V,  9:  "It 
should  also  be  pointed  out,  while  we  are  on  this  matter  of  foresight  in  demons,  that 
many  times  they  merely  predict  things  that  they  are  going  to  do  themselves."  Just 
as  the  physician  foretells  from  external  symptoms  what  the  course  of  a  disease  is  to 
be,  "so  in  the  trends  and  situations  in  the  atmosphere  that  are  known  to  him  but 
unknown  to  us,  the  demon  foresees  approaching  storms."  TertuUian,  Apologeticus, 
XXII,  10:  "From  living  in  the  air  close  to  the  stars  and  in  intercourse  with  the 
clouds,  they  have  ways  of  knowing  celestial  forecasts  {habent  .  .  .  caelestes  sapere 
paraturas),  so  that  they  predict  rains  that  they  already  know  about." 

213  2  St.  Augustine,  De  civitate  Dei,  XXI,  6,  i;  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa 
theologiae,  I^,  qu.  115,  art.  5  {Opera,  Vol.  V,  pp.  545-46:  Uirum  corpora  caelestia 
possint  imprimere  in  ipsos  daemones). 

214  ^  Codex  Theodosianus,  IX,  16,  3  (Haenel,  p.  868) :  "To  what  extent  enchant- 
ments are  prohibited  or  permitted:  The  Law  of  Constantine  the  Great:  Deservedly 
to  be  dealt  with  and  punished  by  the  severest  laws  is  the  science  of  those  individuals 
who,  armed  with  art  of  magic,  are  found  to  have  worked  {moliti,  i.e.,  moliti  esse) 
to  the  hurt  of  human  beings  or  to  have  turned  chaste  minds  to  lechery.  Not  action- 


§215  WEATHER-MAGIC  AND  WITCHCRAFT  I4I 

215.  For  that  matter,  there  are  plenty  of  legitimate  recourses,  quite 
apart  from  exorcisms  and  spiritual  exercises,  and  all  demonologists 
go  into  them  at  length.  Sprenger  and  Kramer,  for  instance,  give  the 
following  instructions  (Summers,  p.  190) :  "Against  hail  and  storms 
the  following  remedy  may  be  used  in  addition  to  the  sign  of  the 
cross  just  mentioned.  Throw  three  hail-stones  into  the  fire,  pro- 
nouncing the  name  of  the  Most  Holy  Trinity.  Follow  with  the 
Lord's  Prayer  and  the  Angelic  Salutation  repeated  two  or  three 
times.  Then  follow  with  In  principio  erat  Verbum  from  the  Gos- 
pel according  to  St.  John,  making  the  sign  of  the  cross  against  the 
storm  in  all  directions,  backwards,  forwards,  and  to  the  cardinal 
points;  then,  to  conclude,  repeat  three  times  Verbum  caro  factum 
est,  and  say  three  times,  'In  the  name  of  this  Gospel,  let  this  storm 
cease.'  Whereupon  it  subsides  forthwith — provided  it  has  been 
caused  by  witchcraft.  These  are  held  to  be  very  sound  practices  and 
above  suspicion  [of  heresy].  But  if  one  throw  hail-stones  into  the 
fire  without  invoking  the  divine  Name,  the  action  is  held  super- 
stitious. If  one  should  ask,  'Cannot  the  storm  be  quelled  without 
hail-stones?'  the  answer  is,  'Certainly,  by  using  holy  words  in  greater 
profusion.'  In  throwing  the  hail-stones  into  the  fire  the  idea  is  merely 
to  annoy  the  Devil  while  one  is  getting  ready  to  undo  his  work  by 
calling  on  the  name  of  the  Most  Holy  Trinity.  It  is  better  to  throw 
them  into  fire  than  into  water;  for  the  sooner  they  melt,  the  sooner 
is  his  work  undone.  Nevertheless  the  outcome  is  all  in  the  hands  of 
the  Divine  Will."  ^  More  gibberish  follows  on  the  ways  in  which  a 

able  by  any  prosecution,  however,  are  remedies  sought  for  human  bodies,  nor  those 
rites  which  are  practised  {adhibita  stiff ragia)  in  good  intent  in  rural  districts  to 
allay  fear  of  storms  for  the  ripened  vintage  or  damage  from  stoning  by  falling  hail, 
such  rites  injuring  no  one  in  health  or  reputation  and,  if  successful  {quorum  actus), 
serving  only  to  prevent  ruination  of  the  gifts  of  God  (diciiia  muiiem)  and  the 
labours  of  men."  The  same  law  appears  in  the  Codex  Justiniani,  IX,  18,  4  {Corpus 
iuris  civilis,  Vol.  II,  p.  595;  Scott,  Vol.  XV,  p.  32).  This  enactment  was  abrogated 
by  the  Emperor  Leo,  Novellae,  65,  Ad  Stylianum,  De  incantatorum  poena  {Corpus 
iuris  civilis  accademicum  Parisiense,  p.  1151;  Scott,  Vol.  XVII,  p.  262). 

215  '^Malleus  maleficarum,  Pars  II,  quaestio  2,  cap.  7  (Summers,  p.  188):  "As  to 
remedies  against  hail  and  lightning,  and  for  spells  cast  upon  catde."  The  Malleus 
mentions  other  remedies  besides.  On  being  asked  by  a  judge  (Summers,  p.  190) 
"whether  hail-storms  caused  by  witchcraft  could  be  abated  in  any  way,"  a  witch 


142  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §2l6 

hail-Storm  can  be  caused  or  prevented.  Del  Rio  lists  numberless  rem- 
edies, natural  and  supernatural,  legitimate  and  illegitimate,  whereby 
the  mischief  of  witchcraft  can  be  averted. 

216.  Here  we  can  stop,  not  for  lack  of  material,  for  of  that  there 
is  enough  to  fill  a  good-sized  library;  but  because  what  we  have  so 

f'  far  said  suffices  to  show  the  essential  traits  of  the  family  of  facts  that 
;   we  have  been  examining,  just  as  a  certain  number  of  plants  suffice 
to  show  the  characteristics  of  the  family  of  Papilionaceae.^ 

217.  The  study  just  completed  clearly  shows  the  presence  of  the 
following  characteristics  in  the  family  of  facts  considered  (§  514^): 

1.  There  is  a  non-logical  nucleus  containing,  in  simple  compound, 
certain  acts,  certain  words,  that  have  specified  effects,  such  as  hur- 
ricanes or  destruction  of  crops. 

2.  From  this  nucleus  a  number  of  branches,  a  number  of  logical 
interpretations,  radiate.  It  is  impossible  not  to  observe  that  in  general 
interpretations  are  devised  for  no  other  reason  than  to  account  for 
the  fact  that  storms  can  be  raised  or  quelled,  crops  protected  or  de- 
stroyed. Only  in  cases  altogether  exceptional  is  the  opposite  observ- 
able— the  case,  that  is,  where  the  logical  theory  leads  to  the  belief 
in  the  fact.  Interpretations  are  not  always  clearly  distinguished  from 
one  another ;  they  often  interlock,  so  that  the  person  accepting  them 
may  not  himself  know  exactly  what  share  is  to  be  credited  to  each. 

replied:  "They  can,  and  in  the  following  manner:  'O  hail,  O  winds,  I  abjure  you 
by  the  five  wounds  of  Christ,  and  by  the  three  nails  that  pierced  His  hands  and 
feet,  and  by  the  four  Holy  Evangelists,  Matthew,  Mark,  Luke,  and  John,  that  ye 
melt  into  water  ere  ye  fall.'  "  The  Malleus  also  mentions  the  time-honoured  cus- 
tom of  ringing  bells.  In  our  time  bells  have  been  replaced  by  "hail-cannon,"  with 
quite  as  good  results. 

216  ^  We  shall  have  to  prosecute  many  other  investigations  of  this  kind;  we  shall, 
that  is,  be  called  upon  to  examine  many  families  of  facts  in  order  to  find  in  each  the 
elements  that  are  constant  and  the  elements  that  are  variable,  and  then  to  classify 
them,  dividing  them  off  into  orders,  classes,  genera,  species,  precisely  as  the  botanist 
does.  In  this  case  I  have  thought  it  wise  to  set  before  the  reader  by  way  of  illus- 
tration by  no  means  a  large,  but  at  the  same  time  a  fairly  appreciable,  fraction  of 
the  facts  that  I  have  examined  in  arriving  at  the  conclusions  stated.  Lack  of  space 
will  prevent  me  from  continuing  to  do  that  for  all  of  the  other  investigations  we 
shall  have  to  make.  The  reader  must  bear  in  mind  that  I  mention  in  these  vol- 
umes only  a  small,  oftentimes  a  very  very  small,  pordon  of  the  evidence  I  have 
considered  in  making  the  inductions  that  I  present. 


§217  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 43 

3.  Logical  interpretations  assume  the  forms  that  are  most  gen- 
erally prevalent  in  the  ages  in  which  they  are  evolved.  They  are 
comparable  to  the  styles  of  costume  worn  by  people  in  the  periods 
corresponding. 

4.  There  is  no  direct  evolution,  such  as  is  represented  in  Figure  5. 
Evolution  takes  the  form  shown  in  Figure  6.  The  pure  non-logical 


Figure  5 


Figure  6 


C 


action  has  not  been  transmuted  into  an  action  of  logical  form.  It  is 
carried  along  with  the  other  actions  that  are  derived  from  it.  It  is 
impossible  to  determine  just  how  the  transformation  has  taken  place 
— for  example,  trying  to  establish  that  from  the  mere  association  of 
acts  and  facts  (fetishism)  people  went  on  to  a  theological  interpre- 
tation, then  to  a  metaphysical  interpretation,  then  to  a  positive  in- 
terpretation. There  is  no  such  succession  in  time.  Interpretations  that 
might  be  called  fetishistic,  magical,  experimental,  or  pseudo-ex- 
perimental are  moreover  often  mixed  in  together  in  such  a  way  that 
they  cannot  be  separated,  and  very  probably  the  individual  who 
accepts  them  would  not  be  able  to  separate  them  either.  He  knows 
that  certain  acts  must  have  certain  consequences,  and  he  does  not 
care  to  go  beyond  that  and  see  how  it  all  comes  about.  | 

5.  In  the  long  run,  to  be  sure,  degrees  of  enlightenment  in  people 
generally  have  their  influence  on  the  non-logical  conduct  in  ques- 
tion, but  there  is  no  constant  correlation  in  that  respect.  The  Romans 
burned  neither  witches  nor  magicians,  yet  they  were  undoubtedly 
inferior  in  scientific  development  to  the  Italians,  the  French,  the 
Germans,  and  so  on,  of  the  seventeenth  century,  who  killed  sorcerers 


144  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §21 8 

in  large  numbers.  So,  also,  towards  the  end  of  the  twelfth  century 
and  the  beginning  of  the  thirteenth,  those  unfortunates  were  not 
persecuted  at  all,  though  beyond  all  doubt  that  age  was  far  inferior 
to  the  seventeenth  century  in  intellectual  and  scientific  development. 

6.  Belief  in  the  non-logical  conduct  was  not  imposed  by  logical 
device  of  the  Church,  of  governments,  or  of  anybody  else.  It  was 
the  non-logical  conduct  that  forced  acceptance  of  the  logical  the- 
ories as  explanations  of  itself.  That  does  not  mean  that  such  theories 
may  not  in  their  turn  have  stimulated  the  belief  in  the  non-logical 
V  conduct,  and  even  may  have  given  rise  to  it  in  places  where  it  had 
not  existed  previously.  This  last  induction  puts  us  in  the  way  of 
understanding  how  other  things  of  the  kind  may  have  come  about 
and  how  we  may  be  mistaken  when,  knowing  non-logical  actions 
only  under  their  logical  coating,  we  give  the  logical  aspect  an  im- 
portance that  it  does  not  really  possess. 

218.  All  the  many  cases  we  have  examined  in  connexion  with 
storms  had  something  in  common,  something  constant:  the  feeling 
that  there  are  certain  means  by  which  storms  can  be  influenced. 
There  is  besides  a  differing,  a  variable,  element — the  means  them- 
selves, and  the  reasons  given  for  using  them.  The  first  element  is 
evidently  the  more  important;  so  long  as  it  is  there,  people  experi- 
ence little  or  no  difficulty  in  finding  the  other.  It  might  well  be, 
therefore,  that  as  regards  determining  the  form  of  society,  elements 
similar  to  the  constant  element  just  discovered  are  of  greater  im- 
portance than  the  other,  the  variable  elements.  For  the  present  we 
cannot  decide  the  matter.  Induction  is  simply  pointing  out  to  us 
one  road  that  we  shall  find  it  advisable  to  explore. 

As  often  happens  with  the  inductive  method,  we  have  found  not 
only  the  thing  we  were  looking  for,  but  another  thing  that  we  were 
not  in  the  least  expecting.  We  set  out  to  discover  how  non-logical 
actions  come  to  assume  logical  forms,  and  by  going  thoroughly  into 
a  special  case,  we  have  seen  how  that  happens.  But  we  have  seen,  in 
addition,  that  such  phenomena  have  an  element  which  is  constant, 
or  almost  constant,  and  another  element  which  is  very  variable.  Now 
science  looks  for  constant  elements  in  phenomena  in  order  to  get  at 


I 


§219  CONSTANTS  AND  VARIABLES  1 45 

uniformities.  We  shall  therefore  have  to  make  a  special  study  of 
these  different  elements — and  that  we  shall  do  in  chapters  follow- 
ing (§182^). 

219.  Meanwhile,  other  inductions  loom  before  us,  not  yet  as  asser- 
tions, since  they  have  been  derived  from  too  few  facts,  but  rather  as 
propositions  that  we  must  verify  as  we  extend  the  scope  of  our  re- 
searches : 

I.  If  for  a  moment  we  consider  the  facts  strictly  from  the  logico- 
experimental  standpoint,  the  policy  of  the  Church  with  reference 
to  magic  is  simply  insane,  and  all  those  stories  of  devils  are  ridicu- 
lously childish.  That  much  granted,  there  are  people  who  infer  from 
the  premises  that  the  religion  of  the  Church  is  equally  unsound  and 
is  therefore  detrimental  to  society.  Can  we  accept  that  inference  ?  It 
is  to  be  noted,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  argument  avails  not  only 
for  Catholicism  but  for  all  religions,  indeed  for  all  systems  of  meta- 
physics— for  everything,  in  fact,  that  is  not  logico-experimental 
science.  It  is  impossible  to  concur  in  that  opinion  and  regard  as 
absurd  the  greater  part  of  the  lives  of  all  human  societies  that  have 
existed  down  to  our  time.  Furthermore,  if  everything  that  is  not 
logical  is  detrimental  to  society  and  therefore  to  the  individual  also, 
we  ought  not  to  find  instances  such  as  we  have  observed  among 
animals  (and  are  going  to  observe  among  human  beings)  in  which 
certain  non-logical  behaviour  proves  beneficial,  and  even  to  a  very 
high  degree.  Since  the  inferences  are  wrong,  the  reasoning  must 
also  be  wrong.  Where  is  the  error? 

The  complete  syllogisms  would  be:  a.  Any  doctrine  of  which  a 
part  is  absurd  is  absurd;  that  part  of  the  Church's  doctrine  which 
deals  with  magic  is  absurd;  therefore,  etc.  b.  Any  doctrine  that  is 
not  logico-experimental  is  detrimental  to  society;  the  doctrine  of 
the  Church  is  not  logico-experimental;  therefore,  etc.  The  proposi- 
tions that  probably  falsify  these  syllogisms  are:  a.  Any  doctrine 
of  which  a  part  is  absurd  is  absurd,  b.  Any  doctrine  that  is  not 
logico-experimental  is  detrimental  to  society.  We  must  therefore 
examine  those  propositions  closely  and  see  whether  they  do,  or 
do  not,  correspond  to  the  facts.  But  in  order  to  do  that,  we  must 


146  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §220 

first  have  a  theory  of  doctrines  and  of  their  influence  on  individuals 
and  society;  and  that  is  something  that  we  are  to  attend  to  in  the 
chapters  next  following  (§  14). 

2.  The  questions  just  asked  in  connexion  with  doctrines  also  arise 
in  connexion  with  individual  human  beings.  If  we  consider  the  con- 
duct of  individuals  from  the  logico-experimental  standpoint,  no 
name  but  "idiot"  describes  the  man  who  wrote  the  absurdities  with 
which  Bodin  stuffs  his  Demonomanie.  And  if  we  consider  such  con- 
duct from  the  standpoint  of  the  good  or  evil  done  to  others,  dic- 
tionaries supply  only  synonyms  of  "murderer"  and  "knave"  for  in- . 
dividuals  who  as  a  result  of  such  idiocies  have  inflicted  the  cruelest 
sufferings  upon  many  many  human  beings,  and  brought  not  a  few 
of  them  to  death. 

But  we  at  once  observe  that  reasoning  in  that  way  we  are  extend- 
ing to  the  whole  what  in  reality  applies  only  to  the  part.  There  are 
examples  a-plenty  to  show  that  a  man  may  be  unbalanced  in  some 
things,  level-headed  in  others;  dishonest  in  some  of  his  dealings, 
upright  in  others.  From  that  conflict  two  errors  arise,  equivalent  in 
origin,  different  in  appearances.  Both  the  following  propositions  are 
false — equally  false:  "Bodin  has  talked  like  a  fool  and  done  great 
harm  to  his  fellow-men;  therefore  Bodin  is  an  idiot  and  a  rascal"; 
"Bodin  was  an  intelligent  and  honest  man;  therefore  the  things  he 
writes  in  his  Detnonomanie  are  sound  and  his  conduct  is  exem- 
plary." We  see  by  that  that  we  cannot  judge  the  logico-experimental 
value  and  the  utility  of  a  doctrine  by  a  facile  consideration  of  the 
reputability  of  its  author;  that  we  must,  instead,  travel  the  rough 
and  thorny  path  of  studying  it  directly  on  the  facts.  And  there  we 
are  back  again  at  the  conclusion  that  will  be  reached  by  an  examina- 
tion of  doctrines  themselves  (§§  1434 f.).  All  that  we  shall  go  into 
thoroughly  later  on.  For  the  moment  let  us  continue  looking  over 
the  general  field  of  non-logical  conduct. 

220.  Worthy  of  some  attention  is  the  logical  form  that  the  Romans 
gave  to  their  relations  with  the  gods.  In  general  it  is  the  form  of  a 
definite  and  unequivocal  contract  that  is  to  be  interpreted  according 
to  the  rules  of  law.  If  we  stopped  at  that,  we  should  see  in  the  fact 


§221  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 47 

a  mere  manifestation  of  what  has  been  called  the  legal-mindedness 
of  the  Romans.  But  similar  facts  are  observable  among  all  peoples. 
Even  in  our  day  the  devout  chambermaid  who  promises  a  few  pen- 
nies to  St.  Anthony  of  Padua  if  he  helps  her  to  get  back  something 
she  has  lost  is  acting  toward  that  saint  exactly  as  the  Romans  acted 
towards  their  gods.  What  distinguishes  the  Romans,  rather,  is  the 
wealth  and  precision  of  detail,  the  subordination  of  substance  to 
form — in  a  word,  the  powerful  cohesion  of  one  act  with  other  acts. 
And  in  that  we  glimpse  a  manifestation  of  the  psychic  state  of  the . 
Romans. 

221.  The  Athenian  Plato  takes  no  interest  in  these  associations  of 
ideas  and  facts  which  disincline  people  to  separate  facts  logically.  In 
the  Euthyphro  (17)  he  scorns  the  notion  that  sanctity  can  be  re- 
garded as  the  science  of  begging  things  of  the  gods.^  For  the  Ro- 
mans, and  especially  for  Roman  statesmen,  the  whole  science  of  the 
relations  of  gods  and  men  lay  in  just  that.  It  was  a  difficult  science. 
One  had  first  to  know  to  just  what  divinity  to  turn  in  a  given  emer- 
gency, and  then  to  know  its  exact  name.  And  since  there  might  be 
doubts  on  such  points,  there  were  formulae  for  getting  around  the 
difficulty — for  example,  "]upiter  Optime  Maxime,  sive  quo  alio 
nomine  te  appelari  volueris" — "Jupiter,  Greatest  and  Best,  or  what 
ever  you  prefer  to  be  called  .  .  ."  ^ 

221  ^Socrates  speaking  (Fowler,  p.  55):  "According  to  that  definition,  holiness 
would  be  the  science  of  asking  and  giving."  That,  substantially,  was  the  opinion  of  a 
great  number  of  Greeks.  We  have  already  said  that  the  difference  between  Athens 
and  Rome  lies  more  in  the  intensity  of  certain  sentiments  than  in  their  substance. 

221  ^  Macrobius,  Saturnalia,  II,  9:  "It  seems  that  all  cities  are  protected  by  certain 
gods;  and  it  was  a  secret  custom  of  the  Romans,  unknown  to  many,  that  when  they 
besieged  an  enemy  city  and  thought  they  were  on  the  point  of  conquering  it,  they 
'called  forth'  its  tutelary  gods  with  a  certain  ritual.  For  otherwise  they  did  not  think 
it  possible  to  take  the  city,  or,  had  it  been,  they  thought  it  impious  to  make  captives 
of  gods.  For  the  same  reason,  the  Romans  were  careful  that  the  name  of  the  patron 
god  of  Rome  should  remain  secret,  and  even  the  Latin  name  of  the  city."  Macrobius 
then  gives  a  formula  for  addressing  the  gods  of  a  besieged  city  and  another  for 
consecrating  cities  and  armies  after  worshipping  such  gods.  But  he  cautions  that 
only  dictators  and  generals-in-chief  could  use  them  effectively:  "Dis,  the  Father, 
Veiovis,  Manes,  or  by  whatever  other  name  it  is  proper  to  address  thee  .  .  ."  The 
words  of  the  formula  had  to  be  punctuated  by  specified  acts:  "When  he  says 
'Earth,'  he  touches  the  earth  with  his  hands.  When  he  says  'Jove,'  he  raises  his 


148  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §222 

222.  Aulus  Gellius,  Noctes  Atticae,  II,  28,  2,  remarks  that  no  one 
knew  what  divinity  to  invoke  in  case  of  an  earthquake — a  most 
serious  embarrassment.  So  "the  ancient  Romans,  who  in  all  the 
duties  of  life  and  especially  in  anything  touching  religious  observ- 
ance and  the  immortal  gods  were  very  scrupulous  and  circumspect, 
proclaimed  public  holidays  whenever  they  experienced  an  earth- 
quake or  heard  of  one.  But  they  refrained  from  naming  the  god,  as 
their  custom  was,  in  whose  honour  the  festivities  were  held  in  order 
that  they  might  not  bind  the  people  to  a  mistaken  rite  by  naming 
the  wrong  god." 

223.  When  wine  was  offered  to  a  divinity,  one  had  to  say,  "Accept 
this  wine  which  I  hold  in  my  hands."  These  last  words  were  added 
to  avoid  any  possible  misunderstanding,  and  the  mistake  in  par- 
ticular of  offering  the  divinity  by  inadvertence  all  the  wine  in  one's 
cellar.^  "It  is  one  of  the  principles  of  augural  doctrine  that  impreca- 
tions and  auspices  of  whatever  kind  have  no  value  for  those  who, 
in  starting  out  .on  an  enterprise,  declare  they  attach  no  importance 
to  them;  the  which  is  one  of  the  greatest  bounties  of  divine  gracious- 
hands  towards  heaven.  When  he  is  acknowledging  a  vow,  he  touches  his  breast  with 
his  hands."  Such  things  would  be  ridiculous  if  the  idea  were  merely  to  make  the 
gods  understand.  They  are  rational  if  words  and  gestures  have  an  efficacy  of  their 
own.  Virgil,  Aeneid,  II,  v.  351:  "The  shrines  and  altars  were  deserted,  for  all  the 
gods  had  gone  away."  And  Servius  annotates  (Thilo-Hagen,  Vol.  I,  p.  277) :  "Be- 
cause, before  the  storming  [of  a  city]  the  gods  were  'called  forth'  by  the  enemy 
that  sacrilege  might  be  avoided.  That  is  why  the  Romans  would  never  let  it  be 
known  under  the  tutelage  of  just  what  god  the  Urbs  abided  and  the  law  of  the 
pontiffs  cautioned  that  the  Roman  gods  should  not  be  addressed  by  name  lest  they 
be  tampered  with  (exaugurari) .  And  on  the  Capitol  there  was  a  consecrated  shield 
with  the  inscription:  Geiiio  Urbis  Romae  sive  mas  sive  joemina  (whether  male  or 
female).  And  the  pontiffs  prayed  as  follows:  'Jupiter  Optime  Maxime — or  whatever 
you  prefer  to  be  called;  and  he  [Virgil]  himself  says,  Aeneid,  IV,  vv.  'yj6-jj: 
'Thee  we  follow,  holiest  of  gods,  whoever  thou  art.'  " 

223  1  Arnobius,  Disptitationes  adversus  gentes,  VII,  31  (Bryce-Campbell,  p.  340). 
J.  C.  Orelli,  the  editor  of  Arnobius,  annotates  (Vol.  II,  p.  433):  "In  making  an 
offering  [to  the  gods]  the  ancients  chose  their  words  cautiously  and  exactly  and 
always  appended  qualifications  {leges)  and  conditions  explicitly,  lest  they  should 
bind  themselves  by  some  tacit  obligadon;  and  this  is  evident  from  not  a  few  in- 
scriptions." He  gives  an  example. 


1 


§224  ROMAN  DIVINATION  1 49 

ness." "  All  that  seems  ridiculous  if  one  is  disposed  to  argue  the  sub- 
stance in  logical  terms.  But  it  becomes  rational  if  we  premise  certain 
associations  of  acts  and  ideas.  If  the  sting  of  a  scorpion  is  really  to 
be  avoided  by  pronouncing  the  number  2  (§  182),  is  it  not  evident 
that  when  one  comes  upon  an  insect  and  would  avoid  its  sting,  one 
must  first  know  exactly  whether  it  is  a  scorpion  or  not,  and  then 
the  number  that  has  to  be  pronounced  .^^  If  it  is  the  act  more  than 
anything  else  that  counts,  obviously  when  one  is  offering  wine  to  a 
divinity  one  must  do  exactly  the  right  thing  and  not  some  other 
thing.  In  any  event  all  such  ratiocination,  whatever  its  value,  oc- 
curred a  posteriori  to  justify  conduct  in  itself  non-logical. 

224.  Systems  of  divination  in  Rome  and  Athens  differed  no  less 
than  religions,  and  the  differences  lay  in  the  same  direction.  Roman 
divination^  was  confined  to  "a  simple  question,  always  the  same, 
and  relating  strictly  to  the  present  or  to  the  immediate  future.  The 
question  might  be  formulated  thus:  'Do  the  gods  favour,  or  not 
favour,  the  thing  that  the  consultant  is  about  to  do,  or  which  is  about 
to  be  done  under  his  auspices?'  The  question  admits  only  of  the 
alternatives  'yes'  or  'no'  and  recognizes  only  positive  or  negative 
signs.  ...  As  for  the  methods  of  divination  prescribed  by  the 
augural  ritual,  they  were  as  simple  and  as  few  in  number  as  possible. 
Observation  of  birds  was  the  basis  of  it;  and  it  would  have  remained 
the  only  source  of  auspices  had  not  the  prestige  of  the  fulgural  art 
of  the  Etruscans  influenced  the  Romans  to  'observe  the  sky'  and  even 
to  attribute  a  higher  significance  to  the  mysterious  phenomena  of 
lightning.  Official  divination  knew  neither  oracles,  nor  lots,  nor  the 
inspection  of  entrails.  It  refused  to  become  involved  in  the  discus- 
sion and  appraisal  of  fortuitous  signs,  taking  account  of  them  only 

223  2  Pliny,  Historia  naturalis,  XXVIII,  4  (2)  (Bostock-Riley,  Vol.  V,  p.  281). 
Cicero  no  longer  understands  these  associations  of  ideas.  In  De  dtvinatiotie,  II,  36,  78, 
he  says,  speaking  of  Marcus  Marcellus:  "He  used  to  say  that  whenever  he  was  en- 
gaged on  business  of  importance  he  made  it  his  habit  to  travel  in  a  covered  litter, 
so  as  not  to  be  interfered  with  by  omens.  That  is  very  much  like  what  we  augurs 
do  when  we  advise  that  all  oxen  about  be  ordered  unyoked,  in  order  to  prevent 
'marred  omens'  [by  both  oxen  in  a  yoked  pair  dunging  at  the  same  time]." 

224  ^  Bouche-Leclercq,  Histoire  de  la  divination  dans  I'antiqtiite,  Vol.  IV,  p.  176. 


150  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §225 

as  they  occurred  in  the  taking  of  auspices.  With  all  the  more  reason 
it  refrained  from  interpreting  prodigies." 

225.  What  the  Romans  could  not  find  at  home,  they  sought 
abroad  in  Greece  and  Etruria,  where  a  freer  imagination  was  creat- 
ing new  forms  of  divination.  In  the  importance  attached  to  the  plain 
association  of  acts  and  ideas  we  must  seek  the  explanation  of  one  of 
the  most  extraordinary  rules  of  Roman  divination,  the  rule  giving 
a  counterfeit  augury  the  same  efficacy  as  a  sign  that  had  actually 
been  observed.  "He  [the  augur]  could  .  .  .  rest  content  with  the 
first  sign,  if  it  was  favourable,  or  let  unfavourable  signs  pass  and 
wait  for  better  ones.  Then  again,  he  could  have  the  assistant  augur 
'renounce,'  that  is,  'announce,'  that  the  expected  birds  were  flying  or 
singing  in  the  manner  desired — a  practice,  in  fact,  more  trustworthy 
and  which  later  became  the  regular  procedure.  This  announcement, 
the  renuntiatio,  made  according  to  a  sacramental  formula,  created 
an  'ominal  auspice'  equivalent,  for  the  purposes  of  the  individual 
hearing  it,  to  a  real  auspice."  ^ 

225  ^  Ibid.,  p.  202.  The  same  writer  gives  the  following  version  of  the  ritual  used 
at  Iguvium,  pp.  170-71:  "The  augur's  assistant  speaking  from  his  station  will  pro- 
pose as  follows  to  the  augur:  'I  stipulate  that  you  are  to  watch — a  hawk  on  the 
right,  a  raven  on  the  right,  a  woodpecker  on  the  left,  a  magpie  on  the  left,  birds  in 
flight  on  the  left,  birds  singing  on  the  left,  being  omens  favourable  to  me.'  The 
augur  will  stipulate  as  follows:  'I  will  watch — a  hawk  on  the  right,  a  raven  on  the 
right,  a  woodpecker  on  the  left,  birds  in  flight  on  the  left  and  birds  singing  on  the 
left,  being  favourable  to  me  on  behalf  of  the  people  of  Iguvium  in  this  pardcular 
temple.'  "  Cicero,  De  divinatione ,  II,  33,  71 :  "As  regards  fictitious  signs  taken  as 
auspices  {tit  sint  auspicia  quae  nulla  sunt)  those  certainly  which  are  customary  with 
us,  whether  by  the  feeding  of  chickens  or  by  lighming  {de  caelo),  are.  mock-auguries 
{simulacra  auspiciorum)  and  in  no  sense  real  ones."  And  continuing,  34,  71: 
"  'Quintus  Fabius,  I  beg  you  to  be  my  augur.'  And  he  answers:  'Gladly!'  With  our 
forefathers,  an  expert  was  used  for  such  purposes — nowadays  anybody  will  do. 
However,  it  does  take  an  expert  to  know  what  'silence'  is — 'silence'  being  the  name 
given  in  the  taking  of  auguries  to  the  circumstance  where  there  is  no  trace  of 
blemish.  It  is  the  test  of  the  perfect  augur  to  be  able  to  determine  that.  When  the 
augur  says  to  his  assistant,  'Tell  me  whether  there  seems  to  be  silence,'  the  assistant 
does  not  look  up,  he  does  not  look  around — he  answers  blithely  {statim):  'There 
seems  to  be  silence.'  Then  the  augur:  'Tell  me  if  they  are  eating.'  'They  are  eating.'  " 
Livy,  Ab  urbe  condita,  X,  40,  ir,  records  an  instance  where  an  augury,  though  in- 
vented, was  taken  as  favourable  from  the  simple  fact  of  being  "renounced."  The 
consul  Papirius  is  informed  by  his  nephew,  a  pious  lad,  that  his  auspices  have  been 
fraudulendy  reported.  Papirius  replies:  "Blessings  on  you  for  your  conscientiousness 


§226  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  I5I 

226.  The  Romans  dealt  with  substance  according  to  their  con- 
venience, at  the  same  time  paying  strict  regard  to  forms,  or  better, 
to  certain  associations  of  ideas  and  acts.  The  Athenians  modified 
both  substance  and  forms.  The  Spartans  were  loath  to  change  either. 
Before  the  Battle  of  Marathon  the  Athenians  appealed  to  Sparta  for 
assistance.  "The  Spartan  authorities  readily  promised  their  aid,  but 
unfortunately  it  was  now  the  ninth  day  of  the  moon :  an  ancient  law 
or  custom  forbade  them  to  march,  in  this  month  at  least,  during  the 
last  quarter  before  the  full  moon;  but  after  the  full  they  engaged 
to  march  without  delay.  Five  days'  delay  at  this  critical  moment 
might  prove  the  utter  ruin  of  the  endangered  city;  yet  the  reason 
assigned  seems  to  have  been  no  pretence  on  the  part  of  the  Spartans. 
It  was  mere  blind  tenacity  of  ancient  habit,  which  we  shall  find  to 
abate,  though  never  to  disappear,  as  we  advance  in  their  history."  ^ 

The  Athenians  would  have  changed  both  substance  and  form. 
The  Romans  changed  substance,  respecting  form.  In  order  to  make 
a  declaration  of  war  a  member  of  the  college  of  Heralds  (Feciales) 
had  to  hurl  a  spear  into  the  territory  of  the  enemy.  But  how  per- 
form the  rite  and  declare  war  on  Pyrrhus  when  that  king's  states 
were  so  far  away  from  Rome?  Nothing  simpler!  The  Romans  had 
captured  a  soldier  of  Pyrrhus.  They  had  him  buy  a  plot  of  ground 
in  the  Flaminian  Circus,  and  the  herald  hurled  his  spear  upon  that 

and  virtue!  But  if  the  augur  makes  a  false  announcement,  the  responsibility  to  the 
gods  rests  with  him.  I  have  the  report  that  the  corn  danced  [when  the  chickens  re- 
fused to  eat  it]  and  that  is  a  first-class  omen  for  this  army  and  for  the  Roman 
People!" 

226  1  Grote,  History  of  Greece,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  341-42.  Ibid.,  Vol.  VII,  pp.  66-67:  The 
Argives  took  advantage  of  these  traits  in  their  neighbours,  the  Spartans.  At  the  time 
of  the  war  against  Epidaurus,  while  the  Spartans  were  sitting  inactive  for  the 
whole  month  called  Karneios,  the  Argives  arbitrarily  decreed  the  month  shortened 
by  four  days  and  opened  hostilities  (Thucydides,  Historiae,  V,  54,  3-4).  [Smith,  Vol. 
Ill,  p.  107:  "The  Argives  set  out  on  the  twenty-seventh  of  the  month  preceding  the 
Carneion,  and  continuing  to  observe  that  day  during  the  whole  time,  invaded  Epi- 
daurus and  proceeded  to  ravish  it." — A.  L.]  On  another  occasion,  they  instituted 
a  fictitious  month  of  Karneios  to  keep  the  Lacedaemonians  quiet.  Knowing  that  he 
was  to  lead  the  Spartan  army  against  Argos,  Agesipolis  went  to  Olympia  and  Delphi 
for  an  opinion  as  to  whether  he  was  bound  to  grant  a  truce.  He  was  told  that  he 
was  at  liberty  to  refuse  one  (Xenophon,  Hellenica,  IV,  7,  2;  Brownson,  Vol.  I, 
PP-  347-49)- 


152  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §227 

property.  So  the  feeling  in  the  Roman  people  that  there  was  a  close 
connexion  between  a  hurled  spear  and  a  just  war  was  duly  re- 
spected." 

227.  Ancient  Roman  law  presents  the  same  traits  that  are  observ- 
able in  religion  and  divination;  and  that  tends  to  strengthen  our 
impression  that  it  must  be  a  question  of  an  intrinsic  characteristic 
of  the  Roman  mind  asserting  itself  in  the  various  branches  of  human 
activity.  Furthermore,  in  Roman  law,  as  in  Roman  religion  and 
divination,  there  are  qualitative  differences  that  come  out  in  any 
I  comparison  with  Athens.  Says  Von  Jhering,'^  "The  written  word 
or  the  word  pronounced  under  circumstances  of  solemnity — the 
formula — strikes  primitive  peoples  as  something  mysterious,  and 
faith  itself  ascribes  supernatural  powers  to  it.  Nowhere  has  faith  in 
the  word  been  stronger  than  in  ancient  Rome.  Respect  for  the  word 
permeates  all  relationships  in  public  and  private  life  and  in  religion, 
custom,  and  law.  For  the  ancient  Roman  the  word  is  a  power — it 
binds  and  it  loosens.  If  it  cannot  move  mountains,  it  can  at  least 
transfer  a  crop  of  grain  from  one  man's  field  to  a  neighbour's.  It 
can  'call  forth'  divinities  {devocare)  and  induce  them  to  abandon  a 
besieged  city  {evocatio  deorum).'' 

226  -  Servius,  In  Vergilii  Aeneidem,  IX,  v.  52  (Thilo-Hagen,  Vol.  II,  pp.  315-16) : 
"Thirty-three  days  after  service  of  the  demands  upon  the  enemy,  the  College  of 
Feciales  sent  their  spear.  But  in  the  case  of  (lemporibiis)  Pyrrhus  the  Romans  were 
to  make  war  on  a  power  overseas,  and  they  could  find  no  place  to  celebrate  the 
ceremony  of  a  declaration  of  war  by  the  Feciales.  They  accordingly  arranged  for  a 
soldier  of  Pyrrhus  to  be  captured,  and  caused  him  to  buy  a  plot  of  ground  in  the 
Flaminian  Circus,  that  they  might  comply  with  the  rite  of  declaring  war  on  hostile 
territory.  Then  a  column  was  erected  on  the  spot  at  the  foot  of  the  statue  of  Bellona 
and  duly  consecrated."  The  commander-in-chief  of  an  army  had  to  keep  his 
auspices  in  order,  and  that  could  be  done  only  on  the  Capitol.  But  how  do  that 
when  he  was  in  a  distant  land?  A  very  simple  matter!  An  imitation  Capitol  was 
built  on  foreign  soil,  and  the  auspices  were  taken  there.  Ibid.,  Aeneid,  II,  v.  178 
(Thilo-Hagen,  Vol.  I,  p.  250) :  "...  Or  a  site  was  chosen  for  a  tent  in  which 
the  auspices  should  be  taken.  But  this  practice  [of  taking  the  urban  auspices]  was 
observed  by  the  Roman  generals  so  long  as  they  were  fighting  in  Italy,  in  view  of 
the  nearness.  But  as  the  Empire  was  extended  far  abroad,  that  the  general  might 
not  be  too  long  separated  from  the  army  by  returning  to  Rome  from  long  distances 
to  take  the  auspices  it  was  ordained  that  a  plot  of  conquered  territory  should  be 
'made  Roman'  in  the  district  where  hostilities  were  in  progress,  and  the  general 
could  repair  thither  if  his  auspices  had  to  be  renewed." 

227  ^  Geist  des  romischen  Rechts,  Vol.  II-2,  §  44,  p.  441. 


§228  PSYCHIC  STATE  IN  ROME  AND  ATHENS  1 53 

Von  Jhering  is  only  partly  right;  not  words  alone  have  such 
powers,  but  words  plus  acts,  and  in  more  general  terms  still,  certain 
associations  of  words,  acts,  and  effects  that  endure  in  time  and  are 
not  easily  disintegrated.  In  the  often  quoted  example  of  Gaius,^ 
where  a  man  loses  his  case  by  calling  his  vines  vines  instead  of  trees, 
as  they  were  called  in  the  Law  of  the  XII  Tables,  one  cannot  see 
that  the  word  had  any  decisive  power.  Certain  associations  of  ideas 
had  grown  up  and  the  Romans  were  loath  to  dissolve  them,  and 
worked  out  their  law  in  deference  to  them.  Anything  new  in  juris- 
prudence had  to  respect  forms  in  the  various  actiones  legis. 

"Theories "  as  to  the  methods  of  voluntary  transfers  of  property 
were  very  different  in  Roman  and  in  Attic  law.  In  Rome  there  were 
formal  ceremonies  for  acquiring  property — the  mancipatio,  and  the 
in  iure  cessio,.  which  had  a  translative  efficacy  in  themselves  inde- 
pendently of  any  physical  transmission.  Nothing  of  the  kind  is  to 
be  found  in  Athens.  If  in  some  other  places  in  Greece  a  sale  is  at- 
tended by  formalities  reminding  one  of  the  mancipatio,  a  sale  in 
Attic  law  remains  a  purely  consensual  contract,  which  ipso  iure 
effects  transfer  of  title  inter  partes.  In  Rome,  furthermore,  the  act 
of  transmission  is  of  great  importance  as  a  method  of  transferring 
property.  In  Attic  law  it  figures  as  a  mere  fact,  devoid  of  any  trans- 
lative significance  whatsoever.  It  appears  as  a  simple  means  of  dis- 
charging obligations,  the  transfer  of  title  having  previously  taken 
place  by  virtue  of  the  contract.  Nor  did  Attic  law,  either,  make  the 
validity  of  a  contract  dependent  on  the  observance  of  certain  solemn 
forms.  .  .  .  Athenian  law  did  not  require  any  of  the  formalities 
commonly  practised  in  other  countries,  such  as  sacrifices,  or  wit- 
nessing by  a  magistrate  or  by  neighbours.  Transfer  took  place  in 
virtue  of  the  mutual  agreement,  and  there  was  no  requirement  of 
witnessing  or  of  stipulation  by  written  deed."  ^ 

228.  But  the  most  striking  trait  in  ancient  Roman  law  is  not  so 
much  its  strict  observance  of  the  word,  of  the  form,  but  rather  the 
progress  that  it  makes  in  spite  of  its  adherence  to  associations  of 

227  ^  Commentarii,  IV,  11  (Poste,  p.  494;  Scott,  Vol.  I,  p.  185). 
227  2  Beauchet,  Histoiie  du  droit  prive  de  la  repttbliqiie  athenienne,  Vol.   Ill, 
pp.  104,  151. 


154  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §229 

ideas  all  the  way  along.  The  fact  was  clearly  apparent  to  Von  Jher- 
ing,  though  that  scholar  was  primarily  interested  in  another  aspect 
of  Roman  law.  After  reciting  several  cases  where  ancient  jurists  sac- 
rificed meaning  to  the  literal  expression  he  adds,  Op.  c'lt.,  Vol.  II-2, 
§  44,  pp.  458-59:  "These  examples  seem  to  show  that  ancient  juris- 
prudence adhered  strictly  to  the  letter  in  interpreting  laws.  Neverthe- 
less, as  I  see  the  matter,  that  opinion  is  to  be  absolutely  rejected;  and 
in  proof  I  will  give  a  list  of  cases  in  which  jurisprudence  undoubtedly 
departed  from  the  letter  of  the  law." 

Ancient  Roman  law  was  all  form  and  mechanism  and  reduced 
freedom  of  choice  on  the  part  of  litigants  and  magistrates  to  a  mini- 
mum. Legal  actions  remind  one  of  a  grist-mill:  grain  was  put  in  at 
one  end  and  flour  came  out  at  the  other.  Says  Girard :  ^  "The  role 
of  the  magistrate  has  to  be  clearly  grasped.  He  does  not  judge.  It 
would  perhaps  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  he  formulates  the  com- 
plaint. His  collaboration  serves  merely  to  lend  an  indispensable  au- 
thenticity to  the  actions  of  the  parties,  especially  to  the  action  of  the 
plaintifl.  As  in  extra-judicial  procedure,  it  is  the  plaintiff  who  is 
asserting  his  right  in  applying  the  legis  actio.  ...  As  for  the  mag- 
istrate, his  role  is  that  of  an  assistant,  and  if  it  is  not  a  purely  passive 
role,  it  is  at  least  almost  mechanical."  He  must  be  present,  and  he 
must  pronounce  the  words  that  the  law  requires  him  to  pronounce. 
But  that  is  almost  all.  He  cannot  grant  action  when  the  law  does  not 
grant  it,  nor,  in  our  sense,  can  he  refuse  it  {dene gave  legis  actionem) 
when  the  law  accords  it ;  ^  and  if  there  is  a  trial,  it  is  not  he  who 
passes  judgment  .  .  .  the  issue,  formulated  iii  iure  before  the  magis- 
trate, is  decided  in  iudicio  by  a  different  authority.  The  task  of  the 
magistrate  ends  with  the  naming  of  the  judge,  a  nomination  made 
to  a  far  greater  extent  by  the  parties  than  by  him." 

229.  We  could  continue  marshalling  such  facts;  for  in  all  depart- 
ments of  Roman  law  one  can  detect  manifestations  of  a  psychic  state 

228  ^  Manuel  elementaire  de  droit  romain,  pp.  973-74. 

228  ^  The  notion  is  Cicero's,  Pro  Lttcio  Marena,  12,  26. 

228  ^  This  is  a  controversial  point  which  we  need  not  go  into  for  the  purposes  we 
have  in  view — namely,  to  show,  without  entering  upon  details,  diat  the  Roman 
magistrate  played  a  virtually  mechanical  role. 


§230  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 55 

A,  that  accepts  progress  while  respecting  associations  of  ideas.  De- 
tecting traces  of  it  in  the  system  of  the  legis  actio,  we  also  see  traces 
of  it  in  the  formulary  system,  and  it  altogether  controls  in  the  whole 
department  of  so-called  legal  fictions.  Legal  fictions  are  to  be  noted 
among  all  peoples  in  certain  stages  of  their  history;  but  the  extent 
of  their  development  and  their  long  survival  are  quite  remarkable 
in  the  case  of  ancient  Rome,  as  they  are  in  the  case  of  modern  Eng- 
land. 

230.  Similar  phenomena  are  observable  in  the  various  aspects  of 
political  life.  As  the  result  of  an  evolution  common  to  the  majority 
of  Greek  and  Latin  cities,  the  king  was  superseded  by  new  magis- 
trates in  Athens,  Sparta,  and  Rome.  But  in  Athens  both  substance 
and  forms  were  completely  changed;  in  Sparta  changes  were  less 
marked  both  in  substance  and  in  form;  in  Rome  they  were  very 
considerable  as  regarded  substance,  and  much  less  extensive  as  re- 
garded forms.^ 

In  deference  to  certain  associations  of  ideas  and  acts,  the  sacerdotal 
functions  of  the  king  passed,  in  Athens  to  the  archon-king,  and  in 
Rome  to  the  rex  sacrorum;  yet  neither  of  those  offices  had  any  im- 
portance politically.  From  the  political  standpoint  the  king  disap- 
pears entirely  in  Athens.  In  Sparta  he  is  kept,  but  with  greatly  re- 
duced powers.  In  Rome  he  is  remodelled  with  the  fewest  possible 
changes  in  forms.  The  supreme  magistracy  becomes  annual  and  is 
divided  between  two  consuls  of  equal  power,  each  of  whom  can  act 
independently  of  the  other  and  can  halt  action  by  the  other."  "The 

230  ^  Mommsen,  Romische  Geschichte,  Vol.  I-i,  p.  244  (Dixon,  Vol.  I,  pp.  254- 
55):  "Everywhere,  in  Rome,  among  the  Latins,  the  Sabellians,  the  Etruscans,  the 
Apulians,  in  all  the  Italic  cities,  in  a  word,  as  well  as  in  the  Greek  cities,  magistrates 
holding  office  for  life  gave  way  to  magistrates  appointed  annually.  Among  the 
Greek  cities  Sparta  of  course  is  an  exception.  It  is  interesting  that  Rome  and  the 
Italic  cities  did  not  have  an  age  of  tyrants  as  Greece  did;  and  the  absence  of  such 
a  stage  in  Italy  was  probably  due,  at  least  in  part,  to  the  psychic  state  of  the 
Italian  peoples,  a  psychic  state  more  conspicuously  noticeable  in  Rome.  In  Sparta, 
the  two  kings  owed  their  royal  dignity  to  hereditary  succession;  they  presided  at 
councils,  administered  justice,  commanded  the  army,  and  served  as  intermediaries 
between  Sparta  and  the  gods." 

.230  ^  Traditions  are  all  unanimous  in  showing  that  the  consuls  inherited  virtually 
all  the  powers  of  the  kings.  Livy,  Ab  urbe  condita,  II,  i,  7:  "You  may  set  down 


156  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §231 

constitution*  gave  the  consuls  the  right  to  expand  their  college, 
especially  in  time  of  war,  by  the  addition  of  a  third  member  exer- 
cising the  more  comprehensive  powers  of  a  dictator.  Popular  elec- 
tion of  dictators  did  not  come  till  a  later  date  and  by  way  of  special 
exception.  The  dictator  was  named  by  one  of  the  consuls,  just  as 
the  king  had  probably  been  named  in  former  times  by  the  acting 
king  [inier-rex].  This  royal  nomination  had  but  one  limitation — the 
fact,  namely,  that  the  consuls  and  their  colleagues,  the  praetors,  re- 
mained in  office  along  with  the  dictator,  although  they  deferred  to 
him  in  cases  of  dispute." 

231.  It  is  a  most  surprising  trait  in  the  Roman  constitution  that 
the  higher  magistrates,  though  in  reality  named  by  the  comitia, 
seem  to  be  named  by  their  predecessors,  "The  most  ancient  popular 
election  was  not  a  choice  freely  made  from  a  number  of  eligible  in- 
dividuals. It  was  probably  limited  at  first  by  the  right  of  the  magis- 
trate directing  the  election  to  make  nominations.  It  is  likely  that  in 
the  very  beginning  exactly  as  many  names  were  submitted  to  the 
people  as  there  were  officers  to  elect,  and  that,  in  principle,  the  voters 
could  do  nothing  beyond  mere  acceptance  or  rejection  of  a  pro- 
posed person,  exactly  as  was  the  case  with  a  proposed  law."  ^ 

Even  in  days  more  recent,  under  the  Republic,  the  magistrate  su- 
perintending an  election  could  accept  a  candidacy  {nomen  accipere) 
or  reject  one  (nomen  non  accipere).  And  later  on  it  was  further 
necessary  for  the  presiding  magistrate  to  consent  to  announce  ("re- 

the  origins  of  our  liberty  rather  to  the  fact  that  the  consular  authority  was  Hmited 
to  a  year  than  to  any  diminution  of  the  powers  the  kings  had  held.  The  first  consuls 
kept  all  the  prerogadves  and  all  the  ceremony  of  the  kings."  Cicero,  De  reptiblica, 
II,  32,  56:  "The  Senate,  accordingly,  held  the  State  in  the  same  balance  in  that 
period.  .  .  .  Though  the  consuls  had  a  merely  annual  authority,  in  character  and 
prerogadve  it  was  a  royal  authority."  Cf.  also  Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus,  Antiqui- 
tates  Romanae,  IV,  73-75  (Spelman,  Vol.  II,  pp.  277-81).  It  is  unimportant,  for  our 
purposes,  whether  these  traditions  be  more  or  less  authenuc.  In  any  event  they  reveal 
the  psychic  state  of  those  who  gave  them  the  form  they  have  or  in  part  invented 
them,  and  that  psychic  state  is  the  thing  we  are  trying  to  stress. 

230  ^  Mommsen,  Rbmisches  Staatsrecht,  Vol.  I,  pp.  216-17. 

231  ^  Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  470. 


§233  ROMAN   FORMALISM  1 57 

nounce,"  refiuntlare)  the  successful  candidate,  and  if  he  refused,  no 
one  could  oblige  him  to.^ 

232.  We  find  nothing  of  that  sort  in  Athens.  There  was,  to  be 
sure,  an  examination  (SoxLi-iaala)  to  decide  whether  archons  (who 
were  chosen  by  lot),  strategoi  (generals  who  were  elective  magis- 
trates) and  senators  were  fit  to  perform  their  duties;  but  that  cer- 
tification of  prerogative  was  something  very  different  from  the 
renmitiatio.  Athens  makes  forms  consistent  with  substance.  Rome 
changed  from  kingdom  to  republic  by  dividing  the  functions  of 
magistrates.  She  went  back  to  monarchy  under  the  Empire  by  re- 
combining  them  anew.  In  the  long  series  of  constitutional  changes 
which  took  place  between  those  two  extremes,  forms  were  as  far  as 
possible  preserved  even  though  substance  changed. 

233.  Towards  the  end  of  his  life  Caesar  seemed  inclined  to  depart 
from  that  rule.  To  a  people  like  the  Athenians  such  a  desire  would 
have  been  considered  reasonable  enough.  The  few  Romans  still  cher- 
ishing old-fashioned  notions  were  incensed  at  the  dissociation  of 
ideas  and  acts  implied  in  it.  Only  by  mistaking  the  part  for  the 
whole  has  it  been  possible  to  imagine  Caesar's  ruin  as  due  to  the 

231  2  Valerius  Maximus,  De  dictis  jactisqiie  metnorabilibus,  III,  8,  3,  tells  how 
C.  Piso  refused  to  "renounce"  M.  Palicanus,  a  notorious  trouble-maker  whom  he 
considered  unworthy  of  the  consulate:  "In  this  situation,  as  lamentable  as  it  was 
disgraceful,  Piso  was  almost  dragged  to  the  rostrum  by  the  tribunes;  and  they  [the 
mob]  crowded  about  him  on  all  sides,  demanding  whether  he  intended  to  announce 
Palicanus  as  elected  consul  by  the  votes  of  the  People.  At  first  he  answered  that  'he 
did  not  think  the  Republic  had  so  far  lost  its  mind  that  things  would  ever  come  to 
such  a  shameful  pass.'  'Well,'  they  pressed,  insisting  on  an  answer,  'if  things  do 
come  to  that  pass.-"  'I  will  not  announce  him!'  he  said."  Aulus  Gellius,  Nodes 
Atticae,  VII,  9,  3:  "But  the  aedile  who  was  presiding  over  the  assembly  said  he 
would  not  accept  the  nomination  and  that  it  was  not  his  pleasure  that  a  recorder 
{qui  scriptum  jaceret:  a  scribe)  should  become  an  aedile."  The  same  incident  is 
mendoned  in  Livy,  Ab  urbe  condita,  IX,  46,  2.  There  are  many  other  examples  of 
the  kind.  Livy,  Ibid.,  XXXIX,  39:  "The  consul,  Lucius  Porcius,  was  at  first  of  the 
opinion  that  he  [Fulvius  Flaccus]  si-ould  not  be  recognized  as  a  candidate."  The 
Lex  lidia  miinicipalis ,  I,  132  (Girard,  Textes  de  droit  romain,  p.  78),  as  reconstituted 
by  Mommsen,  expressly  forbids  "renouncement"  of  individuals  reputed  unfit:  "Nor 
shall  any  of  you  take  account  of  him  from  the  comitia  or  the  council,  nor  shall  any 
of  you  announce  anyone  so  elected  by  the  comitia  or  the  council  against  these  things 
\t.e.,  principles]." 


158  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL   SOCIOLOGY  §234 

extravagant  honours  that  he  arranged  to  have  paid  him.  They  w^ere 
but  one  element  in  a  whole  array  of  things  shocking  to  such  Roman 
citizens  as  still  lingered  in  the  psychic  state  of  the  forefathers/  Au- 
gustus found  ways  to  respect  traditions  better.  He  is  prevaricating 
brazenly  when  he  says  in  the  Ancyra  inscription:  "In  my  sixth  and 
seventh  consulates,  after  ending  the  civil  wars,  I  restored  to  the 
Senate  and  the  Roman  People  the  powers  that  I  had  received  by 
universal  consent;  and  in  honour  of  that  action  a  decree  of  the  Sen- 
ate gave  me  the  name  of  Augustus.  .  .  .  Whereafter,  though  above 
all  others  in  honours,  I  have  held  no  greater  powers  than  my  col- 
leagues." "  Velleius  Paterculus,  who  showers  most  lavish  flattery  on 
Augustus  and  Tiberius,  says  that  Augustus  "restored  to  the  laws 
their  former  force,  to  the  courts  their  old  prestige,  to  the  Senate  its 
pristine  majesty,  and  to  the  magistrates  their  time-honoured  au- 
thority."' 

234.  There  were  still  consuls  and  tribunes  under  the  Empire,  but 
those  were  no  more  than  empty  names.  So  under  Augustus  the 
comitia  still  met  to  elect  public  officials;  and — what  is  more  surpris- 
ing still  and  still  better  demonstrates  the  attachment  of  the  Romans 
to  certain  forms — even  under  Vespasian  a  law  was  passed  by  the 
comitia  investing  the  Emperor  with  power!  At  first  blush  it  would 

233  ^  Cicero,  Philippicae,  II,  34;  Dio  Cassius,  Historia  Romana,  XLIV,  1-3.  Vel- 
leius Paterculus,  Historia  Romana,  II,  56,  4:  "Marc  Antony,  his  colleague  in  the 
consulship  and  a  man  altogether  ready  for  any  act  of  daring,  had  brought  great  un- 
popularity upon  him  by  placing  the  emblem  of  royalty  upon  his  head  as  he  sat 
on  the  rostrum  for  the  festival  of  the  Lupercalia,  since  he  had  rejected  the  offer  in 
such  a  way  that  he  showed  he  had  not  been  displeased  by  it." 

233  ^  Text  as  constituted  by  Franz:  "In  consulattt  sexto  et  septimo  [postquam 
Bella  civili'\a  extinxeram,  per  consensum  universorum  [civium  mihi  tradita'\m  rem 
publicatn  ex  mea  potestate  in  Senatu\_s  poptilique  romani  a^rbitnitm  transtuli,  quo 
pro  merito  meo  Sena\^tiis  cousulto  Augustus  appel'\l[^at~\u\_s'\sum,  et  laureis  posies 
aedium  mearum  v[inctae  sunt  p'\u[bli\c[e'\  su[pe]rque  eas  ad  ianuam  meam 
e[x]qu[erna  fronde  co]r[o]n[a  ci]v[ic]a  posi[ta  ob  servatos  civets,  qu[ique  es] 
se[t  pe]r  [inscriptionejm  [t]e[stis  meae]  virtutis,  clementiae,  iustitiae,  pietatis,  est 
p\^osit'\us  clupe\_us  aureus  in  curia  a  Senatu  populoque  Rlo^mano  quo^d,  quam- 
quam  dignitate  omnibus  praestarem,  potestatem  tamen  nih\ilo'\  amplio  \j-em  habe- 
rem  qtiam]  con[l]e[g]ae  mei." 

233  ^Historia  Romana,  II,  89,  3:  "Restituta  vis  le gibus,  iudiciis  auctoritas,  senatui 
maiestas,  imperium  i7iagistratuum  ad  pristinum  rcdactum  modum." 


§235  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 59 

seem  that  those  Romans  must  have  had  a  deal  of  time  to  waste  to 
be  going  through  with  such  farces!  "Just  so^  was  Augustus  made 
a  tribune  in  the  Roman  year  718,  and  thereafter  his  successors.  After 
a  vote  in  the  Senate,  a  magistrate,  probably  one  of  the  consuls  on 
duty,  presented  to  the  comitia  a  'bill'  {rogatio)  designating  the  Em- 
peror and  specifying  his  powers  and  prerogatives.  ...  So  the  Senate 
and  the  People  both  participated  in  the  'election.'  .  .  .  The  form, 
therefore,  was  the  form  customary  for  extraordinary  magistracies  in- 
stituted under  the  Republic:  first  a  special  law,  then  a  popular  rati- 
fication. .  .  .  The  transfer  of  elections  from  the  comitia  to  the  Sen- 
ate, effected  in  the  year  14  of  our  era,  changed  nothing  so  far  as  the 
imperial  comitia  were  concerned:  it  affected  only  nominations  of 
ordinary  magistrates,  and  had  nothing  to  do  with  magistrates  the- 
oretically extraordinary." 

235.  In  such  things  the  fatuousness  of  some  of  the  logical  reasons 
human  beings  offer  for  their  behaviour  strikes  the  eye  very  forcibly. 
The  Roman  jurists  were  not  joking,  they  were  in  earnest,  when  they 
said  that  "it  has  never  been  questioned  that  the  will  of  the  Emperor 
has  force  of  law,  since  he  himself  receives  his  authority  from  a 
law."  ^  But  after  all,  the  legions  and  the  praetorians  must  have 
counted  for  something!  The  unlettered  dame  in  the  story  was  think- 
ing straighter  than  the  long-faced  Ulpian  when  she  said  to  Caracalla, 
"Knowest  thou  not  that  it  is  for  an  Emperor  to  give,  and  not  to 
receive,  laws?"^ 

234  ^  Mommsen,  Romisches  Staatsrecht,  Vol.  II-2,  pp.  874-76. 

235  ^  Gaius,  Commentarii,  I,  5  (Poste,  pp.  25-26;  Scott,  Vol.  I,  p.  82):  "An  im- 
perial 'constitution'  is  something  that  the  Emperor  has  ordained  by  decree,  edict, 
or  notification  (epistula).  Nor  has  it  ever  been  questioned  that  it  has  status  as  law, 
since  the  Emperor  himself  acquires  his  authority  by  law."  Ulpian,  in  Digesta,  I,  4,  i 
{Corpus  iiiris  civilis,  Vol.  I,  p.  66;  Scott,  Vol.  II,  p.  227):  "The  pleasure  of  the 
Emperor  has  the  force  of  law,  inasmuch  as  by  the  royal  law  ratifying  his  imperittm 
the  People  confers  to  him  and  upon  him  all  its  power  and  authority."  The  Institti- 
tiones  of  Justinian,  I,  2,  6  {Corpus  iiiris  civilis,  Vol.  I,  p.  4;  Scott,  Vol.  II,  p.  7),  re- 
peat the  same  thing;  but  by  Justinian's  time  all  that  was  archaeology. 

235  ^  Aelius  Spartianus,  Antoninus  Caracallus,  10,  2:  "It  may  be  of  interest  to  know 
how  he  is  said  to  have  married  his  step-mother,  Julia.  She  was  a  toothsome  dame, 
and  was  sitting  about  with  her  body  quite  largely  exposed  as  though  by  oversight. 
Said  Antoninus:  'I  would,  if  the  law  allowed.'  And  she  is  said  to  have  answered: 
'Si  libet,  licet.  An  nescis  te  imperatorem  esse  et  leges  dare  non  accipere?'  "  Aurelius 


l6o  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §236 

236.  It  is  a  familiar  fact  that  the  Greeks  had  no  term  correspond- 
ing exactly  to  the  word  religio.  Ignoring  questions  of  etymology, 
which  after  all  would  not  get  us  very  far,  we  may  simply  remark 
that  even  in  the  classical  period  religio  in  one  of  its  senses  undoubt- 
edly meant  painstaking,  conscientious,  diligent  attention  to  duties.^ 
It  is  a  state  of  mind  in  which  certain  ties  (§§  126  f.)  wield  a  powerful 
influence  over  conscience.  If,  therefore,  we  feel  absolutely  compelled 
to  designate  the  psychic  state  in  question  by  a  word  in  common  use, 

Victor,  De  Caesaribus,  XXI:  "He  [Caracalla]  was  like  his  father  in  his  wealth  and 
in  the  marriage  he  made;  for  enamoured  of  the  beauty  of  Julia,  his  step-mother, 
whose  crimes  I  have  already  recounted,  he  sought  her  for  his  wife.  Frowardly  she 
exposed  her  body  to  his  gaze,  as  though  unaware  of  his  presence — he  being  very 
young;  and  when  he  said,  'Vellem  si  liceret  uti!',  she,  saucily  enough,  in  fact  strip- 
ping her  shame  of  every  veil,  replied:  'Libet?  Then,  by  all  means,  licet!'"  In  this 
form  the  anecdote  must  be  fictional  in  character.  Actually  Julia  was  Caracalla's 
mother,  not  his  step-mother. 

236  ^  Breal-Bailly,  Dictionnaire  etymologiqtte  latin,  s.v.  Lego,  derive  religio  from 
lego:  "Religio  meant  'conscientiousness,'  and  particularly  conscientiousness  in  mat- 
ters of  piety.  .  .  .  From  that  first  meaning  all  others  are  derived."  Breal's  etymology 
is  no  longer  accepted;  but  that  is  of  scant  importance,  for  neither  in  this  case  nor  in 
any  other  do  we  intend  to  infer  the  character  of  a  thing  from  the  etymology  of  its 
name.  Forcellini  errs  in  representing  as  derived  a  meaning  that  more  probably  is 
primitive,  but  he  states  it  very  well:  "Religio:  ...  10:  figuratively,  minute  and 
scrupulous  diligence  and  care:  Italian  esattezza.  Cicero,  Brutus,  82,  283:  'Eius  oratio 
nimia  religione  attenuata  [His  style  was  cramped  by  too  great  consciendousness]'; 
Idem,  Orator  ad  Marcum  Brutum,  8,  25:  'It  was  the  wise  and  sound  convicdon  of 
the  Athenians  that  they  could  listen  to  nothing  that  was  not  well-bred  (elegans)  and 
free  from  blemish;  and  if  their  orator  was  attendve  to  this  fasddiousness  on  their 
part  {quorum  religioni  cum  serviret),  he  never  dared  utter  a  word  that  was  insolent 
or  distasteful':  Italian  delicatezza.  11:  lusta  muneris  junctio  [consciendous  per- 
formance of  duty] :  Italian  puntualita." 

One  might  caudon,  meantime,  that  the  primidve  meaning  of  superstitio  was  not 
at  all  what  we  mean  by  "superstidon,"  but  rather  "excessive  piety,"  something  over- 
stepping the  orderliness,  the  regularity,  so  dear  to  the  Romans.  Aulus  Gellius,  Noctes 
Atticae,  IV,  9,  1-3,  quotes  a  line  from  an  ancient  poem,  "Religentem  esse  oportet, 
religiosus  ne  fuas,"  and  the  maxim  means,  he  explains,  that  one  should  be  "re- 
ligious" (observant  of  one's  pious  dudes)  but  not  "supersddous"  (not  so  observant 
to  excess).  And  he  cites  Nigidius  on  the  point:  "'That  is  the  connotation  of  all 
words  of  the  kind:  vinosus,  tnulierosus,  religiosus,  tiummosus  ("overrich"),  which 
suggest  immoderate  abundance  of  the  quality  alluded  to.  So  a  "religious"  man  was 
a  man  who  had  bound  himself  to  an  excessive,  overconscientious  observance  of  his 
pious  dudes  (religione),  so  that  the  trait  could  be  called  a  defect  in  him.'  "  Gellius 
condnues:  "But  in  addition  to  the  sense  mentioned  by  Nigidius,  by  another  shade 
of  meaning  {diverticula)  a  man  of  pure  life  scrupulously  observing  certain  rules 
and  keeping  himself  within  certain  limits  may  be  called  a  'religious'  man." 


§238  PSYCHIC  STATE  IN  ROME  AND  ATHENS  161 

the  most  appropriate  term,  without  being  strictly  exact,  would  seem 
to  be  religio.' 

237.  An  anecdote  of  Livy  clearly  brings  out  this  scrupulous  at- 
tachment to  ties  to  the  discomfiture  of  all  other  sentiments.  A  num- 
ber of  soldiers,  not  wishing  to  obey  the  consuls,  began  to  consider 
whether  they  could  be  freed  of  the  oath  binding  them  to  their  obedi- 
ence by  killing  them.  After  a  time  they  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
a  crime  could  not  wipe  out  a  sacred  pledge,  so  they  resorted  to  a 
sort  of  strike.^  It  matters  little  whether  this  be  history  or  fiction.  If 
it  is  fiction,  the  person  who  invented  it  knew  that  his  hearers  would 
consider  it  quite  natural  to  wonder  whether  killing  a  person  to 
whom  one  was  bound  by  an  oath  were  a  means  of  getting  rid  of  the 
oath;  and  natural  also  to  answer  in  the  negative,  not  from  any  aver- 
sion to  homicide,  but  because  homicide  would  not  be  the  effective 
way  of  cancelling  an  oath.  This  whole  discussion  as  to  the  way  to 
escape  the  consequences  of  a  vow  belongs  to  religio  in  the  Latin 
sense. 

238.  And  as  manifestations  of  the  same  religio  we  must  regard 
the  numberless  facts  that  present  the  Romans  as  a  conscientious, 
exact,  scrupulous  people,  devoted — even  too  much  so — to  orderli- 
ness and  regularity  in  their  private  lives.  The  head  of  every  Roman 
family  kept  a  diary,  or  ledger,  in  which  he  recorded  not  only  income 
and  expenditures,  but  everything  of  importance  happening  in  the 
family  circle — something  similar  to  the  day-books  which  Italian 
law  requires  merchants  to  keep,  but  also  covering  matters  alto- 

236  ^  Even  if  we  stick  to  the  Latin  form  of  the  word,  some  people  will  insist  on 
understanding  it  in  a  sense  altogether  different  from  the  meaning  we  wish  to  give 
it,  whether  because  of  its  similarity  to  the  word  "religion"  or  because  of  other  senses 
that  the  word  has  in  Latin.  It  is  my  sad  experience  that  no  precaution  can  prevent 
people  from  taking  terms  in  their  ordinary  meanings,  and  that  no  attention  is  paid 
to  the  definitions  a  writer  gives,  no  matter  how  explicit  and  clear  he  makes 
them  (§  119). 

237  '^  Ab  tirbe  condita,  II,  32,  2:  "At  first,  it  is  said,  it  was  debated  as  to  whether 
they  could  be  freed  of  their  oath  by  slaughtering  the  consuls;  but  when  they  were 
told  that  no  vow  was  ever  cancelled  by  a  crime,  at  the  suggestion  of  a  certain 
Sicinius  they  withdrew  to  the  Sacred  Mount  [three  miles  from  the  city,  across  the 
Anio]  in  defiance  of  consular  orders." 


l62  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §^39 

gether  foreign  to  the  mere  administration  of  the  family  property.^ 
239.  It  might  seem  that  the  rehgion  of  the  Greeks,  in  which  rea- 
son and  imagination  played  a  more  important  role,  should  be  more 
moral  than  the  religion  of  the  Romans,  which  comes  down  to  a 
series  of  fictions  in  which  reason  played  no  part  whatever.  The  con- 
trary, however,  was  the  case.  We  may  ignore  the  scandalous  adven- 
tures of  the  gods,  and  keep,  rather,  to  the  influence  of  religion  on 
the  conduct  of  daily  life.^  For  the  Romans  the  physical  acts  of  the 
cult  were  everything,  intentions  nothing.  The  Greeks  too  passed 
through  just  such  a  stage  in  an  archaic  period  of  their  history:  a 
murder  was  expiated  by  an  altogether  external  ceremony.  But  they, 
or  more  exactly  their  thinkers,  soon  outgrew  this  materialistic  for- 
malistic  morality.  "Even  as  there  is  no  remedy  for  lost  virginity," 
Aeschylus  will  cry,  "so  all  the  rivers  of  the  world  gathered  into  one 
avail  not  to  wash  the  blood-stained  hands  of  a  murderer."^  Cer- 

238  ^  Cicero,  hi  Caitim  Verrem,  II,  23,  60:  "We  have  heard  of  individuals  not 
keeping  books — that  charge  Vi^as  made  against  Antony,  but  falsely,  for  his  books 
were  in  the  best  of  order.  All  the  same  there  are  some  few  examples  of  such  repre- 
hensible conduct.  Then  again  we  have  heard  of  individuals  whose  books  are  missing 
for  certain  periods — and  one  might  imagine  reasons  to  justify  that  conduct.  But 
what  is  unheard  of  and  altogether  ridiculous  is  the  reply  Verres  made  when  we 
asked  him  to  produce  his  books.  He  said  that  he  had  kept  them  up  to  the  consul- 
ships of  M.  Terentius  and  C.  Cassius,  but  had  ceased  doing  so  after  that."  On  this 
passage  Asconius  annotates:  "It  was  the  custom  for  each  Roman  to  keep  his  do- 
mestic accounts  day  by  day  over  his  whole  life,  so  that  it  might  be  apparent  for  each 
day  what  he  had  laid  aside  from  his  income,  what  his  earnings  from  trade,  business, 
or  money  loaned,  and  what  his  expenditures  or  losses."  To  the  demand  on  his 
client,  M.  Coelius,  to  produce  his  books,  Cicero  replies,  Pro  Marco  Coelio,  7,  17:  "A 
man  who  is  still  a  junior  in  his  family  {qui  in  patris  potestate  est)  is  not  required 
to  keep  books." 

239  1  Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus,  Antiquitates  Romanae,  II,  19  (Spelman,  Vol.  I, 
p.  257):  "One  does  not  hear  among  the  Romans  of  a  Uranus  castrated  by  his  sons, 
of  a  Saturn  devouring  his  children,  of  a  Jove  dethroning  a  Saturn  and  making  him 
a  prisoner  in  Tartarus;  nor  of  divine  wars  and  maimings,  nor  of  gods  in  chains 
and  made  slaves  of  men.  .  .  .  {ovdi  je  n6?i£/iioi  koI  Tpavfiara  Koi  Ssafiol  koI  d/jreiai  deuv 
■nap'avdpuTToic)."  According  to  Dionysius  even  rites  of  worship  were  more  moral 
in  Rome  than  in  Greece. 

239  ^  Choephorae,  vv.  71-74  (69-72) : 

OlyovTi  6'ovTL  vvfKpiKuv  kSu'kiov 
aKog,  irSpoi  re  vavTEq  £k  (J-iaq  66ov 


§240  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 63 

tainly  one  might  expect  to  find  a  rectitude  of  conduct  correspond- 
ing to  such  exalted  thoughts.  What  we  actually  find  is  the  opposite. 
In  the  end  Rome  got  to  be  as  immoral  as  Greece ;  but  originally,  and 
even  in  the  fairly  recent  day  of  the  Scipios,  Polybius  could  write, 
Historiae,  VI,  56,  13  (Paton,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  395-97) :  "So,  not  to  men- 
tion other  things,  if  a  mere  talent  is  entrusted  to  those  who  have 
charge  of  public  monies  in  Greece,  though  they  give  bond  to  ten 
times  the  amount  and  there  be  ten  seals  and  twice  that  many  wit- 
nesses, you  will  never  see  your  talent  again;  whereas  with  the  Ro- 
mans, magistrates  or  provincial  governors  who  have  the  handling 
of  large  sums  of  money  respect  their  given  word  out  of  regard  for 
their  oath."  The  sacred  chickens  may  have  been  ridiculous;  but  they 
never  caused  the  Roman  armies  a  disaster  comparable  to  the  defeat 
that  the  Athenians  suffered  in  Sicily  through  fault  of  their  sooth- 
sayers. 

240.  Rome  had  no  prosecutions  for  impiety  comparable  to  the 
trials  for  daifSsia  in  Athens,  and,  much  less,  to  the  numberless  re- 
ligious persecutions  with  which  the  Christians  were  to  afflict  hu- 
manity. Had  Anaxagoras  lived  in  Rome,  he  could  have  asserted  to 
his  heart's  content  that  the  sun  was  an  incandescent  mass,  and  no 
one  would  have  paid  any  attention  to  what  he  said.^  In  the  year 

[iaivovreg  tov  x^po/^^'<^V 

(povov  Kada'tpovreQ  'lovaav  aTrji'. 

Sophocles,  Oedipus  Rex,  vv.  1227-28  (Storr,  Vol.  I,  pp.  1 14-15):  "I  do  not  believe 
that  the  waters  of  the  Ister  and  the  Phasis  could  wash  away  the  crimes  committed 
in  this  palace."  An  epigram  in  the  Greef^^  Anthology,  XIV,  71  (7)  (Paton,  Vol.  V, 
pp.  62-63),  gives  an  oracle  of  the  Pythoness:  "Stranger,  enter  a  pure  temple  with  a 
pure  heart  after  touching  the  water  of  the  Nymphs.  The  virtuous  need  only  a  drop, 
but  a  wicked  man  could  not  be  cleansed  with  all  the  Ocean." 

240  ^  According  to  Plutarch,  Nicias,  23,  2-3  (Perrin,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  291),  Anaxagoras 
disclosed  his  theories  of  eclipses  only  to  a  few  individuals.  But  at  that  time  such 
speculations  were  not  tolerated  in  Athens.  "Protagoras  was  exiled.  Anaxagoras  was 
thrown  into  prison  and  extricated  by  Pericles  with  great  difficulty.  Socrates  did  not 
deal  with  physical  sciences,  but  was  none  the  less  put  to  death  because  of  his 
philosophy."  Idem,  Pericles,  32,  2  (Perrin,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  93):  "A  law  proposed  by 
Diopeithes  made  it  an  actionable  offence  to  deny  the  existence  of  the  gods  and  dis- 
cuss celestial  things;  and  that  brought  suspicion  upon  Pericles  because  of  Anaxag- 
oras." Diogenes  Laertius,  Anaxagoras,  II,  3,  12  (Hicks,  Vol.  I,  p.  143),  says  that 


164  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §241 

155  B.C.  the  Athenians  sent  to  Rome  an  embassy  made  up  of  three 
philosophers,  Critolaus,  Diogenes,  and  Carneades.  Hellenophiles  in 
Rome  greatly  admired  the  captious  eloquence  of  Carneades;  but 
Cato  the  Censor,  mouthpiece  for  the  spirit  of  the  old  Romans, 
viewed  all  such  clever  chatter  as  more  than  suspicious  and  urged 
the  Senate  to  rush  the  business  that  had  brought  such  individuals 
to  Rome  to  the  earliest  possible  close,  "that  they  might  go  back  to 
their  schools  and  spout  before  the  children  of  the  Greeks,  leaving 
young  people  in  Rome  to  mind  their  magistrates  and  respect  the 
laws  as  they  had  always  done."  ^ 

Cato,  mark  well,  does  not  care  to  discuss  the  doctrines  of  Car- 
neades. He  is  not  in  the  least  interested  in  knowing  whether  or  not 
their  reasoning  is  sound.  He  is  looking  at  them  from  the  outside. 
All  that  captious  hair-splitting  seems  to  him  to  have  no  value.  It 
can  do  no  good  and  may  do  harm  for  young  people  in  Rome  to 
listen  to  it.  Great  would  have  been  Cato's  amazement  had  he  known 
that  some  day  people  were  going  to  kill  each  other  to  prove  or  dis- 
prove the  consubstantiality  of  the  Word  or  the  second  person  of  the 
Trinity — the  Arian  heresy;  and  rightly  would  he  have  thanked 
Jupiter  Optimus  Maximus  for  preserving  the  Romans  from  such 
folly  (which,  for  that  matter,  in  some  instances,  clothed  a  rational 
substance), 

241.  Athenian  law,  which  was  essentially  logical  and  sought  to 
settle  questions  on  broad  lines  without  embarrassments  from  a  stupid 
formalism  or  too  many  fictions,  should  have  been  superior  to  Roman 
law.  But  everybody  knows  that  the  exact  opposite  was  the  case.  "The 
Greek  intellect,^  with  all  its  nobility  and  elasticity,  was  quite  unable 
to  confine  itself  within  the  strait  waistcoat  of  a  legal  formula;  and, 
if  we  may  judge  them  by  the  popular  courts  of  Athens,  of  whose 
working  we  possess  accurate  knowledge,  the  Greek  tribunals  ex- 

Anaxagoras  was  accused  of  impiety  by  Cleon  for  liaving  asserted  that  the  sun  was  a 
molten  mass.  Plato,  Apologia,  16,  (14)  (Fowler,  p.  99),  imagines  Meletus  as  ac- 
cusing Socrates  of  saying  that  the  sun  is  a  stone  and  the  moon  an  earth.  To  which 
Socrates  replies:  "You  must  think  you  are  accusing  Anaxagoras,  friend  Meletus." 

240  ^  Plutarch,  Cato  Maior,  22,  6  (Perrin,  Vol.  11,  p.  371). 

241  ^  Maine,  Ancient  Law,  pp.  72-73. 


§241  FORMALISM  IN  ROMAN  LAW  1 65 

hibited  the  strongest  tendency  to  confound  law  and  fact.  .  .  .  No 
durable  system  of  jurisprudence  could  be  produced  in  this  way.  A 
community  which  never  hesitated  to  relax  rules  of  written  law 
whenever  they  stood  in  the  way  of  an  ideally  perfect  decision  on 
the  facts  of  particular  cases,  would  only,  if  it  bequeathed  any  body 
of  judicial  principles  to  posterity,  bequeath  one  consisting  of  the 
ideas  of  right  and  wrong  which  happened  to  be  prevalent  at  the 
time. 

So  far  we  agree  with  Sumner  Maine ;  but  we  cannot  agree  when, 
loc.  cit.,  pp.  73-74,  he  ascribes  the  perfection  of  Roman  law  to  the 
Roman  theory  of  natural  law.  That  theory  was  appended  to  the 
ancient  fund  of  Roman  law  at  a  relatively  recent  date.  Von  Jhering 
comes  closer  to  the  crux  of  the  problem.  His  description  of  the  facts 
is  excellent.  As  for  the  causes,  what  he  calls  "the  rigorous  logic  of 
the  conservative  spirit"  is  nothing  but  the  Roman  psychic  state,  of 
which  we  have  been  speaking  above,  combining  with  logical  and 
practical  inferences  that  entail  the  fewest  possible  modifications  in 
certain  associations  of  ideas  and  acts. 

I  will  transcribe  Von  Jhering's  paragraph,  putting  in  brackets  the 
emendations  that  I  consider  appropriate : "  "If  Roman  jurisprudence 
found  a  simple  and  logical  law  ready-made,  it  owes  that  advantage 
morally  to  the  ancient  Roman  people,  which,  in  spite  of  its  spirit  of 
liberty,  had  submitted  for  centuries  to  a  relentless  logic  [to  the 
logical  consequences  of  associations — which  they  would  not  have 
anyone  disturb — of  ideas  and  acts].  .  .  .  The  truth  of  what  we  have 
just  said  is  apparent  in  the  peculiarly  Roman  manner — so  familiar 
to  all  who  know  Roman  law — of  reconciling  an  embarrassing  logic 
[certain  associations  of  ideas  and  acts]  with  practical  requirements 
by  devices  of  all  sorts:  make-believe,  roundabout  detours,  fictions. 
The  moral  aversion  of  the  Romans  to  any  violation  of  a  principle 
once  recognized  [resulting  from  associations  of  ideas  and  acts]  stim- 
ulates and,  as  it  were,  crowds  their  intelligence  to  exercise  all  its 
sagacity  in  discovering  ways  and  means  for  reconciling  logic  and 
practical  exigency.  Necessity  is  the  mother  of  invention.  .  .  .  The 

241  -  Geist  des  romischen  Rechts,  Vol.  I,  pp.  333-35  (Pt.  I,  §  20). 


1 66  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §242 

second  national  trait  of  the  Romans  mentioned  above,  their  con- 
servative spirit  [conservative  as  regards  forms,  progressive  as  regards 
substance],  worked  in  exactly  the  same  direction,  and  it,  too,  was  a 
powerful  lever  for  their  inventive  talents  in  law.  To  reconcile  the 
necessities  of  the  present  with  the  traditions  of  the  past,  to  do  justice 
to  the  former  without  breaking,  either  in  form  or  in  substance,  with 
the  latter,  to  discipline  juridical  intercourse  and  guide  the  progres- 
sive force  of  law  into  its  proper  channels — that  for  centuries  was  the 
truly  noble  and  patriotic  mission  of  Roman  juridical  science.  [We 
can  dispense  with  the  mission,  the  nobility,  and  the  patriotism.] 
Roman  jurisprudence  towered  the  greater  in  proportion  to  the  dif- 
ficulties that  it  encountered." 

242.  In  statecraft  there  is  better  yet.  We  can  only  wonder  how  a 
system  so  absurd  from  the  standpoint  of  logic  could  ever  have  sur- 
vived. Magistrates  with  equal  prerogatives,  such  as  two  consuls  and 
two  censors;  tribunes  able  to  halt  the  whole  juridical  and  political 
process;  comitia  trying  to  work  with  the  complication  of  the  aus- 
pices; a  Senate  without  any  well-defined  jurisdiction — such  things 
seem  to  be  loose  parts  of  a  ramshackle  machine  that  could  never 
have  functioned.  Yet  it  did  function  for  century  after  century,  and 
gave  Rome  dominion  over  the  Mediterranean  world;  and  when  it 
finally  broke  down  it  broke  down  because  it  had  been  worn  out 
by  a  new  people  that  had  lost  the  religio  of  the  old.  Thanks  to  ties 
of  non-logical  conduct  and  to  forces  of  innovation,  Rome  found  a 
way  to  reconcile  discipline  with  freedom  and  strike  a  golden  mean 
between  Sparta  and  Athens. 

243.  The  oration  on  the  war-dead  that  Thucydides,  Historiae,  II, 
35-46,  ascribes  to  Pericles  and  Cicero's  oration  on  the  responses 
of  the  haruspices  offer  a  striking  contrast.  The  Athenian  speaks  like 
a  modern.  The  prosperity  of  Athens  is  due  to  democracy,  to  just 
laws,  to  the  good  sense  of  her  citizens,  to  their  courage.  These  traits 
in  the  Athenians  make  Athens  a  better  city  than  the  other  cities  in 
Greece.  The  Roman  does  not  bestow  so  much  praise  on  the  knowl- 
edge and  courage  of  his  fellow-citizens.  "However  highly  we  may 
esteem  ourselves,  O  Conscript  Fathers,  we  have  not  been  superior  in 


§244  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 67 

numbers  to  the  Spaniards,  in  physique  to  the  Gauls,  in  shrewdness 
to  the  Carthaginians,  in  the  arts  to  the  Greeks,  nor  even  to  the 
Itahans  and  the  Latins  in  the  good  sense  native  to  our  soil.  But  to 
all  peoples  and  races  we  have  been  superior  in  piety,  in  religion,  in 
that  wisdom  which  has  led  us  to  understand  that  all  things  are  ruled 
and  directed  by  the  immortal  gods."  ^  That  seems  to  be  the  language 
of  bigotry,  and  instead  it  is  the  language  of  reason,  especially  if  the 
word  "religion"  be  taken  in  the  sense  of  the  religio  defined  above. 
The  cause  of  Roman  prosperity  was  a  certain  number  of  ties,  of 
religiones,  which  made  the  Romans  a  disciplined  people.  To  be  sure, 
Cicero  was  not  thinking  in  just  those  terms — his  theme  was  the 
power  of  the  immortal  gods — but  the  concept  of  the  rule,  of  the 
tie,  was  not  absent  from  his  mind.  He  began  by  lauding  the  wisdom 
of  the  forefathers,  "who  thought  that  sacred  rites  and  ceremonies 
were  the  affair  of  the  pontiffs,  and  good  auspices  the  affair  of  the 
augurs;  that  the  ancient  prophecies  of  Apollo  were  to  be  read  in 
the  Sibylline  Books;  and  that  the  interpretation  of  prodigies  be- 
longed to  Etruscan  lore." "  In  truth,  a  genuinely  Roman  conception 
or  order  and  regularity! 

244.  Among  modern  peoples,  the  English,  at  least  down  to  the 
last  years  of  the  nineteenth  century,^  have  more  than  any  other 

243  ^  Cicero,  De  hariispicum  responsis,  9,  19:  "Oiiam  volumus  licet,  patres  con- 
scripti,  ipsi  nos  amemus,  tamen  nee  numero  Hispanos,  nee  robore  Gallos,  nee  calli- 
ditate  Poenos,  nee  artibus  Graecos,  nee  denique  hoc  ipso  huius  gentis  ac  terrae 
domestico  nativoque  sensu,  Italos  ipsos  ae  Latinos,  sed  pietate  ac  religiojte,  at  que  Imc 
una  sapientia,  quod  deorum  immortalium  numine  omnia  regi  gubernarique  perspexi- 
?nus,  omnes  gentes  nationesque  superavimus."  In  the  De  natura  deorum,  II,  3,  8, 
Cicero  makes  Balbus  say:  "And  if  we  were  to  compare  our  national  traits  with 
those  of  other  peoples,  we  would  find  ourselves  their  inferiors  or  at  the  best  their 
equals  in  many  things,  but  their  superiors  and  by  far  in  religio,  which  means  wor- 
ship of  the  gods."  Note  that  religio  is  here  defined  as  worship  (cultu). 

243  2  Op.  cit.,  9,  18:  ".  .  .  qui  statas  solemnesque  caerimonias  pontificatu;  rerum 
bene  gerendarum  auctoritates  augurio;  fatorum  veteres  pracdictiones  Apollinis  vatum 
libris;  portentortim  explanationes  Etruscoru??:  disciplina  contineri  ptitarunt.  .  .  ." 
And  see  our  §  182.^ 

244  ^  This  qualification  is  necessary,  for  with  the  first  decade  of  the  t%ventieth 
century  the  government  of  England  fell  into  the  hands  of  Welsh  and  Irish  fanatics. 
If  that  is  not  just  a  passing  fancy  but  indicates  a  change  in  the  character  of  the 
country  as  a  whole,  the  England  of  the  future  will  be  nothing  like  the  England  of 


1 68  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §245 

people  resembled  the  Romans  in  their  psychic  state.  English  law  is 
still  replete  with  fictions.  The  English  political  system  keeps  the 
same  antiquated  names,  the  same  antiquated  forms,  whereas  in  sub- 
stance it  is  constantly  changing.  England  still  has  a  king,  as  in  the 
times  of  the  Plantagenets,  the  Tudors,  and  the  Stuarts;  but  he  has 
less  authority,  less  power,  than  the  President  of  the  United  States. 
Under  Charles  I  we  see  a  civil  war  fought  by  the  King  in  his  Parlia- 
ment against  the  King  in  his  camp.  No  Roman  ever  devised  a  fiction 
so  far-fetched !  Even  today  the  ceremonies  connected  with  the  open- 
ing of  Parliament  are  archaic  to  the  point  of  comedy.  Before  the 
Commons  appears  a  pompous  individual  called  the  Gentleman 
Usher  of  the  Black  Rod,  who  invites  them  to  proceed  to  the  House 
of  Lords  to  hear  the  Speech  from  the  Throne.  The  Commons  repair 
thither  and  then  return  to  their  own  chamber,  where  the  Speaker 
informs  them  with  a  perfectly  straight  face  of  something  they  have 
heard  as  distinctly  as  he.  Immediately  a  bill  has  to  be  read,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  mere  form,  to  safe-guard  the  right  of  Parliament  to  be  the 
first  to  discuss  public  business,  without  going  into  the  reasons  for 
the  convocation.  English  political  organization  is  adapted  to  the 
needs  of  the  English  people,  just  as  the  political  organization  of  an- 
cient Rome  was  adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  Roman  people,  and  all 
modern  peoples  have  sought  to  copy  it  more  or  less  faithfully.  That 
organization  enabled  England  to  issue  victorious  from  the  Napole- 
onic wars  and  has  secured  Englishmen  greater  liberties  than  the 
majority  of  European  peoples  have  enjoyed.  All  this  is  now  tending 
to  change  as  a  result  of  new  customs  and  new  habits  that  seem  about 
to  get  a  foothold  in  England. 

245.  In  our  discussion  so  far  we  have  had  to  use  terms  of  ordinary 
language,  which  are  by  nature  not  very  strict  in  meaning.  Keeping 
for  the  moment  to  the  terms  "Athenians,"  "Romans,"  and  so  on, 
used  in  the  foregoing — exactly  what  do  they  represent?  Among 
ancient  peoples  they  designated  citizens  only,  not  slaves  and  not 
foreigners.  But  do  our  statements  apply  to  all  the  citizens  in  ques- 

the  past.  It  is  to  the  latter  England,  the  only  England  very  well  known  as  yet,  that 
I  refer  when  I  mention  that  country  in  these  pages. 


I 


§248  THE  ELITE  1 69 

tion?  From  certain  facts,  acts,  laws,  customs,  we  have  inferred  the 
psychic  state  of  the  individuals  who  created  those  facts,  performed 
those  acts,  accepted  those  laws  and  customs.  Legitimate  enough! 
But  it  would  not  be  legitimate  to  pretend  that  they  made  up  the 
whole  nation,  or  even  the  numerical  majority  in  the  nation. 

246.  Every  people  is  governed  by  an  elite,  by  a  chosen  element  in 
the  population;  and,  in  all  strictness  it  is  the  psychic  state  of  that 
elite  that  we  have  been  examining.^  We  can,  at  the  very  most,  go 
on  and  say  that  the  remainder  of  the  population  followed  the  im- 
pulse given  by  it.  An  elite  can  change  with  changes  in  the  individ- 
uals composing  it  or  in  their  descendants,  or  even  through  the  in- 

_  filtration  of  extraneous  elements,  which  may  come  from  the  same 
country  or  from  some  other  country.  When  only  children  of  Athen- 
ian citizens  could  be  citizens  in  Athens,  the  Athenian  elite  could 
change  only  through  changes  occurring  in  its  individual  members, 
or  through  taking  in  new  members  from  the  Athenian  citizenry  at 
large. 

247.  Observable  in  Rome  are  not  only  changes  of  those  same 
kinds,  but  also  an  infiltration  of  foreign  peoples,  now  of  Latins  or 
Italians  through  an  extension  of  the  right  of  citizenship,  now  of 
miscellaneous  elements  of  all  sorts,  even  of  Barbarians,  by  way  of 
freed  slaves  and  descendants  of  freedmen.  Scipio  Aemilianus  was 
able  to  say  to  an  unruly  assembly  of  plebeians  that  they  were  not 
even  Italians.^  We  must  therefore  be  on  our  guard  against  drawing 
hasty  conclusions  from  the  examples  we  have  been  quoting.  We 
have,  to  be  sure,  found  the  characteristics  of  certain  elites,  but  we 
have  not  solved  the  problem  of  their  composition. 

248.  These  last  considerations  lead  us  to  a  point  beyond  which  we 
begin  to  encounter  a  matter  different  in  character  from  that  so  far 

246  1  The  meaning  of  the  term  "elite"  must  not  be  sought  in  its  etymology.  It 
will  be  defined  in  Chapter  XII. 

247  1  Velleius  Paterculus,  Historia  Rom  an  a,  II,  4,  4:  "With  all  the  assembly  in  an 
uproar  he  said:  'Many  a  time  have  I  stood  unmoved  at  the  clamour  of  armed  en- 
emies! How  then  am  I  to  be  stirred  by  the  clamour  of  men  like  you  who  have 
Italy  for  no  more  than  a  step-mother?'  " 


170  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §248 

examined.  It  would  be  premature  to  go  farther  than  we  have  gone, 
and  dangerous  to  do  so  before  we  have  finished  what  we  have  begun. 
Let  us,  therefore,  retrace  our  steps.  Our  Httle  excursion  has  served, 
however,  to  acquaint  us  with  at  least  the  existence  of  those  other 
problems,  which  we  shall  come  to  in  our  later  chapters. 


CHAPTER     III 


Rationalization  of  Non-logical  Conduct 


&^ 


249.  The  research  just  completed  has  called  our  attention — along 
with  a  number  of  incidental  inductions — to  the  following  facts: 

1.  The  existence  and  importance  of  non-logical  conduct.  That 
runs"  counter  to  many  sociological  theories  that  either  scorn  or  ignore 
non-logical  actions,  or  else,  in  an  effort  to  reduce  all  conduct  to 
logic,  attach  little  importance  to  them.  The  course  we  follow  in 
studying  the  behaviour  of  human  beings  as  bearing  on  the  social 
equilibrium  differs  according  as  we  lay  the  greater  stress  on  logical 
or  non-logical  conduct.  We  had  better  look  into  that  matter  more 
deeply,  therefore. 

2.  Non-logical  actions  are  generally  considered  from  the  logical 
standpoint  both  by  those  who  perform  them  and  by  those  who  dis- 
cuss them  and  generalize  about  them.  Hence  our  need  to  do  a 
thing  of  supreme  importance  for  our  purposes  here — to  tear  off  the 
masks  non-logical  conduct  is  made  to  wear  and  lay  bare  the  things 
they  hide  from  view.  That  too  runs  counter  to  many  theories  which 
halt  at  logical  exteriors,  representing  them  not  as  masks  but  as  the 
substantial  element  in  conduct  itself.  We  have  to  scrutinize  those 
theories  closely:  for  if  we  were  to  find  them  true — in  accord  with 
experience,  that  is — we  would  have  to  follow  an  altogether  different 
course  from  the  one  we  would  follow  were  we  to  discover  that  the 
substantial  element  in  the  conduct  lies  in  the  things  that  underlie 
the  logical  exteriors  (§  146). 

3.  The  experimental  truth  of  a  theory  and  its  social  utility  are 
different  things.  A  theory  that  is  experimentally  true  may  be  now 
advantageous,  now  detrimental,  to  society;  and  the  same  applies  to 
a  theory  that  is  experimentally  false.  Many  many  people  deny  that. 
We  must  therefore  not  rest  satisfied  with  the  rapid  survey  we  have 
made  so  far,  much  less  with  the  bald  declaration  in  §  72.  We  must 

171 


172  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §250 

see  whether  observation  of  the  facts  confirms  or  belies  our  induc- 
tion (§§72-73). 
4.  As  regards  logical  and  non-logical  conduct  there  are  differences 
'    between  individual  human  beings,  or,  taking  things  in  the  mass,  be- 
•,    tween  social  classes,  and  differences  also  in  the  degrees  of  utility 
A  that  theories  experimentally  true  or  experimentally  false  have  for 
[^individuals  or  classes.  And  the  same  applies  to  the  sentiments  that 
are  expressed  through  non-logical  conduct.  Many  people  deny  such 
differences.  To  not  a  few  the  mere  suggestion  that  they  exist  seems 
scandalous.  It  will  therefore  be  necessary  to  continue  our  examina- 
tion of  that  subject,  on  which  we  have  barely  touched,  and  clearly 
establish  just  what  the  facts  have  to  say. 

250.  Meantime,  our  first  survey  has  already  given  us  an  idea,  how- 
ever superficial,  of  the  answers  that  have  to  be  given  to  the  inquiries 
suggested  in  §§  13-14  as  to  the  motives  underlying  theories,  as  to 
their  bearing  on  experimental  realities,  and  as  to  individual  and 
group  utilities — and  we  see  that  some  at  least  of  the  distinctions  that 
are  drawn  in  those  paragraphs  are  not  merely  hypothetical,  but  have 
i  points  of  correspondence  with  reality. 

>     251.  In  the  following  pages  we  shall  devote  ourselves  chiefly  to 

running  down  non-logical  actions  in  the  theories  or  descriptions  of 

social  facts  that  have  been  put  forward  by  this  or  that  writer;  and 

that  will  give  us  an  approximate  notion  of  the  way  non-logical  con- 

>y   ,      iduct  is  masked  by  logic. 

252.  If  non-logical  actions  are  really  as  important  as  our  induc- 
tion so  far  would  lead  us  to  suppose,  it  would  be  strange  indeed 
that  the  many  men  of  talent  who  have  applied  themselves  to  the 
study  of  human  societies  should  not  have  noticed  them  in  any  way. 
Distracted  by  preconceptions  or  led  astray  by  erroneous  theories, 
they  may,  "as  they  that  have  spent  eyes,"  have  caught  imperfect 
glimpses  of  them;  but  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  they  can  have  seen 
nothing  where  we  find  so  much  that  is  of  such  great  significance. 
Let  us  therefore  see  just  how  the  matter  stands. 

253.  But  for  that  purpose  we  have  to  take  an  even  more  general 
[^    view  of  things:  we  have  to  see  to  what  extent  reality  is  disfigured 


§254  FUSTEL  AND  MAINE  ON  PROPERTY  1 73 

in  the  theories  and  descriptions  of  it  that  one  finds  in  the  literature, 
of  thought.  We  have  an  image  in  a  curved  mirror;  our  problem  is 
to  discover  the  form  of  the  object  so  altered  by  refraction. 

Suppose  w^e  ignore,  for  the  moment,  the  simplest  case  of  v^^riters 
who  understand  that  the  conduct  of  human  beings  depends,  to  some 
extent  at  least,  on  the  environment  in  which  they  live,  on  climate, 
race,  occupation,  "temperament."  It  is  obvious  that  the  behaviour 
resulting  from  such  causes  is  not  the  product  of  pure  ratiocination, 
that  it  is  non-logical  behaviour.  To  be  sure,  that  fact  is  often  over- 
looked by  the  very  writers  who  have  stressed  it,  and  they  therefore 
seem  to  be  contradicting  themselves.  But  the  inconsistency  is  now 
and  again  more  apparent  than  real;  for  when  a  writer  admits  such 
causes  he  is  usually  dealing  with  what  is — and  that  is  one  thing. 
When  he  insists  on  having  all  conduct  logical,  he  is  usually  describ- 
ing what,  in  his  opinion,  ought  to  be — and  that  is  quite  another 
thing.  From  the  scientific  laboratory  he  steps  over  into  the  pulpit. 

254.  Let  us  begin  with  cases  not  quite  so  simple  but  where  it  is 
still  easy  to  perceive  the  experimental  truth  underneath  imperfect 
and  partly  erroneous  descriptions  of  it. 

Here,  for  instance,  is  The  Ancient  City  of  Fustel^de  ,Coulanges. 
In  it  we  read,  p.  73  (Small,  p.  89) :  "From  all  these  beliefs,  all  these 
customs,  all  these  laws,  it  clearly  results  that  from  the  religion  of 
,  the  hearth  human  beings  learned  to  appropriate  the  soil  and  on  it 
\  based  their  title  to  it."  But,  really,  is  it  not  surprising  that  domestic 
religion  should  have  preceded  ownership  of  land  ?  And  Fustel  gives 
no  proof  whatever  of  such  a  thing!  The  opposite  may  very  well  have 
been  the  case — or  religion  and  ownership  of  land  may  have  devel- 
oped side  by  side.  It  is  evident  that  Fustel  has  the  preconceived  no- 
tion that  possession  has  to  have  a  "cause."  On  that  assumption,  he 
seeks  the  cause  and  finds  it  in  religion;  and  so  the  act  of  possession 
becomes  a  logical  action  derived  from  religion,  which  in  its  turn  can 
now  be  logically  derived  from  some  other  cause.  By  a  singular  coin- 
cidence it  happens  that  in  this  instance  Fustel  himself  supplies  the 
necessary  rectification.  A  little  earlier,  p.  63  (Small,  p.  78),  he  writes: 
"There  are  three  things  which,  from  the  most  ancient  times,  one 


174  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §255 

finds  founded  and  solidly  established  in  these  Greek  and  Italian 
communities:  domestic  religion,  the  family,  the  right  of  property — 
three  things  which  were  obviously  related  in  the  beginning  and 
which  seem  to  have  been  inseparable." 

How  did  Fustel  fail  to  see  that  his  two  passages  were  contradic- 
tory ?  If  three  things  A,  B,  C  are  "inseparable,"  one  of  them,  for  in- 
stance A,  cannot  have  produced  another,  for  instance  B:  for  if  A 
produced  B,  that  would  mean  that,  at  the  time,  A  was  separate  from 
B.  We  are  therefore  compelled  to  make  a  choice  between  the  two 
propositions.  If  we  keep  the  first,  we  have  to  discard  the  second,  and 
vice  versa.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  have  to  adopt  the  second,  discard- 
ing the  proposition  that  places  religion  and  property  in  a  relation- 
ship of  cause  and  effect,  and  keeping  the  one  that  puts  them  in  a 
relationship  of  interdependence  (§§  138,  267).  The  very  facts  noted 
by  Fustel  himself  force  that  choice  upon  us.  He  writes,  p.  64  (Small, 
p.  79):  "And  the  family,  which  by  duty  and  religion  remains 
grouped  around  its  altar,  becomes  fixed  to  the  soil  like  the  altar 
itself."  But  the  criticism  occurs  to  one  of  its  own  accord:  "Yes,  pro- 
vided that  be  possible!"  For  if  we  assume  a  social  state  in  which  the 
family  cannot  settle  on  the  soil,  it  is  the  religion  that  has  to  be  modi- 
fied. What  obviously  has  happened  is  a  series  of  actions  and  reac- 
tions, and  we  are  in  no  position  to  say  just  how  things  stood  in  the 
beginning.  The  fact  that  certain  people  came  to  live  in  separate  fam- 
ilies fixed  to  the  soil  had  as  one  of  its  manifestations  a  certain  kind 
of  religion;  and  that  religion,  in  its  turn,  contributed  to  keeping  the 
families  separate  and  fixed  to  the  soil  (§  1021). 

255.  In  this  we  have  an  example  of  a  very  common  error,  which 
lies  in  substituting  relationships  of  cause  and  effect  for  relationships 
of  interdependence  (§138);  and  that  error  gives  rise  to  still  an- 
other: the  error  of  placing  the  alleged  effect,  erroneously  regarded 
as  the  logical  product  of  the  alleged  cause,  in  the  class  of  logical 
actions. 

256.  When  Polybius  stresses  religion  as  one  of  the  causes  of  the 
power  of  Rome  (§  313),  we  will  accept  the  remark  as  very  sugges- 


§256        RATIONALIZATION  OF  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 75 

tive;  but  we  will  reject  the  logical  explanation  that  he  gives  of  the 

fact  (§313')- 

In  Sumner  Maine's  Anciejit  Law,  p.  122,  we  find  another  example 
like  Fustel's.  Maine  observes  that  ancient  societies  were  made  up  of 
families.  That  is  a  question  of  fact  which  we  choose  not  to  go  into — 
researches  into  origins  are  largely  hypothetical  anyway.  Let  us  accept 
Maine's  data  for  what  they  are  worth — just  as  hypotheses.  From  the 
fact  he  draws  the  conclusion  that  ancient  law  was  "adjusted  to  a  sys- 
tem of  small  independent  corporations."  That  too  is  good:  institu- 
tions adjust  themselves  to  states  of  fact!  But  then  suddenly  we  find 
the  notion  of  logical  conduct  creeping  stealthily  in,  p.  177:  "Men 
are  regarded  and  treated,  not  as  individuals,  but  always  as  members 
of  a  particular  group."  It  would  be  more  exact  to  say  that  men  are 
that  in  reality,  and  law,  accordingly,  develops  as  if  men  were  re- 
garded and  treated  as  members  of  a  particular  group. 

A  little  earlier,  Maine's  intromission  of  logical  conduct  is  more 
obtrusive.  Following  his  remark  that  ancient  societies  were  made 
up  of  small  independent  corporations,  he  adds,  p.  122:  "Corporations 
never  die,  and  accordingly  primitive  law  considers  the  entities  with 
which  it  deals,  i.e.,  patriarchal  or  family  groups,  as  perpetual  and 
inextinguishable."  From  that  Maine  derives  as  a  consequence  the 
institution  of  transmission,  upon  decease,  of  the  universitas  iuris, 
which  we  find  in  Roman  law.  Such  a  logical  sequence  may  easily  be 
compatible  with  a  posterior  logical  analysis  of  antecedent  non-logical 
actions,  but  it  does  not  picture  the  facts  accurately.  To  come  nearer 
to  them  we  have  to  invert  some  of  the  terms  in  Maine's  previous 
remarks.  The  succession  of  the  universitas  iuris  does  not  derive  from 
the  concept  of  a  continuous  corporation:  the  latter  concept  derives 
from  the  fact  of  succession.  A  family,  or  some  other  ethnic  group, 
occupies  a  piece  of  land,  comes  to  own  flocks,  and  so  on.  The  fact  of 
perpetuity  of  occupation,  of  possession,  is  in  all  probability  ante- 
cedent to  any  abstract  concept,  to  any  concept  of  a  law  of  inherit- 
ance. That  is  observable  even  in  animals.  The  great  felines  occupy 
certain  hunting-grounds  and  these  remain  properties  of  the  various 


176  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  ^^57 

families,  unless  human  beings  chance  to  interfere/  The  ant-hill  is 
perpetual,  yet  one  may  doubt  whether  ants  have  any  concept  of  the 
corporation  or  of  inheritance.  In  human  beings,  the  fact  gave  rise  to 
the  concept.  Then  man,  being  a  logical  animal,  had  to  discover  the 
'Vhy"  of  the  fact;  and  among  the  many  explanations  he  imagined, 
he  may  well  have  hit  upon  the  one  suggested  by  Sumner  Maine. 

Maine  is  one  of  the  writers  who  have  best  shown  the  difference 
between  customary  law  (law  as  fact)  and  positive  law  (law  as 
theory) ;  yet  he  forgets  that  distinction  time  and  again,  so  persuasive 
is  the  concept  that  posits  logical  conduct  everywhere.  Customary  law 
is  made  up  of  a  complex  of  non-logical  actions  that  regularly  recur. 
Positive  law  comprises  two  elements:  first,  a  logical — or  pseudo- 
logical  or  even  imaginary — analysis  of  the  non-logical  actions  in 
question;  second,  implications  of  the  principles  resulting  from  that 
analysis.  Customary  law  is  not  merely  primitive:  it  goes  hand  in 
hand  with  positive  law,  creeps  unobtrusively  into  jurisprudence,  and 
modifies  it.  Then  the  day  comes  when  the  theory  of  such  modifica- 
tions is  formulated — the  caterpillar  becomes  a  butterfly — and  posi- 
,  tive  law  opens  a  new  chapter. 

257.  Of  the  assassination  of  Caesar,  Duruy  writes :  ^  "Ever  since 
the  foundation  of  the  Republic  the  Roman  aristocracy  had  adroitly 
fostered  in  the  people  a  horror  for  the  name  of  king."  In  that  the 
logical  varnish  for  conduct  that  is  non-logical  is  easily  recognizable. 
Then  he  goes  on:  "If  the  monarchical  solution  answered  the  needs 
of  the  times,  it  was  almost  inevitable  that  the  first  monarch  should 
pay  for  his  throne  with  his  life,  as  our  Henry  IV  paid  for  his."  In 
such  "needs  of  the  times"  we  recognize  at  once  one  of  those  amiable 
fictions  which  historians  try  to  palm  off  as  something  concrete.  As 
for  the  law  that  first  monarchs  in  dynasties  have  to  die  by  assassina- 
tion, history  gives  no  experimental  proof  of  any  such  fact.  We  have 
to  see  in  it  a  mere  reminiscence  of  the  classical  jatum,  and  pack  it 

256  ^  On  the  shores  of  the  Lake  of  Geneva  one  may  see  flocks  of  swans  each  of 
which  occupies  a  certain  area  of  the  lake.  If  a  swan  of  one  flock  tries  to  invade  the 
territory  of  another  flock,  it  is  attacked,  beaten,  driven  off.  The  old  swans  die, 
young  ones  are  hatched  and  grow  up,  and  the  flock  endures  as  a  unit. 

257  ^  Histoire  des  Romains,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  411  (Mahaffy,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  398-99). 


II 


I 


§260  EVASIONS  OF  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 77 

off  to  keep  company  with  many  similar  products  of  the  scholarly 
fancy. 

258.  Shall  we  banish  from  history  the  prodigies  that  Suetonius 
never  forgets  to  enumerate  in  connexion  with  the  births  or  deaths 
of  the  Roman  Emperors,  without  trying  to  interpret  them — for  we 
shall  see  how  mistaken  such  an  effort  on  our  part  would  be  (§  672) 
— and  shall  we  keep  only  such  of  his  facts  as  are,  or  at  least  seem  to 
be,  historical?  Shall  we  do  the  same  with  all  similar  historical 
sources — for  instance,  with  histories  of  the  Crusades  ?  ^ 

In  doing  that  we  should  be  on  dangerous  ground,  for  if  we  made 
it  an  absolute  rule  to  divide  all  our  narrative  sources  into  two  ele- 
ments, one  miraculous,  incredible,  which  we  reject,  and  another 
natural,  plausible,  which  we  retain,  we  should  certainly  fall  into  very 
serious  errors  (§  674).  The  part  that  is  accepted  has  to  have  extrinsic 
probabilities  of  truth,  whether  through  the  demonstrable  credibility 
of  the  author  or  through  accord  with  other  evidence. 

259.  From  a  legend  we  can  learn  nothing  that  is  strictly  historical ; 
but  we  can  learn  something,  and  often  a  great  deal,  about  the  psy- 
chic state  of  the  people  who  invented  or  believed  it;  and  on  knowl- 
edge of  such  psychic  states  our  research  is  based.  We  shall  therefore 
often  cite  facts  without  trying  to  ascertain  whether  they  are  historical 
or  legendary;  because  for  the  use  we  are  going  to  make  of  them  they 
are  just  as  serviceable  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other — sometimes,  in- 
deed, they  are  better  legendary  than  historical. 

260.  Logical  interpretations  of  non-logical  conduct  become  in  their 
turn  causes  of  logical  conduct  and  sometimes  even  of  non-logical 
conduct;  and  they  have  to  be  reckoned  with  in  determining  the 
social  equilibrium.  From  that  standpoint,  the  interpretations  of  plain 
people  are  generally  of  greater  importance  than  the  interpretations 
of  scholars.  As  regards  the  social  equilibrium,  it  is  of  far  greater 
moment  to  know  what  the  plain  man  understands  by  "virtue"  than 
to  know  what  philosophers  think  about  it. 

258  ^  [I  read  these  sentences  as  interrogations.  They  are  declarative  in  the  original. 
Evidendy  the  paragraph  has  been  transferred  to  this  point  from  some  place  in 
Chap.  I,  Pareto  neglecdng  to  establish  connecdons. — A.  L.] 


178  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §261 

261.  Rare  the  writer  who  fails  to  take  any  account  of  non-logical 
conduct  whatever;  but  generally  the  interest  is  in  certain  natural 
inclinations  of  temperament,  which,  willynilly,  the  writer  has  to 
credit  to  human  beings.  But  the  eclipse  of  logic  is  of  short  duration — 
driven  off  at  one  point,  it  reappears  at  some  other.  The  role  of 
temperament  is  reduced  to  lowest  terms,  and  it  is  assumed  that 
people  draw  logical  inferences  from  it  and  act  in  accordance  with 
them, 

262.  So  much  for  the  general  situation.  But  in  the  particular, 
theorists  have  another  very  powerful  motive  for  preferring  to  think 
of  non-logical  conduct  as  logical.  If  we  assume  that  certain  conduct 
is  logical,  it  is  much  easier  to  formulate  a  theory  about  it  than  it  is 
when  we  take  it  as  non-logical.  We  all  have  handy  in  our  minds 
the  tool  for  producing  logical  inferences,  and  nothing  else  is  needed. 
Whereas  in  order  to  organize  a  theory  of  non-logical  conduct  we 
have  to  consider  hosts  and  hosts  of  facts,  ever  extending  the  scope  of 
our  researches  in  space  and  in  time,  and  ever  standing  on  our  guard 
lest  we  be  led  into  error  by  imperfect  documents.  In  short,  for  the 
person  who  would  frame  such  a  theory,  it  is  a  long  and  difficult  task 
to  find  outside  himself  materials  that  his  mind  supplied  directly 
with  the  aid  of  mere  logic  when  he  was  dealing  with  logical  conduct. 

263.  If  the  science  of  political  economy  has  advanced  much  farther 
than  sociology,  that  is  chiefly  because  it  deals  with  logical  conduct.'^ 
It  would  have  been  a  soundly  constituted  science  from  the  start  had 
it  not  encountered  a  grave  obstacle  in  the  interdependence  of  the 
phenomena  it  examines,  and  at  a  time  when  the  scholars  who  were 
devoting  themselves  to  it  were  unable  to  utilize  the  one  method  so 
far  discovered  for  dealing  with  interdependencies.  The  obstacle  was 
surmounted,  in  part  at  least,  when  mathematics  came  to  be  applied 
to  economic  phenomena,  whereby  the  new  science  of  mathematical 
economics  was  built  up,  a  science  well  able  to  hold  its  own  with  the 
other  natural  sciences." 

263  ^  Pareto,  Manuel,  pp.  145-46. 

263  ^  Two  very  important  books  on  mathematical  economics  are  Osorio's  Theorie 
mathematique  de  I'echange,  and  Moret's  L'emploi  des  mathematiqttes  en  economic 
politique. 


§267         RATIONALIZATION  OF  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 79 

264.  Other  considerations  tend  to  keep  thinkers  from  the  field  of 
non-logical  conduct  and  carry  them  over  into  the  field  of  the  logical. 
Most  scholars  are  not  satisfied  with  discovering  what  is.  They  are 
anxious  to  know,  and  even  more  anxious  to  explain  to  others,  what 
ought  to  be.  In  that  sort  of  research,  logic  reigns  supreme;  and  so 
the  moment  they  catch  sight  of  conduct  that  is  non-logical,  instead 
of  going  ahead  along  that  road  they  turn  aside,  often  seem  to  forget 
its  existence,  at  any  rate  generally  ignore  it,  and  beat  the  well-worn 
path  that  leads  to  logical  conduct. 

265.  Some  writers  likewise  rid  themselves  of  non-logical  actions 
by  regarding  them — often  without  saying  as  much  explicitly — as 
scandalous  things,  or  at  least  as  irrelevant  things,  which  should  have 
no  place  in  a  well-ordered  society.  They  think  of  them  as  "super- 
stitions" that  ought  to  be  extirpated  by  the  exercise  of  intelligence. 
Nobody,  in  practice,  acts  on  the  assumption  that  the  physical  and  the 
moral  constitution  of  an  individual  do  not  have  at  least  some  small 
share  in  determining  his  behaviour.  But  when  it  comes  to  framing 
a  theory,  it  is  held  that  the  human  being  ought  to  act  rationally,  and 
writers  deliberately  close  their  minds  to  things  that  the  experience 
of  every  day  holds  up  before  their  eyes. 

266.  The  imperfection  of  ordinary  language  from  the  scientific 
standpoint  also  contributes  to  the  wide-spread  resort  to  logical  in- 
terpretations of  non-logical  conduct. 

267.  It  plays  no  small  part  in  the  common  misapprehension  where- 
by two  phenomena  are  placed  in  a  relationship  of  cause  and  effect 
for  the  simple  reason  that  they  are  found  in  company.  We  have 
already  alluded  to  that  error  (§  255);  but  we  must  now  advance  a 
little  farther  in  our  study  of  it,  for  it  is  of  no  mean  importance  to 
sociology. 

Let  C,  as  in  Figure  3,  §  166,  stand  for  a  belief;  D,  for  certain  be- 
haviour. Instead  of  saying  simply,  "Some  people  do  D  and  believe 
C,"  ordinary  speech  goes  farther  and  says,  "Some  people  do  D  be- 
cause they  believe  C."  Taken  strictly,  that  proposition  is  often  false. 
Less  often  false  is  the  proposition,  "Some  people  believe  C  because 


l80  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §268 

they  do  D."  But  there  are  still  many  occasions  when  all  that  we  can 
say  is,  "Some  men  do  D  and  believe  C." 

In  the  proposition,  "Some  people  do  D  because  they  believe  C," 
the  logical  strictness  of  the  term  "because"  can  be  so  attenuated  that 
no  relationship  of  cause  and  effect  is  set  up  between  C  and  D.  We 
can  then  say,  "We  may  assume  that  certain  people  do  D  because 
they  have  a  belief  C  which  expresses  sentiments  that  impel  them  to 
do  D";  that  is  because  (going  back  to  Figure  3),  they  have  a  psychic 
state  A  that  is  expressed  by  C.  In  such  a  form  the  proposition  closely 
approximates  the  truth,  as  we  saw  in  §  166. 

268.  Figure  3  can  be  broken  up  into  three  others  (Figure  7). 


(I) 


(II)  \  (III) 


A  DA  D 

Figure  7 

I.  The  psychic  state  A  produces  the  belief  C  and  the  conduct  D, 
there  being  no  direct  relation  between  C  and  D.  That  is  the  situation 
in  the  proposition,  "People  do  D  and  believe  C." 

II.  The  psychic  state  A  gives  rise  to  the  conduct  D,  and  they  both 
produce  the  belief  C.  That  is  the  situation  in  the  second  proposition, 
"People  believe  C  because  they  do  D." 

III.  The  psychic  state  A  gives  rise  to  the  belief  C,  which  produces 
the  behaviour  D.  That  is  the  situation  in  the  proposition,  "People 
do  D  because  they  believe  C." 

269.  Although  case  III  is  not  the  only  case,  nor  even  the  most 
frequent  case,  people  are  inclined  to  regard  it  as  general  and  to 
merge  with  it  cases  I  and  II  to  which  they  preferably  attribute  little 
or  no  importance.  Ordinary  language,  with  its  lack  of  exactness, 
encourages  the  error,  because  a  person  may  state  case  III  explicitly 


§271  ARISTOTLE  181 

and  be  unconsciously  thinking  meantime  of  cases  I  and  II.  It  often 
happens,  besides,  that  we  get  mixtures  of  the  three  cases  in  varying 
proportions. 

270.  Aristotle  opens  his  Politics,  I,  i,  i  (Rackham,  p.  3),  with  the 
statement:  "Seeing  that  every  city  is  a  society  (Rackham,  "partner- 
ship") and  that  every  society  (partnership)  is  constituted  to  the  end 
of  some  good  (for  all  men  work  to  achieve  what  to  them  seems 
good)  it  is  manifest  that  all  societies  (partnerships)  seek  some  good." 
Here  we  stand  altogether  in  the  domain  of  logic:  with  a  deliberate 
purpose — ^the  purpose  of  achieving  a  certain  good — human  beings 
have  constituted  a  society  that  is  called  a  city.  It  would  seem  as 
though  Aristotle  were  on  the  point  of  going  off  into  the  absurdities 
of  the  "social  contract" !  But  not  so.  He  at  once  changes  tack,  and  the 
principle  he  has  stated  he  will  use  to  determine  what  a  city  ought  to 
be  rather  than  what  it  actually  is. 

271,  The  moment  Aristotle  has  announced  his  principle — an  asso- 
ciation for  purposes  of  mutual  advantage — he  tosses  it  aside  and 
gives  an  altogether  different  account  of  the  origin  of  society.  First 
he  notes  the  necessity  of  a  union  between  the  sexes,  and  soundly 
remarks  that  "that  does  not  take  place  of  deliberate  choice"  ^ ;  where- 
with, evidently,  we  enter  the  domain  of  non-logical  conduct.  He 
continues:  "Nature  has  created  certain  individuals  to  command  and 
others  to  obey."  Among  the  Greeks  Nature  has  so  distinguished 
women  and  slaves.  Not  so  among  the  Barbarians,  for  among  the 
Barbarians,  Nature  has  not  appointed  any  individuals  to  command. 
We  are  still,  therefore,  in  the  domain  of  non-logical  conduct;  nor  do 
we  leave  it  when  Aristotle  explains  that  the  two  associations  of 
master  and  slave,  husband  and  wife,  are  the  foundations  of  the 
family,  that  the  village  is  constituted  by  several  families,  and  that 
several  villages  form  a  state;  nor  when,  finally,  he  concludes  witli 
the  explicit  declaration  that  "Every  city,  therefore,  like  the  original 
associations,  comes  of  Nature."  "  One  could  not  allude  to  non-logical 
actions  in  clearer  terms. 

271  ^  Politica,  I,  I,  4  (Rackham,  p.  5) :  nol  tovto  ovk  Ik  Tvpoai/jtaeug  .  .  . 

271   ^  I,  1,8  (Rackham,  p.  9)  :  A(o  ivaaa  TrdXig  <p'va£i  kariv^  e'nrep  Kal  at  irourat  koivu- 


1 82  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §272 

272.  But,  alas,  if  the  city  comes  of  Nature,  it  does  not  come  of  the 
dehberate  will  of  citizens  who  get  together  for  the  purpose  of  achiev- 
ing a  certain  advantage!  There  is  an  inconsistency  between  the 
principle  first  posited  and  the  conclusion  reached/  Just  how  Aristotle 
fell  into  it  we  cannot  know,  but  to  accomplish  that  feat  for  oneself, 
one  may  proceed  in  the  following  fashion:  First  centre  exclusively 
on  the  idea  of  "city,"  or  "state."  It  will  then  be  easy  to  connect  city, 
or  state,  with  the  idea  of  "association,"  and  then  to  connect  associa- 
tion with  the  idea  of  deliberate  association.  So  we  get  the  first  prin- 
ciple. But  now  think,  in  the  second  place,  of  the  many  many  facts 
observable  in  a  city  or  a  state — the  family,  masters  and  slaves,  and  so 
on.  Deliberate  purpose  will  not  fit  in  with  those  things  very  well. 
They  suggest  rather  the  notion  of  something  that  develops  naturally. 
And  so  we  get  Aristotle's  second  description. 

273.  He  gets  rid  of  the  contradiction  by  metaphysics,  which  never 
withholds  its  aid  in  these  desperate  cases.  Recognizing  non-logical 
conduct,  he  says,  I,  i,  12  (Rackham,  pp.  11-13)  :  "It  is  therefore  mani- 
fest that  the  city  is  a  product  of  Nature  and  is  superior  (prior)  to 
man  (to  the  individual).  From  Nature  accordingly  comes  the  tend- 
ency (an  impulse)  in  all  men  toward  such  association.  Therefore 
the  man  who  first  founded  one  was  the  cause  of  a  very  great  good." 
So  then,  there  is  the  inclination  imparted  by  Nature;  but  it  is 
further  necessary  that  a  man  found  the  city.  So  a  logical  action  is 
grafted  upon  the  non-logical  action  (§306,  I-/3);  and  there  is  no 
help  for  that,  for,  says  Aristotle,  Nature  does  nothing  in  vain.^ 
Our  best  thanks,  therefore,  to  that  estimable  demoiselle  for  so  neatly 
rescuing  a  philosopher  from  a  predicament! 

272  ^  Similar  contradictions  are  observable  in  metaphysical  and  theological  dis- 
putes as  to  "free  will,"  "predestination,"  "efiEcacious  grace"  (§  280),  and  the  like. 
Pascal  well  ridicules  some  of  these  incoherences;  but,  speaking  as  a  metaphysicist  and 
theologian  himself,  he  replaces  them  with  arguments  that  are  worth  but  little 
more,  and  sometimes  less.  He  had  begun  by  saying,  Lettres  a  une  provinciale,  I,  p.  6: 
"I  never  quarrel  over  names,  provided  I  am  told  what  meanings  they  are  given"; 
and  with  that  he  was  almost  taking  his  stand  within  the  domain  of  logico-experi- 
mental  science  (§  119).  But  he  soon  relapses,  to  go  back  to  the  domain  of  meta- 
physics, theology,  sentiment. 

273  ^  I,  I,  10  (Rackham,  p.  11):  OvBiv  yap,  ug  (^afiev,  fidrr/v  i]  (pvaic  ttoleV.  Rackham: 
"does  nothing  without  a  purpose." 


§274         RATIONALIZATION  OF  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 83 

274.  In  distinguishing  the  Greeks  from  the  Barbarians  in  his  cele- 
brated theory  of  natural  slavery,  Aristotle  avails  himself  of  the  con- 
cept of  non-logical  conduct.  It  is  obvious,  among  other  things,  that 
logic  being  the  same  for  Greeks  and  Barbarians,  if  all  actions  were 
logical  there  could  not  be  any  difference  between  Greeks  and 
Barbarians.  But  that  is  not  all.  Good  observer  that  he  is,  Aristotle 
notices  differences  among  Greek  citizens.  Speaking  of  the  forms  of 
democracy  he  says,  VI,  2,  i  (Rackham,  pp.  497-98):  "Excellent  is 
an  agricultural  people;  consequently  one  can  institute  a  democracy 
where  a  people  lives  by  farming  and  sheep-raising."  And  he  repeats, 
VI,  2,  7  (Rackham,  p.  503):  "Next  after  farmers,  the  best  people 
are  shepherds,  or  people  who  live  by  owning  cattle.  .  .  .  The  other 
rabbles  on  which  other  sorts  of  democracy  are  based  are  greatly 
inferior."  Here  then  we  get  clearly  distinguished  classes  of  citizens 
and  almost  a  rudimentary  economic  determinism.  But  there  is  no 
reason  for  our  stopping  where  Aristotle  stops;  and  if  we  do  go  on  we 
see  that  in  general  the  conduct  of  human  beings  depends  on  their 
temperaments  and  occupations. 

Cicero  credits  the  ancestors  of  the  Romans  of  his  time  with  know- 
ing that  "the  characters  of  human  beings  result  not  so  much  from 
race  and  family  as  from  those  things  which  are  contributed  by  the 
nature  of  their  localities  for  the  ordinary  conduct  of  life,  and  from 
which  we  draw  our  livelihood  and  subsistence.  The  Carthaginians 
were  liars  and  cheats  not  by  race  but  from  the  nature  of  their  coun- 
try, which  with  its  port  and  its  contacts  with  all  sorts  of  merchants 
and  foreigners  speaking  different  languages  inclined  them  through 
love  of  profits  to  love  of  trickery.  The  mountaineers  of  Liguria  are 
harsh  and  uncouth.  .  .  .  The  Capuans  have  ever  been  a  supercilious 
people,  because  of  the  fertility  of  their  soil,  the  wealth  of  their  har- 
vests, the  salubriousness,  the  disposition,  and  the  beauty  of  their 
city."^ 

274  ^  De  lege  agraria,  II,  35,  95.  In  combating  the  Agrarian  Law  Cicero  was  try- 
ing to  persuade  his  fellow-citizens  that  a  colony  established  at  Capua  might  become 
dangerous  to  Rome.  For  that  reason  he  may  not  have  been  altogether  convinced 
by  his  own  argument.  But  we  need  not  go  into  that.  We  are  trying  to  ascertain  not 
Cicero's  personal  views,  but  the  opinions  current  in  his  time.  And  if  he  used  the 


184  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §275 

275.  In  his  Rhetoric,  II,  12-14  (Freese,  pp.  247-57),  Aristotle  makes 
an  analysis,  which  came  to  be  celebrated,  of  the  traits  of  man  accord- 
ing to  age — in  adolescence,  in  maturity,  and  in  senility.  He  pushes 
his  analysis  further  still,  II,  12, 17  (Freese,  pp.  257-63),  and  examines 
the  effects  on  character  of  noble  birth,  wealth,  and  power — a  splen- 
didly conducted  study.  But  all  that  evidently  carries  him  into  the 
domain  of  non-logical  conduct.^ 

argument  he  used,  it  means  that  he  thought  it  reflected  the  feeling  of  a  larger  or 
smaller  element  among  Roman  citizens. 

275  ^  One  may  also  detect  a  certain  conception  of  non-logical  conduct  in  the  fact 
that  Aristotle  ascribes  the  virtues — temperance,  justice,  courage,  and  so  on — to  the 
non-rational  part  of  the  human  being.  Magna  moralia,  I,  5,  i  (Stock,  p.  1185-b): 
"Foresight,  intelligence  (quickness  of  wit),  wisdom,  learning  (aptitude  for  learn- 
ing), memory,  and  other  similar  things  arise  in  the  rational  part  [of  the  soul].  In 
the  non-rational  one  finds  what  are  called  the  virtues:  temperance,  justice,  energy, 
and  all  other  moral  qualities  that  are  deemed  worthy  of  praise."  Aristotle's  doctrine 
of  the  logical  or  non-logical  character  of  conduct  in  general  was  perhaps  not  very 
clear — such  doctrines  rarely  are.  All  the  same  he  seems  to  have  recognized  non- 
Jogical  elements,  supplementing  them  with  logical  elements,  and  subordinating 
them  to  the  logical.  In  the  Politica,  VII,  12,  6  (Rackham,  p.  601),  he  says  that  three 
things  make  a  man  good  and  virtuous:  ^vcig^  edog,  ?i.6yog:  "nature,  habit,  rea- 
son." As  for  the  non-logical  element,  Aristotle  admits  that  himian  beings 
act,  in  part  at  least,  under  the  influence  of  external  circumstances,  such  as 
climate,  soil,  and  so  on.  In  Ibid.,  VII,  6  (Rackham,  pp.  565-66),  he  clearly  relates  the 
conduct  of  human  beings  to  such  circumstances;  and  in  De  partibiis  animahum,  II,  4 
[An  erroneous  reference:  read:  Historia  animalium,  VIII,  28-29  (Thompson,  pp.  606- 
07). — A.  L.],  he  explains  just  how  he  thinks  the  relationship  functions,  in  gen- 
eral, for  living  beings.  The  author  (Aristode  ?)  of  the  Probletnata,  offers,  XIV 
(Forster,  pp.  909-10),  additional  reflections  on  such  relationships.  So  far  we  are 
within  the  domain  of  the  non-logical.  But  the  writer  at  once  takes  steps  to  be  rid 
of  it  by  a  procedure  that  is  general  and  which  lies  in  subordinating  it  to  logic:  it 
becomes  the  material  with  which  reason  works.  Magiza  moralia,  I,  11,  3  (Stock, 
p.  1187-b):  "Judgment,  will,  and  all  that  is  in  accord  with  reason,  consdtute  the 
principle  of  conduct,  good  or  bad."  Aristotle  is  not  aware  that  in  that  he  is  con- 
tradicdng  what  he  said,  in  the  Politica,  that  people  who  live  in  cold  countries  are 
courageous.  In  this  case,  the  "principle"  of  courageous  acdon,  that  is  to  say,  the 
"judgment  and  will"  to  expose  oneself  to  peril,  is  determined,  according  to  Aristotle, 
by  climate  and  not  by  "reason."  He  thinks  he  clears  his  traces  by  saying.  Magna 
moralia,  I,  11,  5  (Stock,  loc.  cit.),  that  first  requisite  is  help  from  nature,  and  next 
will;  but  ignoring  any  metaphysical  quesdon  as  to  the  freedom  of  the  will,  which 
we  choose  not  to  go  into,  we  still  have  the  problem,  first  of  knowing  whether  the 
two  things  that  he  considers  independent  are  so  in  reality,  and  then  in  what  propor- 
tions they  figure  in  any  concrete  act.  Going  into  that  problem,  one  finds  that  there 
is  conduct  in  which  the  first  element,  the  non-logical,  prevails,  and  other  conduct 
in  which  the  second  element,  the  logical,  prevails. 

Aristotle  was  lured  from  the  scientific  path,  aside  from  metaphysical  considera- 


§278  PLATO  AND  ARISTOTLE  1 85 

276.  Aristotle  even  has  the  concept  of  evolution.  In  the  Politics, 
II,  5,  12  (Rackham,  pp.  129-31),  he  remarks  that  the  ancestors  of 
the  Greeks  probably  resembled  the  vulgar  and  ignorant  among  his 
contemporaries. 

277.  Had  Aristotle  held  to  the  course  he  in  part  so  admirably  fol- 
lov^ed,  we  Vi^ould  have  had  a  scientific  sociology  in  his  early  day. 
Why  did  he  not  do  so?  There  may  have  been  many  reasons;  but 
chief  among  them,  probably,  vv^as  that  eagerness  for  premature  prac- 
tical applications  which  is  ever  obstructing  the  progress  of  science, 
along  with  a  mania  for  preaching  to  people  as  to  what  they  ought 
to  do — an  exceedingly  bootless  occupation — instead  of  finding  out 
what  they  actually  do.  His  History  of  Animals  avoids  those  causes 
of  error,  and  that  perhaps  is  why  it  is  far  superior  to  the  Politics 
from  the  scientific  point  of  view. 

278.  It  might  seem  strange  to  find  traces  of  the  concept  of  non- 
logical  conduct  in  a  dreamer  like  Plato;  yet  there  they  are!  The 
notion  transpires  in  the  reasons  Plato  gives  for  establishing  his 
colony  far  from  the  sea.  To  be  near  the  sea  begins  by  "being  sweet" 
but  ends  by  "being  bitter"  for  a  city:  "for  filling  with  commerce  and 
traffic  it  develops  capricious,  untrustworthy  instincts,  and  a  breed 
of  tricksters."  ^  Non-logical  conduct  has  its  place  also  in  the  well- 
known  apologue  of  Plato  on  the  races  of  mankind.  The  god  who 
fashioned  men  mixed  gold  into  the  composition  of  those  fit  to  gov- 
ern, silver  in  guardians  of  the  state  (the  warriors),  iron  in  tillers  of 
the  soil  and  labourers.  Plato  also  has  a  vague  notion  of  what  we  are 
to  call  class-circulation,  or  circulation  of  elites  (§§2026f.).  He 
knows  that  individuals  of  the  silver  race  may  chance  to  be  born  in 
the  race  of  gold,  or  vice  versa,  and  so  for  the  other  races." 

tions,  by  that  great  enemy  of  all  social  science:  the  mania  for  achieving  some  prac- 
tical result.  In  the  Ethica  Nicomachea,  II,  2,  i  (Rackham,  p.  75),  he  says 
that  he  does  not  desire  to  confine  himself  to  theory  only:  "For  we  study  not  to 
know  what  virtue  is,  but  to  become  good;  otherwise  our  study  would  be  of  no 
use."  Aristotle  had  no  other  means  of  influencing  others  than  logical  argument;  and 
so  he  was,  as  he  had  to  be,  inclined  to  make  logic  the  controlling  force  in  human 
conduct. 

278  1  De  legibiis,  IV,  Aristotle,  PoUtica,  VII,  5,  also  discusses  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  proximity  to  the  sea. 

278  2  Respublica,  III,  21,  415 A.  And  cf.  my  Systtmes  socialistes,  Vol.  I,  p.  276. 


1 86  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §279 

279.  That  being  the  case,  if  one  would  remain  within  the  domain 
of  science,  one  must  go  on  and  investigate  the  probable  characteris- 
tics and  the  probable  evolution  of  a  society  made  up  of  different 
races  of  human  beings,  which  are  not  reproduced  from  generation  to 
generation  with  exactly  the  same  characteristics  and  which  are  able 
to  mix.  That  would  be  working  towards  a  science  of  societies.  But 
Plato  has  a  very  different  purpose.  He  is  little  concerned  with  what 
is.  He  strains  all  his  intellectual  capacities  to  discover  what  ought 
to  be.  And  thereupon  non-logical  conduct  vanishes,  and  Plato's  fancy 
goes  sporting  about  among  logical  actions,  which  he  invents  in  great 
numbers;  and  we  find  him  at  no  great  cost  to  himself  appointing 
magistrates  to  put  individuals  who  are  born  in  a  class  but  differ  in 
traits  from  their  parents  in  their  proper  places,  and  proclaiming  laws 
to  preserve  or  alter  morals — in  short,  deserting  the  modest  province 
of  science  to  rise  to  the  sublime  heights  of  creation. 

280.  The  controversies  on  the  question  "Can  virtue  be  taught?" 
also  betray  some  distant  conception  of  non-logical  conduct.  Accord- 
ing to  the  documents  in  our  possession,  it  would  seem  that  Socrates 
regarded  virtue  as  a  science  and  left  little  room  for  non-logical 
actions.^  Plato  and  Aristotle  abandon  that  extreme  position.  They 
hold  that  a  certain  natural  inclination  is  necessary  to  "virtue."  But 
that  inclination  once  premised,  back  they  go  to  the  domain  of  logic, 
which  is  now  called  in  to  state  the  logical  implications  of  tempera- 
ment, and  these  in  their  turn  determine  human  conduct.  Those 

280  ^  Ritter,  Geschichte  der  Philosophic  alter  Zeit,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  305  (Morrison, 
Vol.  Ill,  pp.  262-63):  "More  interested  in  didacticism  than  in  physic,  Socrates  sought 
the  principle  of  all  morality  strictly  in  dialectic.  So  virtue,  in  his  opinion,  had  no 
other  foundaton  than  reason  and  knowledge.  But  Plato  already  had  found  that 
courage  and  moderation,  two  necessary  phases  of  virtue,  must  pre-exist  in  the 
temperament  of  the  human  being,  whose  impulses  lie  in  the  heart,  not  in  the  head. 
Aristotle  went  even  farther  in  that  direcdon  and  clung  more  tightly  still  to  physic, 
for  which  he  had  a  temperamental  predilecdon.  As  the  first  principle  of  virtue  he 
takes  not  reason  but  natural  impulse  and  the  emotional  states  of  the  soul  {izaO?])." 
Zeller,  Philosophic  der  Griechen,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  118  (missing  in  Alleyne) :  [For  Socrates] 
"knowledge  is  not  just  an  indispensable  prerequisite,  not  just  an  auxiliary,  to  true 
morality:  it  directly  constitutes  all  morality;  and  when  knowledge  is  lacking,  he  is 
not  content  with  the  mere  recognition  of  an  imperfect  virtue:  he  cannot  see  any 
virtue  at  all.  Not  till  later  on,  in  Plato,  and  more  completely  in  Aristotle,  will  we 
find  a  correction  of  that  narrow  form  of  the  Socratic  doctrine  of  virtue." 


§282         RATIONALIZATION  OF   NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 87 

old  controversies  have  points  of  resemblance  vv^ith  the  disputes  which 
took  place  long  afterwards  on  "eflEcacious,"  and  "non-efficacious," 
grace. 

281.  The  procedure  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  in  the  controversies  on 
the  teaching  of  "virtue"  is  a  general  one.  Non-logical  actions  are 
credited  with  a  role  that  it  would  be  absurd  not  to  give  them,  but 
then  that  role  is  at  once  withdrawn,  and  people  go  back  to  the 
logical  implications  of  inclinations;  and  by  dividing  those  inclina- 
tions, which  in  fact  cannot  be  ignored,  into  "good"  ones  and  "bad" 
ones,  a  way  is  found  to  keep  inclinations  that  are  in  accord  with  the 
logical  system  one  prefers  and  to  eliminate  all  others. 

282.  St.  Thomas  tries  to  steer  a  deft  course  between  the  necessity 
of  recognizing  certain  non-logical  inclinations  and  a  great  desire 
to  give  full  sway  to  reason,  between  the  determinism  of  non-logical 
conduct  and  the  doctrine  of  free  will  that  is  implicit  in  logical  con- 
duct. He  says  that  "virtue  is  a  good  quality  or  disposition  {habitus) 
of  the  soul,  whereby  one  lives  uprightly,  which  no  one  uses  wrongly, 
and  which  God  produces  within  us  apart  from  any  action  by  our- 
selves." ^  Taken  as  a  "disposition  of  the  soul"  virtue  is  classed  with  ^ 
non-logical  actions;  and  so  it  is  when  we  say  that  God  produces  it 
in  us  apart  from  anything  we  do  of  ourselves.  But  by  that  divine 
interposition  any  uncertainty  as  to  the  character  of  non-logical  con- 
duct is  removed,  for  it  becomes  logical  according  to  the  mind  of  / 
God  and  therefore  logical  for  the  theologians  who  are  so  fortunate 
as  to  know  the  divine  mind.  Others  use  Nature  for  the  same  purpose 
and  with  the  same  results.  People  act  according  to  certain  inclina- 
tions. That  reduces  the  role  of  the  non-logical  to  a  minimum,  actions 
being  regarded  as  logical  consequences  of  the  inclinations.  Then 
even  that  very  modest  remnant  is  made  to  vanish  as  by  sleight-of- 
hand;  for  inclinations  are  conceived  as  imparted  by  some  entity 

282  ''- Sutnma  theologiae,  I^  IP^,  qu.  55,  art.  4  {Opera,  Vol.  VI,  p.  353):  "Virtus 
est  bona  qiialitas  seu  habitus  mentis  qua  recte  vivitur  et  qua  nullus  male  utitur  et 
quam  Deus  in  nobis  sine  nobis  operatur."  The  non-logical  character  of  certain  con- 
duct is  more  clearly  perceived  in  a  following  remark  by  the  Angelic  Doctor:  "But 
it  should  be  noted  that  of  the  active  dispositions  {hahituum  operativorum)  some  are 
always  towards  the  bad,  such  as  vicious  inclinations;  some  are  now  towards  the 
good,  now  towards  the  bad,  much  as  opinion  stands  towards  the  true  and  the  false.'* 


1 88  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §283 

(God,  Nature,  or  something  else)  that  acts  logically  (§  306,  l-(3) ;  so 
that  even  though  the  acting  subject  may  on  occasion  believe  that  his 
actions  are  non-logical,  those  who  know  the  mind,  or  the  logical 
procedure,  of  the  entity  in  question — and  all  philosophers,  sociolo- 
gists, and  the  like,  have  that  privilege — know  that  all  conduct  is 
logical. 

283.  The  controversy  between  Herbert  Spencer  and  Auguste 
Comte  brings  out  a  number  of  interesting  aspects  of  non-logical 
conduct. 

284.  In  his  Lectures  on  Positive  Philosophy  (Cours  de  philosophic 
positive)  Comte  seems  to  be  decidedly  inclined  to  ascribe  the  pre- 
dominance to  logical  conduct.  He  sees  in  positive  philosophy.  Vol.  I, 
pp.  48-49,  "the  one  solid  basis  for  that  social  reorganization 
which  is  to  terminate  the  critical  state  in  which  civilized  nations 
have  been  living  for  so  long  a  time."  So  then  it  is  the  business  of 
theory  to  reorganize  the  world!  How  is  that  to  come  about?  "Not 
to  readers  of  these  lectures  should  I  ever  think  it  necessary  to  prove 
that  ideas  govern  and  upset  the  world,  or,  in  other  terms,  that  the 
whole  social  mechanism  rests,  at  bottom,  on  opinions.  They  are 
acutely  aware  that  the  great  political  and  moral  crisis  in  present- 
day  society  is  due,  in  the  last  analysis,  to  our  intellectual  anarchy. 
Our  most  serious  distress  is  caused  by  the  profound  differences  of 
opinion  that  at  present  exist  among  all  minds  as  to  all  those  funda- 
mental maxims  the  stability  of  which  is  the  prime  requisite  for  a 
real  social  order.  So  long  as  individual  minds  fail  to  give  unanimous 
assent  to  a  certain  number  of  general  ideas  capable  of  constituting 
a  common  social  doctrine,  we  cannot  blind  ourselves  to  the  fact  that 
the  nations  will  necessarily  remain  in  an  essentially  revolutionary 
atmosphere.  ...  It  is  just  as  certain  that  if  this  gathering  of  minds 
to  one  communion  of  principles  can  once  be  attained,  the  appropri- 
ate institutions  will  necessarily  take  shape  from  it." 

285.  After  quoting  Comte's  dictum  that  ideas  govern  and  upset 
the  world,  Herbert  Spencer  advances  a  theory  that  non-logical 
actions  alone  influence  society.  "Ideas  do  not  govern  and  over- 
throw the  world:  the  world  is  governed  or  overthrown  by  feelings, 


§286  SPENCER  AND  COMTE  1 89 

to  which  ideas  serve  only  as  guides.  The  social  mechanism  does  not 
rest  finally  upon  opinions;  but  almost  wholly  upon  character.  Not 
intellectual  anarchy,  but  moral  antagonism,  is  the  cause  of  political 
crises.  All  social  phenomena  are  produced  by  the  totality  of  human 
emotions  and  beliefs.  .  .  .  Practically,  the  popular  character,  and  the 
social  state,  determine  what  ideas  shall  be  current;  instead  of  the 
current  ideas  determining  the  social  state  and  the  character.  The 
modification  of  men's  moral  natures  caused  by  the  continuous  dis- 
cipline of  social  life,  which  adapts  them  more  and  more  to  social 
relations,  is  therefore  the  chief  proximate  cause  of  social  progress."  ^ 

286.  Then  a  curious  thing  happens:  Comte  and  Spencer  reverse 
positions  reciprocally !  In  his  System  of  Positive  Polity,  Vol.  IV,  p.  5, 
Comte  decides  to  allow  sentiment  to  prevail,  and  expresses  himself 
very  clearly  on  the  point:  "Though  I  have  always  proclaimed  the 
universal  preponderance  of  sentiment,  I  have  had,  so  far,  to  devote 
my  attention  primarily  to  intelligence  and  activity,  which  prevail  in 
sociology.  But  the  very  real  ascendancy  they  have  acquired  having 
now  brought  on  the  period  of  their  real  systematization,  the  final 
purpose  of  this  volume  must  now  be  to  bring  about  a  definite  pre- 
dominance of  sentiment,  which  is  the  essential  domain  of  morality." 

Comte  is  straining  the  truth  a  little  when  he  says  that  he  has 
"always  proclaimed  the  universal  preponderance  of  sentiment."  No 
trace  of  any  such  preponderance  is  to  be  detected  in  his  Cours.  Ideas 
stand  in  the  forefront  there.  But  Comte  has  changed.  He  began  by 
considering  existing  theories,  which  he  wished  to  replace  with  others 
of  his  own  make;  and  in  that  battle  of  ideas,  his  own  naturally  won 
the  palm,  and  from  them  new  life  was  to  come  to  the  world.  But 
time  rolls  on.  Comte  becomes  a  prophet.  The  battle  of  ideas  is  over. 
He  imagines  he  has  won  a  complete  victory.  So  now  he  begins  pro- 
claiming dogma,  pronouncing  ex  cathedra,  and  it  is  only  natural 
that  nothing  but  sentiments  should  now  be  left  on  the  field — his 
own  sentiments,  of  course.^    \ 

285  ^  The  Classification  of  the  Sciences,  Addendum,  pp.  37-38. 

286  ^  Comte  is  to  an  extent  aware  of  the  evolution  he  has  undergone,  Systeme, 
Vol.  Ill,  Preface,  p.  vii:  "Comparing  this  volume  with  the  historical  portions  of  my 
fundamental  treatise,  it  will  be  noted  that  my  general  system  is  deeper  and  more 


190  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §287 

287.  Comte,  moreover,  began  by  hoping  to  make  converts  of 
people;  and  naturally  the  instrument  for  doing  that  was,  at  the  time, 
ideas.  But  he  ended  by  having  no  hope  save  in  a  religion  imposed 
by  force,  imposed  if  need  be  by  Czar  Nicholas,  by  the  Sultan,  or  at 
the  very  least  by  a  Louis  Napoleon  (w^ho  would  in  fact  have  done 
better  to  rest  content  with  being  just  a  dictator  in  the  service  of  Posi- 
tivism).^ In  this  scheme  sentiment  is  the  big  thing  beyond  shadow 
of  doubt,  and  one  can  no  longer  say  that  "ideas  govern  or  upset  the 
world."  It  would  be  absurd  to  suppose  that  Comte  turned  to  the 
Czar,  to  Reshid  Pasha,  or  to  Louis  Napoleon,  to  induce  them 
merely  to  preach  ideas  to  their  peoples.  One  might  only  object  that 
the  ideas  of  Comte  would  be  determining  the  religion  which  would 
later  be  imposed  upon  mankind;  and  in  that  case  ideas  would  be 
"upsetting  the  world,"  if  the  Czar,  the  Sultan,  Louis  Napoleon,  or 
some  other  well-intentioned  despot  saw  fit  to  take  charge  of  en- 
forcing Comte's  positivism  upon  mankind.  But  that  is  far  from 

complete,  whereas  my  special  demonstrations  are  less  developed.  From  the  latter 
point  of  view,  this  final  elaboration  of  my  philosophy  of  history  is  at  variance  with 
my  original  announcements,  which  promised  more  details  and  proofs  in  this  vol- 
ume than  in  my  first  outlines,  to  which,  instead,  I  am  now  obliged  to  refer  for  such 
things.  Brought  to  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  true  character  of  the  philosophical 
regime,  I  have  come  to  feel  that  systematic  assertions,  which  I  first  regarded  as 
something  merely  provisory,  should  be  the  normal  rule  of  any  truly  systematic  ex- 
position. The  progress  I  have  made  and  the  prestige  it  has  won  for  me  allow  me 
in  my  advancing  years  to  fall  in  with  the  free  and  rapid  stride  of  my  chief  prede- 
cessors, Aristotle,  Descartes,  and  Leibnitz,  who  simply  formulated  their  thoughts, 
leaving  the  task  of  verifying  and  developing  them  to  their  readers.  That  division 
of  labour  in  intercourse  between  minds  is  at  once  the  most  honourable  for  the  in- 
itiated and  the  most  profitable  for  founders."  And  in  this  last,  Comte  is  unques- 
tionably right!  It  is  no  litde  convenience  if  one  can  manage  to  be  believed  without 
being  pestered  for  proofs! 

287  ^  Systewe,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  377-78:  "To  modify  public  life,  it  is  enough  for  [the 
Priesthood  of  Humanity]  that  circumstances  shall  have  brought  to  the  fore  some 
preponderant  and  responsible  will.  That  condition  has  been  fairly  well  provided  for 
in  France  since  the  advent  of  the  Dictatorship,  which  frees  organized  doctrine  from 
the  irksome  obligation  of  deferring  to  legislatures  that  are  ever  disposed  to  perpetu- 
ate a  revolutionary  condition,  even  when  they  are  reactionary.  .  .  .  Without  having 
to  convert  either  the  public  or  its  leaders.  Positivism,  therefore,  in  virtue  of  its  fun- 
damental truth  and  its  utter  seasonableness,  can  win  a  partial  ascendancy  adequate 
for  realizing  the  final  transition,  even  unbeknown  to  the  principal  supporters  of  the 
movement."  An  action  that  takes  place  unbeknown  to  the  individual  who  performs 
it  obviously  belongs  to  the  genus  of  non-logical  actions. 


§291  RATIONALIZATION  OF   NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  I9I 

being  the  meaning  one  gathers  from  the  statements  in  the  Corns. 

288.  Comte  recognizes,  in  fact  he  greatly  exaggerates,  the  social 
influence  of  public  worship  and  its  efficacy  in  education — all  of 
which  is  just  a  particular  case  of  the  efficacy  of  non-logical  impulses. 
If  Comte  could  have  rested  satisfied  with  being  just  a  scientist,  he 
might  have  written  an  excellent  book  on  the  value  of  religions  and 
taught  us  many  things.  But  he  wanted  to  be  the  prophet  of  a  new 
religion.  Instead  of  studying  the  effects  of  historical  or  existing  forms 
of  worship,  he  wanted  to  create  a  new  one — an  entirely  different 
matter.  So  he  gives  just  another  illustration  of  the  harm  done  to 
science  by  the  mania  for  practical  applications. 

289.  Spencer,  on  the  other  hand,  after  admitting,  even  too  sweep- 
ingly,  the  influence  of  non-logical  actions,  eliminates  them  altogether 
by  the  general  procedure  described  in  §  261.  Says  he:  "Our  postulate 
must  be  that  primitive  ideas  are  natural,  and,  under  the  conditions 
in  which  they  occur,  rational,"  ^  Driven  out  by  the  door,  logic  here 
climbs  back  through  the  window.  "In  early  life  we  have  been  taught 
that  human  nature  is  everywhere  the  same.  .  .  .  This  error  we  must 
replace  by  the  truth  that  the  laws  of  thought  are  everywhere  the 
same;  and  that,  given  the  data  as  known  to  him,  the  primitive  man's 
inference  is  the  reasonable  inference"  (§§701,  711). 

290.  In  assuming  any  such  thing,  Spencer  puts  himself  in  the 
wrong  in  his  controversy  with  Comte.  If  human  beings  always  draw 
logical  inferences  from  the  data  they  have  before  them,  and  if  they 
act  in  accordance  with  such  inferences,  then  we  are  left  with  nothing 
but  logical  conduct,  and  it  is  ideas  that  "govern  or  upset  the  world." 
There  is  no  room  left  for  those  sentiments  to  which  Spencer  was 
disposed  to  attribute  that  capacity;  there  is  no  way  for  them  to  crowd 
into  a  ready-made  aggregate  composed  of  experimental  facts,  how- 
ever badly  observed,  and  of  logical  inferences  derived  from  such 
facts. 

291.  The  principle  advanced  by  Spencer  makes  sociology  very 
easy,  especially  if  it  be  combined  with  two  other  Spencerian  prin- 
ciples: unitary  evolution,  and  the  identity,  or  quasi-identity,  of  the 

289  ^  Principles  of  Sociology,  Vol.  I,  §  52. 


192  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §292 

savages  of  our  time  with  primitive  man  (§§  728,  731).  Accounts  by 
travellers,  more  or  less  accurate  and  more  or  less  soundly  interpreted, 
give  us,  Spencer  thinks,  the  data  that  primitive  man  had  at  his  dis- 
posal; and  v^here  such  accounts  fail,  we  fill  in  the  gaps  with  our 
imagination,  which,  when  it  cannot  get  the  real,  takes  the  plausible. 
That  gives  us  all  we  need  for  a  sociology,  for  we  have  only  to 
determine  the  logical  implications  of  the  data  at  hand,  without 
wasting  too  much  time  on  long  and  difficult  historical  researches. 

292.  In  just  that  way  Spencer  sets  about  discovering  the  origin 
and  evolution  of  religion.  His  primitive  man  is  like  a  modern  sci- 
entist working  in  a  laboratory  to  frame  a  theory.  Primitive  man  of 
course  has  very  imperfect  materials  at  his  disposal.  That  is  why, 
despite  his  logical  thinking,  he  can  reach  only  imperfect  con- 
clusions. All  the  same  he  gets  some  philosophical  notions  that  are 
not  a  little  subtle.  Spencer,  Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  §  154,  represents  as  a  "prim- 
itive" idea  the  notion  that  "any  property  characterizing  an  aggre- 
gate inheres  in  all  parts  of  it."  If  you  are  desirous  of  testing  the 
validity  of  that  theory  you  need  only  state  the  proposition  to  some 
moderately  educated  individual  among  your  friends,  and  you  will 
see  at  once  that  he  will  not  have  the  remotest  idea  of  what  you  are 
talking  about.  Yet  Spencer,  loc.  cit.,  believes  that  your  friend  will 
go  on  and  draw  logical  conclusions  from  something  he  does  not 
understand:  "The  soul,  present  in  the  body  of  the  dead  man  pre- 
served entire,  is  also  present  in  preserved  parts  of  his  body.  Hence 
the  faith  in  relics."  Surely  Spencer  could  never  have  discussed  that 
subject  with  some  good  Catholic  peasant  woman  on  the  Continent. 
The  argument  he  maps  out  might  possibly  lead  a  philosopher  en- 
amoured of  logic  to  believe  in  relics,  but  it  has  nothing  whatever  to 
do  with  popular  beliefs  in  relics/ 

293.  So  Spencer's  procedure  has  points  of  similarity  with  Comte's 
procedure.  In  general  terms,  one  might  state  the  situation  in  this 
fashion:  we  have  two  things,  P  and  Q  (Figure  8),  that  have  to  be 
considered  in  determining  the  social  order  R.  We  begin  by  asserting 
that  Q  alone  determines  that  order;  then  we  show  that  ?  determines 
p.  So  p  is  eliminated,  and  P  alone  determines  the  social  order. 


§296  JOHN  STUART  MILL  1 93 

294.  If  Q  designates  "ideas"  and  P  "sentiments,"  we  get,  roughly, 
the  evolution  of  Comte's  theories.  If  Q  designates  "sentiments"  and  P 
"ideas,"  we  get,  roughly,  the  evolution  of  Spencer's  theories. 

295.  That  is  confirmed  by  the  remarks  of  John  Stuart  Mill  on 
the  controversy  between  Comte  and  Spencer.  Says  he :  ^  "It  will  not 
be  found,  on  a  fair  examination  of  what  M.  Comte  has  written, 
that  he  has  overlooked  any  of  the  truth  that  there  is 
in  Mr.  Spencer's  theory.  He  would  not  indeed  have 
said  (what  Mr.  Spencer  apparently  wishes  us  to 
say)  that  the  effects  which  can  be  historically 
traced,  for  example,  to  religion,  were  not  produced 
by  the  belief  in  God,  but  by  reverence  and  fear  of 
Him.  He  would  have  said  that  the  reverence  and 
fear  presuppose  the  belief:  that  a  God  must  be  be-  ''  Figure  8 
lieved  in  before  he  can  be  feared  or  reverenced." 

That  is  the  very  procedure  in  question!  P  is  the  belief  in  God;  Q, 
sentiments  of  fear  and  reverence ;  P  produces  Q,  and  so  becomes  the 
cause  determining  conduct! 

296.  To  a  perfect  logician  like  Mill  it  seems  absurd  that  anyone 
could  experience  fear  unless  the  feeling  be  logically  inferred  from 
a  subject  capable  of  inspiring  fear.  He  should  have  remembered  the 
verse  of  Statius, 

"Primus  in  or  be  deos  fecit  timor,"  ^ 

and  then  he  would  have  seen  that  a  course  diametrically  opposite 
is  perfectly  conceivable.^  That  granted,  what  was  the  course  pursued 

295  ^  The  Positive  Philosophy  of  Aitgttste  Comte,  p.  96  (London,  p.  103). 

296  1  Thebaid,  III,  v.  661.  The  scholiast  Lactantius  [read  Luctatius  Placidus;  see 
Knaack,  Rhenisches  Museum  jilr  Philologie,  Vol.  56,  p.  166. — A.  L.]  annotates  [not 
very  keenly]  (Leyden,  p.  406) :  "He  says  that  the  gods  are  worshipped  for  no  other 
reason  than  the  fear  of  mortals.  As  Lucan  says,  Pharsalia,  I,  v.  486:  'They  fear 
inventions  of  their  own  devising'  {quae  finxere  timent).  Petronius  \Fragmenta, 
XXVII]  follows  Statius:  'Fear  first  created  gods  on  earth.'  And  Mintanor  Musicus 
writes:  '.  ,  .  the  gods,  whom  humanity  first  invented  under  sting  of  pain.'  " 

296  2  Holbach,  Systeme  de  la  nature,  Vol.  I,  pp.  448,  456:   "Mankind  has  ever 

derived  its  basic  ideas  on  divinity  from  ignorance,  fear,  and  calamity.  .  .  .  Man's 

earliest  theology  taught  him  first  to  fear  and  worship  the  elements  themselves,  and 
crude  material  objects." 


194  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL   SOCIOLOGY  ^^97 

in  reality  ?  Or  better,  what  were  the  various  courses  pursued  ?  It  is  for 
historical  documents  to  answer,  and  we  cannot  let  our  fancy  take 
the  place  of  documents  and  pass  off  as  real  anything  that  seems 
plausible  to  us.  We  have  to  know  how  things  actually  took  place, 
and  not  how  they  should  have  taken  place,  in  order  to  satisfy  a 
strictly  logical  intelligence/ 

297.  In  other  connexions,  Mill  is  perfectly  well  aware  of  the  social 
importance  of  non-logical  actions.  But  he  at  once  withdraws  the  con- 
cession, in  part  at  least,  and  instead  of  going  on  with  what  is,  turns 
to  speculations  as  to  what  ought  to  be.  That  is  the  general  procedure; 
and  many  writers  resort  to  it  to  be  rid  of  non-logical  conduct. 

298.  In  his  book  On  Liberty,  p.  i6.  Mill  writes,  for  example: 
"Men's  opinions  ...  on  what  is  laudable  or  blameable,  are  affected 
by  all  the  multifarious  causes  which  influence  their  wishes  in  regard 
to  the  conduct  of  others,  and  which  are  as  numerous  as  those  which 
determine  their  wishes  on  any  other  subject:  sometimes  their  reason 
— at  other  times  their  prejudices  or  superstitions:  often  their  social 
affections,  not  seldom  their  antisocial  ones,  their  envy  or  jealousy, 
their  arrogance  or  contemptuousness :  but  most  commonly,  their  de- 
sires or  fears  for  themselves — their  legitimate  or  illegitimate  self- 
interest.  Wherever  there  is  an  ascendant  class,  a  large  portion  of  the 
morality  of  the  country  emanates  from  its  class  interests,  and  its 
feelings  of  class  superiority." 

All  that,  with  a  few  reservations,  is  well  said  and  approximately 
pictures  the  facts.^  Mill  might  have  gone  on  in  that  direction,  and 
inquired,  since  he  was  dealing  with  liberty,  into  the  relations  of  lib- 
erty to  the  motives  he  assigns  to  human  conduct.  In  that  event,  he 
might  have  made  a  discovery:  he  might  have  seen  that  he  was  in- 
volved in  a  contradiction  in  trying  with  all  his  might  to  transfer 
political  power  to  "the  greatest  number,"  while  at  the  same  time 

296  ^  We  noted  Cicero's  view  of  the  practices  of  Roman  divination  in  §  182^: 
De  divinatione,  I,  3,  3:  "Atqtte  haec,  tit  ego  arbitror,  veteres  rertim  magis  eventis 
moniti  quam  ratione  docti  probavernnt."  That  is  very  often  the  case:  the  fact,  the 
non-logical  action,  comes  first,  then  the  explanation  of  the  fact,  the  logical  varnish. 

298  ^  The  reservations  relate  to  Mill's  not  very  exact  use  of  terms  such  as  "legiti- 
mate" and  "illegitimate."  But  Mill  cannot  be  specially  blamed  for  that.  It  is  a  de- 
fect common  to  almost  all  writers  who  deal  with  such  subjects. 


§299         RATIONALIZATION  OF   NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 95 

defending  a  "liberty"  that  was  incompatible  with  the  prejudices, 
sentiments,  and  interests  of  said  "greatest  number."  That  discovery 
would  then  have  enabled  him  to  make  a  prophecy — one  of  the 
fundamental  functions  of  science;  namely,  to  foresee  that  liberty,  as 
he  conceived  it,  was  progressively  to  decline,  as  being  contrary  to 
the  motives  that  he  had  established  as  determinants  of  the  aspira- 
tions of  the  class  which  was  about  to  become  the  ruling  class. 

299.  But  Mill  thought  less  of  things  as  they  are  than  of  things  as 
they  ought  to  be.  He  says.  Ibid.,  p.  22:  "He  [a  man]  cannot  right- 
fully be  compelled  to  do  or  forbear  because  it  will  be  better  for  him 
to  do  so,  because  it  will  make  him  happier,  because,  in  the  opinions 
of  others,  to  do  so  would  be  wise,  or  even  right.  These  are  good 
reasons  for  remonstrating  with  him,  or  reasoning  with  him,  or  per- 
suading him,  or  entreating  him,  but  not  for  compelling  him,  or 
visiting  him  with  any  evil  in  case  he  do  otherwise."  ^ 

299  ^  Mill,  innocent  soul,  goes  on  to  say,  loc.  cit.:  "To  justify  that  [such  con- 
straint], the  conduct  from  which  it  is  desired  to  deter  him  must  be  calculated  to 
produce  evil  to  someone  else."  He  did  not  realize  that  sophistries  are  never  wanting 
to  show  that  the  damage  is  there.  Notice  what  happens  in  countries  where  people 
set  out  to  enforce  temperance  and  virtue  in  the  holy  name  of  "Progress":  Giornale 
d'ltalia,  March  19,  1912:  "Atlanta,  Georgia,  March  2.  Last  evening  Commendatore 
Alessandro  Bonci,  who  was  stopping  here  temporarily  in  connexion  with  profes- 
sional engagements,  was  arrested  at  the  Georgian  Terrace  Hotel,  together  with  his 
wife,  his  secretary,  and  his  pianist,  for  violating  the  liquor  law.  It  seems  that  Signor 
Bonci  and  his  friends,  like  good  Italians,  who  serve  wine  two  meals  a  day  at  least, 
had  adopted  an  ingenious  device  for  doing  so  in  spite  of  the  law  that  forbids  the 
use  of  wines  and  liquors  in  the  State  of  Georgia.  For  several  days  the  manager  of 
the  hotel  had  noticed  that  towards  the  middle  of  their  meals  the  Boncis  and  their 
friends  were  in  the  habit  of  setting  on  the  table  four  litde  bottles  such  as  are  used 
by  druggists,  with  labels  giving  directions  for  using  the  presumptive  'medicines.' 
The  regularity  with  which  the  Bonci  party  drank  the  contents  of  the  botdes  twice 
a  day,  as  though  each  member  of  it  were  suffering  from  the  same  disease  and  re- 
quired the  same  treatment,  at  length  aroused  the  suspicions  of  the  house  detecdve. 
He  mentioned  the  matter  to  a  zealous  policeman,  who  last  evening,  when  the  time 
for  the  'treatment'  came,  confiscated  the  bottles.  Each  of  them  was  found  to  have 
the  capacity  of  a  wine-glass  and  to  contain  nothing  but  excellent  Chianti,  with 
which,  it  seems,  Commendatore  Bonci  travels  well  supplied  in  order  to  cope  with 
the  surprises  of  American  law.  Despite  the  hvely  protestations  of  Signor  Bonci,  the 
four  offenders  were  put  into  an  automobile  and  taken  to  the  Court  House,  where 
Judge  Ralendorf,  after  a  summary  inquiry,  continued  the  case  dll  this  morning, 
fixing  bail  at  $2,000.  Then  came  the  best,  not  to  say  the  worst,  of  it.  The  celebrated 


196  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §300 

That  may  be  a  "good  justice,"  but  it  is  not  the  justice  handed  out 
to  us  by  our  masters,  who  each  year  favour  us  with  new  laws  to  pre- 
vent our  doing  the  very  things  that  Mill  says  people  should  be 
allowed  to  do.  His  preaching,  therefore,  has  been  altogether  without 
effect. 

300.  In  certain  writers  the  part  played  by  non-logical  actions  is 
suppressed  altogether,  or  rather,  is  regarded  merely  as  the  excep- 
tional part,  the  "bad"  part.  Logic  alone  is  a  means  to  human  prog- 
ress. It  is  synonymous  with  "good,"  just  as  all  that  is  not  logical  is 
synonymous  with  "evil."  But  let  us  not  be  led  astray  by  the  word 
"logic."  Belief  in  logic  has  nothing  to  do  with  logico-experimental 
science;  and  the  worship  of  Reason  may  stand  on  a  par  with  any 
other  religious  cult,  fetishism  not  excepted. 

301.  Condorcet  expresses  himself  as  follows:^  "So  a  general 
knowledge  of  the  natural  rights  of  man;  the  opinion,  even,  that 
such  rights  are  inalienable  and  unprescribable ;  a  prayer  voiced  aloud 
for  liberty  of  thought  and  press,  for  freedom  of  commerce  and 
industry,  for  succour  of  the  people  .  .  .  indifference  to  all  religions 
— classified,  at  last,  where  they  belong  with  superstitions  and  politi- 
cal devices  [The  good  soul  fails  to  notice  that  his  worship  of  Prog- 
ress is  itself  a  religion!] — hatred  and  hypocrisy  and  fanaticism; 
contempt  for  prejudices;  zeal  for  the  propagation  of  enlightenment 
— all  became  the  common  avowal,  the  distinguishing  mark,  of  any- 
one who  was  neither  a  Machiavellian  nor  a  fool."  Preaching  re- 
tenor  found  he  had  no  more  than  $150  in  his  pocket,  and  he  was  faced  with  the 
prospect  of  spending  the  night  in  jail." 

We  may  guess  that  if  Signor  Bonci  had  remembered  that  the  ointment  of  St. 
John  Goldmouth  may  be  used  on  the  hands  of  American  reformers  with  as  good 
effect  as  it  had  in  Boccaccio's  time  on  the  hands  of  our  virtuous  Italian  Inquisitors, 
he  might  have  escaped  such  annoyance.  In  general  terms:  You  happen  to  be  in  the 
dining-car  when  the  train  enters  one  of  the  abstemious  states  of  the  American 
Union,  and  the  glass  of  wine  that  you  were  about  to  drink  is  snatched  from  the 
table  in  front  of  you.  If  you  ask,  "What  harm  am  I  doing  to  my  neighbour  by 
drinking  this  glass  of  wine.''",  the  answer  comes  quick  and  prompt:  "You  are  setting 
a  bad  example!"  And  the  rabble  that  enforces  its  will  upon  you  in  that  fashion 
speaks  with  indignation  of  Spanish  Catholics  who,  to  prevent  setting  bad  examples, 
refuse  to  tolerate  in  Spain  any  public  worship  except  the  Roman  Catholic! 

301  ^  Esquisse  d'un  tableau  historiqtte  des  progres  de  I'esprit  liumain,  pp.  264-65. 


I 


§303  CONDORCET  AND  HOLBACH  1 97 

ligious  toleration,  Condorcet  is  not  aware  that  he  is  betraying  an 
intolerance  of  his  own  when  he  treats  dissenters  from  his  religion 
of  Progress  the  way  the  orthodox  have  always  treated  heretics.  It  is 
true  that  he  considers  himself  right  and  his  adversaries  wrong,  be- 
cause his  own  religion  is  good  and  theirs  bad;  but  that,  inverting 
terms,  is  exactly  what  they  say  too. 

302.  Maxims  from  Condorcet  and  other  writers  of  his  time  are 
still  quoted  by  humanitarian  fanatics  today.  Condorcet  continues,  p. 
292:  "All  errors  in  politics  and  morals  are  based  on  philosophical 
errors,  which  are  in  turn  connected  with  errors  in  physic.  There  is 
no  religious  system,  no  supernatural  extravagance,  that  is  not 
grounded  on  ignorance  of  the  laws  of  nature."  But  he  himself  gives 
proof  of  just  such  ignorance  when  he  tries  to  have  us  swallow 
absurdities  like  the  following,  p.  345:  "What  vicious  practice  is  there, 
what  custom  contrary  to  good  faith,  nay,  what  crime,  that  cannot 
be  shown  to  have  its  cause  and  origin  in  the  laws,  the  institutions, 
the  prejudices,  of  the  country  in  which  that  practice,  that  custom, 
is  observed,  that  crime  committed?"  And  he  concludes  finally,  p. 
346,  that  "nature  links  truth,  happiness,  and  virtue  with  chain 
unsunderable." 

303.  Similar  ideas  are  common  among  the  French  philosophes 
of  the  later  eighteenth  century.  In  their  eyes  every  blessing  doth  from 
"reason"  flow,  every  ill  from  "superstition."  Holbach  sees  the  source 
of  all  human  woe  in  error;  ^  and  that  belief  has  endured  as  one  of 

303  '^Systeme  de  la  nature.  Vol.  I,  pp.  398-409:  "The  errors  of  mankind  as  to 
what  constitutes  happiness  are  the  real  source  of  its  troubles.  Inefficacy  of  proposed 
remedies.  ...  If  we  consult  experience,  we  see  that  the  real  source  of  that  multi- 
tude of  woes  that  everywhere  afBict  the  human  race  is  to  be  sought  in  sacred  opin- 
ions and  illusions.  Ignorance  of  natural  causes  first  created  gods  for  humanity:  im- 
posture clothed  them  with  terror.  The  deadly  thought  of  them  pursued  the  human 
being  without  making  him  better,  filled  him  with  fears  to  no  purpose,  packed  his 
mind  with  nightmares,  blocked  the  progress  of  his  intelligence,  prevented  him  from 
seeking  his  own  welfare.  His  fears  enslaved  him  to  deceivers  who  made  pretence 
of  working  his  weal.  .  .  .  Prejudices  no  less  dangerous  have  blinded  men  as  to 
their  rulers.  ...  A  similar  blindness  we  find  in  the  science  of  morals.  ...  So 
humanity's  burden  of  woe  has  no  whit  been  lightened,  but  has  been  made  heavier 
rather  by  his  rehgions,  his  governments,  his  education,  his  opinions,  in  a  word  by  all 
the  institutions  that  he  has  been  persuaded  to  adopt  [By  whom  persuaded .?  By  someone 


198  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCTOLOGY  §304 

the  dogmas  of  the  humanitarian  religion,  holiest  of  holies,  of  which 
our  present-day  "intellectuals"  form  the  priesthood." 

304.  All  these  people  fail  to  notice  that  the  worship  of  "Rea- 
son," "Truth,"  "Progress,"  and  other  similar  entities  is,  like  all  cults, 
to  be  classed  with  non-logical  actions.  It  was  born,  it  has  flourished, 
and  it  continues  to  prosper,  for  the  purpose  of  combating  other 
cults,  just  as  in  Graeco-Roman  society  the  oriental  cults  arose  out 
of  opposition  to  the  polytheistic  cult,. At  that  time  one  same  current 
of  non-logical  conduct  found  its  multiple  expression  in  the  tauro- 
bolium,  the  criobolium,  the  cult  of  Mithras,  the  growing  importance 
of  mysteries,  Neo-Platonism,  mysticism,  and  finally  Christianity, 
which  was  to  triumph  over  rival  cults,  none  the  less  borrowing  many 
things  from  them.  So,  toward  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  and 
the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth,  one  same  current  of  non-logical 
conduct  finds  its  expression  in  the  theism  of  the  philosophes,  the 
sentimental  vagaries  of  Rousseau,  the  cult  of  "Reason"  and  the 
"Supreme  Being,"  the  love  of  the  First  Republic  for  the  number  10, 
theophilanthropy  (of  which  the  "positivist"  religion  of  Comte  is 
merely  an  offshoot),  the  religion  of  Saint-Simon,  the  religion  of 
pacifism,  and  other  religions  that  still  survive  to  our  times. 

These  considerations  belong  to  a  much  more  comprehensive  order, 
properly  relating  to  the  subjective  aspect  of  theories  indicated  in 
§  13.  In  general,  in  other  words,  we  have  to  ask  ourselves  why  and 
how  individuals  come  to  evolve  and  accept  certain  theories.  And, 
in  particular,  now  that  we  have  identified  one  such  purpose — the 
purpose  of  giving  logical  status  to  conduct  that  does  not  possess  it 
— we  have  to  ask  by  what  means  and  devices  that  purpose  is 
achieved.  From  the  objective  standpoint,  the  error  in  the  arguments 

not  of  the  human  species?]  on  pretence  that  his  lot  would  be  made  more  bearable. 
It  cannot  be  too  often  repeated:  In  error  lies  the  true  source  of  the  ills  that  afflict 
the  himian  race.  Not  with  Nature  lies  the  responsibility  for  human  unhappiness. 
No  angry  God  ever  willed  that  humanity  should  live  in  tears.  No  hereditary  de- 
pravity made  mortals  wicked  and  miserable.  Those  deplorable  consequences  are  all 
and  exclusively  due  to  error." 

303  ^  Elie  Reclus,  Les  primitifs,  p.  161:  "Since  morality  is  measured,  along  its 
general  lines  at  least,  by  intellectual  development,  no  surprise  will  be  occasioned  by 
finding  it  very  rudimentary  here  [among  the  Redskins]." 


§306         RATIONALIZATION  OF   NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  1 99 

just  noted  lies  in  their  giving  an  a  priori  answer  to  the  questions 
stated  in  §  14,  and  in  maintaining  that  a  theory  needs  simply  to  be 
in  accord  with  the  facts  to  be  advantageous  to  society.  That  error 
is  usually  supplemented  by  the  further  error  of  considering  facts  not 
as  they  stand  in  reality  but  as  they  are  pictured  by  the  exhilarated  . 
imagination  of  the  enthusiast.  ^ 

305.  Our  induction  so  far  has  shown  from  some  few  particular 
cases  the  prevalence  of  a  tendency  to  evade  consideration  of  non- 
logical  actions,  which  nevertheless  force  themselves  upon  the  atten- 
tion of  anyone  undertaking  to  discuss  human  societies;  and  also  the 
no  mean  importance  of  that  tendency.  Now  we  must  look  into  it 
specially  and  in  general  terms.^ 

306.  So  let  us  now  examine  the  various  devices  by  which  non- 
logical  actions  are  eliminated  so  that  only  logical  actions  are  left: 
and  suppose  we  begin  as  usual  by  classifying  the  objects  we  are  try- 
ins  to  understand. 


The  principles  ^  underlying  non-logical  actions  are  held  to  be  de- 
void of  any  objective  reality  (§§  307-18). 

305  ^  Farther  along,  in  Chapter  IX,  we  shall  have  to  consider  a  still  more  general 
subject — the  variability  of  the  arguments  to  which  human  beings  are  prompted  by 
sentiments,  and  which  provide  logical  exteriors  for  non-logical  conduct.  A  strictly 
inductive  course,  such  as  we  have  been  following,  brings  up  the  particular  problem 
in  advance  of  the  general.  That  has  the  drawback  of  compelling  us  to  examine  the 
pardcular  problem  first,  and  to  keep  going  back  to  things  on  which  we  have  al- 
ready touched.  It  has,  on  the  other  hand,  the  great  advantage  of  making  the  mate- 
rials we  work  with  clearer  and  more  manageable. 

306  ^  [One  need  hardly  remind  the  reader  that  these  synopdc  pictures  of  Pareto's 
classifications  are  unintelligible  apart  from  the  exposition  seriatim  of  the  various 
categories  that  he  proceeds  to  make.  They  have  to  be  continually  re-read  in  con- 
nexion with  the  text  that  follows.  This  table  is  particularly  obscure  in  itself,  not 
only  because  of  exceptionally  opaque  writing  but  because  implicit  in  it  is  another 
classificadon  that  Pareto  for  some  reason  does  not  see  fit  to  utilize.  It  is  clear  that 
the  devices  in  Class  A  are  used  from  a  sceptical  standpoint  to  discredit  beliefs  on 
logical  grounds.  The  B-I  and  B-III  devices  are  used  by  believers  to  represent  their 
beliefs  as  logical.  The  other  devices  are  "errors"  commonly  made  by  scholars  in 
viewing  the  non-logical  as  logical.  I  use  the  term  "device"  for  the  sake  of  clarity; 
Pareto's  term  was  "means."  Whatever  the  term  used,  it  has  to  be  understood  as  not 

306  ^  "Principle"  here  means  the  cause  to  which  an  acdon  is  to  be  ascribed. 


200  THE   MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §306 

Genera 

Genus     I.  They  are  disregarded  entirely  (§§  307-08) 
Genus    II.  They  are  regarded  as  absurd  prejudices  (§§  309-11) 
Genus  III.  They  are  regarded  as  tricks  used  by  some  individuals 
to  deceive  others  (§§  312-18) 

CLASS  B 

\    The  principles  underlying  non-logical  actions  are  credited  v^^ith 
now^  more,  now  less,  objective  reahty  (§§  319-51) 

Genera  and  Subgenera 
Genus  I.  The  principles  are  taken  as  completely  and  directly  real 
(§§319-38) 

la.  Precepts  v^^ith  sanctions  in  part  imaginary  (§§  321-33) 
1/3.  Simple  interposition  of  a  personal  god  or  a  personified  ab- 
straction (§§  332-33) 
Iv.  The  same  interposition  supplemented  by  legends  and  logical 

inferences  (§  334) 
\h.  Some  metaphysical  entity  is  taken  as  real  (§§  335-36) 
I  e.  What  is  real  is  an  implicit  accord  between  the  principles 
and  certain  sentiments  (§§  337-38) 

Genus  II.  The  principles  of  non-logical  conduct  are  not  taken 
as  completely  or  directly  real.  Indirectly,  the  reahty  is  found  in  cer- 

implying  any  intent  to  deceive  on  the  part  of  a  person  using  such  a  device  or  means. 
Pareto's  classifications,  which  are  taken  over  from  botany,  envisage  classes,  genera 
and  subgenera  (sometimes  species  and  subspecies).  I  keep  these  terms  in  the  tables 
of  classificadon.  In  the  text  at  large,  to  avoid  a  fatiguing  technical  atmosphere,  I 
often  render  "genus"  and  "species"  loosely  as  "type,"  "kind,"  "sort,"  or  more  gen- 
erally "variety":  the  "Iy8  variety,"  or  "1/3  type"  vi^ould  be,  in  the  tables,  the 
"lyS  subgenus,"  and  so  on.  Pareto  makes  but  litde  use  of  the  "genus"  in  the  structure 
proper  of  his  theories,  the  one  exception  perhaps  being  his  analysis  of  the  residue 
of  asceticism  (§§  ii63f.).  The  "class,"  on  the  other  hand,  is  essential  to  his  theory 
of  interdependence  and  intensities  (Chapter  XII).  Since  residues  increase  or  dimin- 
ish in  intensities  by  "classes,"  and  interdependences  arise  primarily  within  "classes," 
it  is  clear  that  the  structure  of  the  "class"  has  all  along  to  be  borne  in  mind. — 
A.  L.] 


§307  NON-LOGICAL  ACTIONS   DISREGARDED  201 

tain  facts  that  are  said  to  be  inaccurately  observed  or  imperfectly 
understood  (§§339-50) 

Ila.  It  is  assumed  that  human  beings  make  imperfect  observa- 
tions, and  derive  inferences  from  them  logically  (§§340- 

46) 
II/5.  A  myth  is  taken  as  the  reflection  of  some  historical  reality 
that  is  concealed  in  one  way  or  another,  or  else  as  a  mere 
imitation  of  some  other  myth  (§§  347-49) 
11^.  A  myth  is  made  up  of  tv^^o  parts:  a  historical  fact  and  an 
imaginary  adjunct  (§  350) 
Genus  III.  The  principles  of  non-logical  actions  are  mere  alle- 
gories (§§  351-52) 

CLASS   C 

It  is  assumed  that  non-logical  actions  have  no  effect  on  "progress," 
or  else  are  obstructive  to  it.  Hence  they  are  to  be  eliminated  in  any 
study  designed  solely  to  promote  "progress"  (§§  353-56). 

307.  Let  us  examine  these  various  categories  one  by  one. 

Device  A-I:  Non-logical  actions  are  disregarded.  Non-logical  ac- 
tions can  be  disregarded  entirely  as  having  no  place  in  the  realm 
of  reality.  That  is  the  position  of  Plato's  Socrates  in  the  matter  of  the 
national  religions  of  Greece/  He  is  asked  what  he  thinks  of  the 
ravishing  of  Orithyia,  daughter  of  Erechtheus,  by  Boreas.  He  begins 
by  rejecting  the  logical  interpretation  that  tries  to  see  a  historical  fact 
in  the  myth  (11^)-  Then  he  opines  that  such  inquiries  are  as  fine- 
spun as  they  are  profitless,  and  falls  back  on  the  popular  belief.  On 
common  belief  the  oracle  at  Delphi  also  relied  when  it  prescribed 
that  the  best  way  to  honour  the  gods  was  for  each  to  follow  the  cus- 
toms of  his  own  city.^  Certainly  the  oracle  in  no  wise  meant  by  that 

307  ^  Pliaedrus,  229-30  (Fowler,  pp.  419-23). 

307  2  The  fact  is  mentioned  by  Xenophon's  Socrates.  Memorabilia,  IV,  3,  16: 
"Since  thou  seest  that  when  the  god  of  Delphi  is  asked  how  best  to  please  the  gods, 
he  replies:  By  following  the  custom  of  the  city."  Cicero,  De  legibus,  II,  16,  40:  "Our 
law  shall  further  provide  that  of  all  our  ancestral  rites  the  best  should  be  fostered. 
When  the  Athenians  consulted  the  Pythian  Apollo  as  to  which  rites  they  had  better 
practise,  they  received  the  oracle:  'Those  customary  with  the  forefathers.'  Then  they 
came  back  again,  saying  that  the  custom  of  the  forefathers  had  often  changed,  and 


202  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §3o8 

that  such  customs  corresponded  to  things  that  were  not  real ;  yet  ac- 
tually they  might  as  well  have,  since  they  were  held  to  be  entirely  ex- 
empt from  the  verification  to  which  real  tilings  are  considered  sub- 
ject. That  method  often  amounts  to  viewing  beliefs  as  non-logical 
actions  to  be  taken  for  what  they  are  without  any  attempt  to  explain 
them — the  problem  being  merely  to  discover  the  relationship  in 
which  they  stand  towards  other  social  facts.  That,  overtly  or  tacitly, 
is  the  attitude  of  many  statesmen. 

308.  So,  in  Cicero's  De  natura  deorum,  the  pontifex  Cotta  dis- 
tinguishes the  statesman  from  the  philosopher.  As  pontifex  he  pro- 
tests that  he  will  ever  defend  the  beliefs,  the  worship,  the  ceremonies, 
the  religion,  of  the  forefathers,  and  that  no  argument,  be  it  of  scholar 
or  dunce,  will  ever  budge  him  from  that  position.  He  is  persuaded 
that  Romulus  and  Numa  founded  Rome,  the  one  with  his  auspices, 
the  other  with  his  religion.  "That,  Balbus,  is  what  I  think,  as  Cotta 
and  as  pontifex.  It  is  now  for  me  to  know  what  you  think.  From 
you,  a  philosopher,  I  have  a  right  to  expect  some  reason  for  your 
beliefs.  The  beliefs  I  get  from  our  forefathers  I  must  accept  quite 
apart  from  any  proof."  ^  In  that  it  is  obvious  that  as  pontifex  Cotta 
deliberately  steps  aside  from  the  realm  of  logical  reality,  which  in- 
plies  a  belief  either  that  traditional  Roman  beliefs  have  no  basis  in 
fact  or  else  that  they  are  to  be  classed  with  non-logical  actions.^ 

309.  Device  A-II:  The  principles  of  non-logical  actions  are  re- 
garded as  absurd  prejudices.  One  may  consider  merely  the  forms  of 
non-logical  actions  and  finding  them  irrational,  judge  them  absurd 
prejudices,  at  the  most  deserving  of  attention  from  a  pathological 

they  asked  which  they  should  prefer  of  the  various  ancestral  customs;  and  the  god 
answered:  'The  best.'  "  Cicero  appends  a  logical  consideration  that  has  no  logical 
force  whatever:  "And  it  is  assuredly  true  that  what  is  best  should  be  taken  as  the 
most  authentic  tradition  and  the  closest  to  God." 

308  ^  III,  2,  5.  Cf.  De  divinatione,  II,  12,  28:  "As  regards  divination,  I  think  the 
custom  should  be  cherished  for  considerations  of  state  and  common  religion.  But 
here  we  are  in  strict  privacy  and  we  surely  have  a  right  to  discuss  the  matter  quite 
frankly  {sine  invidia),  and  I  in  particular,  since  I  have  very  grave  doubts  in  not  a 
few  connexions." 

308  2  [Pareto  wrote:  "which  means  either  that  such  [logico-experimental]  reality 
does  not  exist  or  that  it  is  of  the  genus  of  the  principles  of  non-logical  actions." — 
A.  L.] 


§310         RATIONALIZATION  OF   NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  203 

Standpoint  as  veritable  maladies  of  the  human  race.  That  has  been 
the  attitude  of  not  a  few  writers  in  dealing  with  legal  and  political 
formalities.  It  is  the  attitude  especially  of  writers  on  religion  and 
most  of  all  of  writers  on  forms  of  worship.  It  is  also  the  attitude  of 
our  contemporary  anti-clericals  with  regard  to  the  Christian  religion 
— and  it  betrays  great  ignorance  on  the  part  of  those  bigots,  along 
with  a  narrow-mindedness  that  incapacitates  them  for  ever  under- 
standing social  phenomena. 

We  have  already  seen  specimens  of  this  type  of  reasoning  in  the 
works  of  Condorcet  (§§301-02)  and  Holbach  (§§296",  303).  A 
more  diluted  type  is  observable  in  disquisitions  purporting  to  make 
this  or  that  religion  "more  scientific"  (§16"),  on  the  assumption 
that  a  religion  which  is  not  scientific  is  either  absurd  or  reprehen- 
sible. So  in  earlier  times  there  were  efforts  to  remove  by  subtle  inter- 
pretation such  elements  in  the  legends  and  cults  of  the  pagan  gods 
as  were  considered  non-logical.  It  was  the  procedure  of  the  Prot- 
estants during  the  Reformation,  while  the  liberal  Protestants  of  our 
day  are  repeating  the  same  exploits,  appealing  to  their  pseudo- 
science.  So  also  for  the  Modernists  in  their  criticism  of  Catholicism, 
and  for  our  Radical  Socialists  in  their  demeanour  towards  Marxism. 

310.  If  one  regards  certain  non-logical  actions  as  absurd,  one  may 
centre  chiefly  on  their  ridiculous  aspects ;  and  that  is  often  an  effective 
weapon  for  combating  a  faith.  Frequent  use  of  it  was  made  against 
established  religions  from  the  day  of  Lucian  down  to  the  day  of 
Voltaire.  In  an  article  replete  with  historical  blunders,  Voltaire  says 
of  the  religion  of  Rome:  "I  am  imagining  that  after  conquering 
Egypt  Caesar  sends  an  embassy  to  China,  with  the  idea  of  stimu- 
lating the  foreign  trade  of  the  Roman  Empire.  .  .  .  The  Emperor 
Iventi,  first  of  that  name,  is  reigning  at  the  time.  .  .  .  After  receiv- 
ing Caesar's  ambassadors  with  typical  Chinese  courtesy,  he  secretly 
inquires  through  his  interpreters  as  to  the  civilization,  customs,  and 
religion  of  these  Romans.  ...  He  learns  that  the  Roman  People 
supports  at  great  expense  a  college  of  priests,  who  can  tell  you 
exactly  the  right  time  for  embarking  on  a  voyage  and  the  very  best 
place  for  fighting  a  battle  by  inspecting  the  liver  of  an  ox  or  the 


204  "T^^  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §310 

appetite  with  which  chickens  eat  their  barley.  That  sacred  science 
was  brought  to  the  Romans  long,  long  before  by  a  little  god  named 
Tages,  who  was  unearthed  somewhere  in  Tuscany.  The  Roman 
people  worship  just  one  god  whom  they  always  call  'Highest  and 
Best.'  All  the  same,  they  have  built  a  temple  to  a  harlot  named 
Flora;  and  most  Roman  housewives  have  little  household  gods  in 
their  homes,  five  or  six  inches  high.  One  of  the  little  divinities  is 
the  goddess  Nipples,  another  the  god  Bottom.  .  .  .  The  Emperor 
has  his  laugh.  The  courts  at  Nanking  at  first  conclude,  as  he  does, 
that  the  Roman  ambassadors  are  either  lunatics  or  impostors  .  .  . 
but  the  Emperor,  being  as  just  as  he  is  courteous,  holds  private  con- 
verse with  the  ambassadors.  .  .  .  They  confess  to  him  that  the  Col- 
lege of  Augurs  dates  from  early  ages  of  Roman  barbarism;  that  an 
institution  so  ridiculous  has  been  allowed  to  survive  only  because  it 
became  endeared  to  the  people  in  the  course  of  long  ages;  that  all 
respectable  people  make  fun  of  the  augurs;  that  Caesar  never  con- 
sults them ;  that  according  to  a  very  great  man  by  the  name  of  Cato 
no  augur  is  ever  able  to  speak  to  a  colleague  without  a  laugh;  and 
finally  that  Cicero,  the  greatest  orator  and  best  philosopher  of  Rome, 
has  just  published  against  the  augurs  a  little  essay.  On  Divination, 
in  which  he  hands  over  to  everlasting  ridicule  all  auspices,  all  proph- 
ecy, and  all  the  fortune-telling  of  which  humanity  is  enamoured. 
The  Emperor  of  China  is  curious  to  read  Cicero's  essay.  His  inter- 
preters translate  it.  He  admires  the  book  and  the  Roman  Republic."  ^ 

310  ^  Remarques  pour  servir  de  Supplement  a  I'Essai  sur  les  mceurs,  Pt.  IV 
{CEuvres,  Vol.  V,  p.  48) :  "Contemptible  customs  in  a  nation  do  not  always  indicate 
that  that  nation  is  itself  contemptible."  Among  the  blunders  mentioned  are  the  fol- 
lowing: I.  Cicero's  essay  De  difi?2atione  was  written  after  Cssar's  death.  But  that  is  a 
small  matter;  if  one  is  going  to  pretend  that  Cssar  sent  ambassadors  to  China,  one 
may  also  pretend  that  he  was  living  when  Cicero  wrote  the  essay.  2.  The  Chinese 
pantheon  was  much  better  filled  than  the  Roman  pantheon.  That  error  on  Voltaire's 
part  may  be  forgiven,  since  it  was  the  error  of  all  the  philosophes  of  his  time.  With  a 
little  care,  however,  he  might  have  avoided  the  following:  3.  Wittingly  or  unwittingly, 
he  confuses  Roman  divination  with  the  Etruscan.  The  god  Tages  belonged  only  to  the 
latter.  4.  Jupiter  Optimus  Maximus  was  by  no  means  the  only  god  in  the  official 
cult  of  Rome.  [I  cannot  believe  that  Voltaire  did  not  know  that.  The  very  glaring- 
ness  of  the  error  calls  attention  to  a  sacrilegious  parody  of  French  Christianity  in 
the  allusions  to  Jupiter,  Flora,  and  the  Penates. — A.  L.]  5.  The  Penates  were  not 
at  all  the  gods  of  silly  housewives.  Servius,  In  Vergilii  Aeneidem,  II,  v.  514  (Thilo- 


§311  ABSURD  PREJUDICES  205 

311.  In  dealing  with  writings  of  this  kind,  we  must  be  careful  not 
to  fall  into  the  very  error  we  are  here  considering,  with  reference 
to  non-logical  actions/  The  intrinsic  value  of  such  satires  may  be 
zero  when  viewed  from  the  experimental  standpoint,  whereas  their 
polemical  value  may  be  great.  Those  two  things  we  must  always 
keep  distinct.  Moreover  they  may  have  a  certain  intrinsic  value:  a 
group  of  non-logical  actions  taken  as  a  whole  may  be  useful  for  at- 
taining a  given  purpose  without  absolutely  all  of  them,  taken  in- 
dividually, being  useful  to  that  purpose.  Certain  ridiculous  actions 

Hagen,  Vol.  I,  p.  298) :  "The  Penates  are  all  the  gods  worshipped  in  the  home." 
Rome  herself  had  her  Penates.  Voltaire  would  use  Cicero  against  the  silly  house- 
wives, but  Cicero  himself  invokes  the  Penates,  Pro  Publio  Sulla,  31,  86:  "Wherefore, 
O  ye  gods  of  our  forefathers,  and  ye,  O  Penates,  who  watch  over  this  city  and  this 
country  of  ours,  ye  who  during  my  consulship  did  confer  your  aid  and  your 
divine  protection  upon  this  state,  upon  the  Roman  People  and  its  liberties,  upon 
these  homes,  these  temples,  you  do  I  invoke  as  witnesses  to  my  integrity  and  honesty 
of  purpose  in  appearing  in  defence  of  Publius  Sulla."  Cf.  also  In  Catilinam,  IV,  9,  18. 
6.  Whether  he  believed  in  such  things  or  not,  Caesar  made  a  practice  of  consulting 
soothsayers.  There  is  an  allusion  to  that  in  De  divinatione,  I,  52,  119;  II,  16,  36, 
which  Voltaire  quotes;  and  cj.  Dio  Cassius,  Historia  Ro?nana,  XLIV,  17,  18; 
Plutarch,  Caesar,  63-64  (Perrin,  Vol.  VII,  pp.  589-95);  Suetonius,  Divtis  Julius,  81; 
Pliny,  Historia  naturalis,  XXVIII,  4  (2).  To  one  of  Cesar's  superstitions  we  have  pre- 
viously alluded  in  §  184^.  7.  Cicero  does  not  dream  of  ridiculing  all  auspices.  He 
was  himself  an  augur,  and  speaks  of  auspices  with  the  greatest  respect,  De  legibus, 
II,  12,  31:  "The  office  of  augur  stands  very  high  and  is  of  the  greatest  importance 
in  the  state  \j.e.,  in  Cicero's  ideal  state]  and  it  is  clothed  with  the  greatest  prestige. 
And  that  I  feel  not  because  I  am  an  augur  but  because  we  can  think  not  otherwise." 
He  had  little  or  no  regard  for  the  intrinsic  merits  of  augury;  but  he  considered  the 
institution  useful  to  the  state  and  consequently  did  not  ridicule  it  {cf.  the  quotations 
in  §  313  ^).  8.  Cato  was  speaking  not  of  the  augurs,  but  of  the  haruspices:  Cicero, 
De  divinatione,  II,  24,  51:  "Familiar  the  old  jest  of  Cato,  who  used  to  express  his 
wonder  that  one  haruspex  could  ever  look  at  another  without  laughing."  For  that 
matter  it  is  a  common  error  to  confuse  Roman  augury  with  Etruscan  divination  by 
inspection  of  entrails.  Only  when  they  could  not  help  doing  so  did  the  Romans 
appeal  to  Etruscan  divination.  Tiberius  Gracchus,  the  father  of  the  Gracchi,  on  being 
accused  by  Etruscan  soothsayers,  who  were  functioning  at  an  election,  of  calling 
for  a  vote  against  the  auspices,  addressed  them  as  follows:  Cicero,  De  natura 
deorum,  II,  4,  11:  "  Tou  say  that  I  am  not  in  order,  though  I  am  putting  this  ques- 
tion as  consul  and  as  augur,  and  under  good  auspices?  And  you,  Etruscans,  you, 
barbarians — you  presume  to  say  what  good  auspices  for  the  Roman  People  arc? 
You  presume  to  be  interpreters  for  these  comitia?'  And  he  bade  them  to  be  gone 
from  the  Forum." 

311  ^  Stricdy  speaking,  this  remark  and  the  next  following  are  irrelevant  to  the 
present  chapter.  I  make  them  simply  to  warn  anew  of  the  habit  people  have  of  as- 
suming that  a  writer  says  what  he  does  not  say  (§  §  41,  74-75). 


206  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §312 

may  be  eliminated  from  such  a  group  without  impairing  its  effec- 
tiveness. However,  in  so  reasoning  we  must  beware  of  falUng  into 
the  fallacy  of  the  man  who  said  he  could  lose  all  his  hair  without 
becoming  bald  because  he  could  lose  any  particular  hair  without 
suffering  that  catastrophe. 

312.  Device  A-III:  N on-logical  actioiis  as  tric\s  for  deceit.  After 
establishing,  as  in  the  two  cases  above,  that  certain  actions  are  not 
logical,  but  still  resolved  to  have  them  such  in  the  feeling  that  every 
human  act  should  be  born  of  logic,  a  writer  may  go  on  and  say  that 
an  institution  involving  non-logical  conduct  is  an  invention  of  this 
or  that  individual  or  group  that  is  designed  to  procure  some  per- 
sonal advantage,  or  some  advantage  to  state,  society,  or  humanity 
at  large.  So  actions  intrinsically  non-logical  are  transformed  into 
actions  that  are  logical  from  the  standpoint  of  the  end  in  view. 

To  adopt  this  procedure  as  regards  actions  deemed  beneficial  to 
society  is  to  depart  from  the  extreme  case  noted  in  §  14,  where  it  is 
maintained  that  only  theories  which  accord  with  facts  (logico-ex- 
perimental  theories)  can  be  beneficial  to  society.  It  is  here  recog- 
nized that  there  are  theories  which  are  not  logico-experimental,  but 
which  are  nevertheless  beneficial  to  society.  All  the  same,  the  writer 
cannot  make  up  his  mind  to  admit  that  such  theories  derive  spon- 
taneously from  non-logical  impulse.  No,  all  conduct  has  to  t>e  log- 
ical. Therefore  such  theories  too  are  products  of  logical  actions. 
These  actions  cannot  originate  in  the  sources  of  the  theories,  since 
it  has  been  recognized  that  the  theories  have  no  experimental  basis; 
but  they  may  envisage  the  same  purposes  as  the  theories,  which  ex- 
perience shows  are  beneficial  to  society.  So  we  get  the  following 
solution:  "Theories  not  in  accord  with  the  facts  may  be  beneficial 
to  society  and  are  therefore  logically  invented  to  that  end."  ^ 

313.  The  notion  that  non-logical  actions  have  been  logically  de- 
vised to  attain  certain  purposes  has  been  held  by  many  many  writers. 
Even  Polybius,  a  historian  of  great  sagacity,  speaks  of  the  religion 

312  ^  If  one  were  to  say  "kept,"  or  "preserved,"  instead  of  "invented"  in  the 
proposition  in  question,  it  would  at  times  correspond  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent 
with  reality  (§  316). 


^^I^  RATIONALIZATION  OF   NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  20y 

of  the  Romans  as  originating  in  deliberate  artifice.^  Yet  he  himself 
recognized  that  the  Romans  succeeded  in  creating  their  common- 
wealth not  by  reasoned  choices  but  by  allowing  themselves  to  be 
guided  by  circumstances  as  they  arose.^ 

313  ^  Historiae,  VI,  56,  8-12  (Paton,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  395).  After  noting  the  great  role 
of  religion  in  Roman  public  life,  Polybius  adds:  "That  will  seem  strange  to  many. 
As  for  me,  I  believe  that  religion  was  established  with  an  eye  to  the  masses.  In  fact, 
if  the  city  were  made  up  entirely  of  educated  people,  such  an  institution  might 
never  have  been  called  for.  But  since  the  masses  everywhere  are  fickle  and  untrust- 
worthy, full  of  lawless  passions,  unreasoning  angers,  violent  impulses,  they  can  be 
controlled  only  by  mysterious  terrors  and  tragic  fears.  It  seems  to  me,  therefore, 
that  not  by  chance  and  not  without  strong  motive  did  the  ancients  introduce  these 
beliefs  in  gods  and  hells  to  the  multitude."  Strabo,  Geographica,  I,  2,  8  (Jones,  Vol. 
I,  p.  71) :  "Since  neither  women  in  the  mass  nor  the  utterly  untutored  mob  can  be 
influenced  by  philosophical  discourse  and  preached  into  piety,  reverence,  and  faith, 
superstition  has  to  be  called  in."  And  then:  ",  .  .  myths  being  like  that  and  turn- 
ing out  to  the  advantage  of  society,  civilized  living,  and  the  continuity  of  the  human 
race."  Cf.  Plutarch,  Adversus  Co/otem,  31  (Goodwin,  Vol.  V,  pp.  379-80).  Then 
Livy,  Ab  urbe  condita,  I,  19,  4:  "He  [Numa]  thought  that  fear  of  the  gods  should 
be  instilled  the  very  first  thing,  as  a  most  effective  measure  for  a  populace  that  in 
those  days  was  still  crude  and  ingenuous  {imperitam) ."  Here  we  are  wholly  within 
the  realm  of  logical  conduct,  the  masses  being  lured  into  religion  by  subterfuge. 
Cicero,  De  legibits,  II,  13,  32  (Atticus,  alluding  to  the  different  views  of  the  two 
augurs  Marcellus  and  Appius) :  "  'I  have  examined  their  writings  and  I  find  that 
according  to  the  one,  the  auspices  you  mention  were  devised  for  purposes  of  state; 
while  according  to  the  other  it  would  seem  that  you  can  actually  foretell  the  future 
by  your  science.'  "  Cicero,  De  divinatione,  II,  18,  43:  "We  find  it  written  in  our 
augural  commentaries:  'It  is  sacrilege  to  hold  comitia  with  Jove  thundering  or  light- 
ning.' That  may  have  been  devised  for  purposes  of  state,  for  our  forefathers  wanted 
to  have  some  pretext  for  not  holding  comitia."  Ibid.,  II,  33,  70:  "Yet  I  believe  that 
Romulus,  who  founded  the  city  in  obedience  to  auspices,  must  have  thought  that 
there  was  a  science  of  augury  for  foretelling  the  future  (antiquity  erred  in  many 
matters)  and  we  see  that  that  belief  has  remained  unshaken  whether  by  experience, 
by  learning,  or  by  time.  However,  the  custom  and  science  of  divination,  the  strict 
observance  of  it,  and  the  prerogatives  of  the  augurs  and  the  prestige  of  their  col- 
lege, have  been  kept  alive  in  deference  to  popular  feelings,  and  in  view  of  their 
great  advantage  to  the  state."  A  little  later,  II,  35,  75,  he  adds  that  he  believed  "the 
augural  law  to  have  been  first  established  through  belief  in  divination  and  to  have 
been  kept  and  preserved  later  on  for  reasons  of  state."  That  seems  to  have  been 

313  ^  VI,  II.  He  is  comparing  the  republic  of  Lycurgus  with  the  Roman  Republic. 
He  believes  that  Lycurgus  was  a  real  person  and  founded  his  state  with  preconceived 
purposes.  Then  he  goes  on:  "The  Romans  achieved  the  same  end  in  creating  dieir 
own  republic.  Not  through  speculation  {oh  jif/v  6ia  Adyov),  but  through  their  school- 
ing in  many  struggles  and  vicissitudes  and  through  their  unfailing  choice  of  what 
was  best  did  they  achieve  the  same  end  as  Lycurgus  and  create  the  best  of  our  gov- 
ernments." 


208  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §3X4 

314.  We  may  take  Montesquieu's  view  of  Roman  religion  as  the 
type  of  the  interpretation  here  in  question/  "Neither  fear  nor  piety 
estabhshed  religion  among  the  Romans,  but  the  same  necessity  that 
compels  all  societies  to  have  religions.  ...  I  note  this  difference, 
however,  between  Roman  legislators  and  the  lawgivers  of  other 
peoples,  that  the  Romans  created  religion  for  the  State,  the  others 
the  State  for  religion.  Romulus,  Tatius,  and  Numa  made  the  gods 
servants  of  statesmanship ;  and  the  cult  and  the  ceremonies  that  they 
instituted  were  found  to  be  so  wise  that  when  the  kings  were  ex- 
pelled the  yoke  of  religion  was  the  only  one  which  that  people  dared 
not  throw  off  in  its  frenzy  for  liberty.  In  establishing  religion, 
Roman  law-makers  were  not  at  all  thinking  of  reforming  morals  or 
proclaiming  moral  principles.  .  .  .  They  had  at  first  only  a  general 
view,  to  inspire  a  people  that  feared  nothing  with  fear  of  the  gods, 
and  to  use  that  fear  to  lead  it  whithersoever  they  pleased.  ...  It 
was  in  truth  going  pretty  far  to  stake  the  safety  of  the  State  on  the 
sacred  appetite  of  a  chicken  and  the  disposition  of  the  entrails  in  a 
sacrificial  animal;  but  the  founders  of  those  ceremonies  were  well 
aware  of  their  strong  and  weak  points,  and  it  was  not  without  good 
reasons  that  they  sinned  against  reason  itself.  Had  that  form  of 
worship  been  more  rational,  the  educated  as  well  as  the  plain  man 
would  have  been  deceived  by  it;  and  so  all  the  advantage  to  be  ex- 
pected from  it  would  have  been  lost." 

315.  It  is  curious  that  Voltaire  and  Montesquieu  followed  oppo- 
site though  equally  mistaken  lines,  and  that  neither  of  them  thought 
of  a  spontaneous  development  of  non-logical  conduct. 

316.  The  variety  of  interpretation  here  in  question  sometimes  con- 
Cicero's  own  opinion  and  it  does  not  come  far  from  the  truth.  Non-logical  actions 
arise  spontaneously.  They  may  then  be  kept  in  deference  to  tradition  or  because  of 
their  proved  usefulness.  Of  course  any  logical  origin,  by  design  of  Romulus,  is  pure 
myth.  Cf.  Aristotle,  Metaphysica,  XI,  8,  13  (Ross,  p.  1074b).  After  discussing  the 
divinity  of  the  stars,  he  adds:  "The  rest  is  a  mythical  adjunct,  designed  to  influence 
the  multitude  and  promote  obedience  to  law  and  the  common  welfare."  See  fur- 
ther: Plutarch,  De  placitis  philosophoriim,  I,  7,  2  (Goodwin,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  119);  and 
Sextus  Empiricus,  Contradictiones,  IX,  Adversus  physicos,  II,  De  diis,  14-16  (551) 
{Opera,  Vol.  II,  pp.  539-4o)- 

314  ^  Dissertation  sur  la  politique  des  Romains  dans  la  religion,  p.  303. 


§3l8  INVENTIONS   FOR  PRACTICAL  PURPOSES  2O9 

tains  an  element  of  truth,  not  as  regards  the  origin  of  non-logical 
actions,  but  as  regards  the  purposes  to  which  they  may  be  turned 
once  they  have  become  customary.  Then  it  is  natural  enough  that 
the  shrewd  should  use  them  for  their  own  ends  just  as  they  use  any 
other  force  in  society.  The  error  lies  in  assuming  that  such  forces 
have  been  invented  by  design  (§312).  An  example  from  our  own 
time  may  bring  out  the  point  more  clearly.  There  are  plenty  of 
rogues,  surely,  who  make  their  profit  out  of  spiritualism;  but  it 
would  be  absurd  to  imagine  that  spiritualism  originated  as  a  mere 
scheme  of  rogues. 

317.  Van  Dale,  in  his  treatise  De  Oraculis,  saw  nothing  but  artifice 
in  the  pagan  oracles.  That  notion  belongs  with  this  group  of  inter- 
pretations. Eusebius  wavers  between  it  and  the  view  that  oracles 
were  the  work  of  devils.^  Such  mixtures  of  interpretations  are  com- 
mon. We  shall  come  back  to  them. 

318.  Likewise  with  this  variety  are  to  be  classed  interpretations 
that  regard  non-logical  actions  as  consequences  of  an  external  or 
exoteric  doctrine  serving  to  conceal  an  internal  or  esoteric  doctrinej 
That  would  make  actions  which  are  non-logical  in  appearance  log- 
ical in  reality.  Consider  a  passage  in  Galileo's  Dialogue  of  the 
Greater  Systems  (Salviati  speaking) :  ^  "That  the  Pythagoreans  held 
the  science  of  numbers  in  very  high  esteem  ...  I  am  well  aware, 
nor  would  I  be  loath  to  concur  in  that  judgment.  But  that  the  mys- 
teries in  view  of  which  Pythagoras  and  his  sect  held  the  science  of 
numbers  in  such  great  veneration  are  the  absurdities  commonly  cur- 
rent in  books  and  conversation,  I  can  in  no  way  agree.  On  the  con- 
trary, they  did  not  care  to  have  their  wonders  exposed  to  the  ridicule 
and  disparagement  of  the  common  herd.  So  they  damned  as  sac- 
rilegious any  publication  of  the  more  recondite  properties  of  the 
numbers  and  incommensurable  and  irrational  quantities  with  which 
they  dealt,  and  they  preached  that  anyone  disclosing  such  things 
would  suffer  torment  in  the  world  to  come.  I  think  that  some  of 

317  '^  Evangelica  praeparatio,  V  {Opera,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  307-402). 

318  ^  Dialogo  dei  due  massinii  sistemi  del  mondo,  Giornata  prima  {Opera,  Vol. 

VII,  p.  35). 


210  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §319 

them,  to  throw  a  sop  to  the  vulgar  and  be  free  of  prying  impor- 
tunity, represented  their  numeral  mysteries  as  the  same  childish 
idiocies  that  later  on  spread  generally  abroad.  It  was  a  shrewd  and 
cunning  device  on  their  part,  like  the  trick  of  that  sagacious  young 
man  who  escaped  the  prying  of  his  mother  (or  his  curious  wife — I 
forget  which),  who  was  pressing  him  to  confide  the  secrets  of  the 
Senate,  by  making  up  a  story  wherewith  she  and  other  prattling 
females  proceeded  to  make  fools  of  themselves,  to  the  great  amuse- 
ment of  the  Sentaors." 

That  the  Pythagoreans  sometimes  misrepresented  their  own  doc- 
trines seems  certain;  but  it  is  not  at  all  apparent  that  that  was  the 
case  with  their  ideas  on  perfect  numbers.  On  that  point  Galileo  is 
mistaken  (§§  960  f.). 

319.  Device  B-I:  The  principles  are  ta\en  as  completely  and 
directly  real}  This  variety  is  exemplified  by  non-logical  actions  of 
a  religious  character  on  the  part  of  unquestioning  believers.  Such 
actions  difler  little  if  at  all  from  logical  actions.  If  a  person  is  con- 
vinced that  to  be  sure  of  a  good  voyage  he  must  sacrifice  to  Poseidon 
and  sail  in  a  ship  that  does  not  leak,  he  will  perform  the  sacrifice 
and  caulk  his  seams  in  exactly  the  same  spirit. 

320.  Curiously  enough,  such  doctrines  come  closer  than  any 
others  to  a  scientific  status.  They  differ  from  the  scientific,  in  fact, 
only  by  an  appendage  that  asserts  the  reality  of  an  imaginary  prin- 
ciple; whereas  many  other  doctrines,  in  addition  to  possessing  the 
same  appendage,  further  differ  from  scientific  doctrines  by  infer- 
ences that  are  either  fantastic  or  devoid  of  all  exactness. 

I  321.  Device  B-I  a:  Precept  plus  sanction.  This  variety  is  ob- 
tained by  appending  some  adjunct  or  other  to  the  simple  sanction- 
less  precept — to  the  taboo  {cf.  §  154).^ 

319  ^  This  extreme  case  recognizes  non-logical  actions  for  what  they  are  and 
therefore  ought  not,  strictly  speaking,  to  be  classified  with  procedures  for  giving 
non-logical  actions  the  semblance  of  logic.  However,  we  must  consider  it  as  the 
point  of  departure  for  many  such  procedures,  and  so  glance  at  it  here. 

321  ^  The  sanctionlcss  precept  is  not  of  this  variety  because  it  does  not  evade  but 
recognizes  the  fact  that  an  action  is  non-logical — indeed  it  is  in  the  sancdonless 
precept  that  non-logical  actions  can  be  most  readily  identified. 


§322         RATIONALIZATION  OF   NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  211 

322.  Reinach  writes :  ^  "A  taboo  is  an  interdiction ;  an  object  that 
is  taboo,  or  tabooed,  is  a  forbidden  object.  The  interdiction  may  for- 
bid corporal  contact  or  visual  contact;  it  may  also  exempt  the  object 
from  the  peculiar  kind  of  violation  involved  in  pronouncing  its 
name.  .  .  .  Similar  interdictions  are  observable  in  Greece  and 
Rome,  and  among  many  other  peoples,  vi^here  generally  it  is  ex- 
plained that  knowledge  of  a  name  enables  a  person  to  'evoke'  with 
evil  intent  the  'power'  that  the  name  designates.  That  explanation 
may  have  been  valid  at  certain  periods;  but  it  does  not  represent  the 
primitive  state  of  mind.  Originally  it  was  the  sanctity  of  the  name 
itself  that  was  dreaded,  on  the  same  grounds  as  contact  with  a 
tabooed  object." 

Reinach  is  right  in  regarding  as  an  appendage  the  notion  that 
knowledge  of  the  name  of  an  object  gives  a  person  power  over  it; 
but  the  notion  of  sanctity  is  likewise  an  appendage.  Indeed,  prob- 
ably few  of  the  individuals  observing  a  taboo  would  know  what 
was  meant  by  an  abstraction  such  as  "sanctity."  For  them  the  taboo 
is  just  a  non-logical  action,  just  an  aversion  to  touching,  looking  at, 
naming,  the  thing  tabooed.  Later  on  an  effort  is  made  to  explain  or 
justify  the  aversion;  and  then  the  mysterious  power  of  which  Rein- 
ach speaks  (or  perhaps  his  own  notion  of  sanctity)  is  invented. 

Reinach  continues:  "The  notion  of  the  taboo  is  narrower  still  than 
the  notion  of  interdiction.  The  characteristic  difference  is  that  the 
taboo  never  orives  a  reason."  That  is  excellent !  The  non-logical  action 
has  just  that  trait.  But  for  that  very  reason  Reinach  should  not,  in  a 
particular  case,  provide  the  taboo  with  a  reason  in  some  considera- 
tion of  sanctity.  He  goes  on :  "The  prohibition  is  merely  stated,  tak- 
ing the  cause  for  granted — it  is,  in  fact,  nothing  but  the  taboo  itself, 
that  is  to  say,  the  assertion  of  a  mortal  peril."  But  in  saying  that 
he  is  withdrawing  his  concession  and  trying  to  edge  back  into  the 
domain  of  logic.  No  "cause"  is  taken  for  granted !  The  taboo  lies  in 
a  pure  and  absolute  repugnance  to  doing  a  certain  thing.  To  get 
something  similar  from  our  own  world:  There  is  the  sentimental 
person  who  could  never  be  induced  to  cut  off  a  chicken's  head. 

322  ^  Ciiltes,  mythcs  et  religions.  Vol.  I,  pp.  1-2. 


212  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §323 

There  is  no  "cause"  for  the  aversion;  it  is  just  an  aversion,  and  it  is 
strong  enough  to^keep  the  person  from  cutting  off  a  chicken's  head! 
It  is  not  apparent  either  why  Reinach  would  have  it  that  the  penalty 
for  violating  a  taboo  is  always  a  mortal  peril.  He  himself  gives  exam- 
ples to  the  contrary.  Going  on,  he  returns  to  the  domain  of  non- 
logical  actions,  well  observing  that  "the  taboos  that  have  come  down 
into  contemporary  cultures  are  often  stated  with  supporting  reasons. 
But  such  reasons  have  been  excogitated  in  times  relatively  recent 
[One  could  not  say  better.]  and  bear  the  stamp  of  modern  ideas. 
For  example,  people  will  say,  'Speak  softly  in  a  chamber  of  death 
[A  taboo  that  gives  no  evidence  of  having  a  "mortal  peril"  for  a 
sanction,]  out  of  respect  for  the  dead.'  The  primitive  taboo  lay  in 
avoiding  not  only  contact  with  a  corpse,  but  its  very  proximity. 
[Still  no  evidence  of  any  mortal  peril.]  Nevertheless  even  today,  in 
educating  children  taboos  are  imparted  without  stated  reasons,  or 
i  else  with  some  mere  specification  of  the  general  character  of  the 
interdiction:  'Do  not  take  off  your  coat  in  company,  for  that  is  not 
.  nice.'  In  his  Workj  and  Days,  v.  727,  Hesiod  interdicts  passing 
^  water  with  one's  face  towards  the  sun,  but  he  gives  no  reasons  for 
the  prohibition.  [A  pure  non-logical  action.]  Most  taboos  relating  to 
decorum  have  come  down  across  the  centuries  without  justifications" 
[and  with  no  threats  of  "mortal  peril" ].^ 
\w/  323.  With  taboos  may  profitably  be  classed  other  things  of  the 
kind  where  logical  interpretation  is  reduced  to  a  minimum.  Wil- 
liam Marsden  says  of  the  Mohammedans  of  Sumatra :  ^  "Many  who 
profess  to  follow  it  [Mohammedanism]  give  themselves  not  the  least 
concern  about  its  injunctions,  or  even  know  what  they  require.  A 
Malay  at  Marina  upbraided  a  countryman,  with  the  total  ignorance 
of  religion,  his  nation  laboured  under,  'You  pay  a  veneration  to  the 
tombs  of  your  ancestors:  what  foundation  have  you  for  supposing 
that  your  dead  ancestors  can  lend  you  assistance?'  'It  may  be  true,' 
answered  the  other;  'but  what  foundation  have  you,  for  expecting 

322  ^  We  have  here  been  considering  the  sanction  appended  to  taboos  as  a  device 
for  logicalizing  non-logical  actions.  Farther  along  we  shall  examine  them  as  devices 
for  inducing  observance  of  taboos. 

323  ^  History  of  Sumatra,  p.  250. 


J 


§3^6  TABOOS  AND  PRECEPTS  213 

assistance  from  Allah  and  Mahomet?'  'Are  you  not  aware,'  replied 
the  Malay,  'that  it  is  written  in  a  Book  ?  Have  you  not  heard  of  the 
Koraan?'  The  native  of  the  Passumah,  with  conscious  inferiority, 
submitted  to  the  force  of  this  argument."  ^  That  is  a  seed  which  will 
sprout  and  yield  an  abundant  harvest  of  logical  interpretations,  some 
of  which  we  shall  find  in  the  devices  hereafter  following. 

324.  Something  like  the  taboo  is  the  precept  (§§  154,  1480  f.).  It 
may  be  given  without  sanction,  "Do  so  and  so,"  and  in  that  form  it 
is  a  plain  non-logical  action.  In  the  injunction,  "You  ought  to  do  so 
and  so,"  there  is  a  slight,  sometimes  a  very  slight,  trace  of  explana- 
tion. It  lurks  in  the  term  "ought,"  which  suggests  the  mysterious 
entity  Duty.  That  is  often  supplemented  by  a  sanction  real  or  imag- 
inary, and  then  we  get  actions  that  are  either  actually  logical  or  else 
are  merely  made  to  appear  so.  Only  a  certain  number  of  precepts, 
therefore,  can  be  properly  grouped  with  the  things  we  are  classify- 
ing here. 

325.  In  general,  precepts  may  be  distinguished  as  follows : 

a.  Pure  precept,  without  stated  reasons,  aiid  without  proof.  The 
proposition  is  not  elliptical.  No  proof  is  given,  either  because  no 
proof  exists  or  because  none  is  asked  for.  That,  therefore,  is  the  pure 
non-logical  action.  But  human  beings  have  such  a  passion  for  logical 
explanations  that  they  usually  stick  one  or  two  on,  no  matter  how 
silly.  "Do  that!"  is  a  precept.  If  it  be  asked,  "Why  should  I  do  that?" 
the  answer  is,  let  us  say,  "Because  .  .  .  !"  or,  "Because  it  is  custom- 
ary." The  logical  appendage  is  of  little  value,  except  where  violation 
of  custom  implies  some  penalty — but  in  that  case  the  penalty,  not 
the  custom,  carries  the  logical  force. 

326.  b.  The  demonstration  is  elliptical.  The  proof,  valid  or  not, 
is  available.  It  has  not  been  mentioned,  but  it  may  be.  The  proposi- 
tion is  a  precept  only  in  appearance.  The  terms  "ought,"  "must," 
and  the  like  may  be  suppressed,  and  the  precept  reduced  to  an  ex- 
perimental or  pseudo-experimental  theorem,  the  consequence  de- 
riving from  the  act  without  any  interposition  from  without.  This 
type  of  precept  runs,  "To  get  A,  you  must  do  B,";  or,  negatively,  "To 

323  2  For  other  examples  of  the  kind  see  §§  1430  £. 


214  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §3^7 

avoid  A,  you  must  refrain  from  doing  B."  The  first  proposition  can 
be  stated  thus:  "When  B  is  done,  A  results."  Similarly  for  the  second. 

327.  If  both  A  and  B  are  real  things  and  if  the  nexus  between 
them  is  actually  logica-experimental,  we  get  scientific  propositions. 
They  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  things  we  are  trying  to  classify 
here.  If  the  nexus  is  not  logico-experimental,  they  are  pseudo-scien- 
tific propositions,  and  a  certain  number  of  them  are  used  to  logical- 
ize  non-logical  actions.  For  instance,  if  A  stands  for  a  safe  voyage 
and  B  for  sacrifices  to  Poseidon,  the  nexus  is  imaginary,  and  the  non- 
logical  action  B  is  justified  by  the  nexus  that  connects  it  with  A.  But 
if  A  stands  for  a  safe  voyage  and  B  for  defective  ship-building,  we 
get  just  an  erroneous  scientific  proposition.  A  mistake  in  engineer- 
in^  is  not  a  non-logical  action. 

328.  If  A  and  B  are  both  imaginary,  we  are  wholly  outside  the 
experimental  field,  and  we  need  not  consider  such  propositions.  If 
A  is  imaginary  and  B  real,  we  get  non-logical  actions,  B,  justified  by 
the  pretext,  A. 

329.  c.  The  proposition  is  really  a  precept,  but  a  real  sanction  en- 
forced by  an  extraneous  and  red  cause  is  appended  to  it.  That  gives 
a  logical  action :  the  thing  is  done  to  escape  the  sanction. 

330.  d.  The  proposition  is  a  precept,  but  the  sanction  is  imag- 
inary, or  enjorcible  only  by  an  imaginary  power.  We  get  a  non- 
logical  action  justified  by  the  sanction.^ 

331.  The  terms  of  ordinary  speech  rarely  have  sharply  defined 
meanings.  The  term  "sanction"  may  be  used  more  or  less  loosely. 
Here  we  have  taken  it  in  the  strict  sense.  Broadly  speaking,  one 
might  say  that  a  sanction  is  always  present.  In  the  case  of  a  scientific 
proposition  the  sanction  might  be  the  pleasure  of  reasoning  soundly 
or  the  pain  of  reasoning  amiss.  But  to  go  into  such  niceties  would 
be  just  a  waste  of  time. 

332.  Device  B-I^3:  Introduction  of  a  divinity  or  of  personified 
abstractions.  A  very  simple  elaboration  of  the  taboo,  or  pure  precept, 
is  involved  in  the  introduction  of  a  personal  god,  or  of  personifica- 
tions such  as  Nature,  by  will  of  which  non-logical  actions  are  re- 

330  ^  For  fuller  explanation  see  Chapter  IX  (§§  1480  £.), 


§336         RATIONALIZATION  OF   NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  215 

quired  of  human  beings  and  are  therefore  logicaHzed.  How  the  re- 
quirement arises  is  often  left  dark.  "A  god  (or  Nature)  wills  that 
so  and  so  be  done."  "And  if  it  is  not  done?"  The  question  remains 
unanswered.  But  very  often  there  is  an  answer;  it  is  asserted  that  the 
god  (or  Nature)  will  punish  violators  of  the  precept.  In  such  a  case 
we  get  a  sanctioned  precept  of  the  species  d-  above. 

333.  When  the  Greeks  said  that  "strangers  and  beggars  come 
from  Zeus,"  ^  they  were  merely  voicing  their  inclination  to  be  hos- 
pitable to  visitors,  and  Zeus  was  dragged  in  to  give  a  logical  colour- 
ing to  the  custom,  by  implying  that  the  hospitality  was  offered  either         , 
in  reverence  for  Zeus,  or  to  avoid  the  punishment  that  Zeus  held  in       / 
store  for  violators  of  the  precept. 

334.  Device  B-I^:  Divinities  plus  legeitd  and  logical  elaboration. 
Rare  the  case  where  such  embellishments  are  not  supplemented  by 
multiple  legends  and  logical  elaborations;  and  through  these  new 
adjuncts  we  get  mythologies  and  theologies  that  carry  us  farther  and 
farther  away  from  the  concept  of  non-logical  conduct.  It  may  be 
worth  while  to  caution  that  theologies  at  all  complicated  belong  to 
restricted  classes  of  people  only.  With  them  we  depart  from  the 
field  of  popular  interpretations  and  enter  an  intellectual  or  scholarly  , 
domain.  To  the  variety  in  question  here  belong  the  interpretations  ■ 
of  the  Fathers  of  the  Christian  Church,  such  as  the  doctrine  that  the 
pagan  gods  were  devils. 

335.  Device  B-I^:  Metaphysical  entities  ta\en  as  real.  Here  real- 
ity is  ascribed  not  to  a  personal  god  or  to  a  personification,  but  to  a 
metaphysical  abstraction.  "The  true,"  "the  beautiful,"  "the  good," 
"the  honest,"  "virtue,"  "morality,"  "natural  law,"  "humanity,"  "soli- 
darity," "progress,"  or  their  opposite  abstractions,  enjoin  or  forbid 
certain  actions,  and  the  actions  become  logical  consequences  of  the 
abstractions.^ 

336.  In  interpretations  of  the  B-I/3  variety,  the  personal  god  can 
inflict  a  punishment  because  he  chooses  to.  In  the  case  of  "Nature" 
the  punishment  is  an  automatic  consequence  of  the  conduct.  Those 

333  ■"■  Odyssey,  VI,  vv.  207-08:  rrpof  yap  A;(5f  e'laiv  d-avreg  ^elvoi  rt  tvtuxoI  T€. 
335  ^  For  the  detailed  argument  see  §§  i5io£. 


2l6  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §33^ 

interpretations,  therefore,  are  respectably  logical.  In  the  case  of  meta- 
physical abstractions,  however,  the  logic  is  flimsy  indeed.  You  tell 
a  person,  "You  must  do  that  because  it  is  good,"  and  he  replies, 
"But  I  do  not  choose  to  do  what  is  good."  You  are  checkmated, 
for  milord  Good,  estimable  worthy  that  he  may  be,  does  not  wield 
the  thunderbolts  that  Zeus  wields.  So  our  latter-day  Christians  keep 
the  God  of  the  Old  Testament  but  strip  Him  of  all  His  weapons. 
There  could  be  no  trifling  with  the  God  of  the  Hebrews,  who 
fiercely  avenged  transgressions  of  His  laws,  or  with  the  God  of  St. 
Paul,  who  was  no  whit  less  quick  to  wrath.  But,  armed  with  the 
abstractions  of  their  pseudo-science,  with  what  can  the  neo-Chris- 
tians  threaten  the  unbeliever  ?  Or  what  can  they  do  for  the  believer 
to  make  his  belief  worth  while?  The  answer  is,  "Nothing."  The 
conduct  they  recommend  is  simply  non-logical  conduct.  That  does 
not  mean  that  it  may  not  be  as  beneficial  to  individual  or  society 
as  any  other,  or  even  more  so.  It  may  or  may  not  be.  But  in  any 
event  it  is  certain  that  it  is  not  the  logical  inference  from  a  principle, 
like  the  inference  from  the  existence  of  a  divine  power  and  will  that 
unbelievers  will  be  punished  and  believers  rewarded.^ 

336  ^  As  for  the  God  of  the  Hebrews,  see  Piepenbring,  Theologie  de  I'Ancien  Tes- 
tament, pp.  98-99:  "The  holiness  of  God  is  intimately  bound  up  with  His  jealousy, 
His  wrath,  His  vengeance.  ...  In  the  'Old  Canticle'  {Ex.  15:7)  Moses  cries  out  to 
the  Lord:  '.  .  .  In  the  greatness  of  thine  excellency  thou  hast  overthrown  them  that 
rose  up  against  thee:  thou  sentest  forth  thy  wrath,  which  consumed  them  as  stub- 
ble.' [Can  any  neo-Christian  abstraction  say  as  much?]  The  wrath  of  God  breaks 
out  in  the  form  of  dire  punishment  every  time  His  will  is  crossed,  disregarded, 
transgressed."  These  milk-and-water  Christians  are  inclined  to  think  that  all  that 
changed  with  the  coming  of  Christ,  but  such  is  not  the  case.  The  early  Church 
Fathers  discourse  without  mincing  words  on  the  punishments  that  will  be  visited 
on  unbelievers.  As  for  the  God  of  St.  Paul,  one  of  the  many  passages  will  sufSce: 
I  Cor.  10:8:  "Neither  let  us  commit  fornication,  as  some  of  them  [the  Israelites] 
committed,  and  fell  in  one  day  three  and  twenty  thousand  [Num.  25:1-9]."  Can 
the  abstraction  concocted  by  the  pseudo-science  of  the  neo-Christians  pretend  to  do 
as  much?  No!  Well,  in  that  case  the  precept  will  be  obeyed  by  those  who  are  already 
good  Christians,  and  no  one  who  is  not  will  pay  any  attention.  But  that  is  the  es- 
sential characteristic  of  the  principles  (§  306  ^)  of  non-logical  actions.  The  Apostle 
continues:  "Neither  let  us  tempt  Christ,  as  some  of  them  also  tempted,  and  were 
destroyed  of  serpents  [Num.  21:4-9].  Neither  murmur  ye,  as  some  of  them  also 
murmured,  and  were  destroyed  of  the  destroyer  [Num.  11:16]."  And  later  on,  22, 
he  asks:  "Do  we  provoke  the  Lord  to  jealousy?  are  we  stronger  than  He?"  Every 


§33^  DIVINITIES   AND   PERSONIFICATIONS  21 7 

337.  Device  B-Ie:  What  is  real  is  the  accord  betweeji  the  prin- 
ciples and  certain  sentiments.  This  manner  of  envisaging  facts  is 
implicit  rather  than  explicit.  So  for  certain  neo-Christians  the  reality 
of  Jesus  seems  to  come  down  to  an  accord  between  their  conception 
of  Him  and  certain  sentiments  they  hold.  They  abandon  the  objec- 
tive field,  deny  the  divine  nature  of  Christ,  and  seem  not  to  care 
very  much  about  His  historical  reality.  They  are  satisfied  with  as- 
serting that  Christ  is  the  most  perfect  type  of  humanity,  which 
means  that  their  notions  of  Christ  happen  to  coincide  with  what, 
according  to  their  sentiments,  is  the  most  perfect  type  of  human 
being.  Once  on  that  road  they  finish  by  throwing  all  theology,  all 
rites,  overboard  and  end  with  the  assertion  that  "religion  is  a  man- 
ner  of  living."  ^ 

338.  Along  that  line  they  might  seem  to  be  approxim.ating  the 
concept  of  non-logical  conduct;  but  they  are  still  radically  at  vari- 
ance with  it,  since  they  are  thinking  not  of  what  is,  but  of  what 
ought  to  be,  and  rob  the  "ought"  of  the  subordinate  character 

sensible  man  will  answer  no  if  the  being  in  question  is  an  omnipotent  God;  but 
many  sensible  men  will  answer  yes  if  it  is  a  question  of  an  abstraction  that  some 
few  individuals  have  distilled  from  their  own  sentiments. 

337  ^  Auguste  Sabatier,  Les  religions  d'antorite  et  la  religion  de  V esprit,  pp.  440-41 
(English  translation,  pp.  281-82):  "The  letter,  the  alphabetic  sign,  characterizes  the 
Mosaic  religion  in  accordance  with  the  form  of  its  appearance  in  history,  its  manner 
of  being  and  action.  .  .  .  The  letter  kills.  Spirit,  instead,  characterizes  the  religion 
of  the  Gospel  in  accord  with  the  very  nature  of  the  inner  moral  relationship  that  it 
sets  up  between  God  and  man,  in  accord  with  the  manner  of  being  of  the  Gospel 
and  the  principle  of  its  action.  ...  In  view  of  that  you  must  surely  understand 
what  the  religion  of  the  spirit  is.  It  is  the  religious  relationship  realized  in  pure 
spirituality.  It  is  God  and  man  conceived  both  as  spirit  and  as  reciprocally  permeat- 
ing each  other  to  the  point  of  attaining  complete  communion.  Physical  bodies  are 
by  definition  impenetrable  to  each  other.  .  .  .  Quite  otherwise  the  relationship  be- 
tween spirits.  Their  inward  tendency  is  to  live  each  other's  lives  mutually  and  to 
combine  in  a  higher  common  life.  What  the  law  of  gravitation  is  to  the  physical 
world  as  regards  the  maintenance  of  its  harmony,  so  love  is  and  so  love  does  in 
the  spiritual  and  moral  world.  [The  conception  this  gendeman  has  of  the  law  of 
gravitation  would  make  a  story.]  .  .  .  Ultimate  force  in  the  moral  development  of 
the  human  being,  the  spirit  of  God  no  longer  constrains  him  from  without  but 
determines,  animates,  him  from  within,  and  is  the  source  of  his  life.  .  .  .  The  ful- 
filment of  natural  duties,  the  regular  exercise  of  all  human  faculties,  the  progress 
of  enlightenment  as  well  as  of  justice — that  is  the  perfection  of  the  Christian  life. 
Becoming  an  inner  reality,  a  fact  of  conscience,  Christianity  is  now  nothing  more 
than  conscience  raised  to  its  highest  power." 


2l8  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §339 

(§  326)  it  might  well  have  in  the  case  of  some  few  individuals,  and 
give  it  an  absolute  status  that  altogether  transcends  the  experimental 
field.  Their  theories,  in  a  word,  have  no  other  purpose  than  to  deco- 
rate non-logical  impulse  with  a  logical  rouge. 

339.  B-II:  The  reality  is  no  longer  direct;  that  is  to  say,  it  is  no 
longer  held  that  there  is  a  god,  a  personification,  an  abstraction,  or 
the  like,  from  which  non-logical  actions  may  be  logically  inferred.  // 
is  assumed  that  such  actions  have  arisen  spontaneously,  by  reasonings 
good  or  bad  based  on  facts  well  or  badly  authenticated.  The  differ- 
ence between  this  variety  and  the  B-I  group  is  a  radical  one;  for 
whereas  the  B-I  devices  ascribed  reality  to  entities  foreign  to  the  ex- 
perimental field,  the  entities  posited  in  this  variety  arise  within  the  ex- 
perimental field,  and  the  only  questions  are  whether  they  have  actu- 
ally been  observed  and  whether  the  assumed  consequences  are  real 
consequences.  "Beggars  come  from  Zeus"  is  an  interpretation  of  the 
B-I  variety.  I  create  the  entity  Zeus,  which  I  assume  to  be  real,  and 
from  its  existence  I  draw  certain  inferences.  "Whoever  is  hospitable 
to  beggars  will  be  happy"  is  an  interpretation  of  the  B-II  variety.  I 
pretend  that  I  have  observed  that  people  who  have  been  hospitable 
to  beggars  have  been  happy,  and  I  draw  the  inference  that  if  they 
continue  to  be  hospitable  to  beggars  they  will  continue  to  be  happy. 
I  have  not  created  any  entity ;  I  am  using  real  facts,  combining  them 
as  I  see  fit. 

340.  Device  B-IIa:  Observation  imperfect,  inferences  logical.  This 
method  of  reasoning  aims  to  throw  back  upon  the  premises  a  logico- 
experimental  insufficiency  that  cannot  be  disputed.  We  have  certain 
assertions  that  are  manifestly  in  contradiction  with  logico-experi- 
mental  knowledge.  We  may  assume  that  the  contradiction  arises 
because  the  reasoning  which  produces  the  conclusions  is  not  logical, 
and  we  are  thereby  carried  into  the  domain  of  non-logical  conduct. 
Or  else  we  ma.y  hold  that  the  reasoning  is  logical,  but  that  it  starts 
with  premises  inconsistent  with  experimental  knowledge  and  so 
leads  to  conclusions  where  the  contradiction  is  likewise  apparent.  In 
that  way  we  are  able  to  remain  within  the  field  of  logical  conduct. 
Typical  of  this  variety  are  the  theories  of  Herbert  Spencer  (§§  285, 


I 


§344         RATIONALIZATION  OF  NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  219 

289-95).  The  role  ascribed  to  non-logical  conduct  is  reduced  to  a 
minimum  and  may  even  be  eliminated.  Underlying  certain  phe- 
nomena are  certain  observations  of  fact.  It  is  assumed  that  from  such 
alleged  observations  human  beings  have  drawn  inferences,  reasoning 
very  much  as  any  thinker  would  reason.  So  we  get  the  doctrines  of 
those  human  beings  and  the  reasons  for  their  conduct. 

341.  Concepts  of  this  kind  figure  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  in 
almost  all  theories  dealing  with  the  "origins"  of  social  phenomena 
such  as  "religion,"  "morality,"  "law,"  and  the  like.  Writers  are 
driven  to  admit  the  existence  of  non- logical  actions  but  are  careful 
to  push  them  back  into  the  past  as  far  as  they  can. 

342.  There  may  be  some  truth  in  such  theories  in  so  far  as  they 
call  attention  to  certain  simple  types  of  complex  phenomena.  They 
go  astray  in  trying  to  derive  the  complex  phenomenon  from  the 
simple  type,  and  still  farther  astray  when  it  is  assumed  that  that 
process  is  logical. 

343.  Ignoring  for  the  moment  the  complex  character  of  social 
phenomena,  let  us  assume  that  certain  phenomena  P,  observable  at 
the  present  day,  have  an  actual  origin  A  (Figure  9).  If  the  develop- 
ment took  place  along  a  continuous  line  ABCDP,  it 
would  be  possible,  in  a  sense,  to  take  one  of  the  inter- 
mediate phenomena  B,  C  .  .  .  a.s  the  origin,  or  cause, 
of  P.  If,  for  instance,  going  as  far  back  as  our  historical 
knowledge  permits,  we  found  a  thing  B  of  the  same 
nature  as  P,  though  much  simpler,  we  should  not  go 
too  far  wrong  in  regarding  it  as  the  origin,  or  cause, 
of  P. 

344.  Unfortunately  the  assumption  of  development  along  a  con- 
tinuous line  does  not  at  all  conform  with  the  facts  as  regards  social 
phenomena,  or  even  as  regards  not  a  few  biological  phenomena.  The 

.development,  rather,  seems  to  take  place  along  a  line  with  many 
branches  (Figure  10),  even  still  ignoring  the  complex  character  of 
social  phenomena,  which  hardly  permits  us  to  dissociate  the  social 
phenomenon  P  from  other  social  phenomena  (§  513).  Facts  B,  C,  D 
.  .  .  (Figure  10)  are  no  longer  located  along  a  straight  continuous 


220  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §345 

line,  but  stand  at  the  extremities  or  intersections  of  branch  Hnes; 
and  we  cannot,  even  as  a  hypothesis  very  remotely  approximative  to 
the  facts,  assume  that  C,  for  example,  or  E,  or  any  other  similar  fact 
observable  in  the  past,  is  the  origin,  the  cause,  of  P,  observable  in  the 
present. 

345.  To  take  a  concrete  example :  Reinach  sees  in  taboos  the  origin 
of  religion.  In  so  doing,  he  seems  to  take  the  position  pictured  in 
Figure  9,  B  standing  for  the  taboos,  P  for  present-day  religions.  But 
even  assuming  that  religion  is  unconnected  with  other  social  phe- 

Q 


Figure  10 

nomena,  the  situation  is  actually  as  represented  in  Figure  10,  and  the 
taboos  B  would  be  the  extremity  of  a  by-path.  Taboos  cannot  be 
taken  as  the  origin  of  religion.  They  may  be  regarded  as  simple 
types  of  phenomena,  of  which  the  religions  C,  Q,  P  are  complex 
types.  That  is  all  the  truth  there  is  in  the  theories  of  Reinach,  a 
fairly  important  truth,  for  that  matter,  since  it  emphasizes  the  part 
played  by  non-logical  actions  in  religious  phenomena. 

346.  Studies  in  origins  in  social  matters  often  proceed  very  much 
after  the  manner  of  old-fashioned  etymology.^  The  intermediate 

346  ^  Brachet,  Gra7nmaire  historique  de  la  langue  francaise,  pp.  293-94  (Kitchin, 
pp.  195-96):  "Before  attaining  the  degree  of  exactness  that  it  possesses  today,  etymol- 
ogy, like  all  the  sciences  and  perhaps  more  notably  than  any  other,  traversed  a  long 
period  of  infancy,  of  gropings,  of  uncertain  efforts,  during  which  arbitrary  associa- 
tions, superficial  analogies,  reckless  combinations,  made  up  virtually  its  whole  patri- 
mony." Here  Brachet  quotes  from  Reville,  Les  ancStres  des  europeens:  "  'Abidingly 
famous  the  day-dreams  of  Plato  in  the  Cratylus,  the  absurd  etymologies  of  Varro 
[Etymologiae,  Dordrecht,  Part  III,  pp.  165-176]  and  Quintilian  among  the  Romans, 
the  philological  fancies  of  Menage  in  France  in  the  seventeenth  century.  People  saw 
nothing  strange  about  connecting  jetme,  "fast,"  with  jeune,  "young."  Is  not  youth  the 
morning  of  life,  and  is  one  not  fasting  when  one  gets  up.^*  Most  often  two  words 


§348  MYTH  AND  ALLEGORY  221 

Steps  C,  D  .  .  ,  (Figure  9)  are  assumed  or  guessed  at,  in  getting 
from  B  to  P;  and  the  temptation  is  to  ask  how  things  ought  to  have 
gone  rather  than  how  they  actually  went.  Investigations,  in  such  a 
case.  He  outside  the  domain  of  experimental  reality.  Yet,  historically 
speaking,  they  have  not  been  altogether  wasted :  for  they  have  served 
!'  to  open  a  breach  in  the  ethical  and  a  priori  theories  that  have  been 
explaining  P  by  imaginary  principles.  That  task  accomplished,  it  is 
now  time  for  them  to  give  way  to  purely  experimental  theories. 

347.  Device  B-II/? :  Myths  have  a  historical  basis  or  else  are  imita- 
tions of  other  myths.  Origins  and  evolution  being  discarded,  it  is 

i|  assumed  that  every  myth  is  the  deformed  reflection  of  something 
real.  Of  this  variety  were  the  euhemeristic  theories,  so  called,  as  to 
the  origin  of  the  pagan  gods  (§§  682-708).  Nothing  is  more  certain 
than  that  there  have  been  cases  where  human  beings  have  been 
deified.  The^^euliemeristic  error  lies,  first  of  all,  in  generalizing  a 
particular  fact,  and  then  in  confusing  the  point  B  in  Figure  9  with 
the  point  B  in  Figure  10,  in  assuming,  that  is,  that  because  one  fact 
precedes  another  fact  in  time,  it  is  the  origin  of  it.  The  theories  of 
Palaephatus  (§661)  also  belong  to  this  variety. 

348.  In  general,  interpretations  of  this  kind  are  very  easy  to  work 
out.  One  arbitrarily  changes  in  a  myth  anything  that  needs  to  be 
changed  to  produce  a  picture  that  is  real.  Take,  for  example,  As- 
tolfo's  hippogriff  in  the  Orlando  furioso  of  Ariosto,  The  winged 
horse  can  be  made  a  real  horse  by  interpreting  the  story  in  the  sense 
that  the  hippogrifl  was  some  very  swift  horse  that  was  therefore 
spoken  of  as  having  wings.  Dante  sees  Francesca  and  her  brother- 
in-law  lashed  by  "the  hellish  hurricane."  The  hurricane  can  be  in- 
terpreted as  a  symbol  of  the  carnal  passion  that  smites  the  two  lovers 

of  entirely  different  forms  were  derived  from  each  other,  the  gulf  between  them 
being  bridged  by  fictional  intermediaries.  That  was  the  way  Menage  got  the  French 
rat  from  the  Latin  mus,  "mouse":  "People  must  have  said  first  mus,  then  murattts, 
then  ratus,  finally  rat."  It  was  courageously  assumed  that  an  object  could  get  its 
name  from  a  quality  opposite  to  its  own,  affirmation  provoking  negation,  so  that 
Latin  luctts,  "grove,"  came  from  non  Ulcere,  "not  to  be  bright,"  because  on  entering 
a  grove  one  finds  it  shady.'  "  Brachet  continues:  "From  such  a  mass  of  erudite  non- 
sense how  could  one  of  the  leading  sciences  eventually  arise  in  our  day.''  By  the 
discovery  and  application  of  the  comparative  method,  which  is  the  method  of  the 
natural  sciences" — and  the  method  we  are  trying  to  follow  in  tliese  volumes. 


222  TREATISE   ON  GENERAL   SOCIOLOGY  §349 

like  a  hurricane.  In  such  a  procedure  not  the  sHghtest  difficulty  will 
ever  be  encountered  (§66i). 

349.  With  this  variety  we  may  class  theories  that  explain  the  non- 
logical  actions  observable  in  a  given  society  as  imitations  of  non- 
logical  actions  prevalent  in  other  societies.  To  tell  the  truth,  not  all 
non-logical  actions  are  eliminated  by  this  device;  they  are  merely 
reduced  in  number,  several  of  them  being  taken  as  duplicates  of 

^        one.^ 

350.  Device  B-IIy:  Myths  taken  as  historical  fact  plus  a  fictional 
r-^  I  appendage.  In  this  variety  we  come  a  little  closer  to  reality.  In  every 

/  myth  the  legend  is  assumed  to  have  a  nucleus  of  historical  fact  cov- 
ered over  by  an  alluvium  of  fiction.  One  removes  the  accretion,  and 
finds  the  nucleus  of  fact  underneath.  Many  books  have  been  written 
from  that  point  of  view.  Not  so  long  since  all  the  legends  that  have 
come  down  from  Graeco-Roman  antiquity  were  treated  in  that  way.^ 
Our  variety  B-II/?,  above,  is  often  the  present  variety,  B-IIj/,  car- 
ried to  the  extreme.  There  may  be  something  historical  in  a  myth, 
a  something  more  or  less  extensive.  As  it  is  reduced  to  a  minimum 
and  finally  disappears,  we  get  the  B-II/?  variety. 

351.  Device  B-III:  The  principles  underlying  non-logical  actions 
are  allegories.  The  actions,  it  is  held,  are  in  reality  logical.  They 
seem  to  be  non-logical  only  because  the  allegories  are  taken  literally. 
A  further  assumption  locates  the  source  of  such  errors  in  language 
by  an  allegorical  interpretation.  Max  Miiller  writes:^  "There  are 
many  myths  in  Hesiod,  of  late  origin,  where  we  have  only  to  replace 
a  full  verb  by  an  auxiliary,  in  order  to  change  mythical  into  logical 
language.  Hesiod  [Theogonia,  vv.  211-12  (White,  pp.  94-95)],  calls 
Nyx  (Night)  the  mother  of  Moros  (Fate),  and  the  dark  Ker  (De- 
struction), of  Thanatos  (Death),  Hypnos  (Sleep)  and  the  tribe  of 
the  Oneiroi  (Dreams).  .  .  .  Now  let  us  use  our  modern  expressions, 
such  as:  'the  stars  are  seen  as  night  approaches,'  'we  sleep,'  'we 
dream,'  'we  die,'  'we  run  danger  during  the  night'  .  .  .  and  we 

349  ^  For  examples  see  §§  733  f. 

350  ^  For  several  such  interpretations  see  Chapter  V. 

351  ^  Chips  from  a  German  Workjhop,  Vol.  II,  p.  64.  [The  French  translation 
which  Pareto  used  for  this  passage  has  a  number  of  errors. — A.  L.] 


11 


§354         RATIONALIZATION  OF   NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  223 

have  translated  the  language  of  Hesiod  .  .  .  into  modern  forms  of 
thought  and  speech." 

352.  On  that  basis  all  myths  would  be  charades.  It  seems  incred- 
ible that  a  theory  so  manifestly  absurd  could  have  gained  such  wide 
acceptance.  Miiller's  disciples  did  even  worse  than  their  master,  and 
the  solar  myth  became  a  convenient  and  universal  explanation  for 
every  conceivable  legend. 

353.  Class  C.  In  this  class,  really,  non-logical  actions  are  not  inter- 
preted in  such  a  way  as  to  make  them  logical.  They  are  eliminated, 
so  that  only  logical  actions  are  left.  That  serves  just  as  well  to  reduce 
all  conduct  to  logic.  Such  opinions  are  widely  current  in  our  time, 
and  are  an  article  of  faith  with  a  great  many  people  who  worship  a 
powerful  divinity  known  to  them  as  "Science."  Not  a  few  humani- 
tarians are  of  the  same  tribe. 

354.  Other  people  reason  more  soundly;  and  after  noting  a  thing 
that  is  true  enough — that  science  has  contributed  greatly  to  the  ad- 
vance of  civilization — they  go  farther  still  and  try  to  show  that  noth- 
ing that  is  not  science  can  be  useful.  As  the  type  of  such  theories 
one  might  quote  the  celebrated  argument  of  Buckle :  ^  "It  is  evident, 
that  if  we  look  at  mankind  in  the  aggregate,  their  moral  and  intel- 
lectual conduct  is  regulated  by  the  moral  and  intellectual  notions 
prevalent  in  their  own  time.  .  .  .  Now,  it  requires  but  a  superficial 
acquaintance  with  history  to  be  aware  that  this  standard  is  con- 
stantly changing.  .  .  .  This  extreme  mutability  in  the  ordinary 
standard  of  human  actions  shows  that  the  conditions  on  which  the 
standard  depends  must  themselves  be  very  mutable;  and  these  con- 
ditions, whatever  they  may  be,  are  evidently  the  originators  of  the 
moral  and  intellectual  conduct  of  the  great  average  of  mankind. 

"Here,  then,  we  have  a  basis  on  which  we  can  safely  proceed. 
We  know  that  the  main  cause  of  human  actions  is  extremely  vari- 
able; we  have  only,  therefore,  to  apply  this  test  to  any  set  of  circum- 
stances which  are  supposed  to  be  the  cause,  and  if  we  find  that  such 
circumstances  are  not  very  variable,  we  must  infer  that  they  are  not 
the  cause  we  are  attempting  to  discover. 

354  '^History  of  Civilization  in  England,  Vol.  I,  pp.  179-82. 


224  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §355 

"Applying  this  test  to  moral  motives,  or  to  the  dictates  of  what  is 
called  moral  instinct,  we  shall  at  once  see  how  extremely  small  is 
the  influence  those  motives  have  exercised  over  the  progress  of  civi- 
lization. For  there  is,  unquestionably,  nothing  to  be  found  in  the 
world  which  has  undergone  so  little  change  as  those  great  dogmas 
of  which  moral  systems  are  composed.  .  .  . 

"But,  if  we  contrast  this  stationary  aspect  of  moral  truths  with 
the  progressive  aspect  of  intellectual  truths,  the  difference  is  indeed 
startling.^  All  the  great  moral  systems  which  have  exercised  much 
influence  have  been  fundamentally  the  same;  all  the  great  intellec- 
tual systems  have  been  fundamentally  different.  .  .  .  Since  civiliza- 
tion is  the  product  of  moral  and  intellectual  agencies,  and  since  that 
product  is  constantly  changing,  it  evidently  cannot  be  regulated  by 
the  stationary  agent;  because  when  surrounding  circumstances  are 
unchanged,  a  stationary  agent  can  only  produce  a  stationary  effect. 
The  only  other  agent  is  the  intellectual  one;  and  that  this  is  the  real 
mover  may  be  proved." 

355.  Buckle's  reasoning  is  sound  provided  one  add  that  all  human 
conduct  is  logical  and  derives  from  moral  and  intellectual  principles. 
But  that  proposition  is  false.  In  the  first  place,  many  very  important 
actions  are  non-logical.  Secondly,  the  things  designated  by  the  terms 
"moral  principle"  and  "intellectual  principle"  are  wanting  in  exact- 
ness: they  cannot  be  taken  as  premises  in  a  rigorous  argument. 
Thirdly,  Buckle's  reasoning  has  the  general  defect  of  arguments  by 
elimination  in  sociological  matters — the  enumeration  is  never  com- 
plete.^ He  omits  things  of  great  importance.  Theoretical  principles 
of  morality  may  be  the  same,  and  moral  practices  very  different — for 
instance,  the  peoples  who  all  preach  the  Christian  ethics  by  no  means 
all  behave  in  the  same  way  in  practice.^ 

356.  Buckle's  argument  reduces  the  practical  role  of  moral  the- 

354  ^  Buckle  quotes  James  Mackintosh,  Condorcet,  and  Kant,  in  support. 

355  ^  Pareto,  Maiiuale,  Chap.  I,  §  18. 

355  "  [Fielding,  Totn  Jones,  IX,  iii,  2:  ".  .  .  purposes  .  .  .  which  though  toler- 
ated in  some  Christian  countries,  connived  at  in  others  and  practised  in  all  .  .  .  are 
expressly  forbidden  ...  by  that  religion  which  is  universally  believed  in  in  those 
countries." — A.  L.] 


§358  BAYLE  225 

ories  to  very  small  proportions,  and  in  that  it  accords  with  the  facts. 
But  what  it  takes  away  from  morals  ought  not  be  handed  over  to 
an  "intellectual  principle"  (whatever  that  may  be),  but  to  the  patri- 
mony of  non-logical  actions,  economic  progress,  improvements  in 
communications,  and  the  like.  It  may  well  be  that  something  has 
to  be  assigned  to  scientific  progress  all  the  same,  and  therefore  to 
the  said  "intellectual  principle";  but  there  is  a  big  difference  between 
such  indirect,  non-logical  influence,  and  a  direct  action  by  way  of 
logical  inference  from  a  given  principle.^ 

357.  We  need  carry  our  study  of  this  special  classification  no  far- 
ther. It  has  already  shown  that  existing  doctrines  may  be  broken  up 
into  two  different  elements:  certain  sentiments,  and  inferences  from 
those  sentiments.  It  opens,  in  other  words,  a  path  that  it  may  or 
may  not  be  profitable  to  follow  to  the  end.  We  shall  see  as  we  go  on. 

358.  Many  statesmen,  many  historians,  recognize  non-logical  ac- 
tions without  giving  them  that  name  and  without  going  to  the 
trouble  of  finding  their  theory.  Just  a  few  examples  taken  here  and 
there  from  the  works  of  Bayle,^  implicit  in  which  are  several  theories 
of  non-logical  conduct — and  it  is  indeed  surprising  to  find  in  a 
writer  who  lived  two  centuries  and  more  ago  certain  truths  that  are 
unappreciated  even  today.  Bayle  declares  and  repeats  that  "opinions 
are  not  the  rule  of  conduct";  and  that  "man  does  not  regulate  his 
conduct  by  his  opinions.  .  .  .  The  Turks  hold  certain  tenets  of  that 
doctrine  of  the  Stoics  [fatalism],  and  they  carry  the  business  of 
predestination  to  extreme  lengths.  Nevertheless  they  may  be  seen 

356  ^  Here  and  there  in  his  work  Buckle  himself  ends  by  making  at  least  implicit 
allusion  to  non-logical  actions.  Trying  to  account  for  the  differences  between  the 
Puritan  Revolution  and  the  French  Fronde,  he  suggests.  Vol.  II,  p.  150,  "that  in 
England  a  war  for  liberty  was  accompanied  by  a  war  of  classes,  while  in  France 
there  was  no  war  of  classes  at  all";  and  further.  Vol.  II,  p.  162,  that  "the  object  of 
the  [French]  nobles  was  merely  to  find  new  sources  of  excitement,  and  minister  to 
that  personal  vanity  for  which,  as  a  body,  they  have  always  been  notorious."  Now 
whatever  the  route  that  is  tried  in  order  to  get  from  such  facts  to  logical  inferences 
from  an  "intellectual  principle,"  it  is  certain  that  the  facts  depend  on  natural  in- 
clinations, which  cannot  be  regarded  as  resulting  from  any  differences  between  the 
scientific  and  intellectual  attainments  of  the  English  and  the  French  at  that  period. 
No  such  differences  existed. 

358  ^  Pensees  diver ses,  §  138. 


226  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §359 

to  flee  danger  as  other  men  do,  and  they  are  far  from  charging  in 
battle  with  the  courage  of  the  French,  who  do  not  beUeve  in  pre- 
destination." The  existence  and  importance  of  non-logical  conduct 
could  not  be  recognized  in  plainer  terms.  Find  a  general  form  for 
this  observation  of  particular  fact,  and  we  get  the  starting-point  for 
a  theory  of  non-logical  conduct. 
i  359.  Bayle  further  observes.  Ibid.,  §  139:  "It  cannot  be  said  that 
'  people  who  fail  to  live  according  to  the  precepts  of  their  religion 
do  not  believe  in  a  God";  and  he  presses  the  point,  Ibid.,  §  136: 
"Man  does  not  act  according  to  his  principles.  He  may  be  as  rational 
a  creature  as  you  like,  but  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  he  almost  never 
acts  according  to  his  principles.  [In  other  words  his  conduct  is  non- 
logical.]  He  has  indeed  the  strength,  in  speculative  matters,  not  to 
draw  wrong  conclusions ;  for  in  such  reflections  he  sins  rather  in  his 
readiness  to  accept  false  principles  than  in  drawing  mistaken  con- 
clusions from  them.  But  it  is  quite  another  matter  when  good  morals 
are  in  question.  [A  particular  remark  that  is  true  in  general.]  In 
morals  he  almost  never  hits  on  false  principles.  Almost  always  the 
ideas  of  natural  equity  are  present  in  his  conscience.  Nevertheless 
he  is  always  deciding  in  favour  of  his  uncontrolled  desires.  [The 
usual  vague  phraseology,  but  the  substance  accords  with  fact.]  .  .  . 
The  true  principle  of  human  conduct  ...  is  naught  but  tempera- 
ment, the  natural  inclination  to  pleasure,  the  taste  for  certain  things, 
the  desire  to  please,  the  habits  acquired  in  intercourse  with  friends, 
or  some  other  disposition  arising  from  the  depths  of  human  nature, 
whatever  the  country  in  which  one  is  born  [This  contradicts  the 
preceding  and  is  to  be  deleted.]  and  whatever  the  knowledge  that 
has  been  instilled  in  the  mind." 

That  comes  very  close  to  the  facts.  If  we  tried  to  give  greater 
precision  to  Bayle's  language,  and  establish  a  stricter  classification, 
would  we  not  have  a  theory  of  non-logical  actions — their  great  im- 
portance so  becoming  more  and  more  apparent  ? 

360.  Bayle  quotes  with  approval  a  passage  from  Nicolle :  "  'When 
the  time  comes  for  human  beings  to  pass  from  speculation  to  action, 
they  do  not  follow  consequences;  and  strange  it  is  to  see  how  the 


§363  RATIONALIZATION  OF   NON-LOGICAL  CONDUCT  227 

human  mind  can  stop  at  certain  speculative  truths  without  going 
on  to  their  logical  consequences  in  practice,  which  seem  so  bound 
up  with  those  truths  as  to  be  in  no  way  separable  from  them.' "  ^ 

361.  Bayle  soundly  enough  observes,  Ibid.,  §  51,  that  "the  pagan 
religion  was  satisfied  with  an  external  rite"  (§  174);  but  he  went 
wrong  in  believing.  Ibid.,  §  122,  that  it  "had  no  influence  on  morals." 

'   He  failed  to  perceive  that  ritual  practices  intensified  sentiments  (non- 
^  logical  actions)  and  that  such  sentiments  were  in  turn  sources  of 
morality. 

362.  He  goes  to  some  pains  to  prove  that  atheism  is  preferable  to 
idolatry.  To  understand  him  aright  we  have  to  take  account  of  the 
times  in  which  he  was  living  and  the  perils  to  which  he  was  exposed. 
Just  as  in  our  time  there  are  persons  who  give  perpetual  chase  to 
"immoral"  books,  so  in  Bayle's  time  there  were  those  who  kept  open 
season  on  books  against  Christianity.  Unable  to  whip  the  horse, 
Bayle  whips  the  saddle,  and  belabours  idolatry  with  criticisms  that 
apply  just  as  well  to  all  religions.  At  bottom  his  argument  tends  to 
show  that  since  the  majority  of  human  actions  are  non-logical,  forms 
of  belief  are  of  no  great  importance. 

363.  Montesquieu  did  not  get  that  point,  and  his  reply  to  what  he 
calls  "Bayle's  paradox"  is  of  little  or  no  value.  He  is  solving  the  prob- 
lem by  restating  it  when  he  says:  "A  prince  who  loves  religion 
and  fears  it  is  a  lion  surrendering  to  the  hand  that  caresses  it,  or 
to  the  voice  that  quiets  it;  the  prince  who  fears  religion  and  hates 
it  is  like  the  wild  beast  biting  at  the  chains  that  keep  it  from  attack- 
ing passers-by;  the  prince  who  has  no  religion  at  all  is  the  terrible 
beast  that  never  feels  his  freedom  till  he  is  rending  and  devouring."  ^ 
Underlying  all  this  declamation,  which  is  mere  fustian,  is  the  prop- 
osition, evidently,  that  human  beings  act  logically  in  accord  with 
their  beliefs.  But  that  is  the  very  thing  Bayle  denies;  and  proofs,  not 

360  ^  Continuation  des  Pensees  diverses,  §  139. 

363  ^  U esprit  des  his,  XXIV,  2:  Paradoxe  de  Bayle.  Montesquieu  was  right  in 
saying  that  "in  order  to  attenuate  the  horrors  of  atheism"  Bayle  was  "too  severe  on 
idolatry";  but  he  should  have  recognized  Bayle's  artifice  in  doing  that.  It  was  a 
trick  he  used  himself  on  other  occasions. 


228  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §3^4 

mere  asseverations  of  the  opposite,  were  required  to  refute  him 
(§368). 

364.  Taking  his  stand  on  logical  conduct,  Montesquieu  says  that 
"even  if  it  were  useless  for  subjects  to  have  religions  it  would  not 
be  useless  for  princes  to  have  them."  Starting  with  the  premise  of 
non-logical  conduct,  we  are  carried  to  a  conclusion  directly  opposite: 
the  person  in  command  needs  rational  combinations  particularly, 
and  the  person  who  obeys  needs  more  particularly  an  unreasoned 
rule  independent  of  his  scant  knowledge. 

365.  The  weakness  in  Bayle's  argument  is  not  the  one  that  Mon- 
tesquieu criticizes.  It  lies  in  an  altogether  different  direction.  After 
noting  and  amply  demonstrating  that  human  beings  do  not  act  ac- 
cording to  logical  inferences  from  principles,  from  opinions,  and 
that  a  great  many  human  actions  of  great  importance  are  non-log- 
ical, Bayle  should  have  centred  his  attention  upon  such  actions. 
Then  he  would  have  seen  that  they  were  of  many  kinds;  and  he 
would  have  had  to  decide  whether  they  were  independent  or  influ- 
enced one  another  mutually.  He  would  readily  have  seen  that  they 
do  exert  reciprocal  influences,  and  therefore  that  the  social  impor- 
tance of  religion  lies  not  at  all  in  the  logical  value  of  its  dogmas, 
its  principles,  its  theology,  but  rather  in  the  non-logical  actions  that 
it  promotes.  He  was  actually  on  the  road  to  that  conclusion  when  he 
asserted  that  "a  religion  has  to  be  judged  by  the  cult  which  it  prac- 
tises"; and  when  he  stated  that  the  pagan  religion  stopped  at  a 
purely  external  ritualism,  he  could  hardly  have  been  closer  to  ex- 
perimental truth.  One  step  more  and  he  would  have  had  the  truth 
entire.  But  unfortunately  he  turns  aside.  Instead  of  judging  religions, 
which  are  non-logical  actions,  by  their  social  influence,  he  loses  his 
way  in  questions  as  to  their  moral  value,  or  better,  as  to  their  rela- 
tion to  what  he  is  pleased  to  call  "morality" ;  and  in  that  we  have  a 
counter-attack  by  logic,  which  is  again  invading  territory  from 
which  it  had  been  expelled. 

From  that  point  of  view  one  might  repeat  of  Bayle  what  Sumner 
Maine  says  of  him  in  commenting  on  the  writings  of  Rousseau :  ^ 

365  ^  Ancient  Law,  p.  84. 


§366  BAYLE  229 

"It  [Rousseau's]  was  the  first  attempt  to  re-erect  the  edifice  of 
human  behef  after  the  purely  iconoclastic  efforts  commenced  by 
Bayle,  and  in  part  by  our  own  Locke,  and  consummated  by  Vol- 
taire." But  that  goes  to  show  how,  in  view  of  the  indefiniteness  of 
ordinary  language,  utterly  different  concepts  may  be  expressed  in 
the  same  words.  Maine  is  thinking  not  of  science  or  theory  but  of 
practice,  as  is  clearly  apparent  from  what  immediately  follows.:  "and 
[Rousseau's  system  has],  besides,  the  superiority  which  every  con- 
structive effort  will  always  enjoy  over  one  that  is  merely  destruc- 
tive." It  is  not  the  function  of  theory  to  create  beliefs,  but  to  explain 
existing  ones  and  discover  their  uniformities.  Bayle  took  a  great 
step  forward  in  that  direction  in  exposing  the  vacuity  of  certain 
interpretations  and  opening  the  way  for  the  discovery  of  others  more 
consistent  with  the  facts.  From  the  standpoint  of  theory,  his  work, 
far  from  being  inferior  to  Rousseau's,  is  as  superior  to  Rousseau's 
as  the  astronomy  of  Kepler  is  superior  to  the  astronomy  of  Cosmas 
Indicopleustes.  He  may  be  blamed  only  for  stopping  too  soon  on 
a  road  which  he  had  so  splendidly  opened. 

366.  Why  he  did  so  is  hard  to  guess.  The  case  is  not  rare.  It  would 
seem  as  though  in  science  it  is  often  necessary  to  destroy  before 
building  can  begin.  It  may  also  be  that  Bayle  was  deterred  from  a 
complete  expression  of  his  ideas  by  the  moral  and  religious  persecu- 
tions common  in  his  time,  that  the  atmosphere  of  persecution  af- 
fected the  thinker  not  only  materially  but  intellectually  also,  and 
constrained  him  to  disguise  his  thought  under  certain  forms.  Just 
so  in  our  own  time  persecutions  and  annoyances  of  all  sorts  emanat- 
ing from  votaries  of  the  religion  of  sexual  virtue  have  created  an 
atmosphere  of  hypocrisy  in  speech  and  thought  that  influences  writ- 
ing. And  so,  if  in  some  future  age  the  expression  of  human  thought 
comes  to  be  liberated  from  sex  "ties"  just  as  it  has  already  been  freed 
of  the  ties  requiring  deference  to  the  Bible,  people  desiring  to  under- 
stand the  thought  of  writers  of  our  day  will  have  to  take  account  of 
the  masks  with  which  it  is  disguised  in  deference  to  contemporary 
prejudices.  Another  cause  may  have  been  the  scientific  inadequacies 
of  ordinary  language.  If  Bayle  had  not  had  at  his  disposal  such  terms 


<  / 


230  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §367 

as  "religion"  and  "morality,"  which  seem  to  be  exact  but  are  not, 
he  would  have  been  compelled  to  deal  with  things  instead  of  with 
words,  sentiments,  fictions;  and  in  that  case  perhaps  he  might  not 
have  lost  his  way  (§  114). 

367.  But  his  case  is  merely  typical  of  a  vastly  populous  class  of 
cases  where  error  in  argument  is  directly  proportionate  to  defects 
in  language.  Anyone,  therefore,  desirous  of  remaining  in  the  logico- 
experimental  field  and  concerned  not  to  be  led  astray  into  the  do- 
main of  sentiment,  must  ever  be  on  his  watch  against  this  the  great- 
est enemy  of  science  (§  119).  In  social  matters,  human  beings  as  a 
rule  use  language  that  lures  them  away  from  the  logico-experi- 
mental  domain.  What  does  such  language  really  mean  ?  We  have  to 
be  clear  on  that  question  before  we  can  go  farther,  and  to  it  we  shall 
devote  the  chapter  next  following. 


CHAPTER     IV 


Theories  Transcending  Experience 


368.  We  are  still  with  our  induction.  There  are  phenomena  to 
v/hich  certain  names  are  given  in  ordinary  language:  there  are  nar- 
rations, theories,  doctrines,  that  refer  to  social  facts.  How  are  we  to 
take  them?  Do  they  correspond  to  anything  exact  (§114)?  Even 
when  suitably  retouched  in  form,  can  they  be  classed  as  logico- 
experimental  theories  (§  13),  or  are  they  to  be  taken  as  non-logico- 
experimental  .f^  Even  when  grouped  with  the  latter,  do  they  cor- 
respond to  something,  at  least,  that  is  definite.?  ^^ 

The  study  here  in  hand  relates  exclusively  to  the  logico-experl- 
mental  validity  that  certain  arguments  may  (or  may  not)  have.  For 
the  time  being  we  deliberately  ignore  all  questions  as  to  the  senti- 
ments they  hide,  their  persuasive  force,  the  possible  social  utility  of 
the  underlying  sentiments,  and  hence  of  the  things  that  provoke 
them.  Here,  in  a  word,  we  are  considering  theories  strictly  from  the 
objective  standpoint  (§13). 

Interesting  and  very  important  for  sociology  are  the  phenomena 
designated  in  ordinary  language  by  the  terms  "religion,"  "moral- 
ity," "law."  For  centuries  people  have  quarrelled  about  those  terms, 
and  so  far  they  have  reached  no  agreement  even  as  to  what  they 
mean.  They  have  been  defined  in  many  many  ways,  and  since  the 
definitions  do  not  coincide,  people  have  come  to  designate  different 
things  by  the  same  names — an  excellent  means  for  never  coming 
to  an  understanding.  What  is  the  cause  of  that  ?  And  should  we  try 
to  add  other  definitions  to  the  many  already  given?  Or  would  it  not 
be  better  to  try  to  get  at  the  character  of  such  phenomena  in  some 
other  way  (§  118)? 

369.  We  have  narratives,  such  as  the  Gospel  according  to  St.  John, 

that  many  have  taken  and  still  take  to  be  historical  narrative.  Others 

say  that  it  is  just  allegory;  others  that  it  is  allegory  combined  with 

history;  while  still  others  claim  to  have  a  formula  for  separating 

231 


232  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §37^ 

what  is  historical  from  what  is  allegorical.  Similar  opinions  were 
once  current  with  regard  to  the  myths  of  polytheism,  and  the  pro- 
cedure seems  to  be  general.  What  are  we  to  think  of  these  various 
opinions?  Should  we  select  one  from  among  them?  Or  is  some 
I  other  path  open  to  us?  There  are  no  end  of  theories  on  morality, 
law,  and  so  on.  If  we  could  find  that  one  among  them  was  true  in 
the  sense  that  it  fits  the  facts,  our  task  would  be  appreciably  easier. 
But  if  we  can  find  none  such,  how  are  we  to  proceed? 

370. .  Induction  may  put  us  in  the  way  of  recognizing  certain  ex- 
perimental uniformities.  If  we  succeed  in  finding  them,  we  can  then 
proceed  in  the  opposite  direction,  that  is,  deductively,  and  compare 
our  inferences  with  the  facts.  If  they  are  in  agreement,  we  can  accept 
the  hypotheses  we  have  been  using — the  experimental  principles  ob- 
tained in  our  induction.  If  they  are  not  in  agreement,  we  must 
reject  those  hypotheses,  those  principles  (§§52,  69). 

371.  Suppose  we  stop  for  a  moment  and  examine  the  term  "reli- 
gion"— and  what  we  say  of  religion  will  apply  by  analogy  to  other 
terms  of  the  kind,  "morality,"  "law,"  and  the  like,  which  will  fre- 
quently be  crossing  our  path.  To  admit  a  priori  the  existence  of  re- 
ligion (morality,  law)  leads  to  seeking  the  definition  of  it;  and  mce 
versa,  the  search  for  the  definition  presupposes  the  existence  of  the 
thing  for  which  a  definition  is  sought.  It  is  a  most  impressive  fact 
that  all  attempts  so  far  made  to  find  definitions  of  that  kind  have 
failed.  Before  going  farther,  we  must  recall  the  distinction  between 
real  movements  and  virtual  movements  (§§  129-30).  At  present  we 
are  studying  real  movements  only.  We  are,  in  other  words,  dealing 
with  what  is:  we  are  not  trying  to  discover  what  ought  to  be  in 
order  that  this  or  that  end  may  be  attained. 

372.  Now  a  confusion  is  usually  present  in-  the  U5e  of  the  words 
"religion"  ("morality,"  "law").  Not  only  are  the  investigations  of 
real  movements  and  virtual  movements  often  confused,  but  even 
when  they  are  distinguished  and  a  writer  declares  he  is  keeping  to 
real  movements,  two,  or,  to  be  more  exact,  many  aspects  of  real 
movements  are  not  kept  distinct,  or  are  not  kept  clearly  distinct. 

373.  In  fact,  theory  has  to  be  kept  distinct  from  practice.  In  a  given 


§377  RELIGION  233 

people  at  a  given  period  of  history  there  is  a  theoretical  religion 
(morality,  law)  and  a  practical  religion  (morality,  law).  We  say  a 
religion,  a  morality,  a  law,  for  the  sake  of  brevity:  really  there  are 
more  than  one,  many  many  more  than  one,  even  where  there  is 
apparent  unity  (§§464f.).  These  facts  are  undeniable,  but  they  are 
usually  stated  in  such  a  way  as  to  minimize  their  importance  as  far 
as  possible. 

374.  We  observe,  accordingly,  that  a  certain  religion  (morality, 
law)  is  assumed  to  exist.  For  the  believer  it  is  the  one  he  calls  "true." 

I  Of  it  the  theoretical  religions  observable  are  deviations,  and  practical 
\  religions  are  in  their  turn  deviations  of  the  theoretical  religions.  For 
a  parallel,  there  is  a  given  theorem  in  geometry.  It  may  be  demon- 
strated more  or  less  well — and  so  we  get  theoretical  deviations;  it 
may  be  understood  more  or  less  well — and  so  we  get  practical  devia- 
tions. But  all  that  does  not  lessen  the  strict  truth  of  the  theorem  as 
stated. 

375.  If  the  comparison  held  to  the  very  end,  the  meaning  of  the 
term  "religion"  ("morality,"  "law")  would  be  as  exact  as  one 
might  wish.  The  term  would  designate  a  certain  type  that  might 
even  be  inferred  from  existing  facts — a  thing  not  possible  with  a 
theorem  in  geometry — by  stripping  the  facts  of  incidentals  and  keep- 
ing to  essentials,  or  else,  as  the  evolutionists  would  have  it,  by  de- 
termining the  limit  towards  which  the  facts  tend. 

376.  Unfortunately  that  is  not  the  situation.  Everybody  is  firmly 
convinced  diat  his  religion  (morality,  law)  is  the  true  type.  But  he 
has  no  means  of  imparting  his  conviction  to  anyone  else.  He 
cannot  appeal  to  experience  in  general  nor  to  that  special  kind  of 
experience  represented  by  logical  argument.  In  a  dispute  between  ' 
two  chemists  there  is  a  judge:  experience.  In  a  dispute  between  a 
Moslem  and  a  Christian,  who  is  the  judge?  Nobody  (§§  16 f.). 

377.  In  our  times  there  are  people  who  think  they  can  evade  this 
dilemma  by  abandoning  the  supernatural;  they  imagine  that  diver- 
gences can  arise  only  in  that  domain.  But  they  are  wrong,  just  as  the 
various  sects  of  Christianity  were  wrong  in  a  day  gone  by  in  believ- 
ing that  differences  of  opinion  arose  only  from  varying  interpreta- 


234  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §37^ 

tions  of  the  Scriptures  which  themselves  were   above  discussion. 

378.  From  the  logico-experimental  standpoint  nothing  is  gained 
by  replacing  supernatural  beings  with  metaphysical  principles;  for 
the  metaphysical  principles  can  be  affirmed  or  denied  as  readily  as 

'the  existence  of  a  god,  and  there  is  no  judge  to  settle  the  dispute 

(§§i6f.). 

379.  It  is  of  no  avail  to  appeal  the  issue  to  public  indignation.  Cer- 
tainly, at  the  time  of  the  quarrels  between  Lutherans  and  Catholics, 
to  have  asserted  that  from  the  logico-experimental  point  of  view  the 
Scriptures  had  the  same  value  as  the  Theogony  of  Hesiod  would 
have  been  to  arouse  general,  not  to  say  unanimous,  indignation  in 
Europe.  And  in  the  same  way  to  dare  question  in  our  day  the  dogma 
that  the  sole  purpose  of  society  is  the  "good  of  the  greatest  number," 
and  that  it  is  the  strict  duty  of  every  individual  to  sacrifice  himself 
for  the  good  of  the  lowly  and  the  humble,  would  be  to  arouse  if  not 
universal  at  least  fairly  general  indignation.  But  scientific  problems 
are  solved  by  facts,  not  by  the  holy  horror  of  the  few,  the  many,  the 
all. 

380.  Along  that  route,  therefore,  we  can  never  get  to  sharply  de- 
fined meanings  for  our  terms.  Yet  that  is  the  first  thing  to  be  done  if 
we  would  discuss  matters  of  science  fruitfully;  whereas  if  the  same 
term  is  used  in  a  different  sense  by  each  individual,  rigorous  argu- 
ment becomes  impossible  (§§442,  490,  965). 

381.  That  manner  of  reasoning,  moreover,  has  the  very  serious 
defect  of  bringing  into  the  matter  of  definition  disputes  that  should 
not  arise  until,  owing  to  clear  definitions,  we  can  state  exactly  what 
the  argument  is  about  (§§  119,  387,  963). 

382.  If  one  sets  out  to  define  what  the  "true"  religion  is,  or  the 
"type"  religion,  or  the  "ultimate"  religion,  it  is  evident  that  such  a 
definition  cannot  be  left  to  the  choice  of  one's  adversary,  since  the 
term  contains  a  thesis:  it  asserts  that  the  thing  defined  is  the  thing 
that  corresponds  to  the  truth,  the  type,  the  limit.  That  is  the  chief 
reason  why  physicists  never  dream  of  quarrelling  over  the  name  to 
be  given  to  X-rays,  chemists  over  the  term  "radium,"  or  astronomers 
over  the  names  for  any  one  of  the  countless  asteroids  (except  in  cases 


§383  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  235 

where  the  personal  vanity  of  some  discoverer  may  be  involved); 
whereas  no  end  of  breath  is  still  being  wasted  over  the  definition  to 
be  given  to  "religion"  ("morality,"  "law")  (§  119). 

383.  Here  is  Salomon  Reinach,  writing  a  book  called  Orpheus: 
A  General  History  of  Religions  and  which  might  be  better  called 
A  General  History  of  Religions,  as  Viewed  in  the  Light  of  the  Drey- 
fus Case.  He  believes  that  the  dogmas  of  the  Catholic,  in  fact  of  the 
Christian,  religion  are  false,  whereas  the  dogmas  of  his  humani- 
tarian-democratic religion  are  true.  He  may  be  right.  He  may  be 
wrong.  We  are  not  going  to  argue  that  point;  nor  do  we  think  that 
experimental  science  can  be  of  the  slightest  service  in  solving  such  a 
problem.  At  any  rate,  the  problem  ought  to  be  treated  independently 
of  definitions,  whereas  Reinach  tries  to  make  his  readers  accept  a 
definition  that  will  help  him  to  establish  his  thesis.  His  adversaries 
are  getting  support  from  Catholic  beliefs;  so  he  tries  to  show  that 
that  religion  is,  substantially,  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  tabooism 
of  the  backward  peoples.  For  that  reason  he  has  to  eliminate  from 
the  very  definition  of  "religion"  everything  corresponding  to  a 
higher  intellectual  grade.  That  he  does  quite  skilfully,  for  his  defini- 
tion does  not  after  all  go  very  far  wide  of  the  facts  (§  1032).^  But  his 
theses,  be  they  true  or  false,  ought  to  be  stated  as  theses — as  proposi- 

383  ^  Orpheus,  Chap.  I,  §  5  (Simmonds,  p,  3) :  "I  intend  to  define  religion  as 
a  'sum  of  scruples  that  interfere  with  the  free  exercise  of  human  faculties.'  .  .  . 
The  scruples  in  question  .  .  .  are  of  a  special  kind.  ...  I  will  call  them  'taboos.'  " 
He  goes  on  to  explain  that  the  scruple  involved  in  the  taboo  "is  never  based  on 
any  rational  consideration  of  a  practical  order,  such  as  fear  of  getting  pricked 
or  otherwise  hurt,  in  the  case  of  a  tree-taboo."  Just  previously  (§1),  Reinach 
had  said:  "Mythology  is  an  assemblage  of  concocted  stories — not  invented,  but 
capriciously  combined  and  embellished — where  the  characters  are  beyond  all  verifi- 
cadon  in  positive  history.  Religion,  primarily,  is  a  sentiment,  plus  the  expression  of 
that  sentiment  by  acts  of  a  special  kind,  namely,  rites."  Reinach  is  here  considering 
mythology  not  as  in  process  of  formation,  but  as  a  thing  ready-made  and  fully 
developed,  perhaps  even  in  the  first  stages  of  decadence — at  a  point,  at  any  rate, 
where  without  scruple  poetical  elaborations  may  be  appended  to  popular  beliefs 
(§§  1086-88).  Accepdng  for  the  moment  that  very  special  standpoint,  it  is  evident 
that  in  what  he  says  Reinach  takes  account,  though  in  no  very  specific  terms,  of 
both  logical  and  non-logical  conduct.  Religion  would  be  essentially  non-logical, 
made  up  of  what  we  are  to  call  residues  (Chapter  VI).  Mythology  would,  essen- 
tially, be  a  matter  of  literary  and  logical  embellishments,  of  what  we  are  to  call 
derivations  (Chapter  IX). 


236  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §3^4 

tions  subject  by  their  very  nature  to  controversy — and  not  tucked 
into  a  definition,  which  is,  in  part  at  least,  at  the  arbitrary  discretion 
of  the  author. 

384.  But  here,  on  the  other  side,  rises  Father  Marie-Joseph  La- 
grange, who  believes  that  the  Catholic  dogmas  are  true  and  who 
naturally  cannot,  on  pain  of  suicide,  accept  Reinach's  definition.  He 
says:  "M.  Reinach  seems  to  think  that  a  good  definition  has  to  apply 
to  the  full  breadth  of  meaning  which  a  term  has  acquired  even  by 
abuse."  ^  In  that  we  get,  fundamentally,  the  concept  of  the  "type" 
religion:  once  you  depart  from  the  type,  you  fall  into  an  "abuse." 
Father  Lagrange  ignores  the  fact  that  what  is  for  him  a  type  is  for 
someone  else  an  abuse,  and  vice  versa.  He  continues:  "Because  people 
speak,  abusively — the  figure  is  called  catachresis  in  rhetoric — of  a 
'religion  of  honour,'  that  definition  has  to  be  accounted  for  in  the 
definition  of  reHgion  in  general!"  Yes  and  no!  Yes — it  has  to  be 
included  if  one  is  trying  to  define  "what  people  call  religion,"  just 
as  the  definition  of  the  conjugation  of  an  irregular  verb  has  to  be 
accounted  for  in  a  general  definition  of  conjugation,  if  one  is  trying 
to  define  "what  grammarians  call  conjugation";  and  there  is  no 
point  in  debating  whether  the  irregular  conjugation  is  abusive  or 
whether  the  regular  conjugation  is  the  abuse.  Or  no — the  particular 
definition  need  not  be  accounted  for  in  the  general  definition  if  one 
has  previously  and  explicitly  excluded  facts  of  a  certain  order — a 
thing  that  Father  Lagrange  is  not  at  all  inclined  to  do.  I  can  say  that 
in  Latin  the  active  verbs  of  the  first  conjugation  form  their  future 
in  -abo,  -abis,  -abit  .  .  .  ;  because  when  I  specify  "active  verbs  of  the 
first  conjugation,"  I  previously  and  explicitly  exclude  all  other  verbs. 
But  I  could  not  give  those  endings  for  verbs  in  general  and  then, 
when  I  am  shown  the  future  forms  legam,  leges,  for  the  verb  lego, 
get  out  of  my  predicament  by  saying  that  legam  is  an  abuse.  I  can 
say  (it  might  not  be  true)  that  "originally"  the  active  endings  of  the 
principal  tenses  of  Greek  verbs  were  -^t,  -at,  -Tt  .  .  .  because  I  have 
explicitly  and  in  advance  specified  that  I  am  dealing  with  original 

384  ^  Quelques  remarques  sur  I'Orpheus  de  M.  Salomon  Reinach,  pp.  8-9  (Mar- 
tindale,  p.  11). 


§387  RELIGION  237 

forms,  a  qualification  which  permits  me  to  disregard  verbs  in  -6 
by  holding  (rightly  or  wrongly)  that  they  are  not  primitive  or 
original.  But  I  could  not  state  sweepingly,  without  specific  qualifi- 
cation as  to  origins,  that  Greek  verbs  ended  in  -^t,  -gl,  -rt  .  .  .  and 
then  try  to  be  rid  of  the  verbs  in  -a  by  calling  them  an  abuse.  In 
short,  what  is  Father  Lagrange  trying  to  define.?  What  people  call 
religion  (a  linguistic  question)?  Or  something  else.'^  And  in  the 
latter  case,  just  what  is  the  something  else.f^  Unless  he  tells  us,  we 
cannot  decide  whether  his  definition  is  good  or  bad. 

385.  Father  Lagrange  continues:  "And  we  wind  up  with  this 
definition  of  religion:  a  sum  of  scruples  that  interfere  with  the  free 
exercise  of  human  faculties!  One  would  think  it  a  question  of  a  bet; 
for,  with  triumphant  ingenuousness,  Reinach  proceeds  to  observe 
that  his  definition  eliminates  from  the  fundamental  concept  of  re- 
ligion everything  that  people  commonly  regard  as  the  proper  object 
of  the  religious  sentiment!" 

386.  So  it  would  seem  that  Father  Lagrange  is  looking  for  what 
is  commonly  designated  by  the  term  "religion."  That  would  take  us 
back  to  the  linguistic  question.  But  look  out  for  that  word  "com- 
monly"— for  in  it  treachery  lies!  What  does  it  mean — "commonly".'^ 
Are  we  to  compile  statistics  of  the  opinions  of  mankind  ?  And  only 
of  people  living  today,  or  also  of  people  who  have  lived  in  times 
past?  Of  Europeans  only,  or  of  all  human  beings  who  are  living 
or  have  lived  on  the  face  of  the  earth  ?  And  are  we  to  count  opinions, 
or  are  we  to  weigh  them  (§  595)  ?  If  we  weigh  them,  with  what 
scales?  It  would  seem  as  though  Father  Lagrange  were  inclined  to 
weigh  them,  since  he  calls  some  of  them  abusive;  but  in  that  case 
we  may  rest  assured  that  if  he  selects  the  scales,  they  will  register  the 
weights  he  v/ishes  them  to  register;  and  that  if  his  adversary  selects 
them,  they  will  show  an  entirely  different  weight.  Then  again, 
besides  religion  in  general  there  are  religions  in  particular.  What  are 
we  to  do  with  them  ?  In  order  to  bar  them,  we  have  to  go  back  to  die 
theory  of  the  type  religion. 

387.  Father  Lagrange  adds:  "It  is  another  way  of  saying  that 
M.   Reinach's  definition   is   contemptible.   Logicians   undoubtedly 


238  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §388 

grant  that  a  word  has  only  the  sense  that  is  given  it;  but  to  define  a 
traditional  term  in  a  sense  counter  to  the  general  acceptation  is  a 
childish  jest  or  a  trap  for  fools." 

But,  just  a  moment!  Can  we  be  so  sure?  The  thing  that  chemists 
call  water  is  not  what  is  commonly  called  water;  nor  is  the  gold  of 
the  chemists  the  gold  of  ordinary  language.  For  the  multitude  a 
five-dollar  gold-piece  is  made  of  gold ;  for  the  chemist  it  is  a  mixture 
of  gold  and  copper  with  traces  of  many  other  elements.  It  was  not 
at  all  a  "childish  jest"  to  define  chemical  bodies  in  a  manner  counter 
to  "general  acceptations";  on  the  contrary,  that  was  the  only  thing 
to  do  to  elevate  chemistry  to  dignified  status  as  a  science  (§  115). 
Reinach  is  perfectly  free  to  define  the  term  "religion"  counter  to 
"general  acceptation,"  provided:  (i)  that  he  gives  a  definition  that 
is  clear  and  exact;  (2)  that  he  does  not  confuse  the  thing  which  he 
is  defining  with  some  other  thing  that  bears  the  same  name;  and 
(3)  that  there  is  some  advantage  in  his  new  definition  to  compen- 
sate us  for  our  trouble  in  remembering  that  the  "refigion"  of  Reinach 
is  not  the  "religion"  of  other  people.  To  spare  us  that  trouble  and 
avoid  all  danger  of  misunderstandings,  it  would  be  well  if,  instead 
of  employing  a  term  already  in  use,  he  were  to  use  some  other 
(§  117),  saying,  for  example:  "I  will  call  X  the  sum  of  scruples  that 
interfere  with  the  free  exercise  of  human  faculties."  After  that,  but 
only  after  that  (§381),  he  might  formulate  a  thesis  such  as  this: 
"X  will  be  found  present  in  everything  that  human  beings  call 
religion,  and  nowhere  else."  It  would  then  be  possible  to  verify  on 
the  facts  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  proposition  (§  963). 

388.  Suppose  we  do  that  now.  From  no  other  standpoint  can 
experimental  science  envisage  such  questions.  The  chemist  tells  us 
that  water  is  a  compound  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen.  The  first  of 
the  conditions  that  we  laid  down  is  satisfied.  The  second  is  also 
satisfied,  because  in  no  treatise  on  chemistry  is  chemically  pure 
water  ever  confused  with  the  thing  commonly  known  as  water. 
And  likewise  satisfied  is  the  third,  because  the  advantage  of  knowing 
the  exact  composition  of  the  thing  called  water  is  self-evident 
(§§  108,  69  ^).  Then  we  are  told  that  chemical  water  is  the  principal 


1 


§391  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING   EXPERIENCE  239 

ingredient  of  the  thing  commonly  called  water  that  is  found  in 
wells,  lakes,  rivers,  the  sea,  the  rain.  We  verify  the  proposition  and 
see  that  it  is  true.  If  someone  went  on  and  said  that  chemical  water 
is  not  the  principal  ingredient  in  things  not  commonly  known  as 
water,  the  verification  would  not  turn  out  so  well;  for  water  is  the 
principal  ingredient  in  wines,  beers,  syrups,  and  the  like. 

389.  To  avoid  ambiguities,  suppose  we  give  a  name  to  the  thing 
defined  by  Reinach  and  call  it  religion-a.  If  we  find  that  religion-a 
is  identical  with  ordinary  religion,  so  much  the  better  for  Reinach's 
religion.  We  are  in  no  way  disparaging  his  religion  by  calling  it 
religion-a.  The  latter  is  simply  a  label  we  append  to  the  thing  to 
help  us  keep  track  of  it  (§  119). 

390.  Certain  it  is  that  many  religions  which  are  and  have  been 
the  religions  of  millions  and  millions  of  human  beings — for  instance, 
Indo-European  polytheism,  the  Judao-Christian  and  Moslem  re- 
ligions, fetishism — contain  religion-a.  But  all  those  religions — with 
the  exception,  partial  at  least,  of  fetishism — contain  another  thing 
which  we  may  call  religion-/?  (§119),  and  which,  to  use  words  of 
Father  Lagrange,  is  "a  belief  in  higher  beings  with  whom  it  is 
possible  to  establish  relations."  ^  But  now,  which  is  the  principal 
element  in  the  things  commonly  known  as  religion,  religion-a,  or 
religion-/^  ?  In  order  to  answer,  we  have  to  know  the  exact  meaning 
of  the  term  "principal."  When  we  were  comparing  chemical  water 
with  river  water,  by  "principal  element"  we  meant  the  element 
having  the  greatest  weight.  Chemical  analysis  of  river-water  showed 
that  the  chemical  water  contained  in  it  weighed  more  than  all  other 
ingredients.  But  how  are  we  to  analyze  religions,  and  how  are  we  to 
weigh  the  elements  in  them? 

391.  It  may  be  said:  "The  prmcipal  element  in  religions  is  the 
belief  in  higher  beings,  since  it  is  from  that  belief  that  the  scruples 

390  ^  Etudes  sur  les  religions  semitiqiies,  p.  7:  "Everybody  agrees  at  least  that 
there  is  no  religion  apart  from  belief  in  higher  powers  with  whom  relations  may 
be  established."  But  '"everybody"  is  in  no  such  agreement.  "Everybody"  includes 
Reinach,  and  Reinach  seems  not  to  agree!  But  why  do  those  two  gentlemen  insist 
on  giving  the  same  name  to  different  things?  Simply  because  they  have  an  ax  to 
grind  on  the  sentiments  the  name  arouses! 


240  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §392 

mentioned  by  Reinach  logically  emanate."  To  which  the  answer 
may  be  made:  "The  principal  element  in  religions  is  the  scruples, 
since  the  fact  of  their  existence  provoked  in  human  beings  the  belief 
in  higher  powers" — the  Romans  had  two  sayings:  "If  there  are 
gods,  there  is  divination,"  and  "If  there  is  divination,  there  are 
gods."*  In  the  theorems  mentioned  the  word  "principal"  seems  to 
mean  "anterior  in  time."  But  even  though  it  were  demonstrated  that 
belief  in  superior  powers  came  first  and  scruples  afterwards,  it  would 
by  no  means  follow  that  at  some  later  time  the  scruples  were  not 
the  whole  thing  in  religion,  or  the  more  active  element  in  it.  And 
if  it  were  demonstrated  that  the  scruples  antedated  the  belief,  it 
would  in  no  wise  follow  that  at  some  later  date  they  had  not  yielded 
first  place  to  belief  in  higher  powers. 

392.  If  one  asks,  then,  "Are  the  religion-a  and  the  religion-/^ 
present  in  all  phenomena  called  religions?",  the  answer  has  to  be  no. 
On  the  one  hand  religion-a  is  more  wide-spread  than  religion-/?. 
In  fetishism  and  tabooism  in  whole  or  in  part,  in  modern  free- 
thought,  in  Comte's  positivism,  in  the  humanitarian  religion,  in 
the  metaphysical  religions,  there  are  scruples  but  no  higher  powers 
— at  least  no  such  powers  are  distinctly  present.  It  is  true  that  Comte 
ends  by  creating  fictitious  entities,  but  in  theory  they  remain  fictitious 
throughout.  That  fact  merely  shows  that  where  there  are  such 
scruples,  there  is  a  propensity  to  explain  them  by  a  resort  to  higher 
powers. 

393.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  some  few  cases  where  if 
religion-/?  is  defined  strictly  as  recognition  of  the  existence  of  higher 
beings,  it  may  be  said  that  religion-/?  exists  apart  from  religion-a,  or 
at  least,  without  any  dependence  of  the  latter  on  the  former.  Take, 

391  ^  Cicero,  De  divinatione ,  I,  5,  9:  "My  opinion  is  that  if  those  sorts  of  divina- 
tion which  we  have  inherited  and  practise  are  true,  there  must  be  gods;  and  that 
vice  versa  if  there  are  gods,  there  must  be  people  to  know  their  will" — i.e.,  there 
must  be  divination.  Idem,  De  natiira  deorum,  II,  3,  7:  "What  else  do  prophecies 
and  presentiments  of  the  future  mean  except  that  things  that  are  to  be  are  por- 
tended, 'signed,'  predicted  to  men?  That  in  part  is  why  they  are  termed  'signs,' 
'portents,'  'prodigies'  " — \i.e.,  prodigiiim  from  praedicere. — A.  L.] 


I 


§394  RELIGION  241 

for  example,  the  religion  of  the  Epicureans.*  If  we  are  told  that 
we  must  not  consider  it  because  it  is  a  scandalous  thing,  the  reply  is 
that  we  are  not  investigating  the  composition  of  praiseworthy  re- 
ligions, but  the  composition  of  all  beliefs  that  are  or  have  been 
called  religions.  And  if  it  were  said  that  the  Epicureans  too  had 
scruples,  we  should  reply  that  if  the  term  "religion-a"  is  to  be  defined 
as  broadly  as  that,  then  religion-a  is  everywhere  present,  for  there  is 
not  and  there  has  never  been  a  human  being  in  the  world  who  does 
not  have,  or  has  not  had,  some  scruple  or  other.  In  that  case  the 
term  "religion-a"  defining  everything  would  define  nothing. 

394.  There  is,  again,  a  sect  of  Buddhism  that  shows  no  trace  of 
the  second  half  of  the  definition  of  religion-/^ — of  relations  estab- 
lished with  higher  beings.  In  fact  that  half  is  explicitly  rejected,  as 
witness  the  conversation  between  Guimet  and  three  Japanese 
theologians:  ^ 

"Q.  My  first  question  bears  on  the  origin  of  the  heavens,  the  earth, 
and  everything  about  us.  How  do  you  explain  their  formation,  ac- 
cording to  the  principles  of  the  Buddhist  religion? 

"A.  The  Buddhist  religion  ascribes  the  existence  of  all  things  to 
what  it  calls  In-En  [Cause-Effect].  Each  thing  is  only  a  combination 
of  infinitely  minute  atoms.  Those  atoms  combine  to  form  moun- 

393  ^Cicero,  De  natitra  deorum,  I,  19,  51.  Explaining  views  of  Epicurus  he  says 
of  the  nature  of  a  god  in  a  passage  that  is  celebrated:  "He  does  nothing.  He  has 
no  worries  or  preoccupations.  No  exertion  is  required  of  him.  He  rejoices  in  his 
knowledge  and  virtue;  and  he  can  look  forward  to  an  eternity  of  infinite  beatitude." 
C/.  Diogenes  Laertius,  Epicurus,  X,  139  (Hicks,  Vol.  II,  p.  663):  "Such  a  one  is 
immortal  and  blissful.  He  has  no  worries  of  his  own,  nor  does  he  create  them  for 
anyone  else." 

394  ^  Annales  du  Mtisee  Guimet,  Vol.  I,  pp.  307-44:  Notes  abregecs  stir  les  rS- 
ponses  faites  dans  le  Hioun-Ka\ott  .  .  .  par  MM.  Simatchi,  Atsoumi  et  A^amatsou 
aux  questions  de  M.  Emile  Guimet:  "The  Sin-siou  sect,"  says  M.  Guimet,  "is  one 
of  the  strongest,  as  regards  membership,  in  Japan."  Note  diat  Guimet  and  others 
call  the  thing  here  in  question  a  religion.  Anyone  accepting  the  thesis  of  Father 
Lagrange  might  deny  that  such  a  thing  could  be  called  a  religion,  saying  that  such 
a  name  would  be  an  abuse.  But  if  one  can  get  rid  of  facts  contrary  to  a  dieory 
simply  by  calling  them  an  abuse,  it  is  obvious  that  no  theory  will  ever  fail  of  verifi- 
cation, and  that  it  is  a  waste  of  time  to  go  on  investigating.  We  are  here  examining 
the  peculiarides  of  things  that  have  been  called  religions,  not  the  traits  of  things 
that  one  writer  or  another  would  like  to  have  called  by  that  name. 


242  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §394 

tains,  rivers,  plains,  metals,  stones,  plants,  and  trees.  Such  objects 
come  into  being  from  the  natural  relationship  of  their  In  and  their 
En,  exactly  as  all  living  beings  are  born  by  virtue  of  their  In-En. 

"Q.  Is  there  no  creator  of  the  heavens,  the  earth,  and  all  other 
things  ? 

"A.  No. 

"Q.  What  is  this  thing  which  you  call  In-En? 

"A.  Nothing  is  formed  naturally  and  of  itself.  It  is  always  the  re- 
lation of  a  this  to  a  that  that  constitutes  a  thing.  .  .  . 

"Q.  .  .  .  I  now  ask  you  whether  the  conduct  of  human  beings 
depends  in  any  way  on  God. 

"A.  A  man  is  responsible  for  his  own  conduct.  It  in  no  way  de- 
pends on  God.  [No  trace  so  far  of  any  relations  with  higher  beings, 
which,  according  to  Lagrange,  everybody  recognizes!] 

"Q.  Do  you  not  admit  that  God  exerts  an  influence  on  humanity 
and  guides  us  in  the  performance  of  our  various  acts  of  invention 
or  improvement  ? 

"A.  The  Buddhist  religion  admits  of  no  creator.  It  ascribes  every- 
thing to  the  In-En.  It  thereby  declares  that  every  human  act  is  per- 
formed on  the  individual's  initiative  without  any  interference  on  the 
part  of  God. 

"Q.  It  is  evident  that  the  term  God  is  not  the  proper  one.  Never- 
theless your  religion  does  recognize  a  higher  being,  Amida,  which 
it  venerates  and  devoutly  worships.  Well,  does  not  the  power  of 
Amida  have  some  influence  on  human  conduct? 

"A.  The  differences  prevailing  among  individual  human  beings, 
as  regards  their  personal  value  and  the  value  of  what  they  do,  de- 
pend more  or  less  on  the  education  they  have  received,  and  not  at 
all  on  the  will  of  Amida.  .  .  . 

"Q.  I  would  readily  admit  that  knowledge  may  be  increased  by 
effort  .  .  .  but,  at  the  same  time,  in  the  domain  of  ethics,  in  the 
distinction  between  right  and  wrong,  between  what  is  just  and  what 
is  unjust,  does  it  not  seem  that  there  must  be  a  higher  being  who 
rewards  or  punishes  us  for  our  conduct,  much  as  the  social  authority 
punishes  us  for  infractions  of  the  rules  of  public"  order  ? 


§39^  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  243 

"A.  Every  good  and  every  evil  act  has  as  its  consequence  a  blessing 
or  a  sorrow^.  That  results  from  the  altogether  natural  conception  of 
the  In-Goua  [synonym  of  In-En]." 

395.  Farther  along:  "A.  In  Buddhism  at  large,  one  often  hears  of 
prayers  to  the  divinity  that  have  been  answered.  Our  sect  absolutely 
forbids  such  prayers."  If  we  choose  to  regard  the  two  parts  of  the 
definition  of  religion-/^  as  forming  an  inseparable  unit — that  is,  the 
belief  in  higher  beings  plus  the  belief  that  it  is  possible  to  establish 
relations  with  them — we  should  have  to  conclude  that  religion-/!^  is 
not  present  in  the  two  religions  just  mentioned;  and  we  would 
hardly  know  where  to  place  them,  for  they  do  not  fall,  either,  under 
the  definition  of  religion-a. 

396.  We  can  only  conclude,  therefore,  that  as  usual  the  terms  of 
ordinary  language  do  not  lend  themselves  to  rigorous  classifications. 
Chemistry,  physics,  mechanics,  and  the  other  natural  sciences  were 
never  built  up  by  studying  and  classifying  the  terms  of  ordinary 
language,  but  by  studying  and  classifying  facts.  Let  us  try  to  do  the 
same  for  sociology. 

397.  Meanwhile,  and  still  by  way  of  induction,  we  discover  that 
the  definitions  of  Reinach  and  Lagrange  are  of  a  different  character. 
Their  authors  may  not  have  been  aware  of  it,  but  they  aim  at 
classifying  quite  different  orders  of  facts :  Reinach's,  certain  states  of 
mind ;  Lagrange's,  the  explanations  that  are  given  of  them*.  Can  it  be 
that  those  two  orders  of  facts  are  in  general  profitably  to  be  dis- 
tinguished, classified,  examined?  We  shall  see.  Here  at  any  rate 
there  is  a  substantial  difference,  not  a  mere  difference  in  the  forms 
of  ordinary  parlance.  For  the  moment  let  us  go  on  with  the  inquiry 
in  hand. 

398.  The  difficulties  encountered  in  efforts  to  define  the  terms 
"law"  and  "morality"  have  proved  quite  as  serious  as  was  the  case 
with  the  term  "religion."  No  way  has  yet  been  found  even  to  dis- 
tinguish law  from  morality.  At  one  extreme  we  get  a  definition  that 
is  grossly  empirical.  We  are  told  that  law  consists  of  a  body  of 
norms  that  are  sanctioned  by  a  public  authority,  and  that  morality 
consists  of  a  body  of  norms  imposed  only  by  conscience.  Such  a 


244  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §399 

definition  is  satisfactory  enough  for  the  practical  purposes  of  lawyer 
and  judge;  but  it  does  not  have  the  slightest  scientific  value,  since 
it  assumes  for  criteria  elements  that  are  secondary  and  changeable — 
it  is  like  classifying  birds  by  the  colours  of  their  feathers.  An  action 
passes  from  law  to  morality  or  from  morality  to  law  according  to 
the  will  or  caprice  of  the  legislator.  The  classification  therefore  may 
register  such  will  or  caprice,  but  not,  as  our  purpose  was,  the  intrinsic 
character  of  the  act.  Moreover,  such  a  classification  becomes  useless 
when,  as  was  the  case  in  epochs  remotely  past,  no  public  authority 
interferes  to  proclaim  or  enforce  private  law.  Modern  civilized 
countries  have  written  codes,  and  it  is  an  easy  matter  to  determine 
whether  a  given  act  is  or  is  not  regulated  by  law.  The  definition  in 
question  is  experimental,  clear,  exact;  but  that  does  not  help  very 
much,  since  it  fails  to  classify  the  things  which  we  were  trying  to 
understand. 

399.  If,  furthermore,  we  try  to  consider  things  intrinsically,  we 
are  brought  to  considering  "essences,"  and  are  so  lured  gradually 
away  from  the  experimental  field  to  go  wandering  about  among 
the  clouds  of  metaphysics,  eventually  arriving  at  the  other  extreme, 
where  all  objective  reality  goes  by  the  board. 

400.  There  are  some  who  are  candid  enough  to  admit  as  much. 
Adolf  Franck  says:^  "The  idea  of  law,  considered  in  itself,  inde- 
pendently of  the  applications  of  which  it  is  susceptible,  and  of  the 
laws  more  or  less  just  that  have  been  made  in  its  name,  is  a  simple, 
absolute  idea  of  reason  and  is  therefore  beyond  any  logical  defini- 
tion." At  last!  That  unequivocally  recognizes  the  fact  that  the  con- 

^    cept  of  law  belongs  to  a  category  within  the  domain  of  non-logical 

X'-'^'r^      conduct;  and  unless  some  other  theory,  some  theory  of  innate  ideas, 

,   comes  to  our  rescue,  we  have  to  admit  that  such  a  concept  varies 

^    ^  ^     j.  according  to  times,  places,  and  individuals.  To  deny  that,  we  should 

have  to  attribute  an  objective  existence  to  "simple  ideas" — the  kind 

of  existence  once  enjoyed  by  the  gods  of  Olympus.^ 

400  ^  Dictionnaire  des  sciences  philosophiqites,  s.v.  "Droit." 

400  -  Others  try  to  hide  the  conflict  with  reality  under  ingenious  subtleties,  the 
way  people  ordinarily  do  in  trying  to  logicalize  non-logical  conduct.  With  that  mat- 
ter we  have  already  dealt  in  Chapter  III. 


§404  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  LAW  245 

401.  Theories  of  "natural  law"  and  the  "law  of  nations"  are  an- 
other excellent  example  of  discussions  destitute  of  all  exactness. 
Many  thinkers  have  more  or  less  vaguely  expressed  their  sentiments 
under  those  terms,  and  have  then  exerted  themselves  to  link  their 
sentiments  with  practical  ends  that  they  desired  to  attain.  As  usual, 
they  have  derived  great  advantage  in  such  efforts  from  using  in- 
definite words  that  correspond  not  to  things,  but  only  to  sentiments. 
We  are  now  going  to  examine  such  manners  of  reasoning  for  such 
correspondence  as  they  may  (or  may  not)  have  with  experimental 
reality.  But  the  conclusions  we  reach  must  not  be  carried  over  into 
any  other  field  (§41).  The  question  of  their  experimental  validity  is 
independent  of  any  question  of  their  social  utility;  and  a  theory  may 
be  as  beneficial  as  one  could  wish  under  certain  circumstances  and  in 
this  or  that  period  of  history  without  having  any  bearing  at  all  on 
experimental  realities.  "Natural  law"  is  simply  that  law  of  which 
the  person  using  the  phrase  approves;  but  the  cards  cannot  be  in- 
genuously laid  on  the  table  in  any  such  terms;  it  is  wiser  to  put  the 
thing  a  little  less  bluntly,  supplement  it  by  more  or  less  argument. 

402.  The  objections  that  might  be  raised  against  any  assertion  of 
natural  law  are  met  in  the  following  way:  "Why  must  I  subscribe  to 
your  opinion?"  "Because  it  is  in  accord  with  reason."  "But  I  am 
using  reason  too,  and  my  idea  is  different  from  yours."  "Yes,  but 
my  reason  is  right  reason"  (§§  422  f.).  "How  comes  it  that  you  who 
are  blessed  with  this  right  reason  are  so  few?"  "We  are  not  so  few: 
our  opinion  enjoys  universal  consensus."  "And  yet  there  are  some 
who  think  differently."  "I  should  have  said  the  consensus  of  the 
good  and  the  wise."  "Very  well !  It  was  you  then,  the  good  and  the 
wise,  who  invented  this  natural  law?"  "No,  we  got  it  from  Nature, 
from  God." 

403.  The  resources  on  which  defenders  of  natural  law  rely  are 
chiefly:  right  reason;  nature,  with  its  appendages,  rational  nature, 
state  of  nature,  conformity  with  nature,  sociability,  and  the  like;  the 
consensus  of  all  mankind,  or  of  some  essential  part  of  mankind ;  the 
divine  will. 

404.  Two  questions  especially  are  envisaged:  (i)  the  authorship  of 


246  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §405 

natural  law,  and  (2)  the  manner  of  its  revelation.^  God  may  be  the 
author  of  natural  law  either  directly,  or  else  indirectly  by  means  of 
Right  Reason  or  of  Nature,  His  servants.  Nature  may  be  the  author 
of  natural  law  either  directly  or,  preferably,  indirectly,  by  having 
engraved  on  the  human  mind  a  picture  of  natural  law  (or  merely 
of  law),  which  is  forthwith  discovered  by  right  reason,  or  else  by 
observing  either  general  opinion  or  the  opinion  of  the  best-qualified 
individuals.  It  is  possible  also  to  speculate  as  to  what  humanity 
would  be  like  in  a  "state  of  nature,"  a  state  that,  to  tell  the  truth,  no 
one  has  ever  seen,  but  with  which  metaphysicists  are  so  well 
acquainted  that  from  that  state  (so  well  known  to  them,  to  other 
people  entirely  unknown)  they  derive  their  knowledge  of  things 
which  the  rest  of  us  have  before  our  very  eyes  and  might  therefore 
know  directly.  Finally,  Right  Reason  can  command  observance  of 
natural  law  on  its  own  unsupported  authority. 

405.  Natural  law  may  be  revealed  to  us  directly  by  God  through 
writings  inspired  by  Him — but  that  is  a  very  rare  case.  Direct  ob- 
servation of  the  consensus  of  mankind,  or  of  a  part  of  mankind, 
might  also  reveal  natural  law  directly;  but  that  method,  in  point 
of  fact,  is  seldom  if  ever  followed.  Really  the  function  of  revealing 
natural  law  belongs  properly  to  Right  Reason,  either  as  its  own 
production,  or  as  deriving  from  Nature,  or  from  God;  or  from 
universal  consensus  or  some  more  limited  consensus. 

406.  It  is  quite  generally  asserted,  in  substance,  that  the  concept 
of  natural  law  is  inherent  in  the  human  mind.  Some  indication  as  to 
the  source  of  the  concept  is  often  added,  with  further  support  of  the 
consensus  of  all  mankind,  or  of  the  best-qualified  individuals.  Ordi- 
narily, almost  all  such  weapons  are  used  at  the  same  time,  because 
it  is  better  to  appeal  to  the  greatest  possible  number  of  sentiments; 
and  the  various  manners  of  revelation  are  themselves  declared  to 
be  in  accord  with  one  another,  again  for  the  same  reason. 

407.  The  subjective  argument  by  accord  of  sentiments  seems  to 
be  as  follows:  It  is  perceived  that  existing  laws  are  not  an  arbitrary, 

404  ^  We  encounter  here,  in  a  particular  case,  general  methods  of  logicalization 
that  we  shall  treat  in  Chapters  IX  and  X. 


§410  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  247 

nor  even  an  entirely  logical,  creation — that  they  contain  a  sub- 
stratum not  due  to  any  volition  but  subsisting  by  itself.  That  in- 
duction is  in  accord  with  the  facts,  and  it  ought  to  be  stated  in  this 
form:  "There  are  certain  principles  of  non-logical  conduct  from 
which  human  beings  deduce  their  laws.  Such  principles  of  non- 
logical  conduct  (or  'residues,'  Chapter  VI)  are  correlated  with  the 
conditions  under  which  human  beings  live,  and  change  with  those 
conditions." 

408.  But  in  that  form,  which  emphasizes  the  relative,  subjective, 
non-logical  character  of  the  principles,  the  argument  is  repulsive  to 
metaphysicists  and  theologians,  and  even  to  a  large  number  of  mere 
students  of  social  matters.  What  they  want  is  something  absolute, 
objective,  logical,  and  they  invariably  find  it  by  using  indeterminate 
words  and  defective  reasonings  ("derivations,"  Chapter  IX).  In  the 
case  in  hand,  the  absolute  and  objective  is  sought  in  the  consensus 
of  the  many  or  the  all,  in  conformity  with  Nature,  in  divine  will. 
Of  all  those  things,  or  of  some  of  them,  they  have  most  favourable 
opinions.  They  must  therefore  be  in  accord  with  that  other  thing, 
natural  law,  of  which  they  have  an  equally  high  opinion :  and  logic 
must  supply  us  with  the  nexus  that  brings  the  two  excellences  to- 
gether (§514).  In  such  theories,  ever  peeping  out  from  under  the 
various  disguises,  is  the  notion  of  a  contrast  between  something  that 
is  constant  and  good  ("natural"  law)  and  something  else  that  is 
variable  and  not  so  good  ("positive"  law);  and  that  contrast  is 
chiefly  responsible  for  their  conviction,  and  the  conviction  of  those 
who  agree  with  them  (§  515). 

409.  Whether  the  one  or  the  other  of  these  procedures  occupies 
the  forefront  is  altogether  a  matter  of  individual  preference.  Chris- 
tians, of  course,  cannot  do  without  God;  but  it  is  interesting  that 
they  make  His  interposition  not  so  much  direct  as  indirect.  That 
may  be  because  the  metaphysicist  overbalances  the  Christian  in  them. 
But  pure  metaphysicists  are  satisfied  with  Right  Reason. 

410.  Aristotle  finds  it  characteristic  of  natural  law  that  it  has  the 
same  force  everywhere.  That  does  not  mean  that  it  is  always  the 


248  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §4x1 

same  in  every  place,  since  there  may  be  natural  variations.^  He  uses 
that  reservation  to  answer  the  denial  of  natural  law  on  the  ground 
of  variations  in  the  law  of  nations.  In  the  Rhetoric,  I,  13,  2  (Freese, 
p.  139),  he  expresses  himself  thus:  "I  say  that  law  is  peculiar  or  com- 
mon {Ihiov  xal  xoLvov).  That  law  is  peculiar  which  some  ordain 
for  themselves,  and  it  may  be  written  or  unwritten.  Common  is 
that  law  which  is  in  accord  with  Nature,  since  there  is  a  just  and 
an  unjust  by  nature,  which  all  people  divine,  though  neither  com- 
munication nor  understanding  exist  between  them."  ^  Such  really 
would  be  principles  of  non-logical  actions,  which  are  common  to 
human  beings  everywhere,  varying  according  to  the  conditions 
under  which  they  live.  Aristotle's  theory  would  seem,  therefore,  to 
give  first  place  to  Nature.  Universal  consensus  would  be  the  means 
by  which  that  origin  according  to  Nature  manifests  itself. 

411.  Just  how  the  things  that  have  the  same  force  everywhere  are 
to  be  distinguished  from  those  which  do  not  is  hard  to  imagine. 
Aristotle  thinks  he  can  show  how,  and  he  gives  the  example  [Ethica 
Nicomachea,  V,  7,  2  (Rackham,  p.  295)  ]  of  a  law  prescribing  that 
a  goat  and  not  a  sheep  should  be  sacrificed  to  Zeus.  In  fact,  at  first 
sight,  it  would  seem  evident  that  such  a  law  must  be  arbitrary;  but 
a  slight  modification  in  terms  is  enough  to  endow  the  prescription 
with  the  trait  of  pseudo-universality  required  by  natural  law.  We 
need  only  say:  "In  every  locality  local  customs  must  be  observed. 
In  our  country  it  is  customary  to  sacrifice  a  goat,  and  not  a  sheep; 
hence  a  goat  must  be  sacrificed." 

412.  In  one  and  the  same  treatise  Cicero  sways  back  and  forth  be- 
tween the  various  demonstrations,  so  betraying  the  fact  that  it  is  not 

410  ^Aristotle,  Ethica  Nicomachea,  V,  7,  1-4  (Rackham,  p.  295):  "Of  political 
law  a  part  is  natural,  a  part  legislative.  That  law  is  natural  which  everywhere  has 
the  same  force  and  does  not  depend  on  opinion."  Idem,  Magna  moralia,  I,  33,  19 
(Stock,  p.  1194b,  1.  30):  "Some  just  things  are  so  by  nature,  some  by  legislation." 
He  goes  on  to  say  that  natural  things  too  can  change;  and  he  gives  as  an  example 
the  fact  that  one  could  use  the  right  hand  and  the  left  hand  indifferently,  but  that 
that  would  not  preclude  our  still  having  a  right  hand  and  a  left  hand.  Then  he 
adds:  ".  .  .  the  law  that  endures  is  most  often  just  according  to  nature."  And  then: 
"Justice  according  to  nature  is  therefore  better  than  jusdce  according  to  law." 

410  2  He  says  further,  I,  10,  3  (Freese,  pp.  105-07) :  "I  call  .  .  .  that  [law]  com- 
mon which,  though  not  written,  seems  to  be  recognized  by  all." 


§414  NATURAL  law:   CICERO  249 

the  conclusions  that  follow  from  the  demonstration,  but  that  the 
demonstration  is  selected  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  con- 
clusions. In  his  essay  On  Laws,  De  le gibus,  I,  6,  20,  he  says:  "I  will 
seek  the  origin  of  law  in  Nature  {repetam  stir  pern  iuris  a  Naturd)y 
who  must  be  our  guide  in  this  whole  matter,"  Here  the  appeal 
is  to  Nature  directly;  but  a  few  lines  above,  I,  6,  18-19,  she  was 
brought  in  indirectly,  and  first  place  was  given  to  a  Supreme 
Reason,  and  Cicero  continues:  "Law  is  Supreme  Reason  implanted 
in  Nature  {lex  est  ratio  summa  insita  in  Natura),  who  bids  us  do 
the  things  we  ought  to  do  and  forbids  us  their  contraries.  When 
this  reason  has  been  established  and  elaborated,  (confirmata  et 
cofifecta)  in  the  minds  of  men,  it  becomes  law.  ...  If  that  is 
well  said — and  I  am  of  opinion  that  on  the  whole  it  is — right  has 
its  origin  in  law;  for  law  is  the  force  of  Nature;  it  is  the  mind 
and  the  reason  of  the  wise  man,  and  the  measure  of  what  is  just 
and  what  is  unjust." 

413.  In  this  enumeration  of  highly  estimable  things  divinity  was 
missing — but  not  for  long;  II,  4,  8:  "I  observe  that  it  has  been  the 
opinion  of  the  wisest  that  law  is  not  devised  by  human  intelligence 
nor  is  it  the  decree  of  peoples,  but  something  eternal  that  governs 
the  whole  world  with  the  wisdom  of  its  prescriptions  and  interdic- 
tions. Wherefore  it  has  been  said  that  law  is  the  primal  and  ulti- 
mate mind  of  God,  who  prescribes  and  prohibits  in  all  matters 
through  reason.  Rightly  to  be  praised  therefore  is  a  law  that  the  gods 
have  bestowed  upon  the  human  race:  for  it  is  the  reason  and  the 
thought  [mind]  of  a  wise  being  qualified  both  to  command  and  to 
dissuade." 

414.  Elsewhere,  I,  7,  23,  right  reason  is  said  to  be  the  law;  and 
since  right  reason  is  common  to  gods  and  men,  the  latter  stand  in 
partnership  with  the  gods — no  more,  no  less :  "Since  nothing  is  bet- 
ter than  reason  and  since  it  exists  both  in  man  and  in  God,  a  first 
partnership  of  reason  exists  between  man?  and  God.  But  those  who 
have  reason  in  common  have  also  right  reason  in  common,  and 
since  right  reason  is  the  law  (quae  cum  sit  lex)  we  must  consider 


250  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §415 

ourselves  as  brought  through  the  law  into  partnership  with  the 
gods." 

415.  Then  we  are  back  with  Nature  again,  II,  5,  13:  "Law,  then, 
is  the  distinction  between  what  is  just  and  what  is  unjust,  modelled 
on  that  most  ancient  Nature,  the  beginning  of  all  things."  That 
blessed  Nature  is  like  an  elastic  band:  it  can  be  stretched  to  any 
length  required,  I,  8,  25:  "Virtue  is  nothing  but  Nature  perfect  in 
itself  and  carried  to  its  limit." 

416.  One  cannot  read  all  that  without  seeing  that  Cicero  has  a 
clear  conception  of  a  law  that  is  not  conventional.  It  comes  out  when 
he  says,  I,  10,  28,  that  "not  by  opinion,  but  by  Nature  was  law  con- 
stituted {Neque  opinione  sed  Natura  constitutum  esse  ius)^  But 
then  his  ideas  as  to  the  origin  and  nature  of  such  a  law  grow  con- 
fused. He  goes  groping  about  to  find  every  perfection  he  can  think 
of  to  piece  together  with  the  high  conception  he  has  of  law. 

417.  Little  or  no  progress  has  been  made  since  Cicero's  time;  and 
writers  on  natural  law  continue  to  make  all  possible  combinations 
of  the  same  concepts;  save  that  the  God  of  the  Christians  replaces 
the  pagan  gods,  a  scientific  varnish  is  applied,  and  a  pseudo-science 
is  invited  to  reveal  just  what  Milady  Nature  would  have  us  do. 

418.  Roman  jurists  often  put  their  theories  under  the  protection 
of  a  certain  natural  law  {ius  naturae,  naturale)  common  to  all  men 
and  even  to  animals.  They  have  been  defended  in  that  on  the 
ground  that  human  beings  and  animals  have  in  fact  certain  mental 
traits  in  common.  But  it  is  not  in  the  least  with  such  traits  that  we 
are  concerned;  nor  do  they  in  any  sense  assume  any  authority  as 
principles  of  law  such  as  the  champions  of  natural  law  envisage. 
So,  in  the  very  same  fashion,  from  the  fact  that  certain  good  or 
bad  traits  in  a  parent  affect  the  character  of  his  progeny,  people 
have  tried  to  conclude  that  it  was  "just"  that  the  children  should 
be  punished  for  the  sins  of  their  fathers  (§§  1979 f.).  Such  reasoning 
involves  a  confusion  between  a  state  of  fact  and  a  state  of  "right," 
between  what  happens  and  what  one  should  try  to  have  happen. 
It  is  one  thing  to  say,  "The  progeny  of  a  syphilitic  parent  have  cer- 
tain diseases,"  and  quite  another  thing  to  say,  "The  syphilitic  father 


§421  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  25 1 

should  be  punished  in  his  child,  by  inoculating  the  latter  with 
diseases  he  does  not  have." 

So  also  the  term  "solidarity"  has  been  given  to  correlations  be- 
tween animals  and  human  beings,  or  between  human  beings,  with 
an  inference  from  that  fact  of  something  altogether  different — a 
certain  "obligation"  or  "law"  of  solidarity  (§§449-450). 

419.  In  the  proemium  of  the  Institutes  of  Justinian,  I,  2  {Corpus 
juris  civilis,  Vol.  I,  p.  3;  Scott,  Vol.  II,  p.  5),  we  are  told:  "Natural 
law  is  that  which  Nature  imparts  to  all  animate  creatures;  for  this 
law  is  not  peculiar  to  mankind,  but  is  shared  by  all  animals  that  live 
in  the  air,  on  the  earth,  and  in  the  sea.  Hence  comes  the  union  of 
male  and  female  that  we  call  matrimony,  the  procreation  and  edu- 
cation of  offspring.  We  see,  in  fact,  that  the  animals  have  knowledge 
of  this  law."  If  we  strip  off  the  trappings  of  sentiment  which  dis- 
guise this  passage  it  becomes  frankly  comical.  The  compilers  of  the 
Institutes  are  not  content  with  saying  "all  animals";  they  hammer  on 
the  point,  so  that  every  doubt  may  be  dispelled  and  their  period 
turn  out  more  rhythmical :  it  is  a  question,  no  more,  no  less,  of  "all 
animals  that  live  in  the  air,  on  the  earth,  and  in  the  sea."  So  we 
get  a  natural  law  of  earthworms,  fleas,  lice,  flies,  and  in  our  day  we 
might  add,  of  infusoria.  And  not  only  does  this  pretty  law  exist; 
the  animals  know  it — a  thing,  in  truth,  marvellous  beyond  words! 

420.  And  in  proof — the  institution  of  matrimony  is  brought  for- 
ward !  Among  certain  species  of  spiders  the  male  seizes  the  moment 
in  which  the  female  is  not  looking  to  rush  upon  her  and  copulate. 
He  then  flees  as  fast  as  his  legs  can  carry  him  because  the  female 
will  devour  him  if  she  gets  her  claws  on  him.  Strange  indeed  how 
these  animals  \nou/  the  natural  law  of  matrimony — and  use  it! 

421.  To  make  law  accord  with  the  facts,  the  compilers  of  the 
Institutes  use  a  method  that  is  a  very  common  resort :  they  introduce 
sly  alterations  in  the  meanings  of  terms.  They  say  {Corpus  iuris 
civilis,  Vol.  I,  p.  3;  Scott,  Vol.  II,  p.  5) :  "Hinc  descendit  maris  atque 
jeminae  coniugatio  (variant,  coniunctio),  quam  nos  matrimonium 
appellamus."  ("Hence  comes  the  union  of  male  and  female  that  we 
call  matrimony.")  But  this  they  contradict  later  on  when  they  say, 


252  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §422 

I,  10,  12  {Corpus,  Vol.  I,  p.  6;  Scott,  Vol.  II,  p.  15):  "Si  adversus  ea 
quae  diximus  aliqui  coierint,  nee  vir,  nee  uxor,  nee  nuptiae,  nee 
matrlmonium ,  nee  dos  intelligitur!'  ("If  some  unite  in  ways  dif- 
ferent from  those  specified,  they  cannot  be  known  as  husband  and 
wife,  nor  is  there  either  wedlock  or  marriage  or  dowry.")  In  one 
place  they  say  that  simple  copulation,  as  in  the  case  of  animals,  is 
what  they  mean  by  matrimonium.  In  the  other  place  they  withhold 
that  name  from  unions  which  do  not  have  certain  other  traits.  Of 
the  two  contradictory  propositions,  one  has  to  be  eliminated — and 
better  the  first,  since  it  is  certain  that  in  the  language  of  law  matri- 
monium  is  something  more  than  simple  copulation. 

422.  The  law  of  nations  iius  gentium^  is  declared  to  be  imposed 
by  natural  reason  {iiaturalis  ratio).  This  natural  reason  is  a  beautiful 
creature  to  whom  one  may  resort  in  distressing  predicaments  and 
use  to  demonstrate  many  fine  things.  It  is  also  called  right  reason 
{o^dbc,  /lo/o$),  true  reason,  just,  honest  reason,  and  the  like.  It  is  not 
explained  how  the  reason  worthy  of  these  exalted  epithets  is  to  be 
distinguished  from  the  reason  which  has  to  go  without  them.  But 
at  bottom  the  former  is  always  the  one  that  meets  the  approval  of 
the  writer  who  bestows  the  laudatory  epithet. 

423.  A  person  whom  we  shall  call  Primus  observes  that  A  =  B. 
A  person  whom  we  shall  call  Secundus  denies  it.  Primus  thinks  he 
proves  his  assertion  when  he  says  that  A  =  B  because  right  reason 
will  have  it  so.  But  why  is  the  reason  of  Primus  "right"  reason,  while 
the  reason  of  Secundus  is  not  ?  Who  is  to  pass  judgment  in  the  dis- 
pute.? If  now  a  Tertius  comes  forward  and  says  that  to  his  mind 
the  reason  of  Primus  is  right  reason,  that  only  proves  that  on  the 
subject  in  hand  Primus  and  Tertius  happen  to  think  alike;  and  what 
has  that  got  to  do  with  the  other  fact  that  A  =  B?  If  not  only 
Tertius,  but  several  individuals,  many  individuals — all  men — agree 
with  Primus,  that  fact  continues  to  have  no  bearing  on  the  objective 
proposition  that  A  =  B,  except  for  people  who  take  such  consensus 
as  proof  of  the  theorem.  But  if  we  are  going  to  reason  in  that  fashion, 
it  would  be  as  well,  and  in  fact  much  better,  to  bring  on  the  consen- 


§425  NATURAL  law:   GROTIUS,   PUFENDORF  253 

sus  in  the  first  place,  without  dragging  in  right  reason  for  the  pleas- 
ure of  chasing  it  away  again!  All  that,  of  course,  from  the  logico- 
experimental  point  of  view.  As  an  appeal  to  sentiment  the  intro- 
duction of  right  reason  is  a  very  helpful  thing;  for  it  enables  one  to 
insinuate  that  the  person  who  does  not  accept  the  demonstration 
is  somehow  a  poor  sort  of  person.  The  procedure  is  general,  and  we 
shall  return  to  it  hereafter  (§§  480  f.). 

424.  At  a  later  period  we  come  upon  an  elect  company  of  jurists 
who  formulated  the  theory  of  natural  law  and  the  law  of  nations, 
and  who  are  greatly  admired  by  people  who  are  so  fortunate  as  to 
understand  them:  Grotius,  Selden,  Pufendorf,  Burlamaqui,  Vattel, 
and  so  on.^ 

425.  Grotius  says  that  "natural  law  is  made  up  of  certain  prin- 
ciples of  right  reason  which  teach  us  that  an  action  is  morally  proper 
or  improper  according  as  it  is  in  accord  or  disaccord  with  a  rational 
and  sociable  Nature,  and  that,  consequently,  God,  who  is  the  creator 
of  Nature,  commands  or  prohibits  such  actions."  ^ 

424  ^  Lack  of  space  prevents  us  from  examining  all  their  definitions  here;  but 
that  is  no  great  loss,  for  they  are  all  more  or  less  alike  and  all  equally  hazy. 

425  '^  De  jure  belli  ac  pads,  I,  10,  i  (Pareto  used  Barbeyrac's  French  translation): 
"Four  commencer  par  le  Droit  Naturel,  il  consiste  dans  certains  principes  de  la 
Droite  Raison,  qui  nous  font  connoitre  qu'une  Action  est  moralement  honnete  ou 
deshonnete  selon  la  convenance  on  la  disconvenance  necessaire  qu'clle  a  avec  une 
'Nature  Raisonnable  et  Sociable;  et  par  consequent  que  Dieti,  qui  est  I'Auteur  de  la 
Nature,  ordonne  ou  defend  une  telle  action."  The  Latin  original  reads:  "lus  nat- 
urale  est  dictatum  rectae  rationis  indicans  actui  alicui  ex  ejus  convenentia  aut  dis- 
convenentia  cum  ipsa  natura  rationali  inesse  moralem  turpitudinem  aut  necessitatem 
moralem,  ac  consequenter  ab  auctore  naturae  Deo  talent  actum  aut  vetari  aut 
praecipi."  (See  Campbell,  p.  21.)  Grotius  goes  on  to  observe,  §  2,  that  "the  actions 
in  regard  to  which  Nature  supplies  such  principles  are  obligatory  or  illicit 
in  themselves,  so  that  they  are  conceived  as  necessarily  ordained  or  forbid- 
den by  God" — and  that  is  what  distinguishes  it  from  human  law.  Notice- 
able here,  as  usual,  is  a  perception  that  there  is  in  law  a  something  that  is  not 
arbitrary;  and  that  something  is  "necessarily"  connected  with  God,  Nature,  Right 
Reason,  and  other  similar  endues.  Notes  by  Barbeyrac  to  French  translation:  "Gro- 
tius wrote:  'morally  necessary,'  but  the  term  I  use,  'morally  proper,'  is  clearer  and 
the  contrast  is  more  exact.  I  write  'reasonable  and  sociable  nature,'  following  the 
author's  regular  formula,  as  witness  §  12,  No.  i;  II,  §  12,  No.  3;  III,  §  i.  No.  3. 
The  copyist,  or  the  printer,  would  seem  to  have  overleapt  the  two  words  widiout 
the  author's  noticing,  as  has  happened  in  other  passages." 


254  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §426 

Pufendorf  comments  that  that  is  reasoning  in  a  circle,  because 
natural  laws  are  defined  as  what  is  proper  and  then  to  learn  what  is 
proper  we  have  to  resort  to  natural  laws."  But  Burlamaqui  washes 
Grotius  clean  of  any  such  blemish:  "I  cannot  see  any  circle  there; 
for  the  question  as  to  the  source  of  the  natural  rectitude  or  turpitude 
of  proscribed  or  forbidden  actions  Grotius  does  not  answer  in  the 
manner  represented.  He  would  say  that  the  rectitude  or  turpitude 
arises  from  the  necessary  harmony  {convenance)  or  discord  {dis- 
convenance)  of  our  actions  with  a  rational  and  sociable  nature."  ^ 
That  is  the  usual  method  of  defining  one  unknown  by  another  un- 
known. From  natural  laws  we  are  remanded  to  "rectitude,"  from 
rectitude  to  harmony;  to  say  nothing  of  a  certain  "rational"  nature 
which  is  not  clearly  distinguishable  from  a  nature  that  is  not  such. 

426.  All  the  same,  let  us  do  the  best  we  can.  We  have  been  re- 
ferred to  a  "harmony";  let  us  see  if  we  can  discover  what  on  earth 
it  may  be.  Burlamaqui,  Ibid.y  II,  7,  2,  gives  us  a  lead:  "As  for  the 
harmony  finally,  it  is  something  approximate  to  order  itself.  It  is  a 
relation  of  conformity  among  several  things,  the  one  of  which  is  in 
itself  essential  to  the  conservation  and  perfection  of  the  other,  and 
does  its  share  in  maintaining  it  in  a  good  and  advantageous  state." 
It  would  seem,  then,  that  the  "rectitude"  in  question  is  something 
that  stands  in  the  relation  indicated  to  a  "rational  and  sociable 
nature."  But  our  unknowns,  far  from  getting  fewer,  are  increasing 
in  number.  In  addition  to  discovering  what  "rational  nature"  is,  we 
now  have  to  learn  the  meaning  that  the  author  gives  to  the  words 
"conservation,"  "perfection,"  "good  and  advantageous  state." 

427.  All  this  twisting  and  turning  amounts  in  the  end  to  saying 
that  "natural  law"  is  a  phrase  that  arouses  in  the  mind  of  the  author 
an  atmosphere  similar  to  the  atmosphere  aroused  by  the  words 
"rational  nature,"  "conservation,"  "perfection,"  "good  and  advanta- 
geous state" — all  of  which  are  essentially  undefinable.  Why,  then, 

425  ^  De  iiire  naturae  et  geiitiiim,  I,  i,  10  [Wrong  reference.  Pufendorf  regarded 
I,  2,  6,  as  his  basic  comment  on  Grotius:  Frankfurt,  pp.  27-29;  Kennett,  pp.  18-20; 
Barbeyrac,  Vol.  I,  p.  30. — A.  L.] 

425  ^  Pmicipes  du  droit  natitrel,  Pt.  II,  Chap.  5,  Sec.  6. 


§428  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  255 

instead  of  going  so  far  afield,  does  not  the  author  say  it  that  way 
and  have  done  with  it  ?  ^ 

428.  For  Pufendorf  "natural  law  is  that  law  which  is  so  invari- 
ably in  accord  with  the  rational  and  sociable  nature  of  man  that 
unless  its  norms  were  observed  an  honest  and  peaceful  society  could 
not  exist  among  men."  ^  He  would  seem  here  to  be  depending  on 
experience  alone;  and  if  he  continued  along  that  line,  natural  law 
would  simply  be  a  law  that  governs  societies  in  such  a  way  that 
they  are  able  to  survive.  But  unfortunately  experience  shows  that 
many  are  the  societies  which  subsist,  and  each  with  a  different  set  of 
laws;  so  we  cannot  know  which  of  the  latter  is  the  natural  law  except 
by  determining  what  they  have  in  common — and  that  takes  us  into 
another  field.^ 

427  ^  Here  induction  leads  us  to  consider  a  general  phenomenon  with  which  we 
shall  deal  at  length  in  Chapter  IX.  For  the  present  let  us  continue  examining  the 
relations  of  these  theories  to  experimental  facts. 

428  ^  De  officio  hominis  et  civis,  I,  2,  16  (Oxford,  Vol.  I,  p.  18;  Vol.  II,  p.  16): 
"Ilia  est  quae  cum  rationah  ac  sociali  natura  hominis  ita  congruit  ut  humano  generi 
honesta  et  pactfica  societas  citra  eandem  constare  nequeat." 

428  2  Burlamaqui,  Elements  du  droit  naturel,  Pt.  Ill,  Chap.  13,  Sec.  i:  "As  re- 
gards natural  law,  the  proofs  based  on  the  consensus  and  practices  of  the  nations  or 
on  the  sentiments  of  philosophers  are  not  adequate  for  establishing  that  this  or  that 
thing  is  part  of  natural  law.  The  extent  to  which  even  the  wisest  and  most  en- 
lightened nations  have  gone  astray  on  the  most  important  matters  is  only  too  well 
known."  Pufendorf  also  rejects  the  evidence  of  universal  consensus.  Pufendorf-Bar- 
beyrac,  he  droit  de  la  nature  et  des  gens,  II,  3,  7  (Vol.  I,  p.  179;  De  iure,  Frank- 
furt, p.  179;  Kennett,  pp.  124-25):  "Others  take  for  the  basis  of  natural  law  the  con- 
sent of  all  mankind,  or  of  all  nations,  or  of  most  nations,  or  of  the  more  civilized 
nations,  to  recognize  certain  things  as  proper  or  improper.  But  for  one  thing,  that 
is  only,  as  the  phrase  goes,  an  a  posteriori  proof  [In  other  words,  an  experimental 
proof,  and  therefore  repugnant  to  every  good  metaphysicist.]  and  fails  altogether  to 
explain  why  this  or  that  thing  is  prescribed  or  prohibited  by  natural  law.  Then 
again  it  is  not  a  very  sure  method  and  is  fraught  with  countless  difficulties;  for  if 
one  appeals  to  mankind  as  a  whole,  two  annoying  embarrassments  arise,  as  Hobbes 
well  shows,  De  cive,  II,  §  i.  In  the  first  place,  on  that  assumption  it  does  not  appear 
that  any  human  being  actually  using  his  reason  could  ever  sin  against  natural  law; 
for  the  moment  one  individual  belonging  to  the  human  race  embraces  an  opinion 
differing  from  the  general,  the  consensus  of  mankind  is  impaired.  In  the  second 
place,  it  seems  manifestly  absurd  to  take  as  the  basis  of  natural  laws  the  consent  of 
those  who  break  them  more  often  than  they  observe  them."  Pufendorf  defines  nat- 
ural law,  De  iure  naturae  et  gentium,  I,  6,  18  (Frankfurt,  p.  109,  Barbeyrac,  Vol.  I, 
p.  113;  Kennett,  p.  76),  as  "a  law  standing  in  such  a  necessary  relationship  to 
the  reasonable  and  sociable  nature  of  man  that  without  observance  of  it  no  honest 


256  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §429 

429.  But  Pufendorf  does  not  understand  the  matter  in  that  way, 
really.  He  dismisses  experience  without  further  delay,  adding  that 
the  law  in  question  can  be  discovered  with  the  sole  aid  of  natural 
reason,  by  mere  contemplation  of  human  nature  in  general.  Know 
ye,  therefore,  that^  "to  discover  entirely  and  convincingly  the  dis- 
tinguishing trait  of  natural  law  ...  it  is  sufficient  to  examine  at- 
tentively the  nature  and  inclinations  of  man  in  general."  And  so,  with 
this  blessed  Nature,  we  are  thrown  back  once  more  into  full  meta- 
physics, to  land  at  a  place  where  the  "fundamental  principle  of 
natural  law"  dwells,  the  law  that"  "each  individual  should  do  his 
utmost  to  further  the  welfare  of  human  society  in  general."  That 
does  not  help  us  very  much,  for  we  now  have  to  quarrel  as  to 
the  character  of  that  welfare.  One  person  will  say,  "The  welfare  of 
society  lies  in  an  aristocratic  system";  another  will  retort,  "The  wel- 
fare of  society  lies  in  a  democratic  system."  And  how  are  we  going 
to  settle  the  dispute  on  the  principles  of  natural  law?  Pufendorf 
adds  that  "natural  law  has  God  for  its  author" — and  that,  in  truth, 
must  be  the  case!  ^ 

430.  Burlamaqui  departs  but  slightly  from  Pufendorf.  He  says:^ 
"By  natural  law  is  meant  a  law  that  God  lays  down  for  all  men  and 
which  they  can  discover  and  know  by  the  unaided  light  of  their 
reason,  considering  attentively  their  nature  and  their  state."  Here 
there  is  no  trace  of  the  animals  that  made  up  such  a  fascinating 
menagerie  in  the  Institutes  of  Justinian.^  But  a  new  entity  has  come 

and  peaceful  society  could  exist  in  the  human  race.  Or  if  one  wish,  it  is  a  law  that 
has,  so  to  say,  a  natural  goodness  [The  usual  vagueness.  Metaphysicists  simply  can- 
not hit  on  a  notion  that  is  exact.],  in  other  words,  an  inner  capacity  of  its  own  for 
procuring  the  welfare  of  mankind.  The  law  is  called  natural  because  it  can  be  known 
through  the  natural  lights  of  reason,  and  by  the  contemplation  of  human  nature 
in  the  large." 

429  ^  De  officio  hominis  et  civis,  I,  3,  i  (Oxford,  Vol.  I,  p.  18;  Vol.  II,  p.  17). 

429  ^  Ibid.,  I,  3,  9  (Oxford,  Vol.  I,  p.  21;  Vol.  II,  p.  19). 

429  ^  Ibid.,  I,  3,  II  (Oxford,  Vol.  I,  p.  22;  Vol.  II,  p.  19):  ".  .  .  esse  autem  Deum 
legis  naturalis  autorem." 

430  ^  Principes  du  droit  natiirel,  Pt.  II,  Chap,  i.  Sec.  2. 

430  ^  Cruel  to  the  poor  animals,  Pufendorf  absolutely  will  not  let  them  have  a 
natural  law  in  common  with  man,  De  iitre  7Taturae  et  gentium,  II,  3,  3  (Frankfurt, 
p.  172;  Barbeyrac,  Vol.  I,  p.  171;  Kennett,  p.  119):  "There  have  been  people, 
apparently  more  minded  to  display  their  brilliancy  than  to  sustain  their  thesis  in 


§431  NATURAL  law:  BURLAMAQUI  257 

on  the  scene — God ;  though  we  are  not  told  whether  He  be  the  God 
of  the  Christians,  the  God  of  the  Moslems,  or  some  other  God.  God 
has  made  a  natural  law  common  to  all  men,  who,  however,  do 
not  have  the  same  God!  It  all  sounds  like  a  puzzle. 

431.  In  Burlamaqui's  proposition  there  are  two  definitions  and  a 
thesis.  Natural  law  is  twice  defined,  first  as  given  by  God,  second  as 
known  through  reason.  The  thesis  lies  in  the  assertion  that  the  two 
definitions  are  in  accord.  It  is  not  very  clear  how  people  who  have 
different  Gods,  and  especially  atheists  who  have  no  God  at  all,  can 
all  agree.  As  for  the  conclusions  reached  by  "attentively"  considering 
the  nature  and  estate  of  mankind,  those  are  merely  things  that  the 
author  finds  in  accord  with  his  own  sentiments;  and  of  course  if 
anyone  fails  to  reach  Burlamaqui's  conclusions,  he  must  accuse  him- 
self of  not  having  considered  the  nature  and  estate  of  men  with 
sufficient  attention.  But  if  this  person  should  persevere  in  his  stand 
and  assert  that  despite  his  "attentive"  consideration  of  the  nature 
and  estate  of  man  he  arrives  at  different  conclusions,  on  what  basis 
could  one  decide  which  of  the  conclusions  ought  to  be  accepted 
(§§  16  f.)?  In  a  "consideration"  of  "nature"  one  can  find  anything 
one  chooses.  The  author  of  the  Problems  (attributed  to  Aristotle) 
discovers  in  nature  the  reason  why  man  of  all  animate  creatures 
should  be  the  one  to  have,  in  proportion  to  size  of  body,  the  shortest 
distance  between  the  eyes,  and  he  asks:  "Can  it  perhaps  be  because 
more  than  others  he  is  according  to  nature?"^ 

The  "experience"  of  believers  in  natural  law  is  on  a  par  with  our 

earnest,  who  have  marshalled  from  all  hands  any  evidence  tending  to  establish 
such  an  alleged  law  common  to  human  beings  and  animals.  Scholars,  however, 
have  long  since  rejected  all  the  arguments  put  forward  on  that  score.  I  might  men- 
tion briefly  here  such  as  are  derived  from  Holy  Writ."  And  he  proceeds  to  argue 
at  length  that  the  penalties  laid  on  animals  in  the  Bible  involve  no  presupposition 
of  a  law  of  animals. 

431  ^  Problemata,  X,  15  (Forster,  p.  892a) :  "H  Sidri  iialiara  Kara  (pvaiv  sx^t  tuv 
dP.Awv.  The  writer  continues:  "It  is  the  nature  of  sensation  that  it  takes  place  in 
front;  since,  in  motion,  it  is  necessary  to  see  objects  in  advance.  The  greater  the 
distance  between  the  eyes,  the  more  is  the  gaze  cast  sidewise.  So,  to  conform  with 
nature,  the  distance  must  be  the  shortest  possible,  since  in  that  way  one  can  the 
better  walk  straight  ahead."  O  blessed  Nature,  what  wondrous  revelations  dost  thou 
not  vouchsafe  us! 


258  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §432 

modern  "Christian  experience."  In  neither  case  is  there  anything  that 
resembles  the  experience  of  the  natural  sciences;  and  the  term  "ex- 
perience" serves  only  to  dissemble  the  fact  that  the  person  who  uses 
it  is  merely  expressing  his  own  feeling  and  the  feeling  of  people 
who  happen  to  share  his  views  (§  602). 

432.  In  the  Preface  to  his  treatise  De  officio  hotninis  et  civis 
Pufendorf  epitomizes  his  ideas,  saying  that  there  are  three  distinct 
sciences:^  "Natural  Law  common  to  all  men;  Civil  Law,  which  is 
or  may  be  different  in  different  countries;  and  Moral  Theology. 
.  .  .  Natural  Law  prescribes  this  thing  or  that  because  Right  Reason 
compels  us  to  judge  it  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  human 
society  in  general."  Take  it  for  granted  that  the  reason  which  fails 
to  prescribe  as  our  author  wishes  is  not  right  reason;  but  we  cannot 
know  that  it  is  not  until  we  have  a  clear  and  exact  definition  of  what 
it  is. 

433.  Such  a  definition  Barbeyrac,  adapting  Pufendorf,  tries  to 
give:^  "From  that  it  becomes  apparent  how  we  must  judge  of  the 
rightness  of  reason  in  our  inquiries  into  the  foundations  of  Natural 
Law;  in  other  words,  how  we  are  to  recognize  that  a  maxim  is  in 
conformity  with  or  contrary  to  Right  Reason.  For  the  maxims  of 
Right  Reason  are  true  principles,  principles,  that  is,  which  accord 
with  the  nature  of  things  as  we  know  that  nature  after  careful  exami- 
nation, or  which  are  accurately  deduced  from  some  first  principle 
true  in  itself.  Those,  on  the  contrary,  are  maxims  of  corrupt  reason 
\pravae  raUonis\  which  are  founded  on  false  principles,  or  which 
are  faultily  deduced  from  principles  true  in  themselves." 

434.  Underneath  all  this  pretentious  verbiage  it  is  not  difficult  to 
recognize  a  principle  dear  to  metaphysicists,  whereby  experimental 
truths  may  be  discovered  through  introspection  into  the  "human 
mind"  (§493).  So  right  reason  must  necessarily  be  in  accord  with 
experience,  or  with  Nature,  as  these  gentlemen  say. 

435.  Pufendorf  continues,  II,  3,  14:  "If,  then,  what  is  represented 

432  ^Oxford,  Vol.  I,  pp.  [2]-[3];  Vol.  II,  pp.  viii-ix. 

433  ^  Pufendorf-Barbeyrac,  Le  droit  de  la  nature  et  des  gens,  II,  3,  13  (Vol.  I,  p. 
190;  Frankfurt,  p.  192;  Kennett,  pp.  133-34). 


§436  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  259 

as  a  maxim  of  Natural  Law  is  really  founded  on  the  nature  of  things, 
one  may  safely  regard  it  as  a  true  principle  and  consequently  as  a 
principle  of  Right  Reason ;  for  the  nature  of  things  reveals  to  us  only 
that  which  really  exists."  ^  If  he  were  following  the  experimental 
method  he  would  invert  his  terms  and  say,  "What  really  exists  re- 
veals the  nature  of  things."  But  following  the  metaphysical  method, 
he  tries  to  learn  what  really  exists  not  from  the  observation  of  facts, 
but  from  "principles  in  accord  with  the  nature  of  things."  Of  this 
accord  Right  Reason  remains  judge.  Hence  we  go  round  and  round 
in  a  circle:  to  know  right  reason  we  are  referred  to  the  nature  of 
things,  and  to  know  the  nature  of  things  we  are  referred  back  to 
right  reason. 

436.  Reasoning  in  that  convenient  fashion,  the  author  can  con- 
vince us  of  anything  he  chooses;  and  so  it  is  that,  without  much 
trouble  (according  to  him),  one  comes  upon  the  discovery  that  the 
basis  of  natural  law  is  sociability   (sociality).^  Sociability  always 

435  ^  Barbeyrac  notes  in  his  French  translation  {loc.  cit.;  Kennett,  loc.  cit.) : 
"This  sentence  did  not  appear  in  the  first  edition.  Since  it  did  not  fit  in  very  well 
with  the  context  I  have  altered  connexions  slightly  but  without  in  any  respect  de- 
parting from  the  author's  meaning."  He  then  executes  the  usual  manoeuvre  for 
crippling  his  adversaries  by  barring  them  from  the  list  of  individuals  competent 
to  judge  of  the  issues  in  question:  "The  assumption  here  always  is  that  one's  ad- 
versaries are  not  Pyrrhonians  [sceptics]  or  persons  disposed  to  attach  little  im- 
portance to  the  true  or  the  false;  otherwise  it  would  be  useless  to  try  to  enlighten 
them."  From  the  experimental  standpoint  an  argument  that  will  allow  objections 
only  from  people  who  accept  it  is  no  argument.  From  the  sentimental  standpoint 
an  argument  by  accord  of  sentiment  can  be  accepted  only  by  people  who  already 
enteitain  the  sentiment,  at  least  partially.  Barbeyrac  continues:  "There  has  always 
been  the  question  as  to  whether  the  just  were  just  by  nature  and  not  by  fiat  of  some 
arbitrary  will — ^I'o-e^,  ov  deaet :  in  other  words,  as  the  result  of  essential  re- 
lationships between  our  conduct  and  its  objects  or  the  nature  of  things."  The 
dilemma  exists  only  for  metaphysicists.  Experimental  science  offers  a  third  solution: 
It  holds  that  the  word  "just"  merely  expresses  certain  sentiments,  and  is  therefore 
not  a  little  vague,  as  are  the  sentiments  themselves. 

436  ^  Pufendorf,  De  iiire  naturae  et  gentium,  II,  3,  15  (Frankfurt,  p.  197;  Bar- 
beyrac, Vol.  I,  p.  194;  Kennett,  pp.  136-37):  "We  shall  have  no  great  difficulty  in 
discovering  the  true  foundation  of  natural  law.  .  .  .  Every  individual  is  prompted 
to  cooperate  to  the  full  measure  of  his  capacities  with  other  individuals,  in  the  for- 
mation and  maintenance  of  an  orderly  society  in  conformity  with  the  constitution 
and  purposes  of  all  humanity  without  exception.  [That  will  be  Kant's  "universal 
law."]  And  since  anyone  requiring  a  certain  purpose  also  requires  the  means  essen- 
tial for  achieving  it,  it  follows  that  anything  necessarily  contributing  to  universal 


26o  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §437 

figures  in  these  systems,  either  overtly  or  in  disguise,  because  they 
are  designed  to  induce  people  not  to  injure  but  rather  to  help  one 
another;  and  they  therefore  need  the  support  of  the  sentiments,  so 
called,  of  socialibity  (sociality). 

437.  Burlamaqui  throws  still  other  sentiments  into  the  fray, 
rightly  judging  that  the  greater  the  array  of  the  favourable  senti- 
ments he  can  muster,  the  better  off  he  is.  When  he  is  addressing 
Christians,  he  w^ants  to  have  their  religion  on  his  side.  Egoists  he  tries 
to  convince  that  altruism  is  a  good  policy  for  egoists  (§§  1479 f.). 
With  the  result  that  he  gets  three  principles  for  his  natural  laws:^ 
"Religion,  self-love,  and  sociability,  or  goodwill  to  other  men." 

438.  The  inadequacy  of  the  definitions  of  metaphysical  entities 
that  writers  use  in  the  study  of  natural  law  in  many  cases  does  not 
escape  them;  and  each  exerts  himself — with  little  success,  alas! — to 
find  better  ones. 

439.  Burlamaqui  protests  that  he  is  trying  to  follow  the  experi- 
mental method  and  says:^  "People  often  speak  of  the  useful,  the 
just,  the  honest,  of  order,  of  propriety  {convenance),  but  most  often 
these  different  notions  are  not  defined  with  exactness.  .  .  .  This 
lack  of  precision  cannot  fail  to  leave  a  certain  amount  of  confusion 
and  embarrassment  in  a  discussion.  If  we  are  trying  to  get  light, 
we  must  distinguish  carefully,  and  define  sharply.  [Excellent!  We 
are  now  all  ears  for  a  few  clear  and  exact  definitions!]  A  useful 
action  is  one  that  tends  of  itself  to  the  conservation  and  perfection  of 
man."  Note  the  ambiguity  in  the  impersonal  "man."  Had  Burla- 
maqui said  "of  a  man,"  we  could  say  that  what  tends  to  the  conserva- 
tion and  perfection  of  a  thief  is  to  know  how  to  pick  a  pocket 
dextrously.  But  that  cannot  be  said  of  man  in  general.  It  has  still  to 
be  shown  that  what  is  advantageous  for  man  in  general  is  also  ad- 
vantageous for  man  in  particular,  since  it  is  always  to  a  particular 
person  that  the  argument  is  addressed.  But  the  author  does  not 
bother  with  that  detail! 

sociability  must  be  regarded  as  prescribed  by  natural  law,  and  anything  disturbing 
to  such  sociability  as  prohibited  by  natural  law." 

437  ^  Principes  du  droit  natitrcl,  Pt.  II,  Chap.  4,  Sec.  18. 

439  1  Ibid.,  Pt.  II,  Chap.  7,  Sec.  2. 


§440      THEORY  OF  NATURAL  LAW:  BURLAMAQUI       26 1 

An  action  is  said  to  be  honest  when  it  is  considered  as  "conform- 
ing with  the  principles  of  right  reason  [How  is  right  reason  to  be 
distinguished  from  the  reason  that  is  not  right?],  with  the  dignity 
of  human  nature  [What  is  tliis  new  entity?],  deserving  therefore  of 
the  approbation  of  men  [And  supposing  some  approve  and  some 
disapprove?],  and  consequently  winning  for  the  man  who  performs 
it  consideration,  esteem,  and  honour."  Among  warrior  races  such 
distinctions  go  to  those  who  have  slain  most  enemies,  among  can- 
nibals to  those  who  have  eaten  most.  Order  is  "the  disposition  of  a 
number  of  things  with  reference  to  some  specified  end  and  propor- 
tioned to  a  desired  effect." 

And  at  last  we  come  to  propriety.  "Propriety  {convenance)  ap- 
proximates order  itself.  It  is  a  relationship  of  conformity  [What  is 
this  conformity?]  among  several  things,  each  of  which  is  in  itself 
promotive  of  the  preservation  and  perfection  of  the  other  [And  what 
this  perfection?],  and  does  its  share  in  maintaining  it  in  a  good 
and  advantageous  estate."  Good  for  whom?  Advantageous  for 
whom  ?  A  poison  that  leaves  no  trace  "is  promotive  of  the  preserva- 
tion and  perfection"  of  the  man  who  wants  to  murder  a  neighbour, 
and  maintains  him  in  an  estate  that  is  "good  and  advantageous"  for 
him;  but  it  cannot  be  said  to  be  "promotive  of  the  preservation  and 
perfection"  of  the  victim,  or  that  it  maintains  the  victim  in  a  "good 
and  advantageous  estate."  There  is  no  such  thing  as  a  general  pro- 
priety, in  the  sense  given  the  term  by  Burlamaqui.  The  standpoint 
from  which  the  propriety  is  viewed  has  to  be  specified. 

440.  Burlamaqui,  instead,  talks  of  everything  objectively,  as  though 
his  entities  had  an  independent  existence  of  their  own  (§  471).  And 
how  he  uses  his  definitions!  hoc.  cit.,  %zz.  3:  "So  we  must  not  con- 
fuse the  just,  the  useful,  the  honest.  .  .  .  But  those  ideas,  though 
distinct  from  one  another,  contain  nothing  incompatible  the  one 
with  the  other.  They  are  three  relations  which  can  all  be  appropri- 
ate and  can  all  be  applied  to  one  and  the  same  action  considered 
from  different  points  of  view.  And  if  they  be  traced  back  to  their 
origin,  they  will  be  found  to  derive  all  from  a  common  source,  or 
from  one  and  the  same  principle,  as  three  branches  from  the  same 


262  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §441 

tree-trunk.  That  general  principle  is  the  approbation  of  reason." 
Really  now,  was  there  any  good  excuse  for  taking  such  a  roundabout 
route  just  to  pay  a  call  on  Milady  Reason,  a  lady  already  charged 
so  many  times  with  originating  natural  law? 

441.  Vattel  gives  right  reason  a  rest;  but  it  is  of  litde  relief  to 
us,  for  in  its  stead  another  actor  comes  on  the  scene,  a  certain  "happi- 
ness," which  is  even  more  of  an  unknown.  Says  Vattel :  ^  "Natural 
law  is  the  science  of  the  laws  of  nature  [Of  a  class  therefore  with 
chemistry,  physics,  astronomy,  biology,  and  so  on,  which  are  cer- 
tainly sciences  of  the  laws  of  nature?  No,  because  Vattel  soon 
changes  tack],  of  those  laws  which  nature  lays  down  for  men,  or 
to  which  they  are  subject  for  the  very  reason  that  they  are  men;  a 
science,  the  first  principle  of  which  is  that  truth  of  sentiment  [Here 
is  a  new  one!],  that  incontestable  axiom  [And  what  if  some  black- 
guard did  contest  it  ?  ]  that  'the  great  object  of  every  being  endowed 
with  intelligence  and  sentiment  is  happiness.' "  But  what  kind  of 
happiness  ?  The  happiness  of  the  "destroyer  of  cities"  is  certainly  not 
the  happiness  of  the  citizens  he  slays.  The  happiness  of  the  thief  is 
not  the  happiness  of  his  victim.  The  happiness  mentioned  here  is  a 
particular  happiness,  and  we  are  not  told  how  it  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  thing  that  commonly  goes  by  that  name.  Such  particular 
happiness  is  often  called  "true"  happiness;  but  that  adjective  is  of  no 
great  help  in  getting  nearer  to  experimental  realities.  Nor  are  we 
greatly  helped  either  by  aspersions  cast  upon  those  who  refuse  to 
recognize  it.  "There  is  no  man,  whatever  his  ideas  on  the  origin 
of  things,  and  even  though  he  have  the  misfortune  of  being  an 
atheist,  who  ought  not  to  recognize  the  laws  of  nature.  Those  laws 
are  necessary  to  the  common  happiness  of  men.  The  man  who  would 
reject  them  or  manifest  contempt  for  them  would  by  that  fact  de- 
clare himself  an  enemy  of  the  human  race  and  deserve  being  treated 
as  such"  (§  593).  To  imprison  or  burn  a  man  is  not,  unfortunately, 
a  logico-experimental  demonstration. 

442.  All  these  definitions  and  others  of  their  kind  present  the  fol- 
lowing characteristics:  i.  They  use  indeterminate  words,  which  serve 

441  ^  Le  droit  des  gens.  Vol.  I,  pp.  39-40. 


§444  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  263 

to  arouse  certain  sentiments,  but  which  do  not  correspond  to  any- 
thing exact  (§§380,  387,  490).  2.  They  define  unknowns  by  un- 
knowns. 3.  They  combine  definitions  with  theses  unproved.  4.  Their 
purpose,  in  substance,  is  to  arouse  the  hearer's  sentiments  as  far  as 
possible  in  order  to  lead  him  to  a  pre-established  conviction. 

443.  Selden  begins  by  noting  that  the  writers  who  have  dealt 
with  natural  law  have  derived  it  from  four  different  sources:  (i) 
from  that  which  is  common  to  all  animate  beings  or,  (2)  to  all 
nations,  or  most  nations;  (3)  from  natural  reason  accurately  used; 
(4)  finally,  from  the  will  of  the  Divine  Majesty,  author  of  nature, 
and  therefore  of  natural  reason.^  He  rejects  the  first  three  sources  and 
accepts  only  the  fourth,  limiting  natural  reason,  however,  to  the 
natural  reason  of  the  Hebrews  and  divine  will  to  the  authority  of 
the  Hebrew  God. 

444.  The  Talmud  gives  instructive  details  as  to  the  manner  in 
which  the  various  nations  were  enabled  to  have  knowledge  of  the 
Law  given  by  the  Hebrew  God.  The  manner  described  is  after  all 
no  less  credible  than  that  of  Right  Reason,  while  it  has  the  ad- 
vantage of  being  more  effective,  and  Bertinoro  quite  properly  ob- 
serves that  in  view  of  it  the  nations  could  not  excuse  themselves  by 
saying:  "We  had  no  way  of  learning  the  law."  ^ 

443  ^  Selden,  De  iiire  naturali  et  gentium,  I,  4  (Stxassburg,  p.  43;  Venice,  p.  225) : 
"In  designatione  atqiie  definitione  Juris  Naturalis  quae  apud  scriptores  solet  diversi- 
mode  occurrere,  alii  ex  Aliorum  Animantium  actibus  ac  usti  lura  hominibus  aliquot 
Naturalia  petunt;  alii  Juris  naturalis  Corpus  e  Moribtts  omnium  seu  plurimarum 
Gentium  communibus;  ex  Naturali  Ratione,  seu  recto  eiusdem  usu  alii;  et  demum 
alii  e  Naturae  ideoque  Naturalis  rationis  Parentis,  id  est,  sanctissimi  Numinis  Jm- 
perio  atque  Jndicatione." 

444  ^  Talmud  of  Babylon,  Tract  Sabbath,  IX  (Pavly,  pp.  27-28;  Rodkinson,  Vol. 
I,  p.  163) :  "Each  word  issuing  from  the  mouth  of  God  on  Sinai  made  itself  heard 
in  seventy  different  languages  and  filled  the  universe  with  an  agreeable  perfume. 
The  voice  of  God  was  so  powerful  that  at  each  word  the  Israelites  retreated  twelve 
leagues."  Talmud  of  Jerusalem,  Tract  Sotah  (The  Suspected  Adulteress),  VII,  5 
(Schwab,  Vol.  VII,  pp.  305-06;  Danby,  pp.  300-01):  "Then  stones  were  brought 
and  an  altar  erected.  It  was  faced  with  mortar  and  the  words  of  the  Law 
were  inscribed  on  it  in  seventy  languages,  as  it  is  written  [Deut.  27:8  \_i.e.,  31:9]]." 
Commentary  (Gemara) :  "Contrary  to  the  Mishnah  it  has  been  taught  that  the  said 
words  were  inscribed  on  stones  at  the  place  where  they  passed  the  night  [Josh. 
4:3],  according  to  an  opinion  of  Rabbi  Juda.  Rabbi  Yosse  says  that  they  were 
written  on  the  stones  of  the  altar.  According  to  people  professing  the  first  opinion, 


264  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §445 

445.  If  we  keep  strictly  to  forms,  all  these  disquisitions  on  natural 
law  look  like  a  mass  of  nonsense.  But  if  we  disregard  forms  and 
consider  what  it  is  they  hide,  we  discover  inclinations  and  sentiments 
that  exert  a  powerful  influence  in  determining  the  constitution  of 
society  and  therefore  are  worthy  of  closest  study.  Demonstrations 
given  in  such  forms  are  not  to  be  accepted  because  of  their  accord 
with  certain  sentiments,  nor  rejected  because  they  are  in  patent  dis- 
accord with  logic  and  experience:  we  should  consider  them  simply 
as  not  existing  (§463),  turn  our  attention  upon  the  matter  which 
they  conceal,  and  examine  it  directly  for  its  intrinsic  characteristics. 
So  our  induction  once  more  leads  to  the  discovery  that  we  must 
separate  doctrines,  as  we  find  them  stated,  into  two  parts,  and  that 
of  the  two  parts  one  is  far  more  important  than  the  other.  In  the 
course  of  our  study,  therefore,  we  shall  have  to  try  to  separate  those 
two  parts ;  and  then  not  stop  with  the  reflection  that  a  certain  argu- 
ment is  inconclusive,  idiotic,  absurd,  but  ask  ourselves  whether  it 
may  not  be  expressing  sentiments  beneficial  to  society,  and  express- 
ing them  in  a  manner  calculated  to  persuade  many  people  who 
would  not  be  at  all  influenced  by  the  soundest  logico-experimental 
argument.^ 

446.  The  good  sense  of  a  practical  man  like  Montaigne  is  antidote 
enough  for  all  these  wild  declamations  on  natural  law:  but  it  does 
not  go  far  enough  to  locate  the  error  where  it  really  lies  or  discover 

holding  that  the  Law  was  inscribed  on  the  walls  of  an  inn,  it  is  conceivable  that 
the  nations  of  the  world  could  have  sent  their  scribes  any  day  to  copy  the  texts, 
since  the  Law  was  written  in  seventy  languages.  .  .  .  But  how  accept  the  view 
(which  is  the  view  of  the  Mishnah)  that  the  Law  was  inscribed  on  the  stones  of  the 
altar?  In  that  case  must  it  not  have  been  a  question  of  some  temporary  structure, 
of  which  everything  pertaining  to  worship  must  afterwards  have  been  buried 
underground,  before  their  departure?  And  how  then  could  the  pagans  have 
profited  by  it?  It  was  a  miracle,  of  course!  During  the  short  space  of  time  that 
the  altar  was  standing,  the  Lord  quickened  the  wits  of  the  various  nations,  so 
that  they  could  make  rapid  copies  of  the  text  of  the  Law  written  in  seventy  lan- 
guages." Mishnah,  Sotah,  VII,  5  {De  uxore  adulterii  suspecta)  (Surenhuis,  Vol.  Ill, 
p.  262):  (Bartenor  [read  Bertinoro] ) :  ".  .  .  in  the  script  of  seventy  nations,  that 
anyone  desirous  of  knowing  the  Law  could  do  so,  and  that  the  nations  might 
have  no  excuse  by  saying,  'We  had  no  way  of  knowing.'  " 

445  '^  For  the  moment  it  is  sufficient  to  have  seen  that  a  path  opens  out  before 
us  here.  The  following  of  it  will  be  a  task  for  a  later  portion  of  this  work. 


§447  NATURAL  rights:  the  philosophes  265 

the  sentiments  which  such  arguments  conceal.  Says  he:  "Certainly 
they  are  amusing,  these  people,  when  they  try  to  lend  a  certain 
amount  of  authority  to  their  laws  by  saying  that  some  of  them  are 
fixed,  perpetual,  immutable,  which  they  call  natural  laws  and  which 
are  imprinted  upon  human  beings  by  the  requirements  of  their  very 


nature."  ^ 


447.  There  are  plenty  of  other  theories  neither  better  nor  worse 
than  these  disquisitions  on  natural  law,  and  they  all  arise  in  a  desire 
to  give  a  semblance  of  absoluteness  and  objectivity  to  what  is  rela- 
tive and  subjective.  Here,  for  example,  are  the  Physiocrats,  who  have 
certain  ideas  as  to  social  organization,  political  constitution,  freedom 
of  trade,  and  the  like.  They  might  propound  them  directly,  as  others 
—to  an  extent  at  least — have  done:  but  no,  they  prefer  to  derive 
them  from  some  imaginary  "natural  and  essential  order  of  political 
societies" — the  title,  in  fact,  of  a  famous  book  by  Le  Mercier  de  La 
Riviere.'"  So  back  we  go  to  battles  of  words.  "The  absolutely  just  may 
be  defined  as  'an  order  of  duties  and  rights  arising  from  a  physical 
and  consequently  absolute  necessity.'  The  absolutely  unjust,  there- 
fore, is  all  that  is  contrary  to  that  order.  The  term  'absolute'  is  not 
used  here  in  contradistinction  to  'relative'  for  only  in  the  relative 
can  the  just  and  the  unjust  arise.  But  a  thing  which,  strictly  speak- 
ing, is  only  relatively  just  becomes  nevertheless  absolutely  just  be- 
cause of  its  relation  to  the  absolute  necessity  we  are  under  of  living 
in  society."  Then  there  is  a  certain  "essential  order"  that  is  "the 
order  of  reciprocal  duties  and  rights,  the  establishment  of  which  is 
essentially  necessary  to  the  greatest  possible  increase  of  production, 
to  the  end  that  mankind  may  achieve  the  greatest  possible  amount 
of  happiness  and  the  greatest  possible  increase  in  numbers."  This,  it 
would  seem,  is  all  quite  axiomatic,  as  is  also  the  notion  that  the 
order  in  question  is  a  branch  of  the  physical  order:  "If  any  man 
were  to  object  to  recognizing  the  natural  and  essential  order  of  so- 
ciety as  a  branch  of  the  physical  order,  I  should  regard  him  as  a 

446  ^  Essais,  II,  12 

447  '^  L'ordre  naturel  et  essentiel  des  societes  politiqiies,  pp.  ir,  28,  38-39  (1910  ed., 
pp.  8,  21,  28-29). 


266  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §448 

person  determined  not  to  see,  and  studiously  eschew  any  effort  to 
cure  him  of  his  blindness"  (§§379,  435').  Le  Mercier  de  La 
Riviere  has  one  notion  that  is  in  accord,  substantially,  with  experi- 
ence, the  notion  that  "the  social  order  is  in  no  way  arbitrary";  but 
the  proof  he  gives  of  it  is  the  worst  imaginable. 

448.  As  is  usual  with  this  sort  of  disquisition,  the  author  believes 
that  his  ideas  have  to  be  accepted  by  everybody  the  moment  they 
are  stated  (§§59if.).  "The  simplicity  and  the  obviousness  of  this 
social  order  are  manifest  to  anyone  willing  to  devote  the  slightest 
attention  to  it."  But  along  comes  the  Abbe  de  Mably,  who  certainly 
gave  the  subject  a  great  deal  of  attention,  but  was  not  in  the  least 
persuaded  of  this  and  other  "obvious  truths"  alluded  to  in  the  first 
two  parts  of  Le  Mercier  de  La  Riviere's  work.  He  says :  ^  "The  author 
talks  a  great  deal  about  obviousness,  and  I  find  nothing  obvious 
about  it.  I  have  read  and  re-read  his  book,  and  far  from  finding  my 
doubts  diminishing  in  numbers,  I  have  found  them  multiplying." 
At  times  Mably  does  not  reason  at  all  badly;  and  he  is  following 
principles  of  logico-experimental  science  when  he  observes,  for  in- 
stance, that  a  given  order  cannot  be  considered  necessary  to  societies 
if  we  find  actually  existing  societies  that  do  without  it.  Le  Mercier 
de  La  Riviere  argues,  p.  21,  1910  ed.,  p.  15,  to  show  the  necessity 
of  private  property  in  land.  Mably  comments:  "If  one  were  to  stop 
at  asking  merely  that  every  society  should  embrace  a  certain  amount 
of  real  property,  I  would  not  feel  embarrassed,  for  I  readily  see  that 
it  is  indispensable  that  a  society  should  have  a  domain  by  which  its 
citizens  may  be  assured  of  a  living.  But  that  one  should  regard  as  a 
matter  of  absolute  necessity  and  justice  a  thing  which  civilized  and 
prosperous  societies  have  done  without — that  confounds  my  reason 
and  upsets  all  my  ideas."  Ignoring,  for  a  moment,  public  property 
in  land  and  Madame  Absolute  Justice,  a  lady  with  whom  we  have 
no  close  acquaintance,  the  rest  of  the  argument  is  sound.  The  author, 
moreover,  mentions  the  case  of  Sparta,  an  example  not  so  well 
chosen,  for  though  Sparta  had  no  private  landownership  of  the 

448  ^  Doittes  proposes  aux  philosophes  economistes  stir  I'ordre  naturel  et  essentiel 
des  societes  politiques,  1768,  pp.  4-9  {CEuvres,  1790,  Vol.  XI,  pp.  3-7). 


§44^  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  267 

Roman  type,  the  Spartans  did  know  a  sort  of  real  property.  But 
altogether  to  the  point  is  the  example  of  the  Missions  in  Paraguay: 
"Even  the  Jesuits,  sir,  refute  your  arguments ;  and  in  Paraguay  they 
are  treating  themselves  to  the  privilege  of  defying  the  essential  law 
of  your  natural  order  with  impunity." 

But  the  Abbe  de  Mably,  like  Le  Mercier  de  La  Riviere,  has  a  pre- 
conception of  his  own  to  defend.  He  appeals  to  experience  to  suit  his 
convenience  in  defending  his  pet  idea  of  collective  property,  just  as 
Le  Mercier  de  La  Riviere  called  on  a  "natural  order"  to  help  him 
defend  private  property  in  land.  That  explains  Mably's  failure  to 
notice  that  the  very  same  objection  may  be  made  to  the  first  part 
of  his  argument  that  he  raises  in  its  second  part.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  nomadic  peoples  have  no  landed  property,  either  collective  or 
private.  Mably  might  answer  that  the  nomadic  peoples  are  not  to 
be  counted  among  "civilized  and  prosperous  societies";  but  to  take 
that  line  would  militate  against  his  own  example  of  Paraguay  for 
the  very  same  reason.  And  if  Le  Mercier  de  La  Riviere  would  only 
abandon  his  vagaries  as  to  a  "natural  and  essential  order,"  he  might 
adduce  many  a  sound  example  to  show  that  the  most  "civilized  and 
prosperous"  societies  have  been  those  very  ones  in  which  private 
property  in  land  has  existed.  But  to  give  the  discussion  such  a  turn 
would  be  to  remove  it  from  the  field  of  sentiment  and  metaphysics, 
to  which  our  authors  often  betake  themselves,  and  transfer  it  to  the 
field  of  logico-experimental  science. 

Quesnay  quotes  a  number  of  opinions  on  natural  law  and  finds 
an  element  of  truth  in  all  of  them;^  but  "our  philosophers  have 
stopped  at  the  paralogism,  the  incomplete  argument,  in  their  inves- 
tigations into  this  important  matter,  which  is  the  natural  principle  of 
all  the  rational  duties  of  man."  So  he  then  sets  out  to  complete  their 
work.  First  he  deals  with  justice:  "If  I  am  asked  what  justice  is,  I 
answer  that  'it  is  a  natural  and  sovereign  rule  recognized  by  the 
light  of  reason  [If  the  "reason"  of  some  individuals  "recognizes"  one 
rule,  and  the  "reason"  of  other  individuals  another,  how  are  we  to 
pick  the  good  one?],  which  clearly  determines  what  belongs  to  one- 

448  ^  Le  droit  naturel,  pp.  42-43,  52-53. 


268  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §448 

self  and  what  to  someone  else.' "  After  a  good  deal  of  rambling,  he 
arrives  at  this  conclusion:  "Men  living  together  in  a  society  must 
therefore  be  subject  to  natural  laws  and  positive  laws.  .  .  .  Natural 
laws  are  either  physical  or  moral.  By  physical  laws  is  here  meant  'the 
regulated  course  of  every  physical  event  of  the  natural  order,  which  is 
obviously  the  order  most  advantageous  to  mankind.'  By  moral  law  is 
here  meant  'the  rule  of  every  human  action  of  the  moral  order  con- 
sistent with  the  physical  order,  which  is  obviously  the  order  most  ad- 
vantageous to  mankind.'  The  sum  of  such  laws  makes  up  what  is 
called  'natural  law.'  All  men  and  all  human  powers  must  be  subject 
to  these  sovereign  laws  instituted  by  the  Supreme  Being.  [So  Quesnay 
increases  by  one  the  very  considerable  number  of  individuals  who 
have  thought  they  knew  the  will  of  the  Supreme  Being  in  question 
and  who,  unhappily,  are  not  in  very  close  agreement.]  They  are 
immutable  and  irrefragable,  and  the  best  possible  laws."  To  reason 
in  such  fashion  is  to  reason  in  a  circle;  for  if  natural  law  is  defined 
as  that  "which  is  obviously  the  most  advantageous  to  mankind,"  it 
would  be  difficult  to  understand  how  "the  sum  of  laws  making  up 
natural  law"  could  contain  anything  but  "the  best  possible  laws."  It 
is  indeed  surprising  that  these  "immutable  and  irrefragable"  laws 
should  not  have  been  discovered  before  Quesnay's  time,  and  that 
they  should  not  have  been  universally  adopted  once  he  had  discov- 
ered them  and  revealed  them  to  an  eager  world.^ 

448  ^  Daire,  in  his  Observations,  in  Physiocrates,  Vol.  II,  pp.  438-39,  finds 
these  theories  of  Quesnay  and  his  commentator,  Le  Mercier  de  La  Riviere,  alto- 
gether admirable:  "Instead  of  looking  to  the  nature  of  man  and  his  relations  to 
the  external  world  for  the  immutable  laws  that  establish  and  maintain  order 
within  societies,  our  publicists  and  theologians  have  imagined  that  they 
were  called  upon  to  invent  such  laws;  and  the  institutions  at  present  pre- 
vailing in  Europe  bear  witness  to  the  success  with  which,  in  this  connexion,,  they 
have  replaced  the  views  of  the  Creator  with  their  own."  But  the  Creator  could  not 
have  foreseen  any  such  substitution;  otherwise  He  would  have  prevented  it.  Daire 
observes  that  Le  Mercier  de  la  Riviere  goes  counter  to  Rousseau's  doctrines:  "In- 
stead of  asking  the  legislator  to  create  an  order,  Le  Mercier  de  La  Riviere  urges 
him  to  conform  to  the  order  that  is,  and  to  seek  a  basis  for  it  nowhere  else  than 
in  the  sentiment  and  reason  that  have  been  bestowed  upon  man  that  he  may 
recognize  the  immutable  laws  on  which  his  existence  and  his  happiness  here 
below  depend."  In  this  there  is  a  timid  effort  to  escape  from  the  fog  of  metaphysics, 
but  it  is  not  a  successful  one.  Never  mind  the  appeal  to  the  Creator  and  his 


§45 1  THEORY  OF  SOLIDARITY:  LEON  BOURGEOIS  269 

449.  Interesting  the  analogy  between  such  theories  and  that  con- 
temporary metaphysical  dream  known  as  the  theory  of  solidarity. 
In  the  latter,  as  in  one  of  the  theories  of  natural  law,  the  starting- 
point  is — or  rather,  is  alleged  to  be — experience.  The  theory  of  nat- 
ural law  recognizes  a  law  common  to  human  beings  and  animals. 
The  theory  of  solidarity  goes  that  one  better  and  recognizes  a  law 
of  interdependence  among  human  beings,  animals,  plants,  and  min- 
erals. If  natural  law  was  good,  this  law  of  solidarity  is  perfect.^ 

450.  But  these  estimable  metaphysicists  have  little  patience  with 
experience;  so  they  are  soon  rid  of  it  through  one  door  or  another. 
Natural  law  eventually  allowed  its  animals  to  go  to  the  dogs.  The 
doctrine  of  solidarity  does  even  better.  It  repudiates  its  own  origin 
to  the  point  of  setting  up  a  solidarity-fact  in  contradistinction  to  a 
solidarity-duty.^ 

451.  How  are  we  to  find  this  latter?  After  all  that  we  have  been 
saying  the  canny  reader  cannot  have  a  doubt.  What  in  the  world 
else  are  such  things  as  "right  reason,"  "nature,"  "the  just,"  "the  hon- 
est," good  for?  Just  as  they  yielded  the  theory  of  natural  law  in  a 
day  gone  by,  so  will  they  yield  a  theory  of  solidarity  now,  and  as 

views,  which  transports  us  to  the  domain  of  theology.  "Immutable  laws  that  estab- 
lish and  maintain  order,"  and  "the  sentiment  and  reason  bestowed  on  man  that  he 
may  recognize"  those  laws,  transport  us  far  afield  into  the  domain  of  final  causes, 
or,  in  any  event,  remove  us  from  the  experimental  field,  where  "immutable  laws" 
designed  for  one  purpose  or  another  do  not  exist,  but  just  plain  facts  and  uniformi- 
ties between  them  (§  99). 

449  ^  Bourgeois,  Essai  d'une  philosopliie  de  la  solidaritS,  p.  3:  "In  the  first 
place,  what  is  objective  solidarity,  considered  as  a  fact?  Kant  said:  'What  makes 
up  an  organism  is  the  reciprocity  between  its  parts.'  In  that  lies  the  germ  of  all 
biology.  [This  fanatic  of  "Science"  might  have  quoted  a  biologist  rather  than  a 
metaphysicist  on  a  point  of  that  kind.]  ...  So  the  idea  of  life  is  identical  with 
the  idea  of  association.  And  the  doctrine  of  evolution  has  shown  the  law  by  which 
this  interdependence  of  parts  contributes  to  the  development,  the  progress,  of  each 
individual,  each  group  of  individuals." 

450  ^  Bourgeois,  Ibid.,  p.  13:  "So  here  we  are  very  far  removed  from  a  solidarity- 
fact  and  very  close  to  a  solidarity-duty.  Let  us  never  confuse  them;  they  are  oppo- 
sites.  But  it  was  necessary  to  establish  the  existence  of  the  former  in  order  to  per- 
ceive the  moral  necessity  of  the  latter."  Milady  Science  has  tripped  rather  hastily 
across  the  stage  to  vanish  through  the  wings!  Solidarity-fact  has,  however,  found 
a  champion  in  one  Dr.  Papillant,  Ibid.,  p.  25:  "I  would  make  a  demand  in  the 
name  of  natural  solidarity,  to  which,  in  my  judgment,  too  litde  attendon  is  being 
paid."  Cj.  Bentham's  attitude  towards  morality. 


270  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §452 

many  other  similar  theories  as  writers  of  some  moderate  talent  are 
pleased  to  devise  (§  1557).^ 
452.  In  the  theories  that  we  have  just  been  examining  three  ele- 

,     ments  are  distinguishable:  (i)  an  experimental  element,  which  is 
rarely  absent  but  is  often  more  apparent  than  real;  (2)  a  metaphysi- 

f  cal  trans-experimental  element,  which  is  often  dissembled  but  is 
i  never  absent;  (3)  a  theological  element — and  one  therefore  beyond 
experience,  which  is  present  in  certain  theories  and  absent  in  others. 
These  last  two  elements  are  usually  chosen  from  among  the  doc- 
trines that  enjoy  greatest  prestige  in  the  society  in  which  the  author 
of  the  theory  is  living.  Theology  was  not  enforced  in  ancient  pagan 
society,  and  the  theological  element  is  therefore  missing  in  many 
theories  which  arose  in  those  days.  It  is  seldom  absent,  however,  in 

451  '■  Bourgeois,  Op.  cit.,  pp.  8,  62-65,  72-75,  242:  "When  we  ask  what  conditions 
a  human  society  must  satisfy  in  order  to  maintain  its  balance,  we  are  forced  to 
recognize  that  only  one  word  can  state  them:  'Justice  must  be!'  "  But  a  query  sug- 
gests itself.  The  societies  that  have  hitherto  existed  in  history — have  they  had  their 
balance  or  not?  If  they  have,  they  must  have  had  justice  already;  and  in  that  case 
why  should  M.  Leon  Bourgeois  be  trying  to  get  it  now  through  solidarity?  If  they 
have  not  enjoyed  such  balance,  what  is  a  "balance"  that  has  never  yet  been  known 
of  men?  "I  am  well  aware  that  another  purpose  has  been  assigned  to  society,  which 
is  nothing  less  than  happiness  assured  to  each  of  its  members.  .  .  .  Happiness  is 
not  material,  divisible,  externally  realizable.  The  ideal  of  society  is  justice  for  all." 
Exactly  what  such  a  justice  would  be,  M.  Leon  Bourgeois  seems  not  to  know,  or 
at  least  he  chooses  not  to  tell.  The  objection  had  been  raised:  "M.  Leon  Bourgeois 
has  declared  that  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  justice  is  of  no  importance,  the  moment 
one  agrees  that  justice  is  necessary.  All  the  same,  very  important  practical  conse- 
quences follow  from  the  conception  one  has  of  justice."  The  reply  is:  "M.  Leon 
Bourgeois  .  .  .  has  not  seen  fit  in  this  exposition  to  go  into  the  question  of  the 
origins  of  tlie  concept  of  justice.  [He  was  not  asked  to  discuss  origins  but  to 
define  the  thing  he  calls  justice.]  However  one  try  to  explain  them,  the  idea 
of  and  the  hunger  for  justice  are  present  in  the  human  heart.  That  is  a  fact, 
which  need  simply  be  determined  as  a  fact  and  with  which  we  can  start,  and  all 
the  better  since  if  theoretically  there  may  be  disagreement  as  to  the  first  principles 
from  which  it  is  derived,  practically  everybody  is  in  substantial  agreement  as  to 
the  meaning,  significance,  and  content  of  this  notion  of  justice."  And  so  we  find 
creeping  in  our  never-sufficiently-praised  friend  and  old  acquaintance.  Universal 
Consensus  (§§59if.).  And  miracle  indeed  had  it  failed  to  materialize!  And 
Mademoiselle  Raison?  Patience'  She  too  will  soon  be  coming  to  the  rescue  of 
M.  Leon  Bourgeois!  In  his  SolidaritS,  p.  76,  one  reads:  "If  the  primal  notion  of 
good  and  evil  is  a  necessity  [What  does  that  mean?],  if  the  sentiment  of  moral 
obligation  constitutes  a  'categorical  imperative'  within  us,  the  intellectual  activity 
whereby  the   human   being  strives   to   define  good    and   evil   and   determine   the 


§453  THEORIES   TRANSCENDING   EXPERIENCE  27I 

theories  originating  in  Christian  societies,  in  which  theology  has 
been  enforced.  But  of  late,  poor  Theology  has  been  driven  from  her 
throne  and  Science  has  taken  her  place — not  experimental  science, 
observe,  but  a  certain  metaphysical  entity  on  w^hich  the  name  of 
science  has  been  foisted. 

453.  Burlamaqui  called  religion  to  his  support  (§§43of.).  If  he 
had  lived  in  our  times  he  would  have  appealed  to  Science.  M.  Leon 
Bourgeois  resorts  to  Science.  Had  he  lived  in  Burlamaqui's  time  he 
would  have  resorted  to  religion.  The  reader  must  not  imagine  that 
such  a  thing  embarrasses  those  estimable  gentlemen  in  the  slightest. 
They  know  what  they  are  driving  at,  and  they  are  not  unaware  that 
all  roads  lead  to  Rome !  ^ 

premise  of  the  moral  obligation  belongs  to  the  domain  of  reason.  .  .  .  Everything 
in  man's  environment  has  evolved  in  proportion  as  the  moral  idea,  the  supreme 
function  of  the  reason,  has  evolved  within  him."  May  Mademoiselle  Raison  be 
blessed  vi'ith  a  long  and  prosperous  life,  that  metaphysicists  of  the  future  may  find 
her  the  loyal  helpmeet  she  has  proved  to  be  to  their  predecessors!  And  a  little 
place  has  been  kept  for  Dame  Nature  too!  Essai,  p.  10:  "In  the  first  place  Nature 
has  designs  of  her  own  [The  wicked  hussy!],  designs  which  are  not  our  designs. 
The  special  aim  of  man  in  society  is  justice  [Even  in  slave-holding  societies?],  and 
jusdce  has  never  been  the  aim  of  Nature.  Nature  is  not  unjust,  she  is  a-just.  There 
is  nothing  in  common  therefore  between  the  purposes  of  Nature  and  the  purposes 
of  society."  And  yet,  certain  predecessors  of  M.  Leon  Bourgeois,  to  wit,  the  Stoics, 
assured  us  that  the  supreme  principle  of  morality  was  to  live  according  to  Nature 
(§  1605)!  How  are  we  to  know  whether  Bourgeois  is  right,  or  the  Stoics?  Meta- 
physicists have  so  long  been  inquiring  into  the  purposes  of  Nature  that  by  this 
time  they  should  have  discovered  what  they  are.  But  each  of  them  is  sdll  going 
his  own  road,  and  we,  poor  wretches,  do  not  know  whom  to  bet  on.  And  the 
principle  of  sociability  (sociality),  which  was  of  service  to  Pufendorf  in  his  time, 
does  not  fail  M.  Leon  Bourgeois.  Implicitly  it  is  present  in  everything  Bourgeois 
writes.  It  appears  here  and  there  explicitly:  Xavier  Leon,  Le  jon dement  rational  de 
la  solidarite,  p.  242:  "Reason  does  not  know  individuals  as  such.  Reason  is  realized 
by  individuals  in  the  mass,  by  all  humanity  [What  a  lucky  man  to  know  what 
"to  realize  reason"  means!].  Reason  is  essendally  human  reason.  .  .  ,  This  emi- 
nently social  trait  in  reason  is  the  foundation  of  solidarity.  It  is  that  trait  which 
confers  on  solidarity  a  moral  value  that  one  would  strive  in  vain  to  extract  from 
the  empirical  determination  of  a  biological  or  social  fact,  or  from  the  implications 
of  a  more  or  less  tacit  contract."  (The  passage  is  continued  in  the  next  foot-note.) 
453  ^  Bourgeois,  Solidarite,  p.  25:  "The  sciendfic  method  is  today  making  its  way 
into  all  orders  of  knowledge.  The  most  refractory  minds,  grudgingly  it  may  be, 
are  one  by  one  submitdng  to  it."  That  was  written  for  the  benefit  of  the  French 
and<lericals.  As  we  read  on,  p.  73,  we  see  what  the  science  of  M.  Leon  Bourgeois 
is:  "The  idea  of  right  and  wrong  is,  in  itself,  an  ultimate  idea:  it  is  a  primal  fact. 


272  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §454 

454.  It  is  understandable  that  Christian  philosophy  should  look  to 
the  will  of  God  for  the  origin  of  natural  law.  It  might  well  be  satis- 
fied with  that;  and  we  should  then  have  a  theory  consisting  of  a 
purely  theological  element.  But  it  prefers  also  to  have  the  aid  of  the 
metaphysical  element,  and  perhaps  of  an  experimental  element — 
further  proof  that  the  form  of  such  theories  depends  not  so  much 
upon  their  subject-matter  as  upon  the  concepts  that  are  most  in 
repute  in  the  society  in  which  they  circulate.  Most  men  refuse  to  be 
shut  up  within  mere  theology,  and  to  win  their  assent  the  support 
of  metaphysics  and  experience  has  to  be  procured. 

455.  We  are  told  that  "natural  law  is  implanted  and  written  in 
the  heart  of  man  directly  by  God  Himself  and  that  its  purpose  is 
to  guide  man,  who  aspires  to  his  goal  as  a  free  being  capable  of  good 
and  evil."  ^  Granted  that  God  has  "implanted  and  written"  natural 
law  in  the  heart  of  man,  how  are  we  to  discover  it  ?  If  by  revelation 
exclusively,  we  would  have  an  exclusively  theological  theory.  But 
metaphysics  interposes  and  even,  it  would  seem,  experience. 

456.  St.  Paul  in  his  time  said,  Rom.  2: 14-15:  "For  when  the  Gen- 
tiles, which  have  not  the  law,  do  by  nature  the  things  contained  in 
the  law,  these,  having  not  the  law,  are  a  law  unto  themselves :  which 
shew  the  work  of  the  law  written  in  their  hearts."  Experience,  there- 
fore, might  lead  to  the  discovery  of  it  in  the  hearts  of  men.  But  we 
are  soon  warned  that  we  are  not  to  trust  exclusively  to  conscience, 
since  it  has  been  corrupted,  Loc.  cit.:  "The  primordial  faculties  of 
man  have  been  enfeebled  by  original  sin;  so  it  is  natural  that  the 
implications  [of  natural  law]  should  not  ever  be  drawn  in  their  full 

an  essential  attribute  of  humanity."  But  metaphysicists  had  said  that  two  thousand 
years  ago  and  more.  It  was  hardly  necessary  to  drag  in  science  to  repeat  it.  His 
"science"  and  the  old  metaphysics  are  as  alike  as  two  peas.  Why  then  give  two 
different  names  to  the  same  thing?  For  no  other  reason  than  to  play  on  certain 
sentiments  now  widely  prevalent  that  are  favourable  to  Milady  Science.  Xavier 
Leon,  Le  fondefnent  rational  de  la  solidarite,  p.  245:  "Solidarity  is  therefore  jus- 
tified as  an  exigency  of  reason.  It  is  in  substance  the  principle  of  intelligibility  in 
our  conduct,  the  prerequisite  to  the  realization  of  unity  of  reason  in  humanity." 
If  that  is  not  metaphysics,  what  is  metaphysics? 

455  '^  Dictionnaire  encyclopedique  de  la  theologie  catholiqiie,  s.v.  "Droit"  (Wet- 
zer,  s.v.  Recht).  The  author  quotes  St.  Paul,  Rom.  2:15:  ".  .  .  Which  shew  the 
work  of  the  law  written  in  their  hearts." 


§457      THEORY  OF  NATURAL  LAW:  SAINT  PAUL       273 

perfection  by  any  man,  and  that  often  they  should  be  drawn  incom- 
pletely and  erroneously.  And  that  is  why  human  laws,  which  are 
not  and  ought  not  to  be  anything  but  consequences  of  natural  law, 
are  always  imperfect,  often  defective,  and  sometimes  false."  This 
"law  of  nature"  turns  up  again  in  ancient  Irish  law,  with  postscripts 
by  the  Church  and  learned  Irish  doctors.^ 

457.  St.  Thomas  identified:  (i)  an  eternal  law,  existing  in  the 
divine  mind;  (2)  a  natural  law,  existing  in  men  and  partaking  of 
the  eternal  law,  and  by  which  men  discern  good  and  evil;  (3)  a 
law  devised  by  men,  whereby  they  make  provision  for  what  is  con- 
tained in  the  natural  law;  and  finally  (4),  a  divine  law  whereby 
men  are  infallibly  led  to  the  supernatural  goal — supreme  beatitude.^ 
Her  Ladyship  Right  Reason  is  absent  from  all  this,  but  we  soon  see 
her  putting  in  an  appearance;  and  the  Saint  tells  us  that  "it  is  cer- 
tain that  all  laws,  in  so  far  as  they  partake  of  right  reason,  are  de- 
rived from  the  eternal  law."  ^ 

456  1  Maine,  Early  History  of  histitutions,  pp.  24-25:  "It  [the  Senchus  Mor,  one 
of  the  ancient  Irish  law-books]  describes  the  legal  rules  embodied  in  its  text  as 
formed  of  the  'law  of  nature,'  and  of  the  law  of  the  letter.'  The  'law  of  the  letter' 
is  the  Scriptural  law,  extended  by  so  much  of  the  Canon  law  as  the  primitive 
monastic  church  of  Ireland  can  be  supposed  to  have  created  or  adopted.  The  ref- 
erence in  the  misleading  phrase  'law  of  nature'  is  not  to  the  memorable  combina- 
tion of  words  familiar  to  the  Roman  lawyers,  but  to  the  text  of  St.  Paul  in  the 
Episde  to  the  Romans.  .  .  .  The  'law  of  nature'  is,  therefore,  the  ancient  pre- 
Christian  ingredient  in  the  system,  and  the  Senchus  Mor  says  of  it:  'The  judg- 
ments of  true  nature  while  the  Holy  Ghost  had  spoken  through  the  mouths  of 
the  Brehons  [ancient  doctors  of  Irish  law]  and  just  [italics  mine]  poets  of  the 
men  of  Erin,  from  the  first  occupation  of  Ireland  down  to  the  reception  of  the 
faith,  were  all  exhibited  by  Dubhthach  to  Patrick.  What  did  not  clash  with  the 
Word  of  God  in  the  written  law  and  the  New  Testament  and  the  consciences 
of  believers,  was  confirmed  in  the  laws  of  the  Brehons  by  Patrick  and  by  the 
ecclesiastics  and  chieftains  of  Ireland;  for  the  law  of  nature  had  been  quite  right 
except  as  to  the  faith,  and  its  obligations,  and  the  harmony  of  the  Church  and 
people.  And  this  is  the  Senchus  Mor.'  " 

457  '^  Summa  theologiae,  P  IP%  qu.  91  {Opera,  Vol.  VII,  pp.  153-58:  De  legum 
diversitate) . 

4,57  ^  ibid.,  Ja  Ipe,  qu.  93,  art.  3  {Opera,  Vol.  VII,  p.  164) :  "Ouoniam,  teste  B. 
Augustino,  in  temporali  lege  nihil  est  iustum  ac  Icgitimum  quod  non  sit  ex  lege 
aeterna  profectum,  certum  est  omnes  leges,  in  quantum  participant  de  ratione  recta, 
intantum  a  lege  aeterna  derivari."  [In  the  form  above  this  text  is  the  conclusio  of 
the  argument  Utrum  omnis  lex  a  lege  aeterna  derivetur  in  the  1570  edition.  It 
figures  only  in  substance  in  the  Leo  XIII  edition. — A.  L.] 


274  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §458 

458.  The  Decretum  of  Master  Gratian  defines  natural  law  in  prac- 
tically the  same  terms  as  Roman  law  (§  419),  so  taking  us  back  to 
a  pseudo-experimental  notion.  The  concession,  however,  is  of  little 
avail,  as  it  is  still  necessary  to  consider  what  is  required  by  Scripture 
and  Catholic  tradition.^ 

459.  When  Nature  is  taken  as  the  direct  source  of  natural  law, 
concepts  of  the  latter  may  be  regarded  as  innate  ideas  and  so  take 
on  an  absolute  character — which  in  no  way  spares  us  the  trouble  of 
resorting  to  divine  activity  in  order  to  account  for  the  innate  ideas. 

460.  Denying  innate  ideas,  Locke  is  logically  required  to  reject  the 
theory  of  natural  law  deriving  from  them.  But  that  is  of  little  gain 
to  science,  for  we  at  once  go  back  to  the  domain  of  right  reason. 
Says  he:^  "I  would  not  here  be  mistaken,  as  if,  because  I  deny  an 
innate  law,  I  thought  there  were  none  but  positive  laws.  There  is  a 
great  deal  of  difference  between  an  innate  law  and  a  law  of  nature; 
between  something  imprinted  on  our  minds  in  their  very  original, 
and  something  that  we  being  ignorant  of  may  attain  to  the  knowl- 
edge of,  by  the  use  and  due  application  of  our  natural  faculties." 
This  is  still  the  metaphysical  method,  which  presupposes  the  exist- 
ence of  abstract  entities;  and  it  is  probable  that  even  had  Locke  de- 
sired to  part  from  it,  he  would  have  been  restrained  from  doing  so 
by  the  consideration  that  he  could  not,  without  serious  mishap, 
change  the  destination  at  which  his  argument  had  to  arrive  at  all 
costs — the  existence  of  a  natural  law. 

458  ^  Decretum  Gratiani,  pars  I,  distinctio  i,  canones  6-j  (Friedberg,  Vol.  I,  p. 
2) :  "Law  is  either  natural  law,  or  civil  law,  or  the  law  of  nations.  .  .  .  Natural 
law  is  the  common  law  of  all  peoples,  since  it  arises  by  instinct  of  nature  {instinctti 
naturae)  and  not  by  any  legislative  act  {constitutione) ."  And  cf.  Isidore,  Etymolo- 
giae,  V,  4,  I.  But  as  Lancelotto  cautions  in  his  histitutiones  tuns  canontct,  lib.  I, 
tit.  a,  (p.  11):  "The  above  must  be  taken  as  applying  to  such  customs  as  are  not  in 
conflict  with  divine  law  and  canonical  legislation;  for  if  anything  be  found  at 
variance  with  Catholic  faith,  it  is  to  be  regarded  not  so  much  as  custom  as  long- 
standing error  {vetustas  erroris)."  Isidore,  Ibid.,  II,  10,  3:  "If  law  is  based  on  rea- 
son, everything  will  be  law  that  is  based  on  reason,  provided  it  be  consistent  with 
religion,  in  harmony  with  [Church]  teachings  {disciplinae  conveniat)  and  promo- 
tive of  salvation  through  reason." 

460  ^  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  Bk.  I,  Chap.  II,  §  13  {Works,  Vol. 
I,  p.  44). 


§462  THEORIES   TRANSCENDING   EXPERIENCE  275 

461.  Grotius  posits  the  metaphysical  element  a  priori,  the  experi- 
mental element  a  posteriori.''  His  French  translator,  Barbeyrac,  per- 
ceives the  weakness  of  the  demonstration  a  posteriori;  but  instead 
of  observing  that  natural  law  is  beyond  experience  and  therefore  to 
be  regarded  as  scientifically  non-existent,  he  grasps  at  the  meta- 
physical demonstration  and  judges  it  valid.^ 

462.  Hobbes,  Libertas,  I,  2,  denies  that  natural  law  is  given  by 
universal  consensus,  or  even  by  the  consensus  of  the  wisest  and  most 
civilized  nations,  sensibly  asking  who  is  to  judge  of  the  wisdom  of 
a  nation  (§  592).  There  can,  he  thinks.  Ibid.,  II,  2,  be  no  other  law 
of  nature  except  reason,  nor  any  precepts  of  reason  save  such  as 
point  the  way  to  peace,  if  peace  be  attainable,  or  in  default  of  that, 
to  the  means  of  defence  by  war.  As  usual  religion  and  morality  are 
eventually  called  in  {Ibid.,  IV,  i).  The  laws  that  are  said  to  be  of 
nature  because  prescribed  by  natural  reason  are  moral  laws,  since 
they  relate  to  conduct,  and  divine  laws,  since  God  is  their  author. 
They  cannot  therefore  run  counter  to  the  divine  word  as  revealed 

461  '^De  iure  belli  ac  pads,  I,  i,  12  (pp.  5-6 — translation  from  Barbeyrac's 
French  translation):  "There  are  two  ways  of  proving  that  a  thing  is  part  of  nat- 
ural law,  the  one  a  priori  .  .  .  [by  reasons  derived  from  the  intrinsic  nature  of 
the  thing];  the  other  a  posteriori  [by  reasons  derived  from  something  external]. 
The  first,  the  subder  [and  more  abstract],  lies  in  showing  the  necessary  accord 
or  disaccord  of  the  thing  with  a  rational  and  sociable  nature  such  as  that  of  man. 
[So  there  are  other  such  natures?  What  are  they?]  Following  the  other  more 
vulgar  line  [Science  is  vulgar,  metaphysics  sublime.],  it  is  inferred,  if  not  with 
certainty  at  least  with  great  probability,  that  a  thing  belongs  to  natural  law  be- 
cause it  is  regarded  as  so  belonging  among  all  nations,  or  at  least  among  the  more 
civilized  (moratiores)  nations;  for  a  universal  effect  presupposing  a  universal 
cause,  an  opinion  so  general  can  hardly  have  any  other  source  than  what  is  called 
common  sense."  [Barbeyrac's  rendering  is  very  free.  His  additions  are  printed  in 
brackets.  The  Latin  of  Grodus  begins:  "Esse  autem  aliqiiid  juris  natural  is  proban 
solet  turn  ab  eo  quod  prius  est,  turn  ab  eo  quod  posterius,  quarum  probaiidt  ra- 
tionum  ilia  subtilior  est,  haec  popularior."  And  see  Campbell,  p.  24. — A.  L.] 

461  2  Barbeyrac,  note  to  his  word  "certainty,"  §461^:  "This  manner  of  proving 
natural  law  is  not  very  generally  used,  because  only  the  most  general  principles 
of  natural  law  are  accepted  at  all  widely  among  the  nations;  and  of  some  of  the 
most  self-evident  principles  the  contraries  have  long  been  regarded  as  matters  of 
indifference  in  the  most  civilized  countries,  as  witness  the  horrible  custom  of  ex- 
posing infants." 


276  THE   MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §463 

in  Scripture.  All  of  which  is  proved  with  an  impressive  array  of 
quotations/ 

463.  Epicurus,  in  his  time,  had  sought  the  definition  of  natural 
justice  in  the  pact,  or  contract/  Hobbes  makes  the  contract  one  of 
the  cardinal  principles  in  his  system,  as  do  Rousseau  with  his  famous 
social  contract  and  the  solidaristes  of  our  day — all  of  them  drawing 
different  conclusions  from  the  same  premise.  That  is  not  surprising, 
since  the  principle  is  lacking  in  any  exact  meaning  and  the  argu- 
ments based  upon  it  derive  their  force  not  from  logic  and  experi- 
ence but  from  accords  of  sentiments.  All  such  theories  are  infected — 
and  therefore  sterilized — with  the  same  lack  of  exactness.  From  the 
logico-experimental  standpoint  they  are  neither  true  nor  false:  they 
are  simply  meaningless  (§  445). 

464.  So  far  we  have  been  speaking  of  a  religion,  a  law,  a  morality; 
but,  as  we  cautioned  above  (§  373),  not  even  such  unity  can  be  as- 
sumed. In  point  of  fact  not  only  are  there  various  religions,  various 
moralities,  various  laws ;  but  even  if  one  may  say  that  there  are  types 
of  such  entities,  we  have  to  pay  due  attention  to  the  deviations  from 
them  which  are  met  with  in  the  concrete.  Let  us  assume  for  a  mo- 
ment— though  the  assumption  is  in  general  contrary  to  fact — that, 
in  a  restricted  group  of  people  at  least,  a  certain  theoretical  type 
prevails  from  which  actual  beliefs  and  actual  conduct  may  be  re- 
garded as  deviations.  In  a  group  having  a  civil  code,  for  instance,  it 
may  be  assumed — though  the  premise  would  not  be  altogether  true 
to  fact — that  court  decisions,  as  dictated  by  the  jurisprudence  which 
has  developed  side  by  side  with  the  code  (sometimes  in  opposition 

462  ^  See  also  Leviathan,  XV.  Hobbes  draws  a  distinction  between  natural  right 
which  is  every  individual's  right  to  defend  himself,  and  natural  law,  which  is  the 
norm  in  deference  to  which  the  individual  refrains  from  doing  what  may  be 
harmful  to  himself.  Leviathan,  XIV  (Latin  version):  "]us  et  lex  differunt  ut  lib- 
ertas  et  obligatio";  English  version:  "Law  and  Right  differ  as  much  as  Obligation 
and  Liberty." 

463  ^  Diogenes  Laertius,  Epicurus,  X,  150  (Hicks,  Vol.  II,  pp.  673-75) :  "Natural 
justice  is  a  symbol  or  expression  of  expediency,  to  prevent  one  man  from  harming 
or  being  harmed  by  another.  Since  animals  are  incapable  of  making  covenants 
with  one  another  to  the  end  that  they  may  neither  inflict  nor  suffer  harm,  they  are 
without  either  justice  or  injustice.  And  so  for  peoples  which  have  been  either  unable 
or  unwilling  to  form  mutual  covenants  to  the  same  end." 


§465  ESTABLISHED  DOGMAS  AND  DEVIATIONS  277 

to  it),  or  as  formulated  through  error  or  ignorance  on  the  part  of 
magistrates,  or  for  other  reasons,  are  mere  deviations  from  the  norms 
of  the  code. 

465.  Suppose,  for  a  hypothesis,  it  be  a  Catholic  group.  Three  types 
of  deviation  v^^ill  be  observable: 

1.  The  believer  is  perfectly  sincere,  but  sins  because  the  flesh  is 
weak;  he  repents  and  detests  his  sins.  In  that  we  get  a  complete 
separation  of  theory  and  practice.  It  is  the  situation  represented  in 
the  well-known  lines  of  Ovid,  Metamorphoses,  VII,  vv.  20-21: 

.  .  .  video  meliora  proboque — 
deteriora  sequor. 

Practice  does  not  in  the  least  presume  to  become  theory.  All  con- 
fessors know  that  in  this  connexion  there  are  very  considerable  dif- 
ferences between  individuals.  Some  fall  frequently  into  the  same  sin, 
others  relapse  more  rarely.  It  is  evident  that  two  collectivities  having 
precisely  the  same  theoretical  faith  may  differ  practically,  according 
as  one  of  them  has  more  individuals  of  the  first  kind  than  of  the 
second  kind. 

2.  The  believer  is  of  lukewarm  faith.  He  more  or  less  disregards 
the  precepts  of  his  religion,  and  feels  little  or  no  remorse.  Here  we 
already  get  the  germ  of  a  theoretical  divergence.  Certain  believers 
are  merely  indifferent;  in  their  case  the  theoretical  deviation  is  very 
slight.  Others  think  they  can  atone  for  their  religious  shortcomings 
in  some  way.  Still  others  do  not  even  consider  them  shortcomings — 
they  argue,  split  hairs,  resort  to  casuistry.  So  theoretical  deviations 
arise,  and  they  grow  like  parasitic  plants  on  the  orthodox  faith.  In 
that  way  practical  deviations  go  hand  in  hand  with  theoretical  devia- 
tions, though  these  are  not  carried  to  the  point  of  schism. 

3.  Theoretical  differences  become  accentuated.  Schism,  heresy, 
partial  or  complete  denial  of  the  type-theory,  ensue.  On  reaching 
that  point,  the  deviation  ceases  to  be  a  deviation,  and  we  get  an 
actually  new  type  of  theory. 

As  usual,  transitions  from  one  sort  of  deviation  to  another  take 
place  by  imperceptible  degrees. 


278  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §466 

466.  To  neglect  these  deviations  and  consider  the  type-theories  only 
is  the  source  of  serious  errors  in  sociology.  Nothing  can  be  more 
mistaken  than  to  evaluate  the  influence  of  a  given  religion  by  its 
theology.  We  should  be  going  very  far  wide  of  the  truth  were  we, 
for  example,  to  reason:  "The  Christian  religion  enjoins  forgiveness 
of  offences;  hence  the  people  of  the  Middle  Ages,  who  were  very 
good  Christians  indeed,  always  turned  the  other  cheek."  It  would  be 
erroneous  to  the  same  degree  to  appraise  the  social  value  of  a  moral- 
ity by  the  theoretical  statement  of  it. 

A  lesser  error,  but  still  quite  a  serious  one,  is  to  assume  that  court 
decisions  in  a  given  country  are  made  in  accord  with  its  written 
laws.^  The  constitutions  of  the  Byzantine  emperors  were  often  a 
dead  letter.  In  our  day,  both  in  Italy  and  in  France  the  written  laws 
of  the  civil  code  may  supply  at  least  an  approximate  picture  of  prac- 
tical legislation;  but  the  penal  code  and  its  written  laws  do  not  in 
the  least  correspond  with  practical  decisions,  and  the  divergence  is 
frequently  enormous.  We  need  say  nothing  of  constitutional  law. 
There  is  no  relation  whatever  between  theory  and  practice,  except  in 
the  minds  of  a  few  silly  theorists.^ 

466  '^Liberte,  July  25,  1912:  "Moulins.  The  Court  of  Criminal  Sessions  at  Allier 
has  dealt  with  the  case  of  Louis  Auclair,  18,  travelling  salesman  of  Moulins,  in- 
dicted for  the  murder  of  his  father.  Since  the  death  of  his  mother  at  Cosne-sur- 
rCEil  last  year,  young  Auclair  had  been  on  bad  terms  with  his  father.  The  latter 
had  sold  his  property  for  some  20,000  francs  and  purchased  at  Montlu^on,  ave. 
Jules  Ferry,  a  drinking-place  that  he  began  operating  with  his  son.  Shortly  he 
took  to  drinking  heavily,  and  young  Auclair  became  uneasy  as  to  his  share  in  his 
father's  property.  Violent  quarrels  took  place  between  father  and  son.  One  day 
the  young  man  stole  1,000  francs  from  the  barman,  and  left  home,  going  to  live 
at  Moulins.  On  April  6  last  he  went  back  to  Montlu(;on,  and  a  new  quarrel  with 
his  father  resulted.  About  midnight,  on  the  evening  of  the  seventh,  he  broke  into 
his  father's  establishment.  The  barman,  hearing  a  noise,  hurried  down  to  the  bar, 
and  found  the  young  man  working  at  the  till.  Louis  Auclair  now  pleads  that  he 
had  gone  there  just  to  dare  his  father,  not  for  purposes  of  robbery.  In  any 
case,  there  was  a  scuflSe  and  the  young  man  shot  his  father  through  the  stomach, 
killing  him.  The  jury  handed  in  such  a  mild  verdict  that  the  Court  sentenced 
the  man  responsible  for  such  an  abominable  crime  to  one  year  in  prison."  If  such 
a  news  item  came  not  from  France  but  from  some  little-known  country,  one  might 
conclude  that  the  written  laws  of  that  country  dealt  leniently  with  parricide — and 
that  might  be  a  mistaken  inference. 

466  ^  Here  is  an  example  chosen  at  random.  It  is  typical  of  many  other  cases  not 
only  in  France,  but  in  Italy  and  other  countries.  Liberte,  Mar.  23,   1912   (article 


§466  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  279 

A  practical  fact  is  the  result  of  many  other  facts,  some  of  which 
give  rise  to  theories  and  may  therefore  be  learned  through  them. 
Take,  for  example,  a  penal  decision  following  the  verdict  of  a  jury. 
Distinguishable  among  the  factors  entering  into  such  a  sentence  are 

by  G.  Berthoulat) :  "Sabotage  of  Justice:  In  spite  of  the  conspiracy  of  silence,  public 
attention  is  fixed  on  political  interference  in  the  Rochette  case.  Quite  aside  from  the 
facts  that  have  already  come  to  light,  ordinary  horse-sense  is  enough:  how  could  a 
man  like  Rochette,  with  such  a  retinue  of  pontiffs  of  the  Bloc  in  his  debt,  whether 
public  attorneys  or  otherwise,  have  failed  to  provide  himself  with  a  parliamentary 
body-guard?  One  need  not  hesitate  on  the  point:  Rochette  did  demand  such  pro- 
tecdon!  .  .  .  That  is  why,  in  deference  to  an  order  from  higher  up,  the  Attorney 
General  was  compelled  to  move  for  the  scandalous  adjournment  of  the  Rochette 
case,  a  modon  in  which  M.  Bidault  de  L'Isle  docilely  acquiesced  and  which 
M.  Fabre  himself,  in  his  report,  calls  'the  one  humiliation  of  my  career.'  Along 
with  this  case  of  sabotage  of  the  courts,  the  Abbot  of  Launay,  speaking  before 
the  Senate  yesterday,  gave  the  proofs  of  another  no  less  serious  in  that  astonishing 
case  of  the  Chartreuse  which,  even  more  than  the  Duez  episode,  is  the  jewel  of 
the  liquidations  in  which  the  famous  'billion'  went  up  in  smoke.  The  Chartreuse 
was  worth  fifty  millions.  Why  was  it  knocked  down  at  five  hundred  thousand? 
Because  it  had  depreciated!  .  .  .  But  there  again  there  have  been  political  influ- 
ences: and  they  were  so  effectively  employed  that  the  liquidator  suddenly  became 
the  guardian  of  the  individual  named  in  his  complaint.  And  the  Court  at  Grenoble, 
though  the  case  had  been  regularly  brought  before  it,  ruled  in  1906,  1908,  and  1909 
that  the  papers  in  the  case  were  to  be  held  'non-existent.'  But  they  existed  all  the 
same,  and  so  certainly  that  the  Senate  was  asked  to  take  official  cognizance  of 
them  yesterday.  However,  politics  having  decided  to  'get  out  the  life-boats'  for  the 
plunderers  of  the  Chartreuse,  the  Court  and  full  bench  of  Grenoble  did  not  shrink 
from  that  extraordinary  miscarriage  of  justice.  To  fill  out  the  trio  of  sensational 
acts  of  sabotage,  what  about  this  one:  the  pardon  of  the  incendiaries  of  Ay  ob- 
tained on  February  11  by  M.  Bourgeois  at  the  instance  of  his  'control,'  M.  Valle? 
Those  rascals  had  been  sentenced  to  relatively  insignificant  terms  in  the  reformatory, 
for  had  they  not  been  clients  of  M.  Valle  they  would  have  gone  to  the  penitentiary. 
They  had  been  captured  in  the  act  of  chopping  holes  in  roofs,  pouring  gasoline 
inside  and  setting  fire  to  the  buildings.  The  town  of  Ay  will  have  to  foot  bills 
that  run  into  the  millions  on  the  single  account  of  the  arson  and  depredations  of 
those  individuals." 

Then  come  the  verdicts  of  the  "kind-hearted  juries"  and  other  court  decisions 
equally  fantastic.  A  woman  kills  her  husband  and  her  aunt  without  serious  provo- 
cation. Here  is  an  account  of  her  trial.  Liberie,  May  12,  1912:  "Mme.  P ap- 
peared before  Criminal  Sessions  this  morning  gowned  in  deep  mourning.  She  did 
not  cease  sobbing  once  during  the  whole  session,  her  hysterics  causing  a  suspension 
of  her  examination  several  times.  Presiding  Justice:  'Why  did  you  kill  your  hus- 
band?' A.  'I  was  carried  away  by  a  power  beyond  me.  If,  at  that  moment,  anyone 
had  come  and  stopped  me  and  said,  "What  are  you  doing,  crazy?"  I  would  have 
come  to  myself — nothing  would  have  happened.'  President:  'You  were  so  little 
out  of  your  head  that  when  you  reached  the  Gare  d'Austerlitz,  you  went  to  the 


280  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §466 

the  following:  i.  Written  law — the  part  it  plays  in  criminal  cases 
is  often  insignificant.  2.  Political  influences — in  certain  cases  very 
important.  3.  Humanitarian  inclinations  in  judges  and  jurymen — 
these  are  knowable  from  humanitarian  theory  and  literary  sources. 

toilet  and  reloaded  your  revolver.'  A.  'I  would  have  reloaded  ten  revolvers  at  that 
moment.  I  was  out  of  my  head.  I  was  so  little  aware  of  what  had  happened  that  I 
thought  I  was  going  to  surprise  my  husband  and  my  aunt  at  Savigny.  I  did  not 
remember  what  I  had  just  done  in  the  rue  Sedaine.'  President:  'After  your  second 
crime  you  returned  to  Paris,  took  your  daughter  in  your  arms  and  said:  "Forgive 
me,  I  am  a  murderer!"  '  At  this  allusion  the  defendant  bursts  into  hysterical  sobs. 
Recovering  a  little  she  cries  time  after  time:  'My  child,  my  child,  forgive  me, 
please,  please,  forgive  me!'  Witnesses  are  called.  The  defence  asks  permission  to 
call  the  litde  Paquerette,  nine  years  old,  the  defendant's  daughter.  The  prosecution 
and  the  presiding  justice  object,  describing  such  an  examination  as  an  'impropriety.' 
The  defence  insists.  The  defendant  has  hysterics  again,  requiring  four  policemen 
to  hold  her.  She  screams:  'My  darling!  My  little  girl!  Forgive  your  mother!'  The 
girl  testifies  in  a  barely  audible  childish  voice  that  her  mama  told  her  always  to 
remember  her  father  in  her  prayers  at  night,  and  that  her  mama  had  never  said 
anything  unkind  of  her  father.  The  moving  scene  deeply  affects  the  spectators. 
After  a  recess.  State's  Attorney  Wattinne  closes  with  a  severe  arraignment  of  the 
defendant.  The  jury  brings  in  a  verdict  of  not  guilty  and  the  Court  releases 
Mme.  P ." 

This  is  merely  typical  of  a  situation  that  is  general.  Says  M.  Loubat,  Attorney- 
General  at  Lyons  in  a  letter  to  the  Temps,  August,  191 2:  "Juries  should  be  made 
up  with  a  view  to  social  defence  and  not  to  the  occasional  and  fairly  rare  political 
cases  that  may  come  before  Criminal  Sessions.  The  results  of  the  present  system 
speak  for  themselves.  Our  highest  criminal  jurisdiction,  which  ought  to  approxi- 
mate something  like  absolute  justice  in  view  of  the  tremendous  and  at  times 
irreparable  punishments  that  it  has  within  its  powers,  is  the  least  reliable,  the 
most  capricious,  the  most  unpredictable  imaginable.  Certain  verdicts  are  acts  of 
downright  aberradon:  parricide  is  condoned  by  a  jury;  in  one  same  session  de- 
fendants will  be  condemned  to  death,  others  equally  guilty  will  be  acquitted.  If  a 
court  of  judges  indulged  in  such  insanities  there  would  be  a  public  revolt.  Such 
scandals  would  be  impossible  if  the  jury  contained  more  men  who  were  less  credu- 
lous and  less  responsive  to  emotional  stresses  in  the  court-room." 

Interested  in  a  practical  reform,  the  Attorney-General  was  here  confining  his 
attack  to  the  point  where  the  evil  seemed  greatest.  But  looking  at  the  facts 
theoredcally,  decisions  by  judges  are  on  the  whole  no  better  than  jury  verdicts. 
The  services  rendered  the  French  Ministry  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  in  the  Dreyfus 
case  are  a  matter  of  common  knowledge.  A  very  competent  individual  writes  to  the 
Gazette  de  Lausanne  from  Paris,  Sept.  4,  1912:  "You  may  be  surprised  that  [for  the 
Court  of  the  Seine]  we  have  not  more  than  three  or  four  Assistant  Presiding 
Justices  out  of  the  dozen  that  are  at  all  capable.  For  my  part  I  am  surprised  that 
there  are  that  many.  They  are  not  chosen  for  ability,  but  in  view  of  their  polidcal 
afSIiations.  If  they  are  competent  jurists,  that  is  just  a  matter  of  chance;  and  if 
they  are  independent,  it  is  by  oversight.  On  that  bench  we  have  at  present  a  some- 


§466  LAW  AND  PRACTICE  28 1 

4.  Emotional,  socialistic,  social,  political,  and  other  inclinations  on 
the  part  of  jurymen — all  knowable  from  theories  and  literary 
sources.  5.  The  general  notion  common  to  all  despotisms,  whether 
royal,  oligarchical,  or  democratic,  that  the  law  does  not  bind  the 
"sovereign,"  and  that  the  "sovereign"  may  substitute  personal  whims 
for  enacted  law.  This  notion,  too,  is  knowable  through  theories.  In 
our  day  it  is  the  fashion  to  say  that  "what  we  need  is  a  'living'  law," 
a  "flexible"  law,  a  law  that  "adapts  itself  to  the  public  conscience." 
Those  are  all  euphemisms  for  the  caprice  of  the  individuals  in 
power.  6.  Numberless  other  inclinations,  which  are  not  perhaps  gen- 
erally operative,  but  which  may  chance  to  be  preponderant  in  the 
minds  of  the  twelve  individuals — usually  of  no  great  intelligence, 
no  serious  education,  no  very  high  moral  sense — who  are  called  upon 
to  serve  on  juries.  7.  Private  interests  of  the  citizens  in  question.  8. 
The  temporary  impression  made  upon  them  by  some  striking  fact — 
so  after  a  series  of  startling  crimes  juries  are  inclined  to  be  severe  for 
a  time. 

In  a  word,  it  may  be  said  that  court  decisions  depend  largely  upon 
the  interests  and  sentiments  operative  in  a  society  at  a  given  mo- 
ment; and  also  upon  individual  whims  and  chance  events;  and  but 
slightly,  and  sometimes  not  at  all,  upon  codes  or  written  law.^  All 

time  Radical  Senator  who  was  beaten  for  re-election.  He  was  appointed  to  the 
bench  because  he  was  a  Radical  and  because  he  was  regarded  as  a  victim  of  the 
'Reaction.'  Now  it  happens  that  he  is  a  first<lass  jurist,  and  so  much  the  better. 
But  had  he  not  known  how  to  serve  a  summons  he  would  have  been  appointed 
with  no  more  hesitation."  That  is  France.  In  Italy  things  are  worse,  and  by  far. 
466  ^  It  would  take  a  volume  to  quote  some  very  small  fraction  of  the  facts 
adducible  to  this  point.  A  writer  in  Liberie,  Jan.  11,  1913  (L.  Latapie),  declares 
that  the  French  magistrate  today  stands  "helpless,  spineless,  in  the  face  of  an 
avalanche  of  crime  and  law-breaking.  He  defends  society  by  waving  a  perfumed 
handkerchief  at  the  dirk  and  brass  knuckles  of  the  bandit.  Yesterday,  in  the 
Goutte-d'Or  section,  a  mob  all  but  lynched  a  biu-glar  who  was  run  down  after 
being  surprised  on  a  'job.'  His  record  showed  twenty-three  convictions  for  house- 
breaking! Twenty-three  times  the  police  had  discovered  and  arrested  that  particu- 
lar rogue;  and  twenty-three  times  the  courts  had  turned  him  loose  with  insig- 
nificant penalties!  Nevertheless  there  is  a  law  covering  cases  of  incorrigible  crim- 
inals. The  magistrates  do  not  enforce  it,  doubtless  in  fear  of  weakening  their  sup- 
port among  the  'advanced'  parties.  If  Paris  were  suddenly  purged  of  the  fifty 
thousand  professional  criminals  who  could  be  in  jail  as  well  as  not  but  who  are 
left  free  to  disturb  the  public  peace,  the  Army  of  the  Revolution  would  lose  its 


282  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §4^7 

such  factors,  provided  they  be  general  and  strongly  influential,  give 
rise  to  theories;  and  that  is  why  we  are  studying  now  one  theory, 
now  another,  not  so  much  to  become  familiar  with  them  in  them- 
selves as  to  attain  through  them  a  picture  of  the  tendencies  in  which 
they  originate. 

467.  In  §  12  we  noted  the  necessity  of  distinguishing  between  the 
subject-matter  of  a  theory  and  the  nexus  by  which  the  matter  was 
drawn  together  to  constitute  the  theory.  In  connexion  with  any 
given  theory,  therefore,  two  general  and  two  particular  problems 
arise.  In  general:  i.  What  are  the  elements  utilized  by  theories?  2. 
What  is  the  nexus  that  combines  them?  In  particular:  i.  What  are 
the  elements  utilized  by  a  particular  theory  (§  470)  ?  2.  What  is  the 
nexus  that  combines  them  (§  519)  ?  Our  solution  of  those  problems 
in  §  13  yielded,  in  fact,  a  classification  of  types  of  theories.  Now  we 
must  go  deeper  into  that  matter,  which  at  the  time  we  barely  sign- 
boarded  for  future  investigation. 

most  reliable  troops.  Our  judges  are  getting  along  on  the  best  of  terms  with  the 
Revolution.  Outrages  against  persons  and  property  find  an  indefatigable  spirit  of 
forgiveness  in  the  courts  so  long  as  the  culprits  hide  behind  some  political  pretext. 
Thieves  and  gunmen  are  so  well  aware  of  that  that  they  never  fail  any  longer  to 
afiBliate  with  the  Anarchist  party  before  setting  out  on  a  'job.'  If  they  shoot  down 
a  bank  messenger  and  take  his  bag  it  is  'to  vindicate  democracy.'  And  if  they  take 
a  shot  at  a  policeman  it  is  'to  improve  social  conditions.'  The  judge  blanches  white 
at  mendon  of  such  dreadful  social  issues,  and  he  draws  his  conscience  down  into 
his  red  robe  the  way  a  snail  draws  its  head  into  its  shell.  Who  knows?  The  courts 
may  be  largely  responsible  for  the  wave  of  crime  that  is  today  sweeping  France. 
They  are  failing  to  inspire  respect  and  fear  for  the  law  anywhere.  They  have  so 
accustomed  the  professional  agitator  to  getting  off  scot-free  that  he  is  considering 
himself  intolerably  persecuted  if  any  gesture  is  made  towards  applying  the  laws 
to  him.  The  governmental  press,  which  is  for  ever  flirting  with  the  revoludonary 
parties,  contributes  not  a  little  towards  increasing  uneasiness  and  hesitation  among 
the  judges.  Their  defence  is  well  known:  'After  all,'  say  they,  'why  demand 
courage  of  us  only.?  We  follow  the  lead  of  the  Government.  Let  the  Government 
display  a  little  energy  against  revolutionary  law-breaking.  Let  it  dissolve  its  alliance 
with  institutions  that  are  avowedly  making  war  on  the  country  and  on  organized 
society.  Then  we'll  see  about  restoring  the  majesty  of  the  law.'  " 

This  last  thrust  is  tucked  in  for  polemical  purposes.  In  reality,  courts,  Govern- 
ment, and  public  are  moved  by  the  same  interests  and  sentiments.  Outraged  by 
some  crime  the  public  will  strike  down  a  law-breaker  and  then  turn  to  feed 
anew  on  the  inanities  of  humanitarians  of  every  breed.  Courts  and  governors 
follow  the  course  the  public  approves. 

In  December,  191 2,  a  Mme.  Bloch  came  up  for  trial  before  Criminal  Sessions  in 


§4^9  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  283 

468.  Suppose  we  glance  at  an  analogous  case.  Similar  inquiries 
arise  with  reference  to  language.  Grammar  answers  the  general 
questions.  Morphology  yields  the  elements  of  language — substan- 
tives, adjectives,  verbs,  and  so  on.  Syntax  shows  how  they  are  com- 
bined. The  grammatical  and  the  logical  analysis  of  a  given  passage 
answer  the  particular  questions  arising  in  it.  Grammatical  analysis 
yields  the  elements  (substantives,  verbs,  and  the  like) ;  logical  analy- 
sis shows  how  they  are  combined  and  the  significance  they  acquire 
through  the  combination.  Carrying  the  analogy  further,  we  might 
say  that  rhetoric  deals  with  the  passage  more  especially  under  its 
subjective  aspect  (§  13). 

469.  The  analogy  extends  also  to  the  relations  between  theory  and 
practice.  Theory  never  gives  a  perfect  picture  of  practice.  Language 
is  a  living  organism  even  today  in  our  Western  countries,  where 
there  is  a  continuous  effort  to  crystallize  it  within  specified  forms, 
through  which  it  is  always  breaking,  much  as  the  roots  of  trees  split 
the  ledges  in  the  crevices  of  which  they  grow.  In  remote  ages  Ian- 
Paris  for  killing  her  husband's  paramour,  a  certain  Mrs.  Bridgeman.  The  latter, 
as  is  usual  with  emancipated  women  on  the  American  side  of  the  Atlantic,  was 
amusing  herself  with  men  while  her  husband  devoted  all  his  energies  to  money- 
making.  Mme.  Bloch  was  acquitted,  and  so  far,  nothing  extraordinary — acquittals 
in  such  circumstances  occur  by  tens  and  hundreds.  What  was  not  so  commonplace 
was  to  hear  a  public  ministry,  which  was  supposed  to  be  conducting  a  prosecution 
of  crime,  inciting  to  homicide.  The  State's  Attorney  delivered  himself  of  the  fol- 
lowing: "The  crime  of  this  defendant  was  inexcusable.  She  had  a  legitimate  victim 
in  her  own  house — her  husband.  Had  she  smitten  him,  we  could  only  nod  in 
approval."  The  correspondent  of  the  Journal  de  Geneve  usually  has  good  things  to 
say  of  the  worst  humanitarians.  Of  this  detail,  however,  he  wrote,  Dec.  28,  1912: 
"The  remark  has  caused  an  uproar,  all  the  press  protesting.  But  it  would  take 
more  than  that  to  keep  the  courts  from  discrediting  themselves.  The  people  at  the 
Palais  are  playing  to  the  galleries  in  a  perfectly  shocking  manner.  They  seem  to  be 
less  independent  than  ever  as  regards  the  higher  powers,  and  more  accessible  than 
ever  to  the  temptations  of  a  cheap  publicity.  A  great  effort  would  be  required  to 
restore  justice  to  the  serenity,  earnestness,  and  independence  that  are  essential 
prerequisites  to  its  effective  functioning  and  prestige.  The  Rochette  affair  has  not 
contributed  to  the  good  name  of  the  French  courts.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
that  high-flying  captain  of  big  finance  disappeared  at  the  very  moment  when  he 
was  to  surrender  to  the  authorities." 

But  all  that  results  from  the  sentiments  prevailing  in  the  public  at  large  and 
from  the  political  system  resulting  from  them.  The  causes  are  general  and  cannot 
be  laid  at  the  door  of  this  or  that  individual. 


284  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §469 

guage  developed  freely  like  trees  in  a  virgin  forest — even  in  times 
not  very  long  past  spelling  was  still  arbitrary  in  part.  There  is  no 
reason  for  believing  that  the  situation  is,  or  has  been,  different  with 
other  similar  products  of  human  activity — with  law,  morality,  reli- 
gion. Indeed,  facts  in  huge  numbers  constrain  us  to  hold  that  they 
have  developed  much  as  language  developed.  In  remote  ages  they 
were  blended  in  a  single  mass,  like  the  words  in  ancient  Greek  in- 
scriptions, which  were  written  without  spaces  between  them,  such 
contact  modifying  the  last  letter  of  one  word  and  the  first  letter  of 
a  following  word.  The  analytical  process  of  separating  one  word 
from  another,  so  simple  in  itself,  was  never  carried  out  for  Sanskrit, 
and  was  not  effected  for  Greek  till  fairly  recent  times,  traces  of  the 
original  unions  surviving  even  in  classical  literature.^  So  the  analyti- 
cal process  of  separating  law,  morality,  religion,  from  each  other, 
though  evidently  far  advanced  in  modern  civilized  countries,  has  by 
no  means  been  completed,  and  it  has  still  to  be  carried  out  among 
the  more  backward  peoples.  Greek  inscriptions,  as  well  as  the  his- 
tory of  Graeco-Roman  origins,  present  language,  law,  morality,  re- 
ligion, as  a  sort  of  protoplasm  from  which,  by  a  process  of  scission, 
parts  are  sent  off  to  develop  as  distinct,  and  finally  as  separate,  en- 

469  ^  Reinach,  TraitS  d'epigraphie  grecque,  pp.  237-38,  245:  "Spelling,  especially 
in  private  documents  beyond  the  control  of  the  People's  secretaries  and  the  Senate, 
is  even  more  individual  than  the  script.  It  reflects  not  only  the  general  habits  of 
the  period,  but  the  caprices  or  manias  of  each  stone-cutter.  .  .  .  The  word  or- 
thography awakens  in  us  moderns  an  idea  of  rules  that  was  long  stranger  to  the 
ancients.  For  us  orthography  is  a  fixed  manner  of  writing  words,  oftentimes 
regardless  of  the  way  they  are  pronounced.  For  the  ancients  down  to  the  Alexan- 
drine era,  as  for  the  French  down  to  the  sixteenth  century,  no  orthography,  prop- 
erly speaking,  existed,  and  words  were  written  much  as  they  were  pronounced. 
Writing  was  a  living  organism  with  them.  It  is  a  matter  of  schooling  with  us.  .  .  . 
Countless  examples  of  the  variable  spelling  of  the  ancients  could  be  quoted  from 
inscriptions.  There  is  an  Athenian  decree  in  which  the  forms  £f  and  eJf,  aei  and 
ahi,  appear  just  a  few  lines  apart.  .  .  .  Curtius  has  shown  from  inscriptions  that 
the  normal  state  of  the  more  ancient  Greek  as  regarded  final  consonants  was  one  of 
absolute  mobility — the  same  situation  that  prevailed  down  to  the  end  as  regarded 
the  consonants  of  prepositions  in  elision  (  a<p'  ov  ) .  Later  on  a  struggle  for  survival 
developed  between  the  different  forms,  and  the  spelling  that  prevails  in  the  classical 
language  was  the  victor  in  that  competition. " 


11 


§4^9      ELEMENTS   IN   THEORIES:    SUBSTANCE   AND   NEXUS      285 

tities.^  Studying  the  facts  of  the  past  with  the  ideas  of  our  own  day, 
we  give  body  to  abstractions  created  by  ourselves,  imagine  that  we 
find  them  in  the  past,  and  then  when  we  come  upon  facts  at  vari- 
ance with  our  theories,  we  call  them  deviations.  So  in  our  fancy  we 
create  a  natural  law  from  which  positive  laws  would  be  deviations, 
and  conjugations  of  regular  verbs,  from  which  the  conjugations  of 
irregular  verbs  would  be  deviations.  The  historical  study  of  law  and 
the  historical  grammar  of  the  national  languages  have  shattered  that 
beautiful  and  well-ordered  edifice — yet  not  to  such  an  extent  that  it 
cannot  still  offer  cosy  refuge  to  our  metaphysical  sociologists.  It  is 
impossible  to  study  history  experimentally  and  not  be  impressed  by 
"Hihe  contingent  character  of  law  and  morality.  For  a  long  time  the 
grammar  and  vocabulary  of  Cicero  and  Caesar  were  the  Latin  gram- 
mar and  the  Latin  vocabulary.  Other  writers  showed  deviations — if 
one  did  not  go  so  far  as  to  call  them  errors.  Italian  was  the  language 
of  the  "authorities"  of  the  Crusca,  and  the  person  who  spoke  other- 
wise fell  into  error.  At  last  scholarship  has  come  to  realize  that  there 
is  not  a  Latin  grammar,  a  Latin  vocabulary,  but  many  such.  If 
Plautus  and  Tacitus  write  a  Latin  different  from  Cicero,  it  is  some- 
what ridiculous  on  our  part  to  presume  to  correct  them  as  if  they 
were  so  many  schoolboys  who  have  not  done  their  exercises  with 
sufficient  care.  Even  in  our  parts  of  the  world,  where  law  is  crammed 

469  ^  We  have  another  analogy  in  the  fact  that  scientific  philology  is  a  modern 
science  unknown  for  centuries  upon  centuries  even  to  men  of  great  talent,  and 
that  it  came  into  being  and  prospered  through  use  of  the  experimental  method. 
Greek  grammar,  for  example,  is  much  better  known  to  modern  scholars  than  to 
the  scholars  of  ancient  Greece.  It  seems  impossible  that  Aristotle,  or  whoever  it 
was  that  wrote  the  Poetica,  could  have  written  (20,  8,  Fyfe,  p.  77):  "Since  we  do 
not  ordinarily  give  a  meaning  to  each  part  of  a  compound  noun,  so  in  Qeodupo^, 
Jw/3oi'  has  no  meaning."  The  "critical"  edition,  obtained  by  the  comparative,  the 
experimental,  method,  is  a  modern  thing — the  humanists  had  no  interest  in  it. 
The  fanciful  conjecturings  of  hypercriticism  of  texts  must  not  be  mistaken  for 
sciendfic  philology.  The  conjecture,  after  all,  is  nothing  new.  The  alterations  and 
suppressions  to  which  not  a  few  modern  philologists  presume  to  subject  ancient 
Greek  and  Ladn  texts  are  in  all  respects  kindred  to  the  mutiladons  to  which  the 
Homeric  poems  fell  victim  at  the  hands  of  the  Alexandrians.  The  justifications  put 
forward  by  the  moderns  are  comparable  in  ingeniousness,  and  oftentimes  in  ab- 
surdity, to  the  ancient. 


286  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §470 

into  legislation  and  language  into  grammatical  rules,  evolution  has 
ceased  neither  for  the  one  nor  for  the  other,  and  unity  is  an  abstrac- 
tion of  which  no  trace  is  to  be  found  in  the  concrete. 

470.  The  elements  in  theories.  Carefully  observing  the  matter  of 
w^hich  theories  are  constructed,  we  see  that  it  is  of  two  distinct  kinds. 
Theories  utilize  certain  things  that  fall  within  objective  experience 
and  are  susceptible  of  objective  observation  (§  13),  or  which  may  be 
logically  inferred  from  observation  and  experience;  and  then  again 
certain  other  things  that  overstep  objective  experience  and  observa- 
tion— among  them  such  as  result  from  introspection  or  subjective 
experience  (§§94-95).  Things  of  the  first  kind  we  elect  to  call  ex- 
perimental entities;  things  of  the  second  kind,  non-experimental  en- 
tities (§  119).^ 

471.  Certain  entities  seem  to  be  experimental  but  are  not,  entities 
such  as  "heat,"  "cold,"  "the  dry,"  "the  moist,"  "depth,"  "height," 
and  other  similar  conceptions  of  which  ancient  writers  on  the  nat- 
ural sciences  made  lavish  use.  To  them  may  be  added  the  "atoms"  of 
Epicurus,  "fire,"  and  other  such  things.  The  poem  of  Lucretius  may 
seem  experimental  as  a  whole;  but  it  is  not,  for  the  entities  with 
which  it  deals  lie  outside  the  experimental  field.^ 

470  ^  As  explained  in  §  6,  we  use  the  term  "experimental"  to  designate  not 
merely  experience  but  objective  experiment  and  observation. 

471  ^  Davis,  The  Chinese,  Vol.  II,  pp.  263-64  (1836,  pp.  284-85):  "The  Chinese 
physiologists  expressly  call  man  a  Seaoutien-ty,  a  'litde  universe,'  or  'microcosm,' 
and  they  extend  to  this  the  same  doctrine  of  the  Yin  and  Yang,  or  of  the  dual 
principle  .  .  .  maintaining  the  order  and  harmony  of  the  natural  world.  They 
suppose  that  on  a  due  proportion  between  these,  or  between  strength  and  weakness, 
heat  and  cold,  dry  and  moist,  &c.,  consists  the  health  of  the  human  body;  and  that 
different  degrees  of  excess  or  defect  produce  disease,  and  ultimately  death.  There 
is  a  great  pretension  to  harmony  and  consistency  throughout  the  whole  system  of 
physics,  which  perhaps  might  be  called  beautiful,  were  it  only  true,  and  based  upon 
something  better  than  empty  speculation."  Those  interesting  people  are  so  well 
versed  in  science  that  "they  do  not  even  know  the  distinction  between  arteries 
and  veins,  and  certainly  not  a  syllable  of  the  function  of  the  lungs."  They  call 
the  heart  the  "husband"  and  the  lungs  the  "wife."  "Without  the  practice  of  dis- 
section, it  would  be  singular  indeed  if  they  did  know  much."  Of  just  that  char- 
acter were  disquisitions  on  natural  science  in  Western  countries  not  so  long  ago, 
and  such  even  today  are  many  disquisitions  on  social  "science." 


§471  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  287 

Condillac  well  says:'  "When  philosophers  use  the  words  'being,' 
'substance,'  'essence,'  'genus,'  'species,'  we  must  not  imagine  that 
they  are  designating  by  them  certain  aggregates  of  simple  ideas  de- 
rived from  sensation  and  reflection.  They  mean  to  go  farther  than 
that  and  see  specific  realities  in  each  of  them.  Indeed,  if  we  go  into 
greater  detail  and  review  the  names  of  the  substances  'body,'  'ani- 
mal,' 'man,'  'metal,'  'gold,'  'silver,'  and  so  on,  we  see  that  they 
all  reveal  to  the  eyes  of  our  philosophers  entities  that  are  hidden 
from  the  rest  of  mankind. 

"A  proof  that  they  regard  such  words  as  signs  of  some  reality  or 
other  is  the  fact  that  when  a  substance  has  undergone  some  altera- 
tion they  never  fail  to  ask  whether  it  still  belongs  to  the  same  species 
to  which  it  was  referable  before  the  change,  a  question  that  would 
become  superfluous  if  they  put  concepts  of  substances  and  concepts 
of  their  species  in  different  collections  of  simple  ideas.  When  they 
ask  if  'ice'  and  'snow'  are  'water' ;  if  a  'foetal  monstrosity'  is  a  'human 
being';  if  'God,'  'spirits,'  'bodies,'  and  even  'void'  are  'substances' 
[All  questions  that  logico-experimental  science  regards  as  meaning- 
less, inconclusive,  fatuous],  it  is  evident  that  the  question  is  not 
whether  these  things  are  in  accord  with  the  simple  ideas  gathered 
under  the  terms,  'water,'  'man,'  'substance'  [That  is  a  lapse  into  meta- 
physics. Really  such  problems  are  solved  only  by  accords  of  senti- 
ments.]— such  a  question  would  answer  itself — ^but  whether  such 
things  contain  certain  'essences,'  certain  realities,  which  the  words 
'water,'  'man,'  'substance,'  are  supposed  to  designate." 

Sometimes  it  is  explicitly  recognized  that  such  entities  are  non- 
experimental — that  fact,  indeed,  is  taken  as  investing  them  with  a 
higher  majesty.  At  other  times  there  is  an  effort  to  pass  them  ofF  as 
experimental.  Then  again,  there  is  a  wavering  between  one  concep- 
tion and  the  other,  and  oftentimes  no  very  clear  idea  at  all  regard- 
ing them — the  case  especially  with  politicians  and  other  men  of 
affairs  who  use  such  entities  to  express  their  thoughts.  All  that  does 
not  affect  the  manner  in  which  they  have  to  be  regarded  from  the 

471  ^  Essai  sur  I'origine  des  connaissanccs  humaiues,  sec.  V,  §  7. 


288  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §472 

logico-experimental  standpoint.  However  they  are  defined,  and  even 
if  they  are  left  undefined,  they  are,  and  will  always  remain,  foreign    | 
to  the  experimental  domain.^ 

\j  472.  Between  the  two  kinds  of  matter  just  mentioned  three 
combinations  are  possible:  I.  Experimental  entities  may  be  com- 
bined with  experimental  entities.  II.  Experimental  entities  may  be 
combined  with  non-experimental  entities.  III.  Non-experimental  en- 
tities may  be  combined  with  non-experimental  entities. 

473.  From  the  standpoint  we  are  at  present  taking — the  matter 
of  accord  with  experience — it  is  evident  that  we  can  consider  only 
combinations  of  the  first  variety,  for  the  other  two  are  not  suscepti- 
ble of  any  sort  of  experimental  verification.  To  settle  any  dispute  a 
judge  is  necessary  (§§  17,  27),  and  experience  disclaims  jurisdiction 
in  disputes  arising  under  combinations  II  and  III. 

474.  In  the  treatise  commonly  entitled  De  Melisso  ^  the  following 
proposition  is  ascribed  to  a  philosopher:  "God  being  everywhere  the 
same,  He  must  be  spherical."  ^  That  sets  up  a  relationship  between  a 
non-experimental  entity,  God,  and  an  experimental  entity,  the  shape 
of  a  sphere.  There  is  no  experimental  criterion  for  passing  judgment 
on  such  an  issue.  And  yet  an  apparently  experimental  reason  is  of- 
fered to  prove  that  God  is  spherical:  it  is  said  that  He  is  one,  that 
He  is  absolutely  similar  to  Himself,  that  He  sees  and  hears  on  all 
sides.^  The  author  of  the  De  Melisso  is  not  convinced  and  remarks 
that  if  everything  that  is  similar  to  itself  throughout  has  to  be  spher- 

471  ^  Here,  remember,  we  are  considering  theories  objectively,  quite  apart  from 
the  inner  thought  of  the  persons  who  framed  them.  We  are  dissociating  them 
from  their  authors  and  considering  them  in  themselves. 

474  ^  It  is  attributed  to  Aristotle,  and  the  philosopher  in  question  is  alleged  to 
be  Xenophanes.  Neither  assertion  seems  to  be  substantiated.  The  question,  how- 
ever, is  of  no  importance  to  us.  We  are  interested  in  types  of  reasoning.  We  do  not 
care  whom  they  belong  to. 

474  2  De  Melisso,  Xenophane,  Gorgia,  III  (Bekker,  p.  977b;  Diels,  p.  20)  : 
•KdvTTf  6e  bfiotov  6vTa,  <j(paipoei6y  dvai.  Farther  along,  IV,  6,  7  (Bekker,  p.  978;  Diel-s, 
p.  27),  a  similar  dictum  of  Parmenides  is  noted  [and  denied:  ovSe  rbv  debv  avdyKf) 
elvai  6ia  tovto  at^aipoeiofj] ;  and  in  the  fragments  of  Parmenides,  Carmen,  vv.  101-03 
(Karsten,  p.  38),  one  reads:  "Since  he  [God]  is  perfect  to  the  very  extremities 
everywhere,  he  is  like  unto  the  globe  of  a  round  sphere,  all  of  which  is  equidistant 
from  its  centre." 

474  ^Ibid.,  IV,  6,  7  (Bekker,  p.  978;  Diels,  p.  27). 


§477  NON-EXPERIMENTAL  ELEMENTS  289 

ical,  white  lead,  which  is  white  throughout,  should  also  be  spherical. 
And  he  gives  other  arguments  of  the  kind.  All  that  very  evidently 
overreaches  the  domain  of  experience,  and  if  we  would  keep  within 
the  experimental  field,  we  can  neither  endorse  nor  disavow  either 
party  in  the  controversy.  Any  siding  with  the  one  or  the  other 
would  be  due  to  some  sentimental  inclination  on  our  part  and  not 
to  any  experimental  consideration. 

475.  But  we  happen  on  another  dispute  in  the  same  treatise.  Xe- 
nophanes  holds  that  the  Earth  and  the  air  are  infinite  in  extent,  and 
Empedocles  denies  that.^  The  entities  here  are  experimental,  and 
experience  can  pronounce  judgment.  It  has  in  fact  rendered  judg- 
ment— in  favour  of  Empedocles. 

476.  Now  most  theories  on  social  matters  that  have  been  current 
down  to  our  own  time  tend  to  approximate  the  type  of  theory  that 
is  made  up  of  non-experimental  entities,  but  usurps  the  form  and 
appearance  of  experimental  theory. 

477.  Taking  our  stand  on  formal  logic  and  disregarding  validities 
of  premise,  the  strongest  position  for  us  is  provided  by  combinations 
of  the  type  III,  and  the  next  strongest  by  combinations  of  the  type 
II.  If,  in  the  proposition  "A  =  B"  both  A  and  B  are  non-experi- 
mental entities,  the  person  who  would  keep  strictly  to  the  experi- 
mental field  can  raise,  obviously,  no  objections  of  any  kind  what- 
soever. When  St.  Thomas  asserts  that  angel  speaks  to  angel,  he  sets 
up  a  relation  between  things  about  which  the  person  keeping  strictly 
to  experience  can  say  nothing.  The  case  is  the  same  when  the  argu- 
ment is  elaborated  logically  and  one  or  more  inferences  are  drawn. 
St.  Thomas  is  not  content  with  his  mere  assertion;  he  is  eager  to 
prove  it,  and  says:  "Since  one  angel  can  express  to  another  angel 
the  concept  in  his  mind,  and  since  the  person  who  has  a  concept  in 
his  mind  can  express  it  to  another  at  will,  it  follows  that  one  angel 
may  speak  to  another."  ^  Experimental  science  can  find  no  fault  with 
the  argument.  It  lies  altogether  outside  its  province.  Many  meta- 

475  ^Ibid.,  II  (Bekker,  p.  976;  Diels,  p.  16).  Cf.  Artistotle,  De  coelo,  II,  13,  7 
(Hardie-Gaye,  Vol.  II,  p.  294a). 

477  ^  Summa  theologiae,  I*,  qti.  107,  art.  1  {Opera,  Vol.  V,  p.  488:  Utriim  units 
angehis  alteri  loquatur). 


290  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §478 

physical  arguments  are  of  just  that  type,  and  many  others  differ 
from  it  only  in  taking  over  some  term  from  the  experimental  sphere. 

478.  We  are  given  the  follovi^ing  definition:  "All  beings  capable 
of  some  degree  of  activity — or  one  might  simply  say  all  beings,  since 
absolute  inertia  is  equivalent  to  non-being — tend  to  an  end  tow^ards 
w^hich  all  their  efforts  and  all  their  faculties  are  directed.  That  end, 
without  vi'hich  they  would  not  act — in  other  words,  not  exist — ^is 
what  is  called  'the  good.'  "  ^  So  one  thing  unknown  and  lying  outside 
the  experimental  field  ("the  good")  is  defined  by  another  thing 
even  more  unknown  and  likewise  lying  outside  the  experimental 
field  ("the  end").  On  such  an  argument  we  can  have  nothing  to 
say.  For  its  part,  unfortunately,  the  argument  does  not  stay  at  home; 
it  is  soon  intruding  upon  the  experimental  world,  where  it  neces- 
sarily comes  into  collision  with  experimental  science. 

479.  The  first  class  of  combinations  comprises  all  scientific  the- 
ories; but  it  also  contains  others — exceedingly  interesting  ones — that 
are  pseudo-scientific  in  character.  Pseudo-scientific  theories  arise 
through  the  elimination  of  some  non-experimental  entity  that  has 
been  used  merely  to  establish  certain  relations,  not  otherwise  demon- 
strable, between  experimental  entities.  The  person,  for  example, 
who  gives  the  definition  of  "the  good"  quoted  above,  has  not  the 
remotest  intention  of  remaining  in  the  high  and  nebulous  regions 
whence  he  takes  wing.  Sooner  or  later  he  intends  to  return  to  this 
lowly  earth  of  experience — it  is  too  important,  after  all,  to  be  en- 
tirely ignored.  Similarly,  to  the  assertion  that  the  Scriptures  are  in- 
spired by  God  the  person  who  insists  on  remaining  within  the  limits 
of  experience  can  make  no  objection.  But  those  who  assert  divine 
inspiration  intend  to  use  it  eventually  to  set  up  this  or  that  relation 
between  experimental  entities — to  assert,  for  example,  that  there  are 
no  antipodes.  Such  propositions  logico-experimental  science  has  to 
judge  intrinsically,  without  reference  to  the  non-experimental  con- 
siderations on  which  they  are  based.  So  again,  the  metaphysical 
theory  of  "solidarity"  is  immune  to  rebuttal  from  logico-experi- 
mental science ;  but  those  who  invented  that  non-experimental  phan- 

478  ^  Franck,  Dictionnaire  des  sciences  philosophiques,  s.v.  Bien. 


§481  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  29 1 

torn  intend  to  avail  themselves  of  it  to  establish  relations  between 
experimental  entities  and,  specifically,  between  their  pockets  and 
their  neighbour's  money.  Such  experimental  relations  and  opera- 
tions logico-experimental  science  must  judge  intrinsically,  disregard- 
ing the  fancies  and  vagaries  of  the  Holy  Fathers  of  the  Church  of 
Solidarity. 

480.  These  particular  cases  fall  under  the  following  general  for- 
mula. Let  A  and  B  stand  for  two  things  lying  within  the  experi- 
mental domain,  and  X  for  another  thing  lying  outside  that  domain. 
A  syllogism  is  drawn  with  X  as  the  middle  term.  X  eventually  dis- 
appears, and  just  the  relation  between  A  and  B  is  left.  Experimen- 
tally, neither  the  major  nor  the  minor  premise  can  be  accepted  be- 
cause of  the  term  X,  which  transcends  experience ;  and  therefore  the 
relation  between  A  and  B  cannot  be  accepted  (or  rejected)  either, 
for  it  is  a  relation  that  is  experimental  only  in  appearance.  In  the 
logic  of  sentiment  (§  1416),  on  the  other  hand,  in  a  reasoning  de- 
veloping by  accord  of  sentiments,  the  syllogism  may  be  as  sound  as 
sound  can  be;  because,  in  reality  and  taking  due  account  all  along 
of  the  indefiniteness  of  terms  in  ordinary  language,  if  the  sentiments 
aroused  by  A  accord  with  the  sentiments  aroused  by  X,  and  the 
sentiments  aroused  by  X  with  the  sentiments  aroused  by  B,  it  will 
follow  that  on  the  whole  the  sentiments  aroused  by  A  will  accord 
with  the  sentiments  aroused  by  B.  Farther  along  (§  514)  we  are  to 
examine  this  argumentation  from  the  standpoint  of  its  persuasive 
force.  Suppose  just  here  we  begin  by  considering  it  from  the  experi- 
mental standpoint. 

481.  We  must  be  on  close  guard  against  two  mistakes  that  may 
be  made  in  inverse  directions:  (i)  the  mistake  of  accepting  the  rela- 
tion between  A  and  B  arising  from  the  elimination  of  X,  on  the 
strength  of  the  syllogism,  without  a  strictly  experimental  verifica- 
tion; (2)  if  it  be  experimentally  verifiable  that  the  relation  between 
A  and  B  exists,  the  mistake  of  concluding  from  that  fact  that,  ac- 
cording to  experimental  science,  X  exists;  or  conversely,  if  it  be 
experimentally  ascertained  that  the  alleged  relation  between  A  and 


292  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §482 

B  does  not  exist,  the  mistake  of  concluding  that,  according  to  experi- 
mental science,  X  is  non-existent  (§§  487,  516,  1689). 

482.  For  that  matter,  our  reason  for  rejecting  on  experimental 
grounds  the  relation  between  A  and  B  arising  from  the  elimination 
of  X  is  in  part  purely  formal;  and  we  may  ignore  it  if  the  relation- 
ship between  A  and  B  has  been  experimentally  established.  The  test 
of  that  relationship  is,  after  all,  the  purpose  of  the  theory.  Of  what 
importance  the  means  by  which  it  is  realized  ? 

483.  In  such  a  problem  we  have  to  keep  three  researches  distinct: 

a.  The  investigation  of  whai  is — in?  other  words,  the  study  of  real 
movements 

b.  The  investigation  of  what  would  happen  under  certain  condi- 
tions— in  other  words,  of  virtual  movements 

c.  The  investigation  of  what  ought  to  be. 

484.  a.  As  for  what  really  is,  experience  has  passed  its  judgment. 
Reasonings  of  the  type  mentioned  almost  never  yield  relationships 
that  are  verifiable  on  the  facts  (§  50). 

485.  Let  us  go  back  to  the  matter  of  the  antipodes  already  alluded 
to  (§  67).  Are  there  people  called  antipodes  on  the  face  of  the  earth? 
Good  sense  and  prudence  ought  to  have  counselled  people  to  leave 
the  task  of  solving  that  problem  to  experience.  St.  Augustine  chooses 
to  solve  it  a  priori — and,  after  all,  his  reasoning  is  no  worse  than 
many  others  that  are  accepted  in  our  time,  since  it  has,  if  nothing 
else,  the  merit  of  being  intelligible.  The  Saint  says:^  "There  is  no 
reason  for  believing  that,  as  some  fancy,  there  are  Antipodes,  that 
is  to  say,  people  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  earth,  where  the  sun 
rises  when  it  sets  on  our  side,  people  who  tread  with  their  feet  that 
part  of  the  earth  which  is  opposite  to  the  soles  of  our  feet."  There  is 
no  historical  proof  of  the  fact,  the  Saint  continues.  The  part  of  the 
earth  opposite  to  ours  may  be  covered  with  water,  and  therefore  be 
uninhabited.  But  then,  even  if  it  is  not  covered  with  water,  "it  is  not 
at  all  necessary  that  it  be  inhabited.  For  Holy  Writ  makes  no  men- 
tion of  such  a  thing  and  Scripture  justifies  its  accounts  through  the 
fact  that,  in  the  past,  things  that  it  predicted  have  come  to  pass.  And 

485  1  De  civitate  Dei,  XVI,  9. 


§486  NON-EXPERIMENTAL  ELEMENTS:   ANTIPODES  293 

it  is  moreover  exceedingly  absurd  to  say  that  some  men  could 
have  sailed  across  the  vast  Ocean,  gone  from  this  part  to  that  part 
of  the  earth,  and  founded  a  new  branch  of  the  human  race."  The 
argument  is  v^^ell  knit  and,  if  one  w^ill,  even  sound;  but  unfortu- 
nately it  is  at  w^ar  with  the  facts;  nor  have  the  many  similar  argu- 
ments designed  to  prove  that  there  were  and  could  be  no  antipodes 
enjoyed  a  better  fate. 

486.  Lactantius  Firmianus  says :  "Can  anyone  possibly  be  so  stupid 
as  to  believe  that  there  are  men  who  walk  with  their  feet  up 
and  their  heads  down?  Or  that  there  [at  the  antipodes]  all  that 
which  with  us  lies  on  the  ground  is  upside  down?  That  crops  and 
trees  grow  downward  ?  That  rain,  snow,  and  hail  fall  upward  to  the 
earth?"  ^  The  error  here  may  be  of  theological  origin,  but  it  is  meta- 
physical in  form  at  least.  Lactantius  reasons  like  a  Hegelian.  He 

486  }  Divinae  institutiones.  III,  De  falsa  sapientia,  24,  i  and  7-9,  lo-ii  {Opera, 
Vol.  I,  pp.  254-56;  Fletcher,  Vol.  I,  pp.  196-97) :  "Quid  illi  qui  esse  contrarios  ves- 
tigiis  nostris  antipodas  pittant?  Num  aliqitid  loqmintiir?  Aut  est  qiiisquam  tatm 
ineptus  qui  credat  esse  homines  quorum  vestigia  sint  superiora  quant  capita?  Aut 
ibi  quae  apud  nos  iacent  inversa  pendere?  Fruges  et  arbores  deorsum  versus  cres- 
cere?  Plttvias  et  nives  et  gratidines  sursum  versus  cadere  in  terram?"  Lactantius  re- 
plies to  the  "philosophers"  the  way  our  Hegelians  answer  the  physicists.  He  says 
that  from  the  movement  of  the  sun  and  the  moon  the  "philosophers"  have  con- 
cluded that  the  sky  was  round:  "From  this  roundness  of  the  heavens  it  would  fol- 
low that  the  earth  was  contained  in  the  centre  of  its  interior;  and  if  that  were  so, 
the  earth  itself  would  be  globe-shaped;  for  nothing  embraced  by  a  round  globe 
could  help  being  round  itself.  But  if  the  earth  were  round  it  would  have  to  offer 
the  same  face  [i.e.,  the  same  sort  of  surface]  to  all  parts  of  the  sky,  raising  moun- 
tains, that  is  [/.(?.,  in  the  nether  hemisphere  as  well  as  in  the  upper],  spreading  out 
its  plains  and  its  flat  seas.  And  if  that  were  so,  this  extreme  consequence  would  also 
follow,  that  there  would  be  no  part  of  the  earth  which  is  not  inhabited  by  men  and 
other  animals.  So  the  roundness  of  the  heavens  [i.e.,  the  theory  that  the  universe  is 
a  globe]  would  leave  the  Antipodes  hanging  head  downward.  And  if  you  ask  the 
people  who  sustain  such  marvels  why  everything  does  not  fall  into  the  nether  part 
of  the  heavens,  they  answer  that,  in  the  nature  of  things,  heavy  things  are  carried 
towards  the  centre  and  are  connected  with  the  centre  like  spokes  in  a  wheel, 
whereas  light  things,  such  as  clouds,  smoke,  or  fire,  are  repelled  from  the  centre  so 
that  they  rise  towards  the  sky.  What  I  am  to  say  to  that  I  am  sure  I  do  not  know, 
unless  it  be  that  having  uttered  one  foolish  thing,  they  have  to  go  on  and  defend 
it  with  another."  That  sounds  like  Hegel  taking  Newton  to  task!  Lactantius,  good 
soul,  concludes:  "I  could  prove  with  many  arguments  that  it  is  in  no  way  possible 
for  the  sky  to  be  lower  than  the  earth  [Still  the  Hegelian  method  of  arguing  from 
concepts — here  the  concept  "lower."],  were  it  not  time  for  this  book  to  come  to  a 
close."  A  great  pity!  What  we  have  missed! 


294  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §487 

finds,  and  everybody  will  find  widi  him,  that  the  concepts  of  "high," 
"low,"  "upwards,"  "downwards"  (as  known  in  our  hemisphere), 
are  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  antipodes.  He  is  right,  in  fact : 
it  is  ridiculous  to  imagine  people  walking  with  their  heads  down 
and  their  feet  up.  However,  if  a  person  reasons  not  on  concepts  but 
on  things,  and  considers  names  merely  as  labels  serving  to  keep  track 
of  things  (§  119),  he  readily  sees  that  when  we  move  or^  to  the  part 
of  the  earth  opposite  to  ours  we  have  to  shuffle  our  labels  about, 
exchanging  the  tag  "upward"  for  the  tag  "downward."  Then  belief 
in  antipodes  ceases  to  be  ridiculous.  Though  errors  such  as  Lactan- 
tius  made  have  vanished,  or  all  but  vanished,  from  the  natural  sci- 
ences, they  are  still  very  common  in  the  social  sciences,  where  many 
people  continue  reasoning  in  that  fashion.  Anyone  not  afraid  lest 
his  conclusions  stand  in  a  similar  relation  to  the  facts  may  go  on 
reasoning  like  Lactantius  or  the  Hegelians.  If  he  would,  as  far  as  his 
ability  will  allow,  have  his  conclusions  stand  to  the  facts  in  the  rela- 
tions observable  in  the  physical  sciences,  he  must  try  to  reason  after 
the  manner  now  customary  in  those  sciences  (§§5,  69,  71). 

487.  Many  have  turned,  and  many,  I  believe,  are  still  turning,  the 
errors  of  the  Fathers  with  regard  to  the  antipodes  to  the  discredit  of 
Christianity,  or,  at  least,  of  Catholicism.  Bui  really  religion  is  in  no 
wise  responsible  for  such  errors,  and  sufficient  proof  of  that  is  the 
fact  that  many  pagans  also  gave  the  earth  a  form  other  than  spher- 
ical and  ridiculed  believers  in  antipodes.^  Lucretius,  the  atheist,  rea- 
sons no  better  than  Lactantius.  He  deems  absurd  the  view  that  the 
earth  holds  together  because  all  bodies  tend  toward  the  centre.  "Can 
you  believe,"  he  says,  "that  bodies  can  hold  themselves  up  all  by 
themselves,  that  the  heavy  bodies  under  the  earth  all  tend  upward 
and  then  stick  to  the  opposite  part  of  the  earth  upside  down,  like 
the  reflections  we  see  on  our  side  in  water  ?  On  similar  grounds  it  is 

487  ^Plutarch,  De  placitis  philosophontm,  III,  10  (Goodwin,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  155). 
Idem,  De  facie  quae  in  orbe  limae  apparet,  7,  2  (Goodwin,  Vol.  V,  p.  243):  "We 
must  not  heed  pliilosophers  when  they  try  to  refute  paradox  with  paradox.  .  .  . 
And  what  absurdities  do  they  not  put  forward?  Do  they  not  say  that  the  Earth  is 
spherical,  tipugh  it  has  such  great  cavities,  heights,  inequalities  ?  That  it  is  inhab- 
ited by  Antipodians,  who  crawl  like  worms  and  lizards,  upside  down?" 


§4^9  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  295 

maintained  that  animals  go  about  head  downwards,  and  that  they 
cannot  fall  from  the  Earth  into  the  nether  spaces  of  the  heavens  any 
more  than  our  bodies  can  rise  to  the  higher  regions  of  the  sky."^ 

488.  The  best  that  can  be  said  is  that  a  strong  faith  of  whatever 
kind,  be  it  religious  or  metaphysical,  saves  a  person  from  the  prudent 
scepticism  of  the  experimental  sciences  through  the  pride  one  takes 
in  knowing  the  absolute.  But  that  is  an  indirect  cause  of  error.  The 
direct  lies  in  trying  to  reason  on  concepts  rather  than  on  facts,  and 
in  using  introspection  instead  of  objective  observation.^ 

489.  Amusing  indeed  is  Cosmas  Indicopleustes.  His  second  pro- 
logue is  entitled  "Christian  Topography,  Embracing  the  Whole  Uni- 
verse, and  Proved  from  Holy  Writ,  wherewith  Christians  Must  Not 
Disagree."  ^  First  he  takes  a  fling  at  "those  who  though  Christians 
believe  and  teach  with  the  pagans  that  the  sky  is  spherical."  He  has 
proofs,  excellent  in  truth,  that  the  Earth  is  not  spherical.  "Consider- 
ing its  incalculable  weight  how  can  the  Earth  hang  suspended  in 
the  air  and  not  fall?"^  Whereas  from  Scripture  we  learn  that  the 
world  has  the  shape  of  an  oven  and  that  the  earth  is  quadrangular. 
The  tabernacle  built  by  Moses  is  the  image  of  the  world.  Needless 
to  say,  the  existence  of  antipodes  is  a  ridiculous  myth;  and  to  show 
just  how  ridiculous  it  is,  Cosmas  gives  a  drawing  in  which  very  large 
men  are  shown  standing  feet  to  feet  on  opposite  sides  of  a  very  small 
globe,  131  D  (Migne,  p.  130;  Winstedt,  ps  92):  "As  for  antipodes. 
Scripture  does  not  permit  us  to  utter  or  heed  such  nonsense.  For  it 
says  [Acts  17:26]:  'and  hath  made  of  one  blood  all  nations  of  men 
for  to  dwell  on  all  the  face  of  the  earth.'  ...  It  does  not  say  on  all 
the  faces,  but  on  the  face."  And  other  arguments  just  as  decisive 
follow. 

487  2  De  reru7n  natura,  I,  vv.  1056-63.  Lucretius,  however,  has  one  thing  in  his 
favour:  he  did  not  dream  of  persecuting  those  who  differed  with  him. 

488  1  Here,  as  elsewhere,  we  contrast  concepts  with  facts,  the  subjective  with  the 
objective,  not  in  any  metaphysical  sense,  but  in  an  experimental  sense,  as  explained 
in  §§94-95. 

4Sg  ^  Topograp/iia  C/iristiana,  Prologue  B  (Migne,  p.  58;  Winstedt,  p.  41): 
XpiariaviK^  TOTToypacpia  TrepuKTiKf/  -rvavrbg  tov  Kdafiov,  aTrodel^eig  ixovGa  ek  t^q  deiag  Tpa- 
<p^C,  T^epl  ijc  afx<piG[i7jr£7v  Xpiariavovg  oh  Seov. 

489  '^  Ibid.,  65A  (Migne,  p.  66;  Winstedt,  p.  46):  to.  rooavra  cifirfitira  ^apTj  TfjQyriq, 
TToif  dwarov  vno  aepa  xP^/J-^c^Oai  nai  'iarcaOai,  koI  firj  KaTaniTTTeiv; 


296  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §490 

490.  Even  writers  who  are  otherwise  keen  enough  have  theories 
no  better  when  they  set  to  reasoning  metaphysically.  Aristotle  dem- 
onstrates at  length  in  his  De  coelo  that  the  movement  of  the  heavens 
has  to  be  circular.  He  begins  by  asserting  that  every  movement  in 
space  must  be  either  rectilinear,  or  circular,  or  else  a  combination  of 
the  two  (I,  2,  2;  Hardie-Gaye,  Vol.  II,  268  b).  He  follows  with  an- 
other declaration:  that  only  rectilinear  and  circular  movements  are 
simple.  Then  he  says,  I,  2,  4:  "I  call  those  bodies  simple  which  have 
in  themselves  naturally  the  principle  of  motion,  such  as  fire,  earth, 
and  the  like."  ^  That  is  a  definition,  and  no  objection  could  be  made 
to  it  if  it  were  clear.  Unfortunately  it  is  not,  and  that  is  a  defect  com- 
mon to  all  the  definitions  of  the  metaphysicists,  since  these  inevitably 
contain  terms  that  correspond  to  nothing  real.  "Have  in  themselves 
naturally  the  principle  of  motion!"  What  on  earth  can  that  mean.!^ 
Nothing  whatever!  It  is  a  verbiage  that  acts  solely  upon  a  reader's 
sentiments. 

491.  Those  meaningless  assertions  and  definitions  eventually  serve 
for  reasonings  that  are  professedly  exact,  I,  2,  5  (Hardie-Gaye,  Vol. 
II,  p.  269a) :  "So  then,  since  there  is  a  simple  motion,  and  circular 
motion  is  cimple ;  and  since  a  simple  body  has  a  simple  motion,  and  a 
simple  motion  belongs  to  a  simple  body  (if  it  were  compound  it 
would  move  according  to  its  preponderant  constituent),  there  must 
be  a  simple  body  which  by  nature  moves  in  a  circle."  That  dazzling 
argument  is  reinforced  by  the  following,  I,  2,  9:  "This  motion, 
therefore,  must  necessarily  be  the  first.  The  perfect  by  nature  pre- 
cedes the  imperfect.  Now  the  circle  is  perfect,  whereas  the  straight 
line  is  not.  .  .  .  Hence  if  the  primary  motion  is  of  that  body  which 
is  first  in  nature,  and  if  circular  motion  is  superior  to  the  rectilinear, 
which  is  proper  to  simple  bodies  (for  fire  rises  in  a  straight  line,  and 
terrestrial  bodies  fall  towards  the  centre),  circular  motion  must 
necessarily  belong  to  a  simple  body."  ^  Obviously,  there  is  nothing 

490  ^  Tieyu  6'  an'ka  oca  Kivyaeug  apxyv  ex£i  Kara  (phaiv,  olov  Tvvp  koI  yyv  kol  to,  tovtuv 
e16i]  Kal  TO,  cfvyyevy  rovTocg. 

491  ■*■  'A?./.a  fi7)v  Koi  TtpioTTjv  ys  avayKoiov  elvai  ryv  TomvT9}v  <popav.  To  yap  teIeiov  Tzpd- 
TEpov  tT]  (pvCEi  Tov  ar£?Mvgy  6  Se  KiKkog  riov  T£?.ei(jv,  EvdE'ta  Se  ypa/n/xy  ov6E/j.ta.  Tt/le«of, 
"perfect,"  in  Greek  has  two  meanings:   "finished,"   "complete,"  and  also   "with- 


§491  NON-EXPERIMENTAL  ELEMENTS!   ARISTOTLE  297 

experimental  about  this  argument.  Its  whole  force  lies  in  sentiments 
that  are  aroused  by  suitably  chosen  terms,  and  it  persuades  because 
those  sentiments  are  in  apparent  accord  with  one  another,  or  at  least 
do  not  stand  in  overt  conflict.  Following  that  course  one  may  find 
anything  one  wishes,  just  as  one  can  look  at  the  clouds  in  the  sky  and 
make  out  the  shapes  of  any  sort  of  animal.  So  Plato  considers  the 
circle  and  the  sphere  "divine."  And  why  not?  He  is  at  liberty  to 
call  them  "divine,"  just  as  a  schoolboy  baffled  by  the  problems  of  M 
spherical  trigonometry  is  at  liberty  to  call  them  "hellish."  Such  are 
mere  expressions  of  sentiment,  with  no  relation  whatsoever  to  any  /  / 
objective  reality.^ 

out  fault,"  "the  best  possible."  Aristotle,  Ethica  Nicomachea,  V,  I,  15  (Rack- 
ham,  p.  259),  uses  the  word  in  the  latter  sense  to  designate  a  virtue  that  is  the 
"highest"  "most  exalted":  reXeia  aper^.  This  ambiguity  in  the  meaning  of  teIeloq 
helps  to  conceal  the  inanity  of  the  argument  in  the  De  coelo.  The  circular  move- 
ment is  "finished"  (complete)  because  it  returns  upon  itself,  because  it  can  go  on 
indefinitely  on  the  same  curve;  and  when  in  that  way  the  adjective  tD.eio^  has 
gained  acceptance,  it  follows,  by  virtue  of  the  double  sense,  that  circular  motion  is 
better  than  any  other  motion  (§§  1556  f.). 

There  is  still  another  play  on  ambiguity  in  De  coelo,  II,  4,  2  (Hardie-Gaye,  Vol. 
II,  p.  286b-87).  There  the  reasoning  on  the  "perfect"  circle  is  repeated.  The  circle 
is  said  to  be  perfect  as  compared  with  the  straight  line  because  sometliing  can  be 
added  to  the  straight  line,  nothing  to  the  circle.  Then  Aristotle  goes  on:  "Therefore 
if  the  perfect  is  anterior  to  the  imperfect,  for  that  reason  too  the  circle  is  first  among 
figures."  This  argument  is  as  valid  for  any  closed  curve  as  for  the  circle.  So  Aris- 
tode  says,  De  generatione  et  corruptione ,  II,  10,  8  (Joachim,  p.  337a) :  "When  air 
comes  from  water,  and  fire  from  water,  and,  again  water  from  fire,  we  say  that  the 
process  takes  place  in  a  circle,  since  it  comes  back  upon  itself."  If  the  passage  in  the 
De  coelo  were  to  be  interpreted  in  that  sense,  the  contrast  in  the  passage  would  be 
between  a  movement  that  returns  upon  itself  and  a  movement  extending  indefi- 
nitely along  an  unclosed  line.  But  that  is  in  no  wise  the  case:  a  geometric  circle,  no 
more,  no  less,  is  in  question,  for  in  II,  4,  6  Aristotle  bars  not  only  irregular  poly- 
gons, but  any  curved  figures  where  the  radii  are  not  all  of  equal  length,  such  as 
egg-shaped  or  lens-shaped  figures.  It  is  therefore  evident  that  the  phrase  "circular 
motion"  has  now  one  sense,  now  another;  at  one  time  it  is  just  modon  along  a 
closed  curve,  at  another,  motion  around  a  geometric  circle. 

491  ^  Plato,  however,  is  speaking  of  circle  and  sphere  as  such.  He  lays  down  that 
some  sciences  are  truer  than  others.  He  takes  the  case  of  a  man  who  has  a  true 
knowledge  of  jusdce,  and  then  tries  to  show  how  that  knowledge  mingles  with 
other  knowledge  less  perfect.  Philebus,  62A:  "Will  such  a  man  be  sufHciendy  wise 
if  he  knows  the  nature  {Uyov)  of  the  divine  circle  and  sphere  (  .  .  .  k'vuXov  fiev  koI 
of^aipaq  avTijq  rijg  deiaq  tov  7.6yov  £;\;wv)  and  does  not  know  the  nature  {76-,  or)  of  the 
human  circle  and  sphere?" 


298  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §492 

492.  Aristotle,  De  coelo,  II,  13,  19  (Hardie-Gaye,  Vol.  II,  p.  295b), 
explains  how  the  immobility  of  the  Earth  used  to  be  demonstrated 
according  to  Anaximander:  There  is  no  reason  why  a  body  placed 
in  the  centre  and  equidistant  from  the  extremities  should  be  moved 
upward  rather  than  downward  or  obliquely;  and  since  it  is  impos- 
sible for  a  body  to  move  in  opposite  directions  at  one  time,  it  must 
necessarily  remain  motionless.  And  here  are  words  of  one  of  the 
greatest  scientists  of  our  modern  times:  "A  body  at  rest  cannot  set 
itself  in  motion,  since  it  has  within  itself  no  reason  for  moving  in 
one  direction  rather  than  in  another.  .  .  .  The  direction  of  recti- 
linear movement  evidently  follows  from  the  lack  of  any  reason  why 
the  body  should  move  to  the  right  rather  than  to  the  left  of  its  orig- 
inal direction."  ^ 

Anaximander's  proposition  is  contradicted  by  experience;  the 
propositions  of  Laplace  are  confirmed  by  experience.  In  both  cases 
the  demonstrations  are  without  the  slightest  value. 

493.  The  argument  is  framed  on  the  following  model :  "Anything 
that  to  me  and  other  men  seems  impossible  will  certainly  not  hap- 
pen. I  see  no  reason  why  A  should  be  B.  Therefore  A  cannot  be  B." 
That  is  the  usual  introspective  syllogism  (§§43,  69,  iii,  434). 

494.  The  fallacy  in  the  argument  is  less  evident  because  what 
ought  to  be  stated  in  subjective  form  is  stated  in  objective  form. 
Laplace  said:  "There  is  no  reason  why  the  body  should  move  to  the 
right  rather  than  to  the  left."  Had  he  chosen  to  state  his  thought 
exactly,  he  would  have  said:  ".  .  .  it  seems  to  me  that  there  is  no 
reason  why  .  .  ."  But  in  that  form  the  fallacious  character  of  the 
proof  would  have  been  more  strikingly  apparent.  Laplace  might 
have  replied  that  he  did  not  use  the  revised  form  because  the  thing 
seems  as  it  seems  not  to  him  only,  but  to  all  men.  Another  of  the 
great  sources  of  error  in  such  reasonings!  It  simply  is  not  true  that 
things  seem  to  all  men  as  they  seem  to  him.  Most  men  have  never 

492  ^  Laplace,  Traite  de  mecanique  celeste.  Vol.  I,  p.  14:  "Un  point  en  repos  ne 
pent  se  donner  aucun  mouvement,  puisqti'il  ne  renferme  pas  en  lui-meme  de  raison 
pour  se  mouvoir  dans  un  sens  plutot  que  dans  un  autre.  .  .  .  La  direction  du 
mouvement  en  ligne  droite  suit  cvidemment  de  ce  qu'il  n'y  a  aucune  raison  pour 
que  ce  point  s'ecarte  plutot  a  droite  qu'a  gauche  de  sa  direction  primitive." 


§497  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  299 

given  a  thought  to  the  subject!  But  never  mind  that.  Even  if  they 
had,  the  universal  consensus  of  mankind  would  not  enhance  the 
value  of  the  proposition  by  a  jot  and  w^ould  have  no  powder  to  make 
a  thing  that  is  subjective  objective  (§502). 

495.  As  usual,  reasonings  of  this  type  are  lacking  in  any  exact- 
ness— a  fact  we  have  often  had  occasion  to  stress  and  shall  continue 
stressing.  What  can  it  mean  to  say  that  a  body  "has  within  itself 
no  reason  for  moving  in  one  direction  rather  than  in  another"  ?  And 
how  can  we  know  whether  really  it  has  no  such  reason  within  itself? 
In  no  other  way  than  by  observing  whether  it  remains  at  rest.  The 
Laplace  proposition  therefore  amounts  to  saying  that  a  body  is  at 
rest  when  it  is  at  rest — a  thing  as  true  as  it  is  useless  to  know. 

496.  To  say  that  "force"  is  the  "cause"  of  motion  is  to  think  one 
is  saying  something  and  to  say  nothing — to  define  an  unknown  by 
an  unknown.^  What  would  this  thing  called  the  cause  of  the  move- 
ment be  ?  It  is  difficult  to  imagine  any  other  reply  than  that  the  cause 
is  a  force ;  so  that  the  proposition  comes  down  to  saying  that  a  force 
is  a  force.  A  ban  has  been  laid  on  such  methods  of  reasoning  in  the 
science  of  modern  mechanics."  In  these  volumes  we  were  trying  to 
follow  that  good  example  for  sociology. 

497.  "Natural,"  "violent,"  "voluntary"  movements  play  an  im- 
portant part  in  ancient  philosophy.  To  see  how  much  nonsense  can 
be  emitted  on  such  matters,  one  has  only  to  read  the  tenth  book  of 
Plato's  Laws.  Aristotle,  too,  unfortunately  allowed  himself  to  be 

496  ^  Poisson,  Traite  de  mecanique.  Vol.  I,  p.  2:  "In  general  the  term  'force'  is 
applied  to  any  cause  of  motion  in  a  body."  Physicists  eventually  became  aware  of 
the  inanity  of  such  a  definition.  Barre  de  Saint-Venant,  Principes  de  mecanique 
jondes  siir  la  cinematique ,  p.  65:  "From  our  stricdy  practical  point  of  view,  we  do 
not  stop  to  consider  whether  'mass'  has  any  bearing  on  the  quantities  of  matter  in 
the  various  heterogeneous  bodies  .  .  .  nor  whether  'force'  has  any  bearing  on  the 
efficient-causes  of  movement  in  such  bodies." 

496  ^  Picard,  La  mecanique  classique  et  ses  approxitnations  successives,  p.  6:  "In 
the  study  of  constant  fields,  force  has  been  successively  defined  in  two  different 
ways,  first  by  static  measures,  then  from  a  dynamic  standpoint,  in  terms  of  the 
accelerations  corresponding  to  the  fields.  No  relation  between  these  two  evaluations 
was  a  priori  necessary,  and  we  must  regard  it  as  an  experimental  result  that  the 
numbers  representing  forces  considered  from  the  dynamic  and  from  the  static 
standpoint  are  proportional."  This  last  remark  should  be  pondered  with  the  great- 
est care.  The  conception  it  voices  is  fundamental  to  science. 


300  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §498 

lured  into  similar  lucubrations,  and  so  was  in  a  position  to  be  used 
against  Galileo  when  the  latter  was  laying  the  foundations  of  ex- 
perimental physics.  In  that  science  the  work  of  Galileo  already  be- 
longs to  a  historic  past.  An  achievement  as  significant  is  as  yet  barely 
on  the  horizon  for  sociology,  even  in  our  day. 

498.  Cicero  puts  into  the  mouth  of  Balbus  an  argument  to  prove 
that  the  stars  move  of  their  own  volition.  According  to  Aristotle, 
says  Balbus,  everything  that  moves  is  moved  either  by  nature,  or  by 
force,  or  by  choice.  How  then  do  the  Sun,  Moon,  and  stars  move? 
"Whatever  is  moved  of  nature  is  borne  either  downward  by  its 
weight  or  upward  by  its  lightness.  No  one  of  those  things  is  the  case 
with  the  stars,  since  they  move  in  circular  orbits.  Nor  can  it  be  said 
that  the  stars  are  moved  against  nature  by  a  greater  force,  for  what 
force  could  be  greater?  It  results,  therefore,  that  the  motion  of  the 
stars  is  voluntary."  ^ 

499.  Theories  of  that  kind  are  evolved  in  great  numbers  when 
thinking  is  based  on  concepts  and  words  rather  than  on  facts.^  And 
when  the  error  becomes  manifest,  when  it  can  no  longer  be  deco- 
rously denied,  instead  of  abandoning  the  method  of  reasoning  that 
led  to  it,  people  obstinately  try  to  preserve  it  and  merely  seek  ways 
of  adapting  it  to  the  data  of  experience. 

500.  If  experience  has  in  advance  established  a  relation  between 
two  experimental  facts  A  and  B,  the  theological  or  metaphysical 
thinker  rearranges  his  words  in  such  a  way  as  to  picture  that  rela- 
tionship as  closely  as  possible.  But,  unfortunately,  if  a  person  is  in 
the  habit  of  thinking  in  theological  and  metaphysical  terms,  he  does 
not  readily  adapt  himself  to  the  exactness  of  scientific  reasoning, 
with  the  result  that  the  experimental  relation  existing  between  A 
and  B  is  not  reproduced  as  closely  as  is  desired,  and  very  often  is 
grossly  distorted. 

501.  Long  protracted  in  science  was  the  reign  of  the  notion  that 

498  ^  D<?  natttra  dcoriim,  II,  16,  44:  "Quae  atttem  natura  moverentiir,  haec  ant 
pondere  deorsum  aiit  levitate  in  sublime  ferri:  quorum  neutrum  astris  contingeret 
propterea  quod  eorum  lyiotus  in  orbem  circumque  ferretur.  Nee  vero  dici  potest  vi 
quadam  majore  fieri  ut  contra  naturam  astra  moveantur:  quae  enim  potest  maior 
esse?  Restat  igitur  ut  motus  astrorum  sit  volontarius." 

499  1  The  matter  will  be  dealt  with  at  length  in  Chapter  IX. 


II 


§503  NON-EXPERIMENTAL  ELEMENTS:   HEGEL  3OI 

celestial  bodies,  being  perfect,  had  to  move  in  circles.  It  finally  came 
to  be  recognized  that  that  idea  was  false,  or  better,  nonsensical ;  and 
the  discovery  w^as  made  by  a  method  altogether  different  from  Aris- 
totle's— by  the  empirical  observations  of  Kepler. 

502.  Now  that  metaphysicists  know — or  think  they  know — that 
planets  move  in  ellipses  with  the  Sun  at  one  of  the  foci  (§69^), 
they  do  their  best  to  arrive  by  their  methods  of  reasoning  at  that 
conclusion,  which  is — or  rather,  which  they  imagine  has  been — 
established  by  experience.^ 

Says  Hegel:  "A  circle  is  the  curve  the  radii  of  which  are  all  equal 
— that  is  to  say,  it  is  completely  determined  by  the  radius.  It  is  a 
unity  that  can  be  added  to  itself,  and  therein  lies  its  whole  deter- 
minability.  But  in  free  motion,  where  the  determinations  of  time 
and  space  are  differentiated  and  a  qualitative  ratio  is  established  be- 
tween them,  that  same  ratio  has  to  be  introduced  into  space  as  a 
differential  producing  two  determinations  in  it.  Consequently  the 
essential  form  of  planetary  revolution  is  the  ellipse."  ^ 

503.  Hegel's  demonstration,  Ibid.,  §  270,  of  Kepler's  third  law  is 
wonderful  indeed:  "As  root,  time  is  only  an  empirical  magnitude. 
As  quality,  it  is  nothing  but  an  abstract  unity.^  As  an  aspect  of  the 
developed  totality,  it  is,  in  addition,  a  determined  unity,  a  reflected 

502  ^  For  the  statement  to  be  true,  the  motions  of  the  planets  have  to  be  referred 
to  a  sun  that  is  assumed  to  be  stationary,  at  the  same  time  assuming  that  the  masses 
of  the  planets  as  compared  with  the  Sun's,  as  well  as  the  reciprocal  attractions  of 
the  planets,  may  be  ignored. 

502  ~  Nattirphilosophie,  Pt.  I,  Chap.  Ill,  §270  (p.  130).  [As  a  check  on  Vera's 
exceedingly  free  and  at  times  inaccurate  translation  Hegel's  original  is  prefixed  to 
Pareto's  note. — A.  L.] :  "Der  Kreis  ist  die  in  sich  ziiri'icWehrende  Linie,  in  der  alle 
Radien  gleich  sind:  d.h.  er  ist  durch  den  Radius  voll}{07nmen  bestimmt;  es  tst  diess 
ntir  Eine,  und  zwar  die  ganze  Bestimmt/ieit.  In  der  freien  Bewegttng  aber,  wo 
rdumliche  und  zeitliche  Bestimmungen  in  Verschiedenheit,  in  ein  qualitatives  Ver- 
haltniss  zti  einander  treten,  tritt  nothwendig  diess  Verhaltniss  an  de?7i  Rdtimlichen 
selbst  als  eine  Differenz  desselben  hervor,  welche  hiermit  zwei  Bestimmungen  er- 
fordert.  Dadurch  wird  die  Gestalt  der  in  sich  zuriic\gehenden  Bahn  wesentlich  eine 
Ellipse; — das  erste  der  Kepplerischen  Gesetze."  Vera  is  a  Hegelian  of  great  repute. 
He  must  have  understood  what  his  master  meant  in  the  passage  quoted.  I  transcribe 
below  certain  of  the  notes  that  he  appended  to  his  translation  of  Hegel;  they  add 
light  to  a  text  that  is  already  clarity  itself. 

503  ^  Hegel:  "eine  bloss  empirische  Crosse,  und  als  qualitativ  nur  eine  abstra/{te 
Einheit."  Vera,  Vol.  I,  pp.  296-97:  "It  appears  in  that  form  in  the  fall  {chute — the 
completed  act  of  falling)." 


302  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §503 

totality.^  It  produces  itself,  and  in  producing  itself  it  does  not  tran- 
scend itself.^  But  as  it  has  no  dimensions,  in  producing  itself  it  at- 
tains only  to  formal  identity  with  itself,  to  the  square;  and  space,  on 
the  contrary,  which  constitutes  the  positive  principle  of  external  con- 
tinuity,* attains  to  the  dimensions  of  the  concept,  to  the  cube.  Thus 
their  primitive  difference  subsists  in  their  realization.  That  is  Kep- 
ler's third  law  concerning  the  ratio  of  the  cube  of  the  distance  to 
the  square  of  the  time."  Indeed!  Who  would  ever  have  thought  it! 
What  a  prodigious  mind  to  understand  all  that !  ^ 

503  ^  Hegel,  "jiir  sich."  Vera:  "'In  itself:  here,  that  is,  'complete.'"  Alas,  the 
very  interesting  things  called  "reflected  totality,  in  itself  complete"  are  still  unknown 
to  us! 

503  ^  Hegel:  "prodticirt  sich,  und  bezieht  sich  darin  aiif  sich  selbst."  Vera:  "The 
square,  that  is." 

503  *  Hegel:  "als  das  positive  Aussereinander."  Vera:  "As  continuing  positive  ex- 
teriority." 

503  ^Hegel's  German:  "Als  Wtirzel  ist  die  Zeit  eine  bloss  empirische  Grosse, 
und  als  qualitativ  nur  abstracte  Einheit.  Als  Moment  der  entwic\elten  Totalitdt 
aber  ist  sie  zugleich  an  ihr  bestimmte  Einheit,  Totalitdt  fiir  sich,  produciert  sich 
und  bezieht  sich  darin  auf  sich  selbst;  als  das  in  sich  Dimensionslose  \ommt  ste  in 
ihrer  Production  nur  ztir  jormellen  Identitdt  mit  sich,  dem  Quadrate:  der  Raum 
dagegen,  als  das  positive  Aussereinander,  zur  Dimension  des  Begriffs,  dem  Cubus. 
Ihre  Realisirung  behdlt  so  den  urspri'mglichen  Unterschied  derselben  zugleich  bei. 
Diess  ist  das  dritte  Kepplerische  Gesetz,  das  Verhdltniss  des  Wiirfels  der  Entfernun- 
gen  zu  den  Quadraten  der  Zeiten." 

The  most  remarkable  of  Vera's  notes.  Vol.  I,  p.  297,  relates  to  a  sentence  of  Hegel 
immediately  following  the  passage  quoted  in  his  translation:  "...  a  law  that  is 
profound  merely  because  it  is  so  simple  and  expresses  the  intimate  nature  of  the 
thing."  [Hegel's  original:  ".  .  .  ein  Gesetz,  das  darum  so  gross  ist,  weil  es  so  ein- 
fach  und  mittelbar  die  Vernunft  der  Sache  darstellt."]  It  is  too  long  to  quote  endre. 
This  titbit  will  suffice,  however — Vol.  I,  p.  297:  "Now  by  the  very  fact  that  the  fall 
{chute)  is  only  an  aspect  {moment)  of  finished  mechanics,  dme,  space,  and  matter 
are  present  in  it  only  in  an  abstract  and  incomplete  manner:  in  other  words,  all  the 
elements  constituting  them  are  not  present  in  it  in  their  fully  developed  form,  their 
unity.  Time  figures  only  as  a  root,  space  as  a  square,  and  as  a  purely  formal  square." 
My  heart-felt  sympathy  for  that  poor  "fall"  in  which  dme  figures  only  as  a  "root." 
I  do  not  deny  that  this  manner  of  stringing  words  together  haphazard  may  lead 
to  some  "simple"  and  "profound"  law  that  "expresses  the  intimate  nature  of  the 
thing,"  for  I  have  no  idea  of  what  such  an  estimable  nature  may  be.  But  in  the 
present  volumes  on  sociology  I  am  not  looking  for  any  such  "indmate  nature,"  and 
I  therefore  try,  as  best  I  know  how  and  can,  to  keep  clear  of  disquisitions  of  that 
kind  (§  20).  The  day  may  come  when  sociologies  to  be  written  in  the  future  will 
stand  in  the  same  relation  to  those  now  in  vogue  as  the  celestial  mechanics  of 
Gauss  stands  to  Plato's  ramblings  or  the  vagaries  of  the  astrologers. 


li 


§505  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING   EXPERIENCE  303 

504.  But  there  is  better  yet!  What  is  a  diamond?  "The  diamond 
is  the  typical  crystal,  that  product  of  the  earth  at  sight  of  which  the 
eye  rejoices  because  it  sees  in  it  the  first-born  of  light  and  weight. 
Light  is  abstract  and  completely  free  identity.  Air  is  the  identity  of 
the  elements.  The  subordinated  identity^  is  an  identity  passive  to 
light,  and  that  is  the  transparency  of  the  diamond  [read,  crystal]."  ^ 
Having  understood  the  transparency  of  the  diamond,  you  might 
now  consider  metal:  "Metal,  on  the  other  hand,  is  opaque,  because 
in  metal  individual  identity  is  concentrated  into  a  more  profound 
unity  by  a  high  specific  gravity."  ^ 

505.  A  reminiscence  of  that  exalted  and  luminous  thinking  is 
doubtless  to  be  seen  in  the  following  passage  from  a  philosopher  of 
our  day.^  "What  is  the  movement  of  a  body  through  space.?  It  is 
mechanics  realizing  itself.  What  is  the  formation  of  a  crystal  in  the 
bosom  of  the  earth  ?  It  is  geometry  making  itself  visible  to  the  eye." 
Similar  reasonings  are  current  among  all  metaphysicists  regardless 
of  their  country  of  origin.  The  Chinese  had  long  since  observed  the 
influence  of  the  Moon  on  the  tides  and  given  an  explanation  of  it 
worthy  of  a  Hegel. ^ 

504  ^  Hegel:  "imterworfene";  Vera,  Vol.  II,  p.  21:  "'Subjugated,'  'subdued,'  as 
contrasted  with  the  individual  identity  {individuelle  Selbst)  of  metal,  which  is  not 
passive  to  light." 

504  ^Ibid.,  §317  (p.  306):  "Der  Ur]{iy stall  ist  der  Diamant  der  Erde  dessen 
jedes  Aiige  sich  erjreut,  ihn  ah  den  erstgebornen  Sohn  des  Lichts  und  der  Schwere 
anerl{ennend.  Das  Licht  ist  die  abstracte,  voUhfimmen  jreie  Identitdt, — die  Luft  die 
elementarische;  die  unterworfene  Identitat  ist  die  Passivitdt  jtir  das  Licht,  und  das  ist 
die  Durchsichtigkeit  des  Krystalls.  Das  Metall  ist  dagegen  tindurchsichtig,  wed  in 
ihm  das  individuelle  Selbst  durch  hohe  specifische  Schwere  ziim  Filrsichsein  con- 
centriert  ist." 

504  -  The  density  of  the  diamond  is  about  3.5.  Certain  crystals  have  the  follow- 
ing densities:  glass,  3.3;  various  flints,  from  3.6  to  4.3.  Aluminium,  however,  has 
(melted)  a  density  of  2.56.  Following  Hegel's  system,  therefore,  aluminium  ought 
to  be  more  transparent  than  diamond  or  glass.  It  is  the  hard  luck  of  the  metaphysi- 
cists that  the  contrary  happens  to  be  true.  But  they  are  never  terrified  by  such  dis- 
asters and  always  find  ways  to  reconcile  the  yes  and  the  no.  Their  repeated  errors 
and  absurd  theories  have  so  discredited  them  in  the  physical  sciences  that  no  one 
takes  them  seriously  any  longer;  but  they  continue  to  swagger  about  in  the  litera- 
ture improperly  denominated  social  science. 

505  ^  Fouillee,  Critique  des  systemes  de  morale  contemporains,  p.  22. 

505  2  Davis,  The  Chinese,  Vol.  II,  p.  283  (1836,  p.  307):  "M.  Klaproth  remarked, 
that  in  an  encyclopaedia,  written  before  the  close  of  the  ninth  century,  it  is  said 


304  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §506 

506.  St.  Thomas  also  knows  how  some  bodies  come  to  be  opaque 
and  others  transparent :  ^  "For  light  being  a  quality  of  the  first  alter- 
ant, which  is  the  most  perfect  and  formal  in  bodies,  those  bodies 
which  are  in  the  highest  degree  formal  and  mobile  are  lucid  in  act; 
those  that  are  most  like  them,  such  as  transparent  bodies,  receive 
light;  and  those  that  are  most  material  neither  have  light  in  their 
nature  nor  receive  light,  but  are  opaque.  This  is  manifest  in  the  ele- 
ments, for  fire  has  light  in  its  nature,  but  its  light  is  visible  only  in 
extraneous  matter,  because  of  its  subtlety.  Air  and  water  are  less 
formal  than  fire  and  are  therefore  merely  transparent.  But  the  Earth, 
which  is  in  the  highest  degree  material,  is  opaque."  The  Angelic 
Doctor  was  a  great  saint,  but  not  a  great  physicist.^ 

The  terms  "just,"  "equitable,"  "moral,"  "human,"  "socially- 
minded"  (solidal),  and  the  like,  which  are  today  current  in  the 
social  sciences,  are  of  the  same  character  as  the  terms  "hot"  (§  871), 
"cold,"  "heavy,"  "light,"  and  so  on,  which  were  formerly  used  in 
the  natural  sciences.  They  often  lead  astray  and  give  the  impression 
that  an  altogether  fantastic  argument  is  of  an  experimental  char- 
acter (§§965,  1551). 

507.  It  is  a  curious  thing  that  in  examining  the  theories  of  his 
predecessors,  Aristotle  was  aware  of  the  source  of  their  errors :  ^  "The 

that  'the  Moon,  being  the  purest  principle  of  water,  influences  the  tides.'  "  Hegel, 
Op.  cit.,  §  279  (p.  177):  "The  Moon  is  a  waterless  crystal  striving  to  complete  itself, 
to  quench  the  thirst  of  its  rigidity  in  our  oceans,  so  producing  the  tides.  The  sea 
swells  upward  and  is  on  the  point,  as  it  were,  of  leaping  toward  the  Moon,  and  the 
Moon  in  its  turn  seems  eager  to  take  possession  of  the  sea."  Metaphysical  sociologists 
write  on  social  questions  today  in  just  such  terms.  Hegel's  German:  "Der  Mond  ist 
der  wasserlose  Kristall,  der  sicli  an  unserem  Mcere  gleichsam  zu  integriren,  den 
Durst  seiner  Starrheit  zu  loschcn  sucht,  und  daher  Ebbe  und  Fhtth  hewir\t.  Das 
Meer  erhbht  sich,  steht  im  Begriff,  ziim  Monde  zu  fiiehen,  und  der  Mond,  es  an 
sich  zu  reissen." 

506  ^  De  natura  lujninis  {Opusctda,  51,  Opera,  1570,  Vol.  XVII-2,  p.  36,  iB). 

506  ^  And  yet  he  had  begun  with  an  acute  remark,  noting  that  ordinary  language 
is  misleading  as  to  the  nature  of  light:  "Some  have  said  that  light  is  corporeal,  led 
into  that  error  by  certain  locutions  that  people  use  in  speaking  of  light.  We  ordi- 
narily say  that  a  ray  of  light  darts  through  the  air,  that  rays  of  light  are  reflected, 
that  rays  of  light  intersect — all  such  things  being  apparently  corporeal." 

507  -^  De  generatione  et  corruptione ,  I,  2,  10  (Joachim,  p.  316a). 


§510  NON-EXPERIMENTAL   ELEMENTS!   HEGEL  305 

cause  of  their  seeing  the  things  that  we  know  ^  less  clearly  [than 
we  do]  was  their  lack  of  experience;  for  people  who  have  spent 
their  lives  observing  nature  are  best  qualified  to  make  hypotheses  as 
to  the  principles  that  bring  great  numbers  of  facts  together."  Had 
Aristotle  remained  faithful  to  the  principle  he  stated  so  well,  he 
might  have  hastened  the  progress  of  humanity  in  science  by  many 
centuries. 

508.  Bacon's  case  is  even  more  curious.  It  has  been  frequently  re- 
marked that  he  thought  soundly  enough  on  the  experimental 
method,  but  then  practised  it  badly.  Here,  for  example,  is  one  of  his 
admonitions:^  "There  is  nothing  sound  about  our  notions  whether 
in  logic  or  physic.  'Substance,'  'quality,'  'action,'  'passivity'  [Devey: 
"passion"],  'essence'  [Devey:  "existence"],  are  not  sound  [Devey: 
"clear"]  notions:  and  much  less  'weight,'  'levity,'  'density,'  'rarity' 
[Devey:  "tenuity"],  'moistness,'  'dryness,'  'generation,'  'corruption,' 
'attraction,'  'repulsion,'  'element,'  'matter,'  'form,'  and  the  like. 
All  are  fantastical  and  indeterminate."  But  later  on,  (II,  5), 
he  considers  bodies  "as  a  'throng'  {turmd)  or  'conjugation' 
of  'simple  natures'";^  and  it  does  not  occur  to  him  that  such 
"simple  natures"  are  among  the  "notions"  that  he  disavows. 

509.  In  these  pseudo-experimental  arguments  the  terms  A,  B  .  .  . 
which  are  brought  into  some  relation  or  other,  are  usually  indeter- 
minate. We  have  noted  ambiguities  in  Aristotle  (§491).  They  are 
nothing  as  compared  with  the  absolute  indefiniteness  of  the  terms 
used  by  some  metaphysicists  (§963). 

510.  Says  Hegel:  "In  general  one  cannot  deny  the  influence  of 
comets.  I  set  Mr.  Bode  shrieking  some  time  ago  by  remarking  that 
experience  now  proves  that  comets  are  attended  by  a  good  vintage,  as 
happened  in  the  years  1811  and  1819,  and  that  that  twin  observation 

507  ^  Ta  6/io?io-yoi'fiEva :  literally,  "things  on  which  we  are  agreed"  [Joachim: 
"admitted  facts"]. 

508  ^  Novum  Organum,  I,  15. 

508  2  "The  rule  or  axiom  for  the  transformation  of  bodies  is  of  two  kinds.  The 
first  regards  a  body  as  a  throng  {tiinnam)  or  union  {coniitgationem)  [Devey:  "ag- 
gregate or  combination"]  of  simple  natures;  as,  for  example,  in  gold,  the  following 
properties  [Devey:  "circumstances"]  arc  combined:  yellowness,  heaviness  .  .  ." 


306  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §5x1 

is  worth  as  much  as  the  observations  of  the  returns  or  comets,  and 
even  more."  ^  Here  he  is  stating  a  false  proposition  and  betraying 
gross  ignorance  of  astronomy  by  assuming  that  the  uniformity  in  the 
"returns"  of  comets  is  a  matter  of  merely  empirical  observation ;  but 
at  least  he  uses  clear  and  exact  terms  that  correspond  to  concrete 
things.  That,  in  fact,  is  why  we  see  so  readily  that  his  proposition  is 
false.  But  the  clearness  fades  when  he  adds:  "What  makes  cometary 
wine  so  good  is  the  fact  that  the  aqueous  process  abandons  the  earth, 
and  so  brings  on  a  change  in  the  state  of  the  planet."  ^  "What  in  all 
creation  is  that  "aqueous  process"  which  "abandons"  our  earth  .^ 
Who  has  ever  seen  or  heard  of  it  ? 

511.  The  vagueness  and  absurdity  are  far  greater  in  what  Hegel 
says  of  the  Moon  and  the  tides  (§  505  ").  In  strict  fact,  we  know  what 
he  means  by  "crystal,"  "water,"  "thirst,"  "rigidity."  It  is  his  manner 
of  combining  them  that  makes  them  hard  to  understand.  But  even 
that  glimmer  of  comprehensibility  vanishes  when  Hegel  says,  §  279 
(p.  177):  "Light  is  simple  thought  itself,  existing  under  form  of 
nature.  It  is  understanding  in  nature,  or — what  amounts  to  the  same 
thing — the  form  of  understanding  present  in  nature."  ^  Or  again, 
§  277  (p.  168) :  "Light  as  constituting  universal  physical  identity  is 
first  positable  as  a  differentiated  term  and  consequently  as  forming 
here  a  distinct  and  external  principle  in  matter  qualified  according 
to  another  determination  of  the  notion  that  constitutes  the  negation 
of  light,  namely,  darkness."  ^ 

510  ^  Naturphilosophie.  §  279  (pp.  179-80) :  "Einflilsse  der  Kometen  sind  durchaus 
nicht  zu  verneinen.  Henn  Bode  habe  ich  einmal  zum  Seufzen  gebracht,  weil  ich 
gesagt,  die  Erjahrung  zeige  jetzt,  dass  aiif  Kometen  gute  Weinjahre  folgen,  me  in 
den  Ja/iren  181 1  und  18 ig,  iind  diese  doppelte  Erjahrung  sey  eben  so  gut,  ja  besser, 
ah  die  i'lber  die  Wieder\ehr  der  Kometen." 

510  ^  180:  "Was  den  Kometen-W ein  so  gut  macht,  ist,  dass  der  Wasserprocess 
sic/i  von  der  Erde  losreisst,  und  so  einen  veranderten  Zustand  des  Planeten  hervor- 
bringt." 

511  "^"Es  \_das  Licht~\  ist  der  einjache  Gedan\e  selbst,  auf  natihiiche  Weise  vor- 
handen.  Denn  es  ist  Verstand  in  der  Natur;  d.h.  die  Formen  des  Verstandes 
existieren  in  ihr."  Vera  comments.  Vol.  I,  pp.  378-79:  "Understanding,  rather  than 
speculative  reason,  is  predominant  in  light,  precisely  because  light  is  an  abstract 
identity." 

511  ^"Das  Licht  verhdlt  sich  als  die  allgemeine  physicalische  Identitat  zunachst 
als  ein  Verschiedenes   (§  275),  daher  liier  Aeusseres  und  Anderes,  zu  der  in  den 


§514  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING   EXPERIENCE  307 

512.  If  all  such  verbiage  were  nothing  but  a  reflection  of  the 
psychic  state  of  given  individuals,  there  would  be  no  more  occasion 
for  bothering  with  it  than  with  the  ravings  of  a  lunatic.  But  it  has 
been  admired  by  many  people,  and  its  equivalents  in  the  social  sci- 
ences continue  to  enjoy  great  prestige.  For  that  reason  they  deserve 
consideration  as  a  social  phenomenon  of  great  importance  (§965). 

513.  The  psychic  state  of  people  who  imagine  they  understand 
arguments  of  that  kind  is  not  so  very  different  from  the  psychic 
state  of  the  people  who  thought  they  understood  the  abstractions  of 
the  old  mythology  and  theology.  In  that  we  get 

another  proof  of  the  fact  that  evolution  does 
not  take  place  along  a  continuous  line  (§  344). 
The  three  psychic  states,  A,  B,  C  of  Figure  11  *7n 
stand  in  such  succession  that  they  may  be  sup- 
posed to  form  a  continuous  unit;  but  there  are 
branches  which  lead  to  experimental  cognitions 
p,  q,  r  .  .  .  or  to  other  mystical,  theological,  or 
similar  vagaries,  M,N  .  .  . 

514.  Those  considerations  carry  us  into  the 
field  of  the  logic  of  sentiments  (§  480).  Ordinary  thinking  confuses 
the  three  propositions  following:  ^ 

\.  A  =  X,X  =  B,  therefore  A  =  B. 

II.  The  name  a  of  the  thing  A  arouses  in  a  person  sentiments 
equivalent  to  the  sentiments  aroused  by  the  word  X;  these  are  equiv- 
alent to  the  sentiments  aroused  by  the  name  b  of  the  thing  B;  there- 
fore sentiments  aroused  by  the  name  a  are  equivalent  to  the  senti- 
ments aroused  by  the  name  b. 

anderen  Begriffs-Momenten  qualificirten  Materie,  die  so  ah  das  Negative  des  Lichts, 
als  ein  Dunkles  bestimmt  ist."  Vera  comments,  Vol.  I,  pp.  360-61:  "Hier  Aeiisseres 
und  Anderes:  That  is  to  say:  light  is  first  positable  as  a  phase  opposite  and  exterior 
to  another  phase."  P.  365:  "Das  Diin\ele:  the  obscuring  principle." 

514  ^  For  the  sake  of  brevity  we  use  the  form  of  the  mathematical  equation,  such 
as  "A  =  X,  X==B,  therefore  A  =  B."  In  that  way  we  avoid  secondary  questions  as 
to  the  character  of  the  premises  in  the  syllogism.  This  is  not  a  treatise  on  logic.  We 
are  trying  merely  to  indicate  the  chief  point  in  the  problem.  What  was  said  of  the 
syllogism  in  §  97  also  applies  to  arguments  in  equation  form. 


Figure  11 


/ 


308  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §514 

III.  The  premises  are  the  same  as  in  II,  but  the  conclusion  is: 
therefore  A  =  B. 

From  the  experimental  standpoint,  proposition  I  is  in  accord  with 
experience  if  A,  X,  B  are  real  and  well-defined  things,  and  that  ac- 
cord is  the  closer,  the  more  exact  the  definitions  of  A,  X,  B  are  made. 
On  the  other  hand  the  accord  may  break  down  if  the  terms  are  ill- 
defined.  If  X  is  not  real,  or,  in  general,  if  one  of  the  three  things 
A,  X,  B  is  not  real,  there  can  be  no  question  of  any  accord  with 
experience  (§480). 

The  sentiments  aroused  by  a,  X,  h  are  real  things;  hence  proposi- 
tion II  is  like  proposition  I  and,  like  it,  accords  with  experience  if 
A,  X,  B  are  real.  But  a,  X,  b  are  ordinarily  very  vaguely  defined,  and 
the  accord  therefore  is  usually  not  very  close. 

Proposition  III  has  no  logical  value  whatever,  since  the  things 
A  and  B  that  figure  in  the  conclusion  are  different  from  the  things 
a  and  b  which  figure  in  the  premises.  To  acquire  such  value  it  would 
not  be  sufficient  for  A,  X,  B  to  be  real,  well-defined  things;  it  would 
be  further  necessary  for  the  accord  of  the  concepts  a,  X,  b  to  corre- 
spond exactly  to  the  relation  between  the  things  A,  X,  B.  Just  there, 
in  fact,  lies  the  essential  difference  between  metaphysics  and  logico- 
experimental  science;  the  former  assumes  such  accord  a  priori,  the 
latter  subjects  it  to  experimental  verification.' 

514  ^  Mctaphysicists  reply  that  every  reasoning,  whether  experimental  or  not,  is 
on  concepts.  We  concede  the  point,  since  we  are  never  willing  to  argue  over  names. 
Using  that  jargon  (§  95),  we  will  say  that  the  difference  consists  in  the  number  of 
the  concepts  and  in  the  way  in  which  they  are  used.  To  learn  the  movements  of 
celestial  bodies  Hegel  uses  a  very  few  concepts,  picked  up  here  and  there,  and 
through  them  arrives  at  conclusions  already  known,  which  someone  else  has  de- 
vised to  represent  those  movements  approximately  and  which  he  in  his  ignorance 
imagines  represent  them  exacdy.  Hence  if  in  computing  the  positions  of  heavenly 
bodies  the  concepts  he  obtains  in  this  fashion  were  compared  with  the  concepts  ob- 
served through  a  telescope,  great  discrepancies  would  appear.  Astronomers  contem- 
porary with  Hegel,  on  the  other  hand,  availed  themselves  of  large  numbers  of  con- 
cepts that  they  called  astronomical  observations,  combined  them  with  other  large 
numbers  of  logico-mathematical  inferences,  and  from  the  combination  derived  con- 
cepts as  to  the  positions  of  stars  that  had  the  singular  merit  of  fitting  in  fairly  well 
— at  least  much  better  than  Hegel's  concepts — with  the  concepts  derived  by  the 
astronomical  observations  of  the  time,  and  with  those  which  were  later  derived  from 
astronomical  observations  future  from  the  standpoint  of  those  days,  past  from  ours. 
If,  therefore,  one  would  have  concepts  that  like  Hegel's  are  at  variance  with  the 


§514  LOGIC  OF  SENTIMENT  3O9 

In  the  logic  of  sentiment  proposition  III  is  the  type  of  all  reason- 
ing, substantially,  and  is  held  to  be  certainly  "true."  That  type  can 
be  reshaped  to  fit  the  various  types  of  syllogism.  For  one  example, 
we  may  say:  "The  sentiments  that  the  word  a  arouses  in  me  are  the 
same  as  the  sentiments  aroused  in  me  by  the  word  X,  which  stands 
for  a  general  class;  these  are  the  same  as  the  sentiments  aroused  by 
the  word  b;  therefore  the  thing  A,  which  corresponds  to  the  word  a, 
has  the  attribute  B,  which  corresponds  to  the  word  b.  But  in  that 
there  is  still  too  much  exactness,  and  the  type  becomes  substantially: 
"The  sentiments  aroused  in  me  by  a  are  iiot  incompatible  with 
the  sentiments  aroused  in  me  by  X,  and  these  are  not  incompatible 
with  the  sentiments  aroused  in  me  by  b;  therefore  A  has  the  at- 
tribute B!'  The  argument,  moreover,  is  in  the  form  of  a  perfectly 
logical  syllogism,  and  it  is  obtained  by  translating  the  propositions 
above  in  the  following  ways:  "The  sentiments  aroused  in  me  by 
a  accord  with  those  aroused  in  me  by  X"  becomes  "A  is  a  mem- 
ber of  the  class  X";  and  "The  sentiments  aroused  in  me  by  X  ac- 
cord with  those  aroused  in  me  by  b"  becomes  "All  X's  have  the 
attribute  B!'  Hence,  without  any  breach  of  formal  logic,  the  con- 
clusion is  reached  that  "A  has  the  attribute  B!'  This  sort  of  reason- 
ing is  very  widely  used  and,  apart  from  the  logico-experimental 
sciences,  may  be  said  to  be  the  general  rule.  It  is  used  by  the  masses 
at  large  and  is  almost  the  only  one  that  carries  conviction  to 
them.  It  predominates  especially  in  political  and  social  discussion 
(§§586f.)-' 

concepts  yielded  by  observation,  one  should  follow  Hegel's  lead.  Those,  on  the  other 
hand,  who  would  have  concepts  which  better  approximate  the  concepts  supplied  by 
observation  should  follow  the  course  pursued  by  astronomers,  physicists,  chemists, 
and  the  like.  Here  we  are  trying  to  discover  sociological  concepts  of  the  latter  kind, 
and  for  that  reason  we  are  following  the  latter  course,  which  alone  can  provide  us 
with  them.  We  have  absolutely  no  other  reason  for  following  it. 

514  ^  Sensini,  La  teoria  della  rendita,  pp.  201-02:  "Literary  economists  of  an  ex- 
traordinary productivity  indulge  in  inquiries  that  may  be  summarized  in  this 
fashion:  i.  You  treat  a  subject  X  without  in  any  respect  defining  the  terms  you  use. 
That  allows  you  to  play  indefinitely  on  the  ambiguity  of  the  terms.  2.  You  never 
state  a  problem  with  the  necessary  definiteness,  since  by  doing  so  it  would  be  evi- 
dent in  the  vast  majority  of  cases  that  the  problem  stated  does  not  exist  or  else  is 
unsolvable  because  badly  stated.  3.  You  make  liberal  use  of  metaphysical  and  in 
general  vague  expressions,  which,  since  they  mean  nothing,  can  mean  anything,  and 


310  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §5^4 

From  the  experimental  point  of  view  the  causes  of  error  are  tlie 
following:  i.  The  translations  cannot  be  experimentally  accepted 
even  if  A,  X,  B  are  real  things.  2.  There  is  no  way  of  knowing  to 
what,  exactly,  the  terms  a,  X,  b  correspond.  The  best  chance  for 
experimental  verification — though  not  for  persuasion  through  senti- 
ment— is  offered  by  a  proposition  in  which  those  terms  correspond 
without  too  much  vagueness  to  real  things.  In  that  case  the  transla- 
tions are  more  or  less  readily  adaptable  to  realities,  and  the  conclusion 
is,  roughly,  verified  by  experience.  But  the  correspondence  between 
a,  X,  b  and  real  things  may  be  very  uncertain  and  even  fail  if  one 
of  the  things  proves  not  to  be  real.  That  is  not  noticed  in  the  argu- 
ment, which  is  conducted  around  the  words  a,  X,  b — they  are  there 
even  if  real  things  corresponding  to  them  fail  to  materialize.  That 
is  the  most  important  cause  of  error,  and  it  vitiates  every  reasoning 
of  the  kind.  3.  The  accord  or  mere  compatibility  of  certain  senti- 
ments with  certain  others  is  a  vague  relation  lacking  altogether  in 
exactness.  "The  sentiments  that  a  arouses  in  me  accord  with  the 
sentiments  aroused  in  me  by  X"  is  a  proposition  in  great  part 
arbitrary. 

In  ordinary  logic,  finally,  the  conclusion  follows  from  the  prem- 
ises. In  the  logic  of  sentiment  the  premises  follow  from  the  con- 
clusion. In  other  words,  the  person  who  makes  the  syllogism,  as 
well  as  the  person  who  accepts  it,  is  convinced  in  advance  that  A  has 
the  attribute  B,  and  merely  wishes  to  give  his  conviction  an  appear-" 
ance  of  being  logical.  So  he  goes  looking  for  two  premises  that  can 
justify  the  conclusion,  the  premises,  namely,  that  "The  sentiments 
which  a  arouses  accord  with  the  sentiments  X  arouses"  and  "The 
sentiments  X  arouses  accord  with  the  sentiments  b  arouses."  He  has 
little  trouble  in  finding  them,  in  view  of  the  vagueness  of  the  terms 
and  the  indefiniteness  of  what  is  meant  by  "accord."  ^ 

so  stand  secure  against  every  objection.  4.  You  appeal  more  or  less  covertly  to  senti- 
ments in  general  and  to  those  most  in  vogue  at  the  moment  you  are  writing."  The 
vast  majority  of  literary  works  on  economic  problems  that  are  making  fortunes  for 
their  authors  today  are  of  the  kind  Sensini  describes. 

514  "*  It  is  therefore  evident  that  the  proposition  "A  has  the  attribute  B"  is  the 
constant  element  in  the  syllogism  and  the  element  of  greatest  social  importance. 
The  premises  leading  to  that  conclusion  are  the  variable  and  less  important  element. 
In  our  example  of  storm-compelling  (§  186-216),  the  conclusion  of  the  syllogism — • 


§5l6  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  3II 

515.  Again  in  contrast  with  what  takes  place  in  logico-experi- 
mental  thinking,  where  the  value  of  a  term  increases  in  proportion 
to  its  exactness,  the  terms  of  a  reasoning  by  accord  of  sentiments  are 
more  effective  in  proportion  as  they  are  vague  and  indefinite.  That 
explains  the  abundant  use  such  reasonings  make  of  terms  such  as 
"good,"  "beautiful,"  "just,"  and  the  like  (§408).  The  more  in- 
definite the  concepts  corresponding  to  a,  X,  b,  the  easier  it  is  to  estab- 
lish, by  way  of  sentiments,  the  accord  between  the  concept  a  and  the 
concept  X,  between  the  concept  X  and  the  concept  b.  If  X  is  the 
concept  "perfect,"  it  is  so  indeterminate  that  it  can  be  easily  made  to 
agree  with  the  concepts  A,  B,  determinate  or  indeterminate  as  these 
may  be.  "The  motion  of  celestial  bodies  is  perfect."  And  why  not? 
Sentiment  suggests  no  conflict  between  the  two  concepts  (§§  491  ^ 

1556)- 

516.  So  we  have  now  arrived  inductively,  by  examining  concrete 
facts,  at  the  point  suggested  hypothetically  in  §  13:  we  see,  in  other 
words,  that  there  are  many  subjective,  sentimental  considerations 
of  great  potency  which  prompt  people  to  evolve  and  accept  theories 
independently  of  their  logico-experimental  validity  (§  304).  We 
shall  therefore  have  to  deal  with  that  subject  at  some  length 
(Chapter  IX). 

Meantime  let  us  note  another  common  error  to  which  we  have 
already  alluded  (§§  16-17),  and  which  lies  in  carrying  outside  the 
logico-experimental  field  conclusions  that  are  valid  only  within  it. 
After  the  elimination  of  a  non-experimental  term  X  has  established 
a  relation  between  the  experimental  terms  A  and  B,  proof  or  dis- 
proof of  such  a  relation  can  in  no  wise  serve  to  prove  or  disprove 
the  "existence"  of  X.  The  experimental  and  non-experimental  worlds 
have  nothing  in  common  and  nothing  touching  the  one  can  be 
inferred  from  the  other.  For  a  long  time  people  tried  to  derive 
scientific  propositions  from  the  Bible,  those,  for  instance,  relating 

the  constant  element — was  that  tempests,  hail-storms,  winds,  can  be  caused  or 
averted  by  certain  rites.  The  variable  element  was  the  explanation  of  such  power — 
the  premises,  in  other  words,  from  which  the  conclusion  (the  belief)  resulted.  In- 
duction led  us  to  note  the  fact,  and  we  stated  it  in  general  form  (§  217).  Now  wc 
are  going  a  step  farther,  noting  the  causes  of  the  fact,  bringing  it  into  relationship 
with  other  facts. 


312  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §51? 

to  the  movements  of  the  Earth  and  the  stars.  Nowadays  the  reverse 
reasoning  is  fashionable:  from  the  fact,  that  is,  that  such  scientific 
propositions  are  false,  people  try  to  infer  that  biblical  theology  is 
false  (§487).  Of  those  tw^o  methods  of  reasoning  neither  can  be 
accepted  by  anyone  who  insists  on  remaining  within  the  experi- 
mental field  (§481).  The  scientific  errors  of  the  Bible  merely  show 
that  we  must  not  go  to  theology  for  the  relationships  obtaining  be- 
tween experimental  facts;  just  as  Hegel's  scientific  errors  merely 
show  that  metaphysics  is  no  better  prepared  than  theology  to  supply 
those  relationships.  And  that  is  all.  The  errors  in  question  prove 
nothing  as  to  any  doctrines  that  metaphysicists  and  theologians  may 
be  pleased  to  set  up  outside  the  experimental  field. 

517.  b.  (§  483).  Inquiries  into  virtual  movements  when  the  move- 
ments belong  to  the  experimental  field  are  just  a  way  of  considering 
experimental  relations;  and  therefore  what  has  been  said  above 
applies  to  them  also.  If  some  term  towards  which  virtual  movements 
tend  lies  outside  the  experimental  field,  we  need  not  deal  with  it 
here,  unless  an  attempt  should  be  made  to  return  to  experience  by 
eliminating  that  term;  but  in  that  case  we  should  again  be  going 
back  to  relations  between  experimental  facts. 

518.  r.  (§  483).  There  remains  the  inquiry  as  to  what  ought  to  be 
done,  the  precept  (§§  325  f.).  This  is  a  class  of  relations  that  may  lie 
entirely  beyond  experience,  even  when  the  related  terms  are  experi- 
mental. What  takes  it  out  of  the  experimental  field  is  the  term 
"ought,"  which  does  not  correspond  to  any  concrete  reality.^  The 
question  may  still  be  asked,  "And  if  an  individual  does  not  do  what 
it  is  said  he  ought  to  do,  what  will  happen?"  That  question  leads  to 
a  consideration  of  virtual  movements  {b,  §  483). 

519.  Nexuses  by  which  elements  in  theories  are  combined  (second 
problem  stated  in  §  467).  Let  us  begin  with  a  few  examples. 

There  is  the  case  of  chemistry  when  the  atomic  theory  was  in  full 
vigour.  Chemists  worked  on  certain  hypotheses  and  succeeded  in 
explaining  the  facts  of  chemistry  that  were  known  and  in  foreseeing 
facts  that  were  unknown  and  which  experience  eventually  verified. 

518  ''■  Man  tide.  Chap.  I,  §§39-40. 


§523  NEXUS  BETWEEN  ELEMENTS  IN  THEORIES  313 

Such  are  all  scientific  theories,  and  they  have  unmistakable  charac- 
teristics. 

520.  But  here  now,  for  another  example,  is  one  of  the  so-called 
moral  theories.  It  is  of  an  entirely  different  character.  There  is  no 
trace  of  any  experimental  verification  of  any  sort.  People  ask  how  1 
things  ought  to  be,  and  they  conduct  the  inquiry  in  such  a  way  as  to  I 
find  certain  relations  that  exist,  or  which  they  would  like  to  have  \ 
exist,  among  things.  Imagine  a  chemist  saying:  "It  is  a  pity  that  when 
mercury  protochloride  is  exposed  to  light  it  should  change  spon- 
taneously into  mercury  bichloride,  a  virulent  poison.  I  shall  therefore 
look  for  a  chemical  theory  that  will  render  such  a  thing  impossible." 
Yet  there  you  would  have  a  widely  cultivated  type  of  moral  theory. 

521.  Even  apart  from  that  type  the  difference  between  theories 
that  allow  themselves  to  be  guided  strictly  by  the  facts  and  theories 
that  try  to  influence  the  facts,  is  striking.  Compare,  for  example,  the 
atomic  theory  of  modern  chemistry  and  the  atomic  theory  of  Lucre- 
tius. The  difference  lies  more  in  the  character  of  the  researches  than 
in  the  greater  or  lesser  experimental  validity  of  the  data  and  the 
conclusions. 

522.  In  former  times  theories  of  natural  facts  were  like  modern 
moral  theories.  Later  on  they  changed  completely  in  outlook  and 
became  our  modern  scientific  theories.  Aristotle's  treatise  De  coelo 
may  be  classed  with  modern  treatises  on  morals.  It  cannot  be  classed 
with  Newton's  Principia,  much  less  with  Laplace's  Traite  de 
mecanique  celeste.  Anyone  willing  to  read  those  three  books  one 
after  the  other  will  observe  at  once  that  Aristotle's  is  altogether 
different  from  the  others  in  character  and  in  the  purpose  of  the  in- 
vestigation. There  is  no  seeking  the  cause  of  such  a  difference  in  the 
ability  or  scholarship  of  the  respective  authors.  Newton  wrote  a 
commentary  on  the  Apocalypse  well  worthy  of  a  place  beside 
Aristotle's  De  coelo. 

523.  If,  therefore,  we  set  out  to  arrange  theories  according  to  the 
character  of  their  demonstrations,  we  have  to  distinguish  two  types. 
In  one  the  nexus  consists  entirely  of  logical  implications  of  facts; 
in  the  odier  there  is  an  added  something  that  transcends  experience 


314  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  ^5^^ 

— some  concept  of  necessity,  duty,  or  the  like.  Finally,  to  complete 
our  survey,  we  must  further  consider  propositions  in  which  the 
logical  nexus  is  reduced  to  little  or  nothing — which  are  mere  de- 
scriptions or  narrations.  In  that  way  we  get  the  three  following 
classes: 

Class  I.  Descriptive  propositions  (§  525) 

Class  2.  Propositions  asserting  experimental  uniformities  (§  526) 
Class  3.  Propositions  that  either  add  something  to  experimental 
uniformities,  or  ignore  them  (§  574). 

524.  Scientific  theories  consist  of  propositions  of  the  first  and 
second  classes.  Sometimes  propositions  of  the  third  class  are  ap- 
pended; and  they  may  do  no  harm  provided  the  non-experimental 
adjunct  be  superfluous;  but  they  may  impair  the  scientific  character 
of  the  theory  if  the  non-experimental  adjunct  affects  conclusions. 
Sociological  theories  and  many^  economic  theories  have  hitherto 
made  liberal  use  of  propositions  of  the  third  class  so  affecting  re- 
sults. Such  propositions  must  be  eliminated  if  we  would  have  a 
sociology  or  an  economics  of  a  truly  scientific  character. 

Suppose  we  now  examine  the  logico-experimental  sciences  with 
reference  to  the  classes  just  mentioned.  Here,  however,  we  have  to 
deal  with  them  only  in  a  very  incidental  way,  since  our  main  in- 
terest is  in  theories  dependent  upon  social  facts. 

525.  Class  i :  Descriptive  propositions.  Examples:  "I  tried  to  find 
the  density  of  pure  water  under  an  atmospheric  pressure  of  760  mm. 
of  mercury;  and  I  observed  a  maximum  density  at  4°."  "Roman 
marriage  was  between  one  man  and  one  woman  at  a  time."  The 
description  may  be  extended  to  any  length  one  wishes;  but  when 
it  becomes  at  all  protracted  there  is  a  danger  that  propositions  of 
another  class  will  creep  in.  The  human  being  finds  it  very  difficult 
to  stop  at  mere  description ;  he  is  always  tempted  to  add  explanation. 
To  say,  "The  Greeks  were  hospitable  to  beggars,"  is  a  description; 
but  to  say,  "The  Greeks  were  hospitable  to  beggars  because  they 
thought  that  beggars  came  from  Zeus,"  adds  an  explanation  to  the 
description.  We  could  get  back  to  pure  description  by  saying,  "The 
Greeks  were  hospitable  to  beggars,  and  there  were  some  who  said 


I 


§527  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  315 

that  they  ought  to  be  because  beggars  came  from  Zeus."  The  dis- 
tinction may  seem  fine-spun,  but  it  is  a  very  helpful  one ;  for  slipping 
explanation  covertly  into  description  is  a  favourite  device  for  obtain- 
ing acceptance  for  explanations  devoid  of  a  logico-experimental 
basis.^ 

526.  Class  2:  Propositions  asserting  experimental  uniformities.  In 
any  statement  of  a  uniformity  there  is  something  more  than  a 
description  of  happenings  in  the  past;  there  is  a  forecast,  more  or 
less  probable,  of  future  happenings  (§  1068).  If  I  say,  "Under  pres- 
sure of  760  mm.  of  mercury,  water  attains  a  maximum  density  at 
4°,"  I  say  something  more  than  I  said  in  the  description  stated  above 
(§525).  I  assert  that  if  anyone  puts  water  under  those  conditions 
he  will  observe  a  maximum  density  at  4°. 

Note  further  that  the  last  proposition  contains  a  number  of  im- 
plicit assertions.  It  asserts  that  pressure  and  temperature  are  the  sole 
determinants  of  density.  If,  for  example,  the  electric  tension  of  the 
atmosphere  were  also  a  determinant,  the  descriptive  proposition 
would  be  incomplete,  because  I  ought  to  have  noted  the  atmospheric 
condition;  but  the  proposition  asserting  the  uniformity  would  be 
false,  for  if  I  were  to  make  another  experiment  under  different 
electrical  conditions,  I  should  not  find  the  maximum  density  at  4°. 

527.  Suppose,  instead  of  a  hypothetical  case,  we  take  a  real  one. 
"I  placed  a  thermometer  in  pure  water,  and  I  observed  that  the 
water  began  to  solidify  at  o°."  My  proposition  is  incomplete.  I  should 
have  noted  other  circumstances — atmospheric  pressure,  for  example. 
If  I  say,  "Pure  water  solidifies  at  o°,"  with  no  specifications  as  to 
other  conditions,  my  proposition  is  false.  James  Thomson  found  that 
under  a  pressure  of  16.8  atmospheres,  pure  water  solidifies  at  a 
temperature  of  0.129°.  The  proposition  noted  above,  though  false  in 
the  strictest  sense,  is  customarily  used  by  physicists  because  it  is 
understood  that  the  experiment  is  to  be  performed  under  the  normal 
atmospheric  pressure  of  760  mm.  of  mercury  and  under  other  con- 
ditions well  known  to  physicists.  In  that  case  there  is  no  harm  in 

525  1  This  is  not  just  the  place  to  stop  and  consider  how  far  the  generic  term  "the 
Greeks"  may  be  taken  as  exact. 


3l6  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §528 

such  language;  but  if  the  conditions  that  are  presumed  are  not 
accurately  determined,  if  they  are  in  the  least  respect  uncertain,  the 
proposition  would  have  to  be  rejected.  Of  just  such  obscurities  people 
\l  avail  themselves  when  they  introduce  conditions  that  cannot  be 
taken  for  granted  explicitly. 

528.  Metaphysicists  imagine  that  experimental  science  deals  with 
absolute  propositions  (§97),  and  on  that  hypothesis  they  reasonably 
conclude  that  in  the  statement,  "Water  solidifies  at  o°,"  there  must 
be  something  more  than  a  mere  epitome  of  experiments— there  must 
be  some  principle  of  necessity.  But  that  edifice  crumbles — its  founda- 
/  tions  are  weak.  The  scientific  proposition,  "Water  solidifies  at  o°," 
'     merely  indicates  that  that  fact  has  so  far  been  observed  and  that  very 

probably  therefore  it  will  be  observed  in  the  future  (§97). 
^  529.  Someone  might  say:  "That  statement  does  not  take  into  ac- 
count the  positions  of  the  Sun  and  its  planets  in  space.  It  is  true  that 
so  far  those  conditions  have  not  been  known  to  influence  the  tem- 
perature at  which  water  solidifies;  but  how  can  you  be  sure  they 
will  not  do  so  in  the  future?"  We  can  only  say,  "We  are  not  sure." 
And  we  should  have  to  give  the  same  answer  if  someone  were  to 
assert  that  some  day  the  Sun  in  its  swift  course  will  carry  us  into  a 
four-dimensional  space,  or  to  a  place  where  the  laws  of  physics  and 
chemistry  will  no  longer  hold.  Every  scientific  proposition  has  to  be 
understood  as  prefaced  by  the  reservation  "within  the  limits  of  time 
and  space  known  to  us."  Beyond  those  limits  lie  probabilities,  now 
slight   probabilities,   now   great   probabilities,   but   nothing   more 

(§69-5). 

530.  It  is  laughable  to  reflect  that  though  it  is  indispensable  to 
state  such  reservations  in  sciences  as  advanced  as  chemistry  and 
physics,  there  are  people  who  think  they  are  not  necessary  in  a 
science  as  backward  as  sociology.  But  in  any  event  we  have  no  in- 
tention of  quarrelling  with  them.  Blessed  indeed  are  they  in  knowing 
the  essences  of  things  (§  19)  and  the  necessary  relations  between 
facts.  We,  much  more  modest,  are  simply  trying  to  discover  such 
relations  as  experience  discloses  (§  69-4) ;  and  if  those  good  souls 
are  right,  it  only  means  that  we  shall  be  discovering  with  great  effort 


§533  "higher  principles"  317 

and  after  laborious  investigation  things  that  were  revealed  to  them 
by  metaphysical  enlightenment.  If  the  relations  they  talk  about  are 
really  necessary,  v^t  cannot  possibly  find  different  ones. 

531.  Metaphysicists  are  still  maintaining  that  one  well-conducted 
observation  is  enough  to  establish  a  uniformity  in  chemistry  and 
physics,  and  that  therefore  what  is  needed  is  a  "higher  principle" 
enabling  us  to  draw  just  that  inference — which  certainly  does  not 
owe  its  existence  to  any  great  number  of  facts,  since  it  has  been 
drawn  from  only  one.  They  are  entirely  wrong.  Those  many  other 
facts  are  there,  and  they  are  present  in  all  other  similar  facts  that 
have  been  previously  observed.  Why  is  just  one  chemical  analysis 
sufficient  to  determine  the  proportions  in  which  two  elements  are 
combined  in  a  compound?  Because  that  fact  falls  into  a  group  of 
incalculably  numerous  facts  that  have  permitted  recognition  of  the 
uniformity  (law)  of  definite  proportions.  Why  is  one  accurate 
observation  enough  to  establish  the  gestation  period  of  a  female 
mammal?  Because  that  fact  is  one  of  a  very  large  group  of  facts 
which  show  that  the  period  is  constant  (§  556). 

532.  For  that  reason  when  a  fact  is  referred  to  the  wrong  group, 
the  conclusion  is  false.  If  one  infers  from  the  fact  that  there  is  a 
male  and  a  female  Phylloxeron  that  all  Phylloxera  are  born  of  males 
and  females,  so  classing  the  Phylloxeron  with  cases  of  sexual  genera- 
tion, one's  inference  is  mistaken,  for  the  case  happens  to  belong  to  a 
category  where  parthenogenesis  occurs.  There  is  no  "higher  prin- 
ciple" to  guide  us.  There  is  nothing  but  experience;  and  it  shows 
that  along  with  cases  of  sexual  generation  among  Phylloxera  there 
are  cases  of  parthenogenesis. 

533.  Among  propositions  asserting  uniformities,  some  give  experi- 
mental "explanations"  of  facts.  The  explanation  consists  solely  in 
putting  the  fact  that  is  to  be  "explained"  in  relation  with  other  facts. 
So  one  science,  to  wit,  thermodynamics,  "explains"  why  there  are 
bodies  (such  as  water)  where  the  melting  point  lowers  as  pressure 
increases,  and  others  where  it  rises.  Such  an  "explanation"  amounts 
to  nothing  more  than  placing  that  property  in  the  substance  in 
question  in  a  relationship  of  uniformity  with  other  properties  in  the 


3l8  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §534 

same  substance.  Scientific  explanations  other  than  that  do  not  exist. 

534.  It  is  inexact  phrasing  to  say  that  celestial  mechanics  "ex- 
plains" the  movements  of  heavenly  bodies  by  universal  gravitation. 
Celestial  mechanics  has  put  forward  the  hypothesis  that  the  move- 
ments of  heavenly  bodies  satisfy  the  equations  of  dynamics;  and 
down  to  our  time  the  positions  of  heavenly  bodies  as  calculated  by 
dynamics  have  been  the  same,  allowing  for  possible  errors,  as  the 
positions  obtained  by  observation.  So  long  as  that  correspondence 
holds  the  hypothesis  will  be  held  sound.  If  it  should  fail  to  obtain 
some  day,  it  will  be  modified. 

535.  What  use  can  be  made  of  facts  in  sociology,  and  how  can 
uniformities  be  deduced  from  them  ?  ^ 

536.  Facts.  Facts  are  known  through  various  sources  that  historical 
criticism  sifts  and  appraises.^  With  the  problems  of  historical  criti- 
cism we  are  not  called  upon  to  deal  specially  here.  We  need  concern 
ourselves  merely  with  certain  particular  subjects  that  are  of  special 
importance  to  sociology. 

537.  Numbers  of  facts.  It  is  evident  that  the  greater  the  number 
of  facts  we  have  at  our  disposal,  the  better,  and  that  perfection  would 
be  attained  if  all  the  facts  of  a  given  kind  could  be  utilized.  That, 
however,  is  altogether  impossible,  and  therefore  it  is  simply  a  ques- 
tion of  a  more  or  a  less. 

In  assembling  any  great  number  of  facts  of  a  given  variety  two 
obstacles  of  differing  nature  are  encountered.  As  regards  antiquity, 
the  sources  yield  facts  in  scant  numbers.  For  modern  times  too  many 

535  1  To  find  uniformities  is  really  the  purpose  of  this  whole  study;  and  step  by 
step  as  we  seek  and  find  them  we  shall  distinguish  methods  appropriate  to  the  pur- 
pose from  methods  that  are  not.  Actually,  then,  we  might  simply  refer  to  the  rest 
of  these  volumes  as  a  whole.  But  it  is  helpful  to  have  a  general  view  of  a  subject 
and  grasp  it  in  its  broad  outlines.  That  is  the  purpose  of  the  remarks  following. 

536  ^  De  Morgan,  Les  premieres  civilisations,  pp.  29-30:  "The  documents  that  con- 
stitute the  foundations  of  history  properly  so  called  are  of  four  different  varieties: 
I.  Documents  contemporary  with  events,  inscriptions,  coins,  medallions,  histories, 
annals  memoirs.  2.  Archaeological  documents,  monuments,  objects  of  one  kind  or 
another  found  on  the  ground  or  underground.  3.  Narratives  posterior  to  the  events 
they  describe.  4.  Results  of  the  various  sciences  .  .  .  geology,  zoology,  botany,  an- 
thropology, ethnography,  sociology,  philology,  which  it  is  wise  to  supplement  withi 
data  relating  to  industries,  arts,  commerce,  scientific  development,  and  so  on." 


§537  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  319 

are  available  to  allow  all  to  be  sought  out  and  quoted.  To  get  them 
all  together  would  in  itself  be  a  long  and  not  very  fruitful  task. 
Then  once  they  were  assembled,  no  publisher  could  print  the  huge 
folios  that  would  be  required  to  hold  them,  and  no  reader  would 
care  to  read  them.  What  profit  would  there  be  in  collecting  all  the 
accounts  of  all  the  strikes,  big  and  litde,  that  have  occurred  in  all 
the  countries  of  the  world,  and  printing  them  in  a  large  library  of 
volumes  ? 

Since  records  surviving  from  antiquity  are  relatively  few,  the 
modern  custom  is  to  quote  all  or  nearly  all  writers  who  mention  a 
given  subject.  That  is  well  enough,  and  nothing  else  could  be  done, 
it  would  seem,  in  works  of  scholarship.  That  was  more  or  less  the 
method  of  the  manual  of  Roman  antiquities  of  Marquardt  and 
Mommsen,  of  the  dictionary  of  Greek  and  Roman  antiquities  of 
Daremberg  and  Saglio,  and  of  other  works  of  the  kind.  For  the 
Middle  Ages,  the  same  may  sometimes  be  done  as  regards  literature 
proper;  but  many  mediaeval  sources  still  lie  unpublished  in  Euro- 
pean archives.  For  modern  times  materials  are  overabundant  and 
no  such  thing  is  possible.  A  selection  has  to  be  made.^ 

537  ^  Cridcs  at  no  great  cost  to  themselves  can  always  find  some  fact  that  has 
been  omitted;  and  there  are  those  who  avail  themselves  of  such  omissions  to  con- 
demn books  which  they  could  not  by  any  means  have  written  themselves.  "You 
have  omitted  such  and  such  a  fact,"  they  say,  or,  "You  have  used  such  and  such 
an  edition,  and  it  is  not  the  best."  All  that  would  be  justifiable  if  the  critic  could 
add,  "and  the  fact  you  omit  is  important  for  or  against  your  theory,"  or,  "The  best 
reading  of  the  best  edition  is  equally  important  to  you."  Without  that  supplement 
the  criticism  is  childish  and  betrays  the  mere  fatuity  of  a  pedant,  sometimes  well 
read,  more  often  ignorant.  That  good  soul  M.  Aulard,  being  too  much  in  a  hurry 
to  find  fault  with  Taine,  had  a  comical  adventure  that  reminds  one  of  the  proverb 
of  the  cat  that,  through  too  great  haste,  had  blind  kittens  (see  Cochin,  La  crise  de 
I'histoire  revolutiomiaire :  Taiiie  et  M.  Aulard).  Even  as  regards  an  insignificant 
detail  deriving  from  Clement  of  Alexandria,  Aulard's  criticism  is  wholly  wrong. 
Pareto,  "Un  petit  probleme  de  philologie,"  Independance,  May  i,  1912:  "After  all, 
as  regards  the  history  of  the  French  Revolution,  it  does  not  matter  very  much 
whether  Taine  gave  an  accurate  or  an  inaccurate  translation  of  a  passage  from 
Clement  of  Alexandria.  M.  Aulard  could  have  overlooked  the  matter  without  the 
slightest  embarrassment.  But  if  he  was  bent  on  going  into  it,  he  should  have  done 
so  with  the  time  and  attention  required  .  .  .  and  then  he  would  have  seen  that 
the  comparison  drawn  by  Clement  was  exactly  parallel  with  the  comparison  Taine 
wanted  to  draw,  and  so  have  abstained  from  a  criticism  destitute  of  any  founda- 
tion." It  is  first-class  comedy  to  catch  M.  Aulard  condemning  Taine  for  errors  in 


320  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §538 

538.  Weight  of  facts.  The  significance  of  facts  is  more  important 
than  their  number.  A  single  fact  well  observed  and  well  described 
is  of  greater  value  than  a  very  large  number  of  facts  carelessly 
observed  and  inadequately  described/ 

The  pedantic  custom  of  "complete  bibliographies"  has  nowadays 
come  into  great  vogue.  A  writer  must  quote  all  the  writers  who, 
well  or  badly,  sensibly  or  stupidly,  have  touched  on  his  subject.^  As 
a  rule  he  merely  quotes  them — he  does  not  read,  and  much  less 
master,  them,  and  for  the  good  reason — if  for  no  other — that  he 
would  not  have  time  for  such  a  feat.  But  he  transcribes  the  titles  in 
an  attractive  index,  and  the  more  of  them  he  gets  in,  the  more  he 
is  admired  by  pedants  and  cephalopods.  In  determining  the  rela- 
tions between  facts  or  scientific  laws,  it  would  be  better  for  him  to 
master  the  principal  authors  and  pay  no  attention  to  the  others.  Not 
even  for  knowing  the  history  of  a  doctrine  is  it  useful  to  read  all  the 
writers  who  have  written  on  it;  it  is  sufficient  to  centre  on  the  chief 
types.  It  is  laughable  to  see  a  person  making  a  "complete  bibliog- 
raphy" of  the  writers  who  have  written  on  "income"  and  showing 
himself  entirely  ignorant  of  the  phenomena  known  by  that  name 
and  even  more  ignorant  of  their  relations  to  other  economic 
phenomena. 

539.  As  usual,  scholarship  has  gone  to  that  extreme  to  avoid  an- 

transcription  and  making  similar  ones  himself  in  quoting  from  Taine:  cf.  Taine's 
loth  ed.,  Vol.  Ill,  with  Aulard's  quotations:  Taine,  tisstis,  Aulard,  tisses;  Taine,  en 
chantant,  Aulard,  et  chantant;  Taine,  et  soiileve,  Aulard,  //  sotileve.  Three  errors  in 
eleven  lines!  M.  Aulard  will  say  that  they  are  insignificant,  that  they  do  not  in  any 
way  change  the  meaning,  that  they  do  not  affect  his  criticisms,  that  it  is  the  part  of 
a  pedant  to  call  attention  to  them.  Excellent!  That  is  just  my  point!  And  that  is  why 
I  did  not  specify  such  errors  in  my  review.  But  why  did  M.  Aulard  forget  that 
golden  rule  and  go  carping  at  Taine?  Medice,  ctira  te  ipsum! 

538  ^  It  is  well  known  that  in  modern  palaeography  all  manuscripts  deriving 
from  an  archetype  count  as  one  only.  The  Codex  Ambrosianus  of  Plautus,  for  in- 
stance, counts  for  more  than  all  the  other  Plautan  manuscripts. 

538  ^  In  Independance,  Feb.  15,  1912  [wrong  reference  ?]  Georges  Sorel  con- 
cludes the  review  of  a  book  with  a  remark  that  applies  to  many  similar  cases:  "This 
study,  grounded  on  the  strictest  principles  of  the  Sorbonne,  and  utilizing  four  hun- 
dred and  twenty-two  authors  in  its  composition,  affords  an  interesting  example  of 
the  insignificance  of  the  results  that  are  achieved  by  tlie  methods  imparted  by  Lan- 
son." 


11 


§540  CERTAINTY  AND  PROBABILITY  32 1 

Other,  where  it  was  a  question  of  reasoning  without  giving  facts.  Of 
the  two  evils  the  lesser,  and  by  far,  is  to  give  too  many  facts  rather 
than  none  at  all,  and  it  is  also  better  for  the  number  of  facts  to  be 
larger  rather  than  smaller  than  is  required  for  proof.  Better  even  a 
"complete  bibliography"  of  writers  hastily  read  than  complete 
ignorance  of  the  literature  of  one's  subject. 

540.  Leaving  aside  absolute  certitude,  which  does  not  exist  for  the 
experimental  sciences,  and  speaking  only  of  greater  or  lesser  proba- 
bilities, we  have  to  recognize  that  for  many  historical  facts  such 
probability  is  slight,  for  others  great,  and  for  still  others  so  great 
as  to  be  equivalent  to  what  in  ordinary  parlance  is  known  as  cer- 
tainty. In  that  sense  many  facts  are  certain  in  general  but  uncertain 
in  their  details.  It  seems  certain  that  the  Battle  of  Salamis  took 
place,  but  it  is  not  at  all  certain  that  the  details  were  just  as  Herodotus 
reports  them.  Indeed,  to  judge  by  analogy  with  other  accounts  of  the 
kind,  it  is  very  probable  that  some  of  the  details  he  gives  are  wrong. 
However,  we  do  not  know  which.  Even  in  times  far  closer  to  ours, 
it  is  "certain"  that  the  Battle  of  Waterloo  took  place,  but  various 
details  of  it  are  still  matters  of  dispute. 

Following  a  method  that  will  be  explained  in  §  547,  it  is  easy  to 
see  for  oneself  that  when  there  are  several  accounts  of  a  given  epi- 
sode, they  often  differ  in  particulars.  In  some  of  them  it  is  possible 
to  prove  that  particulars  are  wrong  (§  649),  and  any  interpretation 
treating  them  as  accurate  would  certainly  lead  to  error.  In  that  con- 
nexion, two  pitfalls  have  to  be  avoided :  on  the  one  hand,  the  danger 
of  basing  theories  primarily  upon  disputable  facts — an  error  often 
made  in  investigations  of  origins ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  temptation 
to  reject  any  theory  that  is  not  supported  by  absolutely  authenticated 
facts,  as  certain  pedants  nowadays  seem  inclined  to  do;  on  that  basis 
all  theories  would  be  rejectable.  We  must  find  a  just  mean,  framing 
our  theories  cautiously,  sifting  and  selecting  the  facts  and  using  them 
warily,  always  bearing  in  mind  that  the  best  of  theories  may  show 
some  small  margin  of  error  (§  69  ^). 

What  is  said  above  is  nothing  peculiar  to  sociology:  it  applies  to 
all  the  sciences,  even  the  most  exact.  In  using  a  table  of  logarithms 


322  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §54^ 

to  seven  places  one  must  know  that  beyond  that  point  the  logarithm 
cannot  be  guessed.  Not  so  long  ago  the  atomic  weights  of  chemical 
elements  were  known  only  approximately.  Now  they  are  known 
with  relative  exactness,  but  absolute  exactness  we  shall  never  have. 
From  the  days  of  Tycho  Brahe  down  to  our  own,  measurements  of 
stellar  distances  have  been  brought  closer  and  closer  to  perfection, 
but  they  were  still  very  imperfect  in  Newton's  time.  Should  scientists, 
on  that  account,  have  refrained  from  framing  the  theories  of  celes- 
tial mechanics,  just  to  please  a  few  pedants  ?  Or  indeed,  to  state  the 
full  truth,  should  they  not  rather  forbear  from  theory  now  and 
forever?  Absolutely  exact  measurements  are  not  yet  available,  and 
they  never  will  be. 

We  can  go  even  farther.  It  was  a  fortunate  circumstance  for  the 
foundation  of  celestial  mechanics  that  in  Kepler's  time  observations 
of  the  planet  Mars  were  not  very  exact.  If  they  had  been  he  would 
not  have  detected  an  ellipse  in  the  curve  traversed  by  that  planet  and 
so  would  not  have  discovered  the  laws  of  planetary  movement.  It  was 
also  fortunate  that  he  elected  to  study  the  movements  of  Mars  rather 
than  those  of  the  Moon,  which  is  subject  to  greater  disturbances.^ 

540  ^  Bertrand,  Les  jondateurs  de  V astronomic  moderne,  pp.  146-47:  "Kepler  was 
in  a  position  to  say,  it  is  true,  that  an  error  of  eight  minutes  was  impossible  on  his 
part.  That  self-confidence  saved  the  day.  Had  he  been  able  to  say  as  much  of  an 
error  of  eight  seconds,  all  would  have  been  lost.  .  .  .  Kepler  was  mistaken,  in  fact, 
in  regarding  the  important  advantage  he  had  won  over  the  rebellious  and  stubborn 
planet  as  one  of  those  decisive  victories  that  for  ever  end  a  struggle.  Those  great 
laws,  eternally  true  [Bertrand  might  have  dispensed  with  this  discursion  into  meta- 
physics.] within  reasonable  limits,  are  not  strictly  mathematical.  [They  are  a  first 
approximation,  the  approximation  of  the  elliptical  movement  so  called.]  Numberless 
perturbations  are  constandy  deflecting  Mars  from  his  course,  gradually  freeing  him 
from  the  frail  bonds  in  which  the  fortunate  astronomer  thought  he  had  shackled 
him  for  ever.  For  anyone  going  more  deeply  into  the  matter  [Successive  approxima- 
tions], such  irregularities  once  accounted  for  and  become  predictable  bring  a  star- 
tling confirmation  to  the  theory  of  attraction,  which  they  enhance  in  importance 
in  proportion  as  they  make  it  clearer.  But  any  premature  acquaintance  with  them, 
which  would  necessarily  have  resulted  from  more  accurate  observations,  would  have 
wrapped  the  truth  in  unfathomable  complications,  and  perhaps  long  have  retarded 
progress  in  knowledge  of  the  mechanics  of  the  universe.  For  in  that  case  Kepler 
would  have  had  as  good  reason  to  reject  the  elliptical  orbit  as  the  circular  orbit, 
and  would  have  been  forced  to  hunt  for  the  laws  of  the  irregular  movement  di- 
recdy,  at  the  risk  of  wearing  out  his  stubborn  patience  and  exhausdng  all  his  keen 
resourcefulness   on    insuperable    obstacles."    Whereas    knowledge    of    the    elliptical 


§54^  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING   EXPERIENCE  323 

What  at  that  time  was  the  work  of  chance  must  now  be  done  by 
the  method  of  successive  approximations  (§69-9).  Every  now  and 
then  the  scientific  theories  of  economics  and  sociology  are  chal- 
lenged as  disregarding  certain  particulars.  That,  instead,  is  a  merit. 
One  must  first  obtain  a  general  concept  of  the  thing  one  is  studying, 
disregarding  details,  which  for  the  moment  are  taken  as  perturba- 
tions; and  then  come  to  particulars  afterwards,  beginning  with  the 
more  important  and  proceeding  successively  towards  the  less  im- 
portant.^ 

541.  Suppose  we  have  before  us  a  text,  or  a  number  of  texts,  of  a 
given  writer.  It  (they)  may  be  considered  from  three  points  of  view: 
I.  As  to  what  the  writer  thought,  his  psychic  state,  and  how  he  came 
by  it.  2.  As  to  what  he  meant  in  a  given  passage.  3.  As  to  how  people 
of  a  given  group  at  a  given  time  have  understood  him.  From  the 
standpoint  of  the  social  equilibrium  the  importance  of  the  queries 
increases  from  No.  i  to  No.  3.  From  the  objective  standpoint  No.  2 
is  virtually  the  only  one  to  be  considered,  provided  it  be  possible  to 
establish  a  moderately  exact  relation  between  the  writer's  testimony 
and  something  objectively  real.  No.  i  is  personal  to  the  writer.  No.  2 
is  impersonal,  objective — the  passage  may  be  considered  independ- 
ently of  the  person  who  wrote  it  (§  855).  No.  3  relates  to  the  writer's 
audience. 

I.  The  ideas  of  a  writer  do  not  always  present  consistent  unity, 

movement  led  to  the  notion  that  the  movements  of  the  planets  might  be  due  to 
solar  attraction.  Then  the  theory  of  attraction  was  extended  to  the  reciprocal  influ- 
ences of  the  planets  upon  each  other  and  upon  the  Sun;  and  so  the  successive  af>- 
proximations  of  astrophysics  were  obtained. 

540  ~  Deliberate  disregard  of  certain  particulars  in  a  first  approximation  is  often- 
times called  an  error,  and  those  who  make  that  criticism  no  more  than  confirm  the 
old  saw  that  "the  silence  that  is  golden  never  gets  into  lead."  There  are  those  who 
condemn  one  branch  of  social  science  for  keeping  distinct  from  other  branches  and 
imagine  that  to  ignore  one  branch  while  dealing  with  another  is  to  be  either  igno- 
rant concerning  it  or  neglectful  of  it  (§  SSf-).  That  criticism  is  different  from  the 
other,  but  it  has  an  identical  origin  in  a  presumptuous  ignorance  of  the  character 
of  scientific  theories  and  the  need  of  arriving  at  them  by  analysis.  All  the  same, 
those  good  souls  have  to  be  thanked  for  not  extending  their  censures  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  social  sciences.  They  might  just  as  well  censure  an  economist  for  not 
including  cooking  in  his  science,  for  cooking,  as  no  one  will  deny,  also  contributes 
very  considerably  to  joyous  living  (Pareto,  Coins,  §§2,  34). 


324  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §541 

not  only  because  they  vary  with  time,  as  may  be  seen  in  St.  Augus- 
tine's Retractationes  {Opera,  Vol.  I,  p.  583)  and  other  books  of  the 
kind,  but  also  because  in  matters  pertaining  to  sentiment  an  author 
may  express  differing  and  even  contradictory  ideas  in  the  same  text 
without  being  aware  of  it.  When,  therefore,  one  tries  to  ascertain  his 
ideas  on  a  certain  matter,  one  may  be  looking  for  something  that 
does  not  exist.  Yet  doing  just  that  has  now  become  the  vogue.  We 
have  a  pest  of  "psychological"  studies  of  writers,  which  are,  after  all, 
mere  collections  of  anecdotes  and  gossip  serving  as  materials  for 
the  lectures  and  the  light  reading  so  especially  dear  to  ladies  of 
fashion  who  imagine  that  they  are  following  the  scientific  movement 
in  devouring  them  (§§  858-59).  It  is  also  in  style  to  wonder  why  a 
writer  wrote  what  he  wrote;  and  if  one  can  somehow  manage  to 
discover  that  he  wrote  it  in  a  moment  of  rage  at  a  betrayal  by  a 
mistress,  one  thinks  one  has  discovered  America. 

Beyond  question,  an  author's  views  have  some  relation  to  the 
sentiments  prevailing  in  the  group  in  which  he  lives,  and  it  is  there- 
fore possible,  within  certain  limits,  to  gain  from  his  views  some  light 
as  to  those  sentiments,  which,  meantime,  are  elements  in  the  social 
equilibrium.  But  it  is  curious  that  that  is  more  especially  the  case 
'  with  commonplace  writers  of  mediocre  talents  than  with  eminent 
authors,  those  of  great  genius.  The  latter  in  virtue  of  their  very 
qualities  rise  above  the  commonalty  and  stand  apart  from  the  mass 
of  people.  They  therefore  reflect  less  reliably  the  ideas,  beliefs,  and 
sentiments  actually  prevailing.^ 

2.  When  we  know  what  a  writer  intended  to  say  in  a  given  text, 

541  ^  Sorel  well  says  in  "Quelqiies  pretentions  jnives,"  pp.  217  £.:  "Most  often 
when  we  are  trying  to  determine  the  historical  role  of  a  group  of  human  beings, 
we  study  individuals  to  whom  we  think  we  can  ascribe  a  capacity  for  representing, 
more  or  less  perfectly,  the  spiritual  force  of  the  group  at  large;  we  note  the  senti- 
ments, aspirations,  philosophical  conceptions,  which  those  exceptional  people  have 
voiced.  We  construct  from  individual  elements,  in  a  word,  that  consciousness  of 
rights  and  duties  which  according  to  our  estimate  prevailed  in  the  group.  Now  and 
again  historians  have  chosen  to  deceive  themselves  as  to  the  reliability  of  the  results 
obtained  by  that  method,  holding  that  'representative  men'  are  altogether  deter- 
mined by  environment.  Then  again  other  writers,  admiring  the  originality  that  not 
a  few  of  such  representative  men  evince,  have  seen  creative  geniuses  in  them.  .  .  . 
Evidently,  the  truth  lies  somewhere  between  those  two  extreme  views." 


§541       TEXTUAL  criticism:  objective  standpoint         325 

and  provided  we  have  reason  to  believe  his  testimony  moderately 
veracious,  we  say  that  the  text  establishes  certain  facts.  All  docu- 
ments called  historical  are  substantially  of  that  kind. 
3.  In  addition  to  the  facts  usually  made  available  in  that  way  there 
I;  are  others  which  it  is  important  for  us  to  know.  We  have  already 
seen,  and  we  shall  see  more  clearly  as  we  go  on,  that  the  sentiments 
manifested  in  the  beliefs  and  ideas  of  human  beings  are  important 
factors  in  determining  social  phenomena;  and  it  follows  from  this 

I[  that  sentiments  and  expressions  of  sentiments  are  "facts"  as  im- 
I  <'portant  for  sociology  as  the  "facts"  that  are  actions.  Even  if  the  Battle 
'  '^of  Marathon  had  never  taken  place,  the  conception  the  Athenians 
had  of  it  remains  a  fact  of  great  significance  as  regards  the  form  of 
Athenian  society.  Thucydides,  Historiae,  I,  20,  says  that  it  is  not  true 
that,  as  the  Athenian  masses  believed,  Hipparchus  was  the  tyrant 
when  he  was  murdered  by  Harmodius  and  Aristogiton;  but  as  re- 
gards the  form  of  Athenian  society  the  fact  itself  is  less  significant 
than  the  conception  that  the  Athenian  masses  had  of  it.  And  among 
the  forces  exerting  a  powerful  influence  in  determining  that  form 
was  certainly  the  sentiment  which  found  expression  when  the 
Athenians  sang  the  praises  of  Harmodius  and  Aristogiton  for  killing 
the  tyrant  and  making  Athenians  equals  before  the  law."  So  we 
arrive  at  the  conclusion — it  seems  paradoxical  but  is  not — that  to 
understand  the  form  of  Athenian  society  it  is  much  less  important 
to  know  whether  Hipparchus  was  really  a  tyrant,  or  even  whether 
the  whole  story  was  not  just  a  legend,  than  it  is  to  know  the  ideas 
of  the  Athenians  on  the  matter. 

Does  the  famous  oration  on  the  war-dead  of  Athens  that  Thu- 
cydides  puts  into  the  mouth  of  Pericles  repeat  even  approximately 
the  words  that  Pericles  actually  delivered.?  We  do  not  know,  and 
for  purposes  of  determining  manners  of  feeling  and  thinking  at 
Athens  at  the  time,  we  little  care.  In  all  probability  Thucydides 

541  ^Bergk,  Poetae  lyrici  Graeci,  Scolia,  9,  11,  pp.  1019-20:  "Mid  branches  of 
myrtle  will  I  bear  my  sword  even  as  Harmodius  and  Aristogiton  when  they  slew 
the  tyrant  and  made  the  Athenians  equal  before  the  law."  "Mid  branches  of  myrde 
will  I  bear  my  sword,  even  as  Harmodius  and  Aristogiton  when  they  slew  Hip- 
parchus the  tyrant  at  the  Panathenaia." 


326  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §541 

wrote  the  oration  in  the  spirit  of  the  environment  with  which  he  was 
thoroughly  familiar.  It  would  be  strange  .indeed  that,  inventing  the 
oration  out  of  whole  cloth,  he  should  have  written  it  in  such  a  way 
as  to  clash  with  attitudes  with  which  his  readers  were  as  well 
acquainted  as  he  (§  243). 

Nowadays  there  are  people  who  say  that  Christ  was  a  solar  myth. 
Grant  the  point  for  the  moment.  Will  the  tremendous  role  played 
by  Christianity,  or  rather  by  the  sentiments  manifested  under  Chris- 
tian form  in  European  society,  be  any  the  less  important  on  that 
account  ?  Sorel  well  says :  ^  "As  for  the  stigmata  of  St.  Francis,  we 
do  not  need  to  know  just  what  those  sores  were  like;  but  we  do  have 
to  find  out  what  conception  the  Middle  Ages  had  of  them.  The  con- 
ception was  what  influenced  history,  and  that  influence  is  inde- 
pendent of  the  physiological  problem." 

So,  as  regards  a  given  country  at  a  given  period,  the  significance 
of  what  an  author  wrote  lies  not  so  much  in  what  he  meant  as  in 
what  the  people  who  read  his  book  in  that  country  at  that  time 
thought  he  meant.*  There  is  a  radical  difference  between  a  text  con- 
sidered as  evidence  of  what  a  writer  witnessed  or  thought — and 
used  for  the  purposes  of  getting  at  the  things  he  witnessed  or 
thought — and  a  text  considered  as  influencing  its  readers  and  used 
for  purposes  of  determining  the  ideas  and  conduct  of  those  indi- 
viduals. When  a  text  is  considered  from  the  biographical  standpoint 
it  is  very  important  to  know  what  the  author  intended  to  say.  When 
a  text  is  considered  from  the  social  standpoint  such  an  inquiry  is 
virtually  irrelevant.  The  important  thing  is  to  know  how  the  text 
was  taken,  even  if  it  was  taken  upside  down. 

That  point  is  not  appreciated  by  people  who  think  a  text  has  an 

541  ^  Le  system  e  historiqtte  de  Re  nan,  Vol.  I,  p.  37. 

541  *  Sorel,  "Ouelques  pretentions  jtiives,"  p.  231:  "Renan's  judicious  remarks 
are  quite  to  the  point  here:  'In  religious  history,  the  significance  of  a  text  lies  not 
in  what  the  author  meant  but  in  what  the  requirements  of  the  time  made  him 
mean.  The  religious  history  of  mankind  is  a  history  of  misunderstandings.'  [And 
in  a  note  he  quotes  Renan,  Histoire  du  peuple  d' Israel,  Vol.  IV,  p.  193.]  The  re- 
mark also  applies  very  well  to  secular  history.  The  [German]  Social  Democracy  has 
had  to  perform  miracles  of  misinterpretation  in  order  to  pretend  it  was  following 
Hegel"  (§  iioi  ^). 


§544  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  327 

absolute  meaning  and  has  to  be  understood  in  its  "true"  meaning 
only.  So  they  go  hunting  for  that  "true"  meaning,  and  it  turns  out 
after  all  to  be  the  one  they  like  best — which  gives  them  a  chance 
to  quarrel  with  anyone  who  does  not  see  it  as  they  see  it/ 

542.  And  in  certain  cases  it  is  easier  to  know  with  certainty  (very 
great  probability)  facts  relating  to  expressions  of  thought  than  to 
know  facts  relating  to  conduct.  There  may,  of  course,  be  doubt  as 
to  the  correctness  of  a  text  at  our  disposal;  but  once  that  doubt  is 
removed,  we  have  the  fact  itself  before  us  and  are  not  obliged  to 
discuss  it  at  second  hand.  Our  knowledge  of  what  Cicero  says  about 
Catiline  is  much  more  reliable  than  our  knowledge  of  much  of 
Catiline's  conduct. 

543.  Literary  compositions — works  of  the  imagination,  stories, 
legends,  and  the  like — are  generally  of  little  value  as  sources  for 
historical  and  geographical  information.  All  the  same,  scarcity  of 
documents  sometimes  forces  us  to  depend  on  them  for  ancient  times 
or  for  periods  not  extensively  studied;  but  we  must  do  so  with  great 
caution.  To  comprehend  the  situation  more  clearly,  we  might 
illustrate  a  method  that  we  are  to  elaborate  in  §  547. 

544.  I  have  before  me  a  short  story  by  Alphonse  Karr  that  con- 
tains allusions  to  Lausanne,  Montreux,  and  Geneva.^  Suppose  we 
are  faced  by  a  problem  such  as  ancient  Greece  presents  to  scholars 
of  our  day.  Suppose  some  two  thousand  years  hence  Karr's  story 
is  the  only  surviving  document  in  which  Montreux  is  mentioned, 
and  the  scholars  of  that  time  are  trying  to  ascertain  the  location  of 
Montreux  in  respect  to  Lausanne  and  Geneva.  Criticism  shows  that 
Karr  is  worthy  of  all  confidence :  he  lived  at  a  time  when  Montreux 
was  still  flourishing,  and  in  a  neighbouring  country,  France.  Almost 
all  wealthy  and  educated  Frenchmen  of  his  time  made  frequent 

541  °  Another  point:  Critical  editions  enable  one  to  get  back,  with  greater  or  lesser 
probability,  to  the  archetype  of  manuscripts  that  have  come  down  to  us;  but  they 
cannot  show  the  relations  of  the  archetype  to  a  writer's  thought.  We  might  not  be 
able  to  get  his  thought  altogether  even  if  we  had  the  original  autograph.  One  need 
only  think  of  what  happens  in  our  day  of  the  printing-press.  In  reading  proofs  a 
writer  often  notices  imperfections  that  escaped  him  when  he  was  reading  his  orig- 
inal, especially  if  it  has  been  dictated  to  someone  else;  and  he  makes  changes  in  it. 

544  ^  "Pour  ne  pas  ctre  treize,"  pp.  8,  9,  78. 


328  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §545 

visits  to  Switzerland.  It  is  very  probable  that  Karr  had  personal 
knowledge  of  Montreux.  He  could  have  had,  furthermore,  no  con- 
ceivable motive  for  concealing  the  truth.  What  he  says  may  therefore 
be  taken  as  the  testimony  of  an  eyewitness — better  testimony  than  his 
could  not  be  desired.  A  scholar  ransacks  libraries,  studies,  meditates, 
and  he  finds  that  one  of  Karr's  characters  passed  through  Montreux 
on  his  way  from  Lausanne  to  Geneva.  Of  course  one  has  to  be  on 
one's  guard  against  typographical  errors — much  like  the  miscopyings 
of  scribes  in  the  manuscripts  of  the  old  days.  But  no — that  danger  is 
dispelled  by  the  author's  own  words :  "I  arrived  at  Montreux  at  about 
four  o'clock.  It  is  a  village  to  the  right  of  the  highway  bordering  the 
lake  as  one  comes  in  from  Lausanne  and  stands  some  hundred  paces 
back  from  the  road.  It  is  reached  by  a  climb  up  over  a  narrow  path 
that  bristles  with  stones."  No  doubt  therefore!  It  is  really  the  road 
from  Lausanne  to  Geneva,  the  road  that  has  the  lake  to  the  left  and 
the  hills  to  the  right  as  one  comes  in  from  Lausanne.  Then  comes 
another  passage  that  confirms  the  others  and  dispels  any  suspicion 
of  scribal  error  or  textual  interpolation.  The  same  character  in  the 
story  is  returning  from  Geneva  to  Lausanne.  "A  half-hour  later,  the 
two  friends  departed  for  Lausanne.  As  they  passed  through  Mon- 
treux, which  stood  on  the  height  to  the  left,  Eugene  expressed  a 
wish  to  go  up  to  the  village  for  a  moment."  Our  future  scholar  will 
write  a  learned  thesis,  and  deliver  it  before  a  society  of  scholars, 
showing  that  Montreux  must  have  been  located  between  Lausanne 
and  Geneva;  and  who  knows  but  what  some  archaeologist,  follow- 
ing that  lead,  may  even  find  the  ruins  of  Montreux  in  the  region  so 
designated!  And  yet  if  one  thing  in  this  world  is  certain,  it  is  that 
Montreux  lies  beyond  Lausanne  as  one  comes  in  from  Geneva,  and 
that  in  going  from  Lausanne  to  Geneva  or  returning  from  Geneva  to 
Lausanne  one  does  not  pass  Montreux. 

Not  a  little  of  the  information  we  have,  or  think  we  have,  about 
antiquity  has  no  firmer  foundations  than  the  inferences  I  have  just 
drawn  from  Karr's  story:  and  the  certain  error  in  his  case  shows 
the  possibility  of  similar  errors  in  classical  scholarship. 

545.  Purely   literary   compositions,    works   of   the   imagination, 


§546  INTERPRETATIONS  OF  FACTS  329 

Stories,  legends,  are  often  valuable  sources  for  knowledge  of  senti- 
ments; and  oftentimes  indirect  testimony  of  that  kind  is  worth  more 
than  any  amount  of  direct  testimony.  In  his  Mimiambi  Herondas 
gives  a  parody  of  a  counsel's  plea  before  an  Athenian  court.  The 
orator  says,  in  substance,  that  if  his  opponent  has  prevented  a  famine 
by  bringing  grain  into  the  city  (or  else,  if  he,  the  orator,  has  not 
performed  such  a  public  service)  the  fact  ought  not  to  militate 
against  him  in  the  eyes  of  the  judges.^  It  is  evident  from  the  passage 
that  it  must  have  been  a  common  opinion  that  judges  were  influ- 
enced in  their  decisions  by  considerations  of  benevolence  or  malevo- 
lence of  the  kind  mentioned,  quite  aside  from  the  merits  of  a  case — 
otherwise  the  parody  would  lose  all  meaning.  Its  testimony  therefore 
is  worth  more  than  any  number  of  direct  assertions  (§  572). 

So  many  novels  record  prevalent  opinions,  and  the  opinions  often 
correspond  to  certain  facts  and  give  synthetic  conceptions  of  them 
that  are  much  more  valuable  than  anything  that  might  be  had 
from  any  amount  of  miscellaneous  direct  testimony."  When  a  book 
has  many  readers,  it  is  highly  probable  that  it  reflects  their  senti- 
ments and  may  therefore  prove  helpful  in  discovering  them.^  How- 
ever, one  has  to  make  haste  very  slowly  along  such  a  path,  for  if  we 
are  too  facile  with  our  interpretations  we  may  fall  into  serious 
blunders. 

546.  Interpretations.  For  the  very  reason  that  first-hand  knowledge 
of  facts  is  rarely  available,  interpretations  are  indispensable,  and  any- 

545  '^Mimiambi,  II,  16:  "If,  then,  piloting  a  ship  from  Achaea,  he  brought  grain 
and  put  an  end  to  the  fierce  famine  .  .  ."  Variant  rendering  (by  Blass) :  "If  I  have 
not,  piloting  a  ship  from  Achaea,  brought  grain  and  put  an  end  to  the  fierce  fam- 
ine .  .  ."  (Knox:  "Perhaps  he  will  say  to  you:  'I  have  come  from  Acre  with  a  cargo 
of  wheat  and  stayed  the  accursed  famine.'  ") 

545  ^  Zola's  L'argent,  for  example,  gives  a  fairly  accurate  synthetic  conception  of 
life  at  the  Paris  stock  exchange  in  the  days  of  the  Union  Generale.  Maupassant's 
Bel  Ami  gives  a  picture  hard  to  match  of  the  financial  speculations  of  the  politicians 
at  the  time  of  the  occupation  of  Tunis  by  France,  and  of  the  part  played  by  the 
press  in  those  intrigues.  Similar  phenomena  were  observable  later  on  at  the  time  of 
the  conflict  between  France  and  Morocco,  following  the  Agadir  affair. 

545  ^  In  great  vogue  towards  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  in  nearly  all 
civilized  countries,  and  in  France  in  particular,  was  the  doctrine  that  accounts  all 
conduct  logical  and  every  non-logical  action  a  "prejudice."  The  spread  of  the  doc- 


330  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §547 

!  one  resolved  to  do  absolutely  without  them  might  as  well  not  bother 
with  history  and  sociology.  But  it  is  important  to  decide  when,  how, 
and  to  what  extent  they  may,  with  a  fair  degree  of  probability,  be 
trusted.  That  question,  like  all  questions  in  the  experimental  sciences, 
has  to  be  answered  on  the  basis  of  experience. 

547.  There  is  one  method  that  gives  good  results  in  many  cases. 
Let  A  stand  for  a  fact  of  the  past.  We  do  not  know  the  "explanation" 
of  it.  So  we  find  one — that  is  to  say,  we  establish  a  relation  between 
A  and  another  fact  B,  by  way  of  a  certain  interpretation.  Now  we 
have  to  ascertain  whether  the  interpretation  leads  to  plausible  re- 
trine  may  readily  be  judged  from  the  fact  that  it  affected  even  light  literature — love- 
stories.  For  example,  the  younger  Crebillon,  La  nuit  et  le  moment,  pp.  19-21: 

"Cidalise:  Truly  now,  Clitandre — you  do  not  love  Araminte.?  .  .  .  {Clitandre 
shrugs  his  shoulders.)  All  the  same — you  have  had  her! 

"Clitandre:  Oh,  that's  different! 

"Cidalise:  So  they  say!  It  does  seem  to  be  different  these  days. 

"Clitandre :  Not  just  these  days!  The  old  days  too! 

"Cidalise:  You  astonish  me!  I  thought  this  modern  philosophy  had  changed  all 
that. 

"Clitandre :  Well,  I  think  myself  that  in  such  matters,  as  in  many  others,  it  has 
improved  our  thinking,  but  less  by  changing  the  things  we  do  than  by  giving  us  a 
clearer  understanding  of  why  we  do  them.  Now  we  seem  not  to  be  acting  so  much 
by  chance.  Before  we  learned  to  reason  so  well,  we  used  to  do  the  very  things  we 
do  today;  but  we  did  them  under  stress  of  temptation,  without  knowing  what  we 
were  doing,  and  with  all  the  qualms  of  conscience  that  prejudice  inspired  in  us.  We 
were  not  any  more  virtuous  than  we  are  today,  but  we  wanted  to  seem  so,  and 
there  is  no  doubt  at  all  that  in  those  days  a  ridiculous  prejudice  spoiled  many  a 
good  time.  But  at  last  we  have  been  lucky  enough  to  see  the  truth  [Milord  True 
and  Milady  Truth  are  the  great  divinities  of  emancipated  religions.],  and  what  a 
relief  it  is!  Women  have  never  been  so  care-free  in  society.  There  has  never  been 
so  little  affectation  of  virtue.  You  like  her?  Well,  you  take  her — and  she  you!  You 
are  bored.''  You  separate  with  as  little  ado  as  you  began!  You  are  right  in  saying  that 
love  figures  very  little  in  all  that.  But  what  was  love  but  a  desire  that  people 
chose  to  exaggerate  in  importance  in  their  own  minds — a  sensuous  impulse  that 
they  had  been  silly  enough  to  represent  as  a  virtue?  [Less  frivolous  writers  had  said 
the  same  of  the  religious  and  other  instincts.]  Now  we  have  come  to  see  that  pleas- 
ure is  the  only  thing  .  .  .  and  I  take  it  that  on  the  whole  it  has  proved  the  height  of 
wisdom  to  substitute  so  many  pleasures  for  a  few  outworn  prejudices  that  net  very 
little  esteem  and  a  great  deal  of  annoyance  [for]  those  who  take  them  as  their  rule 
of  life."  For  a  good  understanding  of  the  French  Revolution  such  a  passage  is 
worth  more  than  no  end  of  direct  description.  Victor  Hugo's  Les  Miserables,  com- 
bined with,  let  us  say,  the  novels  of  George  Sand,  gives  a  clear  and  exact  concep- 
tion of  the  epidemic  of  humanitarianism  that  swept  all  civilized  countries  during 
the  nineteenth  century. 


§549  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  33 1 

suits.  So  if  we  can  find  in  the  present  a  fact  a  similar  to  A,  connected 
in  a  manner  well  known  with  another  fact  h,  also  well  known  and 
similar  to  B,  we  use  the  parallel  to  "explain"  a.  If  we  do  find  the 
actual  "explanation"  b,  the  result  is  favourable  to  our  method,  and 
if  we  can  find  numerous  examples,  we  may  conclude  that  it  gives 
fairly  probable  results.  But  if  in  trying  to  explain  a  we  do  not  find  h, 
that  fact  warrants  suspicion  of  our  method — there  is  one  exception, 
there  may  be  others.  If  we  find  even  relatively  few  exceptions,  little 
probability  remains.^ 

548.  In  general  the  unknown  has  to  be  explained  by  the  known, 
and  the  past  is  therefore  better  explained  by  the  present  than  the 
present  is  by  the  past,  though  the  latter  method  was  followed  by  the 
majority  of  writers  in  the  beginnings  of  sociology  and  is  still  followed 
by  many  (§571).  * 

549.  A  certain  amount  of  interpretation  is  nearly  always  necessary. 
A  person  reporting  a  fact  does  so  in  his  own  language,  adding  little 
or  much  to  it  from  his  own  sentiments.  To  get  at  the  fact  we  have  to 
divest  what  he  says  of  such  accessories.  That  will  be  sometimes  easy, 
sometimes  difficult;  but  we  must  never  forget  the  necessity,  or  at 
least  the  utility,  of  doing  it.  Travellers  translate  the  notions  they 
hear  expressed  in  the  languages  of  the  countries  they  visit  into  words 
and  ideas  of  their  own.  Their  accounts  oftentimes  are  now  more, 
now  less,  at  variance  with  the  facts;  and  it  is  necessary,  when  such  a 

547  ^  We  shall  make  frequent  use  of  this  method  in  the  course  of  this  work, 
so  that  we  may.  here  dispense  with  giving  examples.  We  have  already  made  some 
use  of  it,  however,  in  §  544.  We  used  it  also,  implicitly,  in  investigating  the  rela- 
tions of  the  metaphysical  method  to  experimental  facts.  Can  that  method  lead,  or 
can  it  not,  to  results  verifiable  by  experience?  Suppose  we  apply  it  to  cases  such  as 
physics,  celestial  mechanics,  or  chemistry,  where  the  experimental  results  are  well 
known — or  better  yet,  suppose  we  let  Hegel  do  the  applying,  since  he  is  so  much 
admired  by  metaphysicists.  If  the  metaphysical  method  leads  to  conclusions  that 
are  corroborated  by  long  experience  in  those  sciences,  we  shall  have  reasons  for 
hoping  that  it  will  prove  equally  successful  in  other  connexions — in  social  science, 
for  instance,  where  experimental  verifications  are  less  practicable.  If  on  the  other 
hand,  in  physics,  celestial  mechanics,  chemistry,  it  leads  to  conclusions  that  experi- 
ence proves  to  be  senseless,  fantastic,  idiotic,  we  shall  have  reasons  for  fearing 
that  it  will  yield  no  better  results  in  the  social  or  historical  sciences  (§§484f., 
502  f.,  5142), 


332  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §550 

thing  is  possible,  to  retranslate  in  the  inverse  direction  to  get  at  the 
real  states  of  mind  of  the  people  the  traveller  is  describing."^ 

550.  Similarly,  it  is  in  many  cases  unsatisfactory  to  get  facts  for 
sociology  from  translations,  and  if  possible  one  should  refer  to  the 
original  texts.  As  usual,  one  need  not  go  from  one  extreme  to  an- 
other. There  are  cases  in  which,  let  alone  a  translation,  even  a  mere 
abstract  is  sufficient.  It  all  depends  on  whether  conclusions  are  based 
on  the  exact  meaning  of  one  or  more  terms;  if  they  are,  reference  to 
originals  is  indispensable.^ 

549  ^  Reviewing  Junod's  The  Life  of  a  South  African  Tribe,  Vol.  I,  Social  Life, 
in  the  Journal  de  Geneve,  Aug.  25,  191 2,  the  distinguished  Egyptologist  Edouard 
Naville  writes:  "One  of  the  aspects  of  M.  Junod's  book  that  may  prove  most  useful 
to  students  of  very  ancient  philology  is  language.  Primitive  peoples  almost  always 
express  themselves  through  metaphor.  Anything  even  distandy  approximating  the 
abstract  has  to  be  rendered  by  something  susceptible  of  sense-perception.  On  the 
other  hand  some  altogether  crude  or  commonplace  act  may  be  designated  by  the 
religious  or  ritualistic  significance  attached  to  it.  Anyone  not  holding  the  key  to 
such  riddles  is  in  danger  of  going  completely  wrong  in  his  interpretations  of 
words  or  phrases.  I  note,  for  instance,  a  custom  that  has  also  been  observed  in 
Egypt — the  burial  of  broken  vases  or  other  objects  with  bodies  in  tombs.  The 
Bantus  do  the  same.  On  the  grave  of  a  man  who  has  died  they  break  all  objects 
of  no  further  value  that  belonged  to  him — old  pottery,  especially,  and  the  handles 
of  zaga'ies.  Everything  his  must  die  with  him.  That  ceremony  is  called  'showing 
one's  anger  to  the  dead.'  Now  if  we  found  such  an  expression  as  'to  show  one's 
anger  to  the  dead'  in  an  Egypdan  or  Assyrian  document,  I  doubt  very  much 
whether  the  most  learned  philologist  would  ever  guess  its  true  meaning:  'to  break 
a  dish.'  I  am  afraid  that,  unfortunately,  our  translations  may  contain  serious  errors 
due  to  such  ignorance.  I  believe  that  it  is  owing  to  such  mistakes  that  many 
Egypdan  texts,  such  as  those  in  the  Pyramids  or  the  Boo\  of  the  Dead,  seem  often 
so  strange  and  so  childish.  We  have  not  found  the  key  to  the  metaphors  that 
abound,  especially  in  religious  language.  M.  Junod's  book  is  packed  with  such  ex- 
pressions. There  are  some  on  every  page.  I  will  mention  two:  'to  eat  oxen'  means 
to  accept  the  purchase  price,  the  lobola,  of  a  wife,  who  may  be  bought  for  two, 
three,  or  even  ten  such  animals.  'To  eat  two  herds'  is  a  legal  term  for  wrongfully 
charging  two  lobola." 

550  ^  I  have  been  very  cautious  in  these  volumes  in  quoting  from  languages  I 
do  not  know.  Such,  for  example,  would  be  the  case  with  the  Talmud;  though  I 
hope  the  translations  that  I  have  used  reproduce  the  text  at  least  approximately. 
In  any  event,  I  refrain  from  any  conclusion  that  might  depend  too  much  upon  the 
strict  meaning  of  some  term.  It  would  be  very  useful  if  some  person  who  knows 
the  oriental  languages,  Arabic,  Sanskrit,  Chinese,  Japanese,  and  so  on,  would  publish 
literal  translations  with  philological  notes  of  passages  of  texts  serviceable  to  so- 
ciology. Until  that  is  done,  we  shall  have  to  feel  our  way  along  in  the  use  we 
make  of  documents  in  those  languages.  Sumner  Maine,  Early  History  of  Institutions. 


§551  INTERPRETATIONS  OF  FACTS  333 

551.  The  more  important  difficulties  in  understanding  facts  from 
other  periods  of  history  or  other  peoples  arise  from  our  coming  to 
them  with  the  mental  habits  of  our  own  countries  and  our  own 
times.  We  live,  for  instance,  in  countries  and  times  in  which  there 
are  written  laws  with  a  public  authority  to  enforce  them.  It  is  hard 
for  us,  therefore,  to  understand  the  conditions  prevailing  among 
peoples  who  have  not  laws  like  ours,  but  unwritten  customs  with  no 
public  authority  to  enforce  their  observance.^  By  the  very  nature 

pp.  8-9:  "There  is,  however,  another  more  permanent  and  more  serious  cause  of  em- 
barrassment in  drawing  conclusions  from  these  [old  Irish]  laws.  Until  compara- 
tively lately  they  were  practically  unintelligible;  and  they  were  restored  to 
knowledge  by  the  original  translators.  .  .  .  The  translations  have  been  carefully 
revised  by  the  learned  editor  of  the  Irish  text;  but  it  is  probable  that  several  gen- 
erations of  Celtic  scholars  will  have  had  to  interchange  criticisms  on  the  language 
of  the  laws  before  the  reader  who  approaches  them  without  any  pretension  to  Celtic 
scholarship  can  be  quite  sure  that  he  has  the  exact  meaning  of  every  passage 
before  him.  ...  In  what  follows  I  attempt  to  draw  inferences  only  when  the 
meaning  and  drift  of  the  text  seem  reasonably  certain,  and  I  have  avoided  some 
promising  lines  of  enquiry  which  would  lead  us  through  passages  of  doubtful 
signification."  [One  might  note,  a  propos  of  this  passage,  that  in  actual  practice, 
Pareto  used  translations  very  much  as  he  found  them,  and,  in  the  cases  of  the  mod- 
ern languages,  they  were  as  often  erroneous  as  not.  Even  a  writer  in  his  own  lan- 
guage, Casati,  he  quotes  in  a  garbled  French  translation.  In  the  days  when  these 
volumes  were  in  formation,  scientific  philology  and  textual  criticism,  as  represented 
by  the  schools  of  Paul  Meyer,  Lanson  and  Bedier,  were  enjoying  a  virtual  primacy 
in  European  university  life.  Pareto's  efforts  at  textual  criticism,  especially  in  the 
classics,  were  made  largely  in  deference  to  philological  eminences  which  everyone, 
to  use  a  phrase  of  Casanova,  was  ready  to  concede  rather  than  go  to  the  trouble  of 
reading  their  books  to  see  if  their  reputations  were  deserved.  Pious  enough  in  their 
intentions,  those  efforts  were  rarely  prosecuted  to  decisive  results  and  they  remain, 
in  the  Trattato  as  well  as  in  the  Cottrs  and  the  Maniiale,  as  somewhat  of  a  pedantic 
pose.  This  is  said  in  no  spirit  of  irreverence  for  Pareto's  truly  exceptional  and  mar- 
vellously assimilated  culture,  especially  in  the  classical  literatures,  but  just  to  keep 
certain  aspects  of  this  work  in  the  light  in  which  they  belong. — A.  L.] 

551  ^  Maine,  Ibid.,  p.  286:  "The  learned  Editors  of  the  various  Introductions 
prefixed  to  the  official  publications  of  Ancient  Irish  Law  are  plainly  of  opinion  that 
such  jurisdiction  as  any  Irish  Courts  possessed  was,  to  use  the  technical  phrase, 
voluntary.  The  Law  of  Distress,  in  this  view,  was  clearly  enough  conceived  by  the 
Brehon  lawyers,  but  it  depended  for  the  practical  obedience  which  it  obtained  on 
the  aid  of  public  opinion  and  of  popular  respect  for  a  professional  caste.  .  .  .  (pp. 
38-39)  Now,  the  want  of  a  sanction  is  occasionally  one  of  the  greatest  difficulties  in 
understanding  the  Brehon  law.  Suppose  a  man  disobeyed  the  rule  or  resisted  its 
application,  what  would  happen?  The  learned  writer  of  one  of  the  modern  prefaces 
prefixed  to  the  Third  Volume  of  the  Ancient  Laws  contends  that  the  administra- 
tion of  the  Brehon  system  consisted  in  references  to  arbitration;   and  I  certainly 


I 


334  TREATISE   ON  GENERAL   SOCIOLOGY  §552 

of  their  work  scholars  Uve  partly  in  the  past,  their  minds  gradually 
acquire  some  of  the  habits  of  those  periods,  and  so  they  are  better 
able  to  understand  the  facts  than  people  without  that  advantage. 
In  our  time,  likewise,  in  certain  cases  there  is  a  complete  separation 
between  fact  and  law — between,  for  instance,  the  fact  of  ownership 
and  property  right.  There  have  been  peoples  and  periods  where  fact 
and  law  in  ownership  were  one  and  the  same.  In  course  of  time 
the  two  were  gradually  divorced  by  a  slow  process  of  evolution,  and 
now  we  find  it  difficult  to  picture  one  of  the  intermediary  stages 
clearly  to  ourselves. 

552.  But  all  that  is  insignificant  as  compared  with  the  difficulties 
rising  from  intrusions   of  sentiments,   aspirations,   interests,   and 

non-experimental  entities  of  a  metaphysical  or  theological  character. 
The  fact,  indeed,  that  we  simply  must  not  rest  satisfied  with  the 
appearances,  often  very  misleading,  that  such  things  give  to  facts,  but 
must  get  back  somehow  to  facts  themselves,  is  what  is  guiding  us  in 
these  volumes  and  constraining  us  to  follow  such  a  long  and 
fatiguing  road. 

553.  Probability  of  conclusions.  Here  we  are  called  upon  to  find 
a  solution  for  a  problem  of  the  kind  solved  by  the  calculus  of  proba- 
bilities, under  the  name  of  probabilities  of  causes.  Take,  for  example, 
an  urn  containing  a  hundred  balls,  some  of  which  are  white,  the 
others  black — we  do  not  know  in  what  proportions,  but  we  do  know 
that  all  proportions  are  a  priori  equally  probable.  We  draw  a  white 
ball.  We  are  thereupon  certain  that  all  the  balls  are  not  black,  but 
that  all  combinations  allowing  at  least  one  white  ball  are  possible. 
The  probability  that  all  the  balls  are  white  is  2/101 — very  small, 
therefore.  The  probability  that  the  white  balls  may  number  at  least 

think  myself  that,  so  far  as  the  system  is  known,  it  points  to  that  conclusion. 
The  one  object  of  the  Brehons  was  to  force  the  disputants  to  refer  their  quarrels 
to  a  Brehon,  or  to  some  person  in  authority  advised  by  a  Brehon."  Idem,  Ancietit 
Law,  pp.  7-8:  "It  is  certain  that,  in  the  infancy  of  mankind,  no  sort  of  legislature, 
not  even  a  distinct  author  of  law,  is  contemplated  or  conceived  of.  Law  has  scarcely 
reached  the  foodng  of  custom;  it  is  rather  a  habit.  ...  It  is  of  course  extremely 
difficult  for  us  to  realise  a  view  so  far  removed  from  us  in  point  both  of  time  and 
of   association. " 


§556  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  335 

fifty  is  765/1010 — about  three  to  one,  that  is.  Now  let  us  assume 
that  according  to  some  hypothetical  law  all  the  balls  should  be  white. 
The  drawing  of  a  white  ball  corroborates  the  law  in  one  instance. 
That  verification  gives  the  law  a  very  small  probability — about  .02. 
The  probability  that  the  law  will  be  verified  more  often  than  not  is 
not  very  great  either,  being  only  about  three  to  one. 

554.  When  the  calculus  of  probabilities  first  began  to  be  studied, 
there  was  hope  that  it  might  yield  exact  formulae  for  finding  proba- 
bilities of  causes.  The  hope  proved  groundless  because  we  have  no 
means  of  establishing  any  likeness  between  practical  cases  and  draw- 
ings of  one  or  more  balls  from  an  urn.  We  have  no  knowledge  what- 
ever as  to  the  number  of  balls  in  the  urn,  and  little  or  none  as  to  the 
a  priori  probabilities  of  the  various  combinations.  Any  help  we  might 
have  hoped  for  from  the  calculus  of  probabilities  fails,  therefore; 
and  we  are  reduced  to  evaluating  probabiUties  approximately  in 
other  ways. 

555.  An  extreme  case  would  be  the  law  of  chemical  combinations 
(§  531).  In  that  case  we  have  an  urn  that  very  probably  contains  balls 
all  of  one  colour.  A  single  drawing  is  enough  to  determine  the 
colour  with  great  probability.  We  know,  for  instance,  that  all  ele- 
ments very  probably  combine  in  definite  proportions  (the  proportion 
would  be  the  colour,  in  the  case  of  the  balls).  One  experiment  is 
enough  to  determine  the  proportion — one  drawing,  that  is,  to  de- 
termine the  colour  (§§97,  531)- 

556.  When  a  fact,  A,  can  be  classed  with  other  facts,  it  is  a  priori 
probable  that  it  follows  the  laws  they  follow.  A  single  verification 
therefore  yields  a  high  probability  that  that  is  so  (§531)-  The 
method,  in  other  words,  is  first  to  observe  similarities — then  to  verify. 
That  is  one  of  the  methods  most  generally  used  for  discovering  ex- 
perimental laws.  Just  so  Newton,  by  way  of  hypothesis,  extended  to 
the  heavenly  bodies  the  laws  of  motion  established  for  terrestrial 
bodies.  He  then  verified  the  assumption  on  the  movements  of  the 
Moon  around  the  Earth,  and  so  discovered  the  law  for  celestial 
bodies.  His  successors  continued  making  verifications,  all  with  good 


336  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §557 

results.  Now,  therefore,  his  laws  have  a  very  high  degree  of 
probability. 

Modern  etymologists  were  able  to  observe  in  the  fact  the  suc- 
cessive changes  in  a  Vulgar  Latin  word  that  had  developed  into  a 
modern  French  or  Italian  word.  On  the  principle  of  assimilation 
(similitude)  they  extended  the  supposed  laws  they  had  discovered  to 
other  words,  made  verifications,  and  so  constituted  the  science  of 
Romance  phonology. 

The  difficulty  lies  in  establishing  likenesses,  because  there  is  al- 
ways something  more  or  less  arbitrary  about  them.  In  this  as  in  other 
matters  we  have  to  appeal  to  observation  and  experience,  which 
alone  can  yield  trustworthy  data.  One  of  the  characteristic  errors  of 
ancient  writers  was  to  infer  similarities  in  things  from  similarities  in 
names. 

557.  The  principle  of  assimilation  may  yield  apparently  paradoxical 
solutions  to  some  problems.  Here  is  one  such.  Says  Bertrand :  ^  "Does 
not  an  uncertain  event  always  have  a  definite  probability,  known  or 
unknown  ? — By  no  means !  What  is  the  probability  that  it  will  rain 
tomorrow  ?  There  is  none.  .  .  .  The  King  of  Siam  is  forty  years  old : 
what  is  the  probability  that  he  will  be  living  ten  years  hence?  It  is 
different  for  me  than  for  someone  who  has  talked  with  his  physician, 
different  for  the  physician  than  for  someone  who  has  received  his 
personal  confidences."  Bertrand's  inference  would  be  that  a  person 
betting  on  the  death  of  the  King  of  Siam  within  the  year  would  in 
no  way  be  guided  by  probabilities,  since  none  exist;  and  that  is 
correct  up  to  a  certain  point.  In  fact  to  issue  an  insurance  policy  on 
the  life  of  one  person  alone  would  simply  be  gambling;  but  to  issue 
insurance,  as  insurance  companies  do,  on  large  numbers  of  people  is 
to  base  a  financial  operation  on  the  laws  of  probabilities.  It  may  very 
well  be  that  keeping  to  strict  probabilities  nothing  can  be  decided 
as  to  the  King  of  Siam.  However,  supposing  Bertrand  found  him- 
self behind  the  bars  and  were  told:  "You  will  not  get  out  till  either 
A  or  B  dies.  A  is  twenty  years  old,  B  sixty.  Choose  the  man  upon 
whose  death  you  will  have  your  liberty  depend."  We  may  guess  that 

557  ^  Calcul  des  probabilitSs,  pp.  90  f . 


§558  PROBABILITY  OF  CONCLUSIONS  337 

Bertrand  would  choose  B  rather  than  A.  Ought  we  say  that  he  is 
choosing  by  chance,  disregarding  probabilities  ?  In  general  if  a  hap- 
pening P,  assumed  to  be  recurrent,  is  more  probable  than  Q,  shall 
we  say  that  we  are  acting  haphazard  if,  in  the  light  of  an  interest, 
we  elect  a  particular  P  in  preference  to  a.  Q?  Bertrand  would  say  yes, 
because  we  are  making  but  one  choice  and  cannot  have  another 
chance.  "Whether  the  King  of  Siam  live  or  die,  you  have  but  one 
bet."  But  we  can  have  other  chances  on  other  men  of  the  age  of  the 
King  of  Siam,  or  on  other  similar  cases  of  eventual  happenings. 

Let  us  assume  that  Pi  and  Qi,  P2  and  Q2,  Ps  and  Qs  .  .  .  are  en- 
tirely different  happenings,  but  that  Pi  P2  .  .  .  are  alike  in  the  one 
respect  that  they  have  a  greater  probability  than  ^i  ^2  ...  on  the 
assumption  that  the  test  may  be  repeated.  I  may  now  state  the  prob- 
lem: In  case  I  have  only  one  choice  between  Pi  and  Qi,  between  P2 
and  Qo,  have  I  a  greater  probability  of  winning  by  choosing  Pi  P2 
.  .  .  or  Qi  Q2  .  .  .  ?  The  answer  is  not  doubtful:  It  is  better  to 
choose  Pi  P2.  .  .  .  Of  course  Bertrand  might  perhaps  have  done 
better  by  staking  his  release  on  the  death  of  the  twenty-year-older. 
All  the  same,  if  he  did  that  in  all  similar  situations,  if  in  every  act 
of  his  life  he  selected  the  less  probable  outcome  as  the  more  favour- 
able, in  cases  where  the  test  might  be  repeated,  he  would  end  by 
doing  worse  than  he  would  have  done  by  choosing  the  more  prob- 
able outcome. 

Bertrand  solves  the  problem  differently.  For  him  there  are  objec- 
tive probabilities  and  subjective  probabilities.  The  type  of  the  objec- 
tive would  be  an  urn  containing  known  numbers  of  black  and  white 
balls,  from  which  one  ball  is  to  be  drawn  at  a  time.  The  type  of  the 
subjective  would  be  an  event  such  as  the  death  of  the  King  of  Siam, 
which  depends  upon  circumstances  only  partially  known.  Bertrand 
bars  subjective  probabilities  from  his  calculations. 

558.  That  would  amount  to  saying  that  it  is  just  as  well  never 
to  bother  with  probabilities  and  to  act  blindly  in  any  event;  for  all 
probabilities  are  subjective,  and  the  distinction  that  Bertrand  would 
draw  holds  only  as  between  a  greater  or  a  lesser  amount  of  knowl- 
edge. 


338  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §558 

Says  Bertrand,  p.  90,  "It  will  or  will  not  rain  [tomorrow];  one 
of  the  two  events  is  certain  right  here  and  now,  and  the  other  im- 
possible. The  physical  forces  on  which  rain  depends  are  as  rigidly 
determined  and  are  subject  to  laws  as  inflexible  as  the  laws  govern- 
ing the  planets.  Would  one  dare  inquire  as  to  the  probability  of 
there  being  an  eclipse  of  the  Moon  next  month?"  ^  Well — the  same 
thing  might  be  said  of  the  drawing  of  a  ball  from  an  urn.  The 
movements  of  the  drawer  are  no  less  determined  than  the  move- 
ments of  the  stars.  The  only  difference  is  that  we  know  how  to  cal- 
culate the  latter  but  not  the  former.  The  regularity  of  certain  move- 
ments depends  upon  the  number  of  forces  operating  and  the  man- 
ner of  their  operation;  and  what  we  call  manifestations  of  chance 
are  the  manifestations  of  numerous  effects  that  are  interwoven  one 
with  another.  Bertrand  himself  gives  the  proof  for  that,  p.  xxiv: 
"The  stamp  of  chance  [That  expression  is  wholly  wanting  in  exact- 
ness.] is  often  imprinted,  sometimes  very  curiously,  on  numbers 
that  are  inferred  from  the  most  rigorous  laws.  A  table  of  logarithms 
is  a  case  in  point.  For  the  10,000  successive  numbers  in  Vega's  ten- 
place  tables,  I  take  the  seventh  figure  in  the  logarithm.  In  this  choice 
nothing  is  left  to  chance.  Algebra  governs  everything;  an  inflexible 
law  shackles  all  the  figures.  Nevertheless  if  one  computes  chances 
one  should  get,  approximately,  out  of  the  10,000  figures,  the  figure 
o  1,000  times,  the  figure  i  1,000  times,  and  so  for  the  rest  of  them: 
the  formula  conforms  to  the  laws  of  chance  [Interaction  of  causes]. 
Verification  made,  the  seventh  figure  of  the  10,000  logarithms  was 
found  990  times  to  be  o;  997  times  to  be  i;  993  times  to  be  2;  1,012 
times  to  be  4."  However,  that  would  not  happen  for  the  last  figures 
of  a  table  of  squares,  which  not  only  bar  certain  numbers  but  also 
succeed  each  other  in  a  definite  order — the  following:  o,  i,  4,  9,  6,  5, 
6,  9,  4,  I.  The  eclipse  of  the  Moon,  which  Bertrand  mentions,  may 
be  compared  to  this  latter  case — the  determination  of  the  last  figure 

558  ^  And  why  not?  Two  men  have  no  almanacs  or  calendars  handy.  One  says 
to  the  other:  "If  it  rains  next  month,  you  will  give  me  ten  dollars.  If  there  is  an 
eclipse  of  the  Moon,  I  will  give  you  ten."  No  one  would  accept  such  a  wager; 
because  ordinarily  in  our  parts  of  the  world  it  is  more  probable  that  it  will  rain 
during  a  certain  month  than  that  there  will  be  an  eclipse  of  the  Moon. 


I 


§561  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING   EXPERIENCE  339 

in  squares;  but  the  comparison  holds  only  if  the  person  who  is  try- 
ing to  forecast  the  eclipse  is  adequately  equipped  in  astronomy.  If 
he  is  not,  the  eclipse  of  the  Moon  is  a  fortuitous  happening  the  uni- 
formities of  which  he  does  not  know.  Drawing  a  ball  from  an  urn 
may  be  compared  to  the  first  case,  the  seventh  figure  in  Vega's 
logarithms;  but  naturally,  only  for  a  person  who  has  a  fairly  ad- 
vanced knowledge  of  mathematics.  A  person  who  does  not  know 
what  logarithms  and  squares  are  can  foresee  nothing. 

559.  If  a  fact  is  certain  (very  probable)  and  is  described  with  very 
great  exactness,  a  theory  developed  with  rigorous  logic  from  it  is 
also  certain  (has  very  great  probability).  Oftentimes  the  facts  that 
sociology  has  to  use  have  no  high  degree  of  probability  and  are, 
especially,  not  exact.  Hence  even  though  a  rigorous  logic  be  fol- 
lowed, a  theory  based  on  a  single  fact  is  not  very  probable ;  and  it  is 
even  less  so  when  strict  logic  gives  way  to  inductions  in  which  senti- 
ments, "good  sense,"  customary  maxims,  and  the  like,  play  a  part. 
The  remedy  is  to  eliminate  such  inductions  as  far  as  possible,  and 
then  to  consider  not  one  but  as  many  facts  as  possible — always  judi- 
ciously, of  course,  as  we  have  so  many  times  cautioned  (§§  538  f.). 

560.  To  increase  probabilities  nothing  is  quite  so  effective  as  the 
ability  to  make  direct  verification — experience  in  the  strict  sense  of 
experiment.  That  is  the  chief  reason  why  the  laws  of  chemistry  and 
physics,  and  even  of  astronomy,  are  overwhelmingly  probable.  For 
astronomy  the  experience  lies  in  the  verification  of  the  actual  loca- 
tion of  the  stars  in  the  positions  assigned  them  by  theory.  To  a  lesser 
but  still  very  considerable  degree,  the  probability  of  laws  not  sus- 
ceptible of  verification  is  enhanced  if  it  can  be  shown  that  they  are 
at  least  similar  to  other  laws  of  which  verifications  occur. 

561.  The  number  of  persons  from  ancient  times  down  to  our  own 
who  have  asserted  that  they  have  seen  ghosts  is  enormous.  If  prob- 
abilities increased  with  the  mere  number  of  observations,  the  exist- 
ence of  ghosts  would  have  to  be  considered  highly  probable.  Yet  few 
people  now  believe  in  them.  And  why  not?  We  must  not  answer 
the  query  by  referring  to  alleged  natural  laws  that  would  be  vio- 
lated by  the  existence  of  ghosts.  That  would  be  reasoning  in  a  circle. 


340  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §562 

If  the  existence  of  ghosts  could  be  proved,  the  laws  would  no  longer 
stand.  Nor  can  we  say  that  apparitions  are  to  be  denied  because  they 
cannot  be  "explained."  People  who  believe  in  ghosts  or  in  other 
things  just  as  mysterious  can  make  the  excellent  rejoinder  that 
neither  can  light  (or  electricity  or  magnetism)  be  "explained."  Yet 
that  in  no  way  affects  the  reality  of  the  facts  that  are  assumed  to 
prove  their  existence.  The  reality  of  a  fact  does  not  depend  on  the 
"explanation"  that  may  be  given  of  it.^ 

562.  There  are  two  cogent  reasons  why  we  do  not  believe  (why 
we  find  very  scant  probability)  in  the  existence  of  ghosts: 

1.  Direct  experiment  very  frequently  fails.  If  a  person  does  not 
believe  in  wireless  telegraphy,  he  need  only  purchase  a  little  appara- 
tus— they  are  for  sale  even  in  toy-shops — and  he  will  see  the  thing 
take  place  before  his  eyes.  There  is  no  reason,  therefore,  for  his  be- 
lieving in  it  in  advance.  But  if  he  wants  to  see  a  ghost,  conjure  up 
the  Devil,  or  make  some  other  experiment  of  that  nature,  he  will 
succeed  or  fail  according  to  the  state  of  mind  he  is  in.  "Out  with 
unbelievers!"  cries  thaumaturgy.  "Look,  ye  unbelievers!"  says  logico- 
experimental  science. 

2.  There  is  no  group  of  experimental  facts  with  which  appari- 
tions can  be  identified.  If,  for  example,  it  were  experimentally 
shown  that  the  Devil  can  be  conjured  up,  there  would  be  a  certain 
probability  in  favour  of  ghosts,  and  vice  versa.  But  unfortunately 
none  of  the  categories  of  the  ghost  variety  are  susceptible  of  experi- 
mental verifications;  so,  for  the  present,  the  existence  of  ghosts  has 
a  probability  that  is  exceedingly  scant. 

563.  Following  Newman,  who  was  a  cardinal  of  the  Church, 
many  authors  have  attached  a  great  deal  of  importance  to  the  cumu- 
lation of  great  numbers  of  independent  slight  probabilities  as  pro- 
ductive of  a  conviction  of  high  probability.^  There  is  some  truth  in 

561  ^The  terms  "explain"  and  "explanation"  are  here  taken  as  indicating  the 
cause,  origin,  law  of  a  thing.  If,  as  sometimes  happens,  by  "explain"  or  "explana- 
tion" we  mean  relating  a  fact  to  other  similar  facts,  we  should  not  be  in  the  situa- 
tion here  in  question,  but  in  the  case  examined  in  §§  556-58. 

563  ^  Newman,  An  Essay  in  Aid  of  a  Gramtnar  of  Assent,  p.  288  (quoted  by 
Mansion,  Calctil  des  probabilites,  p.  77):  "It  is  plain  that  formal  logical  sequence 


§564  Newman's  fallacy  341 

that.  That  is  the  advantage  of  basing  a  theory  on  many  different 
facts.  But  it  is  also  partly  false,  in  that  it  does  not  take  account  of 
the  cogent  persuasiveness  of  the  mere  possibility  of  making  verifica- 
tions. 

564.  Nev^^man  thinks  that  an  Englishman  believes  his  country  an 
island  simply  because  of  a  cumulation  of  little  probabilities.^  No, 
there  is  a  more  cogent  reason,  to  wit,  the  possibility  of  a  verification. 
It  is  not  imperative  that  the  person  who  believes  England  is  an 
island  should  have  made  the  verification  himself,  nor  that  he  should 
know  someone  who  had.  The  possibility  of  making  one  is  enough, 
for  then  one  could  reason  in  this  fashion :  "What  a  reputation  a  man 
could  make  by  proving  that  England  is  not  an  island!  How  much 
money  that  news  would  bring  him!  If  no  one  has  ever  done  such  a 

is  not  in  fact  the  method  by  which  we  are  enabled  to  become  certain  of  what  is 
concrete  [So  far  Newman  is  in  accord  with  experimental  science  in  the  sense  that 
experimental  premises  are  necessary.  Logic  of  itslf  gives  nothing.];  and  it  is  equally 
plain,  from  what  has  been  already  suggested,  what  the  real  and  necessary  method 
is.  It  is  the  cumulation  of  probabilides,  independent  of  each  other  [There  is  much 
truth  in  that.],  arising  out  of  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  the  particular  case 
which  is  under  review  [And  the  nature  of  our  researches,  experiments,  and  obser- 
vations.]; probabilities  too  fine  to  avail  separately,  too  subtle  and  circuitous  to  be 
convertible  into  syllogisms,  too  numerous  and  various  for  such  conversion,  even 
were  they  convertible"  [That  is  true  in  some  cases,  untrue  in  others] . 

564  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  294-96  (Mansion,  Op.  cit.,  p.  79) :  "We  are  all  absolutely  certain 
beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt,  that  Great  Britain  is  an  island.  We  give  to  that 
proposition  our  deliberate  and  unconditional  adhesion.  .  .  .  We  have  no  fear  of 
any  geographical  discovery  which  may  reverse  our  belief.  .  .  .  Yet  are  the  argu- 
ments producible  for  it  (to  use  the  common  expression)  in  black  and  white  com- 
mensurate with  this  overpowering  certitude  about  it."^  Our  reasons  for  believing 
that  we  are  circumnavigable  are  such  as  these: — first,  we  have  been  so  taught  in 
our  childhood,  and  it  is  so  in  all  maps;  next,  we  have  never  heard  it  contradicted 
or  questioned.  [He  should  have  added:  "yet  the  doubt  was  permissible  by  law  and 
by  custom."]  .  .  .  However,  negative  arguments  and  circumstantial  evidence  are 
not  all,  in  such  a  matter,  which  we  have  a  right  to  require.  They  are  not  the  high- 
est kind  of  proof  possible.  Those  who  have  circumnavigated  the  island  have  a 
right  to  be  certain:  have  we  ever  ourselves  even  fallen  in  with  anyone  who  has? 
[An  argument  of  scant  value.  The  things  we  know  directly  or  by  direct  testimony 
are  very  few  as  compared  with  the  things  we  know  indirectly.]  ...  I  am  not  at 
all  insinuating  that  we  are  not  rational  in  our  certitude;  I  only  mean  that  we 
cannot  analyze  a  proof  satisfactorily,  the  result  of  which  good  sense  actually  guar- 
antees to  us."  [The  French  translator,  P.  Mansion,  rendered  "satisfactorily"  by 
maniere  complete.  Pareto:  "And  what  can  ever  be  done  completely.?" — A.  L.] 


342  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §565 

thing,  it  is  reasonably  safe  to  conclude  that  it  cannot  be  done."  Sup- 
pose a  prize  of  $10,000,000  has  been  offered  to  the  man  who  could 
find  a  wolf  on  the  Isle  of  Wight  and  that  during  the  last  hundred 
years  no  one  has  won  the  prize.  That  alone,  and  without  any  cumu- 
lation of  scant  probabilities,  would  convince  one  oflhand  that  there 
were  no  wolves  on  the  Isle  of  Wight.  Suppose,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  death-penalty  awaited  a  man  who  said  that  England  was  an 
island  or  made  any  investigation  in  that  direction.  All  of  Newman's 
little  probabilities  would  not  dispel  the  doubt  as  to  whether  England 
were  really  an  island. 

565.  Newman's  followers  have  a  purpose.  They  are  trying  in  that 
indirect  way  to  build  up  a  case  for  the  truth  of  historical  traditions, 
and  especially  of  religious  traditions.  But  belief  in  such  traditions  is 
in  no  way  similar  to  belief  that  England  is  an  island.  The  traditions 
have  no  possibility  of  verification.  The  other  thesis  has.  It  has  been 
known  for  centuries  that  England  is  an  island,  whereas  a  hundred 
and  fifty  years  ago  many  things  in  Roman  history  were  considered 
true  that  are  now  considered  mere  legend ;  and  if  the  conclusions  of 
Ettore  Pais,  the  Italian  scholar,  are  sound,  we  shall  have  to  drop 
many  other  things  from  Roman  history. 

566.  In  finding  out  what  Roman  customs  were  like  no  cumula- 
tion of  little  probabilities,  however  large,  is  worth  one  relic  discov- 
ered at  Pompeii  that  anyone  can  see  with  his  own  eyes  and  make 
sure  of. 

567.  According  to  Thucydides  many  Athenians  were  wrong  as  to 
the  murder  of  Hipparchus  (§541).  Who  could  say  how  many  other 
cases  of  the  kind  there  must  be,  how  many  historical  fictions  we 
accept  as  true  ?  But  there  is  no  such  doubt  as  to  the  existence  of  the 
United  States,  even  for  people  who  have  never  been  there  and  do 
not  know  anyone  who  has — there  is  always  the  possibility  of  verifica- 
tion. That  is  enough,  considering  the  great  profit  there  would  be  in 
proving  the  common  belief  mistaken. 

568.  From  that  it  follows  that  before  a  theory  can  be  considered 
true,  it  is  virtually  indispensable  that  there  be  perfect  freedom  to 
impugn  it.  Any  limitation,  even  indirect  and  however  remote,  im- 


§570  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  343 

posed  on  anyone  choosing  to  contradict  it  is  enough  to  cast  suspicion 
upon  it.  Hence  freedom  to  express  one's  thought,  even  counter  to 
the  opinion  of  the  majority  or  of  all,  even  when  it  offends  the  senti- 
ments of  the  few  or  of  the  many,  even  when  it  is  generally  reputed 
absurd  or  criminal,  always  proves  favourable  to  the  discovery  of  ob- 
jective truth  (accord  of  theory  with  fact).  But  that  does  not  prove 
that  such  liberty  is  always  favourable  to  good  order  in  a  society  or 
to  the  advancement  of  political  and  economic  prosperity  and  the 
like.  It  may  or  may  not  be,  according  to  the  case;  and  that  is  a 
problem  we  still  have  to  go  into. 

569.  As  far  as  establishing  the  experimental  truth  of  a  doctrine  is 
concerned,  there  is  no  difference  between  the  direct  enforcement  of 
acceptance  of  such  a  doctrine  and  the  enforced  acceptance  of  certain 
principles  from  which  the  doctrine  follows.  A  constituted  authority 
requires  you  to  believe  that  20  is  equal  to  24.  Another  comes  along 
and  says:  "I  am  much  more  'liberal';  I  merely  ask  you  to  believe 
that  5  is  equal  to  6."  It  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  for  if  5  equals 
6,  two  equal  numbers  multiplied  by  the  same  number  giving  equal 
products,  it  follows  that  the  products  of  5  and  6  multiplied  by  4  are 
equal,  and  20  therefore  is  equal  to  24. 

570.  From  the  standpoint  of  scientific  freedom,  accordingly,  Ca- 
tholicism, which  enforces  acceptance  of  doctrine  directly,  and  Prot- 
estantism, which  requires  merely  that  it  be  derived  from  Scripture, 
have  the  same  value.  "Liberal  Protestantism"  nowadays  believes  that 
it  has  taken  a  step  in  the  direction  of  scientific  freedom  by  dispens- 
ing with  belief  in  the  divine  inspiration  of  Scripture;  but  it  still 
clings  to  belief  in  a  certain  ideal  of  perfection,  and  that  is  enough  /  ( 
to  keep  us  out  of  the  logico-experimental  field.  Nor  can  an  excep- 
tion be  made  for  humanitarian  dogmas,  nor  for  the  dogmas  of  the 

sex  religion  so  dear  to  Senator  Berenger  and  other  geniuses  of  the 
same  magnitude.  Let  us  keep  the  point  strictly  before  us:  There  is 
no  scientific  liberty  unless  everything  is  open  to  doubt — even  Euclid's 
geometry  and  three-dimensional  space.  It  is  ridiculous  to  say  that  one 
is  disposed  to  grant  liberty  for  "truth"  but  not  liberty  for  "error"; 
for  the  point  at  issue  is  none  other  than  to  discover  where  the  "truth" 


\ 


344  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §571 

lies  and  where  the  "error";  and  it  cannot  be  settled  if  "error"  cannot 
be  defended  by  every  possible  reason  that  can  be  advanced  in  its 
favour.  Only  after  such  reasons  have  been  validly  refuted  is  judg- 
ment of  error  affirmed — pending  further  investigation.  Many  people 
fail  to  understand  that,  because  in  judging  of  truth  or  error  they  sub- 
stitute a  criterion  of  sentiment  for  the  logico-experimental  criterion. 

571.  The  possibility  of  direct  verifications,  of  new^  observations,  is 
another  reason  for  explaining  facts  of  the  past  w^ith  facts  of  the  pres- 
ent, w^hich  WG  are  able  to  observe  at  our  leisure  (§  548). 

572.  Take,  for  example,  the  follou^ing  thesis :  "In  Athens  political 
considerations  and  interests  exerted  a  powerful  influence  upon 
judges  in  private  litigations"  (§545).  We  have  direct  proofs  in  the 
few  pleas  of  counsel  that  have  come  down  to  us.  Probability  that 
the  thesis  is  sound  is  increased  by  certain  indirect  evidence,  such  as 
allusions  by  Aristophanes  (Wasps),  and  Herondas  (§545^).  But  it 
increases  enormously  in  view  of  similar  things  going  on  in  our  day 
in  Italy  and  France.  If  a  person  is  still  in  doubt,  he  may,  in  a  cer- 
tain sense,  make  experiments.  He  can  read  the  newspapers  carefully 
and  note  cases  in  which  such  influence  appears.  He  will  find  a 
goodly  number  of  them  every  year  and  also  see  that  for  one  reason 
or  another  not  all  of  them  get  into  the  papers.  He  can  then  question 
people  experienced  in  such  matters  and  so  placed  as  to  be  willing 
to  tell  the  truth;  and  in  that  way,  his  direct  induction  will  be  con- 
firmed by  an  indirect  method. 

573.  Another  example :  There  are  those  who  say  that  witnesses  in 
ages  past  to  miracles  or  other  supernatural  happenings  testified  in 
bad  faith.  But  what  is  the  situation  in  our  own  time.?  Let  us  make 
an  experiment!  It  will  not  be  difficult  to  find  among  our  acquaint- 
ances persons  whom  we  know  to  be  altogether  honest  yet  who  none 
the  less  assert  that  they  have  been  in  communication  with  spirits. 
Our  age  is  sceptical.  Past  ages  were  credulous.  The  same  thing  must 
therefore  have  been  the  case,  and  even  more  easily,  in  the  past. 

574.  Class  3  (as  outlined  in  §  523) :  Propositions  that  either  add 
something  to  experimental  uniformities  or  ignore  them.  The  prob- 
lem is  to  determine  the  manner  in  which  non-experimental  prin- 


§575  NON-EXPERIMENTAL  ADJUNCTS  345 

ciples  influence  theories,  which,  therefore,  considered  from  the  ob- 
jective standpoint  belong  to  Class  II  (§  13).  It  is  helpful  to  dis- 
tinguish the  case  A,  in  which  the  introduction  of  non-experimental 
elements  is  explicit,  from  the  case  B,  in  which  they  are  merely  im- 
plicit. We  are  thinking  of  principal  elements,  of  course.  In  concrete 
cases  there  may  be  a  mixture  of  experimental  and  non-experimental 
elements.  Just  here  we  are  considering  cases  where  something  is 
added  to  experimental  uniformities,  or  where  they  are  ignored.^ 
Authority,  for  example,  is  here  considered  from  the  standpoint  of 
what  it  adds  to  experimental  uniformities.^  The  same  may  be  said 
of  un'iverscd  consensus,  the  consensus  of  the  majority,  of  the  best- 
qualified  individuals,  and  so  on. 

575.  Under  the  aspect  which  we  are  now  considering,  we  may 
classify  types  in  the  following  manner: 

TYPES  OF  CLASS  3 

A.  The  abstract  entities  are  explicitly  introduced  and  are  known  in- 
dependently of  experience.  Such  knowledge  is  superior  to  ex- 
perimental knowledge  (§§  576-632) 

A-a.  Experience  is  given  little  or  no  place  (§§  582-612) 

A-ai.  Authority:  divine  authority,  known  through  one  or 
more  individuals;  authority  of  one  or  more  individ- 
uals (§§  583-90) 

A-a2.  Consensus  of  a  number  of  individuals  who  are 
counted  or  weighed,  or  of  mind  in  the  abstract  ("the 
mind")  (§§591-612) 

A-/3.  Abstractions  and  principles  determined  Independently  of 
experience  are  incidentally  and  secondarily  supported  by  ex- 
perience (§§  613-30) 

A-v.  Great  importance  is  attached  to  experience,  or  there  is  a 

574  '^  We  shall  meet  with  some  of  these  types  again  in  Chapters  IX  and  X, 
and  there  examine  the  methods  whereby,  quite  apart  from  logico-experimental  in- 
ferences, certain  conclusions  are  arrived  at  (§  1397). 

574  ^  In  Chapters  IX  and  X  we  shall  consider  the  use  that  is  made  of  authority 
in  forcing  acceptance  of  certain  conclusions. 


346  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §576 

pretence  of  doing  so.  However,  it  is  always  in  a  subordinate 
role  (§§  631-32) 

B.  The  extra-experimental  origin  of  the  abstract  entities  that  are  in- 
troduced is  not  explicitly  stated.  Either  they  are  mere  abstrac- 
tions arbitrarily  deduced  from  experience,  or  else  they  have  an 
independent  existence  that  implicitly  may  be  non-experimental 
(§§  641-796) 

B-a.  Myths,  religious  narratives,  and  other  legends  of  the  kind 
are  historically  real  (§§  643-61): 

B-a  I.  Myths  and  the  like  taken  literally  without  change 

(§§  650-60) 
B-a2.  Myths  and  the  like  with  slight  and  easy  alterations 

in  literal  meanings  (§  661) 

B-3.  Myths  and  the  like  have  a  historical  element  combined  with 
an  unreal  element  (§§  662-763) : 

B-/?i.  Myths  and  the  like  have  historical  origins,  and  the 
stories  have  undergone  alterations  in  course  of  time 
(§§681-91) 
B-/?2.  Myths  and  the  like  are  made  up  of  experiences 
wrongly  interpreted  and  fallacious  inferences  from 
real  facts  (§§  692-719) 

B-^3.  Historical  facts  are  deviations  from  a  type,  or  consti- 
tute a  series  with  a  limit  or  asymptote  (in  the  mathe- 
matical sense)  (§§720-32) 

B-3^'  Myths  and  the  like  are  imitations  of  other  myths. 
Two  or  more  similar  institutions  are  imitations  of 
each  other  (§§  733-63) 

B-^.  Myths  and  the  like  are  entirely  non-real  (§§  764-96).^ 

576.  A:  Abstract  entities  are  explicitly  introduced  and  are  \nown 
independently  of  experience.  Such  \nowledge  is  superior  to  experi- 
mental kjtowledge.  In  that  we  have  the  chief  characteristic  of  the 

575  ^  We  are  to  study  the  category  A  in  this  chapter;  category  B  in  the  chap- 
ter following. 


§579  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  347 

type.  If,  for  instance,  the  thesis  of  unitary  evolution  be  derived  from 
experience  we  get  a  theory  of  Class  I  (§  13).  If  the  thesis  be  assumed 
a  priori,  wt  get  a  theory  of  Class  II  (§  13).  Generally  in  this  case  the 
principle  is  not  deliberately  removed  from  the  experimental  field.  It 
is  taken  as  self-evident,  and  one  goes  on  from  there,  slipping  un- 
w^ittingly  into  a  type  B  theory  (§575).  If,  on  the  other  hand,  a  "nat- 
ural lavi'"  required  by  "natural  reason"  be  assumed,  one  may  talk 
about  experience  as  much  as  one  pleases :  the  theory  will  still  remain 
in  our  group  A  above,  because  the  naturalis  ratio  is  superior  to  ex- 
perience, and  experience  is  allowed  to  confirm  its  dictates  but  never  ' 
to  contradict  them. 

577.  At  a  given  moment  the  centre  of  the  Earth  is  at  a  certain  dis- 
tance from  the  centre  of  the  Sun.  Since  the  distance  does  not  vary 
greatly,  one  can  define  (an  arbitrary  procedure)  a  roughly  average 
distance  and  call  it  the  distance  between  the  Earth  and  the  Sun. 
It  may  be  hard  to  find  such  a  thing,  but  it  undoubtedly  exists,  and 
one  can  look  for  it  experimentally. 

578.  But  suppose  we  set  out  to  discover  who  Jupiter  is.  The  sus- 
picion at  once  arises  that  the  thing  we  are  looking  for  may  not  exist. 
And  even  if  we  try  to  find  what  conception  the  Romans  had  of 
Jupiter,  we  may  still  be  looking  for  something  that  never  existed — 
there  may  have  been  more  than  one  such  conception.  We  can,  in- 
deed, following  the  method  used  above,  outline  a  roughly  average 
conception,  and  such  a  Jupiter,  in  part  an  arbitrary  creation  of  our 
own  (§  103),  can  then  be  sought  and  found. 

579.  The  belief  that  certain  abstract  entities  exist  independently  of 
experience,  and  are  not  products  of  a  partially  arbitrary  abstraction, 
is  so  self-evident,  and  so  deeply  rooted  in  the  minds  of  most  human  , 
beings,  that  the  non-logical  sentiment  underlying  it  must  be  a  very 
powerful  one  indeed.  So  we  glimpse  thus  early  one  principle  that  \ 
may  serve  to  guide  us  in  a  classification  of  social  facts  with  reference 
to  the  determination  of  the  social  equilibrium.  Moreover,  since  the 
belief  has  gone  hand  in  hand  with  the  progress  of  human  societies, 
we  are  justified  in  surmising  that  however  false  it  may  be  experi- 


348  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §580 

mentally,  it  may  play  a  role  of  some  practical  advantage  in  social 
life.^ 

580.  In  dividing  the  theories  of  category  A  into  genera,  we  may 
take  as  criteria  the  varying  proportions  of  experimental  inferences 
that  they  contain,  starting  from  an  extreme,  A-a,  in  vv^hich  there  is 
little  or  none,  going  on  through  an  intermediate  genus,  A-/3,  in 
w^hich  experience  is  mixed  with  other  considerations,  and  arriving 
at  another  extreme,  K-y,  in  which,  apparently  at  least,  experimental 
considerations  predominate. 

By  "experience"  (§6)  we  here  mean  direct  experience  and  ob- 
servation. A  person  might  say  that  he  is  going  by  experience  (or 
observation)  when  he  tries  to  find  out  from  the  Bible  whether 
,  touching  the  Ark  of  the  Lord  leads  to  death  and  accepts  that  testi- 
mony without  daring  to  doubt  it  or  criticize  it.  Be  it  so — we  are  not 
going  to  argue  over  names.  But  just  to  prevent  misunderstandings, 
we  warn  the  reader  that  that  is  not  the  sense  which  we  attach  to  the 
word  "experience"  (or  "observation"),  which  here  means  either 
direct  observation,  or  observation  at  second  hand  through  testimony 
that  has  been  sifted,  discussed,  criticized,  as  to  whether  people  who 
touch  the  Ark  of  the  Lord  die  or  live  on  (§  1482). 

58L  The  motives  we  have  for  accepting  an  opinion  are  either  ex- 
ternal or  "inner."  The  external  motives,  in  addition  to  rigorously 
scientific  experience,  which  we  are  not  considering  here,  are  chiefly 
authority  and  the  consensus  of  other  human  beings,  whether  real  or 
imaginary,  with  an  appeal  to  "the  mind" — to  mind  in  the  abstract. 
So  we  get  our  two  genera  A-ai,  A-a2.  The  inner  motives  come  down 
to  accords  with  sentiments.  They  yield  phenomena  in  which  experi- 
ence plays  no  part  whatever,  such  as  "living  faith,"  which  goes  so 
far  as  to  declare  that  it  believes  a  certain  thing  because  it  is  absurd. 
We  are  not  going  to  deal  with  them  just  here,  since  we  are  now 
examining  nothing  but  the  means  of  logicalizing  the  non-logical. 
The  living  faith  just  spoken  of  is  non-logical,  but  no  attempt  is  made 

579  '^  For  the  moment  we  can  come  to  no  conclusion  on  the  point;  but  we  are 
tempted  to  call  attention  to  the  possibility,  in  order  to  forestall  the  hasty  inference 
that  because  we  were  rejecting  the  belief  from  the  experimental  standpoint  we 
were  intending  to  condemn  it  also  from  the  social  standpoint  (§§  72  f.,  311). 


§583  ARGUMENTS   FROM  AUTHORITY  349 

to  disguise  it  as  logical.  In  the  concrete  case  of  a  taboo  without  sanc- 
tion there  is,  in  a  first  stage,  a  preponderant  element  of  living  faith 
by  virtue  of  which  one  believes  without  asking  for  reasons.  It  is  pos- 
sible, in  a  later  stage,  to  discern  the  germ  of  a  logical  explanation, 
which  is  purely  verbal  and  comes  down  to  the  bare  statement:  "We 
must  do  so  and  so  because  that  is  what  we  must  do."  ^ 

Inner  motives  present  other  phenomena  in  which  experience  seems 
to  play  a  part,  and  so  we  get  the  genera  A-^^  and  A-y,  and  in  addi- 
tion, an  element,  primary  or  secondary,  of  category  B.  The  sem- 
blance of  experience  is  obtained  either  by  assuming  that  what  is 
really  a  product  of  sentiment  is  confirmed  by  experience,  or  else  by 
effecting  a  confusion  between  objective  experience  and  the  expres- 
sion of  sentiment.  This  reasoning  when  pushed  to  the  extreme  gives 
us  the  introspection  of  the  metaphysicists,  which  is  nowadays  assum- 
ing the  new  name  of  "religious  experience" — the  experience  of  the 
neo-Christians.  In  that  way  the  person  who  frames  the  theory  be- 
comes judge  (§  17)  and  pleader  at  one  time.  The  theory  is  judged 
by  the  sentiment  that  creates  it,  and  the  accord  therefore  cannot  be 
other  than  perfect,  and  the  judgment  other  than  favourable  (§  592). 
But  things  are  different  when  the  judge  is  objective  experience, 
which  can,  as  it  often  does,  deny  the  theory  built  up  on  sentiment — 
the  judge  is  different  from  the  pleader. 

582.  A-a:  Experience  is  given  little  or  no  place.  This  substantially 
is  the  position  of  theologies  and  systems  of  metaphysics.  The  ex- 
treme case  is  the  sanctionless  taboo  just  mentioned,  when  one  says, 
"You  must  do  so  and  so,  because  you  must."  Then  pseudo-logical 
fringes  are  appended  in  greater  and  greater  abundance,  until  long 
legends  or  disquisitions  are  elaborated.  As  means  of  demonstration 
these  pseudo-logical  developments  make  lavish  use  of  authority  and 
universal  consensus. 

583.  A-ai:  Authority,  Just  here  we  are  considering  authority 
merely  as  an  instrument  for  logicalizing  non-logical  actions  and  the 

581  ^  Viewed  under  this  aspect  we  might  make  casual  note  of  this  case  under 
category  A,  leaving  a  more  thorough  study  of  it  for  Chapter  IX,  where  we  shall 
consider  in  their  general  aspects  the  explanations  that  human  beings  give  of  their 
conduct. 


350  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §5^4 

sentiments  in  which  they  originate.^  Divine  revelation  in  so  far  as 
it  is  not  considered  a  historical  fact  (B-a),  belongs  to  this  subvariety, 
as  do  also  the  divine  injunction  and  the  divine  prophecy.  After  all, 
such  things  emanate  strictly  from  human  beings;  and  if  we  look 
closely  we  see  that  the  point  about  divine  will  is  made  merely  to 
justify  the  concession  of  authority  to  the  individual  represented  as 
an  interpreter  of  that  will."  The  Mohammedans  accepted  the  au- 
thority of  Mohammed  just  as  educated  people  at  a  certain  period  in 
our  history  accepted  the  authority  of  Aristotle.  The  Mohammedans 
explained  their  acceptance  on  the  basis  of  Mohammed's  divine  in- 
spiration. The  Christians  pointed  to  the  profound  knowledge  of  the 
Stagirite.  The  two  explanations  are  of  an  identical  character.  So  it 
is  easy  to  understand  how  they  could  be  combined  in  periods  of  un- 
enlightenment,  and  how  the  Virgil  admired  as  a  poet  could  become 
the  wonder-working  magician  of  the  Middle  Ages  (§§668f.). 

584.  Authority  is  frequently  presented  as  an  adjunct  to  other  dem- 
onstrations. Its  meaning,  in  such  a  case,  is  roughly  as  follows:  "The 
facts  we  mention  are  so  well  known,  the  arguments  we  put  forward 
so  convincing,  that  they  are  accepted  by  everyone,  or  at  least  by  all 
educated  and  intelligent  people."  That  method  of  reasoning  was 

583  ^  To  the  general  discussion  of  authority  we  shall  return  in  Chapter  IX. 

583  ^  St.  Augustine  does,  it  is  true,  make  a  distinction  between  divine  and 
human  authority;  but  he  goes  on  to  point  out  that  divine  authority  is  known  to 
us  only  through  human  beings  and  their  writings.  De  or  dine  {Opera,  Vol.  I,  p.  977), 
II,  9,  27:  "Authority  is  partly  divine,  partly  human;  but  the  true,  the  fixed,  the  su- 
preme authority  is  the  one  called  divine."  But  those  infernal  demons  are  always  on 
hand  to  lead  us  astray!  "We  must  always  be  on  our  guard  against  the  wondrous  de- 
ceptions of  aerial  creatures,  which  are  wont  to  deceive  [human]  souls — and  very 
readily — by  certain  powers  they  have,  notably  their  ability  to  foresee  things  within 
reach  of  the  senses  of  their  [aerial]  bodies.  .  .  .  That  authority,  therefore,  is  to  be 
called  divine  which  not  only  transcends  all  human  faculties  in  its  sensible  signs,  but 
by  its  influence  upon  man  {ipsiim  hominem  agens)  shows  him  how  far  it  has 
deigned  to  stoop  {quo  usque  se  depresserit)  on  his  account.  Human  authority, 
however,  is  often  mistaken."  But  how  are  we  to  recognize  the  authority  that  is 
divine?  De  vera  religione  {Opera,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  121),  25,  46:  "God  has  seen  fit  that 
His  intentions  with  the  human  race  {quid  agatur  cum  genere  humano)  should  be 
made  known  through  history  and  prophecy.  But  the  credibility  {fides)  of  tem- 
poral things  past  or  future  is  a  matter  rather  of  faith  than  of  knowledge;  and  it  is 
our  affair  to  decide  to  what  individuals  or  what  books  we  shall  pin  our  faith  for 
the  proper  worship  of  God,  in  which  alone  salvation  lies." 


§585  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  35 1 

widely  used  to  prove  the  existence  of  witches,  ghosts,  and  the  Hke.^ 
585.  The  Protestant  who  sincerely  accepts  the  authority  of  the 
Scriptures  and  the  Catholic  who  defers  to  the  Pope  pronouncing 
ex  cathedra  are  both  doing  the  same  thing  under  different  forms. 
So  also  the  humanitarian  who  swoons  over  a  passage  of  Rousseau; 
so  the  socialist  who  swears  by  the  Word  of  Marx  or  Engels  as  a 
treasure-store  of  all  human  knowledge;  and  so,  further,  the  devout 
democraLwho  bows  reverent  head  and  submits  judgment  and  will 
to  the  oracles  of  suffrage,  universal  or  limited,  or  what  is  worse,  to 
the  pronouncements  of  parliaments  and  legislatures,  though  they  are 
known  to  house  not  a  few  politicians  of  unsavoury  reputation/  Each 
of  such  believers  of  course  considers  his  own  beliefs  rational  and  other 
beliefs  absurd.  The  man  who  admits  the  infallibility  of  universal 
suffrage  as  manifested  by  somewhat  moth-eaten  politicians  flames 
with  scorn  at  the  mere  thought  that  anyone  can  believe  in  the  in- 
fallibility of  the  Pope,  and  demands  that  Catholics  be  deprived  of 
the  right  to  teach  in  the  schools  because  their  judgments  are  not 
"free."  On  the  other  hand,  the  judgment  of  a  person  who  changes 

584  ^  We  shall  revert  to  this  matter  in  §§  1438  f. 

585  ^  One  example  from  the  host  available:  In  Italy  there  was  a  great  deal  of 
opposition  to  a  proposed  bill  giving  a  monopoly  in  life  insurance  to  the  State.  It 
was  alleged,  among  other  things,  that  the  mortality  statistics  used  by  the  Govern- 
ment were  not  accurate.  That  was  a  scientific  conti^oversy,  exactly  parallel  to  Gali- 
leo's quarrel  with  the  Inquisition  as  to  the  rotation  of  the  Sun.  The  law  being 
passed  by  the  parliament,  all  controversies,  the  scientific  included,  were  assumed  to 
be  settled,  and  on  Sept.  16,  1912,  the  Giornale  d'ltalia  published  the  following 
editorial:  "As  is  well  known,  this  newspaper  has  not  been  in  favour  of  the  in- 
surance monopoly,  basing  its  opposition  on  the  economic  theories  of  which  Deputy 
Nitti  has  always  been  the  avowed  champion,  on  self-evident  considerations  of  jus- 
dee,  and,  finally,  on  considerations  of  expediency  that,  unfortunately,  had  to  be 
given  great  weight  in  view  of  the  hostility  of  European  finance  to  Italy  during  the 
[Libyan]  war.  But  our  opposition  ended  the  day  the  insurance  monopoly  was  voted 
by  the  two  houses  of  the  parliament,  because  of  our  great  and  never  disputed  def- 
erence to  the  laws  of  the  State.  Now  the  Istituto  Nazionale  delle  Assicurazioni  has 
become  a  fact,  as  a  state  property,  as  a  possession  of  the  nation  at  large.  All  Italians 
who  love  their  country  must  therefore  hope  that  it  will  actually  realize  the  pur- 
poses for  which  the  law  has  established  it,  that  it  may  extend  the  practical  benefits 
of  insurance  to  the  people  generally  and  become  a  potent  factor  in  the  economic 
progress  of  our  country."  One  can  detect  not  the  slightest  difference  between  that 
atdtude  and  the  attitude  of  the  Catholic  who,  once  the  Pope  has  spoken  ex  cathedra, 
submits  judgment  and  will  to  the  Pope's  decision. 


352  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §586 

views  not  from  personal  conviction,  but  in  deference  to  the 
oracles  of  a  political  assembly,  enjoys,  it  w^ould  seem,  the  quintes- 
sence of  "freedom." 

586.  A  person  interested  in  arguments  only  as  regards  their  logico- 
experimental  force  might  suppose  that  when  people  are  stocking  up 
with  such  postulates  they  would  see  to  it  that  they  be  as  exact  as 
possible  and  lend  themselves  to  strictly  logical  development.  But 
experience  has  shown  that  that  is  not  the  case,  nor  ought  the  fact 
seem  surprising  to  anyone  mindful  of  the  logic  of  sentiments 
(§  514).  For  purposes  of  persuasion  postulates  that  may  mean  any- 
thing simply  because  they  mean  nothing  exact  are  the  best  imagi- 
nable. And  it  is  a  matter  of  observation  that  different  and  sometimes 
opposite  conclusions  are  often  drawn  from  them.  Oftentimes,  be- 
sides, postulates  of  our  A-ai  variety  are  combined  and  confused  with 
postulates  of  our  A-a2  variety.  The  logical  element  is  often  better  in 
A-ai  than  in  A-a2. 

587.  An  example  or  two  of  opposite  conclusions  drawn  from  the 
same  principle.^  There  is  a  wide-spread  belief  that  water  and  fire 
are  pure  and  sacred.  From  it  the  Hindus  conclude  that  the  bodies 
of  the  dead  ought  to  be  either  burned  or  thrown  into  the  Ganges. 
The  Parsees  conclude,  to  the  precise  contrary,  that  neither  fire  nor 
water  should  be  defiled  through  contact  with  a  corpse.^  It  seems  that 
in  India  cremation  was  not  the  absolute  rule.  It  has,  however,  re- 
mained the  principal  means  of  disposing  of  the  dead.  The  corpse  is 

587  ^  We  shall  be  meeting  others  from  time  to  time  as  we  go  on,  for  example, 
in  §873. 

587  ^  Henry,  Le  parsisme,  p.  16:  "The  Persians,  as  is  well  known,  reject  crema- 
tion after  death  as  a  horrible  profanation.  Here  again  let  us  stress  the  identity  of 
standpoint  underlying  an  altogether  superficial  antagonism.  The  common  epithet 
of  the  Vedic  Agni  is  pavaka,  'the  purifier.'  Fire,  say  the  Brahmans,  is  a  thing  es- 
sentially 'pure.'  The  dead  body  therefore  must  go  through  fire  and  leave  all  its 
impurities  there,  that  the  deceased  may  enter  the  eternal  realm  of  Yama  thor- 
oughly cleansed.  Thereafter  the  fire  that  has  been  so  contaminated  can  be  relieved 
of  its  noxious  properties  by  a  rite  of  lustration.  Fire,  reply  the  Mazdeans,  is  a  thing 
essentially  pure.  Who,  then,  would  dare  violate  its  sanctity  by  thrusting  upon  it  the 
abominable  task  of  devouring  the  most  loathsome  thing  in  the  world,  a  corpse  in 
process  of  putrefaction .?  Arguments  carried  to  extremes  that  touch  are  common 
enough  in  mysdcal  systems." 


§587  ARGUMENTS  FROM  AUTHORITY  353 

laid  on  a  pyre  that  has  been  reared  in  the  midst  of  three  fires  kindled 
from  the  three  sacred  fires  of  the  deceased  (in  case  he  has  kept  them 
burning).  There  it  is  burned  with  certain  ceremonies  that  need  not 
concern  us  here.  "As  fire  watches  over  the  Hindu's  birth,  so  it 
watches  over  the  fundamental  phases  of  his  life."  ^  Corpses  are  still 
burned  in  India  in  our  times.  Says  Sonnerat :  *  "As  soon  as  the  pyre 
has  burned  out,  milk  is  sprinkled  over  the  ashes,  and  the  bones  that 
have  been  spared  by  the  fire  are  gathered  up,  put  into  urns,  and  kept 
till  occasion  offers  to  throw  them  into  some  sacred  stream,  or  into 
the  Ganges.  The  Hindus  are  convinced  that  the  man  whose  bones 
get  into  a  sacred  river  will  enjoy  infinite  bliss  for  millions  of  years. 
Those  living  on  the  river-banks  often  throw  corpses  into  the  water 
whole,  after  hastening  death  by  making  the  sick  drink  all  the  water 
they  can  hold,  since  they  attribute  miraculous  properties  to  it."  ^ 

Herodotus,  Historicte,  I,  140,  discourses  on  the  Persian,  or  at  least 
the  Magian,  custom  of  having  dead  bodies  devoured  by  birds  or 
dogs.  An  epigram  by  Dioscorides  says :  ^  "O,  burn  not  Euphrates, 
nor  defile  the  fire  in  my  person,  O  Philonimes.  I  am  a  Persian,  yea, 
O  my  master,  of  the  native  Persian  stock.  To  pollute  fire  is  for  us 
more  bitter  than  grievous  death.  But  wrap  me  in  a  shroud  and  give 
me  to  the  earth.  Nor  do  thou  sprinkle  my  body  with  water,  for  I 
worship,  O  my  master,  the  streams  also." "  Chardin  describes  the 
cemetery  of  the  Parsees  at  Ispahan  in  Persia  where  bodies  are  ex- 
posed to  ravens  and  birds  of  prey.^ 

587  3  Oldenberg,  Religion  des  Veda,  p.  338. 

587  ■*  Voyage  aux  hides  orientales.  Vol.  I,  p.  92. 

587  ^  On  p.  85  he  remarks:  "The  Brahmans  who  worship  Vishnu  believe  that 
the  fire  purifies  them  of  their  sins.  Devotees  of  Siva  (Chit/en)  claim  that  since 
they  have  been  consecrated  to  the  service  of  the  god  they  do  not  need  to  go 
through  fire,  the  sins  they  may  have  committed  not  being 'imputable  to  them.  It  is 
sufficient  if  they  be  sprinkled  with  lustral  water,  of  which  they  make  lavish  use." 

587  ^Gree\  Anthology,  VII,  162  (Paton,  Vol.  II,  p.  91). 

587  ^  Pliny  relates  that  Tiridates  refused  to  go  to  Rome  by  sea  in  order  not  to 
pollute  the  water  by  his  physical  necessities,  Historia  naturalis,  XXX,  6  (Bostock- 
Riley,  Vol.  V,  p.  428) :  "Navigare  noluerat,  quoniam  exptiere  in  maria  aliisqt(e 
mortalium  necessitatibiis  violare  natiiram  earn  fas  non  putant." 

587  ^  Sir  John  Chardin,  Voyage  en  Perse,  pp.  gi.:  "I  shall  describe  a  cemetery 
they  have  half  a  league  outside  the  city  of  Ispahan  in  a  very  out-of-the-way  locality. 
It  is  a  circular  tower  made  of  heavy  rough-hewn  stones,  and  about  thirty-five  feet 


354  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §588 

588.  Lack  of  definiteness  in  the  premises  explains  how  different 
conclusions  may  be  drawn  from  them,  but  it  does  not  explain  why 
they  are  drawn;  and  in  many  cases  we  have  no  way  of  knowing 
whether  the  authority  is  the  source  of  belief,  or  the  belief  (or  rather, 
the  sentiments  underlying  it)  is  the  source  of  the  authority.  In  many 
many  other  cases  it  is  apparent  that  there  has  been  a  sequence  of 
actions  and  reactions.  Certain  sentiments  lead  to  the  acceptance  of 
a  certain  authority,  and  the  latter  in  its  turn  reinforces  the  senti- 
ments or  modifies  them;  and  so  on  over  again. 

589.  The  authority  may  be  of  one  or  more  individuals;  and  if  it 

high  and  ninety  in  diameter.  There  is  no  door  or  other  entrance.  .  .  .  When  a 
body  is  to  be  placed  in  that  tomb  three  or  four  of  their  priests  climb  to  the  top  of 
the  wall  with  ladders,  hoist  the  corpse  up  with  a  rope  and  let  it  down  inside 
along  the  upper  shelf.  .  .  .  There  is  a  sort  of  trench  in  the  middle,  which  I  saw 
to  be  full  of  bones  and  garments.  The  dead  are  laid  fully  clothed  on  little  stretchers 
and  placed  side  by  side,  so  close  as  to  touch,  all  around  the  tower  and  close  up  to 
the  wall.  ...  I  could  see  bodies  recently  arrived,  and  still  intact  as  to  the  feet 
and  hands,  which  were  naked;  but  much  disfigured  about  the  face,  because  the 
crows  which  flock  about  the  cemetery  and  live  by  hundreds  in  the  immediate 
neighbourhood  attack  that  part  of  the  body  first.  .  .  .  Some  fifty  paces  from  the 
tower  stands  a  little  stone  house  ,  .  .  whence  the  high-priest  watches  to  see  in 
just  what  manner  and  on  what  part  of  the  body  the  crows  begin  their  work.  .  .  . 
He  does  not  have  to  wait  long,  for  at  least  some  bird  will  soon  alight  on  the  corpse 
and  begin  at  the  eyes.  ...  In  order  not  to  frighten  the  scavenger  the  priest  per- 
forms his  observation  through  a  litde  hole,  noting  which  eye  is  first  attacked  and 
under  what  circumstances,  basing  thereon  conjectures  as  to  the  status  of  the  de- 
ceased in  the  other  world  and  the  future  of  his  children  and  heirs  in  this.  The 
right  side  is  supposed  to  be  the  good  one.  ...  So  I  was  told  generally  in  all  the 
countries  where  there  are  Parsees;  but  then  again  I  have  met  individuals  who 
denied  all  such  magic  or  superstidon." 

If  a  man  who  does  not  know  how  to  swim  or  is  unable  to  do  so  is  thrown  into 
the  water,  he  sinks  and  is  drowned.  However,  in  a  day  gone  by  it  was  held  that  if 
he  floated  it  was  because  he  was  innocent.  It  was  also  held  that  it  was  because  he 
was  guilty  (§956).  Father  Le  Brun,  in  his  Histoire  critique  des  pratiques  super- 
stitieuses.  Vol.  II,  pp.  256  f.,  notes  the  striking  contradiction.  He  mentions  cases 
where  innocent  people  floated:  "The  defendant,  a  woman,  was  tied  the  way  victims 
used  to  be  ded  for  the  cold-water  test,  and  hurled  from  the  top  of  a  very  high 
bridge  into  the  river;  but  by  the  intercession  of  the  Holy  Virgin  she  remained  afloat 
and  the  current  bore  her  safe  and  sound  to  the  shore.  ...  It  is  quite  clear  that 
such  miracles  stand  in  conflict  with  the  cold-water  test.  They  kept  the  innocent 
afloat  through  a  visible  protecdon  of  God  that  has  been  made  manifest  in  a  hun- 
dred other  such  miracles.  But  by  a  surprising  whimsicality  that  caused  the  adoption 
of  the  cold-water  test,  some  were  of  opinion  that  innocent  people  sank  in  the  water, 
while  only  the  guilty  kept  afloat." 


§591  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING   EXPERIENCE  355 

is  confirmed  by  direct  observation,  it  does  not  overstep  our  subvari- 
ety  A-ai.  Yet  oftentimes  the  consensus  is  not  based  upon  direct  ob- 
servation, but  is  merely  taken  for  granted  on  the  basis  of  certain 
sentiments  held  by  the  person  asserting  it;  and  then  we  get  an 
instance  of  our  subvariety  A-a2.  That  is  the  case  when  there  is  an 
appeal  to  "universal  consensus."  It  is  certain  that  no  one  has  ever 
been  able  to  establish  any  such  consensus  by  consulting  all  the 
human  beings  who  have  lived  or  are  living  on  earth,  and  that  the 
majority  of  them  would  not  even  understand  the  questions  to  which 
they  are  presumed  to  have  given  all  the  same  answer.  Such  a  claim, 
therefore,  has  to  be  translated  somewhat  in  this  fashion:  "The  thing, 
in  my  opinion,  ought  to  enjoy  universal  assent,"  or  else,  ".  .  .  the 
universal  assent  of  people  whom  I  consider  wise,  sensible,  well-in- 
formed," and  the  like.  The  second  assertion  is  by  no  means  the  same 
as  the  first. 

590.  The  principle  of  authority  holds  even  in  our  present-day  so- 
cieties, not  only  for  the  ignorant,  and  not  only  touching  matters  of 
religion  and  morality,  but  even  in  the  sciences,  especially  in  those 
branches  with  which  a  person  is  not  directly  familiar.  Comte  made 
this  point  very  clearly,  though  he  later  drew  erroneous  consequences 
from  it. 

591.  A-a2:  Consensus  of  a  number  of  individuals  who  are  counted 
or  weighed;  or  of  mind  in  the  abstract  ("the  mind").  The  consensus 
may  be  invoked  to  show  that  certain  things  are  inconceivable — an 
"infinite"  straight  line,  for  example.  That  is  the  situation  in  scientific 
or  metaphysical  abstraction,  and  we  are  not  concerned  with  it  here. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  consensus  may  be  alleged  with  reference  to 
propositions  the  contraries  of  which  are  perfectly  conceivable — the 
existence  of  gods,  for  instance.  That  situation  does  lie  within  our 
province. 

If  universal  consensus,  or  the  consensus  of  a  majority  or  even  of 
a  few,  is  explicitly  adduced  as  testimony  to  experience,  we  get  the 
narrations  of  experimental  science  or,  if  the  testimony  overreaches 
experience,  narrations  of  our  group  B.  Here  we  are  to  deal  with 
those  cases  only  in  which  the  consensus  operates  in  and  of  itself  and 


356  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §592 

is  put  above  experience.  It  may  involve  two  things  foreign  to  the 
experimental  domain:  (i)  the  fact  of  consensus;  (2)  the  implica- 
itions  of  the  fact. 

592.  I.  The  fact  of  consensus.  It  might  be  proved  by  statistics — a 
certain  number  of  individuals  are  questioned  and  their  answ^ers 
noted.  In  such  a  case  the  fact  would  be  experimental.  But  generally 
that  is  not  done;  the  consensus  is  taken  for  granted,  or  at  the  most 
verified  by  some  hasty  experimental  or  pseudo-experimental  investi- 
gation. When  the  consensus  is  alleged  to  be  of  "all  men,"  experi- 
mental proof  is  absolutely  out  of  the  question,  even  when  the  "all" 
is  limited  to  living  persons  without  reference  to  the  dead.  It  is  im- 
possible to  question  all  human  beings  living  on  earth,  or  to  make 
many  of  them  even  understand  the  questions  for  which  an  answer 
is  desired.  The  same  applies  to  a  consensus  of  majorities,  even  if 
totals  are  confined  to  a  specified  territory. 

To  avoid  such  embarrassments,  epithets  are  commonly  resorted 
to:  the  consensus  invoked  is  the  consensus  of  all  "intelligent,"  "ra- 
tional," "honest"  men,  or  the  majority  of  them  (§462).  Then  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  one  recognizes  as  intelligent,  rational,  honest, 
only  people  who  share  the  opinion  that  has  been  decorated  with  the 
universal  consensus  (§  1556);  and  so,  by  a  splendid  reasoning  in  a 
circle,  it  is  undeniable  that  the  opinion  enjoys  that  consensus  in  fact. 

To  avoid  the  circle,  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  qualities  re- 
quired in  the  people  consulted  to  be  independent  of  the  opinions 
and  determined  only  by  general  considerations,  such  as  competence 
in  given  connexions.  So  one  might  invite  the  opinion  of  a  farmer 
as  to  a  given  crop,  and  the  opinion  of  a  scientist  on  a  problem  in 
science;  and  that  would  be  taking  us  from  the  question  of  consensus 
back  to  the  question  of  authority.  To  remove  the  embarrassment  of 
statistics  not  possibly  obtainable  and  still  to  escape  faUing  into  the 
circle,  the  appeal  is  made  to  an  abstract,  undefined,  and  undefinable 
"mind,"  which  is,  after  all,  the  mind  of  the  person  claiming  the  con- 
sensus, presuming  the  latter  from  the  assent  of  his  own  mind,  which 
he  baptizes  as  "mind"  in  the  abstract.  So  we  get  the  introspection  of 
the  metaphysicists  and  of  their  successors,  the  neo-Christians.  From 


I 


§593  ARGUMENTS   FROM  UNIVERSAL  CONSENSUS  357 

the  counted  vote,  which  it  is  impossible  to  obtain,  we  move  over  to 
the  assent  that  is  weighed  with  loaded  scales,  and  the  number  of 
the  votes  gradually  comes  down  to  the  single  vote  of  the  person  who 
started  the  voting  in  order  to  prove  his  theory  (§§402f.,  427).  All 
that  takes  us  outside  the  domain  of  experience,  which  could  alone 
show  the  alleged  consensus  either  of  all  men  or  of  the  majority  of 
men,  or  even  of  certain  individuals  selected  for  qualities  independent 
of  the  opinion  desired. 

593.  2.  The  consequences  of  the  fact.  Let  us  assume  the  hypothe- 
sis most  favourable  for  the  purpose  in  view  and  suppose  that  the  fact 
of  consensus  has  been  substantiated  by  experience  to  a  fair  degree 
of  probability.^  It  is  ordinarily  inferred  that  the  idea  expressed  in 
the  consensus  must  all  of  itself  correspond  to  reality;  in  fact  for 
some  metaphysicists  it  is  reality.  Even  if  they  no  more  than  assert 
a  necessary  correspondence  with  experimental  reality,  they  are  over- 
stepping the  bounds  of  experience.  Experience  by  no  means  shows 
that  when  a  very  large  number  of  people  have  an  opinion  that  opin- 
ion corresponds  to  reality.  All  the  way  along  from  the  belief  that  the 
Sun  plunged  into  the  ocean  at  night  down  to  the  countless  beliefs  in 
magic,  we  have  examples  of  manifest  errors  that  have  been  regarded 
as  truths  by  vast  numbers  of  people.  When  therefore  one  asserts  that 
the  opinion  of  the  majority  is  in  accord  with  experience,  one  is  quit- 
ting the  domain  of  experience.  Such  an  assertion  can  be  accepted 
only  on  non-experimental  grounds  (§42). 

Here,  again,  the  reasoning  in  a  circle  helps.  If  the  objection  is 
raised  that  human  beings  in  large  numbers  have  believed  in  witches, 
we  answer  that  such  people  were  neither  intelligent  nor  well  in- 
formed; and  if  we  are  asked  how  the  intelligent  and  the  well-in- 
formed are  to  be  recognized,  we  reply  that  they  are  people  who  be- 
lieve only  in  things  that  are  real.  After  that  we  are  in  a  position  to 
assert  in  all  confidence  that  the  opinions  of  intelligent  and  well- 
informed  people  always  correspond  with  realities  (§  441). 

593  ^  As  we  have  already  said  (§591),  we  are  here  ignoring  the  scientific  case 
in  which  the  probable  existence  of  such  an  experience  is  inferable  from  the  con- 
sensus. 


358  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §594 

If,  to  avoid  the  circle,  we  resort  to  the  consensus  of  "competent" 
individuals,  the  competence  being  determined  independently  of  the 
opinions  desired,  we  are  still  left  outside  the  domain  of  experience 
if  we  assert  that  their  opinions  are  in  accord  with  reality.  Experience 
shows  that  the  opinions  of  the  "competent"  are  oftentimes  wholly 
at  variance  with  realities,  and  the  history  of  science  is  the  history  of 
the  errors  of  experts.  Such  opinions  may  therefore  be  used  only  as 
indicating  a  greater  or  a  lesser  probability  of  an  accord  between  a 
theory  and  reality,  the  chances  varying  with  the  state  of  knowledge 
and  the  competence  of  the  individuals  expressing  the  opinions — 
never  as  an  experimental  proof  of  the  theory,  which  can  be  furnished 
only  by  direct  or  indirect  experience — and  if  that  fact  is  not  taken 
into  account,  we  depart  from  the  logico-experimental  field.  In  the 
logico-experimental  sciences  the  prerogative  of  judging  (§  17)  be- 
longs to  experience.  In  certain  cases  it  may  be  delegated  to  "com- 
petent" experts,  provided  they  be  chosen  in  a  manner  independent 
of  the  character  of  the  reply  desired;  provided  the  problem  sub- 
mitted to  them  be  stated  with  adequate  clarity;  provided  they  be 
truly  acting  as  representatives  of  experience  and  not  of  this  or  that 
creed;  and  provided,  finally,  their  decision  may  always  be  appealed 
to  the  supreme  tribunal  of  experience. 

594.  When,  again,  the  method  chosen  is  to  assert  that  universal 
consensus  is  itself  reality,  "creates"  reality,  it  is  generally  understood 
that  such  consensus  is  not  of  human  beings  of  flesh  and  blood,  but 
of  a  certain  ideal  man;  not  of  the  minds  of  individuals  taken  one  by 
one,  but  of  an  abstraction  called  the  "human  mind,"  or  "the  mind." 
And  since  the  metaphysicist  fashions  the  abstraction  to  suit  himself, 
it  is  obvious  that  in  gratitude  to  its  creator  it  will  eventually  assent 
to  anything  he  pleases.^  Thence,  in  due  course,  arise  such  formulas 

594  ^  Controversies  as  to  the  correspondence  of  concepts  to  objective  reality  are 
nowadays  confined  to  metaphysics  and  its  appendages  in  the  social  sciences.  In  days 
gone  by  they  were  very  common  in  the  natural  sciences.  Even  geography  was 
affected  by  that  disease,  as  witness  Strabo,  Geographica,  I,  4,  7-8  (Jones,  Vol.  I, 
pp.  245-47).  He  quotes  Eratosthenes,  who  was  claiming  that  disputes  as  to  the 
precise  boundaries  of  the  continents  were  a  waste  of  time  because,  there  being  no 
exact  boundaries,  such  territories  could  not  be  divided  off  exactly.  But  Strabo  comes 
back,  saying  among  other  things:   "Who,  in  speaking  of  three  parts  and  calling 


§595  THEORIES   TRANSCENDINQ   EXPERIENCE  359 

as  that  the  "inconceivable"  does  not  exist,  or  that  to  know  a  thing 
one  has  to  "think"  it.  The  correspondence  between  the  notions  of 
the  abstract  mind  (which  in  the  end  proves  to  be  the  mind  of  the 
author  of  the  theory)  and  reaUty  becomes  self-evident,  either  be- 
cause such  ideas  are  in  themselves  reality,  or  because,  if  some  little 
room  is  graciously  made  for  experience,  the  mind  creating  the  theory 
appears  as  both  pleader  and  judge  (§581). 

595.  In  the  concrete  cases  of  arguments  appealing  to  universal  or 
majority  consensus,  experience  is  overreached  in  the  two  ways  men- 
tioned: by  presuming  an  assent  that  is  not  experimental,  and 
by  drawing  from  it  inferences  that  are  not  experimental  either.  All 
reasonings  of  the  kind  are  further  wanting  in  the  trait  of  definite- 
ness.  Anything  calculated  to  lend  precision  or  strictness  to  the  theory 
is  left  unexpressed.  Much  is  made  of  universal  or  majority  consensus 
without  any  inkling  being  given  as  to  how  it  has  been  obtained, 
whether  opinions  have  been  counted  or  weighed,  how  and  why  it  is 
presumed.  Commonly,  one  gets  vague  formulas  such  as:  "Every- 
body knows  .  .  ."  "Every  honest  man  admits  .  .  ."  "No  intelligent 
person  denies  .  .  ."  The  most  patent  contradictions  are  purposely 
disregarded.  Universal  consensus  is  adduced  to  prove  the  existence 
of  God  to  an  atheist,  overleaping  the  fact  that  the  very  existence  of 
the  atheist  who  is  to  be  converted,  or  controverted,  destroys  the  uni- 
versality of  the  assent. 

The  theory  that  the  conceptions  of  "mind"  in  the  abstract  must 
necessarily  accord  with  experience  is  explicitly  stated  only  by  some 
rare  metaphysicist.  Ordinarily  it  is  slipped  in  implicitly.  When  one 
asserts  that  "everybody  knows,"  that  "nobody  denies,"  that  A  =  B, 
it  is  insinuated  or  suggested,  rather  than  shown,  that  experimentally 
A  and  B  will  prove  to  be  equivalents  (§  493). 

each  of  them  a  continent,  has  not  first  had  the  idea  of  the  whole  that  he  is 
dividing  into  such  parts?"  He  then  goes  on  with  an  argument  that  forces  a  smile: 
"If  there  are  two  princes,  one  of  whom  claims  all  Libya  and  the  other  all  Asia, 
how  decide  which  of  them  is  to  get  Lower  Egypt?"  Poor  Strabo  must  have  been 
momentarily  out  of  his  mind!  He  lived  at  the  time  of  the  Roman  Empire,  and 
he  might  have  remembered  that  such  disputes  were  settled  not  by  the  arguments  of 
geographers  but  by  force  of  arms. 


360  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §59^ 

596.  All  that  is  left  loose  and  indeterminate;  for  if  it  were  made 
definite  and  positive,  the  fallacy  in  the  reasoning  would  become 
apparent.  When  it  is  asserted  that  human  beings  and  animals  have 
a  certain  law  in  common  (§§  419,  421,  449),  we  are  not  told  exactly 
to  what  thing  or  things  the  term  "law"  is  applied;  whether  by 
"human  beings"  and  "animals"  all  men  and  all  animals  are  meant, 
or  only  some,  and  how  they  are  selected;  on  what  observations  of 
fact  the  assertion  is  based;  and  what  conclusions  are  to  be  drawn, 
scientifically,  from  the  supposedly  established  existence  of  such  a 
law  common  to  men  and  animals.  All  that  is,  and  is  left,  wrapped 
in  fog,  and  the  argument  in  which  such  indefinite  terms  figure  can 
appeal  only  to  sentiments. 

597. .  If  the  facts  are  considered  in  themselves,  it  may  seem  strange 
that  educated  and  intelligent  people  could  ever  have  imagined  that 
experimental  uniformities  were  to  be  discovered  in  any  such  way; 
stranger  still  that  they  should  have  had  so  many  disciples,  and  their 
theories  been  admired — I  do  not  say  understood — by  hosts  and  hosts 
of  people ;  and  strangest  of  all  that  there  should  be  those  who  think 
they  understand  disquisitions  on  the  "one"  and  the  "multiple,"  for- 
mulas such  as  the  "Being  creates  beings"  of  Gioberti,  or  abstrac- 
tions such  as  that  "goodwill"  of  Kant  which  "is  esteemed  to  be  good 
not  by  the  effects  which  it  produces,  not  by  its  fitness  for  accomplish- 
ing any  given  end,  but  by  its  mere  good  volition — i.e.,  it  is  good  in 
itself"  (Semple  translation).^ 

598.  But  since,  far  from  being  singular,  strange,  extraordinary, 

such  cases  are  common,  ordinary,  the  rule,  they  must  obviously  all 

be  effects  of  some  cause  as  cogent  as  it  is  general;  and  we  begin  to 

;    suspect  that  the  cause  is  to  be  sought  not  so  much  in  the  value  of 

(  ^   the  arguments,  which  is  exactly  zero,  as  in  the  strength  of  the  senti- 

^ '  ments  that  they  disguise.  If  that  should  prove  to  be  the  case,  the 

main  thing  in  metaphysical  theories  would  be  the  sentiments  and 

not  the  arguments;  and  so,  to  stop  at  the  arguments  and  judge  a 

597  '^  Metaphysi\  der  Sitten,  p.  12  (Semple,  p.  4):  [For  the  phrase  of  Gioberti, 
see  his  Introduzione  alia  filosofia,  Vol.  II,  p.  204;  and  for  a  similar  phrase,  "beine 
produces  being,"  p.  194. — A.  L.] 


§599  consensus:  descartes,  spinoza  361 

metaphysical  system  by  its  theories  would  be  not  unlike  judging  the 
strength  of  an  army  by  the  uniforms  of  its  soldiers.  It  might  also 
prove  that  this  again  was  one  of  the  many  cases  in  which  erroneous 
theories  have  their  social  usefulness,  a  fact  that  would  contribute,  in 
a  subsidiary  way  at  least,  to  their  long  survival,  the  influence  of  the 
underlying  sentiments  still  continuing  to  be  the  main  thing.^ 

599.  Proof  by  consensus  is  often  dissembled  under  a  mask  that  is 
ostensibly,  but  not  actually,  experimental.  That  is  the  general  rule 
in  introspection.  In  experimenting  on  oneself,  one  assumes,  without 
explicitly  stating  as  much,  that  the  experiment  will  be  valid'for  all 
other  people,  or  at  least  for  all  reasonable,  intelligent,  "thinking" 
people.  Descartes  begins  his  experiment  on  himself  by  assuming  that 
everything  that  he  has  hitherto  believed  is  unreal,  false.^  Then  he 
runs  on:  "But  shortly,  as  I  was  so  trying  to  think  everything  unreal, 
I  became  aware  that  I,  who  did  the  thinking,  had  to  be  real;  and 
observing  that  the  truth  'I  think,  therefore  I  am'  was  so  solidly 
grounded  and  so  certain  that  all  the  most  extravagant  hypotheses  of 
the  sceptics  were  not  able  to  shake  it,  I  concluded  that  I  could  accept 
it  without  misgiving  as  the  first  principle  of  the  philosophy  I  was 
seeking."  It  is  evident  from  the  whole  essay  that  Descartes's  purpose 
is  not  just  to  exhibit  his  personal  sensations.  He  is  trying  to  establish 
a  thesis  that  will  hold  for  others  too.  On  close  inspection,  his  argu- 
ment is  seen  to  contain  several  implicit  assumptions:  i.  That  his 
thesis,  "I  think,  therefore  I  am,"  has  a  meaning  for  others  as  well 
as  for  himself.  2.  That  others  will  accept  the  thesis.  3.  That  the 
thesis  when  so  accepted  will  be  something  more  than  a  collective 
illusion.  Moreover,  he  crosses  swords  in  advance  with  possible  critics, 
and  that  betrays  his  conviction  that  his  thesis  has  to  be  accepted  by 
all  who  understand  and  reason  aright.  That  is  the  usual  procedure 
with  metaphysicists :  they  have  some  thought  or  other  and  then,  be- 

598  ^  This  is  not  just  the  place  to  deal  with  the  question.  Here  we  are  consider- 
ing theories  primarily  as  to  their  accord  with  experience.  However,  we  have  often 
had  occasion  to  wonder  why  and  how  they  came  to  have  such  wide-spread  appeal, 
and  we  shall  see  the  answer  more  clearly  as  we  proceed  (Chapters  IX  and  X  and 
specifically  §  1468). 

599  ^  Discours  de  la  methode,  IV  {CEuvres,  Vol.  VI,  p.  32). 


362  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §6oO 

cause  the  thing  seems  thus  and  so  to  them,  they  presume  that  every 
intelligent  human  being  has  to  be  of  their  opinion;  and  that  for 
them  is  equivalent  to  the  assent  of  all  rational  beings,  or  at  least  of 
a  very  engaging  abstraction  that  they  call  the  "human  spirit,"  and 
which  no  mortal  man  has  ever  seen  or  know^s  anything  about. 

600.  To  conceal  a  fallacy  it  is  often  helpful  to  adopt  an  impersonal 
mode  of  expression.  Descartes,  for  an  example  right  at  hand,  says, 
Ibid.,  loc.  cit.,  p.  39  (italics  mine) :  "But  if  we  did  not  know  that 
all  within  us  that  is  real  and  true  comes  from  a  perfect  and  infinite 
being,  however  clear  and  distinct  our  ideas  might  be,  there  would 
be  nothing  to  assure  us  that  they  had  the  perfection  of  being  true." 
The  pronoun  "we"  designates  people  impersonally;  but  who  are 
those  people — those  "we's"?  All  the  same,  Descartes  must  have 
known  perfectly  well  that  the  majority  of  people  living  on  earth 
had  never  heard  of  his  theory,  that  of  those  who  did  know  of  it 
many  could  make  neither  head  nor  tail  of  it,  not  a  few  denied  it, 
and  only  a  very  very  few  agreed  with  it.  And  the  question  still 
stands:  Why  should  a  person  not  agreeing  accept  the  thesis?  If  an 
experimental  proof  were  possible,  Descartes  would  have  made  haste 
to  answer,  "In  view  of  the  proof!"  But  there  is  no  such  proof;  and 
there  can  be  no  question,  either,  of  any  consensus,  whether  universal, 
or  of  a  majority,  or  even  of  any  great  number.  It  only  remains  for 
Descartes  and  his  disciples  to  say,  "We  are  right  because  we  are 
right." 

601.  Spinoza  is  looking  for  a  "first  and  general  cause"  for  motion 
(blessed  was  he  to  know  what  that  meant!).  He  observes  that  we 
must  admit  nothing  that  we  cannot  clearly  and  distinctly  perceive 
(again  italics  mine) ;  ^  "and  since  we  clearly  and  distinctly  perceive 
no  other  cause  except  God — that  is  to  say,  the  Creator  of  matter — 
it  becomes  manifest  that  no  general  cause  is  to  be  admitted  except 
God."  But  who,  pray,  are  the  people  designated  by  the  pronoun 
"we"?  Assuredly  not  all  human  beings — for  the  reasons  already 
given;  and  since  not  all,  how  is  one  to  go  about  selecting  the  few, 
the  many,  who  are  to  be  blessed  by  inclusion  among  the  "we,"  and 

601  '^  Renati  Descartes  principia  philosophiae,  II,  11-12,  and  Scholium  a  (p.  60). 


§605  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  363 

separating  them  from  the  reprobates  who  are  to  be  left  in  the  outer 
darkness?  Spinoza  "clearly  and  distinctly"  sees  God  as  the  "cause" 
of  motion — and  what  luck!  But  there  are  plenty  of  people  who  not 
only  do  not  "clearly  and  distinctly"  see  God  as  the  "cause"  of  mo- 
tion, but  who  do  not  even  know  what  "God"  or  "matter"  can  pos- 
sibly be. 

602.  What  has  been  said  above  may  be  repeated  for  any  number 
of  metaphysical  propositions,  and  it  also  applies  to  what  is  known 
nowadays  as  Christian  experience,  which  is  merely  a  new  name  for 
a  thing  many  many  centuries  old — and  to  wit,  introspection  (§§43, 
69-2,  431). 

603.  What  we  have  been  saying  attacks  only  one  aspect  of  the 
problem  we  have  set  ourselves  with  reference  to  the  numerous  prop- 
ositions of  the  type.  It  is  undeniable  that  many  such  propositions 
have  been  accepted  by  learned,  intelligent,  and  sensible  people;  and 
if  one  insists  on  sticking  to  a  theory  of  logical  conduct,  it  is  all  the 
more  difficult  to  understand  how  such  a  thing  could  happen,  the 
more  clearly  it  is  demonstrated  that  such  propositions  are  destitute 
of  any  foundation  whatever  in  experience  and  logic.  We  have  to 
look  in  some  other  direction  for  the  solution  to  the  problem,  there- 
fore.^ 

604.  In  practice  the  subvarieties  A-ai  and  A-a2  seldom  appear  en- 
tirely separate:  ordin.arily  they  are  combined,  and  lend  each  other 
mutual  support;  and  they  may  even  be  re-enforced  by  arguments 
of  our  category  B,  A  thing  that  is  accepted  mainly  on  authority  is 
taken  as  further  confirmed  by  the  accord  of  "reason"  and  experience 
plus  consensus.  Introspection,  for  instance,  yields  a  principle;  the 
principle  is  assumed  to  be  confirmed  by  the  authority  of  the  individ- 
ual performing  the  introspection ;  then  by  the  assent  of  others  as  de- 
termined in  the  ways  just  described,  and  sometimes  further  by 
pseudo-experimental  arguments. 

605.  We  have  another  example  in  Catholic  doctrme.  The  Vatican 

603  ^  We  are  not  yet  ready  for  the  solution  (§  598).  Suffice  it  for  the  moment  to 
understand  clearly  that  we  are  here  considering  just  one  aspect  of  the  problem, 
and  the  aspect  which  from  the  social  standpoint  is  perhaps  the  least  important:  the 
accord  of  such  theories  with  experimental  reality. 


364  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §605 

Council  unequivocally  asserts  that  "God,  the  beginning  and  end  of 
all  things,  may  be  known  of  certainty  from  created  things  through 
the  natural  light  of  human  reason.  .  .  .  Nevertheless  it  has  been 
pleasing  to  His  wisdom  and  goodness  to  reveal  Himself  and  the 
eternal  decrees  of  His  will  to  the  human  race  through  another,  the 
supernatural,  channel."  ^  Here  A-ai  and  A-a2  are  closely  conjoined, 
and  in  such  a  way  that  no  conflict  can  arise  between  them.  Experi- 
ence is  not  asked  whether  faith  can  show  one  thing  and  reason  an- 
other, for  the  answer  would  have  to  be  in  the  affirmative,  and  a 
negative  answer  is  desired.  The  method  used  to  make  the  answer 
negative  is  the  method  used  by  all  metaphysics — by  all  beliefs  which 
try  to  get  along  without  reference  to  experience.  It  lies  in  a  declara- 
tion that  the  answer  has  to  be  negative,  and  that  only  the  reason 
that  agrees  with  faith  is  fit  to  be  called  reason.  An  unimpeachable 
demonstration  is  thus  obtained,  since  every  tautology  is  unimpeach- 
able.^ 

605  ^  Acta  et  decreta  Sacrosancti  et  Oecumenici  concilii  Vaticani,  cap.  II,  §  i 
(Schaff,  Vol.  II,  p.  240):  "Eadem  sancta  mater  Ecclesia  tenet  et  docet  Deum,  rerum 
omnium  principium  et  finem,  naturali  hiimanae  rationis  lurnine  e  rebus  creatis  certo 
cognosci  posse;  .  .  .  attamen  placuisse  eius  sapientiae  et  bonitati  alia  eaqtie  super- 
naturali  via  se  ipsum  ac  aeterna  voluntatis  suae  decreta  humane  generi  revelare." 

605  ^Ibid.,  cap.  IV,  §§  1-4  (Schaff,  pp.  247-49):  "Faith  and  Reason.  It  has  all 
along  been  and  still  is  the  consensus  of  the  Catholic  Church  that  there  are  two 
orders  of  knowledge  to  be  distinguished  both  as  to  the  principle  and  the  matter 
(objecto;  Schaff:  "distinct  both  in  principle  and  also  in  object.")  As  regards  the  prin- 
ciple, we  know  on  the  one  hand  by  natural  reason,  and  on  the  other  by  divine 
faith.  As  regards  the  matter  (objecto),  in  addition  to  such  things  as  natural  reason 
may  attain,  mysteries  that  lie  hidden  in  God  are  set  before  us  for  our  belief,  which, 
unless  they  were  divinely  revealed,  could  never  be  known.  .  .  .  (§3)  And  even  if 
faith  is  higher  than  reason,  there  can  never  be  any  real  conflict  (vera  dissensio) 
between  faith  and  reason."  There  is  an  a  priori  reason  why  things  have  to  be  that 
way:  "The  same  God  that  reveals  the  mysteries  and  inspires  the  faith  has  bestowed 
the  light  of  reason  upon  the  human  soul;  and  God  cannot  deny  Himself,  nor  can 
the  true  ever  contradict  the  true."  And  there  we  are  back  with  our  tautologies 
again!  Nobody  is  saying  that  the  true  can  contradict  the  true.  The  claim  is  that 
one  of  the  things  called  true  is  not  true.  Furthermore,  all  the  argumentation  is 
beside  the  point,  once  it  is  granted  that  God  is  omnipotent.  All  that  need  then  be 
said  is  that  God  has  willed  things  in  that  way.  Why,  then,  all  the  palaver?  Be- 
cause the  human  being  will  have  his  logic,  and  he  has  to  be  humoured  in  one  way 
or  another!  "And  (§  4)  not  only  are  faith  and  reason  never  in  conflict,  but  they 
mutually  support  each  other,  since  right  reason  shows  the  foundations  of  faith 
and  in  the  light  of  faith  perfects  our  knowledge  of  things  divine."  Canones  et 


§6o8  consensus:  christian  theories  365 

606.  St.  Thomas  works  out  a  proof  that  is  substantially  the  one 
adopted  by  the  Vatican  Council.  He  equates  the  processes  of  reason 
and  faith  with  "truth,"  and  thence  concludes  that  they  must  be 
equivalents,  since  two  things  equal  to  a  third  are  themselves  equal.^ 

607.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  their  disputes  with  the  pagans 
the  Fathers  of  the  Christian  Church  base  proofs  of  their  religion  on 
the  accord  existing  betv/een  it  and  the  principles  of  morality,  espe- 
cially sex  morality.  If  one  forgets  for  the  moment  that  logic  is  point- 
less outside  the  experimental  field,  and  then  reasons  logically,  it 
would  seem  that  where  there  is  an  Omnipotent  Being  a  thing  should 
be  moral  because  it  is  willed  by  Him,  and  not  that  He  should  exist 
because  He  wills  what  is  moral.  But  thinking  not  of  logical  but  of 
persuasive  force,  one  sees  at  once  that,  especially  in  a  debate  with 
pagans,  the  persuasive  force  may  lie  in  the  dependence  of  the  exist- 
ence of  God  on  morality.  The  pagans  had  certain  moral  principles 
in  common  with  the  Christians.  Hence  the  expediency  of  starting 
with  them  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  the  Christian  God.^ 

608.  Heckling  the  pagans  on  the  matter  of  their  gods  Tertullian 
says,  Apologeticus,  XI,  11,  "I  ask  you  therefore  whether  they  [the 
men  who  you  say  became  gods]  deserved  to  be  exalted  to  the  heavens 
or  hurled  into  the  pit  of  Tartarus,  which,  you  now  and  then  say,  is 
the  place  of  infernal  punishments."  And  he  mentions  the  various 
sorts  of  rascals  who  are  in  torment  there  and  who,  he  asserts,  are 
perfect  replicas  of  the  pagan  gods.  That  is  a  sound  and  most  dev- 

decreta  concilii  Tridentini,  sessio  III,  De  fide,  3  (Schaff,  Vol.  II,  p.  253) :  "If  any- 
one shall  maintain  that  divine  revelation  cannot  be  corroborated  by  external  evidence 
{externis  signis)  and  that  the  human  being  can  be  brought  to  faith  only  by  inner 
personal  experience  and  inspiration,  let  him  be  anathema." 

606  ^  De  veritate  Catholicae  fidei  contra  Gentiles,  I,  proemitim,  7,  i  {Opera,  1570* 
Vol.  IX,  pp.  6-7):  "It  results  that  those  things  which  are  naturally  inherent  in  the 
reason  are  true,  in  as  much  as  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  them  as  false.  [The 
basic  principle  of  all  metaphysical  systems.  Without  it  metaphysicists  would  go 
out  of  business.]  Nor  can  one  believe  that  the  dicta  of  faith  are  false,  since  it  is 
divinely  confirmed  in  so  obvious  a  manner.  [But  what  the  unbeliever  denies  is 
that  the  faith  of  the  believer  is  obviously  confirmed  by  God.]  Since,  therefore, 
only  the  false  is  opposite  to  the  true,  as  is  manifest  if  one  consider  their  definitions, 
it  is  impossible  for  the  aforesaid  truth  of  faith  to  be  contrary  to  those  principles 
which  the  reason  knows  of  nature." 

607  ^  See,  further.  Chapters  IX  and  X. 


366  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §609 

astating  demonstration  if  the  appeal  is  to  sentiment,  since  the  senti- 
ments associated  with  the  idea  of  a  divine  being  and  those  asso- 
ciated with  the  idea  of  a  rascal  are  absolutely  repugnant  to  each 
other.  But  it  is  a  demonstration  devoid  of  the  slightest  logico-experi- 
mental  value;  for  if  it  is  asked  why  the  pagan  gods  are  rascals,  it  is 
hard  to  know  what  answer  to  make,  unless  it  be  that  they  violate 
some  divine  command.  But  along  that  road  we  bring  up,  as  usual, 
on  a  tautology. 

One  can  prove  as  much  on  the  very  authority  of  the  sacred  doc- 
tors. Christian  writers  blame  the  pagan  gods  for  fornications.  But 
why  is  fornication  a  crime,  or  if  you  prefer,  a  sin?  Says  St.  Thomas: 
"If  among  the  heathen  simple  fornication  was  not  deemed  illicit  be- 
cause of  the  corruption  of  their  natural  reason,  the  Israelites,  en- 
lightened by  divine  law,  considered  it  illicit."  ^  But  if  it  is  divine  law 
that  makes  it  illicit,  how  can  fornicaton  serve  to  demonstrate  that 
the  law  declaring  it  illicit  is  divine  ?  That  is  reasoning  in  a  circle. 

609.  Just  so  reason  the  Holy  Fathers  of  the  Humanitarian  Church 
in  our  day.  They  begin  by  calling  "good"  anything  that  is  beneficial, 
and  "bad"  anything  that  is  detrimental,  to  the  greatest  number,  the 
People,  the  proletariat.  Then  they  conclude  that  it  is  "good"  to  work 
for  the  advantage  of  those  estimable  souls,  "bad"  to  work  against 
them. 

610.  Christians  could  have  adopted  one  of  two  courses  to  be  rid 
of  the  pagan  gods:  they  could  have  held  them  to  be  entirely  imag- 
inary, or  have  conceded  them  a  reality  that  had  its  place  in  the  new 
religion.  There  was  no  question  of  explaining  the  conceptions  of  the 
gods  on  the  basis  of  non-logical  conduct,  not  only  because  science 
was  far  from  being  sufficiently  advanced  for  doing  such  a  thing, 
but  also  because  it  would  have  struck  a  serious  blow  at  the  general 
principles  of  the  Christian  faith  itself.  In  point  of  fact,  the  Christians 
pursued  both  the  courses  mentioned,  and  preferably  the  second — a 
thing  not  difficult  to  understand,  since  the  second  is  more  acceptable 

608  '^  Summa  theologiae,  11^  W^^,  qu.  104,  art.  1  {Opera,  Vol.  X,  p.  219,  Utrum 
fornicatio  simplex  sit  peccattim  7nortale) :  "Quia  apitd  gentiles  jornicatio  simplex 
non  reputababtir  illicita  propter  corrttptionem  tiaturalis  rationis,  ludaici  autem  ex 
lege  divina  instriicti  earn  illicitam  reputabant." 


§6ll  THEORIES   TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  367 

to  a  living  active  faith  that  sees  doings  of  God,  angels,  and  devils 
everywhere.  That  is  why,  not  so  very  long  ago,  Van  Dale's  book  on 
the  pagan  oracles  was  considered  offensive  to  the  Christian  religion, 
and  Fontenelle's  polished  paraphrase  of  it  even  more  so.  For  similar 
reasons,  in  our  day  many  Christians  shut  their  eyes  to  the  quackeries 
of  spiritualism  and  telepathy. 

Christians  perceived  instinctively  that  if  they  took  the  view  that 
the  pagan  oracles  had  nothing  supernatural  about  them,  they  ran 
a  danger  of  seeing  the  same  theory  extended  to  their  own  prophets, 
and  that  one  of  the  best  proofs  which  they  thought  could  be  offered 
of  the  truth  of  their  religion  would  in  that  way  be  seriously  shaken. 
To  regard  oracles,  instead,  as  doings  of  devils  had  decisive  advan- 
tages. It  respected  a  principle  common  to  Christianity  and  paganism 
— that  there  could  be  prophets  and  oracles — and  furthermore  drew  a 
distinction  between  good  ones  and  bad  ones.  The  good  ones,  we 
hardly  need  add,  were  the  prophecies,  the  bad  ones  the  oracles,  the 
ones  being  works  of  God,  the  others,  of  the  Devil. 

The  same  is  to  be  said  of  miracles.  Neither  paganism  nor  Chris- 
tianity denied  that  they  were  possible,  but  each  called  its  own  mir- 
acles true  and  the  miracles  of  the  other  false — and  the  Christians 
added,  for  good  measure,  that  the  Devil  often  mimicked  the  mira- 
cles of  God.  For  many  long  centuries  mankind  fed  on  such  reason- 
ings, which  after  all  are  no  worse  and  no  better  than  many  current 
in  our  own  time. 

611.  Nowadays  a  new  belief,  which  retains  the  name  of  Chris- 
tianity, is  trying  to  replace  traditional  Christianity,  rejecting  the 
supernatural  that  for  centuries  was  a  prominent  element  in  it  and 
was  also  prominent  in  the  Gospels.^  It  finds  its  main  expression  in 

611  ^  Piepenbring,  Theologie  de  I'Ancien  Testament,  pp.  22-24:  "If  the  idea  that 
Jehovah  was  the  only  god  of  Israel  and  that  the  Israelites  were  not  to  worship  any 
other  gods  can  be  carried  back  as  far  as  Moses,  we  cannot  go  that  far  back  with 
absolute  monotheism,  which  does  not  appear  definitely  in  Israel  till  a  much  later 
date.  .  .  .  Not  only  the  people  but  the  kings,  and  Solomon  himself,  who  had 
built  a  temple  to  Jehovah,  either  were  addicted  to  cults  of  foreign  gods  or  else 
favoured  them — which  proves  that  they  regarded  such  gods  as  real.  .  .  .  Schultz 
rightly  observes  that  in  view  of  the  vivid  realism  of  the  ancients,  the  first  impres- 
sion could  never  have  been  that  the  gods  of  other  peoples  were  mere  figments  of 


368  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §6l2 

so-called  Liberal  Protestantism  and  to  a  lesser  degree  in  Catholic 
Modernism.  Just  as  primitive  Christianity  kept  the  principal  traits 
of  pagan  morality,  changing  the  theology,  and  indeed  took  advan- 
tage of  the  common  morality  in  order  to  justify  the  change,  so  this 
neo-Christianity  keeps  the  morality  of  traditional  Christianity, 
changes  the  theology,  and  justijfies  the  change  by  the  common  mo- 
rality. Just  as  Jove  v^^as  dethroned  by  the  God  of  the  Christians,  the 
Divinity  of  Christ  is  now  disappearing  to  make  room  for  the  Divin- 
ity of  Humanity,  Jesus  being  worshipped  only  as  the  exemplar  of 
the  "perfect  man."  Instrument  of  this  transformation  is  universal 
consensus  as  revealed  by  the  inner  experience  of  the  Christian.  The 
good  souls  who  resort  to  it  are  not  aware  that  they  get  out  of  the 
Gospels  only  what  they  read  into  them  themselves,  and  that  they 
might  just  as  well  get  their  theories  out  of  Virgil's  Aeneid  or  any 
other  book  of  the  kind. 

612.  That  delicious  Plato  has  a  simple,  easy,  and  effective  method 
for  obtaining  universal  consensus,  or  if  you  will,  the  consensus  of 
the  wise.  He  has  it  delivered  on  call  by  one  or  another  of  the 
speakers  in  his  dialogues,  with  the  result  that  the  consensus,  at  bot- 
tom, is  only  Plato's  assent,  though  it  is  readily  swallowed  by  people 
whose  fanciful  palates  are  tickled  by  such  things.  In  the  Theaetetus, 
153,  Socrates  asks:  "So  then — motion  you  take  to  be  good  for  soul 
and  body,  and  the  opposite  not?"  Theaetetus,  at  a  nudge  from  Plato, 
replies :  "It  would  seem  so."  ^  But  had  there  been  a  third  party  to 
the  argument,  he  might  have  answered,  "I  do  not  know,  O  Socrates, 
what  on  earth  you  are  talking  about!"  And  in  that  case,  good-bye  to 
your  consensus,  whether  universal,  or  of  the  wise,  or  of  human 
reason,  or  of  any  other  conceivable  brand. 

Plato,  however,  does  not  appeal  his  theories  to  universal  consensus 

the  imagination."  It  is  easy  to  see  that  for  Piepenbring  the  one  true  God  is  the  God 
of  Israel,  and  that  all  other  gods  are  false;  but  it  is  less  easy  to  see  how  he  can 
prove  such  a  point  by  rejecting  the  supernatural  origin  of  the  Bible.  If  we  are  to 
trust  to  inner  experience,  why  is  .Piepenbring's  better  than  somebody  else's  that 
leads  to  opposite  conclusions? 

612  '^    2.  To  jiiv  apa  ayadov  nivtiair  nara  te  Tpvxyv  Kal  kuto,  au/iOj  to  Se  Tovvavriov;  9« 

"EOCKEV. 


§6l3  METAPHYSICS  AND  SCIENCE  369 

directly.  He  seems  in  fact  to  despise  judgments  by  large  numbers  of 
men,  counted,  but  not  weighed."  The  assent  that  he  puts  into  the 
mouths  of  his  characters  represents  the  assent  of  mind  in  the  ab- 
stract, and  serves  but  indirectly  to  build  up  the  theory — it  is  the 
rough  mass  of  marble  from  which  the  artist  in  due  time  will  extract 
the  statue.^  In  that  way  he  manages  to  create  a  confusion  between 
consensus  and  the  assent  of  the  abstract  mind,  which  is  after  all  his 
own  mind. 

613.  A-/? :  Abstractions  and  principles,  determined  independently 
of  experience,  are  incidentally  and  secondarily  supported  by  experi- 
ence. As  noted  above,  people  find  it  difficult  to  abandon  the  experi- 
mental field  altogether,  and  sooner  or  later  they  try  to  get  back  to 
it,  for  after  all  practical  life  more  than  anything  else  is  the  thing 
that  counts.  Theology  and  metaphysics  do  not  wholly  disdain  experi- 
ence, provided  it  be  their  servant.  They  take  great  pride  in  showing 
that  their  pseudo-experimental  inferences  are  verified  by  the  facts; 
but  the  believer  and  the  metaphysicist  already  knew,  prior  to  any 
experimental  investigation,  that  the  verification  would  turn  out 
wonderfully,  since  a  "higher  principle"  would  never  permit  it  to  do 
otherwise.  In  their  explorations  in  the  realm  beyond  experience  they 
satisfy  a  hankering  that  is  active  and  even  tyrannical  in  many  people 

612  ^  Crito,  44.  Speaking  of  the  hoi  polloi,  Socrates  alleges  that  "since  they  cannot 
make  sure  whether  anybody  is  wise  or  witless,  they  prefer  to  act  at  random."  If 
the  Laches  is  not  by  Plato,  it  voices  Platonic  ideas,  and  that  is  all  that  concerns 
us  here.  In  that  dialogue,  184,  Socrates  asserts  point-blank  that  the  majority  view 
is  to  be  disregarded: 

"Socrates.  What,  Lysimachus — you  would  assent  to  anything  a  majority  of  us 
approved  of? 

"Lysimachus.  What  else  could  I  do,  O  Socrates? 

"Socrates.  And  you,  too,  Melesias,  you  would  do  the  same?  If  you  wanted  ad- 
vice as  to  the  proper  training  for  your  son,  would  you  follow  the  majority  of  us 
here,  rather  than  a  person  who  had  been  taught  and  trained  under  good  masters? 

"Melesias.  I  should  follow  the  latter,  O  Socrates.  .  .  . 

"Socrates.  .  .  .  because,  I  suppose,  if  we  would  have  a  sound  judgment,  it  could 
better  be  obtained  from  knowledge  than  from  numbers." 

612  ^  Ritter,  Geschichte  der  Philosophic  alter  Zeit,  Vol.  II,  p.  257  (Morrison, 
Vol.  II,  p.  227):  "It  was  his  [Plato's]  advice  that  one  should  adopt  such  portion 
of  [common]  opinion  as  seemed  plausibly  sound  and  then  subject  it  to  severe 
examination  as  a  basis  for  philosophy.  He  regards  the  formulations  of  [common] 
opinion  as  good  points  of  departure  for  philosophical  research." 


370  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §6x4 

for  knowing  not  only  what  has  been  and  is,  but  also  what  ought, 
or  must  necessarily,  be;  and,  meantime,  in  professing  to  have  taken 
experience  into  account — whether  well  or  badly  matters  little — they 
escape  the  opprobrium  of  going  counter  to  the  scientific  current,  or 
even  to  plain  good  sense.  But  the  facts  that  they  take  into  account 
are  facts  selected  for  a  definite  purpose,  and  serving  no  other  pur- 
pose than  to  justify  a  theory  preconceived — not  that  it  needs  any 
justification,  but  just  for  good  measure!  The  part  assigned  to  experi- 
ence may  now  be  insignificant,  then  again  very  considerable;  but, 
large  or  small,  it  is  always  within  those  limits  and  under  those  con- 
ditions. The  doctrines  of  Comte  and  Herbert  Spencer  are  types  of 
this  class. 

614.  The  disciples  of  such  doctrines  regard  them  as  perfect — and 
how  could  it  be  otherwise  ?  They  are  at  one  with  their  masters  both 
in  thought  and  in  sentiment,  and  they  cannot  see  how  any  objection 
can  be  raised  against  a  doctrine  that  in  addition  to  satisfying  both 
intellect  and  soul-hunger  also  has  the  support  of  such  "experimental" 
verifications. 

615.  Viewed  from  a  standpoint  not  strictly  experimental,  but 
didactic  rather,  and  as  contributing  to  the  progress  of  science,  such 
doctrines  may  be  useful.  They  represent  a  transitional  stage  between 
theories  based  wholly  on  blind  faith — between  stricdy  theological, 
metaphysical,  or  ethical  notions — and  a  definitely  experimental  state 
of  mind.^  The  chasm  between  the  two  worlds  is  too  great  to  be  taken 

615  ^  The  theories  of  Lucretius,  which  are  borrowed  from  Epicurus,  have  Httle 
if  any  experimental  value;  but  there  is  an  element  of  truth  in  what  Lucretius  says 
of  them,  especially  if  his  remarks  be  applied  not  to  the  Epicurean  system  only,  but 
to  philosophical  doctrines  in  general:  De  rerum  natura,  I,  vv.  62-63,  66-67,  78-79: 

"Humana  ante  oculos  joede  qtiom  vita  iaceret 
in  terris  oppressa  gravi  sub  religione  .  .  . 
primum  Graius  homo  mortalis  tollere  contra 
est  oculos  ausus  primusque  obsistere  contra  .  .  . 
quare  religio  pedibus  suhiecta  vicissim 
obteritur,  nos  exaequat  victoria  coelo." 

("When  human  life  was  lying  foully  on  the  ground,  oppressed  by  a  deadening 
religion  ...  a  Greek,  a  mortal  man,  was  the  first  who  dared  lift  his  eyes  against  it 
and  resist.  .  .  .  And  lo!  religion,  lying  now  under  our  feet,  is  in  its  turn  trampled 
to  dust,  and  the  victory  exalts  us  to  the  skies.") 


§6l6  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING   EXPERIENCE  37I 

at  one  leap;  a  bridge  has  to  be  provided.  It  is  already  something  that 
people  should  be  making  a  little  room  for  experience  and  not  stand- 
ing exclusively  on  what  they  find  or  think  they  find  in  their  inner 
selves.  Even  when  experience  is  recognized  merely  for  purposes  of 
verification  a  posteriori,  a  very  important  forward  step  is  being  taken 
— a  step  so  important  that  it  has  not  yet  been  taken  by  many  people, 
beginning  with  those  who  think  they  can  get  their  lottery  numbers 
from  dreams  and  ending  with  our  liegemen  of  the  "categorical 
imperative." 

616.  Once  experience  is  admitted  (it  matters  little  how)  within 
the  theological  edifice,  the  latter  begins  to  crumble — such  portion  of 
it,  of  course,  as  stands  within  the  experimental  domain,  for  the  other 
wings  are  safe  from  any  attack  by  experience.  And  the  dismantling 
would  become  root-and-branch  complete  but  for  the  interposition  of 
a  factor  of  great  moment — the  social  utility  of  certain  theories  that 
are  experimentally  false.^  So  great  is  the  need  of  such  things  which 
human  beings  feel  that  if  one  structure  happens  to  collapse,  another 
is  straightway  reared  of  the  same  material.  That  was  the  case  with 
Positivism,  which  was,  at  bottom,  just  one  of  the  numerous  varieties 
of  metaphysics:  the  old  metaphysics  fell  for  a  brief  moment,  and 
then  at  once  came  to  life  again  in  positivistic  form.  Positivism  is  now 
threatening  to  crumble  in  its  turn,  and  another  metaphysical  struc- 
ture is  in  process  of  erection  to  take  its  place.  That  happens  because 
people  obstinately  refuse  to  separate  what  is  in  accord  with  experi- 
ence from  what  is  beneficial  to  individual  or  society,  and  obstinately 
insist  on  deifying  a  certain  entity  to  which  they  have  given  the  name 
of  Truth.  Let  A  stand  for  one  such  thing  that  is  useful  to  society; 
it  is  recommended  to  us,  or  required  of  us,  by  a  certain  doctrine  of 
faith  V,  which  is  not  experimental  and  often  cannot  be  if  it  is  to  be 
accepted  by  a  majority  of  the  people  in  a  given  country.  The  doctrine 
holds  sway  for  a  more  or  less  extensive  period  of  time.  Then  if 

616  ^  We  shall  deal  with  this  matter  thoroughly  in  Chapter  XII.  It  is  extraneous 
to  the  subject  at  present  in  hand.  But  this  passing  allusion  was  in  point  to  explain 
why  it  is  that  the  theological  and  metaphysical  structure  has  collapsed  completely, 
or  virtually  so,  within  the  natural  sciences,  while  it  has  held  together  longer  in  social 
theory  and  may  perhaps  never  disappear  in  social  practice. 


372  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §6l6 

experimental  science  has  or  acquires  some  prestige,  there  will  be 
people  to  step  forward  and  assert — inspired,  though  they  do  not 
always  realize  as  much,  by  considerations  of  utility — that  the  doctrine 
or  faith  in  question  must  be  in  conformity  with  experience;  and 
other  people  will  come  forward  to  combat  and  ridicule  that  view. 
But  since  society  cannot  do  without  the  thing  A,  some  of  the  de- 
fenders of  the  old  faith  P  will  merely  replace  it  with  a  new  faith  Q, 
no  less  discordant  with  experience.  So  years,  centuries,  go  by ;  peoples, 
governments,  manners  and  systems  of  living,  pass  away;  and  all 
along  new  theologies,  new  systems  of  metaphysics,  keep  replacing 
the  old,  and  each  new  one  is  reputed  more  "true"  or  much  "better" 
than  its  predecessors  (§  2340).  And  in  certain  cases  they  may  really 
be  better,  if  by  "better"  we  mean  more  helpful  to  society;  but  more 
"true,"  no,  if  by  the  term  we  mean  accord  with  experimental  reality. 
One  faith  cannot  be  more  scientific  than  another  (§  16),  and  experi- 
mental reality  is  equally  overreached  by  polytheism,  Islamism,  and 
Christianity  (whether  Catholic,  Protestant,  Liberal,  Modernist,  or  of 
any  other  variety) ;  by  the  innumerable  metaphysical  sects,  including 
the  Kantian,  the  Hegelian,  the  Bergsonian,  and  not  excluding  the 
positivistic  sects  of  Comte,  Spencer,  and  other  eminent  writers 
too  numerous  to  mention;  by  the  faiths  of  solidaristes,  humanita- 
rians, anti-clericals,  and  worshippers  of  Progress;  and  by  as  many 
other  faiths  as  have  existed,  exist,  or  can  be  imagined.  Equally  re- 
mote from  the  field  of  experience  are  Jupiter  ©ptimus  Maximus  and 
the  Jehovah  of  the  Bible;  the  God  of  the  Christians  and  Moham- 
medans and  the  abstractions  of  the  neo-Christians ;  the  categorical 
imperative,  and  the  goddesses  Truth,  Justice,  Humanity,  Majority; 
the  god  People  and  the  god  Progress,  and  as  many  other  gods  as 
people  in  such  infinite  numbers  the  pantheons  of  theologians,  meta- 
physicists,  positivists,  and  humanitarians.  That  does  not  mean  that 
belief  in  some  of  them  or  even  in  all  of  them  may  not  have  been 
beneficial  in  its  time,  or  may  not  still  be.  As  to  that  nothing  can  be 
said  a  priori — experience  alone  can  decide. 

The  metaphysical  ethics  of  the  European  bourgeoisie  has  of  late 
been  assailed  and  weakened  by  the  metaphysical  ethics  of  Socialism, 


§6l8  METAPHYSICS  AND  SCIENCE  373 

which  in  its  turn  is  now  under  fire  from  the  metaphysical  ethics  of 
Syndicalism  (§2002).  Out  of  all  this  battling  one  thing  has  de- 
veloped to  draw  people  closer  to  an  experimental  attitude  towards 
all  such  ethical  systems:  more  or  less  distinctly  people  have  become 
aware  of  their  contingent  character.  Bourgeois  morality,  in  view 
especially  of  the  support  it  had  in  religion,  was  assuming  a  pose  of 
absolute  truth  and  that  pose  it  has  lost  in  the  course  of  the  past 
century  after  its  many  brushes  with  those  fortunate  rivals. 

617.  In  the  natural  sciences  the  religious  and  metaphysical  dis- 
integration is  still  going  on,  with  mere  oscillations  backward  or  for- 
ward, due  to  the  fact  that  scientists  too  live  in  society  and  are  more 
or  less  swayed  by  the  opinions,  beliefs,  and  prejudices  prevailing  in 
it.  Experience,  which  once  began  timidly  to  lift  its  voice  in  the 
natural  sciences,  is  now  lord  and  master  within  them  and  ruthlessly 
banishes  any  a  priori  principles  that  try  to  assert  themselves  against 
it.  Such  scientific  freedom  seems  to  us  an  altogether  natural  thing 
because  we  are  living  in  an  age  in  which  it  is  almost  everywhere  un- 
restricted. But  we  must  not  forget  that  down  to  two  centuries  ago, 
and  less  than  that,  a  scientist  could  not  discuss  his  science  without 
first  protesting  that  he  was  using  experience  only  on  matters  irrele- 
vant to  faith.  At  that  time  it  was  wise  on  his  part  to  take  that  sub- 
ordinate position,  since  it  was  the  only  way  to  get  a  foothold  within 
the  fortress  that  was  soon  to  fall. 

618.  The  freedom  enjoyed  in  the  natural  sciences  is  not  yet  en- 
joyed in  sciences  that  have  any  bearing  on  social  life.  Save  in  the 
case  of  the  religion  of  sex^  the  secular  arm  no  longer  reaches  the 
heretic  and  the  unbeliever — at  least  directly.  But  he  is  handed  over 
to  popular  indignation  and  hostility,  which  ever  rise  to  safeguard 
this  or  that  principle  or  prejudice — a  thing  oftentimes  promotive  of 
the  well-being  of  society.  Indirectly  public  authority  still  makes  the 
weight  of  its  hostility  felt  by  those  who  depart  from  the  dogmas  of 
existing  governments  even  on  strictly  scientific  matters." 

618  ^  Cf.  Pareto,  Le  my  the  vertiiiste. 

618  2  For  such  reasons  many  Italians  have  had  to  live  in  foreign  countries.  In 
Prussia  Socialists  are  barred  from  teaching  in  universities.  In  France  dissidents 
from  the  Radical-Humanitarian  religion  are  persecuted  in  every  way — so  the  chair 


374  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §619 

619.  The  "historical"  method  opened  the  door  for  experience  to 
make  its  way  into  some  of  the  sciences  from  which  it  had  been 
barred,  and  so  served  as  a  transition,  beneficial  from  the  strictly 

\  logico-experimental  point  of  view,  for  bringing  sociology  closer  to 
the  level  already  reached  by  the  natural  sciences.  Curious  the  con- 
fusion still  obtaining  in  the  minds  of  many  people  as  to  the  "his- 
torical" and  "experimental"  methods/  The  historical  method,  when 
it  is — as  it  seldom  is — genuinely  historical  and  has  no  intermixture 
of  metaphysical,  sentimental,  patriotic,  and  other  similar  reflections, 

/  is  just  a  part  of  the  experimental  method.  Its  object  is  to  study  some 

of  Assyriology  was  refused  to  Father  Scheil,  one  of  the  foremost  authorities  in 
that  field.  Of  him  De  Morgan  writes,  Les  premieres  civilisations,  p.  36:  "In  Europe 
today  hardly  four  or  five  scholars  of  real  authority  are  to  be  counted  in  the  field 
of  Assyriology,  and  among  them  is  Fr.  Scheil.  .  .  .  His  name  will  always  be  as- 
sociated with  his  masterly  translation  of  the  laws  of  Hammurabi  and  his  de- 
ciphering of  the  Elamite  texts,  a  feat  he  accomplished  without  the  help  of  a  native 
interpreter."  A  chair  at  the  College  de  France  was  withheld  from  Father  Scheil 
on  the  pretext  that  as  a  priest  he  would  lack  the  impartiality  required  for  dealing 
with  subjects  connected  with  biblical  history.  But  then,  with  no  regard  whatever 
for  the  glaring  inconsistency,  that  excuse  was  tossed  aside  when  it  came  to  pro- 
viding a  chair  in  the  history  of  religions  for  the  ex-priest  Loisy,  famous  for  his 
bitter  attacks  on  Catholicism.  One  may  suspect  that  in  the  two  parallel  cases  it 
was  a  question  first  of  punishing  an  enemy  and  then  of  rewarding  a  deserter 
from  the  hostile  camp.  Mme.  Curie  was  rejected  by  the  Academic  des  Sciences  for 
considerations  in  no  wise  scientific. 

619  ^  Maine,  Ancient  Law,  pp.  2-3,  asserts  that  the  Homeric  poems  contain  hints 
as  to  the  primitive  forms  of  concepts  of  law  (italics  mine) :  "If  by  any  means  we 
can  determine  the  early  forms  of  jural  conceptions,  they  will  be  invaluable  to  us 
[a].  These  rudimentary  ideas  are  to  the  jurist  what  the  primary  crusts  of  the  earth 
are  to  the  geologist  [b].  They  contain,  potentially,  all  the  forms  in  which  law  has 
subsequently  exhibited  itself  [c].  The  haste  or  the  prejudice  which  has  generally 
refused  them  all  but  the  most  superficial  examination,  mus^.  bear  the  blame  of  the 
unsatisfactory  condition  in  which  we  find  the  science  of  jurisprudence  [d].  The 
inquiries  of  the  jurist  are  in  truth  prosecuted  much  as  inquiry  in  physics  and 
physiology  was  prosecuted  before  observation  had  taken  the  place  of  assumption 
[e].  Theories,  plausible  and  comprehensive  [f],  but  absolutely  unverified,  such  as 
the  Law  of  Nature  or  the  Social  Compact  [g],  enjoy  a  universal  preference  over 
sober  research  into  the  primitive  history  of  society  and  law  [h];  and  they  obscure 
the  truth  not  only  by  diverting  attention  from  the  only  quarter  in  which  it  can 
be  found,  but  by  that  most  real  and  most  important  influence  which,  when  once 
entertained  and  believed  in,  they  are  enabled  to  exercise  on  the  later  stages  of 
jurisprudence  [i]." 

The  passage  contains  a  mixture  of  sound  and  unsound  assertions.  It  may  be  in- 


..i 


§6l9  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  375 

of  the  relations  arising  in  the  experimental  domain;  in  other  words, 
it  deals  with  "evolution,"  with  the  manner  in  which  certain  facts 
succeed  other  facts  in  time.  But  still  to  be  discovered  are  the  relations 
obtaining  at  a  given  moment  between  simultaneous  facts,  and  the 
uniformities  in  those  relations;  often  also  the  relations  between  facts 
successive  in  time  and  their  uniformities;  and  almost  always,  finally, 
the  interdependences  of  all  the  elements. 

When  I  know  that  grain  comes  from  the  wheat-plant,  and  the 
history  of  the  wheat-plant,  and  also  know  the  origin  of  man  and  the 
history  of  mankind,  I  still  have  to  find  out  how  much  wheat  the 
human  being  raises  on  an  acre  of  land  in  a  given  territory  at  a  given 
time,  and  the  countless  relationships  arising  between  the  growing 
of  wheat  under  those  conditions  and  the  other  facts  of  human  life. 
When  I  know  the  history  of  money,  I  have  no  very  exact  idea  as  to 
the  functions  of  money  in  economic  life  and  much  less  as  to  the 
correlations  between  the  use  of  money  and  other  economic  and 

structive  to  separate  them,  since  the  example  will  serve  for  other  similar  cases, 
a.  [Pareto's  remark  is  based  on  a  free  translation  of  Maine  by  Courcelle  Seneuil 
(p.  3),  who  rendered  "they  will  be  invaluable  to  us"  by  ce  sera  au  moyen  de  ces 
poenies.  The  remark  as  a  whole,  however,  applies  to  Maine's  general  position. 
— A.  L.]  Doubtful  statement.  The  Homeric  poems  are  extensively  rewritten. 
There  are  now  people  who  claim  that  they  are  not  archaic  at  all.  See  Breal,  Pour 
mieiix  connaitre  Homere,  p.  5:  "I  am  trying  to  shov/  that  the  Greek  epic  belongs 
to  an  age  of  humanity  that  is  already  far  beyond  childhood  and  represents  a 
civilization  in  no  sense  primitive."  I  confess  that  I  am  not  at  all  convinced  by 
Breal's  argument,  but  someone  else  might  be.  On  what  shaky  foundations,  there- 
fore, would  Sumner  Maine  erect  the  whole  science  of  jurisprudence!  This  objection 
is  of  general  bearing  and  valid  for  all  cases  where  there  is  an  effort  to  explain  the 
well-known  by  the  little-known,  b.  Granted.  But  the  analogy  has  to  be  carried 
further.  The  complete  history  of  the  Earth  would  not  give  us  the  composition  of 
a  rock — the  help  of  chemistry  is  needed,  c.  The  expression  "potentially"  is  purely 
metaphysical:  it  serves  merely  to  adulterate  an  argument  that  the  author  would 
have  strictly  experimental,  d.  Very  true,  and  equally  valid  for  economics  and 
sociology,  e.  Idem.  f.  [Pareto's  remark  falls.  It  is  based  on  a  mistranslation  by 
Seneuil  of  "comprehensive"  as  "comprehensible"  {intelligible). — A.  L.]  Compre- 
hensible, yes,  because  in  accord  with  sentiments — but  not  in  accord  with  experience. 
Maine  would  have  stressed  this  important  distinction  if,  instead  of  thinking  stricdy 
of  the  historical  method,  he  had  given  a  thought  to  the  experimental  method, 
g.  Not  only  is  verification  wanting;  the  language  in  those  theories  corresponds  to 
nothing  real.  The  same  error  as  in  f.  h.  For  "sober  research"  one  should  say  "ex- 
perimental research."  i.  Very  true,  provided  the  remark  refers  to  the  experimental 
method.  [The  Homeric  idea  in  {a)  belongs  not  to  Maine  but  to  Vico,  Scienza 
nuova,  I,  2,  20. — A.  L.] 


376  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §620 

social  factors.  If  I  have  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  history  of 
chemistry,  it  may  help  me  to  learn,  but  it  will  never  directly  yield, 
the  chemical  properties  of  new  chemical  combinations  (§§34,  39). 

In  political  economy  or  sociology,  the  so-called  historical  method, 
even  if  by  some  rare  chance  it  be  genuinely  so,  cannot  be  thought 
of  as  antithetical  to  the  metaphysical  method.  The  experimental 
method  can. 

620.  Theologies  not  seldom  offer  prophecies  and  miracles  as 
pseudo-experimental  proofs,  each  religion,  of  course,  considering  its 
own  prophecies  good  and  its  own  miracles  genuine,  while  holding 
the  prophecies  of  other  religions  disastrously  unreliable  and  their 
miracles  frauds.^  One  need  hardly  observe  that  even  if  the  facts  were 
historically  verifiable,  as  they  never  are,  they  would  prove  nothing 
from  the  experimental  standpoint  as  to  the  supernatural  portions  of  a 
religion.  The  reason  why  prophecies,  even  when  they  can  be  said  to 
have  come  true  by  a  prodigiously  far-fetched  interpretation,  and 
miracles,  even  when  unsupported  by  any  valid  historical  proof  what- 
ever, serve  so  effectively  to  corroborate  faith,  lies  not  at  all  in  their 
logico-experimental  probability,  but  rather  in  the  increased  prestige 
that  such  things,  be  they  fact  or  fable,  confer  upon  their  alleged 
authors.^ 

620  ^  Tertullian,  Apologeticus ,  XX,  1-3:  "And  further  ...  we  offer  the  majesty 
of  the  Scriptures,  if  we  fail  to  prove  their  divinity  by  their  age,  or  if  their  age  be 
doubted.  [Authority  guaranteed  by  antiquity.]  .  .  .  The  evidence  stands  before 
our  eyes — the  world,  all  humanity,  all  history  (mundus  et  saeculum  et  exitus). 
Whatever  now  happens  was  foretold  of  yore;  whatever  we  now  see  with  our  eyes 
was  then  heard  of  human  ears  [As  usual,  no  proof  is  given;  for  proofs,  certainly, 
the  generalities  following  can  hardly  be  called.]:  the  fact  that  the  earth  swallows 
up  cities;  that  the  seas  steal  islands  away;  that  wars  civil  and  foreign  destroy;  that 
nation  clashes  with  nation;  that  famine,  pestilence,  earthquakes  {locales  quae  que 
clades)  and  great  slaughters  devastate;  that  the  lowly  are  exalted  to  high  places, 
and  the  mighty  abased."  It  took  no  special  powers  to  predict  such  things,  which 
were  of  everyday  occurrence  in  those  times.  Apollo  in  his  day  had  been  much  more 
definite:  he  told  Croesus  and  Pyrrhus  flatly  that  they  were  going  to  be  whipped, 
and  he  hit  many  other  nails  squarely  on  the  head. 

620  ^  Draper,  History  of  the  Conflict  between  Religion  and  Science,  p.  66:  "Of 
this  presumptuous  system  [Christian  dogma],  the  strangest  part  was  its  logic,  the 
nature  of  its  proofs.  It  relied  upon  miracle-evidence.  A  fact  was  supposed  to  be 
demonstrated  by  an  astounding  illustration  of  something  else!  An  Arabian  writer, 
referring  to  this,  says:  'If  a  conjurer  should  say  to  me,  "Three  are  more  than  ten, 


§623  PROPHECY  AND  MIRACLES  377 

621.  Miracles  have  always  been  common  and  are  still  common  in 
our  own  day,  as  witness  telepathy  and  similar  arts.  Nor  is  there  any 
lack  of  contemporary  religious  prophets,  especially  in  England  and 
the  United  States.  On  a  less  exalted  plane,  the  fourth  pages  of  Italian 
newspapers  often  carry  the  predictions  of  certain  prophets  who,  out 
of  ardent  love  for  their  fellow-men  and  not  without  an  eye  to  per- 
sonal gain,  make  known  to  the  public  the  numbers  that  are  going 
to  be  drawn  in  coming  lotteries.  Such  advertisements  have  been  ap- 
pearing for  a  good  thirty  years  to  my  knowledge,  and  there  must 
still  be  people  who  believe  in  them ;  for  it  costs  money  to  print  them, 
and  if  receipts  did  not  at  least  cover  expenditures,  those  estimable 
seers  would  certainly  go  out  of  business. 

622.  We  are  living  in  a  rather  sceptical  age.  Prophecies  of  lottery 
drawings,  further,  do  not  admit  of  ingenuities  in  interpretation,  and 
the  time  elapsing  between  utterance  and  failure  or  fulfilment  is  very 
short.  If  in  spite  of  these  very  unfavourable  circumstances  faith  in 
such  prophecies  still  endures,  with  all  the  more  reason  should  a 
similar  faith  have  flourished  active  and  strong  in  ages  of  superstition, 
when  prophecies  were  uttered  in  obscure  terms  allowing  of  any 
conceivable  interpretation  and  when  fulfilments  could  be  deferred 
till  Kingdom  Come  (§  1579). 

623.  Says  Galluppi  in  his  Natural  Theology:  "If  God  really  sends 
men  of  His  choice  to  preach  to  others  in  His  name  truths  that  He  has 
revealed  to  them  directly,  He  does  not  fail  to  give  such  apostles  and 
envoys  all  the  means  necessary  for  demonstrating  the  genuineness 
of  their  mission  [Principle  of  authority].  God  owes  that  much  to 
Himself  who  sends  them,  to  the  apostles  whom  He  sends,  and  to  the 
people  to  whom  He  sends  them.  [Proof  by  general  conformity  of 
sentiments;  Galluppi  thinks  so,  hence  everybody  else  must  think  so, 
and  so  it  must  be].  But  what  are  those  means?  They  are  prophecies 
and  miracles.  .  .  .  Prophecy  is  the  certain  prediction  of  future  events 

and  in  proof  of  it  I  will  change  this  stick  into  a  serpent,"  I  might  be  surprised  at 
his  legerdemain,  but  I  certainly  should  not  admit  his  assertion.'  Yet,  for  more  than 
a  thousand  years,  such  was  the  accepted  logic,  and  all  over  Europe  propositions 
equally  absurd  were  accepted  on  equally  ridiculous  proof." 


37^  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §623 

that  cannot  be  foreseen  by  men  from  natural  causes.  .  .  .  God  can 
therefore  bestow  on  His  apostles  the  gift  of  prophecy,  and  the  gift 
of  working  miracles  in  His  name.  When  those  who  announce  them- 
selves as  apostles  of  God  reveal  to  men  dogmas  that  are  not  contrary 
to  the  principles  of  right  reason  [Right  reason  here  serving  as  a 
shield  against  the  pagans,  who  also  had  miracles  and  prophecies 
in  plenty;  but  theirs  were  contrary  to  the  principles  of  right  rea- 
son, the  Christian  are  not.  Why?  Ask  Old  Mother  Hubbard.],  and 
which  tend  to  the  glory  of  God  and  the  happiness  of  mankind,  and 
perform  miracles  to  vouch  for  the  truth  of  the  doctrine  they  pro- 
claim, they  have  abundantly  proved  their  mission,  and  the  people  to 
whom  they  preach  are  in  duty  bound  to  receive  them  as  divine  and  to 
hearken  to  the  truth  that  they  reveal. . .  .  Strictly  speaking,  prophecy 
itself  is  a  miracle,  for  it  is  not  natural  knowledge,  but  a  knowledge 
transcending  the  natural  powers  of  the  human  spirit.  But  the 
prophecy  may  relate  to  events  far  distant  in  the  future,  and  the 
prophet  may  lack  the  gift  of  other  miracles.  Prophecy  alone  is  not 
therefore  always  sufficient  to  prove  divine  mission.  But  the  miracle 
with  which  a  divine  apostle  promises  men  to  prove  his  mission 
divine  is  always  conjoined  with  more  or  less  prophecy.  .  .  .  The 
signs  of  divine  revelation  are  therefore  three:  the  one,  intrinsic,  and 
it  is  the  truth  and  the  sanctity  of  the  doctrine  that  it  teaches  [Accord 
with  certain  sentiments];  the  two  others  extrinsic  [Pseudo-experi- 
mental], and  they  are  miracles  and  prophecies."  ^ 

623  ^  Elementi  di  filosofia,  Vol.  VI,  pp.  100-03.  Says  the  Dictionnaire  encyclopi- 
dique  de  la  theologie  Catholique,  s.v.  Foi  (Wetzer,  s.v.  Glaube) :  "What  then  is 
the  series  of  facts,  what  the  cumulation  of  reasons,  what  the  army  of  witnesses, 
that  establish  the  Christian's  conviction  when  he  asserts  that  Jesus  of  Nazareth 
was  the  Sent  of  God,  nay,  God  Himself?  They  are  prophecies,  miracles,  the  per- 
sonal experience  of  each  Christian  [Tautology:  the  believer  proves  merely  that  he 
believes.],  the  general  history  of  the  world  [The  proof  by  prophecies  and  miracles 
is  a  concession  to  experience.]  Meantime,  the  faith  of  the  Christian  has  a  further 
foundation  that  surpasses  any  other  in  depth  and  scope  [The  metaphysical  proof 
superior  by  nature  to  experience.]:  the  inner  experience  of  truth  that  comes  to  any 
human  being  who  follows  evangelical  doctrine  and  the  heavenly  commandments." 
And  lo,  along  come  the  Modernists  and  turn  that  very  argument  against  the  Catho- 
lics, who,  to  defend  themselves,  have  to  appeal  to  tradition  and  history!  The  "cate- 
gorical imperative"  is  likewise  a  product  "of  the  intimate  experience  that  comes 
to  any  human  being  who  follows  the  Kantian  doctrine  and  the  commandments  of 


§624  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  379 

624.  Calvin  will  have  it  that  Scripture  bears  within  itself  every 
evidence  of  divine  inspiration.  In  other  words  he  seems  to  appeal 
only  to  faith;  and  if  he  held  to  that  ground,  experimental  science 
could  raise  no  objections  to  his  doctrine  on  the  intrinsic  side/  Ex- 
trinsically,  however,  it  proves  nothing  and  can  be  accepted  only  by 
people  who  already  believe  in  it.  From  the  experimental  standpoint 
Calvin's  yes  exactly  balances  the  no  of  any  one  of  his  opponents.' 
But  he,  good  soul,  does  not  see  it  that  way,  and  he  is  soon  reclaiming 
what  he  has  given  away.^  That  is  customary  with  theologians  and 

Pure  Reason";  but  it  proves  nothing  to  a  person  who  cares  not  a  fig  for  Kant  and 
his  "pure  reason."  Here  we  have  another  very  pretty  tautology:  "History:  the  limit 
of  the  Christian's  certitude  is  the  unity  of  Christian  doctrine,  a  unity  established 
over  a  period  of  two  centuries  and  in  the  face  of  countless  obstacles."  The  cer- 
tainty of  certainties  is  that  there  have  been  differences  of  opinion  among  Chris- 
tians at  all  periods  of  history.  If  we  call  one  such  opinion  orthodox  and  the  others 
heretical,  we  can  assert  the  continuous  unity  of  the  faith,  having  barred  in  advance 
everything  that  made  it  multiplex. 

624  ■■•  Institutions  de  la  religion  chrestienne,  I,  7,  5  (Allen,  Vol.  I,  p.  85) :  "So  let 
this  point  be  considered  settled:  that  only  he  whom  the  Holy  Spirit  has  enlightened 
can  rely  on  the  Scriptures  in  wholeness  of  trust;  for  though  it  carries  its  credibility 
within  itself  for  being  accepted  without  rebuttal  and  without  proof  or  argument 
[Here  we  are  outside  the  experimental  field,  and  with  a  vengeance.],  it  is  neverthe- 
less by  its  own  testimony  that  Holy  Writ  possesses  the  certainty  it  deserves.  Albeit 
of  its  own  majesty  [But  suppose  someone  fails  to  see  the  majesty?]  it  has  enough 
to  command  reverence,  it  begins,  nevertheless,  really  to  stir  us  when  it  has  been 
sealed  in  our  hearts  by  the  Holy  Spirit.  [Without  so  much  beating  about  the  bush 
he  might  have  said  that  those  who  believe  it  believe  it.]  So  enlightened  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  we  believe  that  Scripture  is  of  God,  not  by  any  judgment  of  ours  or  of 
anyone  else,  but  above  and  beyond  all  human  judgment  we  decide  indubitably 
that  it  has  been  given  us  from  the  very  mouth  of  God  through  the  agency  of 
men.  .  .  .  And  then  we  no  longer  look  for  arguments  or  plausibilities  on  which 
to  base  our  judgment,  but  subordinate  our  intelligence  and  judgment  to  it  as  to 
something  exalted  above  the  necessity  of  being  judged."  What  a  talkative  soul! 
Calvin  could  have  said  all  that  in  many  fewer  words.  But  he  talked  and  talked, 
because  it  was  a  music  altogether  to  the  liking  of  his  public. 

624  ^  Gousset,  Theologie  dogmatique.  Vol.  I,  p.  156:  "First  Rule:  Scripture  must 
be  interpreted  not  just  by  reason,  as  the  Socinians  and  modern  rationalists  con- 
tend; not  by  direct  revelations,  as  enthusiastic  believers  have  imagined;  and  not  by 
special  personal  succour  of  the  Holy  Spirit  lent  to  each  individual,  as  Lutherans 
and  Calvinists  insist;  but  following  the  teaching  of  the  Catholic  Church."  In  other 
words,  the  metaphysical  principle  is  replaced  by  authority.  They  both  lie  outside 
the  province  of  logico-experimental  science. 

624  ^  Calvin,  Op.  cit.,  I,  7,  4  (Allen,  Vol.  I,  p.  84) :  "All  the  same,  those  who 
insist  on   trying   to  support   the   trustworthiness  of   Scripture   by   disputation   are 


380  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §625 

metaphysicists.  They  quit  the  experimental  world  when  experience 
blocks  the  path  they  are  bent  on  following  to  establish  their  beliefs; 
but  once  they  have  done  that,  back  they  come  to  it;  for  after  all  it 
is  as  important  to  them  as  to  anybody  else,  their  pretended  disdain 
for  it  being  only  an  artifice  for  ridding  themselves  of  objections  that 
they  cannot  face. 

625.  Calvin  was  annoyed  at  the  glimmer  of  experience  that  Catho- 
lics found  in  the  consensus  of  the  Church  Fathers,  and  he  gets  rid 
of  it  by  pretending  that  every  man  must  believe  in  Scripture  by 
inner  persuasion.  And  if  someone  is  not  so  lucky  ?  He  will  roast  him 
for  you  at  the  stake,  as  he  did  poor  Servetus,  or,  if  he  can  do  nothing 
better,  vilify  him.^  These  may  be  excellent  methods  of  persuasion, 
but  their  logico-experimental  value  is  exactly  zero. 

perverters  of  good  order.  There  will,  to  be  sure,  always  be  enough  to  answer  our 
enemies  with;  and  for  my  part  ...  if  I  were  called  upon  to  join  issue  with  the 
slyest  despisers  of  God  one  might  imagine,  with  all  those  who  would  fain  be 
thought  of  as  clever  and  entertaining  hair-splitters  to  the  overthrow  of  the  Scrip- 
tures, I  should  hope  I  would  not  find  it  difficult  to  quash  all  their  cackling;  and  if 
it  were  worth  while  to  refute  all  their  lies  and  insincerities,  it  would  be  no  great 
trouble  for  me  to  show  that  the  conceited  nonsense  which  they  put  forward  in 
bad  faith  is  so  much  humbug."  Just  earlier  he  had  said:  "If  I  saw  fit  to  debate 
this  issue  by  reasons  and  arguments,  I  could  adduce  not  a  few  things  to  prove  that 
if  there  is  a  God  in  Heaven,  the  Law  and  the  Prophets  have  come  of  Him.  Even 
if  all  the  scholars,  and  the  cleverest  in  the  world,  were  to  rise  on  the  other  side 
and  apply  all  their  wits  to  assert  themselves  to  the  contrary,  they  could  be  forced 
to  admit — unless  they  were  hardened  to  a  desperate  impudence — that  it  is  evident 
from  manifest  signs  that  God  doth  speak  through  the  Scriptures."  In  that  way 
one  can  prove  anything  one  pleases.  People  who  do  not  see  things  as  Calvin 
does  are  "hardened  to  a  desperate  impudence."  People  not  so  impudent  as  that, 
therefore,  see  things  as  he  does.  And  there  are  plenty  of  people  who  applaud  argu- 
ments of  that  kind. 

625  ^  In  the  one  chapter  above  quoted,  I,  7  and  8  (Allen,  pp.  81-82,  84,  94-95): 
".  .  .  those  sacrilegious  villains  {vileins  sacrileges;  Latin  version:  sacrilegi  ho- 
mines) who  have  no  other  purpose  than  to  erect  an  unlimited  (Latin:  effreriatttm) 
tyranny  under  the  fair  name  of  the  Church.  ...  It  is  a  silly  dream  on  the  part  of 
those  muddlers  {brouilloiis;  eiusniodi  rabtilae)  that  the  Church  has  the  power 
to  pass  judgment  on  Scripture.  ...  As  for  those  rascals  {canailles;  hominiim 
maledictis)  they  ask  how  and  by  what  we  are  persuaded  that  Holy  Wrif  emanates 
from  God.  ...  It  is  easy  to  see  how  silly  and  wicked  {sotte  et  perverse;  quam 
perferam  et  calumniose)  such  an  application  is.  .  .  .  But  even  after  we  have  up- 
held the  sacred  Word  of  God  against  all  the  protests  and  disparagements  of  these 
wicked  people  ...  I  am  well  aware  that  this  or  that  muddler  (brouillon;  nebu- 
lones)  is  forever  cackling  {gazoitiller;  obstrepant)  to  the  effect  that  ...  A  point 
these  rascals  make  on  the  authority  of  the  Book  of  Maccabees."  In  just  such  terms 


§627  ARGUMENTS   OF   MODERNISM  38 1 

626.  Neo-Christianity  nowadays  seems  inclined  to  put  these  ex- 
trinsic elements  more  or  less,  or  perhaps  entirely,  aside  and  to  pin 
its  faith  to  the  intrinsic  elements  strictly.  In  so  doing  it  would  be 
greatly  improving  its  logical  position,  provided,  after  once  deserting 

:    the  experimental  field,  it  did  not  try  to  get  back  to  it  again  and  begin 
*   dictating  norms  for  the  regulation  of  social  life.  On  that  basis  proof 
is  nothing  more  than  mere  accord  with  the  sentiments  of  the 
preacher;  but  no  one  explains  why  and  how  dissenters  have  to  Hsten 
[   to  him.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  success  of  neo-Christian  doctrines  is 
i   due  altogether  to  their  accord  with  democratic  sentiments;  they  are 
the  garb  in  which  certain  people — not  so  very  many — see  fit  to  dis- 
guise humanitarian  sentiments. 

627.  In  such  doctrines  there  is  a  sincere  belief,  or  in  some  cases  a 
pretence,  that  great  importance  is  being  attached  to  experience.  But 
in  reality  there  is  simply  a  shift  from  our  A-ai  variety  to  A-a2.^ 
Authority  is  dropped  because  it  is  too  apparently  in  conflict  with  ex- 
perience, and  replaced  by  inner  assent  because  its  conflict  with  ex- 
perience is  less  apparent — though  not  less  profound. 

Senator  Berenger  denounces  to  the  public  prosecutor  in  France  adversaries  whom 
he  is  not  the  man  to  silence  by  argument. 

627  ^  FuUiquet,  Les  experiences  du  chretien,  pp.  202-03:  "The  needs  of  the 
Reformation  period,  and  their  being  forced  to  join  issue  with  the  Catholics,  led 
the  Reformers  to  lay  great  stress  on  the  value  of  the  Bible,  as  the  only  authority 
at  all  widely  recognized  on  the  other  side  capable  of  being  set  up  against  the 
traditonal  authority  of  the  Church.  [Here  FuUiquet  is  remaking  history  a  litde 
to  suit  himself.]  Ostensibly  the  Reformers  halt  at  replacing  the  Church  with  the 
Bible  without  changing  the  Catholic  conception  of  faith — the  acceptance  and  sup- 
port of  doctrine  by  trust,  not  in  the  Church  now,  but  in  the  Bible.  .  .  .  But  faith 
is  no  more  trust  in  the  Bible  than  it  was  trust  in  the  Church.  Faith  is  not  ac- 
ceptance of  dogma.  Faith  is  the  trust  of  the  heart  in  God  and  in  Christ.  Save  that, 
as  regards  faith,  the  Bible  has  a  fundamental  role  to  play:  the  Bible  places  religious 
experience  within  our  reach  in  the  persons  of  servants  of  the  Lord  who  have 
had  it  in  the  past.  The  Bible  remains  for  ever,  not  authorit}%  which  in  this  do- 
main means  nothing,  but  the  supreme  influence  in  matters  of  faith.  The  Bible  has 
no  authority  whatever  in  matters  of  belief  [So  Fulliquet  is  rid  of  the  discrep- 
ancies, great  and  numerous,  alas,  between  Scripture  and  tlie  facts.],  for  belief 
never  is  and  never  can  be  anything  more  than  an  expression  of  the  experiment 
of  faith,  of  the  life  of  faith."  Fulliquet's  persistence  in  calling  "experiment"  a  thing 
that  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  experiment  of  the  natural  sciences  is  designed,  un- 
wittingly it  may  be,  to  take  advantage  of  the  sentiments  of  approbation  that  attach, 
in  our  day,  to  the  physical  sciences. 


382  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §628 

628.  Piepenbring,  for  instance,  after  admitting  and  illustrating 
errors  in  the  Bible,  thinks  none  the  less  that  there  is  a  divine  element 
in  it;  and  to  distinguish  the  divine  portion  from  the  non-divine  he  is 
constrained  to  appeal  exclusively  to  inner  consensus.  Says  he :  ^  "Is  it 
possible  to  distinguish  human  elements  in  the  Bible  from  divine  ele- 
ments, human  errors  from  divine  truth?  Is  it  possible  to  say  that 
such  and  such  a  word  in  the  Bible  or  such  and  such  a  biblical  read- 
ing is  inspired  and  that  another  is  not?  No!  That  procedure  would 
be  quite  mechanical  and  superficial;  it  would,  furthermore,  be  im- 
practicable. It  is  not  in  the  dead  letter,  as  that  doctrine  would  have  it, 
that  we  are  to  seek  inspiration  and  revelation,  but  in  the  direct  action 
of  the  spirit  of  God  upon  human  hearts.  [A  good  illustration  of  the 
shift  from  our  A-ai  to  A-a2.]  .  .  .  We  have  just  shown  as  an  un- 
deniable fact  that  that  part  of  Scripture  contains  errors.  Anyone  ap- 
plying himself  exclusively  to  textual  criticism,  instead  of  essaying,  as 
we  have  done,  a  historical  reconstruction  of  biblical  teaching  as  a 
whole,  would  be  able  to  find  errors  far  more  numerous  than  the 
ones  casually  noted  here.  .  .  .  The  fact  that  we  have  put  forward  is 
therefore  fully  established.  But  there  is  another  fact  that,  as  it  seems 
to  us,  is  no  less  fully  established,  namely,  that  the  better  elements  in 
the  Hebrew  nation,  foremost  among  whom  stood  the  Prophets,  the 
Psalmists,  and  the  sacred  writers  in  general,  were  under  the  influ- 
ence of  the  spirit  of  God,  which  imparted  to  them  a  higher  life  and 
light,  of  which  we  have  the  expression,  the  translation,  imperfect  but 
real,  in  the  Old  Testament." 

629.  It  may  well  be  that  the  two  facts  are  equally  certain,  but  it  is 
also  certain  that  the  proofs  which  may  be  offered  for  them  are  essen- 
tially different  in  character.  For  the  first  fact,  that  is,  for  the  his- 
torical and  physical  inaccuracy,  objective  proofs  may  be  adduced 
that  may  be  verified  by  anyone;  for  the  second  fact,  the  only  proofs 
available  are  subjective,  and  they  are  valid  only  for  those  few  indi- 
viduals who  happen  to  share  the  writer's  sentiments.  Anyone  in- 
clined to  go  to  the  trouble  may  prove  that  Jacob's  method  of  pro- 

628  ^  Theologie  de  I'Ancien  Testament,  pp.  307-08. 


§631  THEORIES  TRANSCENDING  EXPERIENCE  383 

ducing  speckled  lambs  with  his  many-coloured  coat^  does  not 
work,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  be  blessed  with  certain  sentiments  to 
find  that  biblical  zoology  does  not  square  with  the  facts.  On  the  other 
hand  there  are  any  number  of  people  who  in  no  way  share  Piepen- 
bring's  admiration  for  the  prophets  of  Israel  and  who  consider 
"lower"  the  enlightenment  that  he  deems  "higher."  How  are  we  to 
decide  who  is  right — in  fact,  what  does  "being  right"  mean  in  such 
a  case.? 

630.  Apparent  from  all  that  is  the  magnitude  of  the  error  of  re- 
garding these  modern  doctrines  and  others  of  their  kind  as  "more 
scientific"  than,  for  instance,  Catholic  doctrines  based  on  authority 
(§§  16,  516).  In  reality  it  is  a  question  of  different  ways  of  appealing 
to  what  is  presumed  to  be — and  is  not — science.  The  difference  is  a 
general  one,  and  appears  in  many  other  theories.  Some  ask  their 
verification  of  historical  reality  and  twist  it  about  to  mean  anything 
they  wish  it  to  mean.  In  one  sense  they  may  be  said  to  be  paying 
tribute  to  the  importance  and  dignity  of  historical  reality  in  that 
they  invoke  its  aid.  In  another  sense,  they  may  be  said  to  be  dis- 
respectful to  it  in — not  deliberately,  but  unwittingly — interpreting 
and  distorting  it.  Other  theories  disregard  verification  by  history,  and 
place  their  whole  reliance  on  inner  conviction.  In  one  sense  they  may 
be  said  to  be  belittling  the  importance  of  historical  reality  by  ignor- 
ing its  force  as  proof.  In  another  sense,  they  may  be  said  to  be 
respecting  it,  in  that  they  do  not  presume  to  interpret  and  distort  it. 

631.  K-y.  Great  importance  is  attached  to  experience,  or  there  is 
a  pretence  of  doing  so.  However,  it  is  always  in  a  subordinate  role. 
The  transition  from  our  A-/3  variety  to  X-y  is  by  imperceptible  de- 
grees. In  K-y  experience  is  apparently  sovereign — but  it  is  the 
sovereignty  of  a  constitutional  king  and  amounts  to  very  little.  In 
the  concrete,  theories  generally  have  elements  belonging  to  both  the 

629  ^  [Pareto  apparently  confused  in  memory  the  striped  rods  of  Jacob  (Gen. 
30:37-43)  with  the  many-coloured  coat  of  Joseph  (Gen.  37:3).  Having  bargained 
with  Laban  for  the  spotted  lambs,  Jacob  made  the  sheep  conceive  among  hazel, 
chestnut,  and  poplar  rods  "pilled"  with  "white  strakes,"  and  they  "brought  forth 
catde  ringstraked,  speckled,  and  spotted." — A.  L.] 


384  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §632 

A  group  and  the  B  group,  and  it  is  difficult  to  separate  them  be- 
cause a  writer  may  not  disclose,  in  fact  oftentimes  does  not  himself 
know,  whether  this  or  that  of  his  principles  is  superior  or  subordi- 
nate to  experience.  To  avoid  a  double  examination  of  the  same 
theory  we  shall  therefore  speak  of  this  variety  K-y  in  the  next  chap- 
ter, where  we  are  to  study  B  theories. 

632.  We  do  that  for  practical  reasons  only,  and  it  in  no  way  im- 
pairs the  theoretical  value  of  our  criterion  of  classification.  It  might 
seem  that  the  mere  fact  as  to  whether  the  sovereignty  assigned  to 
non-experimental  principles  be  explicit  or  implicit  were  not  suffi- 
ciently important  to  warrant  a  distinction  by  genera.  Instead,  the  fact 
is  of  capital  importance,  for  if  the  sovereignty  in  question  is  stated 
explicitly,  the  doors  are  shut  against  experience,  whereas  they  stand 
open  if  it  is  left  implicit.  In  Spencer's  ethical  system,  a  priori  prin- 
ciples figure;  but  they  are  left  implicit,  and  there  is  nothing  there- 
fore to  hinder  us,  in  following  Spencer's  lead,  from  rectifying  them 
and  so  arriving — after  a  long  detour,  it  is  true — at  a  scientific  theory. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  system  of  ethics  that  our  humanitarians 
are  trying  to  set  up,  there  are  principles  which  explicitly  transcend 
experience — the  principle,  for  instance,  that  everything  must  be 
sacrificed  for  the  "good  of  the  greatest  number."  It  is  impossible  to 
imagine  how  a  proposition  of  that  kind  could  be  verified  by  experi- 
ence. Experience,  therefore,  can  in  no  wise  serve  to  correct  it.  It  is 
an  article  of  faith  that  transports  us  to  a  field  entirely  alien  to 
experience. 


CHAPTER     V 


Pseudo-scientific  Theories 


633.  B  (§575).  The  interposition  of  non-experimental  principles, 
which  was  patent  and  explicit  in  group  A,  is  more  or  less  dis- 
sembled and  implicit  in  group  B.  Theories  are  not  logico-experi- 
mental,  but  there  is  an  effort  to  make  them  appear  so.  There  are 
cases,  to  be  sure,  where  they  may  actually  be — cases  where  the  non- 
experimental  element  can  be  eliminated  without  materially  altering 
results.  If  that  is  not  possible,  the  theory  cannot  be  classed,  even  in 
amended  form,  with  the  logico-experimental  variety. 

634.  Here  we  are  considering  the  B  theories  chiefly,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  segregating  the  logico-experimental  element  from  the  non- 
logico-experimental.  The  inquiry  is  important  in  two  respects: 
I.  Such  theories  overlie  facts  that  have  been  distorted;  if  we  can 
manage  to  isolate  the  logico-experimental  element,  we  ought  to  be 
able  to  get  at  the  facts  in  their  real  form.  2.  In  case  perchance  the 
non-experimental  element  in  a  theory  proves  to  be  merely  in- 
cidental, we  can  eliminate  it  and  so  get  a  logico-experimental  theory. 

635.  Suppose,  then,  we  have  before  us  the  statement  of  a  theory, 
the  text  of  a  narration.  We  may  envisage  the  two  following  prob- 
lems: 

1.  Assuming  that  in  the  statement  a  part,  small  or  large,  is  played 
by  metaphysical  or  arbitrary  inferences,  by  myths,  allegories,  and 
so  on,  can  we  get  back  from  the  author's  language  to  the  ideas  he 
was  really  intending  to  express,  to  the  facts  he  meant  to  describe,  to 
the  logico-experimental  relations  he  was  trying  to  formulate — and 
if  so,  how  ? 

2.  What  possible  procedures  are  there  to  arrive,  through  the  use  of 
such  metaphysical  or  arbitrary  inferences,  myths,  allegories,  and  the 
like,  at  certain  conclusions  that  are  desired  in  advance  ? 

636.  The  situation  can  be  better  visualized  in  form  of  a  graph. 
Case  i:  We  have  a  theory  T  (Figure  12),  which  is  assumed  to 

385 


386  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §636 

picture  certain  facts  A — a  statement  T  presumably  originating  in 
the  facts  A.  T  we  know.  Our  purpose  is  to  determine  A.  If  our  effort 
is  successful,  we  shall  be  following  the  line  TA:  starting  with  the 
statement  T,  we  get  to  A.  But,  if  our  venture — quite  without  design 
on  our  part — chances  to  fail,  we  get  not  to  A,  but  to  B,  and  imagine, 
though  mistakenly,  that  B  is  the  source  of  T.  A  procedure  quite 

analogous  is  followed  by  modern  scholarship 
in  trying  to  reconstitute  an  original  text  from 
a  variety  of  surviving  manuscripts.  The  de- 
sired original  would  be  A.  The  various 
manuscript  versions  form  the  complex  T. 

Case  2:  From  the  statement  of  a  theory, 
or  a  text,  T,  the  idea  is  to  draw  certain  con- 
clusions, C,  which  are  generally  known  in  advance.  One  starts  with 
T  and  through  inferences  of  a  non-logico-experimental  character, 
one  gets  to  C. 

In  the  first  case  the  quest  is  for  A;  in  the  second  case,  the  quest  is 
not  f or  C  (C  being  already  known),  but  for  a  way  of  getting  to  C. 
Sometimes  that  is  done  deliberately:  A  person  knows  perfectly  well 
that  C  does  not  follow  from  T,  but  he  thinks  it  desirable  to  make  it 
seem  to.  That  would  be  a  deceit,  a  trick,  a  logical  action — one  person 
trying  to  persuade  another  of  a  thing  he  knows  to  be  untrue.  But 
more  often,  much  more  often,  the  search  for  a  road  that  will  lead 
from  T  to  C  is  not  consciously  premeditated.  The  investigator  be- 
lieves in  T  and  keenly  aspires  to  the  ideal  C.  Quite  without  con- 
scious design  he  brings  the  two  sentiments  together  over  the  path 
TC.  In  that  case  we  get  a  non-logical  action.  The  person  who  is  try- 
ing to  persuade  others  has  first  of  all  persuaded  himself.  There  is 
no  trickery. 

In  the  first  case  (the  quest  for  A),  though  accords  of  sentiment 
are  often  exploited,  there  is  the  assumption  at  least  that  logico- 
experimental  deductions  are  being  used;  and  they  are  really  used 
in  the  sciences.  The  route  TA  (or,  in  case  of  a  mistake,  TB)  is  there- 
fore assumed,  or  at  least  is  ostensibly  assumed,  and  the  search  is  for 
A.  In  the  second  case,  where  the  search,  deliberately  or  unconsciously. 


§638  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  387 

is  for  the  route  TC,  though  it  is  the  pretence,  and  very  often  the 
sincere  beUef,  that  the  logico-experimental  method  is  being  used, 
what  more  often  is  actually  used  is  an  accord  of  sentiments.  The 
search  is  for  a  route  TC,  which  will  have  the  double  advantage  of 
leading  to  the  desired  goal  C,  and  of  being  palatable  to  the  people 
one  is  trying  to  win. 

All  that  is  seldom  apparent.  The  two  problems  are  not  explicitly 
differentiated  and  the  search  for  the  path  TC  is  represented  in  all 
sincerity  as  a  quest  strictly  for  A.  As  usual  the  non-logical  action  is 
given  a  varnish  of  logic.  Suppose  T  stands  for  the  text  of  the  Gospels. 
We  may  seek  the  facts  A  that  gave  rise  to  them — and  that  would  be 
a  task  for  historical  criticism.  But  the  person  who  is  not  using 
historical  criticism,  or  not  using  it  strictly,  is  trying  to  derive  from 
the  Gospels  certain  principles  of  his  own  morality,  or  of  the  morality 
which  he  has  in  some  way  or  other  made  his  own,  and  therefore  is 
using  an  interpretation  TC  suitable  for  getting  him  to  the  desired 
goal.  He  knows  in  advance  that  he  is  to  believe  in  T  and  in  C. 
Those  two  termini  are  fixed.  The  problem  is  simply  to  find  a  way  to 
bring  them  together. 

637.  In  the  present  chapter  we  shall  deal  chiefly  with  the  first  case 
(the  quest  for  A),  dealing  with  the  second  in  Chapters  IX  and  X. 
We  say  chiefly,  and  not  exclusively,  because  in  concrete  cases  ele- 
ments corresponding  to  both  problems  are  usually  combined  in 
varying  proportions,  and  we  should  therefore  be  involving  ourselves 
in  long  and  wearisome  repetitions  if  we  tried  to  keep  such  elements 
strictly  segregated  in  each  concrete  case  and  dealt  exclusively  first 
with  one  and  then  with  the  other. 

638.  In  the  logico-experimental  sciences  we  first  follow  the  line 
AT  and  formulate  a  theory  from  the  facts;  and  then  the  line  TA, 
deducing  predictions  of  fact  from  theory.  In  literary  productions 
involving  departures  from  the  logico-experimental  method,  the  line 
TB  is  on  occasion  followed,  but  nearly  always  it  is  the  line  TC.  T, 
moreover,  is  ordinarily  indeterminate  and  will  yield  almost  anything 
desired.  Often,  also,  the  line  TC  has  very  little  to  do  with  logic.  In 


388  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §639 

a  word,  from  a  sum  of  indefinite  sentiments  T  one  infers  anything 
that  happens  to  be  desired — C. 

639.  Following  the  line  AT,  we  proceed  from  the  thing  to  a 
verbal  term  for  designating  it.  Along  the  lines  TA,  TB,  TC  the 
procedure  is  from  the  verbal  term  to  the  thing.  A  sentiment  prompt- 
ing us  to  objectify  our  subjective  sensations  tempts  us  also  to  believe 
that  in  every  case  there  must  be  some  real  object  corresponding  to 
any  given  term  of  language,  T,  and  that  therefore  all  that  is  needed 
is  to  find  a  way  for  locating  it.  There  is  the  term  "justice."  There 
must  therefore  necessarily  be  something  real  corresponding  to  it; 
and  people  have  sought  high  and  low  to  find  it.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
there  are  many  terms  T  corresponding  to  sentiments  held  by  one  or 
more  persons,  but  nothing  more.  Starting  from  T  we  may  find  those 
sentiments,  but  certainly  not  objects  that  have  no  existence. 

640.  A  situation  of  very  frequent  occurrence  is  the  following.  From 
the  sentiments  A  present  in  many  people  an  indeterminate  expres- 
sion, T,  is  derived.  Then  a  writer  comes  along  and  tries  to  draw  cer- 
tain conclusions,  C,  from  T.  T  being  indeterminate,  he  sees  any- 
thing he  chooses  in  it  (§  514),  and  then  believes,  and  makes  others 
believe,  that  he  has  attained  an  objective  result,  C.  In  reality  he  is 
accepting  C  only  because  C  accords  with  his  sentiments,  A.  But  in- 
stead of  following  frankly  the  direct  line  AC,  he  follows  the  indirect 
line  ATC,  often  a  very  circuitous  route,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  need 
of  seeming  logical  that  he  and  other  human  beings  feel. 

/  Returning  to  our  examination  of  theories  as  classified  in  §  575, 
let  us  see  whether,  and  how,  one  can  get  back  from  them  to  the 
facts  which  they  are  assumed  to  represent. 

641.  B:  The  extra-experimental  origin  of  the  abstract  entities  that 
I  are  introduced  is  not  explicitly  stated.  For  that  matter,  we  must  be 

resigned  to  finding  metaphysical  a  priori  principles  explicit  in  this 
class,  as  well  as  in  the  A  group,  and  rest  satisfied  with  reducing  them 
to  as  slight  a  role  as  possible.  If  we  were  to  bar  them  altogether,  we 
should  have  nothing,  or  almost  nothing,  left  to  put  into  the  class 
we  are  here  considering.  In  .social  matters  such  principles  will  creep 


§643  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  389 

in  by  hook  or  by  crook.  That  is  the  case  not  only  because  they  corre- 
spond to  very  powerful  sentiments  in  human  beings,  but  also  be- 
cause such  matters  are  almost  never  studied  for  the  exclusive  pur- 
pose of  discovering  uniformities,  but  in  behalf  of  some  practical 
purpose,  some  propaganda,  some  justification  of  an  a  priori  belief. 

642.  They  are  sometimes  mere  abstractions  arbitrarily  deduced 
from  experience.  This  is  characteristic  of  the  experimental  sciences; 
and  the  ear-mark  by  which  we  can  recognize  such  abstractions  is  that 
they  may  be  dispensed  with  whenever  we  so  desire.  The  whole 
science  of  celestial  mechanics  can  be  expounded  without  resort  to 
the  concept  of  universal  attraction.  The  hypothesis  that  astronomers 
are  trying  to  verify  on  the  facts  is  that  celestial  bodies  move  in  such 
a  way  as  to  satisfy  the  equations  of  dynamics.  The  whole  science  of 
mechanics  can  be  expounded  without  reference  to  the  concept  of 
"force,"  the  whole  science  of  chemistry  without  once  mentioning 
"affinity."  As  for  political  economy,  we  have  shown  that  the  theories 
of  the  economic  equilibrium  can  be  stated  without  resort  to  my  term 
"ophelimity"  (§  61),  to  the  term  "value,"  or  to  the  abstraction  "capi- 
tal" (§§  117 f.).  In  these  volumes  on  sociology  we  could  substitute 
plain  letters  of  the  alphabet  for  the  terms  "non-logical  actions,"  "resi- 
dues," "derivations,"  and  the  like,  and  the  argument  would  stand 
just  as  well  without  the  slightest  alteration.  We  are  dealing  with 
things  and  not  with  words,  nor  with  the  sentiments  associated  with 
words  (§§  ii9f.). 

We  shall  go  no  farther  here  into  the  character  of  these  logico- 
experimental  theories,  the  better  to  confine  ourselves  to  the  theories 
more  or  less  at  variance  with  them  that  have  so  far  constituted  social 
science. 

643.  B-a:  Myths,  legends,  and  the  like  are  historically  real.  This 
is  the  simplest  and  easiest  solution  of  the  problem  of  getting  from 
T  to  A — of  getting  back  from  a  text  to  the  facts  in  which  it  origi- 
nated. It  may  be  accepted  in  virtue  of  a  fervid,  unreasoning  faith  that 
prides  itself  on  believing  even  quia  absurdum.  With  that  procedure, 
as  explained  in  §  581,  we  need  not  concern  ourselves.  Then  again,  it 


390  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §644 

may  be  accepted  on  the  same  basis  as  any  other  historical  account, 
and  therefore  as  the  consequence  of  a  pseudo-experience,  which 
would  be  identical  with  experience  proper  were  the  story  subjected 
to  severe  historical  criticism  and  to  all  the  other  experimental  verifi- 
cations required.  The  theories  yielded  by  this  solution  differ  from 
the  theories  of  group  A  (§  575)  in  that  in  the  A  theories  the  nar- 
ration is  enforced  as  an  article  of  faith  by  some  non-experimental 
power  which  generally  is  known  on  the  authority  of  some  indi- 
vidual (§  583),  and  it  is  the  interposition  of  such  a  power  that  pro- 
vides the  desired  "explanation."  In  the  present  case,  B-a,  the  theories 
are  believed  on  their  own  pseudo-experimental  evidence.  From  the 
scientific  standpoint  such  a  distinction  is  a  vital  one  (§632).  If  a 
narration  is  presented  as  an  article  of  faith,  that  alone  is  enough  to 
banish  it  from  the  field  of  logico-experimental  science,  which  has 
no  longer  any  business  with  it  as  regards  either  acceptance  or  re- 
jection. But  if  it  is  presented  as  vouching  for  itself  on  its  own 
authority  and  obviousness,  it  is  wholly  within  the  domain  of  experi- 
mental science,  and  it  is  faith  that  loses  all  jurisdiction  over  it.  That 
distinction,  however,  is  seldom  made  by  the  person  who  believes 
such  a  narration,  and  it  is  very  difficult  to  tell  whether  he  is  con- 
sidering it  merely  as  history  or  is  believing  it  on  some  other  ground. 
For  that  reason  a  great  many  cases,  in  the  concrete,  present  mixtures 
of  A  theories  and  B  theories.  For  instance,  the  authority  of  the  writer 
himself  is  seldom  missing,  and  it  is  a  non-experimental  element. 

644.  If  the  text  we  are  trying  to  interpret  were  a  historical  nar- 
rative, we  might  in  fact  consider  it  as  an  at  least  approximative  record 
of  the  facts  with  which  it  deals  (§§  541  f.). 

645.  Even  in  such  cases,  however,  there  are  always  some  differ- 
ences. Any  account  even  of  a  very  simple  occurrence  rarely  repre- 
sents it  exactly.  That  has  been  shown  over  and  over  again  by  a 
favourite  experiment  of  professors  of  criminology.  Something  is 
made  to  happen  in  the  presence  of  witnesses,  and  they  are  asked  to 
give  an  account  of  it  in  writing.  As  many  slightly  differing  nar- 
ratives are  received  as  there  are  witnesses.  A  boy  and  an  adult  of 
lively  imagination  are  made  to  witness  something.  If  they  are  asked 


§647  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  39I 

to  tell  what  they  have  seen,  it  will  be  found  that  each  adds  some- 
thing to  it,  and  in  the  direction  of  making  it  more  striking  or  in- 
teresting than  it  was  in  reality/  The  same  thing  is  true  when  a 
person  is  repeating  a  story  he  has  heard  (§  1568). 

Another  curious  thing:  Since  it  is  the  general  practice  to  make 
such  embellishments,  people  habitually  discount  what  they  hear,  so 
that  an  incident  has  to  be  somewhat  overdrawn  in  order  to  make  an 
impression  at  all  corresponding  to  reality.  If  you  see  nine  people  out 
of  ten  laughing,  and  you  wish  to  convey  to  someone  an  accurate 
impression  of  such  great  hilarity,  you  say,  "Everybody  laughed." 
If  you  were  to  say,  "Nine  of  them  laughed  and  one  did  not,"  the 
impression  would  fall  short  of  the  truth. 

646.  To  be  altered,  a  story  need  not  pass  from  mouth  to  mouth. 
It  is  altered  even  in  a  repetition  by  the  same  person.  A  thing  once 
said  to  be  large  will  become  larger  in  successive  accounts,  and  a  small 
thing  will  become  smaller.  The  dose  is  constantly  increased,  and 
always  under  pressure  of  the  same  sentiment. 

647.  Exact  data  are  available  to  show  how  deceitful  certain  im- 
pressions are.  Singular  indeed  our  common  illusions  as  regards  quo- 
tations from  certain  authors.  I  have  often  heard  Italians  quote  Dante 
{hiferno,  III,  v.  51)  to  the  effect:  "Non  ti  curar  di  lor,  ma  guarda  e 
f assay  Dante  wrote: 

'Non  ragioniam  di  lor,  ma  guarda  e  passa} 

645  ^  [In  his  Memoirs,  published  in  1823,  Lorenzo  da  Ponte,  describing  the  hard- 
ships of  an  ocean  voyage,  says  that  he  crossed  the  Atlantic  in  eighty-six  days.  In  his 
Compendium,  published  in  1807,  he  says  he  crossed  in  seventy  days.  I  have  shown 
on  the  documents  that  he  crossed  on  the  Columbia  in  fifty-seven  days  {Memoirs  of 
Lorenzo  da  Ponte,  Philadelphia,  1929,  p.  353).  The  point  is  this.  Interpreters  of 
Da  Ponte,  such  as  Fausto  Nicolini  {Archivio  storico  italiano,  No.  i,  1930),  enumerate 
such  inaccuracies  in  the  Memoirs  to  prove  that  Da  Ponte  was  a  liar  and  general 
reprobate  (logical  conduct:  misstatement  with  intent  to  deceive).  And  to  the  extent 
of  that  intrusion  of  moralistic  attitudes,  they  are  doing  a  sentimental  gymnastic  and 
producing  pseudo-sciendfic  criticism.  I  view  Da  Ponte,  instead,  as  merely  manifest- 
ing, as  Pareto  would  say,  the  residue  here  in  question  (non-logical  conduct:  un- 
awareness  of  realities  through  stress  of  a  sentiment — §  888,  residue  1-^2),  and  so 
I  come  closer  to  a  scientific  interpretation  of  the  facts. — A.  L.] 

647  1  ["Let  us  not  speak  of  them,  but  look  and  pass"  (Fletcher  translation);  "Let 
us  not  speak  of  them,  but  look  and  go"  (Anderson  translation).] 


392  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §648 

Many  Frenchmen,  says  Fournier,  think  they  are  quoting  Moliere 
when  they  say, 

//  est  avec  le  del  des  accommodements?- 

"The  verse  is  perfect,  but  MoHere  did  not  write  it.  In  fact  to  get  such 
a  verse  we  have  to  take  the  substance  of  two  lines  in  Act  IV,  Scene  V, 
of  Tartu^e: 

Le  del  defend,  de  vrai,  certains  contentements; 
mats  on  trouve  avec  lui  des  accommodements!'  ^ 

Mirabeau's  famous  phrase,  "Go  tell  your  master,"  etc.,  he  never 
uttered.  The  Marquis  of  Dreux-Breze  rectified  the  facts  in  the  Cham- 
ber of  Peers  at  its  session  of  March  10,  1833.  "Mirabeau  said  to  my 
father:  'We  are  assembled  here  by  the  will  of  the  nation,  and  we 
will  not  leave  except  by  force.'  I  ask  M.  de  Montlosier  if  that  be  not 
so. 
648.  A  national  author  is  often  less  accurately  quoted  by  his 

647  ^  "There  are  ways  of  coming  to  terms  with  Heaven." 

647  ^  L'esprit  des  autres,  pp.  374-75.  Ibid.,  pp.  104-05:  "I'know  people  who  would 
blush  red  with  anger  if  I  were  to  tell  them  .  .  .  that  the  celebrated  verse 

'La  critique  est  aisee  et  I'art  est  difficile' 
is  not  in  the  Art  poetique  of  their  darling,  Despreaux.  .  .  .  They  will  go  over  the 
verses  of  the  four  cantos  of  the  poem,  and  indeed  through  all  the  works  of  the 
poet;  and  not  only  will  they  not  find  the  line  they  are  looking  for  but  inci- 
dentally they  will  find  quite  a  few  to  the  opposite  effect.  .  .  .  Never  mind — they 
will  not  be  beaten  so  easily.  They  will  sdll  hold  that  their  beloved  line  is  by  Boileau 
and  that  it  is  in  the  Art  poetique  .  .  .  because  it  ought  to  be  there."  [So  nine  peo- 
ple out  of  ten  will  say  that  the  celebrated  definition  of  comedy,  "Castigat  ridendo 
mores,"  is  by  Horace  in  the  De  arte  poetica,  as  in  fact  it  "ought"  to  be.  Instead  it  is 
by  Santeul,  a  Frenchman  of  the  seventeenth  century.  So  the  Lord's  curse  on  Adam 
and  Eve  (Gen.  3:19)  is  regularly  quoted  "by  the  sweat  of  thy  brow"  instead  of 
"in  the  sweat  of  thy  face."  For  another  example  from  Pareto  himself,  see  §  1397^. 
^A.  L.] 

647  ^  Quoted  by  Fournier,  L'esprit  dans  I'histoire,  p.  229.  Fournier  says  further 
in  a  note:  "According  to  the  report  in  the  Journal  des  debats  of  that  same  day. 
Mar.  10,  1833,  M.  de  Montlosier  nodded  in  the  affirmative.  Bailly's  Memoires,  pub- 
lished in  1804,  Vol.  I,  p.  216,  report  Mirabeau's  words  neither  as  they  are  ordi- 
narily quoted  nor  [as  recdfied  in  the  House  of  Peers].  On  the  other  hand,  Noel's 
Ephemerides,  June,  1803,  p.  164,  establishes  the  version  of  M.  de  Dreux-Breze 
[thirty  years  before  his  dme]."  [The  passage,  however,  is  missing  in  the  third 
edidon  of  the  'Ephemerides. — A.  L.] 


I 


J 


§649  NARRATIONS  OF  FACT  393 

fellow-countrymen,  who  generally  repeat  from  memory,  than  by 
foreigners  who  take  the  pains  to  verify  quotations  on  his  text.  Some- 
thing similar  may  have  happened  with  ancient  Greek  writers  in 
quoting  Homer/  Such  quotations  are  often  different  from  the  texts 
of  Homer  that  have  come  down  to  us,  and  the  differences  are  com- 
monly explained  as  due  to  textual  variants  in  the  original.  All  the 
same,  there  remain  cases  in  which  the  divergences  seem  due  to 
quotation  from  memory.  Ancient  writers  did  not  feel  the  need  of 
accuracy  of  which  some  writers,  at  least  among  the  moderns,  make 
a  point.  Even  a  few  years  back  many  passages  were  being  quoted 
from  authors  without  indications  as  to  where  they  were  to  be  found, 
and  what  is  worse,  opinions  were  credited  to  them  without  textual 
references.  As  late  as  1893  Gomperz  wrote  his  elaborate  Gree\ 
ThinJ^ers  without  a  single  quotation — everything  had  to  be  believed, 
like  the  Delphic  oracle,  on  his  unsupported  say-so.  The  general  cus- 
tom in  historical  works  nowadays  is  different.  The  works  of  Fustel 
de  Coulanges,  Marquardt,  the  Majiual  of  Mommsen  and  the 
Roman  History  of  Ettore  Pais,  are  models  in  that  sense-  In  each  of 
them  the  author's  object  is  to  be  as  accurate  and  objective  as  possible 
and  to  support  his  assertions  with  sound  proofs. 

649.  Divergences  between  facts  and  accounts  of  them  may  be 
slight  or  insignificant.  But  they  may  also  increase,  multiply,  and  be- 
come so  elaborate  as  to  end  in  stories  that  have  virtually  nothing  in 
common  with  the  facts.  So  we  get  fantastic  tales,  legends,  romances, 

648  ^  Dugas-Montbel,  Observations  sitr  I'lliade.  Vol.  I,  p.  139  {Iliad  III,  vv.  8-9) : 
"Plato  quotes  v.  8  in  his  Respublica  [III,  3896]  with  a  slight  change.  ...  It  is 
probable  that  Plato  was  quoting  from  memory,  but  it  is  also  conceivable  that  at 
that  time  Homer's  text  was  not  what  it  is  today.  However  Strabo  [Geograp/jica, 
XII,  8,  7;  Jones,  Vol.  V,  p.  495 1  quotes  v.  8,  and  Aulus  Gellius  [Nodes  Atticae, 
I,  11;  Rolfe,  Vol.  I,  p.  55],  vv.  8  and  9,  in  texts  identical  widi  our  modern  edi- 
tions." Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  213  {Iliad,  IV,  v.  431):  "I  have  already  remarked  that  in 
quodng  Homer,  doubtless  from  memory,  Plato  tied  the  beginning  of  this  hne  to 
the  eighth  of  Canto  III  of  the  Iliad.  .  .  ."  Vol.  I,  pp.  402-03  {Iliad,  IX,  vv.  591-94): 
"In  quodng  this  passage  [Rhetorica,  I,  7,  3;  Freese,  p.  81]  Aristode  does  not  give 
the  exact  text  that  appears  in  our  edidons.  .  .  .  Aristode's  Homer  may  have  been 
different  in  some  respects  from  ours.  ...  All  the  same,  my  guess  would  be  that 
the  difference  here  ...  is  due  to  the  fact  that  Aristode  was  quodng  from  mem- 
ory, as  we  suspected  in  the  case  of  Plato." 


394  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL   SOCIOLOGY  §650 

in  which  there  is  no  telling  whether  there  is  any  basis  in  fact,  and,  if 
so,  what  the  facts  were.  Even  writings  that  are  not  considered  leg- 
endary and  pass  as  historical  may  be  so  widely  at  variance  with 
reality  as  to  bear  a  very  scant  resemblance  to  it.^ 

If  we  follow  in  this  connexion  also  the  method  indicated  in  §  547, 
we  shall  find  examples  in  great  abundance  to  show  how  cautious 
one  has  to  be  in  accepting  details  in  stories  that  are  on  the  whole 
altogether  historical.  In  the  year  11 92  Conrad,  Marquis  of  Tyre,  was 
assassinated  in  that  city.  His  subjects,  needing  a  lord  and  protector, 
insisted  that  Isabelle,  Conrad's  widow,  should  straightway  marry 
Henry,  Count  of  Champagne,  even  though  she  was  with  child.  An 
Arab,  Imad  ed  Din,  tells  the  story  thus,  in  the  Boo\  of  the  Two 
Gardens  (Vol.  V,  pp.  52-53):  "On  the  very  night  of  the  murder. 
Count  Henry  married  the  princess,  widow  of  the  Marquis,  and 
consummated  the  union  even  though  she  was  with  child.  But  in  the 
religion  of  the  Franks  that  circumstance  is  not  an  obstacle  to  mar- 
riage, the  child  being  ascribed  to  the  mother.  Such  the  law  with 
that  nation  of  infidels." 

If  nothing  but  that  were  known  of  the  Franks,  one  might  infer 
that  they  traced  lineal  descent  through  the  female  line  and  would 
so  increase  by  one  the  number  of  peoples  with  a  matriarchal  system. 
Very  likely  not  a  few  facts  adduced  in  support  of  the  general  theory 
of  matriarchy  have  no  better  foundations. 

650.  B-ai :  Myths  and  the  li\e  taken  literally  without  change.  We 
get  the  type  of  this  variety  in  the  blind  faith  with  which  biblical  nar- 
rative was  for  so  long  accepted,  the  Bible  being  regarded  as  simple 
history — for  when  it  is  taken  as  inspired  of  God,  and  the  fact  of 

649  ^  One  example  from  the  hosts  available — Hagenmeyer,  Peter  der  Eremite, 
p.  2:  "When  one  is  confronted  on  the  one  hand  with  documents  on  the  Crusades 
attributed  to  writers  of  the  eleventh  and  twelfth  centuries,  and  which  must  be 
taken  as  sources  emanating  from  eyewitnesses,  and  on  the  other  hand  with  narra- 
tives of  the  same  events  written  at  later  periods,  a  comparison  is  sufficient  to  show 
that  oftentimes  the  tradition  has  been  completely  changed  in  character.  It  is  a 
thing  that  anyone  can  verify  for  himself.  Nor  is  it  rare  even  to  find  that  the 
primitive  narrative  is  hardly  recognizable  under  the  legendary  frills  with  which 
the  modern  account  has  been  decorated,  so  that  if  one  had  to  depend  on  the 
latter  alone,  it  would  be  hard  to  determine  just  how  much  history  it  contained." 


§652  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  395 

inspiration  is  the  reason  for  its  acceptance  as  history,  we  get  a  theory 
of  Class  III-A/  Of  the  same  type  are  the  many  legends  that  have 
been  taken  as  history,  such  as  the  tales  connected  with  the  founding 
of  Rome. 

651.  For  many  centuries  every  statement  by  an  ancient  writer  was 
accepted  as  high-test  gold.  The  more  ancient  the  author,  the  more 
trustworthy  the  fact.  Says  Dante  of  Livy: 

Come  Livio  scrive,  che  non  erra} 

Today  we  stand  dumbfounded  that  so  many  absurd  stories  could 
have  passed  for  history  for  so  many  generations;  and  the  fact  that 
they  did  so  serves  to  demonstrate  the  value  of  that  universal  con- 
sensus on  which  the  metaphysicists  so  pride  themselves. 

652.  Not  less  amazing  is  it  to  see  men  of  great  ability  lending 
their  credence  to  old  wives'  tales  and  prophecies — and  that  goes  to 
show  the  scant  importance  that  is  to  be  attached  to  authority  in  such 
matters.  It  seems  incredible — yet  there  stands  the  fact — that  the 
great  Newton  could  have  written  a  whole  book  to  show  that  the 
prophecies  of  the  Apocalypse  had  been  fulfilled.  How  ever  could 
the  founder  of  celestial  mechanics  have  harboured  such  childish 
idiocies !  ^  But  the  case,  however  extreme,  is  not  exceptional.  Many 

650  ^  [Pareto's  cross-references  grow  a  little  complicated:  Class  III  is  isolated  in 
§  523  (theories  adding  something  to  experimental  reality).  Of  it  the  genera  A  and 
B,  as  distinguished  in  §  574  and  analyzed  in  §  575,  are  subvarieties,  the  extra- 
experimental  element  being  explicit  in  A,  and  in  B,  disguised  or  implicit. — A.  L.] 

651  ^Inferno,  XXVIII,  v.  12:  "As  Livy  writes,  whose  word  we  cannot  doubt" 
(Anderson  translation). 

652  ^  Observations  upon  the  Prophecies  of  Daniel  and  the  Apocalypse  of  St.  John, 
pp.  14,  46-48.  Newton  finds  Daniel  a  most  lucid  seer:  "Amongst  old  Prophets,  Daniel 
is  most  distinct  in  order  to  time  and  easier  to  be  understood."  Daniel  clearly 
prophesies  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire  "on  the  ten  kingdoms  represented  by 
the  horns  of  the  fourth  Beast  (Rev.  13).  Now  by  the  war  above  described  the 
Western  Empire  of  the  Romans,  about  the  time  that  Rome  was  besieged  and  taken 
by  the  Goths,  became  broken  into  the  following  ten  kingdoms.  .  .  ."  He  mentions 
the  kingdoms  of  the  Vandals  and  the  Alans  in  Spain  and  Africa;  the  Suevians  in 
Spain;  the  Visigoths,  the  Alans  in  Gallia;  the  Burgundians,  the  Franks,  the  Brit- 
ons, the  Huns,  the  Lombards;  and  the  kingdom  of  Ravenna.  And  he  concludes: 
"Seven  of  these  kingdoms  are  thus  mentioned  by  Sigonius  .  .  .  add  the 
Franks,  Britons,  and  Lombards,  and  you  have  the  ten:  for  these  arose  about  the 
same  time  with  the  seven." 


39^  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §653 

people  think  soundly  enough  on  certain  subjects  and  as  badly  as 
can  be  on  others,  being  sages  in  one  sphere,  idiots  in  others.  Number- 
less the  chronologies  extant  "from  the  year  of  the  Flood,"  "from 
the  year  of  the  foundation  of  Troy,"  and  so  on.  Glance,  if  you  please, 
at  the  histories  of  Orosius,  and  see  how  he  brings  all  sorts  of  stories 
together  and  presents  them  as  veracious  history — giving  the  exact 
dates  for  good  measure!  Everything  is  grist  for  his  mill  whether  it 
come  from  the  Bible  or  from  the  mythologies  of  the  pagans,  against 
whom  meantime  he  is  writing.^ 

653.  Such  chronologies  were  appearing  as  late  as  the  year  1802, 
when,  in  long  and  erudite  notes  to  his  translation  of  Herodotus, 
Larcher  records  the  dates  of  no  end  of  legendary  happenings.  He 
devotes  a  whole  chapter  to  fixing  the  exact  year  of  the  fall  of  Troy, 
prefacing  it.  Vol.  VII,  p.  290,  with  the  remark:  "I  lay  it  down  as 
an  actual  fact  that  that  city  was  taken  in  the  year  3444  of  the  Julian 
period,  1,270  years  before  the  common  era;  and  I  will  prove  it  in 
my  chapter  on  that  epoch."  ^ 

654.  To  some  extent  in  ancient  times,  more  frequently  in  the  Mid- 
dle Ages  and  even  later,  many  peoples  were  tracing  their  origins 
back  to  the  peregrinations  of  the  Trojans.  Guillaume  le  Breton  re- 
lates in  all  seriousness : '^  "As  we  have  learned  from  the  chronicles 

652  ^  Historiae  adversus  paganos,  I,  2,  i:  "Item.  In  the  year  775  ante  u.  c.  [What 
a  pity  he  does  not  give  the  day  and  the  month!]  fifty  parricides  were  committed  in 
one  night  among  the  children  of  Danaus  and  Aegyptus,  brothers."  [The  legend  in 
its  commoner  form  was  that  the  fifty  sons  of  Aegyptus  were  married  to  the  fifty 
daughters  of  Danaus,  who  slew  their  husbands  at  their  father's  command.  See 
Harper,  s.v.  Danaides. — A.  L.]  Ibid.,  I,  17,  i:  "In  the  year  430  ante  u.  c.  come  the 
rape  of  Helen,  the  conspiracy  of  the  Greeks,  and  the  assembling  of  the  thousand 
ships,  whence  the  ten  years'  siege,  eventuating  in  the  famous  fall  of  Troy,  is  fore- 
told." Clement  of  Alexandria,  Stromata,  I,  21  {Opera,  Vol.  I,  p.  826B;  Wilson,  Vol. 
I,  p.  423),  along  with  other  interesting  information  and  chronology,  locates  at  the 
time  of  Lynceus  [i.e.,  of  the  Argonauts]  the  rape  of  Proserpine,  the  foundation  of 
the  Temple  of  Eleusis,  the  invention  of  agriculture  by  Triptolemus,  the  arrival  of 
Cadmus  at  Thebes,  and  the  reign  of  Minos  in  Crete. 

653  ^  In  the  same  translation  of  Herodotus,  Vol.  VII,  p.  576,  Larcher  notes  for 
the  year  1355  b.c:  "The  women  of  Lemnos,  enraged  at  the  preference  of  the  Lem- 
nians  for  their  concubines,  make  a  general  slaughter  of  their  husbands."  For  the 
year  1354  b.c:  "Oedipus,  son  of  Laius,  marries  Jocasta,  without  knowing  that  she 
is  his  mother,  and  ascends  the  throne." 

654  ^  Vie  de  Philippe  Auguste,  pp.  184-85. 


§654  MYTHS  TAKEN  LITERALLY  397 

of  Eusebius,  Idacius,  Gregory  of  Tours,  and  many  others,  and  from 
the  testimony  of  all  the  ancients,  Hector,  son  of  Priam,  had  a  son 
called  Francion.  Troilus,  son  of  the  same  Priam,  King  of  Asia, 
also  had,  it  is  said,  a  son  called  Turcus.  After  the  fall  of  Troy,  the 
Trojans,  most  of  whom  had  escaped,  became  divided  into  two 
peoples,  the  one  of  which  chose  Francion  king  and  so  came  to  be 
called  Franks.  The  other  named  Turcus  their  chief,  whence  the 
Turks  derived  their  name."  ^ 

654  2  Guillaume  continues,  p.  185:  "Leading  his  people,  Francion  reached  the 
Danube,  where  he  built  a  city  called  Sicambria,  and  there  he  reigned.  .  .  .  Two 
hundred  and  thirty  years  having  passed  [No  more,  no  less!]  twenty-three  thousand 
of  them  [No  less,  no  more!]  left  under  the  leadership  of  Hybor  .  .  .  and  came 
to  Gaul.  Arriving  at  a  very  pleasant  and  convenient  spot  on  the  Seine,  they  built 
a  city  there  and  called  it  Luteda,  because  of  the  mud  {lutum)  that  filled  the  place, 
and  they  called  themselves  Parisians,  from  Paris,  son  of  Priam;  or  rather  [For  Guil- 
laume  has  a  flair  for  historical  criticism.],  they  were  so  called  from  the  Greek  word 
parrhesia,  which  means  'boldness.'  And  there  they  dwelt  one  thousand  two  hundred 
and  sixty  years."  Dugas-Montbel,  Observations  stir  I'lliade,  Vol.  I,  p.  298  (Iliad,  VI, 
vv.  402-03) :  "The  famous  poet  Ronsard  went  even  farther  [in  tlie  Franciade'\  than 
Racine  [in  Andromaque'];  for  he  assumes  that  this  very  Astyanax  went  to  Gaul, 
came  to  be  called  Francion,  and  founded  the  line  of  the  Kings  of  France.  .  .  .  The 
story  seems  to  originate  in  an  alleged  passage  of  Manetho  {Manethone  sacerdote 
egittio)  quoted  by  Annio  da  Viterbo,  the  latter  in  his  notes,  p.  33,  referring 
to  the  historian  Vincent  de  Beauvais  (Vincetizo  historico  jra^icese)  as  his  author- 
ity. Vincent  claims  that  on  the  fall  of  Troy  Astyanax  wandered  to  the  Gauls,  mar- 
ried the  daughter  of  the  king,  and  succeeded  his  father-in-law  on  the  throne.  Many 
poets  are  far  frorh  basing  their  plots  on  such  secure  historical  foundadons."  The 
story  may  go  as  far  back  as  Lucan,  Pharsalia,  I,  vv.  427-28:  "The  Arvernians  [Gauls] 
have  dared  to  pretend  themselves  blood-kindred  to  the  Latian  [Roman]  as  a  people 
of  Iliac  [Trojan]  stock."  In  the  Fragmenta  of  Fredegarius,  Epitomata,  II  (Migne, 
LXXI,  p.  577c),  the  legend  is  well  knit  and  already  full  grown.  As  late  as  the  six- 
teenth century,  a  scholar  of  Etienne  Pasquier's  calibre  hesitated  to  deny  such  non- 
sense, Recherches  de  la  France,  I,  14  (p.  37):  "As  regards  the  Trojans,  it  is  cer- 
tainly surprising  that  all  the  nadons,  as  it  were  by  common  consent,  consider  them- 
selves highly  honoured  to  derive  their  ancient  origins  from  the  destrucdon  of  Troy. 
So  the  Romans  call  their  first  founder  an  Aeneas,  the  French,  a  Francion,  the  Turks, 
a  Turcus,  and  the  people  of  Great  Britain,  a  Brutus,  while  the  first  inhabitants  of 
the  Adriadc  call  themselves  after  Antenor.  .  .  .  For  my  part,  I  should  not  dare 
flatly  to  contradict  that  opinion,  nor  for  that  matter  assent  to  it  without  reservation. 
It  seems  to  me  a  very  dcklish  business  to  argue  about  the  remote  origins  of  peoples; 
because  they  were  so  small  in  their  first  beginnings  that  die  ancient  writers  took 
no  pains  to  establish  the  facts,  so  that  gradually  the  memory  of  them  vanished 
utterly,  or  else  took  the  form  of  pleasant  and  frivolous  tales."  [There  is  no  reference 
to  the  adventures  of  Francion  in  the  half-witted  Chronicon  of  IdaUus,  at  least  in  the 
text  of  that  work  published  in  the  Maxima  bibliotheca  of  Eigne. — A.  L.] 


398  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §655 

655.  In  the  year  of  grace  1829,  at  a  time  when  Niebuhr's  work 
had  gone  through  three  editions,  the  Saint-Simonians  were  still 
swearing  by  Numa/ 

656.  But  specialists  in  Roman  antiquities  had  for  years  been  voic- 
ing their  doubts.  Cliiver  in  1624,  Perizonius  in  1685,  Beaufort  in 
1738,  Charles  Levesque  in  1807,  and  finally  Niebuhr  in  181 1,  had 
gradually  been  drawing  nearer  to  the  point  where  the  historical 
unsubstantiality  of  the  ancient  legends  became  apparent.  Mommsen, 
and  finally  the  Italian  Ettore  Pais,  banished  them  from  history  for 
good  and  all.  By  that  time  Grote  had  done  the  same  for  Greece. 

657.  But  human  beings  are  not  readily  brought  to  discarding  their 
legends.  They  try,  at  least,  to  save  as  much  of  them  as  possible.  The 
method  most  generally  used  is  to  alter  meanings  in  the  parts  that 
seem  irreparably  unacceptable  in  order  to  divest  them  of  traits  too 
conspicuously  impossible. 

658.  Available  in  exceedingly  large  numbers  are  examples  of 
words  transformed  into  things  or  properties  of  things;  and  often- 
times a  whole  legend  is  built  up  around  a  single  term  loosely  in- 
terpreted.^ In  the  languages  in  which  names  of  things  have  gender, 
male  personifications  come  from  masculine  nouns,  female  from 
feminine  nouns  (§§  1645  f.).  It  may  chance  to  be  possible  in  some 

655  ^  Doctrine  Saint-Simonienne ,  Exposition,  1854,  p.  19:  "Moses,  Numa,  Jesus — 
they  all  fathered  peoples  that  are  dead  or  are  dying  today." 

658  ^  Taylor,  Words  and  Places,  pp.  264-70  (quoted  by  Menzerath,  L'Einfiihlung, 
et  la  connaissance  du  semblable) :  "Men  have  ever  felt  a  natural  desire  to  assigR 
plausible  meanings  to  names.  .  .  .  How  few  children,  conning  the  adas,  do  not 
connect  some  fanciful  speculations  with  such  names  as  .  .  .  the  orange  River  or  the 
RED  Sea  .  .  .  [which  are]  supposed  to  denote  the  colour  of  the  waters,  instead  of 
being,  the  one  a  reminiscence  of  .  .  .  the  house  of  Orange,  and  the  other  a  trans- 
ladon  of  the  Sea  of  Edom.  ...  [In  a  note] :  Florida  is  not  the  flowery  land,  but  the 
land  discovered  on  Easter  Day  (Pasqua  florida).  .  .  .  No  cause  has  been  more 
fruitful  in  producing  corruptions  than  popular  attempts  to  explain  from  the  ver- 
nacular .  .  .  names  .  .  .  known  only  to  the  learned.  .  .  .  [In  a  note] :  A  groom 
used  to  call  Othello  and  Desdemona — two  horses  under  his  charge — Old  Fellow 
and  Thursday  Morning.  .  .  .  The  citadel  of  Carthage  was  called  bozra,  a  Phoeni- 
cian word  meaning  an  acropolis.  The  Greeks  connected  this  with  (ivpaa,  an  ox- 
hide, and  then,  in  harmony  with  the  popular  notions  of  Tyrian  acuteness,  an  ex- 
planatory legend  was  concocted,  which  told  how  the  traders,  who  had  received  per- 
mission to  possess  as  much  land  as  an  ox-hide  would  cover,  cut  the  skin  into  strips 
with  which  they  encompassed  the  spot  on  which  the  Carthaginian  fortress  was 


§66o  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  399 

cases  to  get  back  from  the  name  to  the  thing;  but  we  must  take  care 
to  do  that  only  when  we  have  adequate  proofs  of  the  development 
from  the  thing  to  the  name.  To  be  sure,  when  we  are  looking  for 
the  meaning  of  a  term  there  is  always  the  temptation  to  alter  it 
slightly  and  give  evidence  of  our  ingenuity  by  bringing  out  hidden 
implications  and  so  drawing  name  and  thing  together.  But  past 
experience  shows  that  that  course  has  almost  always  led  to  error 
(§  547),  and  the  more  certainly,  the  greater  the  talent  and  learning 
of  the  interpreter,  who  is  tempted  by  his  very  endowments  to  try 
unbeaten  paths.  Going  from  the  name  to  the  thing  is  to  retrace  the 
path  that  has  led  from  the  thing  to  the  name.  The  return  trip  may 
be  made  in  some  confidence  only  when  our  knowledge  of  the 
original  development  is  more  or  less  thorough.^ 

659.  There  is  an  analogous  situation  in  etymology.  The  ancients 
derived  their  etymologies  from  verbal  similarities  that  were  often 
very  superficial,  and  nearly  always  they  went  v/rong.  Modern 
philologists  accept  no  etymology  that  fails  to  accord  with  the  laws 
of  phonetics:  they  refuse,  that  is,  to  retrace  the  path  from  word  to 
etymon  unless  they  are  certain  of  the  original  development  from 
etymon  to  word. 

660.  So  we  are  left  in  doubt  when  someone  suggests  going  back 
from  the  name  Saint  Venise  to  Venus,  until  we  have  some  other 

erected."  (Menzerath:  "The  classic  example  is  Romtilits,  as  the  founder  of  Rome, 
a  form  philologically  impossible.")  Taylor  continues,  p.  269:  "The  name  of  Antwerp 
denotes,  no  doubt,  the  town  which  sprang  up  'at  the  wharf.'  But  the  word  Ant- 
werpen  approximates  closely  in  sound  to  the  Flemish  handt  werpen,  hand  throwing. 
Hence  arose  the  legend  of  the  giant  who  cut  off  the  hands  of  those  who  passed 
his  castle  without  paying  him  black  mail,  and  threw  them  into  the  Scheldt,  till  at 
length  he  was  slain  by  Brabo,  eponymus  of  Brabant.  The  legend  of  the  wicked 
Bishop  Hatto  is  well  known.  ...  At  a  time  of  dearth  he  forestalled  the  corn  from 
the  poor,  but  was  overtaken  by  a  righteous  Nemesis — having  been  devoured  by 
the  swarming  rats,  who  scaled  the  walls  of  his  fortress  on  the  Rhine.  The  origin 
of  this  legend  may  be  traced  to  a  corruption  of  the  name  matitthurm,  or  custom- 
house, into  the  mause-thurm,  or  Mouse-tower.  .  .  .  Near  Grenoble  is  a  celebrated 
tower,  which  now  bears  the  name  of  la  tour  sans  venin,  the  tower  without  poi- 
son. The  peasantry  firmly  believe  that  no  poisonous  animal  can  exist  in  its  neigh- 
bourhood. The  superstition  has  arisen  from  a  corruption  of  the  original  saint-name 
of  San  Verena  into  sans  venin." 
658  2  We  shall  discuss  the  matter  at  length  in  Chapter  IX. 


400  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §66 1 

proof  than  the  mere  resemblance  of  the  words.  But  the  suggested 
relationship  will  become  the  more  probable  in  proportion  as  we  get 
surer  evidence  of  the  direct  development  from  Venus  to  Venise. 
That  is  exactly  the  way  Maury  goes  about  it:  ^  "The  legend  of  Saint 
Venise,  as  recounted  in  the  De  cultu  vineae  Domini  of  Pierre  Subert 
(1513),  in  a  fragment  attributed  to  Liutprand  of  Cremona,  a  tenth- 
century  writer,  and  in  the  Dexter  Chronicle,  establishes  her  pagan 
and  entirely  'aphrodisiac'  origin,  though  we  should  look  for  her 
name  in  vain  in  the  Acta!' 

We  are  not,  for  a  contrast,  able  to  accept  the  explanations  of  the 
birth  of  Orion  offered  by  certain  ancients,  until  we  get  better  proofs 
of  the  original  development." 

661.  B-a2:  With  slight  and  easy  alterations  in  literal  meanings. 
Typical  of  this  variety  of  interpretation  is  the  method  of  Palaephatus 
in  explaining  legends — a  method  so  easy  and  convenient  that  it 
can  be  used  by  anyone  without  the  slightest  difficulty.^  We  have 

660  ^  Croyances  et  legendes  de  I'antiquite,  p.  349. 

660  2  Clavier,  Bibliotheque  d'Apollodore,  Vol.  II,  p.  49:  "The  story  of  Orion's 
birth  is  told  at  greater  length  by  Homer's  scholiast  following  Euphorion  {Iliad, 
XVIII,  V.  486;  Dindorf,  Vol.  II,  p.  171);  Palaephatus,  De  incredibilibus  historiis,  5 
(Leipzig,  pp.  36-39,  Ilfpi 'iip/ovof ) ;  Ovid,  Fasti,  V,  vv.  493-536;  and  Hyginus,  Fabu- 
lae,  195  {Orion),  and  Poeticon  astronomicon,  II,  34,  12  (Chatelain,  p.  38).  Jupiter, 
Neptune,  and  Mercury  having  been  well  entertained  by  Hyrieus,  son  of  Neptune 
by  Halcyone,  daughter  of  Adas,  at  Tanagra  in  Boeotia,  where  he  was  living,  de- 
sired to  give  him  evidence  of  their  saUsf action.  Hyrieus  suggested  the  gift  of  a  son. 
They  therefore  took  the  hide  of  the  ox  he  had  just  sacrificed  to  them,  went  to  one 
side,  and  into  it  did  what,  to  use  the  words  of  Ovid,  modesty  forbids  specifying 
further.  They  sewed  up  the  hide,  buried  it,  and  at  the  end  of  ten  months  Orion 
came  forth.  He  was  first  called  by  that  name  from  the  manner  [arro  tov  ovpT/aai'] 
of  his  engendering  by  the  gods  in  the  skin  {Etymologicon  magnum,  823).  That 
bad  etymology  may  have  been  the  only  basis  for  the  story  mentioned,  which  was 
an  invention  of  fairly  late  poets.  Hesiod,  who  was  probably  the  source  of  Pherecydes,, 
called  him  a  son  of  Neptune  and  Euryala,  daughter  of  Minos  (Eratosthenes,  Catas- 
terismi,  3  [read  32,  Schavbach,  pp.  25,  58] ;  Hyginus,  Poeticon  astronomicon,  II, 
34)."  And  see  §  691  ^. 

661  ^  Our  friend  Larcher,  in  his  notes  to  Herodotus  (§  653),  takes  what  Palaepha 
tus  says  quite  seriously.  Op.  cit..  Vol.  Ill,  p.  494  (on  Herodotus,  IV,  75):  "Medea 
introduced  the  use  of  hot  baths  into  Greece  (Palaephatus,  De  incredibilibus  his- 
toriis, 44).  Her  use  of  cauldrons  and  fire  gave  the  impression  that  she  rejuvenated 
people  by  boiling  them,  and  all  the  more  readily  in  that  she  kept  her  method  secret 
so  that  the  doctors  would  not  learn  of  it.  Pelias  was  suffocated  by  the  steam  in- 
his  bath." 


I 


§66l  ADAPTATION  OF  MYTHS  4OI 

already  alluded  to  it  as  one  of  the  means  for  dissembling  non-logical 
conduct  (§347).  The  legend  is  kept,  literally,  but  the  meaning  of 
the  terms  is  altered  just  enough  to  eliminate  everything  implausible. 
Familiar  to  everyone  is  Hesiod's  vivid  description,  Theogonia, 
vv.  617-735,  of  the  battle  between  the  descendants  of  Cronus  and 
the  Titans,  and  there  can  be  no  question  of  his  intending  to  do  any- 
thing more  than  tell  a  simple  story.  The  gods  had  Briareus,  Cottus, 
and  Gyges  on  their  side.  Each  of  these  giants  had  a  hundred  hands 
and  fifty  heads.  Palaephatus  gets  out  of  the  hole  as  follows:  "It  is 
said  of  them  that  they  had  a  hundred  hands,  though  they  were  men. 
How  else  but  call  that  nonsense?  But  the  truth  is  this:  they  lived 
in  a  city  named  Hundredhands,  situated  in  the  region  now  called 
Orestis.  Hence  people  called  Cottus,  Briareus,  and  Gyges  the 
Hundred-handers.  On  appeal  of  the  gods,  they  drove  the  Titans  from 
Olympus."  ^  The  legend  of  Aeolus  is  readily  turned  into  history 
by  making  him  an  astrologer  who  furnished  weather  forecasts  for 
Ulysses.^  It  was  said  that  the  Chimaera  was  a  lion  in  front,  a  goat 
about  the  middle,  a  dragon  behind.  But  that  would  be  impossible: 
a  lion  and  a  goat  could  not  get  along  on  the  same  fodder !  The  truth 
was  that  the  Chimaera  was  a  mountain.  On  the  front  slope  lived  a 
lion,  on  the  rear  slope  a  dragon,  and  in  between  them,  goatherds.* 
If  you  do  not  find  that  explanation  to  your  liking  you  might  sample 
another  by  that  Heraclitus  who  wrote  the  treatise  De  incredibiUbus 
(15) :  "The  form  of  the  Chimaera  is  described  by  Homer  [Iliad,  VI, 
vv.  179-82],  as:  'lion  in  front,  dragon  behind,  and  goat  about  the 
middle.'  The  truth  must  be  as  follows.  A  woman  who  was  queen 
of  a  country  had  two  brothers  named  Lion  and  Dragon  as  co 
regents."  And  if  you  are  still  not  satisfied,  make  a  try  yourself! 
Diodorus  Siculus  [Bibliotheca  historica,  III,  56,  5  (Booth,  Vol.  I,  p. 

661  ^  op.  cit.,  20  (Leipzig,  pp.  84-86)  :  YVtpl  Koztov  koI  Bptdpeug  ■  ^aatv  ovv  rrepl 
TovTuv  <jf  Ecxov  EKarbv  jeipaf,  avdpeg  bvTei;.  nug  de  ovk  evTjQeq  to  toiovtov;  to  6e  akjfii^ 
ovTuq  ■  Tn  Tr6?iEi  ovofia  'EKaTovTaxsipia,  iv  f/  ukovv.  tjv  6e  7r(5/l<f  Trjg  vvv  Ka?.ovfiivr/c  'Opea- 
Tiddog.  e2.eyov  ovv  ol  avdpunot;  Kd-Tog  Kal  Bpidpeug  Kal  Tvyt/q  01  'UKaTOVTaxstpeQ,  fSotjO^- 
ffatTff  roZf  deolg,  avTol  k^r/Xaaav  roi'f  TCTdvag  ek  tov  '0?u'/x7rov. 

661  ^  Ibid.,  18  (Leipzig,  pp.  79-80):  Uepl  tov  Ai6?.ov. 

661  *  Ibid.,  29  (Leipzig,  pp.  1 14-21):  Uspl  BeX^Epofpdvrov. 


402  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §662 

197)],  sees  in  Uranus  a  king  of  the  Atlantides,  who  dwelt  on  the 
shores  of  the  Ocean.  He  had  forty-five  sons  by  one  woman  or  an- 
other. Eighteen  were  called  Titans  from  the  name  of  their  mother, 
Titaia.  Uranus  and  Titaia  were  worshipped  as  gods  after  their 
deaths,  the  former  as  Heaven,  the  latter  as  Earth.  Incredible  as  it  may 
seem,  Palaephatus  has  found  writers  even  in  our  day  to  take  him 
seriously;  and  traces  of  his  interpretations  may  be  detected  in  mod- 
ern theories  on  totemism  and  the  origins  of  the  family.^ 

662.  B-.3:  Myths  and  the  li\e  have  a  historical  element  combined 
with  an  unreal  element.  This  is  one  of  the  more  important  varieties. 
Explanations  of  the  kind  were  widely  current  in  the  past  and  have 
not  yet  fallen  into  desuetude.  For  many  people  this  has  the  ad- 
vantage of  reconciling  love  of  legend  with  a  desire  for  a  certain 
amount  of  historical  verity.  It  is  convenient,  furthermore,  in  that  in 
general  it  admits  of  a  lavish  use  of  written  documents,  and  in  par- 
ticular enables  a  writer  to  draw  any  inference  he  chooses  from  them. 
The  norms  for  distinguishing  what  is  historical  from  what  is  leg- 
endary are  anything  but  exact.  Everybody  therefore  twists  them — 
very  often  without  meaning  to — in  the  direction  that  best  serves  the 
purpose  in  hand. 

663.  Nowadays  ethical  and  aesthetic  appendages  are  also  intro- 
duced. That  gives,  it  is  claimed,  a  "living"  history  as  contrasted 

i  with  a  "dead"  history,  which  would  be  a  history  aiming  strictly  at 
accord  with  the  facts.^  This  procedure,  at  bottom,  substitutes  the 

661  ^  Grote,  History  of  Greece,  Vol.  I,  p.  418  (note  i):  "The  learned  Mr.  Jacob 
Bryant  regards  the  explanations  of  Palaephatus  as  if  they  were  founded  upon  real 
fact.  He  admits,  for  example,  the  city  Nephele  alleged  by  that  author  in  his  exposi- 
tion of  the  fable  of  the  Centaurs.  Moreover,  he  speaks  with  much  commendation 
of  Palaephatus  generally:  'He  [Palaephatus]  wrote  early,  and  seems  to  have  been 
a  serious  and  sensible  person;  one  who  saw  the  absurdity  of  the  fables  upon  which 
the  theology  of  his  country  was  founded'  {Ancient  Mythology,  Vol.  I,  pp.  411-35). 
So  also  Sir  Thomas  Browne,  Pseitdoxia  epidemica  or  Enquiry  into  Vulgar  Errors, 
Book  I,  Chap.  VI  (1835,  p.  221;  1686,  p.  17),  alludes  to  Palaephatus  as  having  in- 
contestably  pointed  out  the  real  basis  of  the  fables." 

663  ^  Renan,  Vie  de  Jesus,  Preface,  p.  Iv:  "In  such  an  effort  to  bring  lofty  spirits 
from  the  past  to  life  again  a  certain  amount  of  divination  and  conjecture  has  to  be 
allowed.  A  great  life  is  an  organic  whole  that  cannot  be  translated  through  a  mere 
agglomeration  of  litde  details.  A  deep  feeling  has  to  embrace  that  whole  and  create 
unity.  The  artistic  sense  is  a  trustworthy  guide  in  such  matters.  The  exquisite  tact 


§664  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  4O3 

writer's  imagination  for  liistory.  From  tlie  didactic  standpoint  the 
substitution  may,  conceivably,  give  a  reader  an  image  of  the  past 
that  imprints  itself  on  the  mind  more  vividly  than  would  be  pos- 
sible with  a  more  accurate  method.  So  illustrated  histories  may  prove 
helpful  to  children  and  even  to  grown-ups  by  re-enforcing  rational 
with  visual  memory.  But  such  things  are  of  no  concern  to  science 
proper.^ 

664.  Though  Niebuhr  rejected  the  traditional  legends  of  Rome, 
he  saw  fit  nevertheless  to  draw  to  some  extent  upon  them,  stepping, 
that  is,  from  our  III-B-a  variety  to  Ul-B-[3.  But  Duruy  is  much  less 
scientific  than  Niebuhr.  He  simply  cannot  bring  himself  to  bid 
farewell  to  tradition,  and  seizes  every  pretext  to  get  back  to  III-B-a. 
"It  was  not,"  he  suddenly  bursts  out,^  "that  we  were  intending  to 
deny  the  existence  of  Romulus ;  only,  the  hymns  that  were  still  sung 
at  the  time  of  Augustus  and  which  preserved  the  poetic  history  of 
the  first  king  of  Rome  we  now  have  to  regard  as  mere  legends  such 
as  all  ancient  peoples  possessed."  ^  In  that  we  are  getting  pretty  close 

of  a  Goethe  would  there  find  a  task  worthy  of  it.  The  essential  trait  of  creations 
of  art  is  that  they  form  living  systems,  each  element  depending  on  every  other  and 
determining  it."  That  would  be  a  definition  of  the  historical  novel.  Renan,  Les 
Evangiles,  Preface,  p.  xxxiii:  "In  this  volume,  as  in  its  predecessors,  my  idea  has 
been  to  follow  a  golden  mean  between  a  criticism  marshalling  all  its  resources  in 
defence  of  texts  long  since  discredited,  and  an  exaggerated  scepticism  rejecting 
in  toto  everything  that  Christianity  has  to  say  of  its  earliest  origins."  On  this  method 
of  writing  history  see  Sorel,  I^  systeme  historique  de  Renan,  an  essay  that  de- 
serves attentive  reading  and  mastery.  Reinach,  Orpheus,  Chap.  VIII,  §  27  (Sim- 
monds,  p.  226):  "Is  it  even  possible  to  extract  the  elements  of  a  biography  of  Jesus 
from  the  Gospels?  It  is  contrary  to  sound  method  to  compose,  as  Renan  did,  a  life 
of  Jesus,  eliminating  the  marvellous  elements  of  the  Gospel  story.  It  is  no  more 
possible  to  make  real  history  with  myths  than  to  make  bread  with  the  pollen  of 
flowers."  Golden  words!  But  why,  alas,  does  Reinach  forget  them  when  he  sets 
out  in  his  turn  to  make  true  history  out  of  legends,  and  especially  of  legends  which 
he  imagines  have  something  to  do  with  totemism? 

663  2  We  shall  return  to  the  matter  of  historical  writing  in  §§  1580  f. 

664  ^  Histoire  des  Romains,  Vol.  I,  p.  62  (Mahaffy,  Vol.  I,  p.  64) . 

664  ^  Duruy  had  remarked  earlier,  Vol.  I,  p.  i  (Mahaffy,  Vol.  I,  p.  i):  "We  have 
no  intention  of  discussing  the  legends  of  the  period  of  the  kings.  For  that  the 
reader  interested  in  such  speculations  can  turn  to  the  first  volumes  of  Niebuhr. 
.  .  .  For  our  part  such  hypotheses,  however  ingenious  and  learned  they  may  be, 
will  always  be  as  unreliable  as  the  traditions  they  combat,  and  less  significant  than 
the  admirable  narratives  of  Livy,  if  not  as  truth,  at  least  as  colouring  {tableaux) ." 
We  must  first  come  to  an  understanding  as  to  what  we  are  doing.  If  the  idea  is 


404  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §665 

to  the  method  of  Palaephatus.  How  can  Duruy  cling  to  the  historical 
existence  of  Romulus  while  regarding  as  legendary  the  only  docu- 
ments in  which  the  memory  of  him  has  come  down  to  us?  Only 
in  deference  to  the  non-experimental  principle  that  legend  origi- 
nates in  history;  and  by  following  a  method  still  less  scientific 
whereby  such  origins  may  be  recognized  under  a  cloaking  of 
legend.^ 

665.  These  a  priori  assertions  experimental  science  cannot  meet 
with  a  priori  denials.  One  has  to  determine  by  experience,  and  ex- 
perience only,  whether  a  proposed  method  is  or  is  not  capable  of  un- 
covering the  historical  reality  underlying  the  legend  (§  547). 

(i(i^.  For  such  a  test  we  have,  fortunately,  a  series  of  parallels  with 
history  on  the  one  side,  legend  on  the  other:  we  know,  that  is,  a 
historical  fact  and  also  the  legend  to  which  it  has  given  rise.  Assum- 
ing that  only  the  legend  is  known,  we  can  try  to  derive  the  historical 
fact  from  it  by  one  method  or  another,  and  then  we  are  in  a  position 
to  determine  whether  the  fact  we  get  in  that  way  is  the  real  fact. 

to  get  a  literary  effect,  a  writer  may  choose  his  "colouring"  where  he  pleases;  and 
someone  else,  for  reasons  equally  good,  may  prefer  Ariosto's  Orlando  furioso  to 
the  legends  chosen  by  Duruy.  If  the  idea  is  to  write  history,  a  writer's  preferences 
as  to  colouring  are  of  no  importance  whatever.  The  one  thing  that  matters  is  to 
determine  which  account  comes  closest  to  the  facts. 

664  ^  Duruy  notes,  however.  Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  62-63  (Mahaffy,  Vol.  I,  pp.  64-65), 
that  "it  would  be  easy  to  find  resemblances  to  the  Romulus  legend  in  other  national 
traditions.  Like  Romulus,  Semiramis  was  the  offspring  of  a  goddess;  like  him,  and 
like  Cyrus,  who  was  exposed  in  a  forest  and  reared  by  a  bitch,  she  was  left  to  die 
in  the  desert,  supplied  with  food  by  doves,  and  finally  rescued  by  a  shepherd  of 
the  king."  In  that  Duruy  was  on  the  way  to  a  natural  classification  of  legends 
(§675),  and  he  had  one  of  the  basic  elements  already — the  fact  that  eminent  per- 
sonages have  to  have  something  extraordinary  about  their  births  or  origins.  Had  he 
gone  on,  he  would  have  found  others.  Very  soundly  he  says:  "Such  legends,  which 
are  to  be  found  on  the  far-away  banks  of  the  Ganges  in  the  story  of  Chandragupta, 
made  up,  with  others,  the  common  patrimony  of  the  peoples  of  Aryan  extraction." 
But  he  soon  gets  off  the  track,  going  back  to  his  historical  interpretation,  which  he 
has  himself  barred  in  deciding  that  the  Romulus  legend  formed  part  of  a  cycle  of 
legends  common  to  the  Aryan  races:  "Romulus  may  be  attached,  if  one  will  have  it 
so,  to  the  royal  house  of  Alba.  For  us  he  will  be  just  one  of  the  military  chieftains 
familiar  in  ancient  and  modern  Italy  alike,  a  leader  who  chanced  to  become  king 
of  a  people  on  which  fortunate  circumstances  and  the  location  of  Rome  bestowed 
empire  over  the  world."  No,  Romulus,  Semiramis,  Cyrus,  and  so  on,  are  just  names 
wherein  the  sentiments  that  gave  rise  to  the  many  similar  legends  noted  by  Duruy 
himself  attain  concrete  form. 


§668  MYTH  AND  HISTORY  405 

If  it  is,  the  method  is  good;  if  not,  it  is  worth  little  or  nothing 

(§547)- 
^Q.  The  reconstruction  of  the  fact  must,  of  course,  amount  to 

something  more  than  the  mere  assertion  that  certain  persons  about 
whom  we  otherwise  know  nothing,  not  even  their  names,  once 
lived.  That  would  be  saying  virtually  nothing.  If  we  know  nothing 
about  Romulus,  where  do  we  get  by  beheving,  with  Duruy,  that 
there  was  such  a  person }  And  why  is  the  legend  required,  to  know 
that  much  ?  The  ancient  Romans  must  have  had  military  chieftains, 
just  as  all  other  peoples  have  had.  That  is  a  safe  guess — it  amounts 
almost  to  a  certainty;  but  analogy  is  enough  to  tell  us  that,  without 
requiring  any  legend  of  Romulus.  The  real  problem  has  to  be  stated, 
therefore,  as  follows:  Given  a  legend,  have  we  any  means  of  identi- 
fying in  it  a  historical  element,  small  though  it  be  ?  ^ 

668.  Virgil  is  a  historical  character.  On  the  other  hand  he  is  also 
a  legendary  character.  Thanks  to  Comparetti's  excellent  book  on 
Virgil  in  the  Middle  Ages,  our  knowledge  of  the  legend,  or,  better, 
the  legends  about  him,  is  very  complete.  Could  we  get  at  the  Virgil 
of  history  if  we  had  only  the  legends  to  go  by  ? 

Comparetti  distinguishes  two  orders  of  legend:  (i)  Virgil  in  lit- 
erary tradition;  (2)  Virgil  in  popular  lore.  We  need  concern  our- 
selves here  only  with  the  second.  The  outstanding  feature  in  the 
legends  in  mediaeval  times  is  that  Virgil  is  a  magician.  In  many  of 
them  the  sole  points  of  contact  with  historical  reality  are  that  Virgil 
is  a  Roman  citizen,  and  is  somehow  connected  with  an  Emperor — 
very  little  indeed!  Comparetti  reprints  among  other  legends  a  tale 
called  "The  Marvellous  Feats  of  Virgil."  The  chapter  headings  give 
a  fair  idea  of  its  character:  "I.  How  Romulus  slew  Remus,  his 
brother,  and  how  the  son  of  Remus  slew  Romulus,  his  uncle.  [From 
the  text] :  It  so  happened  that  Remus,  who  was  Em,peror,  died,  and 
a  son  he  had  became  Emperor  after  him.  And  that  knight  who  had 
married  the  Senator's  daughter  started  a  great  war  which  was  a 
heavy  burden  to  him  and  caused  him  much  expense.  That  knight 

667  ^  Lack  of  space  forbids  our  treating  the  problem  in  the  full  wealtli  of  its 
materials,  but  we  must  consider  at  least  one  example. 


406  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §668 

had  a  son  by  his  wife,  and  he  was  born  with  great  travail.  For  he 
refused  to  be  born,  and  there  was  great  to-do  to  make  him  issue 
from  his  mother's  womb.  But  in  the  end  he  was  born,  and  he  re- 
quired attentive  watching  for  a  long  time,  and  that  was  why  he 
was  named  Virgil  [vigilare,  to  watch].  ...  II.  Of  the  birth  of  Vir- 
gil, and  how  he  was  put  to  school.  .  .  .  And  when  Virgil  was  born 
the  whole  city  of  Rome  shook  from  one  end  to  the  other.  .  .  .  Vir- 
gil had  gone  to  Toilette  to  school,  for  he  was  a  willing  scholar,  and 
he  was  very  wise  in  the  arts  of  necromancy.  .  .  .  III.  How  Virgil 
came  to  Rome  and  complained  to  the  Emperor.  .  .  .  IV.  How  the 
Emperor  of  Rome  assailed  Virgil  in  his  castle.  ...  V.  How  Virgil 
shut  up  the  Emperor  and  his  army  inside  a  wall.  .  .  .  VI.  How  the 
Emperor  made  peace  with  Virgil.  .  .  .  And  it  came  to  pass  that 
Virgil  fell  enamoured  of  a  damsel  .  .  .  and  he  besought  her  love 
through  an  old  witch."  The  damsel  gets  word  to  Virgil  "que  se  vou- 
loit  coucher  avec  elle,  he  must  come  very  quietly  {tout  quoy)  to  the 
foot  of  the  tower  where  she  slept,  after  all  the  people  were  in  their 
beds,  and  she  would  let  down  to  him  a  basket  tied  to  a  rope,  and  he 
should  get  into  the  basket,  and  she  would  raise  it  up  to  her  cham- 
ber. .  .  .  VII.  How  the  damsel  left  Virgil  hanging  in  the  basket." 
The  damsel  makes  a  fool  of  Virgil,  but  he  gets  even:  "Virgil  took  his 
books  and  brought  it  to  pass  that  all  the  hearth-fires  in  Rome  went 
out,  and  there  was  no  one  who  could  bring  fire  into  Rome  from 
outside  the  city.  .  .  .  VIII.  How  Virgil  extinguished  the  fires  of 
Rome."  The  Emperor  and  his  barons  ask  Virgil  how  they  can  get 
fire,  and  he  replies:  "You  will  build  a  scaffold  in  the  market-place, 
and  cause  this  damsel  who  left  me  hanging  in  the  basket  the  other 
day  to  mount  thereon  naked  in  her  shift,  and  you  will  have  it  cried 
through  all  Rome  that  whosoever  would  have  fire  shall  come  to 
the  scaffold  to  get  it  lighted  a  la  nature  dicelle  damoiselle;  other- 
wise shall  they  have  none.  .  .  .  IX.  How  the  damsel  was  placed  on 
the  scaffold  and  how  each  person  went  there  to  light  his  candle  or 
his  torch  as  said.  ...  X.  How  Virgil  made  a  lamp  that  never  went 
out.  .  .  .  XI.  Hereinafter  of  the  orchard  that  Virgil  caused  to  grow 
[around  the  spring  that  fed  the  pond].  .  .  .  XII.  The  image  that 


§668  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  407 

Virgil  made  of  his  wife."  The  image  "was  of  such  virtue  that  every 
woman  who  had  seen  it  lost  all  desire  de  faire  le  peche  de  fournica- 
tion.  Whereat  the  women  of  Rome  who  loved  for  love's  sake  were 
exceeding  wroth."  They  complain  to  Virgil's  wife,  and  she  upsets  the 
image  and  breaks  it.  "XIII.  How  Virgil  repaired  the  image  and 
tripped  his  wife  [so  that  she  fell,  like  the  image],  and  how  he  built 
a  bridge  over  the  sea."  One  of  the  Sultan's  daughters  falls  in  love  with 
Virgil,  and  he  brings  her  back  to  R.ome  {chez  lui)  on  "a  bridge 
in  the  air  over  the  sea.  .  .  .  XIV.  How  Virgil  took  the  damsel  back 
to  her  country.  .  .  .  XV.  How  Virgil  was  arrested  together  with 
the  damsel,  and  how  he  escaped,  carrying  the  damsel  off  with  him. 
.  .  .  XVI.  How  Virgil  escaped  and  carried  the  damsel  back  and 
founded  the  city  of  Naples.  .  .  .  XVII.  How  the  Emperor  of  Rome 
besieged  the  city  of  Naples.  .  .  .  XVIII.  How  Virgil  had  the  city 
peopled  with  scholars  and  traders  (marschandises).  .  .  .  XIX.  How 
Virgil  made  a  serpent  in  Rome.  .  .  .  XX.  How  Virgil  died."  ^ 

668  ^  Virgilio  nel  medio  evo,  Vol.  II,  pp.  282-300  (missing  in  Benecke).  Les  jaictz 
merveilletix  de  Virgille.  Several  incidents  in  this  legend  are  told  of  other  persons  in 
other  tales.  In  the  story  of  Joseph  of  Arimathea,  the  hero  of  the  basket  incident  is 
Hippocrates,  the  only  difference  being  that  the  vengeance  ensues  in  a  different  form. 
Paulin  Paris,  Les  romans  de  la  Table  ronde.  Vol.  I,  pp.  246-71:  "The  history  of  the 
philosophers  bears  witness  that  Hippocrates  was  the  most  highly  skilled  of  all  men 
in  the  arts  of  physic.  He  lived  long  years  in  no  special  renown;  but  a  thing  he  did 
in  Rome  spread  the  fame  of  his  incomparable  wizardry  everywhere."  He  comes 
to  Rome  at  the  time  when  Gaius,  nephew  of  the  Emperor  Augustus  Caesar,  was 
being  mourned  as  dead.  He  perceives  that  the  young  man  is  not  really  dead,  and 
heals  him,  whereat  he  is  greatly  honoured  and  petted  by  the  Emperor.  He  falls 
enamoured  of  a  lady  who  came  to  Rome  from  Gaul.  She  feigns  consent  and  in- 
duces him  to  enter  a  basket  that  he  may  be  drawn  up  to  her  chamber.  "The  lady 
and  her  maid  were  on  watch  at  their  window.  They  pulled  the  cord  to  the  height 
of  the  room  that  Hippocrates  thought  he  was  to  enter;  but  then  they  continued 
pulling,  so  that  the  basket  was  raised  more  than  two  lance-lengths  above  their 
window.  Then  they  tied  the  cord  to  a  hook  in  the  wall,  and  cried:  'A  good  time  to 
you,  Hippocrates!  That  is  the  way  to  treat  philanderers  {musards)  like  you!'  "  The 
next  morning  Hippocrates  is  the  laughing-stock  of  the  city.  But  he  takes  measures 
to  get  even.  He  gives  a  certain  herb  to  an  uncouth  and  crippled  dwarf.  When  the 
lady  is  touched  with  the  herb,  she  falls  in  love  with  the  dwarf,  marries  him,  and  is 
left  to  live  with  him.  The  writer,  who  seems  not  to  have  had  a  very  fertile  imag- 
ination, repeats  the  adventure  once  again  to  encompass  the  death  of  Hippocrates. 
Dardanus,  nephew  to  Antonius,  King  of  Persia,  is  given  up  for  dead.  Hippocrates 
heals  him  and  in  company  with  Antonius  visits  the  King  of  Tyre,  and  receives  his 
daughter  in  marriage.  But  the  princess  is  contemptuous  of  such  a  match.  After 


408  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §669 

669.  Now  suppose  we  knew  nothing  about  Virgil  except  this  long 
legend.  How  much  historical  fact  could  we  get  from  it?  None  what- 
ever! The  story  may  be  as  interesting,  amusing,  or  lively  as  one 
pleases,  but  it  has  no  bearing  on  fact  at  all. 

670.  If  we  choose  to  go  sailing  out  on  the  high  seas  of  interpreta- 
tion, we  may  get  what  we  please  from  the  legend  by  inferences  that 
look  persuasive  enough,  but  which  lead  to  nothing  in  any  way  ac- 
cording with  historical  realities.  One  might  see  in  it  a  reminiscence 
of  a  great  war  between  Rome  and  Naples,  just  as  the  Iliad  is  sup- 
posed to  record  a  war  between  the  Greeks  and  Asiatics.  The  erotic 
adventures  of  Virgil  might  tempt  one  to  class  him  among  the  gods 
of  generation,  of  whom  he  would  be  a  Roman,  or  shall  I  say  a  Nea- 
politan, form.  His  difficulty  in  getting  into  the  world  might  lead  us 
to  regard  him  as  one  of  the  manifestations  of  Hercules,  or  if  you 
prefer,  of  Bacchus ;  and  Naples  being  a  Greek  colony,  such  hypothe- 
ses would  have  a  basis  in  history;  and  a  pretty  and  very  sizable  mon- 
ograph could  be  written  to  show  that  the  legend  is  one  of  the  many 

many  attempts  on  her  husband's  life  have  been  checkmated  by  his  wizardry,  she 
finally  takes  advantage  of  his  very  science  to  poison  him.  King  Antonius  is  in 
despair  and  asks  whether  there  be  no  remedy.  "  'There  might  be  one,'  [Hippocrates 
answers.]  'It  would  be  to  have  a  woman  heat  a  big  slab  of  marble  burning  hot  by 
being  stretched  out  on  it  entirely  naked.'  'Well,  let  us  try:  and  since  your  wife  is 
the  cause  of  your  death,  she  will  be  the  one  we  shall  stretch  out  on  the  marble.' 
...  So  the  lady  was  stretched  out  on  the  marble,  and  the  cold  of  the  stone  grad- 
ually taking  possession  of  her,  she  died  in  cruel  pain  an  hour  before  Hippocrates." 
These  stories  simmer  down  to  certain  sentiments  that  are  elaborated  in  forms  more 
or  less  attractive  and  ingenious,  the  stories  thus  constructed  being  thereupon  at- 
tributed to  some  well-known  individual.  The  chief  sentiments  in  this  case  are  three: 
I.  The  sentiment  associated  with  the  fact  that  the  wise  or  the  powerful  can  be 
brought  to  ruin  by  insignificant  causes.  It  is  a  sentiment  arising  from  the  ups  and 
downs  commonly  observable  in  life.  2.  A  misogynic  sentiment,  whereby  a  woman 
becomes  the  instrument  of  ruin  for  the  wise  or  the  powerful.  3.  The  sentiment  of 
vengeance.  The  amount  of  fiction  that  originates  in  such  sentiments  is  prodigious. 
Agamemnon,  bravest  of  warriors,  conqueror  of  the  Trojans,  is  slain  in  his  bath  by 
a  weak  woman,  but  he  is  avenged  by  his  son.  Virgil  the  magician  is  tricked  by  a 
silly  woman;  but  he  more  than  evens  the  score.  The  wizard  Hippocrates  is  able  to 
raise  the  dead;  but  he  cannot  keep  his  wife  from  poisoning  him.  In  the  end  he 
repays  her.  The  names  Agamemnon,  Virgil,  Hippocrates,  or  others  equally  famous 
are  altogether  incidental  and  may  be  replaced  by  others  at  will.  The  episodes  them- 
selves are  of  little  importance.  They  vary  at  the  fancy  of  the  person  who  invents  the 
legend  or  copies  an  old  one. 


§671  MYTH  AND  HISTORY  4O9 

associated  with  the  invasion  of  Roman  soil  by  the  gods  of  Greece. 
And  we  could  point  to  the  senatus  consultus  against  the  Bacchanals 
(§  1 1 08)  and  connect  Virgil's  obscene  device — he  would  now  be  a 
manifestation  of  Bacchus — for  relighting  the  hearth-fires  of  Rome 
with  the  obscenities  of  the  Bacchic  mysteries.  Many  interpretations 
of  legends  rest  on  proofs  much  weaker  than  this,  which  we  know 
to  be  entirely  false.^ 

671.  Some  legends  may  have  been  elaborated  otherwise;  but  it  is 
also  possible  that  they  may  have  been  developed  like  the  one  above ; 
and  unless  we  have  some  historical  authority  for  deciding  we  can 
infer  nothing,  absolutely  nothing,  of  a  historical  character  from 
them/  Such  legends  one  may  find  to  one's  heart's  content  in  antiq- 
uity, in  the  Middle  Ages,  and  even  in  modern  times,  and  all  along 
romance  may  be  seen  combining  with  history  in  an  unmistakable 
manner.  So  when  only  the  mixture  is  known,  we  have  no  way  of 
telling  how  it  was  compounded.^ 

670  ^  Other  methods  of  interpretation  would  yield  other  results;  but  they  would 
all  be  foreign  to  reality  (§  789). 

671  ^  Sorel,  i>  systeme  historiqtte  de  Renan,  Vol.  I,  p.  41:  "The  interpretation 
of  apocalypses  was  to  play  a  great  role  in  the  labours  that  Renan  was  intending  to 
undertake  in  1848.  We  have  seen  that  such  a  method  could  only  eventuate  in  a  dis- 
covery of  history  as  underlying  legend.  I  do  not  believe  there  is  any  fallacy  more 
dangerous  than  the  one  involved  in  such  an  enterprise.  Legend  may  throw  invalu- 
able light  on  the  manners  of  thinking  of  a  people.  But  it  cannot  give  historical 
facts;  and  it  was  facts  that  Renan  was  intending  to  ask  of  his  apocalypses." 

671  ^  Chassang,  Histoire  du  roman  .  .  .  dans  I'antiquite  grecque  et  latine,  pp.  432- 
33:  "One  need  merely  glance  at  the  Byzantine  chroniclers  to  discover  reminiscences  of 
the  old  romances  everywhere.  .  .  .  Zonaras,  for  instance,  knows  the  stories  of  Cyrus 
according  to  Herodotus  (Historiae,  I)  and  according  to  Xenophon,  and  he  prefers 
the  latter,  because,  he  says  [Epitome  historiarum ,  III,  26;  Migne,  Vol.  134,  p.  311], 
'he  is  writing  a  compendium  and  need  only  give  the  most  plausible  accounts.'  For 
Cicero  the  Cyropaedia  was  just  a  story  [Episttdae,  Ad  Otiintum  fratrem,  I,  i,  8,  23]. 
Thanks  to  Zonaras  it  makes  its  bow  as  history.  Cedrenus  [Historiarum  compendium, 
I,  136-37;  Bekker,  Vol.  I,  pp.  239-41],  on  a  happier  impulse,  follows  Herodotus,  but 
stirs  into  the  narrative  of  the  historian  of  Halicarnassus  a  number  of  Jewish  or 
Christian  legends  [notably  that  of  the  relations  of  Cyrus  to  one  Daniel,  who  con- 
verted him  to  belief  in  the  Jehovah  of  the  pre-Christians].  Those  stories  appear  in 
still  ampler  elaboration  in  Malalas  [Chronographia,  VI,  201  (158);  Migne,  p. 
259].  Malalas,  to  be  sure,  has  his  authority,  and  a  very  imposing  one:  Julius  the 
African,  no  less,  who  notes  among  the  sources  he  used  a  History  of  the  War  be- 
tween Cyrus  and  the  Samians,  written  by  the  sage  Pythagoras  of  Samos!" 


410  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §672 

672.  A  common  method  of  interpretation  lies  in  eliminating  ap- 
parently fictional  elements  from  a  narrative  and  keeping  the  rest  as 
history  (§  258).  Used  not  as  interpretation  but  as  a  mere  device  for 
eliminating  incidental  elements  from  texts  that  on  the  whole  have 
their  status  as  history,  this  method  is  not  only  helpful  but  in  many 
cases  indispensable.  Few  the  texts  of  antiquity  in  which  history  is 
not  interspersed  with  marvels;  and  if  we  were  to  reject  them  as  his- 
tory because  of  the  miracles,  we  would  know  nothing  whatever  of 
antiquity — or  even  of  times  more  recent. 

673.  But  let  us  not  overlook  the  two  essential  conditions  (§  258): 
The  fiction  has  to  be  incidental,  and  the  part  held  to  be  historical 
must  have  additional  traits,  and  sufficient  corroboration,  to  make  it 
evidently  historical.  If  the  legendary  element  predominates,  if  the 
historical  element  is  without  corroborating  testimony,  or  at  least  a 
fair  amount  of  probability,  the  method  becomes  mere  interpretation 
and  is  entirely  misleading.  In  short,  the  reasons  for  accepting  the 
testimony  of  a  writer  must  be  intrinsic  to  his  person  and  his  work, 
and  not  lie  in  any  extrinsic  principle  that  what  is  plausible  has  to 
be  distinguished  from  what  is  not.  The  fact  that  a  thing  is  plausible 
is  not  enough  to  make  it  true. 

674.  That  is  not  all.  There  are  cases  where,  if  we  eliminate  ele- 
ments suspected  of  being  fictional  and  keep  such  as  are  apparently 
historical,  we  eliminate  the  very  element  that,  if  not  true,  has  a 
chance  of  being  true,  and  keep  what  is  certainly  false.  A  mediaeval 
story-book  of  Roman  history^  says:  "We  read  in  the  chronicles  that 
in  the  twenty-second  year  after  the  foundation  of  Rome,  the  Romans 
erected  a  marble  column  in  the  Capitol  of  the  city,  and  on  the  col- 
umn they  placed  the  statue  of  Julius  Caesar,  and  on  the  statue  his 
name  was  inscribed.  But  this  Caesar  had  three  marvellous  signs  be- 
fore dying.  The  hundredth  day  before  his  death  the  lightning  struck 
in  front  of  his  statue,  obliterating  the  first  letter  of  his  name.  The 
night  before  his  death  the  windows  of  his  bedchamber  flew  open 
so  violently  that  he  thought  the  house  was  falling.  On  the  very  day 

674  ^  Le  violier  des  histoiies  romaines,  pp.  229-30  [Gesta  Romanoriini,  Dick  ed., 
no.  80,  p.  50]. 


-^ 


§675  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  4II 

he  was  killed,  as  he  was  entering  the  Capitol,  some  letters  of  warn- 
ing were  handed  to  him.  They  foretold  his  death,  and  had  he  read 
them,  he  would  have  escaped  his  murder  and  death."  If  we  were  to 
keep  such  parts  of  this  story  as  seem  to  be  historical  and  eliminate 
the  apparently  fanciful,  we  should  have  to  keep  the  statement  that 
Caesar  was  living  in  the  year  22  a.u.c.  and  that  in  that  year  a 
column  bearing  his  name  and  topped  by  his  statue  was  erected  in 
his  honour  in  the  Capitol.  All  of  which  would  be  entirely  false. 
Meantime  we  would  have  to  eliminate  the  three  portents  that  pre- 
ceded Caesar's  death,  and  which,  by  the  writer's  own  admission,  are 
in  the  nature  of  miracles.  But  the  portentsr  are  the  things  best  cor- 
roborated in  the  histories  most  nearly  contemporary  with  Caesar. 
They  may  be  false:  but  they  also  may  be  true,  at  least  in  part.^ 

675.  In  the  Virgilian  legend  mentioned  we  get  an  illustration  of 
the  way  in  which  myths  in  general  develop.  It  is  something  like  the 
formation  of  crystals.  Drop  a  grain  of  sand  into  a  saturated  solution 
of  alum,  and  a  number  of  large  crystals  will  be  seen  to  form  about 
it.  So  around  a  story  that  has  no  basis  in  fact,  but  is  a  mere  objec- 
tification  of  a  sentiment,  other  stories  of  the  same  kind  with  various 
ornaments  cluster,  and  form  an  agglomerate  with  it.  Sometimes  the 
characters  are  left  imaginary;  then  again  they  are  chosen  from 
among  historical  characters  whom  the  adventure  seems  best  to  fit. 
Once  the  character,  historical  or  otherwise,  is  so  chosen,  he  often- 
times becomes  a  type  and  is  given  a  part  in  other  imaginary  adven- 
tures. Such  characters,  and  even  the  adventures,  are  obviously  in- 
cidental elements  in  the  story,  the  chief  element  being  the  senti- 
ments that  it  expresses.  Ordinarily  literary  historians  invert  those 
relations:  they  stress  the  characters  and  the  adventures,  and  disre- 
gard the  sentiments  to  express  which  the  stories  were  invented.^  So 

674  ^  Suetonius,  Divtis  Julius,  81,  3-4:  "And  suddenly  the  doors  of  his  bedroom 
opened  of  their  own  accord.  .  .  .  About  eleven  o'clock  (fere  quitJta  hora)  he  set 
forth,  and  a  letter  warning  of  the  plot  against  him  was  handed  to  him  by  a  chance 
passer-by.  He  mixed  it  in  with  other  letters  he  was  carrying  in  his  left  hand,  as 
though  intending  to  read  it  later."  And  cf.  Dio  Cassius,  Historia  Romana,  XLIV, 
18;  Plutarch,  Caesar,  65  (Perrin,  Vol.  VII,  p.  595). 

675  ^  The  theories  and  manners  of  thinking  current  in  society  are  generally 
treated  in  the  same  way.  First  prominence  is  given  to  the  accessory  elements — logi- 


412  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §676 

artificial  classifications  are  obtained,  all  stories  dealing  with  a  given 
character,  and  resembling  each  other  only  in  that  subordinate  re- 
spect, being  grouped  together.  Whereas  a  "natural"  classification 
would  put  into  one  class  all  stories  expressing  the  same  sentiments 
and  therefore  resembling  one  another  in  a  major  respect,  the  names 
that  are  used  to  give  concrete  point  to  the  expression  being  disre- 
garded, or  virtually  so  (§  684").  So,  again,  around  a  historical  fact 
so  insignificant  as  oftentimes  to  amount  to  no  more  than  a  mere 
name  (Virgil),  a  rank  tanglewood  of  fiction  flourishes,  that  has 
nothing  absolutely  to  do  with  history.  When,  then,  we  examine  such 
legends  with  a  view  to  their  origins,  we  cannot  expect  to  find  them 
in  the  pseudo-historical  element,  but  only  in  the  principal  element — 
in  the  sentiments  that  are  expressed. 

676.  So  it  is  that  around  a  single  name  a  motley  agglomerate  of 
adventure  gathers.  That  was  the  case  with  the  gods  of  paganism. 
When  later  on,  in  the  early  days  of  criticism,  it  was  seen  that  all 
those  adventures  could  not  possibly  be  assigned  to  a  single  person, 
a  way  was  sought  to  account  for  the  legend.  The  manner  of  develop- 
ment just  described  not  being  known,  scholars  preferred  to  see  two, 
three,  or  even  more  persons  in  the  god  or  hero  to  whom  the  many 
adventures  had  been  attributed.  So,  as  in  the  interpretations  of  Palae- 
phatus,  the  letter  of  the  legend  was  respected  while  its  meaning  was 
changed.  Cicero  enumerates  three  Jupiters,  five  Vulcans,  three 
Aesculapiuses,  and  so  on.^ 

677.  There  is  no  denying  that  in  some  cases  divinities  of  different 
peoples  were  fused  into  one  and  given  one  same  name.  Of  that  the 
assimilation  of  Greek  to  Roman  divinities  would  be  sufficient  proof. 

cal  expositions  and  pseudo-experience,  non-logical  conduct,  which  is  the  principal 
element,  being  relegated  to  the  background  or  entirely  ignored.  These  present  vol- 
umes on  sociology  aim  at  restoring  those  elements  to  their  natural  relative  position. 
That  is  why  we  began  with  a  study  of  non-logical  conduct.  That  is  why  we  have 
given,  are  here  giving,  and  will  continue  to  give  examples  of  inversions  in  the  order 
of  those  elements.  Later  on,  after  we  have  distinguished  them,  and  evaluated  them 
according  to  their  importance,  we  shall  study  them  each  in  particular  (Chapters  VI 
to  X).  Until  we  have  finished  that  task,  we  shall  not  have  the  real  elements  in  the 
social  equilibrium. 
676  ^  De  natura  deorum,  III,  22,  55-60. 


§678  FORMATION  OF  MYTHS  413 

The  error  lies  in  the  assumption  that  all  legends  must  have  orig- 
inated in  that  way. 

678.  As  usual,  let  us  revert  to  experience  to  determine  hovi^  such 
legends  are  formed  (§  547).  In  plenty  of  cases  it  is  apparent  that 
the  name  of  a  person  to  vv^hom  a  variety  of  adventures  have  been 
ascribed  is  not  a  name  for  two  or  three  persons  who  have  been 
blended  into  one.  An  amusing  story,  for  instance,  is  told  of  Mme. 
de  Talleyrand.  But  if  we  look  into  the  facts  it  develops  that  the 
story  was  current  long  before  Mme.  de  Talleyrand  was  born  or 
thought  of.  She  had  the  reputation  of  being  a  stupid  woman,  and 
she  was  therefore  credited  with  incidents  befitting  the  woman  she 
was  supposed  to  be.^ 

Her  husband,  on  the  other  hand,  was  famous  as  a  witty,  shrewd, 
intelligent  man;  and  in  the  same  way  he  was  credited  with  all  the 
witty  stories  that  came  along.  Fournier  alleges  that  Talleyrand  often 
appropriated  the  jests  he  read  in  the  Improvisateur  fratjgais  and 
adds:^  "But  oftentimes  he  was  provisioned  with  wit  with  even  less 
effort  on  his  part.  He  gathered  them  in  from  all  hands  without 
meaning  to,  even  without  knowing.  Every  jest  to  the  point  took  his 
name  for  its  flag,  and  so  recommended  enjoyed  only  the  greater 
vogue  in  virtue  of  the  careless  habit  talkers  have,  as  Nodier  says,  of 

678  ^  Lacombe,  La  vie  privee  de  Talleyrand,  p.  197:  ".  .  .  as  witness  this  other 
story  which  made  Napoleon  burst  into  a  laugh  every  time  he  thought  of  it  at  St. 
Helena  (O'Meara,  Napoleon  in  Exile,  Vol.  I,  p.  435) :  Talleyrand  had  invited  Denon, 
the  Egyptologist,  to  dinner.  With  the  idea  that  his  wife  should  have  a  subject  of 
conversation  handy,  he  suggested  that  she  read  one  of  Denon's  books.  Going  to  the 
Hbrary,  she  picked  up,  by  mistake,  a  copy  of  Robinson  Crusoe,  which  she  devoured 
at  one  sitting.  At  table  that  evening,  still  thrilling  with  the  tale,  she  could  hardly 
wait  to  take  up  Denon's  marvellous  adventures  with  him.  'Oh,  Monsieur  Denon, 
what  a  strain  it  must  have  been!  Your  ship  wrecked!  That  desert  island!  But  I'll 
guess  you  looked  funny  in  that  pointed  hat!'  The  scholar  gazed  at  her  in  amaze- 
ment; nor  did  the  mystery  clear  till  Mme.  de  Talleyrand  began  on  the  subject  of 
his  man  Friday.  .  .  .  The  trouble  with  the  story  is  that  it  is  told  now  with  Denon, 
now  with  Humboldt,  now  with  a  certain  Sir  George  Robinson  as  hero;  and  worse 
yet,  it  was  not  invented  for  Mme.  de  Talleyrand.  Years  before  her  day,  it  seems, 
society  wags  were  peddling  it  about,  with  just  one  variant:  the  mistake  was  ascribed 
to  a  priest.  It  would  take  a  volume  to  accommodate  all  the  anecdotes  current  on 
the  Princesse  de  Benevent  [Mme.  de  Talleyrand]." 
678  ^  L'esprit  dans  I'histoire,  p.  267. 


414  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §679 

attaching  all  they  know  to  well-known  names.^  A  jest  of  his  some- 
times did  not  get  to  his  ears  until  after  it  was  worn  out  and  become 
altogether  stale.  Hearing  it  then  when  it  was  an  old  story  with 
everyone  else,  he  would  still  be  ingenuously  laughing  at  it  as  the 
latest  hit,  though  everybody  had  long  since  tired  of  it." 

679.  Another  historical  character,  but  one  of  ancient  times,  is  cred- 
ited with  many  implausible  adventures :  La'is  the  courtesan.  As  usual, 
to  remove  incongruities  in  the  story  two  Laises  were  called  in.  "The 
conjecture,"  says  Bayle,^  "that  there  were  two  courtesans  by  the 
name  of  Lais  is  based  on  the  fact  that  it  is  chronologically  impos- 
sible to  attribute  all  that  is  reported  of  Lai's  to  one  woman."  But 
that  is  not  the  end  of  it;  Bayle  shows  that  to  reconcile  all  details  in 
the  narrative,  three  different  Laises  have  to  be  assumed.  It  is  prefer- 
able, he  rightly  adds,  to  imagine  that  Lai's  has  been  credited  with 
adventures  of  other  courtesans.^ 

678  ^  Fournier  notes,  Questions  de  litterature  legale,  p.  68:  "According  to  the 
British  Review,  October,  1840,  p.  316,  the  person  thus  chosen  as  responsible  for  the 
jest  of  the  day  is  to  the  dandies  of  the  Parisian  Mayfair  what  the  statue  of  Pasquino 
is  to  the  idlers  of  Rome:  a  sort  of  common  bill-board  on  which  anybody  feels  free 
to  paste  up  his  jests  good  or  bad." 

679  ^  Dictionnaire  historique,  s.v.  Lais. 

679  ^  Bayle  says  in  full:  "There  is  a  conjecture  that  there  were  two  courtesans 
named  Lai's.  The  lady  here  in  question  was  carried  to  Corinth  at  the  time  when 
Nicias  was  in  command  of  the  Athenian  army  in  Sicily,  in  other  words,  in  the 
year  2  of  the  91st  Olympiad.  She  was  then  seven  years  old,  if  we  are  to  believe 
the  scholiast  of  Aristophanes  [Pltitus,  v.  179;  Diibner,  pp.  334,  550,  662].  Now  since 
Demosthenes  did  not  dare  to  go  to  Corinth  to  visit  Lais  except  by  stealth,  he  could 
not  have  been  a  stripling  schoolboy,  but  a  man  already  of  some  reputadon.  Let  us 
make  him  at  least  thirty.  That  would  make  Lais  sixty-seven.  There  is  no  probability 
therefore  either  that  Demosthenes  cared  much  about  seeing  her,  or  that  she  would 
have  held  out  for  an  exorbitant  price.  So  then,  it  must  have  been  another  Lais  who 
had  her  eye  on  the  wallet  of  Demosthenes.  If  we  say  that  Demosthenes  made  the 
trip  to  Corinth  at  about  twenty,  Lais  would  sdll  be  well  on  toward  sixty.  Speaking 
of  Lais,  Plutarch  expressly  states  that  she  was  a  girl  from  Hyccara  in  Sicily  and 
that  she  had  been  carried  away  from  there  as  a  slave.  So,  according  to  Plutarch 
\_Alcibiades,  37],  the  Lais  the  Younger  mendoned  by  Athenaeus  was  the  Lais  born 
in  Sicily  before  the  91st  Olympiad;  so  that  if  the  Lais  who  asked  the  money  of 
Demosthenes  is  a  different  Lais,  there  have  to  be  three  courtesans  by  that  name.  .  .  . 
For  my  part,  instead  of  assuming  two  Laises,  I  should  be  inclined  to  imagine  that 
the  Greek  writers,  who  were  not  strong  on  chronology,  attributed  to  the  famous 
Lais  an  adventure  of  Demosthenes  which  concerned  another  woman."  [The  con- 
fusions about  Lais  do  not  stop  there.  Villon,  in  his  "Ballade  of  the  Fair  Dames 


§680  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  415 

680.  Some  legends  have  a  historical  origin.  The  Chanson  de  Ro- 
land studied  by  Gaston  Paris  is  one  such.^  One  historical  detail  seems 
authentic:  "On  the  fifteenth  of  August,  778,  the  rear-guard  of  the 
army  that  Charles,  King  of  the  Franks,  was  leading  back  from  Spain 
after  a  half-successful  expedition,  was  ambushed  and  destroyed  in 
the  Pyrenees  by  Basques  of  Navarre  with  whom  the  Franks  were 
not  openly  at  war."  The  King  turned  back,  but  was  unable  to  avenge 
the  massacre  of  his  soldiers  and  had  to  proceed  on  his  way.  "Such 
the  version  given  in  the  royal  Annales  and  in  Eginhard's  Life  of 
Charlemagne.  It  is  the  version  adopted  by  all  our  historians.  The 
Arab  version  is  quite  different.  According  to  Ibn-al-Athir,  'it  was  the 
Mussulmans  of  Saragossa,  the  very  people  who  had  called  Charle- 
magne to  Spain,  who  inflicted  that  serious  defeat  on  the  Franks  at 
a  time  when  they  were  off  Arab  territory  and  were  thinking  them- 
selves altogether  safe.' " 

On  that  scanty  historical  foundation  a  spacious  edifice  of  legend 
was  built  up  without  any  extrinsic  trait  to  justify  one  in  going  back 
from  the  legend  to  history.  After  attempting  a  reconstruction  of  the 
true  story  of  the  battle,  Gaston  Paris  observes:  "Of  the  fight  as  we 
are  able  to  picture  it  to  ourselves  very  little  is  left  in  our  poem." 
And  he  concludes :  "We  may  infer  from  all  that  .  .  .  that  the  Chan- 
son de  Roland  certainly  rests,  in  the  beginning,  on  direct  knowledge 
of  events,  people,  and  places,  and  that  in  certain  respects  it  even 
shows  very  remarkable  accord  with  the  information  supplied  by  his- 
tory. But  the  form  in  which  it  has  come  down  to  us,  a  form  three 
centuries  posterior  to  the  primitive  form,  is  widely  at  variance  with 
the  latter,  and  that  is  due  very  largely  to  successive  inventions  by 
amplifiers  and  rewriters  who  were  thinking  only  of  literary  effects 
and  who,  moreover,  had  no  other  source  of  information  on  the 
events  celebrated  in  the  Chanson  than  the  poem  itself."  But  what 
is  the  good  of  knowing  that  the  legend  has  a  historical  background 

of  Long  Ago,"  makes  Alcibiades  a  female  prostitute,  first  cousin  to  Thais:  "Aclti- 
piada  ne  Thais — Qui  jut  sa  cousine  germaine."  That  is  a  confused  reminiscence 
of  Plutarch's  description  of  Lais  as  daughter  to  a  concubine  of  the  famous  Athenian 
statesman. — A.  L.] 
680  ^  Legendes  du  moyen  age,  pp.  3-4,  53-54,  61-62. 


41 6  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §68 1 

if  we  have  no  means  of  identifying  the  latter  under  the  legendary 
trappings  ?  The  Chanson  de  Roland  had  a  basis  in  historical  fact.  By 
a  false  analogy,  are  we  to  extend  that  conclusion  to  all  the  legends 
of  the  Carlovingian  cycle  ?  That  would  be  a  grave  mistake,  because 
for  many  of  them  no  such  historical  background  exists.^  The  prin- 
ciple of  considering  anything  smacking  of  the  supernatural  as 
fictional  may  therefore,  as  proofs  in  abundance  show,  work  more  or 
less  well  with  documents  that  are  mainly  historical;  but  it  nearly 
always  leads  amiss  when  applied  to  legends.  From  legends  lacking 
in  extrinsic  historical  adjuncts  we  can  therefore  infer  little  or  noth- 
ing that  is  historically  real — nothing  rather  than  little. 

681.  B-/i?i:  Myths  and  the  li\e  have  historical  origins,  and  the 
stories  have  undergone  alterations  in  course  of  time.  The  remarks 
just  made  for  our  variety  B-/3  apply  also  to  the  sub  variety  B-/^i.  A 
type  of  this  species  is  a  euhemerism  that  we  will  call  old-fashioned 
to  distinguish  it  from  the  neo-euhemerism  of  Spencer. 

682.  Little  is  known  about  the  Sacred  Anagraphs  of  Euhemerus. 
From  accounts  of  the  work  given  by  other  writers  we  may  distin- 
guish two  elements  in  it:  first  an  interpretation,  and  then  the  proofs 
that  are  given  of  it.  The  interpretation,  which  views  the  gods  as 
nothing  but  deified  human  beings,  is  partly  sound,  if  not  in  the  cases 

68o  '  Many  legends  of  the  Carlovingian  cycle  have  nothing  to  do  with  reality. 
We  read,  for  instance,  in  Menage,  Menagiana,  Vol.  I,  p.  no:  "One  of  the  great- 
est ingenuities  ever  written  is  the  story  in  the  'Tale  of  Galien  Restored'  of  the 
reception  given  by  King  Hugon,  Emperor  of  Constantinople,  to  Charlemagne  and 
his  peers,  and  what  followed  from  it.  Charlemagne  and  his  Twelve  Peers  stopped 
at  Constantinople  on  their  way  back  from  the  Holy  Sepulchre,  and  were  enter- 
tained in  the  palace  of  King  Hugon.  After  a  magnificent  banquet,  attended  by 
his  wife  the  Queen,  his  two  sons,  the  princes  Henry  and  Tiberius,  and  his  daugh- 
ter, the  fair  Jacqueline,  he  led  them  into  a  magnificent  hall  where  they  were  to 
pass  the  night."  Before  falling  asleep  Charlemagne  and  his  peers  amuse  them- 
selves by  boasting  of  imposible  feats  at  arms.  Such  swaggering  coming  to  the  ears 
of  King  Hugon,  he  compels  Charlemagne  and  his  peers  to  make  good  their  boasts. 
Heaven  helping,  Charlemagne  cuts  a  fully  armoured  man  in  two  at  one  stroke — 
and  the  story  runs  on.  Suppose  a  story  of  that  kind  were  found  in  Suidas,  instead  of 
in  the  Menagiatm,  and  suppose  the  characters  were  Greek  heroes.  We  may  be  certain 
that  there  would  be  no  end  of  commentary  to  a  thousand  different  purports  in  an 
effort  to  discover  underneath  it  some  historical  basis,  which  it  surely  does  not  have. 
Strip  the  legend  of  everything  marvellous,  reduce  it  to  the  bare  fact  of  Charle- 
magne's visit  to  Constantinople — and  we  get  a  fact  that  is  altogether  false! 


§683  EUHEMERISM  417 

mentioned  by  Euhemerus,  at  least  in  other  similar  cases.  The  proofs 
are  worth  nothing,  Euhemerus  asserts  that  he  arrived,  in  the  course 
of  his  travels,  at  an  island  called  Panchaea,  which  was  wholly  con- 
secrated to  the  gods,  and  that  he  saw  there  a  temple  to  Zeus  Triphy- 
lius,  which  had  been  built  by  that  god  in  person  while  he  was  still 
living  on  earth.  In  the  temple  stood  a  golden  column  commemorat- 
ing achievements  ascribed  to  Uranus,  Cronus,  and  Zeus,  all  three  of 
whom  had  lived  on  earth  and  sat  on  thrones.  Euhemerus  filled  a 
whole  book  with  the  deeds  of  men  who  had  become  gods. 

After  all,  we  do  not  know  whether  the  travels  in  question  were 
offered  as  proofs  or  whether  they  were  a  mere  literary  device  for 
developing  a  theory  which  had,  for  that  matter,  diiTerent  and  better 
proofs.  Several  ancient  writers  considered  the  stories  of  Euhemerus 
downright  lies.  Strabo  was  of  that  opinion.  After  mentioning  cer- 
tain stories  that  he  considers  inventions,  he  adds:^  "All  that  is  not 
so  very  different  from  the  hoaxes  of  Pitteas,  Euhemerus,  and  An- 
tiphanes.  But  those  writers  may  be  forgiven  them.  These  charlatans 
are  merely  feathering  their  nests,"  Polybius  too  seems  to  have  con- 
sidered Euhemerus  a  deliberate  liar.  But  it  was  only  the  testimony 
of  Euhemerus  that  he  rejected.  As  regards  the  interpretation,  he  too 
held  that  the  gods  were  once  men.  He  says,  for  a  sample : "  "Aeolus 
taught  navigators  how  to  manoeuvre  in  the  Straits  [of  Messina], 
which  are  winding  and  difficult  of  egress  because  of  the  ebb  and 
flow;  and  that  was  why  he  was  called  a  dispenser  of  winds  and  held 
to  be  king  thereof."  He  mentions  other  similar  cases,  and  concludes, 
loc.  cit.,  8-9:  "So  in  each  of  the  gods  we  see  homage  rendered  to  the 
inventor  of  some  useful  thing." 

683.  Polybius  was  familiar  with  real  facts  that  showed  how  human 
beings  had  been  deified.  He  notes,  X,  10,  11  (Paton,  Vol.  IV,  p.  125), 
that  there  were  three  low  hills  near  New  Carthage:  "The  one  to  die 
east  is  called  the  hill  of  Hephaestus.  The  one  next  to  it  bears  the 
name  of  Alestus,  who,  it  is  said,  came  to  be  honoured  as  a  god  for 

682  ^  Geographica,    II,    3,    5. 

682  ^  Historiae,  XXXIV,  2,  5  (Paton,  Vol.  VI,  p.  299).  Polybius  is  criticized  by 
Strabo,  Geographica,  I,  2,  15  (Jones,  Vol.  I,  pp.  85-87). 


41 8  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §684 

having  discovered  die  silver  mines.  The  third  is  known  as  the  hill 

o 

of  Cronus." 

684.  The  Fathers  of  the  Church,  vv^ho  in  general  did  not  make  any 
great  use  of  historical  criticism,  could  be  expected  to  offer  favourable 
welcome  to  the  theories  and  proofs  of  Euhemerus,  which  fitted  their 
bill  to  perfection.  St.  Augustine  holds  it  the  most  credible  opinion 
that  the  gods  were  men,  each  of  them  succeeding,  according  to  his 
abilities,  manners  of  living,  conduct,  and  various  fortuities,  in  being 
deemed  a  god  by  his  flatterers  and  in  winning  worship  and  rites.^ 
Just  previously,  VII,  7,  he  had  said :  "What  did  they  think  of  Jupiter, 
no  less — they  who  placed  his  nurse  in  the  Capitol  ?  Do  they  not  bear 
witness  for  Euhemerus,  who,  not  as  a  teller  of  tales,  but  as  a  diligent 
historian,  wrote  that  all  those  gods  had  been  men  and  mortal.?" 
Lactantius  takes  seriously  what  Ennius,  following  Euhemerus,  says 
about  the  reigns  on  earth  of  Uranus  and  Saturn.^  Says  Minucius 

684  1  De  civitate  Dei,  VII,  18. 

684  ^  Lactantius  Firmianus,  Divinae  institvitiones,  I,  De  falsa  religione,  XI,  33,  and 
45-47  {Opera,  Vol.  I,  pp.  42,  44-45;  Fletcher,  Vol.  I,  pp.  30-32):  "Euhemerus,  a 
writer  of  the  old  days,  who  came  from  Messene,  collected  the  biographies  of  Jupiter 
and  other  men  who  are  considered  gods,  and  compiled  a  history  from  the  titles  and 
inscriptions  that  were  preserved  in  sacred  temples  of  most  ancient  date,  and  es- 
pecially in  the  shrine  of  Jupiter  Triphylius,  where  a  title  on  a  certain  column  of 
gold  indicated  that  it  had  been  erected  by  Jupiter  himself,  and  in  it  he  had  re- 
counted his  deeds,  that  it  should  be  a  reminder  of  his  life  to  posterity.  .  .  .  Having 
described  in  his  [Latin  version  of  the]  Sacred  History  [of  Euhemerus]  everything 
Jupiter  had  done  in  his  lifetime,  Ennius  concludes  [Fragment  725,  Giles,  p.  68] : 
'Having  five  times  gone  about  the  whole  earth,  Jupiter  divided  his  realms  among 
relatives  and  friends,  left  laws  and  customs  for  men,  taught  them  agriculture,  and 
did  many  other  good  things.  Eager  not  to  be  forgotten,  yearning  for  undying 
glory,  he  left  abiding  memorials  to  his  people.  In  the  utter  fullness  of  age  he  died 
{vitam  commiitai/it)  in  Crete  and  went  away  to  the  gods;  and  the  Curetes,  his 
sons,  cared  for  his  body  (eiim)  and  clothed  it  with  royal  raiment  {decoraverunt  etim) 
[This  may  also  mean:  "paid  worship  to  him,  and  decked  his  shrine  with  garlands." 
— A.  L.];  and  his  tomb  is  in  Crete  in  the  town  of  Cnossus;  and  it  is  said  that  Vesta 
was  the  founder  of  that  city;  and  on  his  tomb  is  written  in  ancient  Greek  charac- 
ters: ZAN  KRONOU,  which  is  to  say  in  Latin:  "Jupiter  [son]  of  Saturn."  And 
these  things  are  handed  down  to  us  not  by  fanciful  poets,  but  by  scholars  {anti- 
quarum  reruni  scriptores) .' "  Lycophron,  Cassandra,  v.  1194  (Mair,  pp.  591-93). 
mentions  the  region  where  Zeus  was  born.  In  comment  on  the  verse  Tzetzes 
(Potter,  p.  123)  says  that  scholars  know  that  kings  bore  the  name  of  Zeus  and  were 
called  gods  and  that  Zeuses  were  born  in  Crete,  Arcady,  Thebes,  and  a  thousand 


§685  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  419 

Felix,  Octavius,  21,  1-2  (Randall,  p.  373;  Freese,  pp.  62-63): 
"Read  the  writings  of  historians  or  philosophers,  and  you  will 
agree  with  me  that  men  have  been  made  gods  because  of  their  merits 
or  their  philanthropies,  as  Euhemerus  relates;  for  he  tells  the  man- 
ner of  their  birth,  their  native  towns,  and  the  location  of  their  tombs, 
designating  the  places  [to  which  they  belong],  such  as  the  Dictaean 
Jupiter,  the  Delphic  Apollo,  the  Pharian  Isis,  the  Eleusinian  Ceres. 
Prodicus  says  that  those  men  were  made  gods  who,  travelling  about 
the  world  and  finding  new  things  of  use,  brought  them  home  to 
their  peoples.  Of  that  opinion  is  Persaeus,  and  he  adds  that  their 
names  were  given  to  the  things  they  found,  whence  the  savoury  prov- 
erb :  'Apart  from  Liber  and  Ceres  Venus  droops.' "  ^ 

685.  Very  numerous  in  times  present  and  past  are  interpretations 
of  this  variety  that  are  used  to  strip  a  story  of  its  less  credible  ele- 
ments in  order  to  save  the  rest.  So,  for  example,  miraculous  births 
are  transfigured  into  natural  births,  and,  as  Dante  says : 

,  .  .  e  v'len  Quirino 
Da  St  vil  padre  che  si  rende  a  Marte} 

other  places — aal  hv  hepoiq  fivploic  roKoig — where  they  had  inscriptions.  The  usual 
case  of  similar  sentiments  finding  expression  in  various  ways  (§675).  Cf. 
Arnobius,  Disputationes  adversus  gentes,  IV,  14  (Bryce-Campbell,  pp.  195-97). 
St.  Cyprian,  De  idolortim  vanitate,  II,  says  {Opera,  p.  567;  Wallis,  Vol.  I.  p. 
444) :  "A  cave  of  Jove  may  be  visited  in  Crete,  and  his  tomb  is  pointed  out  to 
one."  St.  Epiphanius,  Ancoratus,  106  {Opera,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  210),  says  of  Zeus  that  "his 
grave  is  known  to  not  a  few,  since  even  in  our  day  it  is  shown  on  Mount  Lasius  in 
Crete."  Cf.  Clement  of  Alexandria,  Protrepticus  {Exhortation  to  the  Gree\s),  II,  32 
(Butterworth,  p.  79).  Non-Christian  writers  also  mention  the  tomb  of  Zeus:  Cicero, 
De  natura  deortim,  III,  21,  53;  Lucian,  De  sacrificiis,  10  (Harmon,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  165); 
Statius,  Thebaid,  I,  vv.  278-79;  Lucan,  Pharsalia,  VIII,  v.  872.  In  his  Hymnus  in 
]ovem,  vv.  6-9,  Callimachus  brands  stories  of  the  kind  as  lies:  "Zeus,  some  say 
that  thou  wert  born  on  Mount  Ida  in  Crete,  others  in  Arcady.  Which,  O  Father,  are 
the  liars?  The  Cretans  are  perpetual  liars,  for  they  have  built  a  tomb  they  say 
is  thine,  O  King.  But  thou  art  not  dead:  thou  art  eternal." 

684  2  [Randall  drops  his  knitting  to  render  the  proverb  daintily:  "Venus  without 
Liber  and  Ceres  is  a-cold."  It  goes  better,  however,  in  American:  "Venus  without 
Liber  and  Ceres  is  a-frost." — A.  L.] 

685  ^  "From  such  base  lineage  doth  Quirinus  come,  who  is  hailed  the  son  of 
Mars."  Paradiso,  VIII,  vv.  130-31.  [Romulus  was  son  of  Rhea  by  father  unknown. 
Legend  made  Mars  the  parent. — A.  L.] 


420  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §686 

686.  To  the  present  variety  belong  thecfries  that  derive  the  nature 
and  properties  of  a  thing  from  the  etymology  of  its  name/  The 
premise  of  such  theories  is,  implicitly  at  least,  that  each  thing  was 
originally  given  a  name  corresponding  exactly  to  its  nature.  That 
premise  metaphysicists,  still  implicitly,  may  supplement  with  others; 
things  being  as  the  human  mind  imagines  them,  to  reason  from  the 
name  of  a  thing  is  tantamount  to  reasoning  from  the  thing.  This, 
in  a  word,  is  one  of  the  many  cases  in  which  subjective  sentiments 
are  endowed  with  objective  reality.  The  theory  attains  its  maximum 
absurdity  in  Plato's  Cratylus. 

687.  However,  ignoring  such  a  priori  considerations,  let  us,  as 
usual,  appeal  to  experience.  It  may  well  be  that  in  our  day  scientists 
try  to  name  new  things  in  such  a  way  as  to  indicate  some  of  their 
properties.  In  such  a  case  etymology  might  be  of  use  in  discovering, 
if  not  the  actual  properties  of  a  thing,  at  least  the  notion  its  dis- 
coverer had  of  it.  So  the  name  "oxygen"  indicates  not  that  that  body 
is  the  sole  generator  of  oxides,  but  that  those  who  gave  it  the  name 
(Scheele,  Priestley,  Lavoisier)  thought  that  it  was.  The  names  given 
by  people  at  large,  and  therefore  most  of  the  terms  of  ordinary  lan- 
guage, do  not  have  even  that  modified  significance.  They  depend 
upon  accidental  circumstances  which  have  often  little  or  nothing  to 

.  do  with  the  nature  of  the  thing.^ 

688.  Among  rigorously  etymological  interpretations  one  has  re- 
mained famous.  It  was  long  believed  that  servus,  "slave,"  came 
from  servare,  "to  save,"  i.e.,  to  keep  safe  or  sound;  and  a  very  pretty 

686  1  See  Chapter  X. 

687  ^  Darmesteter,  La  vie  des  mots,  pp.  41-42.  Speaking  of  the  quality  of  an  ob- 
ject that  serves  to  give  it  a  name,  Darmesteter  says:  "It  is  interesting  that  the  quahty 
need  not  at  all  be  essential  and  really  denominative.  The  French  word  cahier  is, 
etymologically,  a  group  of  four  things  (O.F.  caier,  caern,  cadern,  Lat.  quaternum , 
'group  of  four'  ['sheets,'  understood]).  .  .  .  Confection  is  just  a  'preparation'  (Lat. 
confectio).  Chapelet  is  just  a  'little  crown'  {chapel,  'garland')."  TopfTer,  Nouveaux 
voyages  en  zig-zag,  p.  6  (trip  to  the  Grande  Chartreuse) :  "Let  a  group  of  people 
live  together,  travel  together,  just  for  a  few  days,  and  you  will  inevitably  see  words 
and  acceptations  of  words  growing  up  that  are  stricdy  peculiar  to  that  group,  and 
that  so  certainly  and  so  naturally  that,  just  the  reverse  of  what  the  scholars  say,  it 
seems  much  harder  to  explain  how  a  language  could  fail  to  develop  wherever 
human  beings  are  consordng  together  than  to  imagine  how  it  actually  arises." 


§690  MYTH  AND  ETYMOLOGY  42 1 

theory  of  slavery  was  derived  from  the  etymology.  The  Institutes  of 
Justinian  say,  I,  3,  3:  "Slaves  were  called  servi  because  the  generals 
ordered  that  prisoners  of  war  be  sold,  and  therefore  were  wont  to 
'save'  and  not  to  slay  them."  ^  But  that  etymology  is  no  longer  ac- 
cepted. Servus,  it  now  seems,  means  "guardian  of  a  house,"  and  our 
pretty  theory  of  slavery  goes  by  the  board.'  A  pity  indeed!  But  if 
anyone  is  anxious  to  deliver  himself  of  a  theory  of  slavery  based  on 
the  new  etymology,  he  ought  to  attend  to  it  at  once,  before  the  ety- 
mology is  changed  on  us  again. 

689. .  In  Italy  and  countries  where  there  are  any  great  numbers  of 
Italian  labourers,  the  name  crumiro  is  used  to  designate  a  man  who 
works  while  his  comrades  are  on  strike — a  "scab."  If  this  word  were 
Latin  or  Greek,  we  might  derive  many  pretty  etymological  theories 
from  it:  crumiro,  or  \rumiro  (as  many  write  it)  from  xooxn^^  "to 
knock"  or  "beat,"  whence  xpov^a,  "blow,"  "stroke,"  the  etymology 
so  indicating  that  the  crumiri,  or  \rumiri,  were  "beaten"  by  their 
fellow-workers.  Many  etymologies  that  have  been  and  still  are  cur- 
rent are  more  far-fetched  than  that.  As  a  matter  of  fact  we  know 
where  the  word  comes  from.  The  Krumiri  were  a  tribe  in  Tunis, 
and  the  French  took  imaginary  depredations  by  that  tribe  as  a  pre- 
text for  invading  Tunis.  The  displeasure  occasioned  in  Italy  by  the 
episode  led  to  an  association  of  the  name  Krumiri  with  unpleasant 
sentiments.  When  Italian  working-men  came  to  feel  other  unpleas- 
ant sentiments  for  men  who  they  thought  were  betraying  them  in 
times  of  strike,  they  forthwith  labelled  them  crumiri  (§  547). 

690.  This  case  is  typical  of  a  very  wide-spread  class.  Every  day  we 
see  new  words  and  phrases  originating  in  associations  of  ideas  that 

688  ^  Corpus  iuris  civilis.  Vol.  I,  p.  4;  Scott,  Vol.  II,  p.  8:  "Servi  autem  ex  eo 
appellati  sunt  quod  imperatores  captivos  vendere  jubent,  ac  per  hoc  servare  nee  occi- 
dere  solent." 

688  2  Breal-Bailly,  Op.  cit.,  s.v.  Servus:  "Servus  literally  means  'guardian'  .  .  . 
the  slave  being  considered  as  the  guardian  of  the  house."  James  Darmesteter, 
Notes  sur  quelques  expressions  zendes,  p.  309:  "That  origin  of  the  word  being 
gradually  forgotten,  servus  came  to  mean  simply  'slave,'  and  that  sense  is  the  only 
one  that  figures  in  derivatives  such  as  servio  and  servitus.  The  etymology  of  servus 
understood  as  a  prisoner  of  war  whose  life  has  been  'saved'  is  therefore  to  be 
rejected." 


422  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §691 

are  frequently  quite  fortuitous/  If,  in  some  period  in  the  distant 
future,  someone  tries  to  discover  what  they  mean  by  going  directly 
from  word  to  thing,  he  will  certainly  miss  the  mark.  It  is  evident 
therefore  that  if  we,  in  our  time,  use  that  method  to  get  at  things  of 
the  remote  past,  we  may  sometimes  hit  the  truth,  but  may  just  as 
easily  go  astray. 

691.  The  direct  etymological  procedure  derives  the  name  from 
the  properties  of  the  thing;  the  inverse  procedure  ascribes  certain 
properties  to  the  thing  simply  because  of  its  name.  This  latter  seems 
to  have  played  a  considerable  role  in  mythology,  and  it  is  probable 
that  many  mythological  episodes  were  invented  because  of  names.'^ 
In  many  cases,  however,  it  is  a  question  of  mere  probabilities,  and 
conclusive  proofs  are  lacking.^ 

692.  B-/?2:  Myths  and  the  like  are  made  up  of  experiences  wrongly 

690  ^  Liberie,  Dec.  10,  1910  (from  the  Cri  de  Paris):  "Elle  suit  ou  est  le  compteur 
— 'She  knows  where  the  gas-meter  is' — is  the  latest  fad  in  the  way  of  slang.  It  is 
going  the  rounds  of  the  cabarets  and  vaudeville  houses.  You  do  not  say  of  a 
woman:  'She  is  being  seen  about  town  with  Monsieur  X.'  You  say:  'She  knows 
where  his  gas-meter  is!';  and  everybody  understands.  All  the  same,  very  few  know 
how  the  expression  started.  ...  It  seems  that  one  of  our  playwrights,  a  young 
man  and  rich,  invited  a  number  of  very  pretty  actresses  and  a  few  gentlemen  to 
attend  a  reading  of  a  new  play  of  his  in  a  studio  which  he  prefers  on  certain  oc- 
casions to  his  official  residence.  The  company  made  their  way  in  a  body  into  a 
room  shrouded  in  blackest  darkness.  The  dramatist  struck  a  match,  turned  on  a 
gas-jet,  and  cried:  'Dear  me — my  franc  has  run  out!'  Without  a  moment's  hesita- 
tion, though  the  room  was  dark,  one  of  the  young  ladies  opened  a  panel  and 
pointed  to  the  gas-meter.  Light  dawned  in  the  room  and  in  the  wits  of  the  com- 
pany. The  elect  of  the  moment  had  betrayed  herself.  'Oh,  so  she  knows  where  the 
gas-meter  is!'  And  the  phrase  took  Paris  by  storm." 

691  ^  Dugas-Montbel,  Observations  stir  I'lliade,  Vol.  II,  p.  145  {Iliad,  XVIII,  v. 
486):  "As  for  Orion,  he  became,  eventually,  the  hero  of  a  very  unpleasant  adven- 
ture that  Voltaire  relates  in  the  crudest  terms  in  the  article  on  allegory  in  the 
Philosophical  Dictionary  {CEuvres,  Vol.  VII,  pp.  54-55),  believing  it  to  be  an  alle- 
gory. But  the  offensive  tale  did  not  originate  in  any  desire  to  find  an  allegory.  It 
was  due  to  a  mere  association  of  the  name  'ilpiuv  with  ovpov,  'urine.'  Nor  was 
Orion's  name,  either,  derived  from  the  adventure,  as  the  little  scholia  say.  The 
adventure  was  invented  to  account  for  the  name.  The  proof  is  that  all  those  vul- 
garises did  not  come  on  the  scene  till  after  Homer's  time,  for  Homer  knew  the 
name."  The  proof  is  not  very  strong,  but  the  conjecture  has  probabilides  in  its 
favour  (§  660). 

691  ^  Etymology  also  plays  a  part  in  another  variety  of  interpretations — B-y.  See 
§§78of. 


§694  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  423 

interpreted  and  fallacious  inferences  from  real  facts.  This  variety 
differs  from  the  preceding,  B-/?i,  in  that,  apparently  if  not  actually, 
it  assigns  a  more  important  role  to  experience,  and  its  pseudo-experi- 
mental inferences  are  longer  drawn-out  and  more  ingenious  and 
fine-spun. 

693.  The  theory  of  "animism"  belongs  to  this  variety.  It  appears 
under  several  forms.  In  the  more  definite,  it  asserts  that  primitive 
peoples  are  convinced  that  human  beings,  animals,  plants,  and  even 
non-living  things  have  souls;  and  religious  phenomena  accordingly 
owe  their  origin  and  development  to  logical  inferences  from  that 
conviction.  In  a  less  definite  form  it  runs :  "We  can  be  sure  that  chil- 
dren and  savages  are  animists,  that,  in  other  words,  they  project  the 
volition  acting  within  themselves  upon  things  without  and  so  people 
the  world,  and  especially  the  creatures  and  objects  immediately 
about  them,  with  life  and  sentiments  similar  to  their  own."  ^ 

Inferences  are  evidently  drawn  out  longer  in  the  first  form  of 
animism  than  in  the  second,  but  there  is  no  lack  of  them  in  the 
second.  To  reduce  the  second  to  sentiments  corresponding  to  non- 
logical  conduct,  we  have  to  change  our  language  and  say  that  the 
child  and  the  savage  in  many  cases,  and  even  civilized  man  in  some 
cases,  act  in  the  same  ways  towards  the  human  beings,  living  crea- 
tures, and  even  objects  with  which  they  stand  in  contact. 

694.  When  there  is  an  effort  to  give  a  logical  colouring  to  the 
non-logical  conduct,  inferences  are  appended.  A  person  may  say: 
"I  do  as  I  do  because  I  believe  that  the  animals,  plants,  and  objects 
connected  with  me  have  a  will  such  as  I  and  other  human  beings 
have."  Or  the  inference  may  be  lengthened  by  giving  the  will  in 
question  a  cause,  attributing  it  to  an  entity  called  "soul,"  and  assert- 
ing that  other  beings  have  souls  just  as  human  beings  have. 

693  ^  Neither  here,  nor  anywhere  else,  do  we  intend  to  solve  the  problem  of 
"origins"  from  the  chronological  standpoint  (§§885f.).  Documents  for  any  such 
research  are  wanting,  and  so  it  becomes  a  mere  exercise  of  the  imagination.  We 
are  going  to  try  simply  to  reduce  complex  phenomena  to  simpler  ones,  and  ex- 
amine the  relationships  between  them.  It  may  be  that  the  simple  phenomena  have 
preceded  the  composite  in  time,  or  the  reverse  may  be  the  case.  For  the  present 
we  are  not  interested  in  the  question. 


424  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §^95 

Tylor  goes  even  farther.  Says  he:^  "The  sense  of  Spiritualism  in 
its  wider  acceptation,  the  general  belief  in  spiritual  beings,  is  here 
given  to  Animism."  And  he  adds:  "Animism  characterizes  tribes 
very  low  in  the  scale  of  humanity,  and  thence  ascends,  deeply  modi- 
fied in  its  transmission,  but  from  first  to  last  preserving  an  unbroken 
continuity,  into  the  midst  of  high  modern  culture."  Tylor  must 
therefore  be  describing  an  evolution  of  those  non-logical  sentiments, 
or  of  their  expressions.  To  tell  the  truth,  it  is  surprising  to  hear  that 
"tribes  very  low  in  the  scale  of  humanity"  should  already  have  de- 
veloped so  subtle  a  theory  as  belief  in  the  existence  of  spiritual  be- 
ings. Their  language  has  to  be  highly  enough  perfected  to  express 
abstractions  such  as  "being"  and  "spiritual."  It  also  has  to  be  very 
well  known  to  travellers,  if  they  are  to  translate  such  terms  accu- 
rately into  ours. 

695.  Meantime  there  are  plenty  of  doubts  even  with  languages  that 
are  very  well  known.^  One  writer  says  of  Chinese  morals:  ^  "Noth- 

694  ^  Primitive  Culture,  1871,  Vol.  I,  p.  385;  1873,  Vol.  I,  p.  486. 

695  ^  We  cannot  give  a  definite  translation  even  of  the  term  ■i'vxv  in  ihe  Homeric 
poems.  In  Greek  writings  of  a  later  date  it  may  be  translated  as  "soul";  but  in 
Homer  it  has  a  number  of  meanings  that  are  not  sharply  defined.  Theil,  Diction- 
tmire  cornplet  d'Homere,  s.v.  '^vxrj:  "'ivxr],  properly,  'breath,'  and  since  breath 
is  the  sign  of  life,  'spirit,'  'life,'  'vital  force,'  'soul':  Iliad,  V,  v.  696:  tov  iliire  i^vx^, 
'the  spirit  left  him':  that  is  to  say,  'he  fainted';  but  it  may  also  mean  'he  died,'  as 
in  Odyssey,  XIV,  v.  426,  where  it  is  a  question  of  animals.  It  is,  further,  more  often 
phrased  with  such  words  as  fiivog  [soul  and  strength] :  Iliad,  V,  v.  396;  ai6v 
[life  and  soul]:  Iliad,  XVI,  v.  453;  and  6v/u6g  [soul  and  spirit]:  Iliad,  XI,  v.  334.  In 
Iliad,  I,  V.  3,  it  appears  in  the  plural;  and  in  Odyssey,  III,  v.  74,  one  notes:  tjjvxag 
Tzapde/ievoi,  'exposing  their  lives.'  This  vital  principle  was  conceived  as  an  actual 
substance.  When  a  man  dies  it  goes  out  through  his  mouth:  Iliad,  IX,  vv.  408-09; 
or  through  a  wound:  Iliad,  XIV,  vv.  518-19.  Whence,  the  'souls  of  the  dead'  in 
the  other  world,  'soul,'  'spirit,'  'shade':  ipvxv  'Ajafie/xvovog,  Alavrog,  'the  soul  of 
Agamemnon,'  'of  Ajax.'  Such  a  soul  was,  actually,  without  body,  but  it  kept  the 
shape  of  the  body:  Odyssey,  XI,  vv.  204-09;  it  had  no  (ppeveg  [mind,  or  perhaps 
vitals] :  Iliad,  XXIII,  v.  103;  therefore  it  was  only  a  'ghost,'  eiSuAov.  Odyssey, 
XI,  V.  601.  The  two  words  are  often  conjoined  (i/wj^ /cat  elduXov):  Iliad,  XXIII, 
V.  103,  Odyssey,  XXIV,  v.  14;  and  in  that  sense  ipvx^  is  contrasted  with  the 
'body,'  which  the  ancient  Greek  thought  of  as  his  'ego,'  his  personality  (avTdg) : 
Iliad,  I,  V.  3;  Odyssey,  XIV,  v.  32  [Wrong  reference — perhaps  XIV,  v.  134,  or  XXIV, 
V-  35]-  "^^XV  is  never  used  in  Homer  to  designate  states  of  mind."  When  we  have 
explanations  equally  detailed  of  the  terms  that  are  used  by  savages,  we  may  have 
some  conception  of  the  words  that  travellers  and  missionaries  arbitrarily  translate  by 
our  word  "soul." 

695  2  Farjenel,  La  morale  c  hi  noise,  p.  20. 


§696  THEORY  OF  ANIMISM  425 

ing  is  easier  for  the  translator  than  to  yield  to  the  temptation  of 
making  a  text  say  what  he  wishes  it  to  say,  and  that  temptation  is 
of  course  very  great  in  dealing  with  works  on  philosophy  or  morals." 
It  is  therefore  legitimate  to  wonder  whether  the  missionaries  and 
travellers  through  whom  we  get  our  knowledge  of  savage  or  merely 
backward  peoples  have  not  altered  meanings  of  terms  thus  ren- 
dered.^ But,  after  all,  any  mere  presumption,  however  reasonable 
and  probable,  has  to  bow  to  the  facts.  To  them,  therefore,  let  us 
look  for  our  solution. 

696.  in  the  first  place  the  things  we  observe  in  our  children  can- 
not be  grouped  with  the  phenomena  of  animism.  Children  talk  to 
their  dolls  and  the  house-dog  as  though  dog  and  dolls  were  able  to 
understand  them  long  before  they  have  any  such  notions  as  are  ex- 
pressed by  the  terms  "beings"  and  "spiritual."  We  can  go  farther 
still.  Even  among  adults,  a  hunter  talking  to  his  dog  would  be 
astounded  were  he  asked  whether  he  thought  he  was  conversing 
with  a  "spiritual"  being.  In  reality,  in  all  such  cases  we  are  dealing 
with  non-logical  actions,  with  expressions  of  certain  inclinations,  and 
not  with  results  of  logical  processes.^ 

695  ^  Even  scholars  who  have  perfect  mastery  of  their  subjects  may  in  moments 
of  inattention  use  terms  not  corresponding  to  the  texts  before  them.  Maury,  His- 
toire  des  religions  de  la  Grece  antique,  Vol.  I,  p.  336:  "The  Elysium,  or  better 
the  Elysian  Fields  {^'Rlvciov  nediov')  is  described  in  the  Odyssey  as  'a  land  where 
the  just  man  leads  a  happy  life  in  peace  under  a  sky  that  is  ever  cloudless.'  "  Maury 
is  referring  to  Odyssey,  IV,  vv.  561-69.  Now  for  that  passage  the  term  "just"  does 
not  serve.  There  is  no  reference  whatever  to  "just"  men.  It  is  a  question  of  Menelaus, 
who  is  to  go  to  the  Elysian  Fields  not  because  he  has  been  "just,"  but  "because 
(v.  569)  he  has  Helen  to  wife  and  is  in  the  eyes  of  the  immortals  a  son-in-law  of 
Zeus":  ovvek'  e;jf£<f  'EMvtjv,  Kat.  a^iv  janjipog  Ai6g  eacri.  The  line  cannot  be  otherwise 
translated,  and  all  the  translations  agree — the  Latin,  for  instance:  "qiioniam  habes 
Helenam  et  ipsius  ]ovis  gener  es."  The  verse  (561)  quoted  by  Maury,  Soi  S'ov 
6ga<j>aT6i>  iari,  AioTp£(peg  w  MeveXae,  with  the  lines  following,  alludes  to  the  fact  for 
which  the  cause  is  given  in  v.  569;  namely,  that  Menelaus  is  not  to  die  but  will  go 
to  the  Elysian  Fields  because,  etc.  If  we  knew  the  passage  only  from  Maury's  version 
of  it,  we  would  conclude  that  it  asserts  a  moral  principle  which  really  is  not  there. 

696  ^  On  Jan.  25,  19 10,  a  great  crowd  was  gathered  in  the  Piazza  d'.\rmi  in 
Turin  waiting  for  the  Sun  to  go  down  in  order  to  see  the  comet.  The  comet  not 
appearing  at  once,  many  people  began  to  hoot  and  whisde  as  Italians  do  in  a 
theatre.  Yet  certainly  not  a  person  in  the  crowd  imagined  that  the  comet  had  a 
"soul."  There  was  nothing  to  it  except  one  of  those  impulses  whereby  we  treat  human 
beings,  animals,  and  things  alike.  In  his  Journal  of  a  Cruise  Made  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  Vol.  II,  p.  31,  Admiral  Porter  describes  the  pleasure  and  admiration  evinced 


426  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §697 

697.  But  that  proves  nothing  as  to  primitive  peoples.  We  have  to 
go  on  and  examine  the  facts  about  them  directly.  Tylor  cautions  that 
his  researches  vi^ere  conducted  on  two  principles :  ^  "First,  as  to  the 
religious  doctrines  and  practices  examined,  these  are  treated  as  be- 
longing to  theological  systems  devised  by  human  reason,  without 
supernatural  aid  or  revelation;  in  other  words,  as  being  develop- 
ments of  Natural  Religion.  Second,  as  to  the  connexion  between  sim- 
ilar ideas  and  rites  in  the  religions  of  the  savage  and  the  civilized 
world." 

698.  The  first  principle  aims  at  solving  a  priori  a  problem  that 
ought  to  get  its  solution  strictly  from  observations  of  fact.  There  is 
nothing  to  justify  our  seeing  in  religious  doctrines  and  practices 
mere  products  of  reason,  so  excluding  non-logical  conduct;  and  it 
is  evident  that  if  we  exclude  them  a  priori,  we  shall  not  be  able  to 
find  them  afterwards  in  the  facts.  What  follows  substantiates  that 
criticism:  "What  the  doctrine  of  the  soul  is  among  the  lower  races, 
may  be  explained  in  stating  the  present  [the  animistic]  theory  of  its 
development."  The  sentence  exemphfies  the  usual  errors  of  that 
method  of  reasoning:  i.  The  metaphysical  abstraction  "soul"  is 
taken  as  a  real  thing.  Every  man  that  has  eyes  sees  the  Sun;  one 
may  therefore  ask  what  notion — often  it  is  a  very  hazy  one — he  has 
of  it.  But  before  we  can  find  out  what  notion  he  has  of  the  soul,  we 
must  know  whether  he  has  in  mind  any  concept  at  all  correspond- 
by  the  natives  of  Madison  Island  on  seeing  a  cannon  fired:  "They  hugged  and 
kissed  the  gun,  lay  down  beside  it,  and  fondled  it  with  the  utmost  delight,  and  at 
length  slung  it  to  two  poles  and  carried  it  toward  the  mountain" — as  they  had  been 
ordered  to  do  by  Porter.  The  natives  had  no  idea  that  the  cannon  was  an  animate 
being.  They  were  merely  expressing  certain  feelings  of  admiration  provoked  by  its 
power.  See,  further,  Erman,  Aegyptischc  Religion,  p.  7  (Johns,  pp.  7-9).  Noting  the 
great  discordance  of  Egyptian  views  about  the  cosmos,  Erman  adds:  "Later  on  the 
Egypt  of  the  historical  period  made  up  its  picture  of  the  world  out  of  all  these  dif- 
ferent features,  mixing  them  together  more  or  less  haphazard,  indiflferent  to  the 
inconsistencies  and  impossibilities  to  which  it  was  calling  public  attention.  The  sky 
is  represented  as  a  cow,  with  the  bark  of  the  Sun  sailing  on  its  belly.  The  sky  is  an 
ocean,  yet  the  Sun  was  engendered  by  it.  The  Sun-god  is  a  scarab  and  at  the  same 
time  the  scarab's  eye.  The  names  and  images  that  are  made  to  fit  these  different 
conceptions  are  jumbled  together  in  a  thorough-going  mixture."  Something  of  the 
sort  is  observable  in  Greek  mythology. 

697  1  Primitive  Culture,  1871,  Vol.  I,  pp.  386-87;  1873,  Vol.  I,  pp.  427-28. 


11 


§701  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  427 

ing  to  such  a  term.  2.  The  attempt  to  reconstruct  theories  held  by 
primitive  peoples  on  the  basis  of  our  present-day  ideas  as  civilized 
people.  In  that  way  we  get  not  the  theories  of  primitive  peoples,  if 
any  they  have,  but — a  wholly  different  matter — the  theories  that  we 
would  evolve  were  we  to  put  aside  certain  ideas  we  hold,  a  certain 
part  of  our  knowledge,  and  then  to  work,  with  our  logic,  strictly  on 
the  concepts  and  knowledge  remaining. 

699.  In  fact,  Tylor  continues:  "It  seems  as  though  thinking  men, 
as  yet  at  a  low  level  of  culture  were  deeply  impressed  by  two  groups 
of  biological  problems.  In  the  first  place,  what  is  it  that  makes  the 
difference  between  a  living  body  and  a  dead  one;  what  causes  wak- 
ing, sleep,  trance,  disease,  death  ?  In  the  second  place,  what  are  those 
human  shapes  which  appear  in  dreams  and  visions?  Looking  at 
these  two  groups  of  phenomena,  the  ancient  savage  philosophers 
probably  made  their  first  step  by  the  obvious  inference  that  there  is 
in  every  man  two  things  belonging  to  him,  namely,  a  life  and  a 
phantom.  These  two  are  evidently  in  close  connexion  with  the  body, 
the  life  as  enabling  it  to  feel  and  think  and  act,  the  phantom  as 
being  its  image  or  second  self;  both,  also,  are  perceived  to  be  things 
separable  from  the  body,  the  life  as  able  to  go  away  and  leave  it 
insensible  or  dead,  the  phantom  as  appearing  to  people  at  a  dis- 
tance from  it." 

700.  That  method  of  approaching  phenomena,  though  slightly 
better,  starts  with  the  same  principles  that  are  used  by  Rousseau 
(§821) — putting  facts  aside,  and  trusting  wholly  to  imagination. 
Of  course  if  primitive  peoples  ever  had  their  Aristotle,  he  may  have 
managed  to  think  with  that  rigorous  logic  on  the  metaphysical  ab- 
stractions in  question;  but  we  may  well  wonder  whether  such  an 
Aristotle  ever  was.  Furthermore,  after  once  reasoning  so  well  man- 
kind must  have  forgotten  the  art;  for  in  historical  times  we  find  a 
thinking  that  is  far  from  being  as  logical  and  luminous  as  the 
thoughts  gratuitously  ascribed  to  our  savage  ancestors. 

701.  We  are  not  asking  how  savage  or  backward  peoples  must 
have  reasoned,  but  rather  how  they  actually  reason.  We  are  not  try- 
ing to  brush  the  facts  aside,  as  is  done  in  the  method  dear  to  Rous- 


428  THE   MIND   AND  SOCIETY  §702 

seau  (§821)  and  his  imitators:  we  are  trying,  instead,  to  put  imag- 
ination aside  as  far  as  we  possibly  can  and  stick  as  close  to  the  facts 
as  we  possibly  can.  Now  there  is  an  exceedingly  large  body  of  fact 
which  goes  to  show  that  savage  or  backward  peoples  have  little  or 
no  inclination  towards  abstract  thinking,  that  they  are  very  far  from 
I  presuming  to  solve  metaphysical  or  philosophical  problems,  or  even 
problems  to  some  little  extent  abstract,  and  that  often  they  evince  vir- 
tually no  curiosity  regarding  them.^ 
702.  Of  a  Negro  tribe  called  the  Mandingos,  Mungo  Park  writes :  ^ 

701  ^  Cf.  Captain  Cook,  Account  of  a  Voyage  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  Vol.  II,  p.  310. 
Of  the  natives  of  Nootka  (North  America)  Cook  remarks:  "Their  other  passions  ap- 
pear to  lie  dormant,  especially  their  curiosity.  Few  expressed  any  desire  or  inclination 
to  see  or  examine  things  with  which  they  were  unacquainted;  and  which,  to  a  curi- 
ous observer,  would  have  appeared  astonishing.  If  they  could  procure  the  articles 
they  knew  and  wanted,  they  were  perfectly  satisfied;  regarding  everything  else  with 
great  indifference.  Nor  did  our  persons,  dress,  and  behaviour  (though  so  very  dif- 
ferent from  their  own),  or  even  the  size  and  construcdon  of  our  ships,  seem  to  ex- 
cite their  admiration  or  attendon."  [Cook's  texts  show  so  many  formal  variants  as 
to  read  like  different  writings.  We  follow  the  edidon  of  1784. — A.  L.]  Pruneau  de 
Pommegorge,  in  Hovelacque,  Les  Negres  de  I'Afrique  sus-equatoriale,  p.  29:  "Not 
being  able  to  imagine  that,  as  I  had  been  informed,  they  [the  Sereres]  had  no  re- 
ligion, and  finding  myself  one  afternoon  at  sunset  on  the  seashore  with  five  or  six 
men  well  on  in  years,  I  asked  them  through  an  interpreter  if  they  knew  who  had 
made  that  Sun  which  was  about  to  disappear  .  .  .  finally  if  they  knew  the  sky  and 
the  stars  that  would  be  visible  an  hour  thence.  At  my  question  the  old  men  looked 
at  each  other  as  though  nonplussed  and  made  no  answer.  However,  after  a  mo- 
ment's silence,  one  of  them  asked  me  if  I  knew  all  those  things."  Pommegorge  is 
not  aware  that  from  the  standpoint  of  experimental  science  the  knowledge  he  thinks 
he  has  of  Him  who  made  the  Sun  is  worth  less,  much  less,  than  the  so  frankly 
manifested  ignorance  of  those  Negroes.  Of  a  Madison  Island  chief.  Admiral  Porter 
observes,  Op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  pp.  27-28:  "After  he  had  been  a  short  dme  on  deck,  I 
endeavoured  to  impress  him  with  a  high  opinion  of  our  force;  and  for  this  purpose 
assembled  all  of  my  crew.  It  scarcely  seemed  to  excite  his  attention.  I  then  caused 
a  gun  to  be  fired,  which  seemed  to  produce  no  other  effect  on  him  than  that  of 
pain:  he  complained  that  it  hurt  his  ears.  I  then  invited  him  below  where  nothing 
whatever  excited  his  attention  undl  I  showed  him  some  whales'  teeth.  ...  I  asked 
him  if  he  had  seen  anything  in  the  ship  that  pleased  him — if  he  did  to  name  it  and 
it  should  be  his.  He  told  me  he  had  seen  nothing  which  had  pleased  him  so  much 
as  one  of  the  small  whales'  teeth."  Hovelacque,  Op.  cit.,  p.  456:  "Abstraction  is 
altogether  outside  his  [the  Negro's]  powers  of  conception.  There  are  no  abstract 
words  in  his  language.  Only  tangible  objects  are  able  to  catch  his  interest.  As  for  any 
generalizing,  as  for  getdng  any  sort  of  systemadzation  from  the  mass  of  material 
phenomena,  they  should  not  be  expected  of  him." 

702  ^  Travels  and  Recent  Discoveries  in  the  Interior  Districts  of  Africa,  London, 
pp.  271-74;  New  York,  pp.  306-09. 


§703  THEORY  OF  ANIMISM  429 

"I  frequently  enquired  of  some  of  them  what  became  of  the  sun 
during  the  night,  and  whether  we  should  see  the  same  sun  or  a 
different  one  in  the  morning;  but  I  found  that  they  considered  the 
questions  as  very  childish.  The  subject  appeared  to  them  as  placed 
beyond  the  reach  of  human  investigation:  they  had  never  indulged 
a  conjecture  nor  formed  any  hypothesis  about  the  matter."  Park  as- 
serts, however,  that  "the  belief  of  one  God  and  of  a  future  state  of 
reward  and  punishment  is  entire  and  universal  among  them."  But 
one  may  wonder  whether  he  has  not  to  some  extent  credited  them 
with  ideas  of  his  own,  for  he  proceeds  to  note  things  not  quite  con- 
sistent with  such  a  belief:  "If  they  are  asked  for  what  reason  then 
do  they  offer  up  a  prayer  on  the  appearance  of  the  new  moon,  the 
answer  is  that  custom  has  made  it  necessary:  they  do  it,  because 
their  fathers  did  it  before  them.  Such  is  the  blindness  of  unassisted 
nature!"  And  farther  along:  "When  interrogated  in  particular  con- 
cerning their  ideas  of  a  future  state,  they  express  themselves  with 
great  reverence,  but  endeavour  to  shorten  the  discussion  by  observ- 
ing 'Mo  0  mo  inta  alio!'  [No  man  knows  anything  about  it!]  They 
are  content,  they  say,  to  follow  the  precepts  and  examples  of  their 
forefathers  through  the  various  vicissitudes  of  life;  and  when  this 
world  presents  no  objects  of  enjoyment  or  of  comfort,  they  seem  to 
look  with  anxiety  towards  another,  which  they  believe  to  be  better 
suited  to  their  natures,  but  concerning  which  they  are  far  from  in- 
dulging vain  and  delusive  conjectures."  ^ 
703.  All  that  by  no  means  precludes  there  having  been  peoples 

702  ^  Similar  observations  are  to  be  found  in  Burchell,  Travels  in  the  Interior 
of  Southern  Africa,  Vol.  II,  p.  427:  "I  found  no  difficulty  in  making  him  [a 
Bachapin]  sensible  of  a  future  state  of  existence,  as  the  Bachapins  seemed  to  possess 
some  confused  notions  of  this  kind;  but  of  their  belief  in  retributive  justice  after 
death,  I  never  could  gain  any  clear  account.  [Of  course  one  cannot  discover  what 
is  not  there!]  Neither  did  it  appear  to  me  that  they  had  any  very  sublime  idea  of 
the  soul  or  of  immortality  [Or  of  solid  geometry  either,  one  might  guess].  Of  the 
worldly  superintendence  of  a  Supreme  Power,  they  are  not  ignorant;  but  their 
knowledge  is  so  mingled  with  superstition,  that  this  can  be  of  litde  practical  benefit 
to  their  moral  conduct  or  religious  feelings.  These  superstitious  notions  could  only 
have  been  the  offsprings  of  the  weakest  mind;  and  the  respect  which  continues  to 
be  paid  to  them  proves,  better  than  any  argument,  how  low  is  the  state  of  intellect 
and  reason  among  these  people." 


I 


\ 


430  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §704 

with  a  theory  of  animism  such  as  Tylor  outHnes  (§694).  Indeed, 
there  certainly  have  been  such  peoples.  But  it  is  not  in  the  least 
proved,  either,  that  animism  is  the  "origin"  of  religion  or  a  simple 
•  form  of  more  evolved  religions/ 

704.  Herbert  Spencer's  refutation  of  animism  has  the  same  defects 
as  the  theory  itself.  He  marshals  facts  to  show  ^  that  "in  the  ascent 
from  low  to  high  types  of  creatures,  the  power  of  distinguishing  the 
animate  from  the  inanimate  increases."  The  tests  used  to  distinguish 
them  are  at  first  very  vague  and  then  gradually  become  more  pre- 
cise. First  they  are  very  general;  then  they  are  specialized;  finally 
the  classification  becomes  less  often  erroneous.  "First  motion,  then 
spontaneous  motion,  then  adapted  spontaneous  motion  are  the  suc- 
cessive tests  used  as  intelligence  progresses."  These  observations  are 
true  in  substance,  erroneous  in  form — and  unhappily,  the  form  pre- 
vails in  the  bulk  of  Spencer's  argument.  What  Spencer  calls  "classi- 
fication" is  a  classification  for  us,  but  not  for  the  animals  that 
make  it. 

705.  Let  us  go  back  for  a  moment  to  Fabre's  experiments  on  the 
Cerceres  (§155).  In  order  to  provide  their  grubs  with  living  but 
paralyzed  prey,  those  insects  "select"  certain  species  of  Coleoptera. 
The  term  "select"  has  to  be  explained.  If  we  say  that  the  Cerceres 
select  those  particular  Coleoptera,  we  are  describing  the  objective 
end  (§151),  and  in  that  sense  the  statement  is  true.  But  no  one  would 
grant  that  Cerceres  use  classifications  like  ours  and  that  they  select 
their  Coleoptera  the  way  an  entomologist  classifying  insects  might 
select  them.  We  do  not  know  how  or  why  the  Cerceres  make  their 

703  ^  Tylor,  Ibid.,  1871,  Vol.  I,  pp.  377  f.;  1873,  pp.  418  f.,  rejects  the  testimony  of 
several  travellers  that  certain  peoples  had  religions,  in  the  light  of  the  contrary 
testimony  of  other  travellers.  [I  suspect  a  misprint,  the  dropping  of  a  non  before 
avevano  in  Pareto's  text.  What  Tylor  rejects  is  the  testimony  that  certain  peoples 
had  no  religion. — A.  L.]  He  is  right  in  some  instances.  He  may  be  right  in  others, 
and  wrong  in  still  others;  for  there  is  no  v^^ay  of  showing  that  the  negative  testi- 
mony is  always  more  credible  than  the  positive.  The  fact  stands  in  any  event  that 
savages  in  general  are  little  prone  to  abstract  thinking;  and  it  is  not  at  all  certain 
that  the  concept  "soul"  which  travellers  attribute  to  them  is  identical  with  our 
"soul."  The  authenticated  case  of  the  Greek  ^ivxn  is  sufficient  warning  as  to  the 
ease  of  one's  going  wrong  in  such  interpretations  (§  695  ^). 

704  ^  Principles  of  Sociology,  Vol.  I,  §  64. 


^yo6  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  43 1 

choices;  but  we  can  be  certain  that  they  do  not  make  them  by  the 
rational,  scientific  methods  of  the  entomologist.  Similar  facts  are  ob- 
servable for  human  beings,  and  their  non-logical  conduct  must  not 
be  confused  with  such  logical  actions  as  are  involved  in  a  scientific 
classification. 

706.  Spencer  extends  logical  conduct  to  animals.  Says  he,  §  63 : 
"Yet  a  further  test  used  by  intelligent  animals  to  discriminate  the 
living  from  the  not-living  is  the  adaptation  of  motion  to  ends.  Amus- 
ing herself  with  a  mouse  she  has  caught,  the  cat,  if  it  remains  long 
stationary,  touches  it  with  her  paw  to  make  it  run.  Obviously  the 
thought  is  that  a  living  thing  disturbed  will  try  to  escape,  and  so 
bring  a  renewal  of  the  chase.  Not  only  is  it  expected  that  there  will 
be  self -produced  motion;  but  it  is  expected  that  this  motion  will  be 
away  from  danger."  Roughly  the  facts  are  as  stated ;  the  description 
of  them  is  entirely  misleading,  and  the  error  lies  in  assuming  that 
the  cat  thinks  like  a  logical  human  being.^  i.  Animals  do  not  have 
the  abstract  concepts  of  "living"  and  "not-living."  One  need  only 
watch  a  dog  attentively  to  be  sure  of  that.  Much  less  can  they  know 
what  an  "end"  and  an  "adaptation"  are.  2.  There  is  nothing  to  war- 
rant belief  that  the  cat  thinks  that  a  living  thing  disturbed  will  try 
to  escape.  It  is  a  habit  of  cats  to  touch  any  little  object  with  their 
paws  to  make  it  move  if  possible;  and  it  matters  little,  from  that 
standpoint,  whether  the  object  be,  for  example,  a  pen-holder  well 
known  to  them,  or  a  mouse,  or  an  insect.  If  anything  is  certain  it  is 
that  they  act  as  if  they  did  not  have  the  abstract  notions  of  "living" 
and  "not-living"  with  which  Spencer  credits  them.  3.  Similarly, 
they  have  none  of  the  abstractions  required  for  designating  a  mouse's 
movement  as  away  from  danger.  To  be  convinced  of  that  one  need 
only  tie  a  piece  of  paper  to  a  string  and  drag  it  either  towards  the 
cat  or  away  from  it.  The  cat  jumps  at  the  ball  whether  it  moves  in 
one  direction  or  the  other.  Leave  the  paper  at  rest  in  the  middle  of 
the  room,  and  after  a  time  the  cat  will  approach  it  and  stir  it  with 
its  paw  exactly  as  it  does  in  playing  with  a  mouse.  There  is  not  the 

706  ^  On   this  point  see   Martello,  L'economia   modenia  e  la   odieriia   crisi   del 
darwinismo. 


432  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §707 

slightest  difference,  and  yet  we  cannot  say  with  Spencer  that  the  cat 
is  arguing  that  "a  Hving  thing  disturbed  will  try  to  escape."  In  case 
one  should  object  that  the  cat  thinks  the  paper  ball  a  living  thing, 
that  would  only  mean  that  it  is  incapable  of  distinguishing  the  living 
from  the  not-living,  and  Spencer's  whole  argument  crumbles.  In 
any  case  it  is  clearly  apparent  that  Spencer  has  merely  translated  the 
non-logical  conduct  of  the  cat  into  terms  of  logical  conduct.  Others 
translate  the  non-logical  conduct  of  human  beings  in  the  same  way. 

707.  Spencer  himself  moves  on  from  animals  to  human  beings. 
"Shall  we  say,"  he  asks,  §  65,  "that  the  primitive  man  is  less  intelli- 
gent than  the  lower  mammals,  less  intelligent  than  birds  and  rep- 
tiles, less  intelligent  even  than  insects?  Unless  we  say  this,  we  must 
say  that  the  primitive  man  distinguishes  the  living  from  the  not- 
living;  and  if  we  credit  him  with  intelligence  higher  than  that  of 
brutes,  we  must  infer  that  he  distinguishes  the  living  from  the  not- 
living  better  than  brutes  do."  That  method  of  reasoning  would  be 
sound  enough  if  conduct  were  all  strictly  logical ;  but  it  is  not  of  the 
slightest  value  as  regards  non-logical  actions.  It  proves  too  much, 
and  therefore  proves  nothing.  If  it  were  valid,  it  would  follow  that 
since  the  human  being  is  certainly  more  intelligent  than  the  Cer- 
ceres,  he  ought  to  recognize  kinds  of  Coleoptera  on  which  the  Cer- 
ceres  prey  better  than  they  do.  But  go  to  the  most  intelligent  in- 
dividual you  know,  someone  even  who  is  up  to  date  in  all  the  sci- 
ences except  entomology,  and  ask  him  to  find  one  of  those  Coleop- 
tera for  you.  He  will  be  absolutely  unable  to  do  so. 

708.  Spencer  has  another  animistic  theory,  which  involves  him  in 
a  neo-euhemerism,  the  point  of  arrival  being  the  same  as  in  the 
ancient,  but  the  proof  different.  Ancient  euhemerism  had  pseudo- 
historical  proofs  (the  ego  ipse  vidi  of  Euhemerus).  This  new  system 
rests  on  the  implications  of  certain  facts  that  seem  probable  to  us — 
something  analogous  to  the  evolution  in  religious  theory  which  sub- 
stitutes inner  experience  for  external  authority  (§  627). 

709.  Spencer  assumes  that  the  savage  interprets  dreams,  trance 
phenomena,  death,  with  rigorous  logic.  By  a  series  of  ingenious  in- 
ferences primitive  man  arrives  at  the  conclusion  that  human  beings 


I 


§711  THEORY  OF  ANIMISM  433 

have  doubles  which  may  separate  themselves  from  the  body,  and 
then  extends  that  conclusion  to  plants  and  inanimate  objects.  Since 
syncope  and  catalepsis  are  mere  temporary  states,  the  savage,  reason- 
ing as  Spencer,  Ibid.,  §  99,  thinks  he  ought  to  reason,  believes  that 
death  also  is  temporary,  or,  if  permanent,  is  so  because  the  double 
is  kept  av^^ay  from  the  "body  too  long:  "Belief  in  re-animation  im- 
plies belief  in  a  subsequent  life."  Hence,  w^ith  the  same  logic,  arises 
the  idea  of  another  world.  Ibid.,  §  114:  "The  transition  from  a  moun- 
tain abode  to  an  abode  in  the  sky,  conceived  as  the  sky  is  by  primi- 
tive men,  presents  no  difficulties."  So  now  we  have  the  sky  peopled 
with  the  doubles  of  human  beings.  "But  ,  .  .  besides  the  above 
origin,  carrying  with  it  the  belief  that  departed  souls  of  men  live  on 
the  mountain-tops,  or  in  the  heavens,  there  is  another  possible,  and 
indeed  probable,  origin,  not  carrying  such  a  conclusion;  but,  con- 
trariwise, restricting  this  heavenly  abode  to  a  different  race  of  be- 
ings." It  is  "an  invading  race  which,  bringing  knowledge,  skill,  arts 
and  implements,  unknown  to  the  natives,  were  regarded  as  beings 
of  superior  kind,  just  as  civilized  men  now  are  by  savages."  These 
conquerors  established  themselves  on  the  heights  near  the  clouds, 
and  became  inhabitants  of  the  sky,  divinities. 

710.  The  origin  of  the  gods  once  determined  in  this  manner,  the 
rest  of  religion  comes  easily.  Says  Spencer,  §  162:  ".  .  .  the  wor- 
ship of  the  fetich  is  the  worship  of  an  indwelling  ghost,  or  a  super- 
natural being  derived  from  the  ghost."  §  164:  "Propitiation  of  the 
dead,  which,  originating  funeral  rites,  develops  into  the  observances 
constituting  worship  in  general,  has  thus  among  its  other  divergent 
results  idol-worship  and  fetich-worship."  ^ 

711.  Spencer's  theory  is  neither  better  nor  worse  than  other  sim- 
ilar theories.  They  all  have  one  trait  in  common:  Certain  conjectures 
roughly  compatible  with  observable  fact  are  taken  as  premises;  then 
this  or  that  conclusion  is  drawn,  reasoning  as  one  thin\s  primitive 
man  must  have  reasoned.  That  tells  us  the  way  things  went  in  times 
on  which  we  have  no  historical,  no  experimental,  data  of  any  kind. 

710  ^  Spencer  also  explains  totemism  and  myths  such  as  the  solar  myth  by  his 
theory.  See  our  §  793. 


434  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §712 

712.  These  theories  undoubtedly  contain  a  certain  amount  of  ex- 
perimental truth.  They  go  wrong  in  leaping  from  the  particular  to 
the  general,  like  a  person  seeing  a  forest  of  pine-trees  and  conclud- 
ing that  all  forests  are  of  pine.  In  totemism  the  experimentally  true 
part  is  very  considerable.  Salomon  Reinach  suggests  stating  the  code 
of  totemism  as  follows:  ^  "i.  Certain  animals  are  neither  killed  nor 
eaten,  but  some  few  specimens  are  raised  and  cared  for.  i.  The  acci- 
dental death  of  such  an  animal  is  regularly  mourned  and  it  is  buried 
with  the  honours  customarily  accorded  to  human  members  of  the 
clan.  3.  Sometimes  the  alimentary  interdiction  applies  only  to  some 
part  of  the  animal's  body.  4.  When  animals  ordinarily  exempt  from 
slaughter  are  killed  in  view  of  some  urgent  necessity,  excuses  are 
offered  to  them  and  efforts  are  made  in  various  ways  to  mitigate  the 
violation  of  the  taboo — the  slaughter  of  the  animal.  5.  After  a  ta- 
booed animal  has  been  sacrificed  according  to  ritual  it  is  mourned. 
6.  The  skins  of  certain  animals  are  worn  by  human  beings,  espe- 
cially in  religious  ceremonies.  Where  totemism  prevails,  such  ani- 
mals are  totems.  7.  Clans  and  their  individual  members  have  animal 
names.  Where  totemism  prevails,  such  animals  are  totems.  8.  Some 
clans  decorate  their  banners  and  weapons  with  pictures  of  animals 
and  certain  individuals  paint  or  tattoo  them  on  their  bodies.  9.  It 
is  assumed  that  totem  animals  of  species  dangerous  to  human  be- 
ings spare  members  of  the  totemic  clan,  but  only  provided  they  are 
such  by  birth.  10.  Totem  animals  help  and  protect  members  of  the 
totemic  clan.  11.  Totem  animals  reveal  the  future  to  their  worship- 
pers and  guide  their  conduct.  12.  Members  of  a  totemic  clan  often 
believe  themselves  related  by  blood-descent  to  the  totem  animal." 

713.  This  code  is  too  particularized,  too  definite.  It  would  be  truer 
to  the  facts  to  say  that  totemism,  as  understood  by  one  writer  or 
another  (§  718  ^),  is  a  state  of  mind  in  which  certain  animals  are  re- 
spected, honoured,  revered,  human  beings  considering  themselves 
bound  to  them  by  certain  ties,  doing  them  favours,  and  expecting 
favours  in  return.^ 

712  ^  Cubes,  my  the  s  et  religions.  Vol.  I,  pp.  17-26. 

713  ^  More  recently  in  his  Orpheus,  Chap.  I,  §  28  (Simmonds,  pp.  13-14),  Reinach 
does  not  press  the  complete  code:  "It  is  difficult  to  define  totemism.  We  may  say. 


I 


§7l6  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  435 

714.  Many  writers  have  dealt  with  these  phenomena,  usually  try- 
ing to  prove  general  what  is  strictly  particular.  Totemism  has  been 
regarded  as  nothing  less  than  the  "origin"  of  religion,  and  when- 
ever some  fancy  even  remotely  suggesting  totemism  has  been  found, 
it  has  been  taken  as  proof  of  the  existence  of  totemism  in  that  local- 
ity. Reinach  uses  such  proofs  in  large  numbers  and  Frazer  is  more 
extreme  still,  taking  the  slightest  allusion  to  an  animal  as  proof  of 
the  presence  of  totemism. 

715.  Unwittingly,  doubtless,  such  writers  reason  after  the  manner 
of  the  palaeontologist  who,  given  a  few  fossil  bones,  is  able  to  re- 
construct the  whole  animal  from  which  they  came.  But  the  two 
cases  are  very  different.  The  animal  is  an  individual  unit  where  the 
parts  stand  in  necessary  relations — dentition  with  feeding,  for  in- 
stance. Nothing  of  the  kind  obtains  in  the  arbitrary  complex  to 
which  the  term  "totemism"  has  been  appHed.  A  lion's  jaw  cannot 
belong  to  a  herbivorous  animal;  but  it  is  quite  possible  for  the  fact 
that  honours  are  paid  to  an  animal  to  have  no  connexion  with  any 
of  the  other  characteristics  said  to  be  peculiar  to  totemism. 

716.  Let  us,  as  usual,  see  what  experience  has  to  say  (§  547).  Sup- 
pose some  centuries  hence  only  a  few  isolated  facts  are  available  as 
to  the  Florentine  Republic.  It  will  be  evident  that  the  Republic  kept 
lions,  that  the  street  where  they  lived  was  called  the  Via  dei  Leoni, 
a  name  it  bore  for  centuries.  Excavations  conducted  on  the  site  of 
Florence  yield  any  quantity  of  little  stone  lions  called  marzocchi. 
It  is  further  known  that  when  the  Republic  conquered  a  place  a 
column  topped  by  a  marzocco  was  erected  there.  And  what  not? 
There  are  legends  to  show  that  lions  respected  Florentine  citizens 

subject  to  more  detailed  definition  hereafter,  that  it  is  a  sort  of  worship  that  is  paid 
to  animals  and  plants  considered  as  allies  and  kindred  of  the  human  being."  Frazer, 
Totemism,  pp.  1-2:  "A  totem  is  a  class  of  material  objects  which  a  savage  regards 
with  superstitious  respect,  believing  that  there  exists  between  him  and  every  mem- 
ber of  the  class  an  intimate  and  altogether  special  relation.  .  .  .  The  connexion  be- 
tween a  man  and  his  totem  is  mutually  beneficent:  the  totem  protects  the  man, 
and  the  man  shows  his  respect  for  the  totem  in  various  ways,  by  not  killing  it  if 
it  be  an  animal,  and  not  cutting  or  gathering  it  if  it  be  a  plant.  As  distinguished 
from  a  fetich,  a  totem  is  never  an  isolated  individual,  but  always  a  class  of  objects, 
generally  a  species  of  animals  or  of  plants,  more  rarely  a  class  of  inanimate  natural 
objects,  very  rarely  a  class  of  ardficial  objects." 


436  THE   MIND   AND   SOCIETY  ^^^7 

exactly  as  the  code  of  totemism  requires.  So  one  could  marshal  a 
mass  of  evidence  far  more  impressive  than  is  required  to  satisfy  the 
champions  of  totemism  in  such  cases;  and  if  wq  are  to  follow  them 
in  their  reasoning,  we  are  forced  to  admit  that  the  lion  was  the 
totem  of  the  Florentines  in  the  days  of  their  Republic.  And  yet  we 
are  certain  that  that  was  not  the  case ;  nor  is  there  the  slightest  prob- 
ability that  the  marzocco  was  the  Florentine  totem  in  times  more 
ancient,  say  in  the  days  of  the  Roman  Republic,  or  in  some  epoch 
still  more  remote.  If  such  a  mass  of  fact  does  not  prove  totemism 
in  this  case,  how  are  proofs  fewer  in  number  and  less  significant  to 
do  so  in  similar  cases  ?  ^ 
717.  At  Muri  (near  Berne)  in  Switzerland  a  group  design  repre- 

716  ^  Villani,  Cronica,  Bk.  VI,  Chap.  69:  "At  the  time  of  the  People  of  Florence, 
a  very  handsome  and  mighty  lion  was  presented  to  the  Commune,  and  it  was 
caged  in  the  Piazza  di  San  Giovanni.  It  came  to  pass  that  through  the  remissness 
of  its  guard,  the  lion  escaped  from  its  coop  and  began  running  through  the  streets, 
whereat  all  the  city  was  terrified.  And  it  chanced  to  come  to  the  Orto  San  Michele 
and  there  it  seized  a  child  and  lay  holding  him  between  its  paws.  The  child's 
cries  were  heard  by  his  mother,  who  had  no  other  child  and  had  been  with  this 
child  when  the  father  died;  and  she  ran  upon  the  lion  as  if  mad,  wailing  and 
tearing  her  hair,  and  snatched  the  child  from  the  lion's  paws.  And  the  lion  did  no 
harm  either  to  the  woman  or  to  the  child;  he  only  looked  on,  and  did  not  stir. 
[All  in  strict  obedience  to  Article  9  of  Reinach's  totemic  code  (§  712).]  There  was 
a  great  question  as  to  what  chance  it  was,  whether  the  gentleness  of  the  lion's  na- 
ture, or  Fortune,  which  preserved  the  life  of  said  child  that  he  might  grow  up  and 
avenge  his  father,  as  he  afterwards  did."  What  Villani  calls  the  "gentleness  of  the 
lion's  nature"  was  evidently  the  benevolence  of  the  totem  for  its  clan.  One  need 
only  compare  any  number  of  totemistic  explanations  with  this  one  to  see  that 
their  proofs  are  not  as  strong,  but  that  they  are  accepted  in  all  conviction.  If  one 
had  time  to  waste  on  such  investigations,  other  documents  could  readily  be  found 
to  support  our  totemistic  interpretation  of  the  Florentine  marzocco — for  example, 
Bayle,  Dictionnaire  historiqtte,  s.v.  Delphintts  (quoting  Mabillon):  "The  inhabi- 
tants of  Arezzo  had  torn  down  a  stone  lion  (note  by  Bayle:  "The  coat-of-arms  of  the 
city  of  Florence.")  that  stood  on  the  tower  of  the  cathedral  and  thrown  it  into  a 
well.  When  the  French  entered  the  city  under  Charles  VIII,  the  lion  was  taken  out 
and  placed  in  the  middle  of  the  main  street  and  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  who 
passed  that  way  were  obliged  to  kneel  down  before  it  and  ask  forgiveness  for  their 
revolt."  If  that  were  the  only  document  known,  what  a  pretty  totemistic  theory 
might  be  derived  from  it!  The  lion  in  question  was  a  marzocco,  and  the  episode 
is  just  one  of  the  many  historical  instances  of  the  compulsory  saluting  of  a  flag  that 
has  been  insulted.  Bayle's  note  makes  everything  clear.  Without  it,  a  person  not 
knowing  that  the  marzocco  was  the  emblem  of  Florence  might  have  imagined 
anything  except  a  compulsory  salute  to  a  flag. 


§719  THEORY  OF  TOTEMISM  437 

senting  a  goddess  and  a  she-bear  has  been  discovered — that,  and 
nothing  more.  It  has  been  taken  as  proving  the  existence  of  a  totemic 
clan  with  the  bear  as  totem/  If  that  is  all  the  proof  we  need,  why 
could  we  not  just  as  well  conclude  that  Venice  was  inhabited  by  a 
totemic  clan  with  the  lion  as  totem  ?  In  Venice  we  have  something 
better  than  a  single  group.  Designs  representing  a  man  and  a  lion 
can  be  seen  there  almost  anywhere!  We  know  that  the  man  is  St. 
Mark;  but  if  we  did  not,  we  might  take  him  for  a  god,  just  as  the 
Swiss  figure  has  been  taken  for  a  goddess.  And  if  the  goddess  and 
her  she-bear  prove  a  totemic  clan,  why  should  not  St.  Mark  and  his 
lion  serve  the  same  purpose? 

If  the  argument  in  the  case  of  the  Berne  group  were  designed 
merely  to  suggest  a  line  of  inquiry,  it  might  be  considered,  for  in 
that  case  it  would  work  equally  well  for  Florence  and  Venice,  As 
regards  Berne,  the  investigation  can  go  no  farther  for  lack  of  docu- 
ments, and  we  give  up  without  reaching  any  conclusions.  As  for 
Florence  and  Venice,  historical  evidence  is  abundant,  and  we  go 
on — to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  no  trace  of  totemism  there. 

718.  Totemism  as  understood  by  not  a  few  writers  presents  a 
number  of  characteristics.  A,  B,C,D.  .  .  .  We  have  just  seen  that  if 
A  is  present  in  a  certain  people,  we  can  by  no  means  infer  that  B, 
C  D  ...  are  present  also.  Conversely,  if  A  is  not  present,  we  cannot 
conclude,  either,  that  B,  C,D  .  .  .  are  not  present.^ 

719.  This  latter  consideration  vitiates  certain  criticisms  that  Fou- 
cart  makes  of  totemism.  He  observes,  for  example,^  that  "all  the 
members  of  the  Indian  tribe  call  themselves  descendants  and  rela- 
tives of  the  totem  animal.  Among  the  Egyptians  only  the  chief  is 
a  descendant  of  the  animal  god.  The  Pharaoh  of  historic  times  is 
the  only  person  who  is  a  child  of  the  Sparrow-hawk,  who  bears  its 
name  and  is,  in  view  of  that,  heir  to  the  realm  of  the  Sparrow-hawk, 

717  ^  Reinach,  Cultes,  mythes  et  religions.  Vol.  I,  pp.  55-58. 

718  ^  One  must  not  forget  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  totemism  in  the  sense 
in  which  there  is  such  a  thing  as  an  animal  called  the  elephant.  What  exists  is  a 
number  of  states  of  mind  that  certain  writers  have  seen  fit  to  gather  into  one  class 
which  they  then  proceed  to  designate  as  "totemism."  How  such  a  class  is  to  be 
made  up  is  within  certain  limits  a  matter  of  arbitrary  choice. 

719  ^  La  methode  comparative  dans  I'histoire  des  religions,  pp.  72-73. 


438  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §720 

and  the  latter's  high-priest.  The  other  individuals  in  the  nation  are 
not  and  do  not  pretend  to  be  Sparrow-hawks."  It  is  quite  conceiv- 
able that  the  chieftains  may  have  usurped  something  that  formerly 
belonged  to  everyone  and  made  it  exclusively  their  own.  But  apart 
from  that  objection  and  others  of  the  kind,  Foucart's  thesis  would 
only  prove  that  there  are  totemisms  with  the  traits  he  indicates.  It 
would  prove  nothing  against  totemism  in  general.  Before  it  could 
prove  anything  in  that  direction  totemism  would  have  to  be  a  single 
indivisible  unit.  The  same  thing  might  be  said  for  his  other  stric- 
tures. What  Foucart  shows,  in  a  word,  is  that,  possibly,  the  totemic 
code  of  Reinach  does  not  hold  for  Egypt  as  we  know  Egypt.  He 
has  by  no  means  shown  that  the  Egyptians  did  not  have  relations 
with  animals  similar  to  those  described  as  totemism.^  Similar  objec- 
tions may  be  made  to  the  theory  that  religion  originated  in  magic. 
720.  B-^y.  Historical  facts  are  deviations  from  a  type,  or  consti- 
\tute  a  series  with  a  limit.  Oftentimes  in  the  view  of  their  authors 
Isuch  theories  contain  a  principle  superior  to  experience,  and  ought 
therefore  to  be  classified  in  K-y  (§575);  but  they  are  represented 
,  strictly  as  experimental  theories  and  therefore  belong  here/ 

719  ^  Foucart's  argument,  pp.  52-54,  runs:  "These  animal-cults,  which  are  so 
constant,  so  unvarying,  in  their  characteristic  traits,  seem  to  be  as  ancient  as  Egyp- 
tian religion  itself.  They  go  back  to  its  very  origins,  if  one  may  presume  to  speak 
of  times  that  we  shall  never  know  directly.  ...  So  there  we  have,  in  Egypt,  the 
[essential]  traits  of  zoolatry:  gods  of  animal  form,  and  human  leaders  who  are 
their  direct  descendants.  How  did  such  a  notion  come  into  being?  It  must  have 
derived  from  beliefs  of  the  Egyptians,  and  from  conceptions  they  had  of  the  sen- 
sible world  in  which  they  moved.  [So  they  began,  good  souls,  by  framing  a  theory 
of  the  sensible  world  and  went  on  from  there  to  invent  their  gods!  The  usual 
mania  for  logical  interpretations!  And  what  a  complicated  theory  they  worked  out, 
according  to  Foucart!]  ...  In  their  eyes  everything  in  nature  was  alive,  even  what 
we  call  inanimate  objects.  Nature  was  made  up  of  two  elements  [They  even  knew 
elements!]:  a  material  wrapping,  the  body,  and  another  element,  subder,  invisible, 
but  likewise  material,  to  which  they  gave  various  names — soul,  spirit,  double.  The 
combination  [of  the  two  elements]  was  indispensable  if  a  body  was  to  be  alive." 
If  Foucart  had  only  added  that  those  primitive  peoples,  living  in  times  "that  we 
shall  never  know  directly,"  also  invented  algebra,  his  picture  would  be  complete. 
See  §§  701,  695  1. 

720  ^  The  contrast  between  the  two  varieties  comes  out  very  strikingly  in  certain 
passages  in  the  Doctrine  Saint-Simonienne ,  Exposition,  2*"^  seance,  1854,  pp.  82,  68 
(Bougle-Halevy,  pp.  179-80,  158)  (italicized  words  are  so  printed  in  the  original 
French) :  "It  is  our  task  to  show  to  an  age  that  claims  to  be  above  all  else  rational 


§723  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  439 

721.  We  find,  for  instance,  the  hypothesis  of  a  primitive  state  of 
rehgious  perfection.  That  state  reappears  in  some  contemporary  re- 
ligion, and  the  latter,  naturally,  is  the  "true"  religion.  Other  reli- 
gions exemplified  in  history  are  deviations,  or  degenerations,  from 
the  type.  We  also  find  the  opposite  hypothesis :  The  various  historical 
religions  are  imperfect  efforts  gradually  approximating  perfection. 
The  perfection  here  is  located  at  the  limit  approximated  through 
the  deviations.  In  the  other  hypothesis  it  lay  in  the  original  religion 
and  the  deviations  represented  departure  from  it.  Controversies  as 
to  primitive  states  of  religious  perfection  are  interesting  primarily 
to  attackers  or  defenders  of  Hebrew^-Christian  beliefs.  They  lie, 
therefore,  in  part,  outside  the  domain  of  sociology. 

722.  For  long  centuries  in  Europe  the  primitive  state  of  perfec- 
tion w^as  a  dogma  that  could  not  be  questioned  without  peril.  Even- 
tually the  reaction  came,  and  the  dogma  was  superseded  by  another, 
not  as  yet  enforced  by  the  secular  arm,  which  locates  the  state  of 
perfection  at  the  end  of  the  evolution. 

723.  We  must  hold  aloof  from  the  controversy  and  keep  strictly 
to  the  domain  of  experimental  science.  Believers  also  can  stick  to 
that  domain,  provided  they  are  willing  to  distinguish  faith  from 
experience.  That  is  what  Father  Marie-Joseph  Lagrange  does  in  his 
studies  on  Semitic  religions,  and  what  certain  worshippers  of  the 
god  Progress  fail  to  do — notably  Messrs.  Aulard,  Bayet  &  Co.^ 

that  our  beliefs  as  to  the  future  of  mankind,  which  have  been  revealed  to  us  by  a 
keen  sympathy  and  an  ardent  desire  to  contribute  to  human  happiness,  are  justified 
by  the  most  rigorous  examination  of  the  facts.  .  .  .  We  stated  at  the  outset  that 
Saint-Simon's  conception  was  verifiable  by  history.  Do  not  expect  from  us,  how- 
ever, any  discussion  of  partial  facts  or  any  elucidation  of  details  that  are  buried 
away  in  forgotten  chronicles.  [The  usual  procedure:  experience  is  accepted  in  pre- 
tence, but  then  at  once  discarded.]  We  are  to  consider  only  the  general  laws  that 
control  (dominent)  all  such  facts,  laws  as  simple  and  as  constant  as  those  that 
govern  the  organization  of  the  human  body  (?  de  I'homme).  ...  It  was  Saint- 
Simon's  mission  to  discover  those  laws,  and  he  left  them  to  the  world  as  a  sublime 
legacy.  Our  mission,  as  his  disciples,  is  to  carry  on  his  revelation,  to  develop  and 
propagate  his  noble  ideas." 

723  ^  Etudes  sur  les  religions  semitiqties,  published  with  the  imprimatur  of  the 
Archbishop  of  Paris.  Says  Father  Lagrange,  p.  i:  "Our  intention  in  studying 
Semitic  religion  has  been  simply  to  elucidate  certain  dark  areas  in  the  religions  of 
the  peoples  that  were  neighbours  or  relatives  of  Israel.  That  domain  has  been  so 


440  THE  MIND  AND   SOCIETY  §724 

724.  Keeping  strictly  to  the  facts,  we  see  that  the  development  in 
/  religion  does  not  show  a  uniformly  progressive  movement,  ab  (Fig- 
ure 13),  but  follows  an  undulating  line,  pqrst,  now  rising,  now 
falling. 

far  but  scantily  explored,  and  meantime  discoveries  in  epigraphy  are  daily  extend- 
ing it.  The  wiser  part,  therefore,  would  surely  be  to  halt  at  merely  collecting  the 
new  facts  and  drawing  the  more  certain  conclusions  from  them.  For  our  part,  we 
have  done  our  best  to  banish  all  preconceived  ideas  from  our  mind.  We  do  not 
consider  ourselves   called   upon   to   deal   with   the   original   Revelation,    since   the 
Scripture  that  transmits  it  to  us  also  explains  that  it  has  been  obliterated.  [Theory 
of  decadence  from  the  type.]  We  have  never  yielded  to  the  temptation  of  stressing 
the  symptoms  of  religious  degeneration  more  than  was  required."  We  need  not  de- 
cide here  how  far  Father  Lagrange  succeeded  in  keeping  his  promise.  It  is  evident 
enough  from  his  book  that  it  was  made  in  all  good  faith.  Compare  his  programme, 
now,  with  the  programme  of  the  official  historiographer  of  the  French  Revolution, 
M.  Aulard,  in  Histoire  politique  de  la  revolution  jrancaise.  Preface,  p.  v:  "In  this 
political  history  of  the  French  Revolution,  I  intend  to  show  how  the  principles  of 
the  Bill  of  Rights  were  carried  out  in  institutions  between  the  years  1789  and  1804, 
or  interpreted  in  the  speeches,  writings,  and  acts  of  [political]  pardes  and  in  the 
various  manifestations  of  public  opinion."  M.  Aulard  is  probably  not  aware  that  he 
is  imitating  Bossuet,  who  sets  out  in  his  Discourse  on  Universal  History  to  show 
how  the  insdtutions  and  cultures  of  mankind  have  been  governed  by  designs  of 
Providence.  Says  Bossuet,  Discours,  Pt.  Ill,  Chap.  I:  "So  all  the  great  empires  that 
have  been  seen  on  earth  have  contributed  in  one  way  or  another  to  the  welfare  of 
religion  and  the  glory  of  God,  as  God  Himself  declared  through  His  prophets." 
M.  Aulard  continues:  "The  logical  consequence  of  the  principle  of  equality  is  democ- 
racy. The  logical  consequence  of  the  principle  of  national  sovereignty  is  the  repub- 
lic. [O  unhappy  Logic,  how  many  stupidities  are  uttered  in  thy  name!]  Those  two 
consequences  were  not  drawn  at  once.  [Because,  unluckily  for  them,  the  people  of 
those  days  did  not  have  an  expert  logician  handy,  such  as  M.  Aulard.]  Instead  of 
democracy  the  men  of  '89  set  up  a  bourgeois  system  based  on  property  qualifica- 
tions; instead  of  the  republic,  they  organized  a  limited  monarchy."  In  the  Aulard 
coUecdon,  M.  Bayet  published  a  little  handbook  for  French  elementary  schools  en- 
titled Lessons  on  Morals,  Intermediate  Grades  (Lecons,  etc.).  He  apprises  us.  Preface, 
pp.  i-ii,  that  his  aim  is  to  stress  "the  difference  between  sciendfic  truths,  which 
only  the  ignorant  can  refuse  to  recognize,  and  religious  or  metaphysical  beliefs, 
which  each  of  us  has  the  right  to  accept,  reject,  or  modify  as  he  pleases."  That  is 
the  mere  metaphysics  of  "science,"  failing  as  it  does  to  recognize  the  essentially  con- 
tingent character  of  "scientific  truths."  If  M.  Bayet  had  any  knowledge  whatever  of 
experimental  science  he  would  know  that  science  is  in  process  of  continuous  change 
and  that  it  progresses  precisely  because  scientists  "refuse  to  recognize"  certain  prin- 
ciples that  have  always  been  regarded  as  "scientific  truths."  Among  the  "scientific 
truths"  of  M.  Bayet  one  notes  a  very  handsome  theory  of  religion  and  another  al- 
most as  pretty  of  the  origin  of  religion.  Says  he,  p.  155  (capitals  and  italics  his): 
"Since  we  cannot  know,  scientifically,  what  takes  place  after  death,  men  have  tried 
to  GUESS,  and  they  have  put  forward  no  end  of  speculations  on  the  subject.  Some 


§726  THE  GOLDEN  SAGA  AND  UTOPIAS  44 1 

725.  The  mythologies  of  Hesiod  and  Homer  are  certainly  less  ab- 
stract, less  fine-spun,  than  Plato's  religion,  which  is  also  more  ab- 
stract and  subtle  than  the  religion  of  the  Gospels  and  the  early 
Church  Fathers.  It  seems  probable  that  after  an  archaic  period  of 
high  civilization  ancient  Greece  ex- 
perienced a  Middle  Ages  followed  by 
a  Renaissance — something  analogous  to 
what  took  place  in  Europe  between  the 
days  of  the  Roman  Republic  and  our 
own. 

726.  Our  data  on  Egyptian  religion 
seem  to  lead  to  similar  conclusions. 
This  shows  a  number  of  oscillations.  r>- 

Figure  13 

In  a  study  of  the  later  religion  of  An- 
cient Egypt,  Erman  writes:^  "Anyone  who  has  followed  the  de- 
velopment of  Egyptian  religion  thus  far  might  imagine  that  it  was 
advancing  towards  complete  disintegration  and  an  early  end.  Thor- 
oughly exhausted,  seeming  as  it  were  to  survive  itself,  the  Egyp- 
tian people  had  fallen  prey  to  foreign  conquerors.  Nevertheless 
that  aged  people  rose  again  and  with  it  its  religion  took  on  a  new 
life,  if  not  a  new  youth.  Towards  the  end  of  the  eighth  century 
[b.c]  we  stumble  on  the  remarkable  symptom  of  a  reversion  to- 
wards the  ideas  of  the  people.  ...  By  that  return  to  the  old  Egyp- 
tian spirit,  religion  itself  acquired  new  strength,  and  to  a  greater 
degree  than  ever  before  permeated  all  branches  of  people's  lives,  as 
though  it  were  their  sole  object  in  living.  .  .  .  But  it  was  right  there, 

have  said  that  after  death  nothing  happens  at  all.  Others  have  thought  that  after 
death  men  stand  in  the  presence  of  an  eternal  being,  supremely  good,  supremely 
just:  GOD.  They  have  beheved  that  God  judged  men,  rewarding  or  punishing  them. 
On  that  account  they  have  said  that  men  should  honour  and  worship  God,  and  they 
have  fixed  on  the  prayers  with  which  He  should  be  addressed  and  the  ceremonies 
that  should  be  performed  in  His  honour.  So  a  certain  nimiber  of  religions  came 
into  being."  Bayet  should  have  read  an  elementary  text-book  on  the  history  of  reli- 
gions himself.  Before  setting  out  to  teach  other  people,  it  is  a  credit  to  a  man  to 
have  learned  sometliing  on  his  own  account.  These  estimable  gentlemen,  not  being 
able  to  persuade  others  by  argmnent,  are  now  prosecuting  anyone  who  fails  to 
pay  due  respect  to  their  profound  science. 

726  ^  Aegyptische  Religion,  pp.  169-70  (Johns,  pp.  169-70). 


442  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  ^7-7 

under  those  conditions,  that  the  strange  side  of  the  Egyptian  faith, 
such  as  the  worship  of  animals,  attained  its  most  exaggerated  de- 
velopment." 

727.  Reasoning  a  priori  one  might  be  inclined  to  suppose  that 
animal-worship  in  Egypt  began  by  embracing  a  whole  species  of 
animals,  becoming  more  restricted  later  on.  But  in  the  case  of  at 
least  one  of  the  oscillations  accessible  to  observation  the  worship  of 
one  animal  was  extended  to  embrace  all  animals  of  the  species. 
That,  however,  does  not  in  the  least  prove  that  that  particular  oscil- 
lation had  not  been  preceded  by  another  in  the  opposite  direction. 

728.  The  theory  that  locates  perfection  at  the  end  of  an  evolution 
is  generally  conjoined  with  another  to  which  we  have  often  alluded, 
and  according  to  which  present-day  savages  would  be  very  similar 
to  the  prehistoric  ancestors  of  the  civilized  peoples  (§291).  Two 
fixed  points  are  thus  obtained  for  determining  the  line  of  evolution, 
and  by  prolonging  it  sufficiently  people  obtain,  or  think  they  obtain, 
the  limit  that  the  evolution  will  approximate  in  the  future. 

729.  Spencer,  for  instance,  would  combat  the  theory  that  attributes 
ancestor-worship  to  inferior  races.  It  is  surprising,  he  objects,^  "that 
adherents  of  the  Evolution-doctrine  should  admit  a  distinction  so 
profound  between  the  minds  of  different  human  races.  .  .  .  Those 
who  believe  in  creation  by  manufacture,  may  consistently  hold  that 
Aryans  and  Semites  were  supernaturally  endowed  with  higher  con- 
ceptions than  Turanians.  If  species  of  animals  were  separately  made 
with  fundamental  differences,  varieties  of  men  may  have  been  so  too. 
But  to  assert  that  the  human  type  has  been  derived  from  lower  types, 
and  then  to  deny  that  the  superior  human  races  have  been  evolved, 
mentally  as  well  as  physically,  from  the  inferior,  and  must  once  have 
had  those  general  conceptions  which  the  inferior  still  have,  is  a 
marvellous  inconsistency." 

730.  That  is  metaphysical  and  not  scientific  thinking.  In  the  first 
place,  the  relations  between  facts  of  the  present  and  facts  of  the  past 
cannot  be  confined  within  the  alternative  of  either  creation  or  uni- 
tary evolution  (§  344).  In  the  second  place,  accepting  for  the  moment 

729  ^  Principles  of  Sociology,  Vol.  I,  §  150. 


I 


M 


§731  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  443 

the  doctrine  of  a  unitary  evolution,  it  is  not  proved  that  the  back- 
ward races  of  our  day  are  identical  with  our  prehistoric  ancestors. 
The  probability,  rather,  is  that  they  differ  greatly,  for  the  reason — if 
for  no  other — that  they  were  lacking  in  those  qualities  which  resulted 
in  civilizing  our  races.  Nor  is  there  any  proof,  either,  that  mental 
evolution  has  to  run  parallel  with  physical  evolution.  Finally,  even 
if  it  did,  why  might  it  not  have  sent  off  two  branches,  A  and  B, 

from  a  common  trunk,  M,  one  of  which  has  ended  in 

7? 

ancestor- worship,  the  other  in  a  different  belief.?  Just 
such  an  evolution  has  certainly  taken  place  on  the 
physical  side,  on  the  assumption  of  a  common  trunk, 
M,  since  we  now  have  at  least  three  racial  branches, 
the  white,  the  black,  and  the  red. 

Figure  14 

731.  The  theory  that  contemporary  savages  are  iden- 
tical with,  or  at  least  similar  to,  the  prehistoric  ancestors  of  civilized 
peoples  has  many  opponents  nowadays.  But  as  usual  people  have 
gone  from  one  extreme  to  the  other  and  now  assert  that  savages  rep- 
resent the  senility  rather  than  the  infancy  of  the  human  races.  That, 
evidently,  is  a  consequence  of  the  belief  that  locates  the  perfect  state 
at  the  beginning  of  evolution  instead  of  at  the  end.  But  the  facts  elude 
such  a  priori  syntheses.  If  the  ancient  Gauls  as  they  stood  before  the 
Roman  invasion  have  to  be  compared  either  with  savages  or  with 
the  Frenchmen  of  our  day,  it  is  clear  that  they  stand  closer  to  the 
former  than  to  the  latter;  and,  conversely,  one  could  not  admit  that 
the  savages  of  our  day  are  less  like  the  ancient  Gauls  than  like 
modern  Frenchmen.^ 

731  ^  De  Morgan,  Les  premieres  civilisations,  p.  45:  "The  Homo  (Pithecanthropus) 
alalus  .  .  .  still  unable  to  speak,  Haeckel's  Homo  stupidus,  Mortillet's  Anthropo- 
pithecus  Bourgeois!  and  Ribeiroi,  are  hypothetical  creatures  whose  existence  rests  on 
nothing  but  guesswork  devoid  of  definite  scientific  basis.  That  theory  implies  the 
original  unity  of  the  human  species,  which  seems  to  be  true  of  the  races  living 
today  but  may  not  have  been  for  others  that  have  disappeared.  Those  theories  are 
altogether  gratuitous,  beyond  any  doubt;  but  they  have  nevertheless  acquired  status 
as  axioms  in  the  minds  of  many  people  and  have  served  during  recent  years  as 
foundations  for  a  number  of  theories  in  which  fancy  takes  the  place  of  scientific 
thinking.  [Note  by  De  Morgan:  "Elisee  Reclus,  among  others,  carries  things  to  a  ri- 
diculous extreme  in  his  L'hommc  et  la  terre.  He  goes  so  far  as  to  regard  domestic  ani- 


444  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §732 

732.  If  the  "historical  series"  of  the  Saint-Simonians  be  considered 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  experimental  demonstration  that  they 
think  they  can  give  of  it,  it  belongs  in  this  present  category,  6-/^3,  as 
does  also  Comte's  theory  of  the  "three  phases"  and  further,  Spencer's 
theory  of  "pre-morality."  Spencer  tries  to  derive  morality  from 
experience.  He  encounters  facts  that  are  not  in  accord  vv^ith  his  ideas, 
and  to  be  rid  of  them  says  that  they  belong  not  to  morality  but  to 
"pre-morality."  ^ 

733.  B-1^4:  Myths  and  the  like  are  imitations  of  other  myths.  Ac- 
cording to  this  principle,  whenever  two  institutions  are  similar,  one 
is  held  to  be  a  copy  of  the  other.  Here  again  the  error  lies  merely  in 
trying  at  all  costs  to  generalize  a  fact  that  may  be  altogether  true  in 
the  particular  case,  and  in  so  overstepping  experience. 

734.  As  usual,  let  us  fall  back  on  the  method  suggested  in  §  547. 
We  have  remarkable  instances  of  almost  identical  institutions  that 
seem  really  not  to  have  been  copied  from  one  another.  Describing  a 
custom  at  Marseilles  Petronius  writes :  ^  "Whenever  the  Marsilians 
were  harassed  by  plague,  some  beggar  used  to  volunteer  to  be  sup- 
ported in  the  greatest  luxury  at  public  expense  for  a  whole  year. 
Then  clad  in  sacred  vestments  and  decked  with  vervain,  he  was 

mals  (in  view  of  improvements  they  have  made)  as  'candidates  for  humanity.'  "] 
Not  a  few  scientists,  or  self-styled  scientists,  regard  the  Pithecanthropus  as  our  an- 
cestor. There  is  no  proof  of  any  such  descent.  Not  a  single  fact  justifies  the  asser- 
tion that  he  was  an  ancestral  form  of  man,  or  related  even  in  a  very  remote  way  to 
our  species.  [Note  by  De  Morgan:]  Another  theory  tends  to  regard  the  simians  as 
degenerate  branches  of  the  human  race.  Cf.  J.  H.  F.  Kohlbrugge,  Die  morpho- 
logische  Abstammitng  des  Menschen,  Stuttgart,  1908." 

732  ^  [An  allusion  apparently  to  Spencer's  theory  of  an  "intuitive  moral  sense." 
Cj.  Social  Static,  pp.  17-19. — A.  L.]  For  the  historical  series  of  Saint-Simon  see  Doc- 
trine Saint-Simonienne ,  Exposition ,  1854,  pp.  18-19;  Bougle-Halevy,  pp.  92-93  (italics 
and  capitals  as  in  the  original):  "But  what  is  this  new  manner  of  envisaging  history, 
of,  as  it  were,  asking  the  past  to  foretell  the  future  of  humanity?  What  is  the  value 
of  the  proof  we  offer  in  support  of  our  dreams  for  that  future?  A  new  science,  a 
science  as  positive  as  any  other  deserving  of  that  title,  was  conceived  by  Saint-Simon 
— the  science  of  the  human  species.  His  method  is  the  method  used  in  astronomy 
or  in  physics.  Facts  are  classified  by  series  of  homogeneous  terms  and  related  in  the 
order  of  generalization  and  particularization ,  so  as  to  bring  out  their  tendency, 
show,  in  other  words,  the  law  of  increase  and  decrease  to  which  they  are  subject." 

734  '^  Fragmenta,  I  (Buechler,  p.  109).  The  fragment  was  preserved  by  Servius, 
^Ad  Vergilii  Aeneidem,  III,  v.  57  (Thilo-Hagen,  Vol.  I,  p.  346). 


^yS^  MEXICAN  RELIGION  445 

borne  about  the  streets  of  the  city  [saluted  everywhere]  with  curses 
that  all  the  city's  woes  might  fall  on  him,  and  finally  he  was  thrown 
[into  the  sea]." 

735.  The  Aztecs  in  Mexico  observed  a  similar  ceremony  every 
year.  They  chose  a  young  man  from  among  their  prisoners.  "So 
designated  for  sacrifice  a  year  in  advance,"  writes  Lucien  Biart,^  "the 
youth  was  dressed  like  the  idol  [of  the  god  Tezcatlipoca].  He  was 
free  to  walk  the  streets  of  the  city,  though  always  under  guard,  and 
was  paid  the  same  worship  as  the  image  of  the  supreme  divinity. 
Twenty  days  before  the  god's  festival  the  unlucky  youth  was  mar- 
ried to  four  girls,  and  on  the  last  five  days  efforts  were  made  to 
procure  him  every  possible  enjoyment.  On  the  morning  of  the 
ceremony  he  was  escorted  to  the  temple  with  great  pomp.  Just  before 
arriving  thither  he  bade  his  wives  adieu.  He  then  walked  beside 
the  idol  in  the  procession.  .  .  .  When  the  hour  for  the  sacrifice  was 
at  hand,  he  was  stretched  on  the  altar,  where  the  high-priest,  in  a 
most  reverent  manner,  cut  open  his  breast  and  crushed  his  heart."  ^ 

736.  The  common  conception  of  a  whole  year's  enjoyment  fol- 
lowed by  death  was  not  transmitted  from  the  ancient  Marsilians  to 
the  ancient  Mexicans,  nor  mce  versa.  It  arose  spontaneously  in  both 
places.  The  same  conception  figures  in  another  more  general  one 
in  which  human  beings  have  ever  delighted — the  desire  to  bring 

735  ^  Les  Azteqites,  pp.  125-26. 

735  ^  And  cf.  Reville,  Les  religions  du  Mexiqtie,  pp.  135-36:  "He  was  clothed  in 
the  vestments  and  decorations  of  Tezcadipoca,  and  when  he  appeared  about  the 
town  with  an  escort  of  eight  pages  in  royal  livery  he  was  worshipped  by  the  people 
as  the  divinity  itself.  The  most  attentive  care  was  taken  of  him.  He  was  bathed 
and  perfumed  and  provided  with  a  head-dress.  His  divine  uniform  was  ever  new. 
He  was  given  four  young  wives  chosen  for  their  beauty.  They  bore  the  names  of 
goddesses  and  were  instructed  to  overlook  nothing  that  might  make  their  divine 
husband  as  happy  as  possible.  During  the  three  weeks  preceding  the  ceremony 
these  honorific  distinctions  were  multiplied.  .  .  .  But  on  the  next  to  die  last  day 
of  the  festival  Tezcatlipoca's  subsdtute  was  placed  aboard  a  royal  barge  with  his 
eight  pages  and  his  four  goddesses  and  rowed  across  the  lake.  That  evening  the 
goddesses  left  their  unlucky  god  and  the  eight  pages  escorted  him  to  a  lonely 
teotcali,  some  six  miles  farther  along.  He  mounted  the  steps,  breaking  his  flutes 
one  by  one.  Reaching  the  top,  he  was  seized  by  the  priests  who  stood  there  waiting, 
stretched  without  warning  on  the  sacrificial  stone,  cut  open,  and  his  quivering 
heart  was  proffered  as  a  sacrifice  to  the  Sun." 


44^  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  ^737 

contraries,    opposites,    together    (§§910 f.).    From    it    numberless 
branches  radiate. 

737.  Reinach,  following  Frazer's  Golden  Bough,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  197, 
notes  one  such  branch,  which  in  its  turn,  forks  into  others  ^ — "a 
periodic  custom  similar  to  the  Roman  Saturnalia  and  characterized 
by  the  temporary  suspension  of  civil  and  moral  laws.  .  .  .  The  char- 
acteristic trait  of  the  Saturnalia  was  the  licence  permitted  to  slaves, 
who  became  for  a  time  masters  of  the  house.  [There  we  have  the 
contrast.  In  the  Middle  Ages  there  will  be  another  contrast  similar, 
though  not  identical,  in  All  Fools'  Day — the  fete  des  Faux.]  .  .  ? 

737  ^  Cultes,  mytlies  et  religions,  Vol.  I,  pp.  332-34. 

737  ^  Le  Bibliophile  Jacob,  Curiosites  de  I'histoire  de  France,  pp.  14-31.  Beleth, 
De  qtiadam  libertate  decembris  (in  his  Divinorttm  officiorum  rationale,  pp.  125-26), 
calls  All  Fools'  Day  "  'December  freedom,'  on  the  model  of  the  pagan  Saturnalia. 
The  'freedom'  lay  in  an  inversion  of  roles  and  ranks  in  the  clergy,  who  played  all 
sorts  of  pranks  inside  the  churches  during  the  Christmas  holidays  and  at  Twelfth- 
night.  Clerks,  deacons,  and  subdeacons  said  mass  in  place  of  the  priests.  The  priests 
danced,  shook  dice,  played  at  ball,  bowls,  and  other  games  of  chance  in  front  of 
the  altar.  The  choir-boys  masqueraded  in  costume  and  occupied  the  stalls  of  the 
canons.  On  Holy  Innocents'  Eve  they  elected  one  of  their  number  bishop,  clothed 
him  in  episcopal  robes,  anointed  him,  and  paraded  him  about  town  to  the  ringing 
of  bells  and  with  bands  of  music.  At  the  Feast  of  the  Circumcision  the  churchmen 
appeared  at  mass,  some  in  female  attire,  some  dressed  as  clowns  or  street-performers, 
others  with  their  capes  and  cassocks  inside  out  [Principle  of  contrast.],  and  almost 
all  wearing  grotesque  false  faces.  They  then  proceeded  to  elect  a  'Bishop,'  or  'Arch- 
bishop of  Fools.'  ...  At  Antibes  .  .  .  the  actors  in  the  festival  rushed  into  the 
stalls  in  the  choir  with  their  sacerdotal  robes  inside  out  [Again  the  contrast.]  or 
in  tatters,  and  capered  about  like  people  who  had  lost  their  minds.  They  held  their 
prayer-books  upside  down,  pretended  to  read  through  spectacles  with  orange-skins 
in  place  of  lenses,  and  dusted  each  other  with  ashes  or  flour."  Du  Cange,  Glossarium 
ad  scriptores  mediae  et  infimae  Latinitatis,  s.v.  Kalendae,  quotes  a  letter  of  Charles 
VII,  King  of  France,  dated  Apr.  17,  1445:  "Our  beloved  and  loyal  councillor,  the 
Bishop  of  Troyes,  has  represented  and  complained  to  us  that  although  ...  by  de- 
cree of  the  Council  of  Basel  [Anno  1431,  Sessio  XX,  Cap.  11:  Labbe,  Vol.  XVII,  p. 
322],  it  is  expressly  forbidden  to  ministers  and  attendants  of  the  Church  to  partici- 
pate in  a  certain  mocking  and  scandalous  festival  that  is  called  the  'Festival  of 
Fools,'  which  is  usual  during  the  Christmas  octave  and  holidays  in  not  a  few 
churches,  cathedrals,  and  other  chapter-houses,  wherein  said  churchmen  commit  ir- 
reverences and  mockeries  towards  God  the  Creator  and  His  holy  and  divine  services, 
to  the  grievous  discredit  and  disrepute  of  the  ecclesiasdcal  calling  at  large,  neverthe- 
less, said  churchmen  in  all  churches  and  holy  places  during  divine  service,  as  well 
as  outside,  continue  to  utter  great  insolences,  mockeries,  and  irreverences,  with  pub- 
lic spectacles  and  masquerades,  using  indecent  attire  unbecoming  their  state  and 
profession,  such  as  the  raiment  and  garb  of  clowns,  soldiers,  and  other  secular  occu- 
pations, some  wearing  female  raiment,  masks,  false  faces.  .  .  ." 


^y^y  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  447 

In  the  provinces  things  were  the  same  but,  if  I  may  so  put  it,  with 
more  archaic  traits.  [Perhaps,  but  Reinach  gives  no  proof  of  any  such 
archaism.]  We  know  the  details  of  the  SaturnaHan  festival  from 
a  troop  of  Roman  soldiers  encamped  on  the  Danube,  at  Durostolum 
[ruins  of  Drst-Ostrov,  Bulgaria],  during  the  reigns  of  Maximian  and 
Diocletian — they  are  recorded  in  an  account  of  the  martyrdom  of 
St.  Dasius  published  by  M.  Cumont.  [Such  a  source  is  in  itself  sus- 
pect. The  Acta  of  the  martyrs  often  contain  more  piety  than  his- 
torical truth.]  Thirty  days  before  the  festival  the  soldiers  picked  a 
good-looking  young  man  by  lot.  They  dressed  him  up  as  a  king  and 
pretended  that  he  was  the  good  king  Saturn.  He  paraded  the  streets 
attended  by  a  brilliant  escort  and  had  the  right  to  use  and  abuse  his 
power.  On  the  thirtieth  day  he  was  obliged  to  kill  himself  on  the 
altar  of  the  god  Saturn  whom  he  had  been  impersonating.  ...  In 
the  classical  period  the  King  of  the  Saturnalia  in  Rome  was  no  more 
than  a  vaudeville  king — an  inoffensive  dolt.  But  the  story  of  St. 
Dasius  seems  to  prove  that  in  more  ancient  times  the  king  lost  his 
life  with  his  crown."  The  usual  error  of  assuming  that  evolution 
can  take  place  only  along  a  continuous  line  (§  344) !  Accepting  the 
story  of  St.  Dasius  as  true,  why  should  that 
episode,  which  took  place  after  the  institution 
of  the  Saturnalia  in  Rome,  have  to  represent 
something  that  took  place  before  the  Saturna- 
lia and  of  which  they,  the  Saturnalia,  would 
be  a  consequence?  And  at  just  what  point 
on  such  a  continuous  line  are  we  to  locate  the  Mexican  rite?  It  is 
more  probable  that  the  rite  of  Tezcatlipoca,  the  orgy  at  Marseilles, 
and  other  similar  things,  are  like  the  points  A,  B,  C,  D  .  .  .  on 
branches  shooting  off  from  a  common  source,  T,  among  which 
there  may  be  some,  such  as  the  Roman  Saturnalia,  E,  and  the  French 
All  Fools'  Day,  F,  which  in  fact  represent  an  evolution  in  a  con- 
tinuous line.  Reinach  adds,  p.  334:  "Customs  similar  to  the  Roman 
Saturnalia  prevailed  in  Crete,  Thessaly,  Olympia,  Rhodes,  and  otlier 
places.  .  .  .  More  curious  still  was  the  festival  of  the  Sacaea,  in 
Babylon,  which  lasted  five  days.  As  was  the  case  in  Rome,  the  slaves 


448  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §738 

became  masters,  and  in  each  household  a  slave  dressed  as  the  king 
and  bearing  the  title  of  Zoganes  wielded  an  ephemeral  power.  More- 
over a  condemned  criminal  was  dressed  as  the  king  and  was  author- 
ized to  conduct  himself  accordingly,  to  the  point  of  frequenting  the 
royal  concubines.  At  the  end  of  the  holiday,  he  was  stripped  of  his 
fine  vestments,  flogged,  and  either  hanged  or  crucified."  Reinach 
further  notes  the  resemblance  between  these  cases  and  the  story  of 
Esther  and  another  festival  that  was  celebrated  in  Persia;  and  he 
goes  on  to  describe  a  historical  episode  reported  by  Philo  as  having 
occurred  at  Alexandria.  These  resemblances  to  accounts  of  the  Pas- 
sion of  Jesus  tend,  according  to  Reinach,  to  show  that  the  latter  was 
a  myth.^ 

738.  Reinach  might  have  carried  his  analogies  much  farther,  and 
he  would  readily  have  found  any  quantity  of  episodes,  stories, 
legends,  in  which  contrasts  are  set  up  between  extreme  felicity  on 
the  one  hand  and  extreme  misery  on  the  other,  or  in  which,  ironi- 
cally or  otherwise,  the  semblances  of  power  are  conferred  upon  the 
wretch,  and  vice  versa.  The  literatures  of  all  lands  draw  liberally  on 

737  ^  Orpheus,  Chap.  VIII,  §  36  (Simmonds,  p.  229) :  "The  details  of  the  Passion 
bear  a  very  suspicious  resemblance  to  rites  that  were  common  in  certain  festivals 
of  much  earlier  date.  ...  At  the  feast  of  the  Sacaea  in  Babylonia  and  Persia,  a 
condemned  criminal  -was  paraded  in  triumph  in  royal  robes.  At  the  end  of  the  holi 
day  he  was  stripped  of  his  fine  raiment,  scourged,  and  then  hanged  or  crucified. 
We  know  from  Philo  that  the  populace  of  Alexandria  called  one  such  momentary 
king  by  the  name  of  Karabas,  overwhelming  him  with  mock  honours  and  then 
mistreating  him.  But  Karabas  means  nothing,  either  in  Aramaic  or  Greek.  We 
must  read  Barabbas,  which  means  in  Aramaic  'son  of  the  father.'  .  .  .  These  colla- 
tions indicate  that  Jesus  may  have  been  put  to  death  not  in  preference  to  Barabbas 
but  as  a  Barabbas.  The  authors  of  the  Gospels  understood  neither  the  ceremony  they 
were  describing  nor  the  character  of  the  mock  honours  paid  to  Jesus."  [The  story 
appears  in  Philo,  In  Flaccmn,  VI  (Cohn,  Vol.  VI,  pp.  127-28;  Yonge,  Vol.  IV,  pp. 
68-69).  Journeying  from  Rome  to  Palestine  whither  he  has  been  appointed  as  "King 
of  the  Jews,"  Agrippa  decides  to  stop  at  Alexandria,  where  anti-Semitic  sentiment  is 
rife.  Flaccus,  the  procurator,  grudgingly  accords  him  royal  honours,  the  populace 
joining  in  with  enthusiasm  in  turning  the  celebrations  into  a  mockery,  so  absurd 
does  it  seem  to  them  that  there  could  be  a  "King  of  the  Jews."  Among  other  things 
they  take  a  half-wit  named  Karabas,  crown  him  as  "King  of  the  Jews"  and  escort 
him  with  mock-royal  honours  about  the  city.  Philo  upbraids  Flaccus  for  anti-Sem- 
itism and  for  doing  nothing  to  interfere  with  these  insults  to  a  guest  of  the  city. — 
A.  L.] 


§740  THE  FEAST  OF   FOOLS  449 

that  inspiration  and,  without  the  least  regard  to  historical  fact,  supply 
legend  and  story  to  the  heart's  content.  There  is,  for  instance,  the 
story  in  the  Arabian  Nights  where  poor  Abu-Hassan  enjoys  all  the 
delights  of  a  sovereign  one  day  and  is  beaten  as  a  lunatic  the  next.^ 
\  A  commonplace  in  the  Greek  novels  was  the  plot  designed  to  play 
on  just  that  sentiment  of  contrast,  and  it  served  Boccaccio  for  the 
tales  of  his  fifth  day,  which  dealt  with  "fortunate  outcomes  for  this 
lover  or  that  after  some  cruel  and  unhappy  mischance." 

Reviewing  Reinach's  data,  Father  Lagrange  saw  clearly  ^  that  the 
Sacaea  and  other  festivals  of  the  kind  may  have  had  common  origins, 
but  do  not  stand  in  any  direct  relationship  that  would  make  one 
derive  from  the  other  either  by  imitation  or  otherwise. 

739.  So  far  it  is  a  question  of  mere  imagination.  But  human  beings 
like  to  translate  their  fictions  into  reality  so  far  as  is  possible  and  be 
it  only  under  vain  semblances — whence  the  development  of  various 
theatrical  spectacles,  invariably  harmless  in  our  time,  though  in 
ancient  Rome  they  inflicted  real  sufferings  on  their  actors  and  shed 
blood.  In  such  things  the  human  hankering  for  contrasts,  which 
underlay  the  sanguinary  spectacles  both  of  Rome  and  Mexico,  are 
caught  as  it  were  in  the  act  of  transforming  themselves  into  realities.^ 

740.  All  these  stories,  mock  facts,  facts,  have  a  nucleus  in  com- 

738  ^  Burton,  "The  Sleeper  and  the  Waker"  in  Supplemental  Nights,  Vol.  I,  pp. 

1-35- 

738  2  Quelques  remarques  sur  I'Orpheus  ile  M.  Salomon  Reinac/i,  pp.  39-52  (Mar- 
tindale,  pp.  30-32). 

739  ^  Friedlander,  Sittengeschichte  Roms,  Vol.  II,  pp.  386-87  (English,  Vol.  II,  pp. 
73-74),  discusses  theatrical  spectacles  in  the  Roman  arena  in  which  condemned 
criminals  figured:  "They  were  specially  trained  and  rehearsed  for  their  parts,  in 
which  they  suffered  torture  and  death  not  in  play  but  very  much  in  reality.  They 
appeared  in  the  arena  clad  in  sumptuous  gold-embroidered  tunics  .  .  .  but  sud- 
denly the  magnificent  raiment  would  burst,  like  the  robes  of  Medea,  into  violent 
flames  that  roasted  the  unhappy  victims  to  death  amid  untold  sufferings.  .  .  . 
Christian  men  were  obliged  to  submit  to  martyrdom  clad  as  priests  of  Saturn, 
Christian  women  as  priestesses  of  Ceres.  Scarcely  a  form  of  torture  or  execution 
shiveringly  alluded  to  in  history  or  literature  but  was  called  upon  for  the  amuse- 
ment of  the  throngs  at  such  spectacles.  ...  As  a  rule  executions  took  place  in 
Rome  in  the  early  morning,  and  we  know  from  Philo  that  that  was  the  case  in 
Alexandria."  See  further  Martial,  Lucian's  Ass  {Lucis),  and  Metamorphoses,  X,  of 
Apuleius. 


450  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §741 

mon.^  But  in  addition  to  the  common  trait  they  have  other  character- 
istics that  differentiate  them  from  one  another  and  make  them 
susceptible  of  a  variety  of  classifications,  according  to  the  criterion  we 
select. 

741.  There  might  be,  first,  the  criterion  of  reality,  and  in  that  case 
pure  fictions,  such  as  Boccaccio's  tales,  might  go  into  a  group  a. 
Another  group,  h,  w^ould  comprise  theatrical  representations  of 
imaginary  episodes — tragedies  and  dramas  where  the  action  is  not 
in  earnest,  the  Alexandrian  custom  reported  by  Philo,  the  French 
All  Fools'  Day,  and  the  like.  A  group  c  would  comprise  representa- 
tions that  have  an  element  of  reality,  the  action  being  in  earnest — 
on  the  one  hand,  such  representations  as  the  Roman  Saturnalia,  on 
the  other,  the  bloody  spectacles  of  the  Roman  circus.  Finally  would 
come  a  group  d,  where  the  reality  is  thorough-going,  the  sentiment 
of  contrast  supplying  the  forms  only — and  here  the  rites  of  Marseilles 
and  Mexico. 

The  criterion  might  well  be  different — the  extent,  for  instance,  to 
which  the  contrast  is  carried.  Along  that  line  in  a  group,  i,  the  con- 
trast would  halt  at  ascribing  to  persons  or  things  characteristics  that 
are  in  strident  conflict  with  reality:  the  Alexandrian  celebration.  All 
Fools'  Day,  the  countless  stories  where  the  fool  is  represented  as  a 
wit  (or  vice  versa),  and  so  on  (§§  668  ^,  737 ").  In  another  group,  2, 
the  contrast  is  carried  to  an  extreme:  a  state  of  felicity  is  followed 
by  the  greatest  misfortune,  or  vice  versa.  The  Greek  tragedies  present 
notable  features  belonging  in  this  category.  It  is  the  power  of  this 
sentiment  of  contrasts,  more  than  anything  else,  that  gives  the  Greek 
plays  their  quality  of  sublime  awe.  In  the  same  group  we  would  also 
place  the  customs  of  Marseilles  and  Mexico.  At  bottom,  the  senti- 
ments of  contrast  involved  in  the  case  of  the  powerful  and  glorious 
Agamemnon  falling  under  the  ax  of  Clytemnestra  and  the  case  of 
a  youth  who  enjoys  all  the  delights  of  life  for  a  full  year  and  is  then 
led  to  slaughter,  are  not  essentially  different.  Other  criteria  might  be 

740  ^  They  constitute  another  illustration  of  a  process  that  we  met  with  above  and 
which  our  next  chapter  will  show  to  be  general.  There  again  we  shall  encounter  the 
nucleus  mentioned  here  (§§9i3f.)' 


§744  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  45 1 

chosen,  and  they  would  yield  different  classifications,  always  from 
the  standpoint  of  sentiments  or  non-logical  conduct. 

Considering  these  same  materials  from  the  standpoint  of  logical 
actions  or  of  experimental  reality,  we  should  be  carried  into  a  quite 
different  field.  Then  situations  that  belong  to  the  same  category 
from  the  standpoint  of  non-logical  conduct  would  have  to  be  dis- 
tinguished. The  tragedy  of  Agamemnon,  for  instance,  and  the  Mexi- 
can sacrifice  would  belong  to  different  classes. 

742.  Concrete  situations  may  present  combinations  of  these  various 
types,  along  with  other  sentiments,  other  logical  inferences,  rhetorical 
ornaments,  and  so  on.^ 

743.  It  is  apparent,  meantime,  and  it  will  be  more  so  as  we  pro- 
ceed (§§  746-63),  that  little  or  nothing  is  to  be  inferred  from  re- 
semblances between  certain  facts  as  regards  their  being  imitations 
the  one  of  the  other  or  their  originating  one  in  the  other  by  some 
other  similar  process  of  direct  transformation.  Nor  are  such  resem- 
blances to  be  pronounced  artificial  or  imaginary.  They  may  very 
well  be  real,  the  single  sentiment  underlying  them  finding  different 
expressions  in  them. 

744.  Lagrange^  is  therefore  right  in  rejecting  the  argument  by 
which  Reinach  would  prove  {Orpheus,  Chap.  VIII,  §  28)  that  the 
account  of  Christ's  Passion  in  the  Gospels  is  a  mere  reproduction  of 
a  pagan  legend  or  rite.  Reinach  gives  a  number  of  examples  of  un- 
fortunates who  are  first  showered  with  pleasures  and  honours  and 
then  tormented.  One  of  them,  the  Alexandria  incident  reported  by 
Philo,  has  to  be  eliminated  as  not  conforming  to  the  groups  c  and 
d  (§  741)  on  which  Reinach  would  rely  to  prove  that  the  story  of 
the  Passion  of  Jesus  is  a  myth  devised  in  imitation  of  pre-existing 
festivals.  The  remaining  examples  prove  very  little.  In  fact  they 
merely  prove  that  the  Passion  of  Jesus  manifests  the  sentiment  of 
contrast  that  figures  in  numberless  other  cases  (§§9i3f.). 

If  Reinach's  reasoning  were  sound,  why  should  the  story  of  the 

742  ^  For  such  composite  types  see  Chapters  VI  and  VII.  We  are  not  interested 
in  them  here,  where  we  are  merely  illustrating  our  contention  that  many  different 
branches  may  radiate  from  the  trunk  of  a  single  sentiment. 

744  ^  Quelqties  remarqiies,  pp.  28-47  (Martindale,  pp.  29-34). 


452  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §745 

Passion  of  Jesus  be  the  only  one  copied  from  other  narratives,  and 
why  should  not  some  of  these  be  copies  of  others  still?  If,  further- 
more, all  episodes  in  which  the  sentiment  of  contrast  figuring  in  the 
Sacaea  or  in  other  similar  ceremonies  appears  are  to  be  considered 
mythical,  little  indeed  that  is  real  would  be  left  in  the  greater  part 
of  history.  I  am  not  in  the  least  presuming  here  to  solve  the  question 
as  to  the  historical  verity  of  all  these  facts.  I  am  merely  saying  that 
the  resemblances  between  them  show  nothing  that  can  serve  to  prove 
some  of  them  false  and  others  true.^ 

745.  Many  other  examples  of  similar  institutions  that  are  not  imi- 
tations of  one  another  might  be  mentioned.  Herodotus  alludes  to  an 
Egyptian  lantern  festival  that  parallels  a  festival  of  the  Chinese,  and 
which  may  also  be  regarded  as  a  counterpart  to  the  celebration  in 

744  ^  Lagrange  makes  the  following  points:  i.  The  Karabas  episode  must  not  be 
confused  with  the  Sacaea:  "When  the  young  king,  Agrippa  I  .  .  .  called  at  Alex- 
andria, the  people  of  that  town  decided  to  make  fun  of  him.  .  .  .  They  made  a 
prisoner  of  a  poor  half-wit  named  Karabas — not  being  a  convert,  Philo  could  not 
have  mistaken  the  name.  .  .  .  The  unlucky  idiot  was  dragged  to  the  Gymnasium 
and  made  to  stand  in  a  conspicuous  place.  .  .  .  He  was  clothed  in  royal  robes, 
'after  the  manner  of  actors  on  a  stage,'  and  a  number  of  young  men  appointed 
themselves  his  body-guard.  .  .  .  The  mobs  began  acclaiming  him  as  Marin,  which, 
in  Syriac,  means  'master,'  to  make  it  clear  that  they  were  having  their  fun  with 
Agrippa.  It  was,  evidently,  a  piece  of  buffoonery  failing  in  the  respect  due  to  a 
human  unfortunate,  but  without  flogging,  without  shedding  of  blood.  [The  inci- 
dent, as  recounted  by  Philo  in  the  Flaccus,  seems  in  fact  irrelevant  to  the  argument 
Reinach  tries  to  build  up.]  All  the  same,  it  will  be  said,  the  affair  is  very  like  the 
body-guard  scene  at  Jerusalem.  Of  course  it  is!  That  is  why  it  has  been  going  the 
rounds  of  the  commentaries  ever  since  Grotius  called  attention  to  it  in  1641 !  [Grotius' 
note  is  reprinted  in  Annotationes  in  Evangeliiun  secundum  Matthaeum  (Matt.  27: 
28),  in  his  Opera  theologica,  Vol.  II-i,  p.  269. — A.  L.].  Nothing,  in  fact,  could 
better  serve  to  place  the  conduct  of  Pilate's  soldiers  in  its  proper  historical  setting. 
The  idea,  in  both  cases,  was  to  ridicule  the  Jews  and  the  aspirations  of  a  Jew  to 
the  crown.  [In  other  words,  two  branches  from  one  same  trunk,  as  in  our  Fig- 
ure 14.]  At  Alexandria  Agrippa  is  abused,  so  to  speak,  only  in  efiBgy,  in  the  person 
of  Karabas,  said  to  be  Barabbas.  At  Jerusalem  a  pretender  to  the  throne  is  handed 
over  to  the  soldiers  at  a  time  when  such  pretence  is  a  capital  offence;  he  is  con- 
demned in  advance.  It  is  all  in  fun  at  Alexandria.  At  Jerusalem  the  jest  ends  in 
blood."  The  Sacaea,  on  the  other  hand,  does  serve  Reinach's  purposes.  Says  Father 
Lagrange:  "The  fesdval  is  known  to  us  through  Berosus  (Athenaeus,  Deipnosophis- 
tae  {Banquet  of  Scholars),  XIV,  44).  It  lasted  five  days  in  an  atmosphere  of  carnival. 
Masters  were  obedient  to  slaves.  An  individual  robed  as  a  king  was  paraded  about 
in  solemn  pomp.  Though  Berosus  is  chary  of  details,  he  chances,  interestingly,  to 
mendon  the  name  given  to  the  mock  king:  that  Barabbas  was  called  Zoganes!  .  .  . 
At  a  later  date,  Strabo,  Geograpliica,  XI,  8,  4-5  (Jones,  Vol.  V,  pp.  261-65),  repre- 


§747  VESTALS  OF  ROME  AND  PERU  453 

Florence  known  as  the  rifocolone   (Festival  of  Jack-o'-Lanterns). 
There  is  no  question  of  any  imitation  in  these  cases.^ 

746.  The  Vestal  Virgins  in  Rome  are  in  all  respects  similar  to  the 
Virgins  of  the  Sun  in  Peru.  In  Rome  the  Vestals  were  chosen  by 
the  Pontifex  Maximus.  In  Peru  that  function  belonged  to  a  woman 
who  was  dean  of  the  virgins.  Both  in  Rome  and  in  Peru  the  Virgins 
chosen  kept  a  sacred  fire  burning  and  were  sworn  to  the  strictest 
chastity.  If  they  broke  their  oath,  they  were  buried  alive.  Of  course, 
people  who  explain  everything  by  logic  have  long  known  and  still 
know  the  reasons  for  that  particular  kind  of  punishment,  as  well  as 
the  explanations  of  all  the  other  details  in  the  two  parallel 
institutions ! 

747.  In  the  first  place,  why  virgins  ?  Several  explanations  are  avail- 
able, and  we  may  choose  among  them  at  our  pleasure.  Dionysius  of 
Halicarnassus  relates  that  Numa  erected  a  temple  to  Vesta  and  en- 
trusted the  cult  to  virgins  in  accord  with  Latin  custom.  "There  are," 
he  says,  Antiquitates  Romanae,  II,  66  (Spelman,  Vol.  I,  p.  343), 
"doubts  as  to  what  is  guarded  in  the  temple  and  why  its  custody  is 

sents  the  Sacaean  festival  as  intimately  associated  with  the  worship  of  the  Persian 
goddess  Anaitis."  As  Father  Lagrange  points  out,  this  may  be  the  festival  which 
Diogenes,  according  to  Dio  Chrysostom,  De  regno,  IV,  66-67,  described  to  Alex- 
ander: "  'The  Persians  take  a  condemned  criminal  and  seat  him  on  the  royal  throne 
in  royal  regalia.  He  is  allowed  to  order  everyone  about,  drink,  have  a  good  time, 
have  his  way  at  his  leisure  with  the  royal  concubines.  No  one  restrains  him  from 
doing  anything  he  pleases.  Then  he  is  stripped,  flogged,  and  hanged.'  Dio's  text 
was  referred  to  in  a  marginal  note  to  Wetztein's  Gospels  in  1752.  No  one  exagger- 
ated the  significance  of  the  parallel  at  that  time.  What  recently  brought  it  to  life 
was  the  publication  by  M.  Cumont  of  the  Acta  of  St.  Dasius.  In  this  case,  a  Chris- 
tian soldier  refused  to  play  the  part  of  king  in  the  Saturnalia,  and  was  obliged  on 
that  account  to  suffer  martyrdom.  Now  the  mock  king  impersonated  Saturn,  and 
if,  over  a  space  of  thirty  days,  he  was  free  to  indulge  any  whim,  he  was  expected 
to  sacrifice  himself  on  the  altar  of  the  god  on  the  day  of  the  festival." 

745  ^  Says  Herodotus,  Historiae,  II,  62:  "When  the  people  assemble  in  the  city 
of  Sais  to  offer  sacrifices  on  a  certain  night,  they  all  light  lamps  in  tlie  open  air 
around  their  houses.  The  lamps  are  little  vases  full  of  salt  and  oil,  with  a  floating 
wick  that  burns  all  night.  This  celebration  they  call  the  Feast  of  the  Lighted  Lamps." 
Larcher  comments  on  the  passage,  Vol.  II,  p.  297:  "This  festival  is  very  like  a  lan- 
tern festival  that  has  been  customary  in  China  from  time  immemorial.  It  tends  to 
corroborate  the  view  of  M.  de  Guignes,  who  was  one  of  the  first  to  suspect  that 
China  was  just  an  Egj'ptian  colony."  One  of  the  many  mistaken  nodons  based  on 
the  principle  that  similar  things  must  have  common  origins! 


454  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  ^747 

entrusted  to  virgins.  Some  say  there  is  nothing  there  save  the  fire 
which  everyone  can  see  and  that  care  of  it  is  entrusted  to  virgins 
rather  than  to  men  by  way  of  simihtude,  fire  being  undefiled  even 
as  the  virgin  is  uncorrupted,  and  because  to  the  most  chaste  of  the 
divinities  the  purest  of  mortal  things  is  pleasing."  Ovid  poses  the 
question:  "Why  does  the  goddess  have  virgins  as  the  ministers  of 
her  cult?"  And  he  answers,  because  Vesta  is  a  virgin:  "Is  it  strange 
that  a  virgin  should  delight  in  virgin  ministers  and  insist  that  the 
ceremonies  of  her  cult  be  performed  by  chaste  hands  .^^  Nor  shalt 
thou  see  in  Vesta  aught  but  a  living  flame,  and  ne'er  hast  thou  seen 
bodies  born  of  flame!  Seemly  is  it  therefore  that  she  who  neither 
receiveth  nor  giveth  forth  any  seed,  should  be  a  virgin  and  have 
virgin  associates,"  ^  Cicero  is  much  more  practical :  ^  "Let  Vesta's  cult 
be  administered  by  virgins  to  the  end  that  watch  may  be  more 
readily  kept  of  the  fire,  and  that  women  may  perceive  how  much 
chastity  their  nature  can  bear."  ^  Plutarch  has  explanations  in  surfeit. 
In  Numa,  9,  5  (Perrin,  Vol.  I,  p.  339),  he  relates  that  that  king  as- 
signed the  everlasting  flame  to  the  care  of  the  Vestals  "either  be- 

747  ^  Fasti,  VI,  vv.  283-294.  The  Latin  reads: 

"Quid  minim,  virgo  si  virgine  laeta  ministra 
admittit  castas  ad  sua  sacra  manus? 
nee  tu  aliud  Vestam  quam  vivam  intellige  flammam, 

nataque  de  flamma  corpora  nulla  bides. 
iure  igitur  virgo  est,  quae  semina  nulla  remittit 
nee  capit  et  comites  virginitatis  habet." 

747  ^  De  le gibus,  II,  12,  29. 

747  ^  [Pareto's  rendering  is  somewhat  free.  Cicero's  meaning  seems  to  be:  "that 
women  may  know  through  them  that  strict  chastity  is  compatible  with  {pati)  fe- 
male nature." — A.  L.]  The  passage  reads,  in  Latin:  "Virgines  praesint  ut  advigiletur 
facilius  ad  custodiam  ignis  et  sentiant  mulieres  in  natura  jemtnarum  omnem  casti- 
tatem  pati."  There  is  a  variant:  peti  for  pati.  If  one  reads  peti,  the  meaning  would 
be  that  women  ought  to  be  chaste  because  chastity  is  pleasing  to  the  gods.  Duruy, 
Histoire  des  Remains,  Vol.  I,  p.  103  (Mahaffy,  Vol.  I,  p.  107),  seems  to  incline  to 
that  view:  "The  religious  idea  which  had  originally  determined  the  conditions  im- 
posed upon  the  priestesses  had,  as  a  consequence,  been  supplemented  with  a  moral 
idea.  That  undying  flame  symbolized  the  very  life  of  the  Roman  People.  Virgins 
only  could  keep  it  alive!  The  institution  of  the  College  of  Vestals  was  therefore  an 
instinctive  glorification  of  chastity,  and  in  times  of  deep  faith  the  belief  must  have 
had  a  good  influence  on  morals."  Written  in  that  fashion,  history  becomes  a  mere 
collection  of  moralizing  fairy-tales  for  the  edification  of  children. 


I 


§749  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  455 

cause  he  thought  a  pure  and  uncorrupted  substance  such  as  fire 
should  be  entrusted  to  persons  who  were  chaste  and  pure,  or  because 
he  judged  the  sterility  and  barrenness  of  fire  consonant  with  vir- 
ginity." Then  again,  in  Camillus,  20,  4-5  (Perrin,  Vol.  II,  p.  143), 
we  get  a  different  story.  According  to  some,  says  Plutarch,  Numa 
instituted  the  cult  of  fire  because  fire  is  the  principle  of  all  things 
and  an  image  of  the  eternal  power  that  governs  the  all.  According 
to  others,  the  Romans,  like  the  Greeks,  kept  fire  burning  before 
sacred  objects  because  of  its  purity. 

748.  But  the  fact  that  the  Vestals  were  virgins  is  far  from  being 
an  isolated  case,  and  all  such  logical  explanations  fall  of  their  own 
weight.  A  current  of  sentiment — not  of  logic — establishing  a  rela- 
tion between  sexual  purity  and  the  service  of  gods  (or  of  God) 
makes  itself  felt  from  ancient  times  all  the  way  down  to  our  own. 
The  Pythia  had  to  be  a  virgin.  Of  course  there  is  no  dearth  of  logical 
explanations  of  the  fact — when  have  they  ever  been  wanting?  In- 
deed, for  any  single  case  we  always  find  several,  the  one  better 
than  the  other.  "It  is  said,"  writes  Diodorus  Siculus,  Bibliotheca 
historica,  XVI,  26,  6  (Booth,  Vol.  II,  p.  loi),  "that  the  prophetesses 
of  old  were  virgins  because  they  were  undefiled  and  because  of  their 
resemblance  to  Artemis  [who  was  a  virgin]  and  because  they  were 
most  likely  to  keep  the  secrets  of  the  oracle."  But  eventually  a 
Thessalian,  Echecrates  by  name,  abducted  and  violated  a  Pythia  of 
whom  he  had  fallen  enamoured;  whereupon  the  people  of  Delphi 
made  a  law  that  the  prophetess  should  be  not  a  virgin  but  a  woman 
over  fifty.  Later  on,  it  seems,  the  office  was  restored  to  young  women. 
That  at  least  is  what  may  be  gathered  from  a  passage  in  Plutarch.^ 

749.  In  the  days  of  Pausanias  a  temple  to  the  Artemis  Hymnia 

748  ^  Plutarch,  De  Pythiae  oraculis,  22  (Goodwin,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  93-94) :  "So  the 
Pythia  who  now  serves  the  god  must  come  of  a  good  and  law-abiding  family  and 
have  herself  lived  above  reproach."  He  goes  on  to  say  that  the  young  woman  de- 
scribed meets  the  ideal  of  Xenophon,  who  thought  that  a  bride  should  go  to  her 
husband  having  seen  and  heard  as  little  as  possible  of  life.  That  may  explain  why 
Bouche-Leclerc,  Histoire  de  la  divination  dans  I'antiqtiite,  Vol.  III.  p.  93,  writes: 
"The  god,  who  was  thenceforth  to  be  her  only  husband,  wanted  her  beautiful  and 
chaste.  Any  pollution  would  have  made  her  unworthy  of  the  mystic  union  that 
Chrisdan  propagandists  took  too  much  delight  in  ridiculing  with  their  indecent  al- 
lusions." A  new  logical  explanation,  for  the  mere  asking! 


456  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §75^ 

Still  Stood  on  the  confines  of  the  land  of  the  Orchomeni,  near 
Mantineia.  The  priestess  at  one  time  had  been  a  young  virgin,  and 
a  certain  Aristocrates,  historically  a  somewhat  hazy  figure,  violated 
her,  though  she  had  taken  refuge  in  the  temple  under  protection 
of  Artemis.  The  Arcadians  put  her  to  death  by  stoning  and  then 
decreed  by  law  that  "instead  of  a  virgin,  the  priestess  of  Artemis 
should  be  a  woman  who  had  had  commerce  with  men."  ^ 

750.  Another  temple  to  the  Artemis  Hymnia  had,  says  Pausanias 
(loc.  cit.,  13,  i),  a  priest  and  a  priestess  who  were  obligated  to  live 
In  chastity,  and  a  similar  duty  devolved  upon  the  Essenes  who  pre- 
sided at  the  suppers  in  the  temple  of  Artemis  at  Ephesus.  Their  term 
of  service,  however,  was  only  a  year.  In  the  temple  to  the  Earth,  near 
the  river  Crathis  {Ibid.,  VII,  Achaia,  25,  12-13),  ^^e  priestess  could 
have  lived  with  one  man  before  assuming  the  post,  but  was  obli- 
gated to  remain  chaste  thereafter. 

751.  In  other  cases  {Ibid.,  VII,  Achaia,  19,  i,  and  II,  Corinth,  33, 
2),  priestesses  could  serve  in  the  temple  so  long  as  they  were  maids, 
but  had  to  resign  on  marriage.  The  Tegeans  were  more  cautious 
still,  giving  Artemis  a  priestess  who  retained  office  only  until  she 
reached  the  age  of  puberty  {Ibid.,  VIII,  Arcadia,  47,  3).  At  Athens 
the  wife  of  the  archon-king  had  to  be  a  virgin  at  the  time  of  her 
marriage.^  Familiar  the  fact  that  among  the  Israelites  the  priest  had 
to  marry  a  virgin.^ 

752.  Virginity  was  not  the  only  quality  required  in  a  Vestal.  She 
could  not  be  a  deaf-mute,  nor  have  any  physical  defects.  At  the  time 
when  she  was  "taken"  by  the  pontifex  to  serve  as  a  Vestal,  her 
parents  had  to  be  still  living — or,  as  the  Latins  said,  she  had  to  be 
matrima  and  patrima.  She  had  to  come  of  a  free-born  and  reputable 

749  ^  Pausanias,  Periegesis,  VIII,  Arcadia,  5,  12:  Kvt\  yap  wapdhov  6c66aoi  r^ 
Apre/iidi  Upeiav  yvvaiKa  ofiMag  avSpuv  (nroxpuvTug  exovaav.  Strange  logic!  As  though 
a  grown  woman  could  not  be  misled  as  readily  as  a  virgin!  [Pareto  seems  to  over- 
look aTToxpd^vTug .  Jones  translates:  "A  woman  who  had  had  enough  of  intercourse 
with  men,"  i.e.,  too  old  for  intercourse  with  men. — A.  L.] 

751  ^  Demosthenes,  7«  Neaeram,  1370  (Auger,  Vol.  X,  pp.  408-09) :  .  .  .  '!/>  6i 
yvvalna  avTov  vdfiov  eOevto  aarfp  elvat,  Kat  [ifj  e7nfj.E/j,iyfiev7jv  he  put  avSpl  alTia  irapdhov  yafiEiv. 

751  2  Lev.  21: 13. 


II 


§753  VESTALS  OF  ROME  AND  PERU  457 

family/  Just  so  victims  offered  to  the  gods  had  to  be  perfect;  and  a 
feeUng  that  persons  and  objects  in  the  service  of  gods,  or  offered 
to  them,  have  to  be  perfect  persists  all  the  way  along  from  antiquity 
down  to  our  own  days.^ 
753.  It  is  obvious  that  the  causes  of  such  things  are  not  to  be 

752  ^  The  conditions  are  stated  by  Aulus  Gellius,  Nodes  Atticae,  I,  12,  1-6,  follow- 
ing Labeo:  "Those  who  have  written  on  the  'taking'  of  vestal  virgins — Antistius 
Labeo  most  authoritative  of  them  all — say  that  it  was  unlawful  to  'take'  a  girl  less 
than  six  years  old  or  more  than  ten;  that  her  father  and  mother  had  still  to  be  liv- 
ing {patrima  et  matrima) ;  that  she  could  not  have  any  defects  of  speech  or  hearing 
or  be  marked  by  any  other  bodily  defect;  that  she  could  not  be  emancipated  [from 
paternal  control,  through  crime]  nor  daughter  of  a  man  who  had  been,  even  if 
she  were  under  the  authority  of  her  grandfather  {in  avi  potestate)  with  her  father 
still  living;  that  she  was  ineligible  if  either  or  both  of  her  parents  had  ever  served 
as  slaves  or  engaged  in  any  degrading  occupation  (negotiis  sordidis)." 

752  ^  Well  known  the  fact  that  a  Catholic  priest  is  required  to  live  in  chastity 
and  be  free  of  any  considerable  physical  defects.  Lancelotto,  Institutiones  iuris  can- 
onici,  lib.  I,  tit.  25  (p.  100) :  "A  man  who  has  married  twice  (bigamus)  or  has  mar- 
ried a  widow,  a  divorced  woman  (eiectam),  or  a  prostitute,  cannot  be  ordained." 
Ibid.,  p.  102:  "A  man  defective  in  body,  unless  the  injury  be  of  no  importance,  can- 
not be  ordained."  [And  the  heading  reads:  Modica  laesio  non  impedit  ordinandttm.] 
Decretum  Gratiani,  pars  I,  distinctio  33,  canon  1  (Friedberg,  Vol.  I,  p.  123):  "A  man 
who,  after  baptism,  has  been  the  husband  of  two  wives  cannot  be  ordained  a  cleric, 
nor  a  man  who  has  had  but  one  woman,  but  as  a  concubine  not  as  a  wife;  nor  a 
man  who  has  taken  in  marriage  a  widow,  or  a  divorced  wife,  or  a  prostitute;  nor 
a  man  who  has  mutilated  himself  in  any  part  of  his  body  in  disdain  [of  the  flesh] 
or  at  the  promptings  of  a  fear,  justified  or  unjustified  [of  carnal  sin];  nor  a  man 
proved  to  have  received  usury,  or  known  to  have  played  on  the  stage;  nor  a  man 
who  shall  have  repented  of  some  mortal  crime  by  public  penance;  nor  a  man  who 
has  at  any  time  been  insane  or  obsessed  of  devils  {afflictione  diaboli  vexattis),  nor 
a  man  who  out  of  vainglory  (ambitionem)  shall  have  taken  money  in  imitation  of 
Simon  Magus."  Ibid.,  distinctio  32,  canon  12:  "No  one  shall  be  allowed  access  to 
a  sacred  order  unless  he  be  virgin  and  of  proved  chastity  and  down  to  the  time  of 
his  subdiaconate  shall  have  had  but  one  wife  herself  a  virgin"  [The  requirement 
made  of  the  archon-king  in  Athens!]:  Rabbinovicz,  Legislation  criminelle  dii  Tal- 
mud, p.  190:  "Mishnah.  Subject  to  the  penalty  of  flogging  are  ...  a  high  priest 
who  marries  a  widow  (Lev.  21:  14);  a  priest  who  marries  a  divorced  woman  or  a 
woman  who  'has  loosed  tlie  shoe'  \_i.e.,  a  widow  refused  in  remarriage  by  her  de- 
ceased husband's  brother],  Deut.  25:9."  Decretum  Gratiani,  pars  I,  distinctio  55, 
canones  4-5  (Friedberg,  Vol.  I,  p.  216):  "If  anyone  has  mutilated  himself,  id  est,  si 
quis  amputavit  sibi  virilia,  he  may  not  be  a  cleric,  for  he  is  a  murderer  of  himself 
and  an  enemy  of  God's  profession  (that  is,  the  priesthood — Dei  conditionis  inimicus) . 
...  If  a  man  already  a  priest  shall  mutilate  himself,  let  him  be  altogether  damned, 
for  he  is  a  murderer  of  himself.  .  .  .  Those  who  mutilate  themselves  not  knowing 
how  otherwise  to  combat  carnal  temptation  are  not  eligible  to  the  priesthood."  The 
priests  of  Cybele,  on  the  other  hand,  were  eunuchs. 


458  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  ^754 

sought  in  logical  explanations  of  this  kind,  and  that  we  shall  find 
them  only  as  we  turn  our  attention  to  certain  sentiments  which 
account  both  for  the  things  and  for  the  explanations  given  of  them. 

754.  An  identical  punishment  was  inflicted  upon  the  Roman 
Vestals  and  the  Virgins  of  the  Sun  in  Peru  if  they  broke  their  vows 
of  chastity.  In  Rome,  says  Marquardt,^  the  guilty  Vestal  was  car- 
ried "on  a  bier  to  the  Campus  Sceleratus  near  the  Porta  Collina. 
There  she  was  flogged  and  then  buried  alive.  The  Romans  dared 
not  kill  her,  for  they  considered  it  nefas  to  cause  a  person  consecrated 
to  the  gods  to  die  a  violent  death."  If  the  explanation  is  not  to  your 
liking,  here  is  another.  The  dead  are  cremated.  Would  it  not  be 
inappropriate  to  burn  a  woman  who  has  not  faithfully  tended  her 
fire }  Or  will  you  have  still  another  ?  The  guilty  woman  was  handed 
over  to  the  gods,  and  her  punishment  left  to  them.^ 

755.  If  your  appetite  is  still  not  sated,  we  will  look  around  for 
something  else.  Reville  has  produced  the  following,  which  may 
serve  both  for  Rome  and  Peru :  ^  "Is  it  not  astonishing  that  the 
punishment  held  in  store  for  violators  of  the  vow  of  chastity  was 
exactly  the  same  as  the  one  inflicted  on  unchaste  Vestals  in  Rome? 
They  were  buried  alive!  ^  The  parallel  arises  in  the  fact  that  in  both 
countries  the  culprit  was  held  to  be  hateful,  after  such  a  crime,  to 
the  divinities  of  the  Day,  of  Light.  She  had  provoked  their  wrath. 
The  sight  of  a  being  worthy  of  their  resentment  could  no  longer 
be  inflicted  upon  them.  She  could  only  be  dedicated  to  the  nether 

754  -^  Romische  Staatsverwaltung:  Sacralwesen,  p.  328. 

754  ^  For  both  explanations  see  Plutarch,  Quaestiones  Romanae,  96  (Goodwin, 
Vol.  II,  p.  254). 

755  ^  Les  religions  du  Mexique,  p.  367. 

755  ^  Festus,  De  verborum  significatione,  XIV,  s.v.  Probrum  virginis  Vestalis 
(London,  Vol.  VI,  p.  644) :  "Inchastity  in  a  Vestal  Virgin  was  punished  capitally, 
and  the  man  who  had  led  her  astray  was  flogged  to  death.  According  to  M.  Cato, 
in  his  oration  entitled  De  augitribus,  the  law  was  posted  in  the  atrium  of  the  temple 
to  Liberty,  the  exact  text  being  lost  along  with  that  of  many  other  laws  when  that 
temple  was  burned.  Cato  adds  that  when  Vestal  Virgins  were  convicted  of  pro- 
faning their  priesthood  by  inchastity  they  were  buried  alive  as  having  defiled  the 
sanctity  of  Mother  Vesta.  Though  criminals,  they  were  not  buried  outside  the  city, 
but  in  a  field  near  the  Porta  Collina,  called  the  Field  of  Impurity  {Campus  Scele- 
ratus)." 


§757  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  459 

gods  of  Darkness,  of  Death,  whose  handmaiden  she  had  elected  to 
become." 

756.  The  Romans  themselves  had  different  reasons  for  punishing 
Vestals.  Their  chief  aim,  it  seems,  was  to  escape  impending  mis- 
fortunes. "There  are  several  signs,"  says  Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus, 
"when  divine  service  has  not  been  in  due  form,  chief  among  them 
the  going  out  of  Vesta,  a  thing  that  the  Romans  fear  more  than  any 
catastrophe,  for  whatever  the  cause,  they  believe  that  it  presages 
disaster  for  the  City."  ^ 

757.  There  is  a  story  ^ — whether  it  be  history  or  legend  matters 
little — that  in  Rome,  about  the  year  481  e.g.,  a  series  of  prodigies 
made  it  clear  that  the  gods  were  angry.  Investigation  revealed  that 
the  Vestal  Opimia  was  no  longer  a  virgin.  She  was  buried  alive. 
Thereupon  the  sacrifices  became  favourable  again,  and  the  wrath  of 
the  gods  was  evidently  appeased.  Eleven  years  later,  in  470  b.c. — still 
a  very  hazy  period  historically — a  pestilence  broke  out  among  women 
in  Rome  causing  many  deaths.^  No  one  knew  which  way  to  turn 
till  a  slave  informed  the  high-priests  that  the  Vestal  Urbinia  was  no 
longer  a  virgin  and  that  she  was  offering  sacrifices  for  the  City  with 
impure  hands.  She  was  buried  alive.  One  of  her  two  lovers  killed 
himself,  the  other  was  slain.  "The  pestilence  among  the  women  and 
the  frequent  deaths  ceased  as  soon  as  these  things  were  done." 
Another  legend  supplies  an  etymology  for  the  name  of  the  Campus 
Sceleratus.  In  the  year  334  b.c,  says  Livy,  Ab  urbe  condlta,  VIII,  15, 
7-8,  "the  Vestal  Minucia  was  reported  to  the  priests  by  a  slave  in- 
former. She  had  first  fallen  under  suspicion  by  being  more  fash- 
ionably dressed  than  was  seemly  in  the  performance  of  her  duties 
{propter  mundiorem  iusto  cultum).  She  was  at  once  ordered  to 
abstain  from  the  rites  and  to  hold  her  slaves  in  her  own  possession 
[that  they  might  be  tortured  to  extract  evidence  against  her].  After 
a  trial  she  was  buried  alive  in  the  Field  of  Impurity  {Campus 
Sceleratus)   next  to  the  paved  road  at  the  Porta  CoUina.  That 

756  '^  Antiqtiitates  romanae,  II,  67  (Spelman,  Vol.  I,  p.  348). 

757  ^Ibid.,  VIII,  89  (Spelman,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  432-34). 
757  ^Ibid.,  IX,  40  (Spelman,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  74-75). 


460  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §758 

name  was  given  to  the  place,  I  believe,  because  of  her  crime." 

758.  In  times  historical,  and  to  v^^it,  just  after  the  defeat  at  Cannae 
(216  B.c),  direful  prodigies  appeared.  The  Romans  were  terrified 
by  the  fact  that  within  a  year's  time^  "two  Vestals,  Opimia  and 
Floronia,  had  been  convicted  of  violating  their  vows.  One  of  them 
had  been  buried  alive,  according  to  custom,  near  the  Porta  Collina, 
the  other  had  committed  suicide."  Their  lovers  were  flogged  to 
death.  But  all  that  was  not  enough  to  dispel  the  terror.  So  the  Sibyl- 
line books  were  opened,  and  they  were  found  to  prescribe  extraordi- 
nary sacrifices.  "Two  Gauls,  a  man  and  a  woman,  and  two  Greeks,  a 
man  and  a  woman,  were  buried  alive  in  the  Forum  Boarium  in  a 
place  marked  off  by  stones,  where  other  human  sacrifices  had  been 
performed.  The  which  is  unworthy  of  the  Roman  religion  (or  Fos- 
ter: "which  was  rather  a  Greek  than  a  Roman  rite")." 

759.  It  cannot  be  said  that  human  beings,  Greeks  and  Gauls,  were 
buried  alive  in  this  case  because  they  were  considered  objects  of 
loathing  to  the  divinities  of  Day  or  of  Light.  The  character  of  the 
non-logical  conduct  expressed  in  those  sacrifices  and  in  the  punish- 
ment of  the  Vestals  is  evident  enough.  It  was  the  instinct  of  self- 
preservation,  insisting  on  matching  extreme  misfortunes  with  ex- 
treme remedies  (§§929^).  It  was  the  same  instinct  that  impels 
people  to  make  human  sacrifices  in  order  to  ensure  success  in  rites 
of  magic  (§931).^ 

760.  The  Vestal  was  buried  in  a  little  vault  with  a  few  provisions: 
a  little  bread,  some  water,  milk,  and  oil.^  That  manner  of  death  was 
not  peculiar  to  guilty  Vestals.  There  is  an  allusion  to  something 
similar  in  a  tragedy  of  Sophocles.'  According  to  certain  traditions 

758  1  Livy,  Ibid.,  XXII,  57,  2-6. 

759  1  [A  cross-reference  to  §§  1092-93  would  have  been  in  point  here  also. — A.  L.] 

760  1  Plutarch,  Nnma,  10,  5  (Perrin,  Vol.  I,  p.  343).  Plutarch  explains  the  pro- 
cedure on  the  ground  that  it  would  be  sacrilegious  to  allow  persons  duly  conse- 
crated to  the  most  sacred  ceremonies  to  perish  of  hunger. 

760  ^Antigone,  vv.  773-80  (Storr,  Vol.  I,  pp.  374-75)-  Creon  says  of  Antigone: 
"I  shall  lead  her  to  a  deserted  place  without  trace  of  human  being,  and  there  will 
I  shut  her  up  alive  in  a  cave,  with  enough  food  to  spare  me  a  sacrilege  and  the 
city  a  crime."  The  scholiast  notes  that  that  was  an  ancient  custom,  "that  she  might 
not  seem  to  be  killed  by  starvation,  for  that  would  be  impious." 


I 


§762  VESTALS  OF  ROME  AND  PERU  46 1 

condemned  Vestals  were  not  always  executed  in  the  same  way.  The 
law  prescribing  burial  alive  is  attributed  by  Zonaras  to  Tarquinius 
Priscus.^ 

761.  Under  the  Empire  the  old  laws  were  not  always  observed. 
Suetonius  says  of  Domitian,  Domitianus,  S,  4,  that  "he  curbed  im- 
morality among  the  Vestal  Virgins,  which  had  been  ignored  by  his 
father  and  brother,  with  a  variety  of  severe  penalties,  at  first  with 
death,  then  with  punishments  according  to  the  ancient  custom.^  He 
permitted  the  Oculata  sisters  and  another  Vestal,  Varronilla,  to 
choose  their  mode  of  death,  sending  their  accomplices  into  exile. 
The  Vestal  dean,  Cornelia,  who  had  been  acquitted  at  previous 
trials,  was  again  indicted  and  found  guilty.  He  caused  her  to  be 
buried  alive  and  her  accomplices  to  be  flogged  to  death,  with  the 
exception  of  one,  a  former  praetor,  against  whom  proofs  seemed 
insufficient.  He  was  exiled.  Caracalla,  too,  had  Vestals  buried  alive.^ 

762.  By  a  fortuitous  coincidence,  the  Virgins  of  the  Sun  in  Peru 
were  allowed  to  have  commerce  with  the  Incas,  who  were  sons  of 
the  Sun;  while  in  Rome,  the  Emperor  Elagabalus,  himself  a  priest 
of  the  Sun,  went  so  far  as  to  marry  a  Vestal  and  say:  "I  have  done 
this  that  divine  children  may  be  born  of  me,  a  high  priest,  and  of 
her,  a  supreme  Vestal."  ^ 

760  ^Epitome  historiartim.  III,  8  (Migne,  Vol.  134,  p.  566).  Relating  how  Tar- 
quinius caused  an  unchaste  Vestal  to  be  buried  alive  with  a  cot,  a  lantern,  and  a 
table  with  food,  Zonaras  adds:  "From  that  time  on  it  became  the  rule  to  punish  in 
that  manner  such  of  the  priestesses  as  failed  to  keep  their  vows." 

761  ^  See  also  Dio  Cassius,  Historia  Romana,  LXVII,  3  (he  has  a  slighdy  differ- 
ent slant  on  Domitian's  crusade  against  the  Vestals) ;  and  the  younger  Pliny,  Epistti- 
lae,  IV,  ir:  "He  had  set  his  heart  on  having  Cornelia,  the  dean  of  the  Vestals, 
buried  alive,  as  though  he  thought  that  his  reign  would  be  glorified  by  an  example 
of  that  sort." 

761  2  Dio  Cassius,  Ibid.,  LXVIII,  16.  And  cf.  Herodian,  Historiae,  IV,  6:  "He  had 
Vestals  buried  alive,  on  charges  that  they  had  not  preserved  their  chastity."  [Hero- 
dian, that  is,  doubdng  their  guilt:  cjf  [if]  (pvlarTovaag  ttjv  Trapdeviav — A.  L.] 

762  ^  Dio  Cassius,  Ibid.,  LXXX,  1 1 ;  Herodian,  Historiae,  V,  4.  He  defended  his 
conduct  in  a  letter  to  the  Senate  on  the  grounds  that  "it  was  but  a  human  sinne, 
that  he  was  enchanted  with  the  magicke  of  her  beauty,  and  that  it  was  no  incon- 
gruitie  for  a  priest  to  marry  a  priestesse,  which  could  only  be  a  seemlie  and  sacred 
thing."  Reville,  Les  religions  dti  Mexiqite,  p.  366:  "The  Virgins  of  the  Sun  were 
cloistered  in  absolute  seclusion,  cut  off  from  any  connexions  with  the  rest  of  so- 
ciety, especially  as  regards  men.  Only  the  Inca  and  his  principal  wife,  the  Coya, 


462  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §763 

763.  Another  coincidence  is  remarkable  indeed.  In  Peru  the  Vir- 
gins of  the  Sun  made  certain  loaves  of  bread  of  a  very  pure  flour, 
vi^hich  vi^ere  offered  to  the  Incas  during  a  certain  festival  of  the  Sun. 
In  Rome  the  Vestal  Virgins  prepared  a  dough  of  flour  called  mola 
salsa  to  be  used  for  offerings  to  the  goddess  Vesta.^  All  these  ex- 
amples serve  to  show  that,  as  v^e  saw  in  §  743,  resemblances  be- 
tween certain  rites  in  no  way  prove  that  the  one  is  derived  directly 
from  the  other. 

764.  B-y:  Myths  and  the  li\e  are  entirely  non-real.  In  this  group 
we  find  the  numerous  and  important  theories  of  allegory,  including 
the  theories  of  the  solar  myth  and  others  of  the  same  brand.  All  of 
them,  widely  current  in  the  past,  still  have  their  adherents.  They  are 
dear  to  ingenious,  subtle,  imaginative  minds,  eager  for  unexpected 
discoveries.  They  represent,  further,  a  salutory  transition  stage  be- 
tween blind  faith  and  scientific  scepticism;  What  can  be  no  longer 

were  at  liberty  to  enter  the  convent.  These  visits  were  not  altogether  disinterested, 
for  the  Inca  ordinarily  recruited  his  harem  from  the  girls  there.  A  son  of  the  Sun 
and  able  to  marry  his  sisters,  he  was  merely  choosing  within  his  family.  All  the 
same,  the  young  virgins  were  held  to  the  strictest  chastity  and  took  oath  never  to 
depart  from  it.  But  the  vow  came  down  to  a  promise  that  they  would  belong  to  no 
husband  save  the  Sun  or  'him  to  whom  the  Sun  should  give  them.'  " 

763  ^  Garcilaso  de  la  Vega,  Comentarios  reales  que  tratan  del  origen  de  los 
Incas,  Vol.  II,  pp.  182-84:  "Of  the  four  feasts  of  the  Sun  celebrated  by  the  king- 
Incas,  the  chief  one  was  the  Raymi,  coming  in  the  month  of  June.  .  .  .  The  priest- 
Incas,  who  were  to  perform  the  sacrifices,  prepared  the  sheep  and  lambs  that  were 
to  be  used,  the  day  before,  as  well  as  the  food  and  beverages  that  were  to  be  prof- 
fered to  the  Sun.  .  .  .  The  'wives'  of  the  Sun  spent  that  same  night  in  grinding 
the  flour  for  a  dough  called  cancu,  which  they  moulded  into  little  loaves  of  bread 
about  the  size  of  an  apple.  .  .  .  The  chosen  Virgins  were  the  only  ones  allowed 
to  grind  the  flour  for  the  loaves,  especially  for  those  which  the  Inca  and  the  princes 
of  the  blood  were  to  eat.  They  also  prepared  all  the  other  foods;  for  the  notion  was 
that  on  that  day  the  Sun  was  host  to  his  children."  Servius,  In  Vergilii  Biicoli- 
con,  VIII,  V.  82  (Thilo-Hagen,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  106):  "Sparge  molam:  'Flour  and  salt.' 
The  term  is  derived  from  religion.  'Sacred  flour':  mola  casta,  mola  salsa  (for  they 
both  mean  the  same),  is  made  in  the  following  manner:  Taking  turns  each  day  be- 
tween the  nones  of  May  and  the  day  before  the  ides  [May  7-14:  the  same  date,  vir- 
tually, as  that  of  the  Peruvian  ceremony,  for  they  were  both  spring  fesdvals.],  the 
three  eldest  Vestals  filled  harvest  baskets  with  spelt,  and  themselves  roasted,  crushed, 
and  ground  the  grain,  making  a  flour  of  it.  Three  times  a  year,  at  the  Lupercalia, 
the  feast  of  Vesta,  and  the  ides  of  September,  the  Virgins  made  dough  of  the  flour, 
adding  cooking-salt  and  rock-salt." 


§767  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  463 

defended  has  to  be  dropped,  but  there  is  an  effort  to  salvage  as  much 
as  possible  of  the  old  myths. 

765.  However,  what  often  happens  is  that  little  or  nothing  really 
is  saved.  Past  experience  shows  that  little  is  gained  by  trying  to 
logicalize  an  outworn  belief.  Often,  in  fact,  that  is  the  way  to  hasten 
its  ruin.  Abstract,  ingenious,  finely  drawn  reasonings  have  no  great 
influence  as  regards  fostering  the  non-logical  sentiments  that  make 
up  the  substance  of  beliefs.^ 

766.  It  might  be  well,  at  this  point,  to  recall  in  the  particular  the 
remarks  as  to  the  purpose  of  this  immediate  research  that  we  made 
in  general  terms  on  the  diagram  in  §§  635  f.  Given  a  piece  of  writing 
in  which  myths,  allegories,  and  the  like,  are  assumed  to  play  a  part 
more  or  less  extensive,  our  main  concern  is  to  determine  whether 
and  in  what  manner  we  can  get  back  from  the  text  to  the  writer's 
ideas  or  to  the  facts  that  he  meant  to  describe. 

767.  Grote  has  passed  an  excellent  judgment  on  allegorical  and 
historical  interpretations  of  ancient  Greek  myths.  Says  he:^  "The 
doctrine,  supposed  to  have  been  originally  symbolized  and  subse- 
quently overclouded,  in  the  Greek  mythes,  was  in  reality  first  in- 
truded into  theni  by  the  unconscious  fancies  of  later  interpreters. 
It  was  one  of  the  various  roads  which  instructed  men  took  to  escape 
from  the  literal  admission  of  the  ancient  mythes,  and  to  arrive  at 
some  new  form  of  belief,  more  consonant  with  their  ideas  of  what 

765  ^  Sorel  remarks  in  "Ouelques  pretentions  jtiives,"  pp.  292-93:  "Catholi- 
cism has  very  appreciably  strengthened  its  situation  in  the  course  of  the  nineteenth 
century  by  pursuing  a  policy  quite  different  from  the  one  advised  by  men  of  talent: 
the  Church  has  stressed  its  theology,  multiplied  its  monastic  institutions,  and  at- 
tached to  miracles  an  importance  they  had  not  enjoyed  since  the  Middle  Ages.  .  .  . 
Bernard  Lazare  was  terribly  mistaken  when  he  wrote,  L'antisemitisme,  pp.  359-60 
[English,  p.  327] :  'Christianity  is  disappearing  like  the  Jewish  religion,  like  all  the 
religions  that  we  can  see  very  gradually  perishing.  It  is  succumbing  to  the  blows 
of  reason  and  science.  .  .  .  We  are  daily  losing  the  feeling  for  the  absurd,  the  need 
of  it,  and  consequently  the  need  of  religion,  especially  the  practical  need;  and  diose 
who  still  believe  in  the  Divinity  have  ceased  to  believe  in  the  necessity,  and  above 
all  in  the  efficacy,  of  acts  of  worship.'  Bernard  Lazare  was  merely  paraphrasing 
Renan  in  all  that,  without  going  into  the  question  personally.  In  any  event,  things 
have  changed  greatly  since  1894."  The  assertion  quoted  from  Lazare  is  absolutely 
and  completely  at  variance  with  the  facts. 

767  1  History  of  Greece,  Vol.  I,  pp.  439-40. 


464  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §768 

the  attributes  and  character  of  the  gods  ought  to  be.  .  .  .  The 
same  conflicting  sentiments  which  led  the  philosophers  to  decom- 
pose the  divine  mythes  into  allegory  impelled  the  historians  to 
melt  down  the  heroic  mythes  into  something  like  continuous  politi- 
cal history,  with  a  long  series  of  chronology  calculated  upon  the 
heroic  pedigrees.  The  one  process  as  well  as  the  other  was  interpre- 
tative guesswork,  proceeding  upon  unauthorised  assumptions,  and 
without  any  verifying  test  or  evidence:  while  it  frittered  away  the 
characteristic  beauty  of  the  mythe  into  something  essentially  anti- 
mythical,  it  sought  to  arrive  both  at  history  and  philosophy  by  im- 
practicable roads." 

768.  A  commentary  on  the  Homeric  poems  written  by  Heraclides 
of  Pontus  [or  Heraclitus  of  Alexandria],  Allegoriae  Homericae, 
may  be  mentioned  as  typical  of  the  allegorical  interpretation.  The 
critic's  purpose  is  to  make  Homer's  stories  rational,  moral,  and  pious. 
So  with  reference  to  the  passage  in  the  Iliad,  I,  vv.  396-411,  that  speaks 
of  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  gods  to  put  Zeus  in  chains,  Herac- 
lides remarks,  cap.  21,  that  "for  those  verses  alone  Homer  would 
deserve  to  be  banished  not  only  from  a  republic  of  Plato  but  beyond 
the  farthest  pillars  of  Hercules  and  the  inaccessible  Ocean" ;  and  he 
goes  on,  22:  "After  all,  there  is  only  one  way  to  excuse  such  impiety: 
we  shall  prove,  namely,  that  the  myth  is  allegorical."  He  therefore 
proceeds  to  explain  in  lengthy  disquisitions,  24-25,  that  Zeus  is  the 
ether,  Hera  the  atmosphere,  Athena  the  Earth,  Poseidon  water, 
Thetis  Providence.  When  Homer  says  that  Thetis  rescued  Zeus  when 
Hera,  Poseidon,  and  Athena  set  out  to  put  him  in  chains,  he  is  repre- 
senting a  disturbance  of  the  elements  that  is  averted  by  Providence. 

769.  The  Odyssey,  V,  v.  121,  says  that  rosy-fingered  Dawn  ab- 
ducted Orion.  According  to  Heraclides  [Heraclitus],  cap.  68,  that 
was  Homer's  way  of  saying  "that  a  young  man  in  the  flower  of  his 
youth  was  carried  off  by  Fate.  Indeed  it  was  a  custom  of  the  ancients 
when  a  man  died  not  to  move  his  body  either  at  night  or  in  the 
heat  of  the  day,  but  at  dawn,  when  the  Sun's  rays  were  not  yet 
warm.  So  when  a  youth  well  born  and  distinguished  for  handsome 
physique  died,  his  early-morning  funeral  was  most  happily  called  an 


§772  MYTH  AND  ALLEGORY  465 

abduction  by  Dawn,  as  though  he  had  not  died  but  had  been 
snatched  away  by  an  amorous  yearning."  Allegories  of  this  kind 
have  no  sounder  basis  in  fact  than  the  interpretations  of  Palaephatus. 
Indeed  it  would  serve  just  as  well  in  this  case  to  read  that  a  queen 
by  the  name  of  Aurora  misled  a  young  man  by  the  name  of  Orion. 

770.  There  is  no  end  to  allegorical  explanations  of  Homer's  poems, 
and  new  ones  have  kept  appearing  every  so  often  from  ancient  times 
down  to  our  own.  Eustathius  already  has  a  number,  and  eventually 
we  get  to  a  certain  Hugon,  who  saw  a  prophecy  of  Christ's  Passion 
in  the  Homeric  poems;  and  to  one  Gerard  Croese,  who  regarded 
them  as  an  allegorical  history  of  the  Jews.^ 

771.  In  the  same  way  and  for  the  same  reasons  Virgil  had  his 
allegorical  interpretations  too.  Comparetti  notes  that  the  works  of 
Virgil  were  supposed  to  contain  a  prophecy  of  the  coming  of  Christ:  ^ 
"The  most  elaborate  interpretation  of  the  kind  appears  in  an  ad- 
dress delivered  by  the  Emperor  Constantine  before  a  church  as- 
sembly. .  .  .  The  translation  of  the  eclogue  [the  fourth]  into  Greek 
verse  as  we  read  it  today  in  the  imperial  lecture  shows  traces  of  the 
ancient  plague  of  occultism.  In  not  a  few  places  it  departs  arbitrarily 
from  the  original,  altering  meanings  with  the  obvious  purpose  of 
adapting  things  to  the  Christian  interpretation  propounded.  The 
Emperor  examines  Virgil's  composition  in  its  various  parts  and  finds 
hints  of  the  advent  of  Christ  in  a  number  of  particulars:  the  re- 
turning virgin  is  Mary;  the  new  Heaven-sent  progeny  is  Jesus;  and 
the  'serpent  which  shall  be  no  more'  is  the  age-old  Tempter  of  our 
forefathers."  And  that  is  not  all. 

772.  Another  fine  specimen  is  Fulgentius.  Says  Comparetti  farther 
along:  "The  De  continentia  Virgilia?ta,  in  which  Fulgentius  eluci- 
dates the  content,  or  rather,  the  hidden  content,  of  Virgil's  poem  is 
one  of  the  strangest  and  most  curious  documents  of  the  Latin  Middle 

770  ^  Hugon,  Vera  historia  Rowaria,  sen  origo  Latii  vd  Italiae  ac  Romanae  Urbis, 
e  tenebris  longae  vetiistatis  in  liicem  prodiicta,  Rome,  1655.  'Ofiiipo^  Lifmloq,  sive 
historia  Hebraeorum  ab  Honicro  hebraicis  nominibus  uc  sententiis  conscripta  in 
Odyssea  et  lliade,  exposita  illitstrataqiie  studio  ac  opera  Gerardi  Croesi,  Dordrecht, 
1704. 

771  ^  Virgilio  nel  medio  evo,  Vol.  I,  pp.  134  f.  (Benecke,  p.  100). 


466  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §773 

Ages.  .  .  .  The  writer  makes  haste  to  declare  in  a  preamble  that 
he  is  to  confine  himself  to  the  Aeneid  alone,  since  the  Bucolics  and 
the  Georgics  contain  mystical  significances  so  recondite  that  there  is 
virtually  no  skill  great  enough  to  divine  them  fully.  They  constitute, 
at  any  rate,  a  burden  too  heavy  for  shoulders  of  his  size,  'forasmuch 
as  they  would  require  too  great  knowledge,  since  the  first  meaning 
of  the  Georgics  is  wholly  astrological,  the  second  physionomical  and 
medical,  the  third  relative  entirely  to  "haruspicinics"  [art  of  divina- 
tion].'"^ 

773.  In  the  same  way,  and  for  the  same  reason,  people  have  sought 
and  found  allegories  in  the  Bible  and  in  the  Gospels.  Immense  the 
amount  of  work  that  has  been  done  along  this  line  by  the  Church 
Fathers  and  their  successors,  Catholic,  Protestant,  Modernist.  Philo 
the  Jew  wrote  Allegories  of  the  Sacred  Laws,  which  stand  on  a  par 
with  the  allegories  the  ancients  found  in  Homer  and  Virgil  and 
those  the  Modernists  have  of  late  been  discovering  in  the  Gospels. 
Strange  that  these  last  should  vaunt  a  mere  reversion  to  antiquity  as 
modern.  That  is  something  like  discovering  America  in  the  twentieth 
century! 

774.  Says  the  Bible,  Gen.  2:25:  "And  they  were  both  naked,  the 
man  and  his  wife,  and  were  not  ashamed."  Would  you  know  what 
that  means  ?  Philo  will  enlighten  you.  It  means  that  "the  mind  did 
not  think  and  that  the  senses  did  not  perceive,  that  the  man  was 
without  thought,  the  woman  without  perception."  ^  Clearer  and 
more  definite  than  that  one  could  not  be!  Or  would  you  know  the 

772  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  144  f.  (Benecke,  p.  108).  The  opening  verse  of  the  Aeneid,  Arma 
virumqiie  cano  Troiae  qui  primus  ab  oris,  Fulgentius,  De  Virgilliana  continen- 
tia  (Miincker,  Vol.  II,  p.  147),  imagines  Virgil  as  explaining  as  follows:  "There  is 
a  threefold  progress  (gradus  irifarius)  in  human  life:  first  comes  'to  have,'  second, 
'to  manage  what  one  has,'  third,  to  'beautify  what  one  manages.'  Those  three  steps 
you  must  regard  as  stowed  away  in  that  one  verse  of  mine:  ar7na,  in  other  words, 
power,  relates  to  corporal  substance;  virum,  that  is  to  say,  wisdom,  relates  to  intel- 
lectual substance;  primus,  that  is,  prince  [/.<?.,  princely],  relates  to  beautifying  sub- 
stance. Whence  the  following  sequence:  'to  have,  to  manage,  to  beautify.'  So,  under 
semblance  of  a  tale,  I  have  portrayed  the  whole  -lot  of  human  kind:  first  nature, 
then  learning,  then  happiness." 

774  1  Sacrarum  legum  allegoriae,  II,  16  (Cohn,  Vol.  I,  p.  103;  Yonge,  Vol.  I,  p. 
96) :  OvTE  6  vovg  ev6ei,  ovre  1)  aladrjaiq  ^addvero,  alTJ  rjv  6  fisv  tov  voeIv  epjjiidq  re  kol  yv/i- 
vof,  7  6e  Toi)  aladdvEadai. 


§774  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  467 

meaning  of  the  miracle  of  the  water  changed  into  wine,  or  of  the 
Wind  man  restored  to  sight,  or  of  the  man  raised  from  the  dead? 
This  time  the  Rev.  Father  Loisy  will  tell  you  in  terms  as  clear  and 
definite  as  Philo's.^  The  change  of  the  water  to  wine  means  the 
replacement  of  the  Law  by  the  Gospels.  The  blind  man  made  to 
see  and  the  man  raised  from  the  dead  represent  humanity  called  to 
the  "true"  light  and  the  "true"  life  of  the  Incarnate  Word.  M.  Loisy 
takes  vigorously  to  task  anyone  not  accepting  such  lucid  interpreta- 
tions out  of  hand.  Says  he:  "The  theologians  of  our  day  are  so  far 
removed  from  the  ways  of  thinking  of  the  Evangelist  [John],  and 
at  the  same  time  have  so  little  sense  of  the  possible  and  real  in  mat- 
ters of  history,  that  we  must  give  up  hope  of  making  them  under- 
stand that  accounts  such  as  the  story  of  the  miracle  of  Cana,  the  heal- 
ing of  a  man  congenitally  blind,  the  raising  of  Lazarus  from  the 
dead — unintelligible,  absurd,  or  ridiculous  as  matters  of  faith,  unless 
they  be  regarded  as  bold  tricks  of  a  sleight-of-hand  performer — are 
of  easy  and  simple  interpretation  if  we  avail  ourselves  of  the  keys 
supplied  by  the  Evangelist  himself,  and  see  in  the  miracle  of  the 
water  changed  to  wine  the  Law  replaced  by  the  Gospel  and  in  the 
blind  man  restored  to  sight  and  the  man  raised  from  the  dead, 
humanity  called  to  the  true  light  and  the  true  life  by  the  Incarnate 
Word,  who  is  Himself  the  Light  and  the  Life."  ^  Unfortunately  that 
is  the  trouble  with  all  allegorical  interpretations  of  mythology.  It  is 
very  difficult  to  make  a  choice,  accepting  this  or  that  and  rejecting 
the  others.* 

774  ^  Simples  reflexions  stir  I'encycUqtie  Pascendi,  pp.  52-53. 

774  ^  Further  along,  p.  55,  M.  Loisy  complains  that  his  meaning  has  been  mis- 
represented by  the  Holy  Office:  "I  say  that  John  could  call  himself  a  witness  to  the 
Christ  since  he  was  the  witness  to  His  life  in  the  Church.  The  Holy  Congregation 
makes  me  say  that  John  should  not  have  offered  himself  as  a  witness  to  the  Christ 
since  he  was  only  a  witness  for  the  Christian  life.  Under  similar  forms  of  expres- 
sion the  two  ideas  are  different."  To  avoid  such  misunderstandings,  M.  Loisy  should 
have  expressed  himself  more  clearly.  "Pliny  the  younger  is  a  witness  to  Trajan, 
Suetonius  to  a  number  of  Emperors,  John  to  Christ."  From  a  historico-experimental 
point  of  view  that  really  would  seem  to  mean  that  Pliny  knew  Trajan,  saw  Trajan, 
Suetonius  other  emperors,  John  Christ.  If  one's  meaning  is  something  else,  one 
should  say  so  in  unmistakeable  terms. 

774  *  Another  Modernist  has  tried  his  hand  at  allegorizing  the  wedding-feast  at 
Cana:  D'Alma:  La  controverse  dii  Ouatrieme  evangile,  pp.  59-62:   "Six  stone  jars 


468  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §775 

775.  Are  there  allegories  in  the  Gospel  according  to  St.  John? 
There  may  be — in  fact,  it  is  very  probable  that  there  are.  But  we  have 
no  means  whatever  of  distinguishing  the  allegorical  element  from 
the  historical  element,  and  it  is  even  possible  that  the  writer  of  the 
Gospel  did  not  distinguish  them  very  clearly  himself.^  Nor  is  that 
all.  Even  assuming  that  we  could  determine  for  a  certainty  that  a 
given  story  is  allegorical,  we  are  still  nowhere  as  regards  knowing 
exactly  what  allegory  the  writer  had  in  mind.  On  that  point  the 
Apocalypse  is  evidence  enough.  It  is  certainly  allegorical;  but  as  for 
what  the  allegory  is,  people  have  been  investigating  for  centuries  and 
nothing  certain  has  come  of  it. 

776.  M.  Loisy  has  a  strange  way  of  understanding  the  significance 
of  historical  proofs.  Says  he:  ^  "Remove  from  the  Gospels  the  idea  of 
the  great  Advent  and  the  idea  of  the  Christ-king,  and  I  defy  you  to 

stand  on  the  floor  according  to  the  manner  of  purification  among  the  Jews.  They 
hold  about  two  or  three  measures  each.  If  one  chooses  to  inquire  further  as  to  the 
meaning  which  the  spiritual  Gospel  attaches  to  that  symbol,  the  marriage  feast  at 
Cana  has  to  be  taken  in  connexion  with  the  feast  of  which  Jesus  partook  after  he 
had  gathered  his  first  five  aposdes  at  the  house  of  Levi-Matthew.  There,  answering 
a  question  of  the  Pharisees  as  to  the  difference  between  his  rule  of  life  and  that  of 
the  disciples  of  John,  he  compares  himself  to  the  bridegroom  who  feasts  with  his 
friends  and  does  not  put  his  wine  into  old  botdes  (Mark  2:  22).  Now  the  five  disci- 
ples he  has  just  assembled,  and  who  make  six  if  we  count  the  bridegroom,  are  not 
leathern  gourds  but  jars  of  stone,  foundations  of  the  Church.  [If  there  had  been 
six  disciples  the  bridegroom  would  not  have  been  counted,  and  the  jars  would  have 
stayed  at  six.  Had  there  been  four  disciples,  there  would  still  have  been  no  diffi- 
culty: we  count  the  bride  as  well  as  the  groom  and  again  get  our  six.]  .  .  .  Such, 
says  the  Evangelist,  was  the  first  of  the  miracles  of  Jesus.  ...  It  would  have  been 
strange  indeed  that  Christianity  should  have  had  a  grossly  material  miracle  of  that 
kind  as  its  starting-point."  With  arguments  of  that  sort  one  can  prove  anything 
one  pleases. 

775  ^  D'Alma  agrees.  Op.  cit.,  pp.  25,  19,  that  history  is  interwoven  with  allegory 
in  the  Gospel  according  to  St.  John:  "His  prologue  complete,  the  Evangelist  enters 
straightway  upon  the  drama  he  has  just  outlined.  There  is  a  first  encounter  between 
darkness  and  light  [John  i:  5:  And  the  light  shineth  in  darkness;  and  the  darkness 
comprehended  it  not.]  Not  that  John  is  the  light:  he  was  a  witness  [to  the  light, 
John  1:8],  a  flaming,  shining  torch.  He  baptizes.  From  Jerusalem  the  Jews  send 
him  their  official  supervisors  of  religion — priests  and  Levites.  Is  that  story  to  be 
taken  literally?  Or  is  it  altogether  allegorical?  It  may  be  both  at  once."  D'Alma  is 
right;  but  for  that  very  reason  it  is  futile  to  try  as  he  does  to  sift  the  history  from 
the  allegory,  and,  one  may  add,  from  the  ficdon  and  the  imagination. 

776  ^  Autour  d'un  petit  lime,  p.  70. 


%"]^"]  MYTH  AND  ALLEGORY  469 

prove  the  historical  existence  of  the  Saviour;  for  you  w^ill  then  have 
stripped  His  life  and  death  of  all  their  historical  significance."  So 
it  would  follow  that  it  is  the  "idea"  implied  in  a  narrative  which 
proves  its  historical  veracity! 

777.  It  is  the  ordinary  confusion  between  subjective  proofs  and 
objective  proofs  (§  1567).  One  has  to  make  up  one's  mind:  Either  a 
story  is  a  matter  of  faith,  in  which  case  objective  proofs  are  super- 
fluous, or  it  is  a  matter  of  history  with  an  experimental  substance, 
in  which  case  subjective  proofs,  "ideas,"  beliefs,  have  no  status  as 
evidence.  The  same  objection  may  be  raised  against  neo-Christians, 
such  as  Piepenbring  in  his  ]esiis  historique,  who  try  their  hardest  to 
eliminate  the  supernatural  and  the  miraculous  from  the  Gospels.  If 
the  Gospels  are  to  be  taken  as  strictly  historical  texts,  "Christian  ex- 
perience"— their  accord,  in  other  words,  with  the  sentiments  of  this 
or  that  person — has  no  status  as  proof.  The  mistake  these  people 
make  lies  in  their  believing  that  their  humanitarian  inspirations  hav 


; 


a  greater  objective  force  than  mere  faith  in  miracles.^ 

777  ^  Piepenbring  bestows  high  praise  on  Loisy.  He  tries  to  conjecture  what  the 
primitive  Gospels  may  have  been  and  does  not  notice  that  in  his  own  work,  which 
is  entirely  hypothetical,  he  finds  in  them  only  what  he  chooses  to  put  into  them. 
So  he  is  able  to  conclude,  Op.  cit.,  p.  181:  "If  now  we  cast  a  glance  in  retrospect 
upon  the  ministry  of  Jesus,  we  are  forced  to  recognize  that  in  the  sources  of  our 
Gospels  miracles  play  a  very  insignificant  role,  coming  down  to  a  few  cures  worked 
by  Jesus.  Preaching  was  by  far  the  important  element  in  His  ministry.  The  situation 
is  quite  different  in  the  recent  portions  of  the  Gospels.  An  attentive  comparison 
of  them  with  their  original  sources  proves  that  the  miracles  kept  gradually  increas- 
ing in  evangelical  history,  becoming  more  and  more  extraordinary  all  along."  What 
are  the  "sources"  in  question?  Piepenbring  himself  confesses  that  they  simmer  down 
to  the  Logia,  of  which  he  says,  p.  40:  "The  Logia  have  evidently  come  down  to 
us  in  a  disconnected  state.  A  number  of  the  texts  are  not  strictly  original  but  al- 
ready bear  the  imprint  of  apostolic  theology";  and  then  to  a  Proto-Mark,  which  no 
one  has  ever  seen  and  of  which  many  doubt  the  existence.  Yet  Piepenbring  rears 
his  whole  edifice  on  those  tottering  foundations,  p.  75:  "Since  it  is  not  to  be  as- 
sumed that  no  other  authentic  element  figures  in  our  synoptic  Gospels  aside  from 
the  Logia  and  the  Proto-Mark,  they  should  be  carefully  scanned  for  such  of  those 
elements  as  are  really  there."  People  have  tried  to  do  just  that  with  the  Ihad  and 
other  legendary  narratives,  and  to  little  or  no  purpose.  There  is  no  method  for 
solving  such  riddles. 

Among  the  prettiest  transformations  of  a  known  text  into  an  allegedly  primitive 
text  must  be  reckoned  the  feat  of  Bascoul  in  rewriting  Sappho's  ode.  He  asserts 
that  the  text  we  know  is  a  parody — and  so  far,  so  good;  but  then  with  no  other 
document  than  the  text  itself,  he  discovers  the  primitive  text  so  parodied,  and  it 


470  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §778 

778.  From  the  standpoint  of  objective  reality,  one  cannot  imagine 
what  M.  Loisy  means  when  he  says  further  along,  p.  93 :  "This  Christ 
[of  the  Gospel  according  to  St.  John]  is  undoubtedly  not  a  meta- 
physical abstraction,  for  He  is  alive  in  the  soul  of  the  evangelist." 
Every  metaphysical  abstraction  at  all  vivid  is  "alive"  in  the  mind  of 
the  metaphysicist.  Loisy  would  take  the  side  of  historical  and 
scientific  criticism  as  against  the  Roman  Church;  but  then  he  is 
himself  a  theologian  more  metaphysical,  more  abstract,  more 
abstruse,  than  the  theologians  of  the  Curia.^ 

779.  In  order  to  get  at  least  something  that  is  real  into  their  alle- 
gories etymology  has  been  called  to  the  rescue,  and  etymological 
methods  of  interpretation  keep  turning  up  all  the  way  down  to  our 
day.  One  of  them,  the  system  that  leads  to  the  solar  myth,  has  en- 
joyed wide-spread  acquiescence.  As  regards  sociology,  the  intrinsic 
value  of  the  method  is  of  less  significance  than  the  fact  of  its  wide 
acceptance,  as  indicating  an  influential  mental  state  and  the  con- 
proves  to  be  something  entirely  different  from  the  text  we  know!  One  can  only 
hope  that  Bascoul  will  now  go  on  and  give  us  the  "primitive  Iliad"  which  will  tell 
the  true  history  of  the  Trojan  War,  and  so  bring  to  a  triumphant  conclusion  the 
audacious  emprise  vainly  essayed  by  Thucydides,  Dio  Chrysostom,  and  no  end  of 
other  writers.  Bascoul,  La  chaste  Saphos  de  Lesbos,  p.  30:  The  ode  is  not  an  erotic 
poem,  but  "...  a  description  of  the  emotions  caused  by  the  rise  of  a  poet-musician 
as  a  rival  to  Sappho  and  her  school,  and  by  his  songs.  Here  history  points  to 
Stesichorus.  [What  a  blessing  to  be  able  to  guess  what  history  is  so  easily!]  As  a 
great  poet  and  a  reformer  of  lyric  poetry  he  must  necessarily  [When  one  knows 
what  necessarily  happens  one  also  knows  what  happens.]  have  made  a  profound  im- 
pression on  Sappho,  when  she  met  him  in  Sicily,  where  she  was  in  exile  with  her 
daughter.  [What  a  pity  we  are  not  told  the  exact  day  and  hour!]  It  was  to  rouse 
her  daughter  from  her  indifference  that  Sappho  sang  to  her  that  masterpiece  in 
the  natural  and  sublime  description  of  the  emotions,  which  were  provoked  first  by 
the  appearance  of  the  gods,  then  by  inspiration,  and  finally  by  enthusiasm." 

778  ^  The  dispute  today  has  become  primarily  political.  It  is  a  question  not  of 
historical  criticism,  but  of  attacking  or  defending  the  Roman  Church.  Reinach, 
Orpheus,  Chap.  VIII,  §  20  (Simmonds,  p.  223) :  "Collation  of  our  Gospels,  and  the 
distinguishing  of  the  successive  strata  of  which  they  are  made  up,  prove  that  even 
the  legend  of  Jesus  as  taught  by  the  Church  is  not  corroborated  in  all  its  particu- 
lars by  the  texts  cited  in  evidence."  That  is  true;  but  Reinach  accepts  Loisy's  in- 
terpretadons,  which  are  of  no  greater  value.  They  are  as  wanting  in  proof  as  the 
interpretations  of  Homer  by  Heraclides  [Heraclitus].  Now  we  are  by  no  means 
caught  in  the  dilemma  of  either  accepting  the  Iliad  as  historical  narrative  or  substi- 
tuting the  interpretations  of  Heraclides  for  it. 


§781  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  47 1 

tinued  prevalence  of  an  anti-scientific  attitude  towards  the  traditions 
and  institutions  of  the  past/ 

780.  Max  Miiller  and  his  followers  carried  the  method  of  allegor- 
ical etymology  to  the  extremest  limits.  Their  procedure  is  to  use  for 
purposes  of  proof  uncertain  and  very  comprehensive  meanings  of 
certain  words,  which  Miiller  generally  derives  from  the  Sanskrit. 
From  them,  by  reasonings  that  are  not  a  little  loose  and  vague, 
sharply  defined  and  positive  conclusions  are  reached. 

781.  Here  is  an  example.  Miiller  is  trying  to  interpret  the  legend 
of  Procris.^  He  breaks  it  up  into  its  "elements."  "The  first  .  .  . 
'Kephalos  loves  Prokris.'  Prokris  we  must  explain  by  a  reference  to 
Sanskrit,  where  prush  and  push  mean  to  sprinkle  and  are  used 
chiefly  with  reference  to  rain  drops.  For  instance,  in  the  Rig-Veda, 
I,  168,  V.  8:  'The  lightnings  laugh  down  upon  the  earth  when  the 
winds  shower  forth  the  rain.'  The  same  root  in  the  Teutonic  lan- 
guages has  taken  the  sense  of  'frost' ;  and  Bopp  identifies  prush  with 
the  Old  High-German  frus,  frigere.  In  Greek,  we  must  refer  to  the 
same  root  n^cic,,  npoxog,  a  dew-drop,  and  also  Prokris,  the  dew. 
Thus  the  wife  of  Kephalos  is  only  a  repetition  of  Herse,  her  mother 
— Herse,  dew,  being  derived  from  Sanskrit  t/rish,  to  sprinkle;  Prok- 
ris, dew,  from  a  Sanskrit  root  prush,  having  the  same  sense.  The 

779  ^  Foucart,  Lm  methods  comparative  dans  I'histoire  des  religions,  pp.  18  £.:  "In 
the  course  of  the  past  century  the  discovery  of  the  Vedic  Hterature  aroused  an  excite- 
ment in  the  learned  world  that  is  hard  to  imagine  today.  People  thought  they  had 
come  into  possession  of  the  songs  that  the  shepherds  of  early  humanity  sang  in 
honour  of  their  gods  as  they  led  their  flocks  to  pasture,  songs  faithfully  transmitted 
by  tradition.  Those  shepherds  were  believed  to  be  the  ancestors  of  the  Aryan  races, 
and  the  monuments  [of  their  culture]  were  to  supply  the  key  to  all  the  languages 
and  all  the  religions  of  the  Indo-European  peoples.  Knowledge  of  Greek  and  Greece 
were  to  suffer  especially  from  such  illusions.  For  half  a  century  the  etymological 
methods  that  claimed  to  be  revealing  the  true  nature  of  the  Hellenic  gods  as  solar 
myths  and  phenomena  of  weather  held  up  all  serious  progress.  The  solar  myth, 
especially,  seems  to  be  a  sort  of  inescapable  measles  that  growing  sciences  of  religion 
have  to  suffer  in  early  childhood.  Egyptology  is  still  infected  with  the  hazy  reveries 
of  that  early  school,  the  mystical  nonsense  of  which  can  be  found  still  going  the 
rounds  in  this  late  day.  As  regards  the  Hellenic  religions,  treatises  recendy  pub- 
lished are  still  steeped  in  the  time-worn  errors  propagated  by  Max  Miiller  and  his 
disciples."  Unfortunately,  Foucart's  "comparative"  method  also  has  its  faults,  as 
every  a  priori  method  must  have. 

781  ^  Chips  from  a  Gerfnan  Workshop,  Vol.  II,  pp.  86-88. 


472  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §782 

first  part  of  our  mythe,  therefore,  means  simply:  'The  Sun  kisses 
the  Morning  Dew.'  The  second  saying  is :  'Eos  loves  Kephalos.'  This 
requires  no  explanation :  it  is  the  old  story  repeated  a  hundred  times 
in  Aryan  mythology,  'the  Dawn  loves  the  Sun.'  The  third  saying  is: 
'Prokris  is  faithless';  yet  her  new  lover  in  a  different  guise  is  still 
Kephalos.  This  we  may  interpret  as  a  poetical  expression  for  sun- 
beams, the  rays  of  the  sun  being  reflected  in  various  colours  from 
the  dew-drops — so  that  Prokris  may  be  said  to  be  kissed  by  many 
lovers;  yet  they  are  all  the  same  Kephalos,  disguised,  but  at  last  rec- 
ognised. The  last  saying  was,  'Prokris  is  killed  by  Kephalos,'  i.e., 
the  dew  is  absorbed  by  the  sun.  Prokris  dies  for  her  love  to  Kephalos, 
and  he  must  kill  her  because  he  loves  her.  It  is  the  gradual  and  in- 
evitable absorption  of  the  dew  by  the  glowing  rays  of  the  sun  which 
is  expressed,  with  so  much  truth,  by  the  unerring  shaft  of  Kephalos 
thrown  unintentionally  at  Prokris  hidden  in  the  thicket  of  the  for- 
est." That  may  be  the  way  people  reason  in  dreamland,  but  what  is 
certain  is  that  one  can  prove  nothing — or  rather  prove  anything — in 
such  a  manner.  Miiller's  etymologies  of  Procris  and  of  Herse  were 
impugned.  In  defence  he  says.  Ibid.,  pp.  86-87,  note:  "Pushat,  fem- 
inine piishati,  means  'sprinkled,'  guttatus  in  Latin,  and  it  is  applied 
to  a  speckled  deer,  and  to  a  speckled  cow."  When  one  has  at  one's 
disposal  a  term  which  of  itself  means  a  "rain-drop,"  a  "dew-drop," 
"frost,"  "speckled  cow,"  and  a  few  terms  equally  definite,  it  is  never 
difficult  to  extract  from  it  anything  one  wishes.  We  must  not  forget 
meantime  that  interpretations  of  this  sort  have  been  accepted  and 
admired  by  hosts  and  hosts  of  people.^ 

782.  It  would  be  too  simple  to  see  in  the  Centaurs  products  of  the 
human  imagination,  which  created  those  monsters  just  as  it  has 
created  so  many  others.  There  must  be  some  great  mystery  about 
such  a  conception.  Etymology  offers  a  choice  among  many  inter- 
pretations. The  term  "centaur"  may  indicate  ^  "a  population  of  neat- 
herds; for  the  name  is  derived  from  x^vtuv-,  'to  goad,'  and  rarpo;, 

781  ^  I  do  not  know  Sanskrit  and  can  therefore  say  nothing  as  to  Miiller's  etymol- 
ogies. I  accept  them  with  eyes  closed.  But  the  trouble  is  that  even  when  they  are 
unconditionally  accepted,  the  reasonings  based  on  them  are  worth  little  or  nothing. 

782  ^  Maury,  Histoire  des  religions  de  la  Crece  antique,  Vol.  I,  p.  12,  note. 


§784  THE  SOLAR  MYTH:   MAX  MULLER  473 

'bull.'  It  refers  to  the  custom  of  neatherds  of  driving  their  cattle  with 
pointed  sticks."  If  that  etymology  is  not  to  your  liking,  you  might 
sample  another:  ^  "Another  etymology,  modern  this  time,  associates 
the  word  avpog,  'hare,'  with  the  word  xevtelv.  That  would  make 
centaurs  'hare-drivers.' "  If  you  are  still  not  satisfied :  "Comparative 
mythology,  assuming  an  Asiatic  origin  for  the  Centaurs,  has  com- 
pared them  with  the  Gandharvas  of  India,  gods  that  were  hairy  like 
monkeys  and,  like  the  Centaurs,  lovers  of  wine  and  women,  and 
practising  medicine,  divination,  and  music,  as  did  the  Centaurs  of 
Hellenic  mythology.  The  comparison  with  the  Gandharvas  (the 
name  means  'horse'  in  Sanskrit)  would  tend  to  make  the  Centaurs 
{i.e.,  men-horses)  personifications  of  sunbeams,  pictured  as  horses 
in  the  imagination  of  the  Aryans,  or,  as  has  also  been  said,  as  clouds, 
thought  of  as  riding  horses  about  the  sun."  If  you  are  dubious  about 
that,  suppose  we  make  them  sons  of  Ixion  and  Nephele:  "Some 
have  seen  in  Ixion  and  his  wheel  an  image  of  the  sun  sweeping 
along  in  its  everlasting  movement;  others  a  personification  of  the 
hurricane  and  the  waterspout.  The  Centaurs  are  either  sunbeams  or 
clouds  surrounding  the  sun.  They  may  also  be  taken  as  demons  of 
the  tempest,  unless  one  prefers  to  regard  them  as  symbols  of  the  tor- 
rents that  come  rushing  down  from  Pelion." 

783.  This  method  of  reasoning  by  gross  approximation  should  be 
carefully  considered,  for  it  is  typical:  a  wheel  revolves;  the  Sun  re- 
volves; therefore  Ixion's  wheel  is  the  Sun.  In  general  terms,  the 
method  is  as  follows.  We  set  out  to  prove  that  A  =  B.  We  try,  by 
appropriate  selection  of  terms,  to  make  A  and  B  arouse  more  or  less 
similar  sentiments  in  people  of  our  time.  We  then  draw  the  infer- 
ence that  A  was  exactly  equal  to  B  in  the  eyes  of  people  of  ages  long 
past.  To  attain  that  end,  it  is  important  not  to  make  the  statement 
too  succinct.  It  must  be  drawn  out  lon^  enough  to  give  the  sentiments 
in  question  time  to  come  into  play  and  gain  momentum,  burying 
the  fatuity  of  our  reasoning,  meantime,  in  our  many  words. 

784.  Maury  sees  in  the  Centaurs  "the  metamorphosis  diat  die 

782  2  Daremberg-Saglio,  Dictioniiaire,  s.v.  Centaiiri.  So  for  the  two  following 
etymologies. 


474  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §784 

Gandharvas  underwent  in  Greece.  .  .  .  The  Gandharvas,  in  fact, 
are  sunbeams,  flames  of  the  sacred  hearth-fire  in  which  gaudy  re- 
flections play,  waves  of  the  Soma,  in  which  those  flames  are  mir- 
rored and  which  the  Aryan  imagination  pictured  as  horses."  ^  Those 
blessed  Gandharvas  are  all  that;  and  if  it  is  not  enough,  fix  it  up  to 
suit  yourself.  The  Gandharvas  are  also  Centaurs.  Uhlenbeck,  for  his 
part,  Worterbuch,  s.v.  Gandharvas,  does  not  believe  that  the  Gan- 
dharvas have  anything  to  do  with  the  Centaurs.  Victor  Henry  comes 
back  at  him  and  floors  him  with  the  following  argument:^  "In 
Vedic  mythology  the  Gandharvas  pass  for  prodigiously  powerful 
and  lascivious  beings.  Those  are  the  epithets  which  precede  their 
name,  the  attributes  which  everywhere  follow  them.  .  .  .  What  do 
we  know  of  the  history  of  the  Centaurs  ?  Very  little,  after  all.  If  de- 
scriptions of  them  abound,  there  are  no  legends,  properly  so  called, 
about  them.  Nevertheless,  in  this  incredible  dearth  of  facts  a  single 
story  stands  out,  and  it  is  exactly  to  the  purport  that  the  Vedic  por- 
traitures led  us  to  expect.  Invited  to  the  marriage  of  Pirithous  and 

784  ^  Op.  cit..  Vol.  I,  p.  202.  Bergaigne,  Les  dieux  souverains  de  la  religion 
Vedique,  p.  65:  ".  .  .  it  seems  legitimate  to  infer  that  in  the  eyes  of  the  author  of 
the  hymn  [in  the  Rig- Veda]  at  least,  Gandharva  is  the  same  person  as  Savitri.  .  .  . 
One  may  also  wonder  whether  Gandharva,  like  Tvashtri,  does  not  figure  as  an 
enemy  of  Indra.  ...  In  such  a  myth  Gandharva  can  figure  hardly  otherwise  than 
as  the  guardian  of  the  Soma  or  as  the  Soma  itself;  and  in  the  latter  case  he  would 
be  duplicating  the  role  of  Kutsa.  .  .  .  According  to  IX,  113,  v.  3  [Griffith,  Vol.  IV, 
p.  104],  the  Gandharvas,  already  identified  with  sacrificing  priests  in  Hymn  III, 
38,  V.  6  [Griffith,  Vol.  II,  p.  47] ,  have  received  the  bull  (Soma)  that  has  been  reared 
in  the  clouds  and  have  extracted  from  it  the  juice  of  the  soma  (the  plant  of  the 
earthly  Soma).  In  that  guise  they  play  a  beneficent  role  by  distributing  the  Soma  to 
men.  ...  In  a  word,  the  Gandharva  is  unquestionably  an  example  of  the  con- 
fusion that  has  often  taken  place  under  a  single  name,  of  attributes  belonging  to  a 
father  and  a  son."  Oldenberg,  Religion  des  Veda,  p.  244:  "The  Gandharva  as  a 
type  goes  back,  along  with  its  Vedic  name,  as  far  as  the  Indo-Iranian  period;  but  it 
is  all  very  very  obscure.  [In  a  note:  "Manhardt  and  others  have  rejected,  and  rightly 
I  believe,  any  identification  of  the  Gandharvas  and  the  Centaurs."]  The  Rig-Veda 
mentions  the  name  in  both  the  singular  and  the  plural,  but  it  gives  only  the  vaguest 
and  most  incoherent  hints  as  to  what  the  name  stands  for.  The  features  of 
Gandharva  have  been  obliterated  or  greatly  changed,  probably  as  the  result  of  the 
blending  of  all  sorts  of  mythical  beings  under  a  single  name.  In  a  word,  there  is 
nothing  definite  or  certain  that  we  can  even  guess." 

784  ^  Nouvelles  etudes  de  mythologie,  pp.  22-26. 


11 


§786  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  475 

Hippodamia,  they  tried  to  ravish  the  bride,  but  were  overcome  by 
Theseus  and  the  Lapithae."  ^ 

785.  Interesting,  besides,  is  the  way  Henry  brings  grist  to  his  own 
mill.  If  the  adventures  of  the  Centaurs  and  the  Gandharvas  were 
somewhat  alike,  they  might  serve  to  prove  the  identity  of  those 
mythical  creatures.  But  they  are  altogether  different;  never  mind — 
while  there  is  life  there  is  hope!  .  .  .  "To  my  mind,"  says  Henry, 
p.  26,  "the  capital  consideration  is  that  their  stories  are  not  the  samel 
The  case  with  the  stories  is  the  case  with  the  names.  If  the  names 
were  identical,  the  etymologist  would  scent  some  borrowing.  If  the 
stories  were  alike,  the  mythographer  would  suspect  them  of  having 
travelled.  Far  from  that!  The  Hindus  know  things  about  the  char- 
acter of  the  Gandharvas  that  the  Greeks  forgot.  To  even  the  score, 
the  Greeks  tell  a  story  about  the  Centaurs  of  which  the  Hindus 
do  not  know  the  first  word ;  and  the  character  trait  in  question  and 
the  stories  fit  into  each  other  like  two  fragments  of  a  broken  vase, 
and  evidently  derive  from  the  same  fund  of  ideas.  Reducing  diat 
fund  to  its  simplest  expression,  one  has  only  to  formulate  the  basic 
conception,  or,  if  you  will,  the  naive  riddle  that  was  pregnant  with 
this  whole  myth:  'Who  are  those  formless  male  monsters  who  are 
forever  going  about  scattering  fertility.?'  And  the  least  informed 
person  in  the  world  will  at  once  answer:  'The  clouds.' " 

But  now — in  point  of  fact — of  all  the  characters  in  Greek  mythol- 
ogy the  Centaurs  are  the  least  reproductive.  They  are  lascivious,  but 
sterile,  or  virtually  so.  A  better  answer  to  Henry's  riddle  would  be 
Zeus.  He  is  a  male,  he  is  "formless,"  in  the  sense  that  he  is  forever 
changing  forms  the  better  to  seduce  goddesses  and  mortal  females, 
and  as  for  reproductivity,  he  has  no  equal  in  Heaven  or  on  Earth. 
Greek  mythology  speaks  of  little  else  than  his  sons  and  daughters. 

786.  Whenever  a  person  turns  up  in  history  of  whose  existence 
we  cannot  be  certain  and  who  seems  to  be  legendary,  someone  even- 

784  ^  If  that  is  the  only  story  that  survives,  it  is  because  Henry  will  have  it  so. 
Anyone  minded  to  take  the  trouble  will  find  plenty  of  Centaur  stories  of  no  less 
significance — for  example,  the  adventures  of  Hercules  in  the  land  of  the  Centaurs. 


476  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §787 

tually  makes  a  solar  myth  of  him.  That,  for  example,  was  the  fate  of 
Lucius  Junius  Brutus,  the  slayer  of  Tarquin/ 

787.  Let  us  resort  here  again  to  the  method  suggested  in  §  547.  A 
Greek  writer — for  the  present  we  will  not  say  who — speaks  of  a 
certain  Lamprocles,  AajW7tpoxX)7g.  The  name  is  made  up  of  /la^aTtpog, 
"shining,"  and  of  x'kEoq,  "glory,"  "fame."  But  who  is— par  excel- 
lence— shining,  glorious,  famous  ?  The  Sun,  of  course !  On  the  other 
hand  we  know  that  Lamprocles  was  the  son  of  a  "gold-red  mare"; 
and  is  it  not  evident  enough  that  he  must  be  the  Sun,  which  appears 
just  after  dawn  in  crocus-coloured  garb — x^oxouETikoq}  A  solar 
myth  more  certainly  than  many  one  might  mention!  But  there  is 
one  difficulty — and  it  is  a  big  one.  The  Greek  writer  whose  name 
we  have  been  holding  up  our  sleeve  is  Xenophon.  Lamprocles 
(Memorabilia,  II,  2)  was  the  son  of  Socrates  and  of  Xanthippe 
(Bavdlnnyi)  from^ai^Odg,  "gold-red"  and  (innog,  "horse");  and,  in 
fact,  neither  the  Sun  nor  the  Dawn  had  anything  to  do  with  him. 

788.  Well  known  the  fun  that  our  grandfathers  had  at  the  ex- 
f  pense  of  the  solar  myth  by  showing  that  Napoleon  Bonaparte  could 

also  be  accounted  a  myth  of  that  sort.^ 

789.  One  might  easily  see  a  solar  myth  in  our  legend  about  Virgil 
(§  668).  Virgil's  aerial  journey  and  the  fire  that  is  extinguished  and 

786  ^  Pais,  Storia  di  Roma,  Vol.  I,  p.  477:  "Some  importance  must  be  attached, 
however,  to  the  fact  that  Junius  Brutus,  for  the  very  reason  that  he  was  a  hero 
identified  with  the  cult  of  Juno,  was  likewise  identified  with  the  cult  of  Apollo, 
in  other  words,  of  the  Sun.  .  .  .  Zaleucus,  also,  the  lawgiver  of  Locris,  had 
become  famous  for  his  severity.  .  .  .  Something  of  the  same  sort  was  told  of 
the  lawgiver  Charondas,  in  fact  the  same  adventures  in  general  are  ascribed 
to  Charondas  and  Zaleucus.  .  .  .  But  the  circumstance  that  Zaleucus,  who 
was  reputed  to  have  received  his  laws  from  Minerva,  never  existed  deprives 
the  accounts  of  all  historical  value.  .  .  .  Zaleucus  was  a  divinity,  and  what 
kind  of  divinity  is  made  clear  by  his  very  name,  which  means  'he  who  is  wholly 
luminous.'  In  a  word,  Zaleucus  was  the  Sun,  and  in  his  putting  out  one  of  his  own 
eyes  and  one  of  his  son's  eyes  we  have  symbols  of  the  new  Sun  and  the  old." 
[A  litde  slip  in  the  text:  Brutus  did  not  kill  Tarquin,  but  merely  overthrew  him. — 
A.  L.] 

788  ^  A  pamphlet  published  on  the  subject  has  remained  famous.  The  first  edition, 
anonymous,  was  entided:  Comme  quoi  'Napoleon  n'a  jamais  existS — grand  erratum, 
source  d'un  nombre  infini  d'errata,  a  noter  dans  I'histoire  du  XIX^  siecle,  Paris, 
1827.  The  fifth  edition,  posthumous,  bears  the  name  of  the  author,  J.  B.  Peres,  btblio- 
thecaire  de  la  ville  d'Agen.  A  tenth  edition  appeared  in  1864  and  a  critical  edition 


I 


§792  THE  SOLAR  MYTH:   MAX  MULLER  477 

then  rekindled  suggest  the  idea  of  the  Sun,  which  runs  its  course 
in  the  heavens  and  each  day  is  extinguished  at  sunset  and  rekindled 
at  dawn.  The  identity  becomes  the  more  evident  as  we  stress  the 
manner  of  Virgil's  death:  ^  ".  .  .  he  climbed  into  a  boat,  and  the 
fourth  in  the  company,  put  out  to  sea;  and  as  they  went  thus  chat- 
ting over  the  water,  there  came  a  gust  of  wind.  ...  So  were  they 
swept  away  out  upon  the  high  sea,  and  thereafter  was  no  one  seen 
or  heard  of  more."  For  the  inhabitants  of  Naples  the  Sun  in  fact 
sets  in  the  sea.  And  as  for  the  boat,  who  can  fail  to  see  that  it  is  a 
detail  derived  from  Egyptian  mythology,  which  has  the  Sun  run  its 
course  in  a  boat  ? 

790.  Not  in  jest,  but  in  all  earnestness  has  one  writer  tried  to  show 
that  the  Gospel  story  of  the  life  of  Jesus  is  a  solar  myth  drawn  along 
the  lines  of  Hebrew  and  Babylonian  legends.^ 

791.  All  this  by  no  means  implies  that  there  have  never  been  solar 
myths.  We  say  merely  that  they  have  to  be  identified  as  such  by 
historical  proofs,  and  not  by  the  similarities  prevailing  between 
vague  details  in  a  story  arbitrarily  interpreted  and  the  general  traits 
of  solar  movements. 

792.  To  speak  in  terms  still  more  general,  there  have  certainly 

by  Gustave  Davois,  with  biographical  and  bibHographical  notes,  in  1909.  The  argu- 
ments used  in  the  httle  pamphlet  follow  the  lines  of  the  interpretations  of  mythology 
as  solar  myths,  pp.  15-17,  25.  "It  is  held  that  his  mother's  name  was  Letitia.  But 
Letitia  means  'joy,'  and  the  name  is  simply  a  designation  for  the  Dawn,  whose 
morning  light  spreads  joy  throughout  all  Nature.  ...  It  is  noteworthy  further  that, 
following  Greek  mythology,  Apollo's  mother  was  named  Leto,  or  Leto,  Greek  A^tw. 
But  if  the  Romans  saw  fit  to  change  Leto  into  Latona,  mother  of  Apollo,  our  age 
has  preferred  to  make  Letitia  of  it,  because  laetitia  is  the  substantive  form  of  the 
verb  laetor  (more  rarely  laeto),  which  means  'to  inspire  joy.'  It  is  certain  therefore 
that  both  mother  and  son  were  borrowed  from  Greek  mythology.  ...  It  is  said 
that  this  modern  Apollo  had  four  brothers.  Now  those  four  brothers  can  only  be  the 
four  seasons  of  the  year.  ...  It  is  said  that  Napoleon  put  an  end  to  a  devastating 
scourge  that  was  terrorizing  all  France  and  which  was  called  'the  Hydra  of  Revo- 
lution.' Now  a  hydra  is  a  snake — what  kind  of  a  snake  does  not  matter,  since  we 
are  talking  mythology.  That  is  an  allusion  to  the  Python,  an  enormous  reptile  that 
was  an  utter  terror  to  Greece.  That  terror  Apollo  relieved,  by  killing  the  monster." 
The  pamphlet  concludes  that  Napoleon  was  Apollo,  in  other  words,  the  Sun. 

789  1  Comparetti,  Virgilio  net  medio  evo,  Vol.  II,  pp.  299-300  (missing  in 
Benecke). 

790  ^  Jensen,  Das  Gilgamesch-Epos  in  der  Weltliteratur. 


478  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §793 

been  allegories,  and  not  only  allegories  that  are  artificial  products 
N  of  scholarly  minds  but  also  allegories  arising  spontaneously  among 
the  people.  Oftentimes,  for  that  matter,  the  development  is  the  re- 
verse of  the  one  assumed  when  the  allegory  is  taken  as  coming  from 
the  name,  whereas  it  is  the  name  that  comes  from  the  allegory.  A 
girl  child  is  called  Aurora  not  because  she  has  rosy  fingers:  the  fact 
of  dawn  has  suggested  the  allegory  of  the  rosy  fingers  (§  794). 

793.  Herbert  Spencer  is  not  of  that  way  of  thinking.  He  extends 
his  theory  of  the  imperfect  inferences  from  experimental  facts  to 
totemism  and  the  solar  myths.  The  worship  of  animals,  he  thinks, 
springs  from  the  fact  that  the  human  being  and  the  animal  become 
blended  in  the  mind  of  the  savage.  The  habit  of  using  names  of 
animals  as  surnames  for  children  or  adults  facilitates  such  identifica- 
tion of  men  and  animals :  ^  "We  cannot  wonder  if  the  savage,  lack- 
ing knowledge  and  speaking  a  rude  language,  gets  the  idea  that  an 
ancestor  named  'the  Tiger'  was  an  actual  tiger."  From  such  con- 
fusion of  the  descent  of  the  man  bearing  an  animal  name  with  the 
descent  of  that  animal,  all  the  characteristics  of  totemism  are  even- 
tually obtained  by  a  fine  set  of  logical  reasonings:  "A  second  se- 
quence is  that  animals,  thus  conceived  as  akin  to  men,  are  often 
treated  with  consideration.  .  .  .  Naturally,  as  a  further  sequence, 
there  comes  a  special  regard  for  the  animal  which  gives  the  tribal 
name,  and  is  considered  a  relative.  ...  If  the  East  Africans  [as 
Livingstone  tells  us]  think  the  souls  of  departed  chiefs  enter  into 
lions  and  render  them  sacred,  we  may  conclude  that  sacredness  will 
equally  attach  to  the  animals  whose  human  souls  were  ancestral.  If 
the  Congo  people,  holding  this  belief  about  lions,  think  'the  lion 
spares  those  whom  he  meets  when  he  is  courteously  saluted,'  the 
implication  is  that  there  will  arise  propitiations  of  the  beast-chief 
who  was  the  progenitor  of  the  tribe.  ...  So  that  misinterpretations 
of  metaphorical  titles,  which  inevitably  occur  in  early  speech,  being 
given,  the  rise  of  animal-worship  is  a  natural  sequence." 

794.  This  theory  envisages  nothing  but  logical  conduct.  It  also 
applies  to  plants  and  inanimate  things:  "Now  if  an  animal  regarded 

793  '^Principles  of  Sociology,  Vol.  I,  §§  171-73,  181,  186,  188-91. 


I 


§794  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  479 

as  original  progenitor,  is  therefore  reverentially  treated ;  so,  too,  may 
we  expect,  a  plant-ancestor  will  be.  .  .  .  One  way  in  which  a  moun- 
tain comes  to  be  worshipped  as  ancestor  is  here  made  manifest.  It  is 
the  place  whence  the  race  came,  the  source  of  the  race,  the  parent 
of  the  race :  the  distinctions  implied  by  the  different  words  here  used 
being,  in  rude  languages,  inexpressible.  Either  the  early  progenitors 
of  a  tribe  were  dwellers  in  caves  on  the  mountain;  or  the  mountain, 
marking  conspicuously  the  elevated  region  they  migrated  from,  is 
identified  as  the  object  whence  they  sprang."  Everything  is  explain- 
able in  that  fashion:  "That  belief  in  descent  from  the  Sea  as  a  pro- 
genitor sometimes  arises  through  misinterpretation  of  individual 
names,  is  likely.  ...  It  may  be  that  sometimes  Dawn  is  a  compli- 
mentary metaphorical  name  given  to  a  rosy  girl;  though  I  can  give 
no  evidence  of  this.  But  that  Dawn  is  a  birth-name,  we  have  clear 
proof."  Spencer  mentions  many  instances  to  show  that  the  name  of 
Dawn  (Aurora)  was  given  to  human  beings  by  savages;  and  be- 
sides, many  women  have  the  same  name  in  modern  countries:  "If, 
then.  Dawn  is  an  actual  name  for  a  person — if  it  has  probably  often 
been  given  to  those  born  early  in  the  morning;  the  traditions  con- 
cerning one  of  such  who  became  noted,  would,  in  the  mind  of  the 
uncritical  savage,  lead  to  identification  with  the  Dawn ;  and  the  ad- 
ventures would  be  interpreted  in  such  manner  as  the  phenomena  of 
the  Dawn  made  most  feasible."  This  manner  of  reasoning  by  accumu- 
lating hypotheses  and  plausibilities  should  be  attentively  remarked; 
and  also  the  fact  that  the  long  road  leads  to  a  goal  which  we  might 
reach  in  one  bound  by  saying  that  a  woman  named  Aurora  abducted 
a  youth  named  Orion  (§  769). 

Spencer  continues:  "Is  there  a  kindred  origin  for  the  worship  of 
Stars.?  Can  these  also  become  identified  with  ancestors?  This  seems 
difficult  to  conceive;  and  yet  there  are  facts  justifying  the  suspicion 
that  it  has  been  so.  .  .  .  Has  identification  of  the  Moon  with  per- 
sons who  once  lived,  been  caused  by  misinterpretation  of  names? 
Indirect  evidence  would  justify  us  in  suspecting  this,  even  were  there 
no  direct  evidence.  .  .  .  Even  were  there  no  direct  evidence  that 
solar  myths  have  arisen  from  misapprehensions  of  narratives  re- 


480  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §795 

specting  actual  persons  or  actual  events  in  human  history,  the  evi- 
dence furnished  by  analogy  would  warrant  the  belief.  But  the  direct 
evidence  is  abundant."  This  so-called  direct  evidence  is,  instead,  just 
a  series  of  mere  interpretations  of  Spencer's  own,  and  they  are  on  a 
par  with  other  interpretations  we  have  met  with. 

795.  All  such  simple  a  priori  explanations  take  us  outside  the  real- 
ities of  the  very  complicated  situations  underlying  mythical  narra- 
tives. Mingled  in  varying  proportions  in  such  myths  are  products  of 
mere  fancy,  reminiscences  of  actual  facts,  and  among  peoples  with 
literatures  reminiscences  of  literary  productions.  And  such  things 
are  further  embellished  by  metaphors,  allegories,  and  one  theory  or 
another,  now  childish,  now  exceedingly  ingenious.  Nor  should  we 
forget,  either,  the  spontaneous  clustering  of  legends  around  primi- 
tive nuclei  of  sentiment  (§  740),  nor  the  frequent  simultaneous  pres- 
ence of  different  processes  of  construction  or  formation. 

796.  The  proposition,  for  instance,  that  Apollo  is  a  solar  god  is  a 
mixture  of  error  and  truth — of  error  in  the  sense  that  in  a  cycle  such 
as  the  Iliad  Apollo  is  not  a  solar  god ;  of  truth,  in  that  in  other  cycles 
solar  myths  come  to  be  combined  with  the  not-yet-solar  myth  of 
Apollo  and  finally  gain  such  predominance  over  the  latter  that 
Helius  comes  to  be  confused  with  Phoebus  and  Apollo. 

797.  Let  us  pause  for  a  moment  now  and  consider  just  where  our 
induction  has  brought  us.  It  has  not  only  confirmed  the  wide-spread 
prevalence  of  non-logical  conduct,  which  we  noted  as  early  as  Chap- 
ter II,  but  has  shown  in  addition  that  such  conduct  constitutes  the 
substance  of  many  theories  which,  judged  superficially,  might  seem 
to  be  exclusive  products  of  logic. 

\l        798.  Our  detailed  examination  of  one  theory  or  another  has  in 

any  case  led  to  our  perceiving  that  theories  in  the  concrete  may  be 

divided  into  at  least  two  elements,  one  of  which  is  much  more 

/stable  than  the  other.  We  say,  accordingly,  that  in  concrete  theories, 

which  we  shall  designate  as  c^  there  are,  besides  factual  data,  two 

798  ^  To  keep  as  far  as  possible  from  reasoning  on  words  rather  than  on  things, 
we  shall  begin  in  our  usual  manner  (§  119)  by  using  letters  of  the  alphabet  to 
designate  the  things  with  which  we  are  dealing,  substituting  names  for  this  in- 
convenient method  of  notation  in  the  next  chapter. 


1/ 


II 


§80I  PARETAN  THEORY  OF  CONSTANTS  48 1 

principal  elements  (or  parts) ;  a  substantial  element  (part),  which 
we  shall  designate  as  a,  and  a  contingent  element  (part),  on  the 
whole  fairly  variable,  which  we  shall  designate  as  h  (§§  217,  514"*). 
The  element  a  directly  corresponds  to  non-logical  conduct;  it  is 
the  expression  of  certain  sentiments.  The  element  b  is  the  manifesta- 
tion of  the  need  of  logic  that  the  human  being  feels.  It  also  partially 
corresponds  to  sentiments,  to  non-logical  conduct,  but  it  clothes 
them  with  logical  or  pseudo-logical  reasonings.  The  element  a  is 
the  principle  (§306^)  existing  in  the  mind  of  the  human  being; 
the  element  b  is  the  explanation  (or  explanations)  of  that  principle, 
the  inference  (or  inferences)  that  he  draws  from  it. 

799.  There  is,  for  example,  a  principle,  or  if  you  prefer,  a  senti- 
ment, in  virtue  of  which  certain  numbers  are  deemed  worthy  of 
veneration:  it  is  the  chief  element,  a,  in  a  phenomenon  that  we  shall 
study  further  along  (§§  960  f.).  But  the  human  being  is  not  satisfied 
with  merely  associating  sentiments  of  veneration  with  numbers;  he 
also  wants  to  "explain"  how  that  comes  about,  to  "demonstrate"  that 
in  doing  what  he  does  he  is  prompted  by  force  of  logic.  So  the  ele- 
ment b  enters  in,  and  we  get  various  "explanations,"  various  "dem- 
onstrations," as  to  why  certain  numbers  are  sacred.  There  is  in  the 
human  being  a  sentiment  that  restrains  him  from  discarding  old 
beliefs  all  at  once.  That  is  the  element  ^  in  a  phenomenon  that  we 
examined  some  distance  back  (§§  172  f.).  But  he  feels  called  upon 
to  justify,  explain,  demonstrate  his  attitude,  and  an  element  b  enters 
in,  which  in  one  way  or  another  saves  the  letter  of  his  beliefs  while 
altering  them  in  substance. 

800.  The  principal  element  in  the  situation,  the  element  a,  is  evi- 
dently the  one  to  which  the  human  being  is  most  strongly  attached 
and  which  he  exerts  himself  to  justify.  That  element  therefore  is 
the  more  important  to  us  in  our  quest  for  the  social  equilibrium. 

801.  But  the  element  b,  though  secondary,  also  has  its  effect  upon 
the  equilibrium.  Sometimes  the  effect  may  be  so  insignificant  as  to 
be  accounted  equivalent  to  zero — as  when  the  perfection  of  the  num- 
ber 6  is  ascribed  to  its  being  the  sum  of  its  aliquots  (i,  2,  3).  But 
the  effect  may  also  be  very  considerable,  as  when  the  Inquisition 


482  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §802 

burned  people  guilty  of  some  slip  in  their  theological  calculations. 
"~^  802.  We  have  said  (§  798)  that  the  element  h  is  made  up,  in  vari- 
able proportions,  of  sentiments  and  logical  inferences.  It  is  well  to 
remark  at  once  that  in  social  matters  its  persuasive  force  depends  as 
a  rule  chiefly  on  sentiments,  the  logic  being  accepted  principally  be- 
cause it  chances  to  harmonize  with  such  sentiments.  In  the  logico- 
experimental  sciences,  in  proportion  as  they  are  brought  to  greater 
and  greater  perfection,  the  part  played  by  sentiment  tends  to  de- 
crease towards  zero,  and  the  persuasive  force  lies  altogether  in  the 
logic  and  in  the  facts.  When  it  reaches  that  extreme  the  element  h 
evidently  changes  its  character,  and  we  shall  designate  it  by  B.  At 
another  extreme  there  are  cases  in  which  the  logical  inference  is  not 
clearly  manifested,  as  in  what  jurists  call  "latent  principles  in  law."  ^ 
Psychologists  explain  such  phenomena  as  effects  of  the  subconscious, 
or  in  some  other  way.  We  do  not  choose  to  go  quite  so  far  back 
here ;  we  stop  at  the  fact,  leaving  the  explanation  of  it  to  others.  All 
concrete  theories  fall  between  those  extremes,  approaching  the  one 
or  the  other  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent. 

803.  Though  sentiment  has  no  place  in  the  logico-experimental 
sciences,  it  nevertheless  invades  that  field  to  some  degree.  If,  over- 
looking such  considerations  for  the  moment,  we  designate  as  C  the 
concrete  theories  of  logico-experimental  science  that  constitute  the 
second  group  in  §  523,  we  may  break  them  up  into  an  element  A 
made  up  of  experimental  principles,  descriptions,  and  experimental 
assertions,  and  an  element  B  made  up  of  logical  inferences,  along, 
further,  with  experimental  principles  and  descriptions  used  for 
drawing  inferences  from  the  element  A. 

802  ^  Von  Jhering,  Geist  des  romischen  Rechts,  Vol.  I,  pp.  29-30  (Pt.  I,  §  3) : 
"Despite  the  great  skill  of  the  classical  jurists  of  Rome,  there  were,  even  in 
their  time,  rules  of  law  that  remained  unknown  to  them  and  which  were 
first  elucidated  by  the  efforts  of  the  jurisprudence  of  our  own  day.  I  call 
them  'latent'  principles  of  law.  But,  someone  will  ask,  can  such  a  thing  be 
possible.?  To  apply  such  a  rule,  must  it  not  be  known?  For  an  answer  we  need 
simply  point  to  the  laws  of  language.  Thousands  of  persons  daily  apply  [linguistic] 
laws  that  they  never  heard  spoken  of  [Non-logical  conduct.],  laws  of  which  philolo- 
gists themselves  are  not  always  clearly  aware.  The  deficiencies  of  the  understanding 
are  made  up  for  by  sendment,  by  grammatical  instinct." 


I 


ik 


§805  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  483 

The  theories  c,  in  which  sentiment  plays  a  part,  which  add  some- 
thing to  experience,  which  He  outside  experience,  and  which  con- 
stitute the  third  group  in  §  523,  Hkewise  break  down  into  an  element 
a,  made  up  of  manifestations  of  certain  sentiments,  and  an  element 
h,  made  up  of  logical  reasonings,  fallacies,  and  sophistries,  along, 
further,  with  other  manifestations  of  sentiment  used  for  drawing  in- 
ferences from  a.  There  is,  accordingly,  a  certain  correspondence  be- 
tween a  and  A,  between  b  and  B,  and  between  c  and  C.  In  these 
volumes  we  are  dealing  strictly  with  c  theories,  ignoring  experi- 
mental scientific  theories,  C. 

804.  In  trans-experimental  and  pseudo-experimental  theories,  c, 
writers  seldom  distinguish  the  elements  a  and  b  with  the  clearness 
required.  As  a  rule  they  more  or  less  confuse  them. 

805.  Example:  One  of  the  principles  of  Roman  law  is  the  prop- 
erty-right. Once  the  principle  is  admitted,  many  consequences  are 
logically  inferable  from  it  and  they  make  up  a  very  considerable 
portion  of  the  theory  of  Roman  civil  law.  There  is  a  celebrated  in- 
stance, the  case  of  specification,  in  which  the  principle  is  not  ade- 
quate for  solving  the  problems  that  arise  in  practice.  Girard,  a  very 
competent  authority  on  Roman  jurisprudence,  writes:  ^  "The  theory 
of  specification  assumes  that  a  person  has  taken  a  thing,  and,  nota- 
bly, a  thing  belonging  to  another  person,  and  given  a  new  form  to 
it  by  his  own  labour,  so  creating  a  nova  species  {speciem  novam 
fecit) :  he  has  made  wine  out  of  grapes,  a  vessel  out  of  metal,  a  boat 
out  of  lumber,  and  so  on.^  The  question  is  to  determine  whether  the 
object  so  manufactured  is  still  the  old  object,  and  therefore  lawfully 
belonging  to  the  former  owner,  or  a  new  object  conceivably  belong- 
ing to  a  new  owner."  That  manner  of  stating  the  problem  already 
to  some  extent  confuses  the  elements  a  and  b  in  the  law  of  property. 
To  keep  them  distinct  one  would  have  to  say:  "The  problem  is  to 

805  '^Manuel  elementaire  de  droit  romain,  pp.  316-17. 

805  ^  In  a  note:  "The  case  does  not  arise  when  he  has  merely  dyed  a  piece  of 
cloth,  or,  Justinian  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding  {Institutiories,  2,  i,  25  [Corpus 
iuris  civilis,  Vol.  I,  pp.  12-13;  Scott,  Vol.  II,  p.  37]),  merely  taken  the  wheat  from 
the  kernels  that  contained  it." 


484  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §  806 

determine  the  owner  of  a  single  object  in  which  two  property-rights 
have  become  blended." 

806.  A  person  considering  nothing  but  legal  constructions,  c, 
ought  in  this  case  simply  to  confess  that  the  principles  supplied  by 
element  a  in  the  law  are  not  adequate  for  solving  the  problem,  and 
that  therefore  others  are  needed.  The  new  principle  asked  for  might 
be  that  an  old  object  always  belongs  to  the  old  proprietor  and  that 
a  neu/  object  may  have  a  new  proprietor.  In  that  case  Girard's  fram- 
ing of  the  issue  would  be  perfect,  but  we  would  be  avoiding  one  dif- 
ficulty only  to  fall  into  another ;  for  now  we  would  need  some  prin- 
ciple for  determining  how  flatly  and  squarely  the  new  object  is  to 
be  distinguished  from  the  old,  not  in  general  terms,  be  it  remem- 
bered, but  as  regards  ownership.  We  would,  in  short,  be  no  nearer 
a  solution  of  the  problem. 

807.  Law,  a,  may  furnish  the  principle  that  ownership  of  the  thing 
takes  precedence  over  ownership  of  labour.  That,  we  may  conjec- 
ture, may  have  been  the  archaic  principle,  because  on  the  one  hand 
ownership  of  material  substance  is  something  more  concrete  than 
ownership  of  labour,  and  in  general,  the  concrete  takes  precedence 
over  the  abstract;  and  on  the  other  hand  labour  enjoyed  no  very 
high  esteem  in  ancient  Roman  society. 

808.  Says  Girard:  "Very  probably  the  ancient  jurists,  without 
going  into  theoretical  niceties,  regarded  the  object  as  remaining  the 
same."  That  would  be  describing  the  evolution  of  the  form  rather 
than  of  the  substance.  The  ancient  jurists  probably  had  in  their 
minds  a  non-logical  inclination  that  prompted  them  to  give  owner- 
ship of  material  substance  precedence  over  ownership  of  labour.  In 
a  later  phase  they,  or  their  successors,  desiring  to  give  a  logical  rea- 
son for  their  ruling,  came  out  with  the  consideration  that  the  object 
remained  the  same.  But  any  other  pretence  might  have  served  just 
as  well. 

809.  The  development  of  Roman  civilization  produced  a  corre- 
sponding development  in  capacities  for  abstraction  and  in  the  esteem 
in  which  labour  was  held.  We  might  foresee,  therefore,  that  in 


§8 13  ROMAN  law:  specification  485 

course  of  time  the  law,  a,  would  supply  other  non-logical  principles 
more  favourable  to  labour. 

810.  Speaking  of  specification,  in  fact,  Gaius  says:  "In  other 
species  appeal  is  made  to  natural  reason."  ^  This  naturalis  ratio  is  an 
old  acquaintance  of  ours.  Strange,  indeed,  had  it  not  turned  up! 
Under  the  wing  of  that  authority  the  Roman  jurists  sheltered  their 
expressions  of  sentiment,  which  corresponded  to  non-logical  in- 
stincts in  the  society  in  which  they  lived.  Gaius  states  that  the  writ- 
ing done  on  a  piece  of  parchment  is  held  to  belong  to  the  owner  of 
the  parchment,  the  contrary  being  true  of  a  picture  painted  on  a 
canvas;  and  he  comments: "  "The  reason  given  for  this  inconsistency 
is  hardly  adequate."  As  usually  happens  when  people  set  out  to  ex- 
plain non-logical  conduct  logically! 

811.  Girard  continues:  "Later  on,  in  virtue  of  a  nicer  analysis,  the 
Proculians  maintained  that  it  was  a  new  object  and  should  belong  to 
its  maker,  on  the  ground  either  that  the  workman  had  acquired  it  by 
tenure,  or  perhaps  simply  that  a  thing  should  belong  to  its  maker." 
Here  again  we  get  the  evolution  of  the  form  rather  than  of  the  sub- 
stance. It  is  not  a  case  of  "nicer  analysis"  yielding  new  principles; 
analysis  has  merely  produced  new  logical  justifications  for  new  non- 
logical  sentiments  that  had  developed  in  the  minds  of  the  Romans 
and  their  jurists. 

812.  "In  the  face  of  this  doctrine,  the  Sabinians — probably  with- 
out denying  that  it  was  a  case  of  a  new  object — refused  to  admit 
that  the  maker  acquired  the  product  of  his  labour,  and  held  that 
the  new  article  belonged  to  the  owner  of  the  old."  As  usual,  the 
solution  of  the  Sabinians  was  dictated  by  sentiments  that  they  held 
and  which  they  sought  to  justify  by  logical  argument, 

813.  Gaius,  quoted  in  Digesta,  XLI,  i,  7,  §  7  {Corpus  iiiris  civilis, 
Vol.  I,  p.  737;  Scott,  Vol.  IX,  p.  157),  gives  a  sample  of  such  argu- 
ments: "In  the  case  where  a  person  makes  a  new  thing  in  his  own 
name  out  of  material  belonging  to  another,  Nerva  and  Proculus 

810  ^  [Comnientarii,  II,  79  (Poste,  p.  200;  Scott,  Vol.  I,  p.  120):  "Iti  aliis  quoque 
speciebus  naturalis  ratio  reqtiiritiir:  Poste:  "On  a  change  of  species  also  we  have 
recourse  to  natural  law  to  determine  the  proprietor." — A.  L.] 

810  ^  Commentarii,  II,  77-78  (Poste,  pp.  199-200;  Scott,  Vol.  I,  p.  120). 


486  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §814 

opine  that  the  owner  of  the  thing  is  the  person  who  has  made  it, 
because  before  that  the  thing  made  belonged  to  no  one.  More  in 
accord  with  natural  reason,  Sabinus  and  Cassius  rule  that  the  owner 
of  the  material  is  the  owner  of  the  thing  made  from  it,  because 
without  material  nothing  can  be  made."  Benevolent,  indeed.  Dame 
Naturalis  Ratio,  who  never  withholds  her  assistance  from  anyone, 
and  lends  herself  so  readily  to  the  proof  of  both  the  yea  and  the  nay. 
These  arguments  are  devoid  of  sense  and  simply  express  certain 
sentiments. 

814.  In  the  end  a  compromise  solution  was  adopted  on  grounds 
no  sounder.  When  the  thing  made  could  be  restored  to  its  original 
form  the  view  of  Sabinus  and  Cassius  was  followed.  When  that  was 
not  possible  the  view  of  Nerva  and  Proculus  prevailed. 

815.  Returning  to  the  general  case:  Ordinary  parlance  is  nearly 
always  synthetic  and  has  its  eye  on  the  concrete  situation.  Usually, 
therefore,  it  confuses  the  elements  a  and  h,  which  scientific  analysis 
has  to  distinguish  (§  817).  Practically  it  may  be  useful  to  consider 
the  elements  a  and  h  together.  If  the  principles,  a,  were  definite,  any- 
one accepting  them  would  also  be  bound  to  all  their  logical  implica- 
tions, b.  But  the  principles,  a,  being  devoid  of  all  precision,  one  may 
infer  anything  one  chooses  from  them,  and  the  implications,  b,  are 
therefore  accepted  only  in  so  far  as  they  accord  with  sentiments, 
which  are  in  that  manner  called  in  to  sift  the  logical  inferences. 

816.  The  abuse  often  heaped  on  moral  casuistry  or  legal  quibbles 
is  chiefly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  principles,  a,  have  been  designedly 
used,  in  view  of  their  lack  of  definiteness,  to  support  consequences 
that  are  repugnant  to  sentiment. 

817.  From  the  scientific  standpoint,  any  progress  in  theory  is 
strictly  bound  up  with  progress  in  distinguishing  between  the  ele- 
ments a  and  b — a  point  on  which  one  cannot  insist  too  emphatically. 
It  is  all  very  well  that  the  function  of  art  is  to  study  the  concrete 
phenomenon,  c,  synthetically  and  must  therefore  not  separate  the  ele- 
ments a  and  b;  and  to  do  that,  moreover,  is  an  effective  method  of 
persuasion,  because  nearly  all  human  beings  are  in  the  habit  of 
thinking  synthetically,  and  find  it  hard  to  grasp,  in  fact  are  quite 


I 


§820  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  487 

unable  to  grasp,  a  scientific  analysis.  But  such  analysis  is  indispensa- 
ble to  anyone  trying  to  frame  a  scientific  theory.  That  is  all  very 
difficult  to  get  into  the  heads  of  people  who  have  no  aptitude  for 
scientific  thinking,  or  who  divest  themselves  of  it  the  moment  they 
turn  to  matters  pertaining  to  sociology.  They  obstinately  insist  on 
considering  situations  synthetically  (§§  25,  31). 

818.  When,  therefore,  a  writer  is  read  with  the  idea  of  passing  a 
scientific  judgment  on  his  theories,  it  is  essential  first  of  all  to  do  a 
thing  that  he  almost  never  has  done  for  himself:  to  distinguish  the 
elements  a  and  b.  In  general,  in  every  theory  it  is  necessary  to  dis- 
tinguish carefully  the  premises — in  other  words,  principles,  postu- 
lates, sentiments — from  the  inferences  that  are  drawn  from  them.^ 

819.  Oftentimes  in  the  case  of  theories  adding  something  to  ex- 
perience (§§  803,  523),  the  premises  are  at  least  partially  implicit, 
that  is  to  say,  the  element  a  is  not  declared  or  is  not  fully  and  clearly 
declared.  If  we  would  know  what  it  is,  a  search  has  to  be  made 
for  it.^ 

820.  From  the  logico-experimental  point  of  view,  the  fact  that  a 
premise  is  left  implicit,  or  even  just  partially  so,  may  give  rise  to 
very  serious  errors.  The  mere  declaration  of  a  premise  raises  the 
question  as  to  whether  and  how  far  it  is  to  be  accepted;  whereas  if 

818  ^  Sumner  Maine  was  well  aware,  as  regards  law,  of  the  antagonism  between 
the  metaphysical  concepts  of  a  perfect  ideal  and  the  study  of  the  facts,  which  he 
identifies  with  the  "historical  method."  Says  he.  Ancient  haw,  p.  87:  "I  believe 
.  .  .  that  it  [the  philosophy  founded  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  state  of  nature]  is  still 
the  great  antagonist  of  the  Historical  Method;  and  wherever  (religious  objections 
apart)  any  mind  is  seen  to  resist  or  contemn  that  mode  of  investigation,  it  will 
generally  be  found  under  the  influence  of  a  prejudice  or  vicious  bias  traceable  to  a 
conscious  or  unconscious  reliance  on  a  non-historic,  natural,  condition  of  society  or 
the  individual."  But  Maine  forgets  all  that  when  it  comes  to  morality.  He  seems 
to  think  that  morality  is  a  model  of  perfection  more  nearly  attained  by  the  morality 
of  the  present  than  by  the  morality  of  the  past.  He  says,  for  example,  that  English 
jurists  regard  English  equity  as  founded  on  moral  rules,  and  adds,  Op.  cit.,  p.  66: 
".  .  .  but  it  is  forgotten  that  these  rules  are  the  morality  of  past  centuries  .  .  . 
and  that,  though  of  course  they  do  not  differ  largely  from  the  ethical  creed  of  our 
day,  they  are  not  necessarily  on  a  level  with  it." 

819  ^  To  that  search  we  were  led  in  an  incidental  way  in  Chapter  II  (§§  186  f.), 
and  then  again  in  Chapter  IV  and  in  this  Chapter  V  (§  740).  We  shall  deal  with  it 
expressly  in  the  chapters  next  following. 


488  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §821 

it  is  left  implicit  we  accept  it  without  being  fully  aware  of  what  we 
are  conceding;  and  we  assume  it  to  be  definite  and  exact,  whereas 
it  is  so  far  from  being  so  that  we  would  be  put  to  it  to  find  any 
meaning  in  it  whatever. 

821.  Often  a  writer  will  say  nothing  at  all  about  his  non-experi- 
mental premises,  and  often,  also,  when  he  does  declare  them,  he  will 
try  to  create  a  confusion  between  them  and  scientific  principles  re- 
sulting from  experience. 

An  interesting  example  of  such  a  confusion  is  to  be  found  in  the 
theory  stated  by  Rousseau  as  a  preface  to  his  discourse  on  the  origin 
of  inequality:^  "Let  us  therefore  begin  by  setting  all  facts  aside. 
They  have  no  bearing  on  the  question.  Such  investigations  as  we 
may  make  in  this  connexion  must  not  be  taken  as  historical  truths, 
but  simply  as  hypothetical  and  contingent  reasonings,  calculated 
rather  to  elucidate  the  nature  of  things  than  to  show  their  actual 
origin,  something  similar  to  the  reasonings  that  our  physicists  are 
making  every  day  as  to  the  formation  of  the  world."  ^  So  then,  Rous- 
seau's prospective  research  is  essentially  an  experimental  research; 
but  the  experience  is  a  special  kind  of  experience — something  like 
what  is  nowadays  called  "religious  experience" — having  nothing 
whatever  to  do  with  the  experience  of  the  physical  sciences,  in  spite 
of  the  confusion  that  Rousseau  tries  to  create  and  which  merely 
serves  to  prove  his  prodigious  ignorance.  He  continues:  "Religion 
requires  us  to  believe  that  since  God  Himself  removed  men  from 
the  state  of  nature  immediately  after  the  Creation,  they  are  unequal 
because  He  has  willed  that  they  be  so;  but  it  does  not  forbid  our 

821  ^  Discours  stir  I'origine  et  les  fondements  de  I'inegalite  parmi  les  hommes. 

821  ^  Here,  unwittingly,  Rousseau  brings  the  hammer  down  on  his  own  thumb. 
He  is  right:  his  investigations  are  in  fact  Hke  the  idle  speculations  that  sought  the 
origin  of  the  world  in  "damp,"  in  "fire,"  and  the  like.  His  theories  stand  towards 
social  science,  properly  so  called,  exactly  as  those  physical  speculations  stood  towards 
astronomy,  as  astronomy  was  even  in  Rousseau's  day.  He  says  further  in  the 
same  preface:  "Ignoring  therefore  all  those  scientific  books  that  teach  us  only  to 
know  men  as  men  have  made  themselves,  and  pondering  the  elementary  and 
simplest  operations  of  the  human  soul,  I  seem  to  perceive  two  principles  anterior 
to  reason."  And  Rousseau  is  the  Holy  Father  of  a  church  that  pretends  to  represent 
reason  and  science  as  against  a  Catholic  Church  which,  those  gendemen  say,  stands 
for  superstition! 


§822  ENGELS  ON  THE   FAMILY!   BURLAMAQUI  489 

making  conjectures,  based  solely  on  the  nature  of  man  and  the  crea- 
tures about  him  [Here  the  pseudo-experience.]  as  to  what  the 
human  race  might  have  become  had  it  been  left  to  itself.  That  is 
the  question  which  is  set  me,  that  the  subject  which  I  propose  to 
examine  in  this  essay.  Since  my  subject  concerns  mankind  in  gen- 
eral [An  abstraction  designed  to  get  rid  of  experience  after  the  pre- 
tence of  accepting  it.],  I  shall  try  to  use  a  language  suitable  to  all 
nations  [Some  of  which  were  absolutely  unknown  to  this  shrewd 
rhetorician.],  or  rather,  forgetting  times  and  places,  and  thinking 
only  of  the  human  beings  I  address,  I  shall  imagine  myself  as  speak- 
ing in  the  Lyceum  at  Athens,  with  Platos  and  Xenocrates's  for  my 
judges,  and  mankind  for  my  audience."  So  he  goes  chattering  on, 
and  discovers,  starting  from  the  "nature"  of  things,  how  things  must 
have  been,  without  being  put  to  the  trouble  of  verifying  his  fine 
theories  on  the  facts,  since  he  began  by  stating  that  he  was  ignoring 
r  them.  There  are  still  hosts  and  hosts  of  people  who  admire  such 
\  ,  prattle.  That  is  why  it  has  to  be  taken  into  account  when  one  sets 
\  out  to  study  human  society. 

822.  Many  other  writers  who  none  the  less  pretend  to  be  using 
strictly  scientific,  even  "materialistic"  methods,  follow  more  or  less 
covertly  the  path  blatantly  trodden  by  Rousseau.  Engels,  for  exam- 
ple, confesses  that  direct  evidence  as  to  a  certain  inferior  stage  trav- 
ersed by  humanity  is  not  available;  but  he  demonstrates  the  exist- 
ence of  such  a  stage  a  priori  from  the  fact  that  man  has  evolved  from 
the  animal.  It  is  fun  to  write  history  in  that  fashion,  describing  times 
altogether  unknown  on  the  basis  of  hypotheses  altogether  uncer- 
tain. People  who  admire  that  manner  of  thinking  pride  themselves 
on  being  more  "scientific"  than  those  who  used  to  admire  the  holy 
Fathers  of  the  Catholic  Church  when  they  disproved  the  possibility 
of  antipodes  (§  16).^ 

822  ^  Engels,  Der  Ursprung  der  Familie,  pp.  2-4:  "First  Inferior  Stage:  It  is  the 
childhood  of  humanity.  Human  beings  were  still  living  in  their  primitive  homes  in 
the  tropical  or  subtropical  forests,  and  partly  at  least  in  trees — which  explains  their 
managing  to  survive  in  the  face  of  the  great  beasts  of  prey.  Fruits,  nuts,  and  roots 
were  their  food.  The  working  out  of  an  articulate  language  is  the  main  achievement 
during  this  period.  .  .  .  We  are  likewise  unable — though  it  may  have  lasted  thou- 


490  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL   SOCIOLOGY  §823         ] 

823.  Amusing  the  case  of  Burlamaqui  (§  439).  His  theory  of  "nat- 
ural law"  is  entirely  metaphysical,  and  yet  he  writes:^  "If  strict  at- 
tention be  paid  to  our  manner  of  establishing  our  principles  of  nat- 
ural laws,  it  will  be  recognized  that  the  method  we  have  followed 
supplies  fresh  proof  of  the  certainty  and  actual  existence  {realite) 
of  those  laws.  We  have  laid  all  abstract  and  metaphysical  specula- 
tion aside  to  keep  solely  to  the  fact — to  the  nature  and  condition  of 
things."  But  then,  right  away,  and  with  the  greatest  ingenuousness, 
he  contradicts  himself:  "We  have  derived  our  principles  from  the 
essential  constitution  of  man  and  the  relations  in  which  he  stands 
to  other  creatures."  Essential  constitutions,  like  all  other  considera- 
tions on  "essences,"  lie  outside  the  domain  of  experience.  Burlamaqui 
so  little  comprehends  what  he  is  saying  that  he  adds:  "One  cannot 
refuse  to  recognize  natural  laws  or  doubt  their  reality  without  re- 
pudiating the  purest  light  of  reason — a  procedure  that  would  even- 
tually lead  to  mere  scepticism  {?yrrhonisme)r  In  the  experimental 
field  what  decides  is  the  accord  between  theory  and  fact,  not  "the 
pure  light  of  reason." 

824.  Given  the  element  a,  the  element  b,  or  better,  B,  may  be 
built  up  deductively;  and  to  study  it  therefore  is  very  much  easier 
than  to  study  the  element  a.  It  has,  in  fact,  produced  the  only  social 
sciences  that  are  today  at  all  exact  and  well  developed:  the  sciences 
of  juridical  constructions  and  pure  economics  (§2011).^  Studies  of 

sands  of  years — to  prove  its  existence  by  direct  evidence;  but  once  one  grants  that 
the  human  being  came  from  the  animal  kingdom,  such  a  period  of  transition  has 
to  be  assumed.  .  .  .  Second  Intermediate  Stage:  It  begins  with  the  use  of  fish 
(among  which  also  are  to  be  counted  Crustacea,  shell-fish  and  other  aquatic  animals) 
as  food,  and  with  the  use  of  fire.  The  two  go  together,  fire  alone  making  fish 
perfectly  edible."  What  a  lot  of  interesting  things  this  man  knows!  Scientists  are 
still  arguing  as  to  whether  the  human  race  has  one  or  more  origins  and  where, 
geographically,  they  are  to  be  located.  Engels  knows  that  man  came  from  the 
animal  kingdom  and  that  the  development  took  place  in  the  tropics  or  subtropics. 
He  also  knows  that  men  began  by  eating  fish;  and  that  is  not  all,  for  "hunter- 
peoples,  as  pictured  in  the  books,  peoples  living  exclusively  by  hunting,  tliat  is,  have 
never  existed,  the  fruits  of  the  chase  being  far  too  uncertain," 

823  ^  Principes  du  droit  naturel,  Pt.  II,  Chap.  5,  sec.  3. 

824  1  In  this  and  the  following  paragraphs  (as  contrasted  with  its  use  in  §  806) 
the  term  "juridical  construction"  is  used  not  in  the  special  sense  it  has  in  legal 
science  (interpretation,  "construing")   but  in  the  ordinary  sense.  Our  term  there- 


§827  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  49 1 

the  element  b  will  be  the  more  perfect,  the  nearer  they  come  to 
being  made  up  of  logic  only;  and  the  less  perfect  in  proportion  as 
they  assume,  or  allow  to  creep  in,  any  great  number  of  non-experi- 
mental principles  that  ought  properly  to  remain  in  the  element  a. 
Moreover,  since  the  element  a,  or  even  A  {^  803^,  is  the  part  that 
gives  rise,  or  may  give  rise,  to  doubts  and  uncertainties,  the  slighter 
it  is,  the  sounder  may  be  the  science  derived  from  it. 

825.  Pure  economics  has  the  advantage  in  fact  of  being  able  to 
draw  its  inferences  from  very  few  experimental  principles;  and  it 
makes  such  a  strict  use  of  logic  ^  as  to  be  able  to  state  its  reasonings 
in  mathematical  form — reasonings  having  the  further  very  great 
advantage  of  dealing  with  quantities.  The  science  of  juridical  con- 
structions also  has  the  merit  of  requiring  few  principles ;  but  it  does 
not  have  the  advantage  of  dealing  with  quantities.  Quantity  still 
remains  the  great  stumbling-block  in  sociology;  but  we  can  at  least 
be  rid  of  the  nuisance  caused  by  intrusions  of  element  a  into  ele- 
ment b. 

826.  Speaking  in  general  terms,  certain  principles,  a,  may  be  ar- 
bitrarily assumed,  and — provided  they  be  definite — a  body  of  doc- 
trine, c,  may  be  derived  from  them.  But  if  the  principles,  a,  are  for- 
eign to  reality,  it  is  evident  that  the  part  c  will  also  have  no  bearing 
on  the  concrete.  When,  therefore,  one  would  constitute  a  science,  it 
is  important  to  select  one's  principles,  a,  judiciously  with  a  view  to 
keeping  as  close  to  reality  as  possible,  well  aware  as  one  may  be  that 
no  theory,  c,  can  ever  represent  reality  in  every  particular  (§  106). 

827.  Other  sociological  theories  have  been  used  in  efforts  to  con- 
stitute a  rigidly  scientific  body  of  doctrine,  but  unfortunately  with 
no  success;  and  that  because  the  principles  on  which  the  theoret- 
ical structure  was  based  were  too  far  removed  from  experience 

(§§20I5f.).  i 

fore  designates  the  framing,  composition,  creation,  of  a  juridical  theory.  In  this 
sense,  celestial  mechanics  would  be  a  mechanical  construction  based  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  universal  gravitation. 

825  ^  That  merely  by  definition,  to  a  certain  extent  arbitrary  (§119).  See 
Mantiale,  Chap.  Ill,  §  i:  "We  are  to  deal  with  the  logical  actions  repeated  many 
times  over  and  in  great  numbers  that  human  beings  perform  in  order  to  acquire 
things  sadsfying  to  their  tastes." 


49^  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §828 

828.  One  such  would  be  "social  Darwinism."  If  it  be  granted  that 
— apart  from  temporary  oscillations — the  institutions  of  a  society  are 
always  those  best  suited  to  the  circumstances  in  which  that  society 
is  situated,  and  that  societies  not  possessing  institutions  of  the  kind 
eventually  perish,  we  get  a  principle  susceptible  of  important  logical 
developments  that  may  well  serve  to  constitute  a  science.  That  ex- 
periment was  made,  and  for  some  little  time  there  was  reason  to 
hope  that  a  scientific  theory,  c,  of  sociology  was  at  last  within  reach, 
since  some  of  the  inferences,  b,  were  verified  by  the  facts.  But  the 
doctrine  declined  with  the  Darwinian  biological  theory  in  which  it 
originated.  It  was  perceived  that  the  explanations  of  facts  that  it 
yielded  were  too  often  merely  verbal.  Every  form  of  social  organiza- 
tion or  life  has  to  be  explained  by  its  utility,  and  to  attain  that  end, 
arbitrary  and  imaginary  utilities  were  brought  into  play.  Unwit- 
tingly, the  theory  was  just  a  return  to  the  old  theory  of  final  causes. 
Social  Darwinism  still  remains  a  well-ordered  body  of  doctrine,  c, 
but  it  has  to  be  considerably  modified  before  it  can  be  reconciled 
with  the  facts.  It  determines  not  the  forms  of  institutions  but  merely 
certain  limits  that  they  cannot  overpass  (§  1770). 

829.  "Economic  determinism"  is  another.  If  that  theory  be  taken 
in  the  sense  that  the  economic  state  of  a  society  entirely  determines 
all  social  phenomena  arising  within  it,  we  get  a  principle,  a,  from 
which  a  wealth  of  inferences  may  be  so  drawn  as  to  constitute  a 
science.  The  economic  interpretation  of  history  was  a  notable  for- 
ward step  for  social  science,  bringing  out  as  it  did  the  contingent 
character  of  certain  phenomena,  such  as  morals  and  religion,  which 
many  people  regarded  and  still  regard  as  proclaiming  absolute  veri- 
ties. Undoubtedly,  moreover,  it  contains  an  element  of  truth  in  that 
it  takes  account  of  the  interdependence  of  economic  and  other  social 
factors.  Its  error  lies  in  representing  that  interdependence  as  a  rela- 
tion of  cause  and  effect. 

830.  An  incidental  circumstance  contributed  to  making  the  error 
much  graver.  Economic  determinists  saw  fit  to  couple  their  theory 
with  another,  the  theory  of  the  "class  struggle,"  from  which  it  might 
just  as  well  have  been  left  entirely  independent;  and  the  classes,  into 


§832  spencer's  theory  of  limits  493 

the  bargain,  were  reduced  by  a  dichotomy  somewhat  cavaUer  to 
two.  So  the  field  of  science  was  progressively  deserted  in  favour  of 
excursions  into  the  domain  of  romance.  For  the  historical  material- 
ists sociology  becomes  a  very  easy  science.  It  is  idle  to  waste  time  and 
energy  discovering  the  relationships  between  facts — their  uniformi- 
ties. Any  fact  recorded  by  history,  any  institution  described,  any  po- 
litical, moral,  or  religious  order  exemplified,  finds  its  cause  in  the 
"exploitation  of  the  proletariat"  by  the  "bourgeoisie,"  and  its  remedy 
in  the  resistance  of  the  "proletariat"  to  said  exploitation.  If  the  facts 
corresponded  to  such  inferences,  we  should  have  a  science  as  perfect 
as  human  science  ever  was,  and  more  so.  Unfortunately  the  theory 
goes  in  one  direction  and  the  facts  in  quite  another  (§  1884^). 

831.  Still  another  doctrine  is  the  "theory  of  limits,"  which  may 
well  be  called  Spencerian  or  of  the  Spencerian  school,  if  the  writings 
of  the  master  and  his  disciples  could  be  purged  of  their  numerous 
metaphysical  accessories.  It  assumes,  as  its  principle,  a,  that  all  social 
institutions  tend  towards  a  limit,  are  like  a  curve  that  has  an  asymp- 
tote (§§  2279  f.).  The  curve  known,  the  asymptote  can  be  determined; 
known  the  historical  evolution  of  an  institution,  its  limit  can  be  de- 
termined, in  fact,  more  easily  determined  than  the  asymptote  in  the 
simpler  case  of  the  curve,  for  in  mathematics  knowledge  of  a  few 
points  on  the  curve  is  not  enough  to  compute  the  asymptote — we 
must  have  its  equation,  know,  that  is,  its  intrinsic  character — 
whereas,  given  a  few  points  on  the  graph  representing  an  institu- 
tion, it  is  possible,  or  rather,  it  is  believed  to  be  possible,  to  deter- 
mine the  limit  ipso  facto. 

832.  This  principle,  a,  lends  itself  to  scientific  inference,  b,  and  so 
yields  an  extensive  body  of  doctrine,  which  may  be  examined  in 
Spencer's  own  Principles  of  Sociology  and  other  works  of  that 
school.  The  doctrine — provided  always  we  eliminate  metaphysical 
intrusions — brings  us  close  to  the  experimental  method,  since  it  is 
from  the  facts,  after  all,  that  the  conclusions  are  derived.  But,  alas, 
facts  are  not  all  that  count:  the  principle  mentioned,  that  institu- 
tions have  a  limit,  is  always  interfering,  and  that  other  principle, 
that  the  limit  may  be  determined  if  a  few  successive  stages  of  the 


494  TREATISE  ON  GENERAL  SOCIOLOGY  §833 

institution  are  known.  Furthermore,  by  a  coincidence  that  would 
be  strange  indeed  if  it  were  truly  fortuitous,  the  limit  which  a  writer 
assumes  to  be  determined  strictly  by  his  facts  turns  out  to  be  iden- 
tical with  the  limit  towards  which  he  is  sentimentally  inclined.  If 
he  is  a  pacifist,  as  Spencer  was,  most  obliging  facts  show  him  that 
the  limit  towards  which  human  societies  are  tending  is  universal 
peace;  if  he  is  a  democrat,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  limit  will  be 
a  complete  triumph  of  democracy;  if  he  is  a  coUectivist,  the  triumph 
of  collectivism;  and  so  on.  Hence  a  suspicion  arises,  and  grows 
stronger  as  we  proceed,  that  the  facts  are  serving  merely  to  conceal 
more  potent  motives  of  persuasion. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  the  reasons  advanced  by  these  positivists  to 
justify  their  inferences  do  not  correspond  to  the  facts,  and  that  viti- 
ates the  whole  structure.  Then,  finally,  there  is  the  serious  difficulty 
(in  time  it  might  be  corrected,  of  course)  that  we  are  at  present  far 
from  possessing  the  historical  knowledge  which,  strictly,  would  be 
indispensable  for  proper  use  of  the  method. 

833.  Different  altogether  in  nature  from  the  theory  of  limits  are 
those  theories  which  assume  an  indefinite,  nebulous  principle,  a,  ut- 
terly lacking  in  exactness  and  proceed  to  derive  from  it,  with  a  logic 
apparently  sound,  conclusions  that  are  after  all  mere  expressions  of 
sentiments,  and  gain  no  demonstrative  force  whatever  from  the  rea- 
soning that  binds  them  to  a.  In  fact  it  very  frequently  happens  that 
from  such  a  principle,  a,  one  thinker  will  draw  one  set  of  conclusions 
and  another  a  quite  opposite  set.  There  is  generally  little  fault  to 
be  found  with  the  reasoning  in  itself;  but  the  principle  does  not 
lend  itself  to  strict  reasoning — like  rubber,  it  may  be  stretched  to 
any  length  desired. 

834.  The  theories,  c,  cannot  attain  an  even  moderately  scientific 
form  unless  the  principles,  a,  are  to  some  extent  exact.  From  that 
point  of  view,  an  arbitrary  definition  is  better  than  no  definition  at 
all.  When  we  are  dealing  with  matters  of  law,  lack  of  definiteness 
may  be  corrected  by  fictions;  and  that  method  has  its  uses  also  in 
other  sciences,  when  the  purpose  is  to  get  simplified  statements  of 
theses.  It  is  used  even  in  mathematics.  The  theorem,  for  instance, 


§835  PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC  THEORIES  495 

that  every  algebraic  equation  has  a  number  of  roots  equal  to  its 
power  is  useful  and  convenient  in  that  form;  but  it  is  true  only  in 
virtue  of  the  fiction  that  among  such  roots  are  to  be  counted  not 
only  real  roots  but  imaginary  ones/ 

835.  Well  known  the  fact  that  in  Rome  the  praetorian  law  modi- 
fied the  civil  law  not  by  alterations  in  the  principles,  a,  which  for  a 
time  retained  all  their  formal  strictness,  but  by  interpretations  and 
qualifications.  The  praetor  serves  notice  that  since  according  to  civil 
law  an  obligation  obtained  by  fraud  is  valid,  he  will  make  an-  excep- 
tion for  the  non-enforcement  of  the  obligation:  that  is,  to  say,  he 
inserts  in  the  formula  a  clause  (the  exceptio  doli  mali)  enjoining 
the  magistrate  to  award  judgment  only  si  in  ea  re  nihil  dolo  malo 
Auli  Ageri  (i.e.,  John  Doe)  factum  sit  neque  fiat  (In  case  no  fraud 
in  the  matter  has  been  or  is  being  committed  by  John  Doe)/  What- 
ever the  theory  accepted  with  reference  to  the  bofiorum  possessio, 
it  is  incontestable  that  at  a  given  epoch  it  served  to  introduce  a  prae- 
torian inheritance  more  liberal  than  the  inheritance  of  the  civil  law. 
The  two  modes  of  inheriting  existed  side  by  side.  If  the  idea,  for 
instance,  was  to  emphasize  blood-relationship,  the  civil  law  might 
have  been  amended,  as  was  in  fact  done  by  the  Emperors  later  on. 
The  preference,  instead,  was  to  admit  to  the  inheritance  unde  liben 

834  ^  I  am  using  the  term  "fiction"  here  in  a  broad  sense,  as  does  Maine  in  his 
Ancient  Law,  pp.  24-25:  "I  employ  the  word  'fiction'  in  a  sense  considerably  wider 
than  that  in  which  English  lawyers  are  accustomed  to  use  it,  and  with  a  meaning 
much  more  extensive  than  that  which  belonged  to  the  Roman  fictiones.  Fictio,  in 
the  old  Roman  law,  is  properly  a  term  of  pleading,  and  signifies  a  false  averment 
on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  which  the  defendant  was  not  allowed  to  traverse;  such, 
for  example,  as  an  averment  that  the  plaintiff  was  a  Roman  citizen,  when  in  truth 
he  was  a  foreigner.  The  object  of  these  fictiones  was,  of  course,  to  give  jurisdiction, 
and  they  therefore  strongly  resembled  the  allegations  in  the  writs  of  the  English 
Queen's  Bench  and  Exchequer,  by  which  those  Courts  contrived  to  usurp  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Common  Pleas — the  allegation  that  the  defendant  was  in  cus- 
tody of  the  king's  marshal,  or  that  the  plaintiff  was  the  king's  debtor,  and  could 
not  pay  his  debt  by  reason  of  the  defendant's  default.  But  now  I  employ  the  ex- 
pression 'Legal  Fiction*  to  signify  any  assumption  which  conceals,  or  affects  to 
conceal,  the  fact  that  a  rule  of  law  has  undergone  alteration,  its  letter  remaining 
unchanged,  its  operation  being  modified."  The  meaning  may  be  even  more  gen- 
eral, designating  an  assertion  evidently  false  that  is  granted  in  order  to  leave  a 
rule,  a  theory,  a  thesis,  unchanged  while  changing  its  implications. 

835  ^  Girard,  Manuel  elementaire  de  droit  romain,  p.  40. 


49^  THE  MIND  AND  SOCIETY  §836 

individuals  whom  the  civil  law  would  have  called  sui  (relatives), 
in  case  they  had  no  minima  capitis  diminutio  (forfeiture  of  civil 
rights). 

836.  This  procedure,  we  have  seen  (§§226f.),  was  closely  corre- 
lated with  the  Roman  psychic  state.  But  in  addition,  and  quite  un- 
consciously, we  may  guess,  the  Romans  were  realizing  a  most  im- 
portant purpose  of  giving  stability  to  the  principles,  a,  of  law  and, 
consequently,  of  finding  ways  to  consolidate  a  body  of  legal  doctrine, 
c.  That  was  perhaps  one  of  the  chief  reasons  why  Roman  law  be- 
came so  superior  to  the  Athenian  (§241). 

837.  Legal  construction  of  the  Roman  type  appears  in  a  large 
number  of  other  instances.  It  was  once  believed  that  certain  coun- 
tries, such  as  England,  which  had  only  a  customary  law  (in  Eng- 
land the  common  law)  had  only  one  body  of  law,  a.  But  that  was 
an  error  which  Maine  did  well  to  correct.^  He  pointed  out  the  anal- 
ogies between  English  "case  law,"  supposedly  derived  from  prece- 
dents, and  the  responsa  prudentium  of  the  Romans.  The  part  b  fig- 
ures in  the  common  law,  but  it  is  greatly  inferior  as  regards  theory 
to  the  parts  b  in  other  laws  that  have  definitely  accepted  and  framed 
their  juridical  systems. 

838.  Concrete  juridical  entities  are  made  up  of  parts  a  and  b.  De- 
scriptive law,  c,  catalogues  those  entities  just  as  mineralogy  cata- 
logues rocks  and  minerals,  leaving  the  question  of  their  composi- 
tion to  chemistry. 

839.  Roguin  has  contributed  treatises  on  b  and  c,  with  very  scant 
reference  to  a,  so  that  his  work  belongs  in  part  at  least  to  the  gen- 
eral science  of  society.  In  his  ha  regie  de  droit  he  is  dealing  with  b, 
and  he  says  (Preface,  p.  v):  "This  is  an  absolutely  neutral  study, 
that  is  to  say,  a  study  free  from  any  appraisals.  It  shows  not  a  trace 
of  criticism  from  the  standpoint  of  justice  or  morals.  Nor  is  it,  either, 
a  study  of  natural  law  or  philosophy  in  the  ordinary  senses  of  those 
terms.  It  has,  furthermore,  no  bearing  on  the  history  of  law:  it  does 
not  try  to  link  juridical  institutions  with  causes,  to  show  their  effects. 
We  are  not  even  dealing  with  comparative  law.  Our  purpose  has 

837  ^  In  his  Ancient  Law,  p.  32.  Sec  also  Lambert,  La  jonction  du  droit  civil 
compare.  Vol.  I,  pp.  180  f. 


§841  THOMAS  AQUINAS  497 

been  to  analyze  the  rules  of  law  that  have  existed  historically  or 
which  are  merely  imaginable,  possible;  to  show  the  nature  of  the 
juridical  relation  as  distinguished  from  relations  of  other  kinds,  and 
to  determine  the  elements  within  it  that  are  constant. 

840.  Later  on  Roguin  deals  with  c  in  his  Traite  de  droit  civil 
compare,  adding  a  few  b  developments:  "It  is  important  to  distin- 
guish sharply  between  statements  of  fact  and  appreciations  [A  thing 
very  rarely  done  in  sociology!],  between  history,  which  records  ob- 
jective facts,  and  criticism,  which  passes  judgment  upon  them."  ^ 
Very  few  people  are  willing  to  do  that,  even  in  history ! 

841.  The  example  of  civil  law  is  the  easier  to  consider  because  it 
makes  less  of  an  appeal  to  sentiments.  On  the  other  hand,  sentiments 
acquire  great  importance  in  criminal  law,  and  that  is  one  among 
many  reasons  why  theories  of  criminal  law  have  always  been  less 
perfect  than  theories  of  civil  law.  In  morals  and  religion  sentiments 
reign  supreme,  and  therefore  in  those  fields  it  is  difficult  to  get  the- 
ories that,  let  alone  scientific,  are  even  to  any  extent  exact;  what  we 
get  is  an  amorphous  mass  of  metaphysical  preconceptions  and  ex- 
pressions of  sentiments. 

The  Italian  school  of  positive  law  might  become  scientific  if  it 
would  only  shed  its  useless  appendages  of  democratic  faith  and  be 
cured  of  its  mania  for  immediate  practical  applications,  which  is  the 
bane  of  all  kinds  of  theory.  At  any  rate  it  would  seem  that,  follow-  i 
ing  the  trail  it  has  been  blazing,  one  might  some  day  arrive  at  a 
scientific  theory  of  criminal  law. 

Theology  has  a  part  b  that,  as  in  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  is  sound 
and  well  developed;  but  its  element  a  entirely  transcends  experience 
and  therefore  fails  to  interest  us.  Ediics,  too,  works  from  non-ex- 
perimental principles  and  has  in  addition  an  element  b  that  is  truly 
chaotic  and  loses  logical  value  almost  entirely  the  moment  ethics  is 
separated  from  theology.  Pseudo-sciences  of  that  type  take  us  alto- 
gether outside  the  logico-experimental  field. 

840  ^  Vol.  I,  p.  9.  Roguin  continues,  pp.  lo-ii,  Le  manage:  "Now  how  ought 
we  to  evaluate  those  tendencies  in  legislation?  We  have  not  always  been  concerned 
to  express  any  opinion.  The  present  volume  contains  but  very  few  critical  judg- 
ments scattered  here  and  there." 


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